Business Case and Intervention Summary
Intervention Summary
Title: Leaping and learning: Strategies for taking agricultural successes to scale
What support will the UK provide?
DFID will provide £206,000 to identify agricultural interventions that have helped African smallholders
strengthen their food and nutrition security (stable availability and access to nutritious food), are
scalable and provide value for money. The programme will disseminate the findings; it will ensure the
strategic engagement of policy and decision makers and will provide the evidence for a rapid scale-up.
Core costs and specified elements of the overall programme amounting to £65,640 are funded by a
grant of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) which also provides additional core funding to
the project implementer. DFID is requested to fund < 75 % of the programme cost.
The funds will cover a period of 18 months, ideally from January/February 2012 to June/July 2013, with
the programme starting the day after which the last party has signed an accountable grant document.
Why is UK support required?
What need will be addressed?
Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in agriculture as an important sector to strengthen
food and nutrition security and to reduce poverty. Smallholders play a central role in these efforts.
Globally 1.5-2.5 billion people1 live in households depending on small farms. Smallholders account for
802-903% of agricultural production in Sub Saharan Africa. A number of publications have addressed
the ‘big picture’ questions of agricultural development, in particular in Africa, where challenges and
opportunities appear to be greatest. Donors, governments and increasingly the private sector have
started to commit additional funding to agriculture. But they do not have a simple, but rigorous
assessment of what works under specific conditions and can be readily increased in scale, or strategic
tools to guide decision making on how to mobilise the potential of smallholders to improve their food
and nutrition security.
What will the programme do to tackle the problem?
The programme will analyse what has been proven to work and can be expanded (scaled up) to
maximise impact. It will subject its analysis to a rigorous vetting process and will tailor the
communication of its findings to suit the identified needs of policy and decision makers in Europe and
Africa. The resulting toolbox to scale up programmes that work will describe what these programmes
do, how they do it; identify relevant factors of a supportive environment, and highlight which conditions
are essential to make the work successful. It also explains why the selected programmes are
considered to be scalable. The result will be launched publicly in the form of a report. The findings will
be disseminated via traditional and innovative media channels. An innovative media design tool will
aim to highlight essential messages and reach new audiences. Personal engagement by leading
thinkers and further direct communication will ensure that important decision makers among public and
private sector development partners are enabled and motivated to take action to scale up successes
rapidly.
Who will be implementing?
The appraisal concludes that best impact and value for money can be achieved by channelling DFID
financial support through Agriculture for Impact, the policy research and strategic engagement
programme housed by the Centre for Environmental Policy at Imperial College London.
What are the expected results?
What will change as a result of the support?
Impact
An increased number of agricultural programmes aiming at food and nutrition security and poverty
reduction target significantly larger numbers of smallholders with well evidenced interventions.
The programme will make a significant contribution to achieving this impact.
Outcome
Public and private development partners have a greater understanding of the factors that are
necessary and of the recommended actions in support of smallholder agricultural development projects
at scale in Sub Saharan Africa to boost food and nutrition security and support poverty reduction. They
have been strategically engaged to increase their efforts based on improved information on what
works, and an increased number take such action with demonstrable results.
How will we know whether the expected results have been achieved?
Programme progress will be closely monitored along a tight timeline by DFID and a strategic
programme partner, with regular physical outputs confirming the rate of progress. The programme will
also carry out an impact assessment during the last phase of the implementation period.
The results of DFID support will be:
Output 1: A research report with a ‘toolbox’ of what works and can be scaled up in smallholder
programmes to improve food and nutrition security, which has been peer reviewed, and published
Output 2: Development partners have been strategically engaged to increase their efforts based on
what works, and an increased number take such action with demonstrable results.
About 75% of the overall outcome is attributable to UK funding and about 25% to the co-donor BMGF.
How will we determine whether the expected results have been achieved?
Impact, outcome and output indicators will be monitored throughout the lifetime of the programme. A
DFID advisor will monitor the programme and track milestones, outputs and outcomes and assure
quality. A final impact assessment will confirm whether or not the results stated in the logframe have
been achieved.
Abbreviations
AATF
ACPC
AFI
AFSI
AgMIP
AGPM
AGRA
ATAI
BIS
BMGF
CAADP
CCAFS
CGIAR
CFS
CSC
DG
DEFRA
DPC
EC
EU
FAO
FANPRAN
FARA
FCO
FNS
FtF
GAFSP
GEF
GHI
GDP
GRD
GTZ
HLPE
IAASTD
IFAD
IMF
J-PAL
Kcal
LIC
MDG
MIF
NEPAD
ODI
PRP
ReKaSS
SOLAW
SSA
UN
UNDESA
UNDP
UNEP
UNESCO
USAID
WASH
WEF
WFP
WHO
African Agriculture Technology Foundation
African Climate Policy Centre
Agriculture for Impact
L’Aquila Food Security Initiative
Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project
Agriculture Pull Mechanism Initiative
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
Agricultural Technology Adoption Initiative
UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CGIAR research programme)
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
Committee for Food Security
Critical Success Criteria
Directorate General
UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Development Policy Committee
European Commission
European Union
Food and Agriculture Organisation
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network
Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Food and nutrition security
Feed the Future
Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme
Global Environment Facility
Global Hunger Index
Gross Domestic Product
Growth and Resilience Department (of DFID’s Policy Division)
German Development Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit)
High Level Panel of Experts on food security and nutrition
Internat. Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for
Development
International Fund for Agriculture
International Monetary Fund
Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab
Kilocalorie(s)
Low Income Country
Millennium Development Goal
Mo Ibrahim Foundation
New Partnership for Africa’s Development
Overseas Development Institute
Protracted Relief and Recovery Programme
Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture
Sub Saharan Africa
United Nations
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Environment Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
United States Agency for International Development
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
World Economic Forum
World Food Programme
World Health Organisation
Business Case
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
The strategic case sets out the rationale for supporting better evidence and resulting programmes at
scale to improve food and nutrition security through appropriate smallholder support in Sub Saharan
Africa. It describes the gaps and states where DFID can add value while delivering on its priorities.
The Situation
Over the past three years, food and nutrition insecurity and economic crises have highlighted both
the urgent need and the potential for developing sustainable agricultural systems.4 Hunger and
malnutrition remain widespread. The number of hungry people has remained almost static despite an
increase in food production over the past 20 years.5 While there are proportionately fewer
malnourished people in the world than there used to be, the absolute number may even be rising.6
◄ Number of hungry people, 1969-2010 (Source: FAO)
At least one billion people (1 out of 7 globally) are estimated
to lack access to adequate food and nutrition.7 The world
presently produces enough food to feed everyone. World
agriculture produces 17% more calories per person today
than it did 30 years ago, despite a 70% population increase.
This is enough to provide everyone with at least 2,720
kilocalories (kcal) person/day.8 The problem is one of
distribution and access. Poor people in developing countries
do not have access to sufficient land to grow, or income to
purchase enough food9.
This situation is worsening as a result of population growth and other challenges. World population is
growing fastest in some of the poorest countries with the highest hunger and lowest agricultural
productivity rates.10 By 2050, the global population will reach 9.3 billion people11, and demand for
agricultural products is expected to increase between 70%12 and 100%13. This is also because in the
emerging powers14 an additional 3 billion people are expected to join middle class status and related
consumption and livelihood patterns15. At the same time, the world’s agricultural systems will be
increasingly challenged by water scarcity, climate change16 and volatility, raising the risk of
production shortfalls and worsening food and nutrition insecurity.17 Food availability will be an
increasing problem.
The rural poor are likely to be disproportionately affected by such stresses and shocks.18
Development in low income countries without increasing the risk of conflict and violence19 will only be
possible if food and nutrition security are improved sustainably20, and if the poorest and vulnerable
enjoy a degree of protection from stresses and shocks, i.e. if growth is resilient and equitable.21
While agriculture needs to feed us all22, the current priority for many development stakeholders is to
support economic growth while achieving the hunger Millennium Development Goal (MDG), to help
reduce poverty, and to support sustainable food and nutrition security beyond 2015.23 Agriculture is
the source of food and incomes, and it is a primary source of economic growth.24 Substantial gains in
agricultural productivity in pursuit of these objectives are needed and can be realized through
investment, innovation, policy and other improvements.25
Why support agriculture?
Agriculture has an important role to play in helping DFID realize its commitments on food and
nutrition security. Most countries with large numbers of poor and hungry people depend on
agriculture for growth and economic development and will do so for years to come.26 The large
majority, 75% of the world’s poor (3 billion of 5.5 billion in the developing world, some 50% of the
global population), live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their subsistence and livelihood.27
Agriculture accounts for 40% of worldwide employment28 and is a fallback option for those working in
cities and losing their jobs. Agriculture provides a safety net for jobs and economic buffer when other
sectors are struggling. For example, during the 2009 crisis, globally employment in industry fell while
employment in agriculture increased.29 At least 43% of the agricultural workforce in developing
countries are women30.
Many agriculture-dependent countries in a state of protracted crisis, conflict or fragility (a major focus
of DFID’s work) have large rural populations.31 This rural population is particularly dependent on local
agriculture, resulting from threats to mobility, increased poverty, destroyed infrastructure and
disruptions of markets. To survive and avoid a further deterioration of the situation, people live off
local agriculture.32
In most developing countries development builds on rural growth. This results from improved
agriculture, the mainstay of rural economies.33
Agriculture is more effective in boosting growth and more
effective in reducing poverty (MDG1) than other sectors34. No
country has achieved mass dollar poverty reduction without
prior investment in agriculture.35
◄ Average contribution to poverty reduction by income source in 25
developing countries between 1980-2005 (Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, China,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala,
Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Philippines, Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia and
Vietnam), at different stages of their development36
The potential poverty-reducing impact of agriculture-related growth is three times larger than growth
originating from other sectors of the economy.37 In most countries where hunger and poverty were
reduced fast, agriculture was the most important sector at essential stages of their development.38
Evidence suggests that effective support to agriculture also speeds up the achievement of the MDGs
related to education, maternal health, HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases39. Current research into
how agriculture can best improve nutritional outcomes for food insecure households will strengthen
the evidence of what works while delivering value for money.40
In spite of demonstrated successes in curbing hunger and under nutrition41, what does not work well
is presently much clearer to stakeholders than what has been proven to work42. What has been
proven to work must be stated clearly and taken to scale rapidly to sustain the current momentum
around agriculture and food security, meet MDG1, and cope with current and future challenges.43
Support to agriculture reaches the poor where they are, even in today’s rapidly urbanising world44.
Most of the poor still reside in the rural areas 45 and suffer multiple disadvantages through poor
services and infrastructure and rapidly natural deteriorating resources46. This is particularly true for
women and girls who provide much of the labour for agriculture but who, in most cultural contexts,
are significantly less mobile than men and boys.47 Not all (neither women nor men) would want to
become or remain farmers if they had a choice48, but for the time being they need agriculture to feed
themselves and their families and to provide for education, health and incomes for households to
diversify, including into off-farm income generation.49
Agriculture provides jobs for 1.5 billion, by some estimates 2 billion50, smallholders and landless
workers, “farm-financed social welfare” when there are urban shocks, and is a foundation for viable
rural communities.51 Rapidly growing urban populations also need to be fed from rural agriculture
which often suffers from underinvestment.52 Many urban poor – those in precarious informal jobs or
who are unemployed - depend on support from extended family networks in the local rural hinterland
and rely on agriculture as a safety net53.
Agriculture is therefore important for developing countries’ economic growth, food and nutrition
security, and overall development and rapid poverty reduction, at a minimum to help them progress
to a less farm-dependent model of economic growth.54. Progress, however, does not only depend on
budgets but also on the right enabling environments and mix of initiatives.55
What kind of agriculture?
There is an unusually ideological debate about whether large scale agri businesses or support to
smallholders will be the solution to hunger and food insecurity in the world while feeding the 9.3
billion in 2050.56 In order to reduce the numbers of hungry and undernourished while feeding the
world in 2050 action needs to be taken fast57, and it needs to start where the hungry people are.58 In
practice the way forward does not lie in either small or large farms but in making a deliberate choice
of both small and large farms, depending on the specific situation, as both have a role to play.59
Smallholders, because of their sheer numbers and because of the frequent absence of alternative
livelihood opportunities (large numbers of formal off-farm jobs) for those who might wish to exit
farming, the total land area they occupy and their efficiency will play a dominant role in agricultural
development for several decades to come.60 Some 80% of African farms (33 million farms) are
smallholdings (<2 ha). In all continents, farms of less than one ha and with few resources are
usually unable to produce surplus and be food secure.61 Such ‘marginal farms’ occupy 17% of the
farmed land.62 However, there are examples where tiny farms contributed significantly to food
security, economic growth and development.63 The Chinese agricultural revolution was brought
about by very small smallholders, with only on average a ‘mu’ (1/15 ha) of land.64 Growth in smallfarm production reduces the number of people in poverty and reduces its severity: the consumption
of the poorest may be increased.65 Small farmer income is presently two to ten times higher than
the income from wage employment.66 During the Indian Green Revolution it was productivity
increases on small farms that enabled younger generations with better health and education to
transition out of farming and into secure off-farm livelihoods.67 Land size was just one factor among
other, often more important ones.68 Under the right conditions, smallholder agriculture can be as or
more productive than large agro businesses.69
Comparing smallholders to large commercial farms and contrary to expectations, a multi country
study undertaken by the World Bank found that few economies of scale were found in the larger
farms.70 Proportionately very large farms also employ significantly fewer people. This makes them a
less ideal contribution to achieving MDG1 through supporting people’s own efforts at farming or
waged agricultural labour.71
Agriculture is local. Globally today more than 85% of food never crosses an international border. This
is also more economical and environmentally sound than the alternative. Discussions about
agricultural productivity increases to close the looming food gap often overlook the potential
mismatch between the location of production and the location of people who need the food.72
While food self sufficiency cannot be globally sustainable, given huge imbalances among countries
and the need to support food security for all, there are clear benefits for developing countries in trying
to achieve a greater degree of food self sufficiency if they have this potential and can compete with
often cheaper imports. If done well, farmer incomes and overall food security can increase rapidly.73
Import dependent countries suffered more in recent food price shocks.74 Many agriculture dependent
food insecure countries are landlocked and/or have high trade-related cost. Producing the food close
to where the consumers are is more economical. It is often the only viable option in fragile or conflict
areas. In SSA where most of the LICs and their poor depend on agriculture, African farmers compete
favourably with food imports. 75
Food and nutritional security and poverty reduction requires all three key elements to be in place:
availability, access and utilisation, with all of the three dimensions having to be sustainable for lasting
poverty reduction to happen. This is all the more important considering the correlation between
imperfect and failing markets and where the poor are. Food only feeds those who have access to it
and who can afford it.76 The urban poor and non-poor also depend on rural agriculture for their food
security. They cannot afford costly imports and rely on local or regional production.77
Everywhere people want to eat to be healthy and able to live a fulfilling life. Many poor people’s
greatest worry is about their families’ food security and incomes to pay the bills. 78 The majority of the
population in developing countries are young. Most of the young do not want to remain in agriculture
as a livelihood.79 At the moment most of them do not have choices because growth, even where it is
high, does not produce sufficient numbers of adequate formal jobs. In a period of global financial
crisis, persistently high food prices in local markets80 and continuing volatility, households will
continue to rely on agriculture. For the majority, farming should aim to strengthen livelihoods and
enable those who desire to exit to take up off farm income opportunities. 81
While supporting agricultural innovation and development stimulates economic growth, this does not
necessarily lead automatically to a reduction in poverty and under nutrition. For example, exportoriented agriculture in SSA influences domestic food security very differently under dissimilar
conditions. It can contribute to but can also worsen food security (including level of food availability
and access in country, productivity, type of imports, off-farm income options, etc.).82
The nature of innovations and whether the agricultural development is broad based are also
important for FNS through agriculture.83 Research has shown that rapid and sustainable progress to
reduce extreme poverty is next to impossible except where incomes who farm for a living increase,
and where this is combined with non-discriminatory domestic rules and improved access to market.84
With DFID’s mandate being poverty reduction, and economic growth expected to support this
objective, it is important to identify agricultural approaches that have worked and delivered value for
money, tease out the relevant factors and conditions for success, identify the conditions under which
these success stories can be replicated or scaled up and then ensure the dissemination of findings
and related advocacy with strategic change agents for this to happen.
Why Africa?
Africa is home to both, the worst aspects of the problem ie. lowest global agricultural productivity;
high chronic and acute malnutrition rates – in some countries reducing proportionately but in many
countries and across the continent rising in absolute terms; high population growth rates; frequent
mutually reinforcing stresses and shocks; low levels of services and infrastructure; fragility and
conflict), and potential solutions ie. significant potential for productivity increase even without
significant expansion of land under agricultural use and related damage to natural resources,
emerging success stories, for example in Ghana85, Ethiopia86, Rwanda87, Liberia, Malawi, Sierra
Leone, South Africa88).
After decades of neglect, agriculture has recently seen a renewal of interest and increasing
investment among African countries.89 However, neither Africa as a whole nor SSA are on track to
meet either of the MDG1 targets. While agricultural spend is increasing in most African countries, in
2010 only three countries (Egypt, Ghana, Mauritania) were on track to reach the MDG1 target.90 Due
to recent reversals of earlier positive trends not a single country or region for which data is available
would be on track to meet MDG1, based on recent performance in hunger reduction.91
Hunger is still most severe in Africa and affects women and children most. All countries with
extremely severe hunger scores (GHI 2011) are in Africa. One in three people in Africa is chronically
hungry, the highest proportion in the world (a total of 239 million in 2011).92 In 2011 the food
distribution gap in SSA – the difference between projected food availability and food needed to
increase consumption in food-deficit income groups – increased by 20 per cent, while the distribution
gap was projected to decline by half in Asia and by 30 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean.93
In December 2011, 23 out of a global total of 33 assessed countries requiring external food
assistance to satisfy their minimal FNS requirements were in Africa.94 With food and agricultural
inputs prices rising and remaining volatile this situation is deteriorating further. Except for some areas
in southern and western Africa, most of the continent is dependent on imports for its food security,
thus highly vulnerable to volatile global food markets.95
A GALLUP poll undertaken in 2009/10 in 28 SSA countries96 ranked food security through
strengthening agricultural production as priority one, ahead of jobs. Two thirds of Sub Saharan
Africans agree that their governments are not doing enough on agriculture and should do significantly
more. 59% reported that food security issues rule their daily lives also in normal times.
◄ Food Security Risk Index – Africa has by far the
worst ranking97
Most of the population growth by 2050 is
expected in SSA (49%), an increase of one
billion by 2050).98 By 2040, one in five of
the world's young people will live in Africa
and they will form part of the world's
largest working age population.99 With SSA
alone having to create 8-9 million jobs per
year just to keep pace with the number of
new entrants into the job markets100, let
alone to curb existing open and hidden
unemployment, and the need to match
often highly skilled new jobs with a large
number of youth with relatively low skills,
the farming sector will remain an important employer for a majority of rural people for a significant
time to come. Even without increased rural exodus, 16 of the 20 fastest growing cities in the world
will be in Africa by 2025, and they will need to be fed from rural areas.101
The majority of countries with large numbers of poor and hungry people have economies that depend
on agriculture. But most of them also have high agricultural potential. In SSA the agricultural sector
employs nearly 2/3 of the population and accounts for 20-30% of GDP, in some countries for up to
50%102 and for over half of export earnings103. More than 70% of Africa’s poor and food insecure live
in rural areas, and all depend on agriculture for their livelihoods.104 Smallholders contribute 80-90% of
Africa’s agricultural production. Women grow over 80% of all food grown in SSA but are among the
poorest and most food insecure and they only own 2% of the land.105
Africa has the world's largest share of arable land106 with 16% of its land arable and 79% of this land
uncultivated.107 Africa currently has the lowest overall productivity rate in the world, but rates vary
widely in different sub regions and agro ecological zones. African average yields per hectare are a
quarter of those seen in East Asia, for example.108 Food production per person slumped since
independence in the 1960s.109 But Africa also has huge untapped potential for agricultural
productivity increases.110 For every 10% increase in yields in Africa, it has been estimated that this
leads to a 7% reduction in poverty; growth in manufacturing and services do not have such effects.111
Africa needs to learn from the Asian Green Revolution to increase its productivity to feed its growing
population and support global food security while generating wealth through trade. But it needs to do
so rapidly and while learning from the failures of the Green Revolution. It needs a “Doubly Green
Revolution”112 which increases productivity fast, is environmentally sustainable and helps boost food
and nutrition security while ensuring significant poverty reduction.
In SSA, agriculture accounts for 12% of the continent’s growth, even with low investments in the
sector, and 85% of farms are small (2 ha or less). In most of SSA, faster growth in agriculture is a
precondition for sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction. The time for this is right, not
least because even allowing for the knock-on effect of the northern hemisphere’s slowdown, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects Africa to grow by 6% in 2011 and nearly 6% in 2012,
about the same as Asia, and the rate of foreign investment has soared around tenfold in the past
decade.113
To reduce hunger and strengthen FNS and incomes for improved livelihoods, the large numbers of
currently unemployed people need to be absorbed in efforts to raise agricultural productivity at least
for a transitional period.114
For the first time in two generations, Africa has a real opportunity to achieve food and nutrition
security through agricultural development.115
What is already happening? What is missing?
The following presents a brief overview of significant programmes, research and other work already
underway, and of DFID’s involvement in them.
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP): In 2003 African
Governments endorsed the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa116 and
committed themselves to spending at least 10% of their national budget allocations to strengthen the
development of agriculture and related value-added activities, rural development and food security at
national and regional levels. CAADP was established as part of the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) in July 2003 and focuses on improving and promoting agriculture across
Africa and eliminate hunger. As of May 2011, 26 countries117 had signed the compact and
incorporated the CAADP Compact into their agricultural agenda. The development of strategies and
budget allocation at national level so far has been slow.
DFID is funding CAADP through a multi donor trust fund118 based at the World Bank. The trust fund
has just undergone a mid term evaluation which recommended a range of reforms to improve
efficiency and effectiveness. DFID and other donors have been working together through this fund,
and through the Global Donor Platform119, to align their support for CAADP, in particular by
providing financial support to the process of enabling SSA countries and regions to fully develop their
own agricultural development strategies.
G8/G20: The increasing recognition of the potential of agriculture to contribute to food and nutrition
security and growth, and the food price spikes in 2007/08 and 2010/11 and increased volatility have
led to stakeholders starting to increase their commitment to global food security, albeit still with
insufficient funding to deliver impact at scale.
 The Hokkaido Toyako Statement on Global Food Security120 at the 2008 G8 summit in Japan
focused on stimulating world food production and increasing investment in agriculture.
 In 2009, G8 leaders committed to the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI)121, including a pledge
for $22 billion over 3 years to fund food security, nutrition and sustainable agriculture. This funding
included initiatives such as the UK’s commitment of £1.1 billion and the European Commission’s
Food Facilty of €1 billion over three years.
 The 2010 G20 Seoul Multi-Year Action Plan on Development122 included a specific pillar focusing
on food security. It was followed in 2011 by the first ever G20 agriculture ministers' meeting that
adopted the G20 Paris ‘Action plan on food price volatility and agriculture’123 with measures at the
macro level, some elements of which are already being implemented. The UK supported the plan.
 The French Presidency of the G20 in 2011 reached agreement on enhancing information and
transparency of agricultural productivity and food security through a new agricultural market
information system (AMIS)124, with support from DFID.
 Various stakeholders are lobbying intensively for the 2012 G20 Presidency by Mexico to retain
food security as a priority on the agenda.
These actions, together with the reform of the Committee for Food Security125 hosted by the FAO,
have strengthened the global governance on food security and agricultural development.
European Union (EU): The EU is the largest recipient of DFID’s multilateral aid (£1.3 billion in
2009/10, which was 1/3 of DFID’s multilateral aid). The new (March 2010) ‘EU Policy Framework for
Food Security in developing countries’126 puts food security higher among the EU's priorities in the
years ahead. Policy priorities include support to those countries that have the biggest difficulties in
meeting MDG1 by 2015.127
USAID Feed the Future (FtF): In 2010 the US Government launched the bilateral ‘Feed the Future’
programme128 to fight hunger by supporting innovation, research, and accelerated development to
improve agricultural productivity, link farmers to local and regional markets, enhance food and
nutrition security, and build safety nets. DFID and Feed the Future are engaged in a close dialogue.
The Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP): The US Government has also
joined six other donors in supporting the public and private sector windows of GAFSP129, a
multilateral mechanism originally established to channel funding pledges and implement
commitments to agricultural development under AFSI. DFID is currently considering a contribution.
The New Vision for Agriculture by the World Economic Forum (WEF): Substantial gains in
agricultural productivity can be realized with close collaboration among stakeholders in the
agricultural value chain, including governments, companies, multilateral and civil-society
organizations, farmers, consumers and entrepreneurs. The New Vision for Agriculture initiative was
released at the WEF meeting in January 2011. Its approach is supported by DFID. The initiative130
has so far catalysed five major public-private partnerships, including country-level initiatives in
Tanzania, Vietnam, Indonesia and Mexico, each one engaging between 15-35 companies – as well
as a regional task force in SSA.131 The partnerships support countries in realizing their agriculturesector goals by aligning investments, programmes and innovations around shared priorities for
agricultural growth, and to date more indirectly for the food and nutrition security of poor people.
DFID programmes are helping to implement this model in Tanzania and Mozambique.
The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF): In 2011 the BMGF132 refreshed their agricultural
development strategy with the aim of, by 2030, contributing to nearly tripling sustainable productivity
for 30 million poor farming households in SSA and to more than doubling productivity for 45 million
poor farming households in India and Bangladesh. The Foundation associates these productivity
targets with poverty reduction levels of 40% in SSA and 25% in India and Bangladesh. They propose
to do this by aligning their work around a priority set of staple crop and livestock value chains, and, in
SSA, to focus their work in a limited number of countries133. They are making investments that adopt
a variety of approaches in order to try and achieve their desired success at scale. DFID and the
BMGF have a strategic collaboration on agricultural research.134
Mo Ibrahim Foundation (MIF): Established in 2006, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation supports good
governance and leadership in Africa. More recently, the MIF has begun to focus also on agriculture
as one solution of the continent’s hunger and malnutrition problem. The most recent forum organised
by the Foundation in Tunis in November 2011 had the theme “African Agriculture: From Meeting
Needs to Creating Wealth”135. With hunger in SSA being very much a problem of poor governance
and lack of political will, and with the MIF and its founder enjoying exceptional leverage among
decision makers in Africa as well as globally, the MIF is well positioned to support transformative
change. The MIF and DFID are engaged in a regular dialogue.
United Nations: Within the UN, mostly three agencies have the mandate of covering agriculture and
food security. These are the International Fund for Agriculture (IFAD) whose main focus are
smallholders, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) with a wide portfolio of normative
products and a mix of country and regional programmes, and the World Food Programme (WFP)
which leads on humanitarian food assistance and resilience to stresses and shocks. DFID supports
all three organisations through its multilateral funding. DFID’s annual ‘core’ funding to WFP, FAO and
IFAD, combined, is projected to increase from £52 million in 20011/12 to £82 million in 2014/15. The
FAO which was rated as weak but strategically important for its global mandate in DFID’s Multilateral
Aid Review is subjected to increased scrutiny of spend and achievement of outcomes.136
The World Bank has a significant agricultural programme portfolio137, and so do leading non
governmental organisations. The World Bank receives a large share of DFID’s multilateral funding.
Leading UK based non governmental organisations (and through them frequently local
organisations) are also supported in their work on agriculture and food security.138
In order to achieve all of the ambitious global donor goals, there has been a growing interest in better
analysing and understanding the evidence about what policies, strategies and action might deliver
African agricultural development success on the ground. This is also motivated by the increased
focus on generating value for money for all development investments.
Several studies have sought to identify ‘big picture’ factors that led to agricultural development
success. For example, Peter Hazell and Steve Haggblade published a book in 2010, ‘Successes in
African Agriculture - Lessons for the Future’, which concluded that there were two recurring
requirements for agricultural growth in Africa: (i) long-term investment in agricultural technology, and
(ii) favourable incentive systems for farmers and agribusinesses.139
In 2010, IFPRI, supported by the BMGF, published ‘Millions Fed’140 that identified key elements for
success from a series of big global agricultural success stories. The conclusions were broad and
actionable lessons pitched at a macro level e.g. ‘success is a process’ and ‘success is not a
substitute for strategy’.
A study by Sustainet141 focused on lessons on policy changes and approaches to scaling up
sustainable agriculture approaches in East Africa. It sets out the following four dimensions of
scaling up which help to structure required further research: (i) Quantitative: Increasing the numbers
of people who adopt a technology: directly, spontaneously, or through other organizations.
(ii) Functional: Adding new activities or technologies, or adapting them to suit new situations.
Example: Adapting a farming technique to suit a different soil type. (iii) Political: Changing the “rules
of the game” by influencing the provision of government services or changing policies.
(iv) Organizational: Increasing the organization’s capacity and making it more efficient. Example:
training staff in innovative dissemination techniques.
The comprehensive report ‘Agriculture at a Crossroads’142 published in 2008 by the International
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD)
presented the status of scientific knowledge and technology in agriculture, called urgently for
increased investments to support food security, and pointed out emerging risks such as food price
volatility and its drivers, and climate change.
In January 2011 the UK Government Office of Science published the Foresight report on ‘The
Future of Food and Farming: Challenges and Choices for Global Sustainability’143. The main
report and its numerous synthesis reports, reviews and case studies draw attention to a set of large
and complex issues around agriculture and food. The report calls for the accelerated sustainable
intensification of agriculture to reduce hunger and poverty and to feed a rapidly increasing global
population. Synthesis report C11 discusses the challenge of chronic hunger and points out that while
increased investments in agriculture are urgently needed, these will have to be accompanied by
other measures, e.g. social protection, women’s empowerment and nutrition specific interventions. At
the same time chronic hunger needs to be given a much higher priority on the political agenda.144
The report refers to 40 case studies of successful sustainable intensification in SSA. It also calls for
urgent strategies to identify scalable approaches and support the up-scaling of outcomes so that
hundreds of millions of people can benefit from improved FNS and reduced poverty. 145
Following the report’s publication, DFID and other Government ministries agreed on an action
plan146 in which DFID committed itself to:
 Promote a more effective approach to global food security by national governments and
international organisations, based on a strengthened evidence base that makes the links.
 Develop a joined up approach to addressing nutrition, which includes health and agriculture
inputs, and which is based on strengthened evidence.
 Improve evidence and understanding of agricultural systems in diverse and vulnerable systems,
which leads to interventions to reduce vulnerability to shocks and trends for men and women
smallholders – mostly supported by DFID’s agricultural research into more effective innovation.
The UK Government Foresight team has in the meantime commissioned research about the
evidence on sustainable agriculture in Africa as an engine of growth and what findings will mean for
policy makers to strengthen agricultural growth against African Union priorities.147 The study builds on
the Foresight‘s 40 cases of agricultural innovation and success from over 20 countries written by
African scientists and policy makers.148 The work takes a broad approach, with an orientation towards
the increasing but limited number of CAADP countries149 that are delivering on their commitments. It
will not deal specifically with agricultural approaches that can be scaled up rapidly in CAADP
countries and across the continent to strengthen food and nutrition security through smallholders.
The recent internal paper ‘Food Security Stock-take: Challenges and Opportunities’ discussed
by DFID’s Development Policy Committee (DPC) contains additional information on stakeholders,
programmes, relevant DFID support and opportunities for action.
Priorities for DFID’s regional support are detailed in the draft ‘Africa Regional Department
Agriculture and Food Security Strategy’. These are the continued political dialogue to support
CAADP (including through facilitation of support by emerging powers), direct investments with a
direct impact on the poor, dealing with regional challenges and promoting regional integration while
strengthening agricultural productivity, markets and resilience. Annex 1 of the strategy summarises
DFID’s overall support for agriculture and food security in SSA over the period 2011-15.150
What is needed, now?
A large body of literature shows that most public investments in rural areas have contributed
significantly to agricultural growth and to some extent on poverty, but this is mostly restricted to
Asia.151 Although such investments were successful, they were less ideal in terms of efficiency (value
for money) and the degree to which hunger and poverty were reduced. The same is true for Asia’s
Green Revolution.152
Research programmes are working on innovative solutions for agriculture to provide sustainable
solutions to food and nutrition security in an era of multiple challenges.153 DFID has a large and
growing portfolio of investments in agricultural research154 with its main focus on sustainable
intensification, much of it in collaboration with the CGIAR system, and additional work with the
Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP)155, and Africa-focused
accelerated agricultural innovation also by the J-PAL Agricultural Technology Adoption Initiative
(ATAI) programme156, the Agricultural Pull Mechanism (AGPM) Initiative, and the second phase of
the Research into Use programme157. Most of the important research questions are known.158
Policy documents – the most important of which were summarised above - provide a general
framework for more effective investments in African agriculture, and may call for a rapid scaling up of
what works. However, they fail to specify (beyond single case studies) what this is and how it will be
achieved.159
G8 nations and others have pledged increased investments in agriculture and food security.160 There
is also a strong call to maximise private sector investment in agriculture. There is now early evidence
that the decades-long slump of investments in agriculture is being reversed.161
However, there appears to be a gap between world leaders’ high level declarations on agricultural
development and on the need to strengthen food security and on the ground reality in SSA. There is
also need to underpin the efforts to maximise benefits from private sector involvement such as the
WEF initiative with better evidence and a road map on how this can benefit smallholders directly and
strengthen their contribution to overall development through improved growth.
While much of what works can be known and may well be scalable, increased funding is either not
forthcoming in the pledged amounts, or is not strategically invested at scale in what has been
documented through good evidence to be working well in strengthening FNS. This is also due to a
huge gap in strategic knowledge at a time where increased funding is a realistic option. The factors
that allow development partners to expand current agricultural development success are not well
documented in a comprehensive, systematic, and policy-relevant way.
DFID itself is funding significant programmes on agriculture and FNS, but it also does not yet have a
compendium of best practice to support maximised outcomes for its support to smallholders.
Answers are urgently required to how development partners can support agricultural development at
scale that is productive, sustainable, equitable and resilient162, and that help reach MDG1 and
strengthen food and nutrition security beyond 2015.
What is missing is a synthesis of what has been proven to work for poor farmers in developing
countries while delivering value for money (without need for new research, as for example
productivity of all major crops can be substantially increased with technology available today163) and
can be taken to scale rapidly,164 combined with its systematic dissemination and strategic advocacy
to provide support to such rapid up-scaling. The BMGF which has already supported agriculture as
an area of “major giving” for several years, and which has placed a focus on smallholders, has joined
those calling for a strategic toolbox and up-scaling of good practice.165
How does this relate to DFID’s priorities?
Food and nutrition security
Supporting improved food and nutrition security (FNS) through a multi-sectoral, evidence-driven
approach has been defined as an important priority for DFID.166 The UK government is committed to
playing a “significant part in ensuring food and nutrition security for all”. DFID’s four broad
approaches to tackling food security are (i) prioritizing nutrition for women and young children, (ii)
strengthening agricultural growth in developing countries as the best contributor to poor people’s food
security, (iii) supporting cash and asset transfers to the poorest and most vulnerable, and (iv) building
the right policy environment to stimulate growth and increase private sector investment.167 FNS is
also at the heart of DFID’s efforts to strengthen resilience so that vulnerable people are better able to
cope with shocks.168 DFID’s Structural Reform Plan 2011-15 also aims to maximize results for girls
and women who are usually among the most vulnerable.169 FNS is among the headline results of
DFID’s bilateral and multilateral aid reviews published in March 2011.170 DFID’s Business Plan 201115 for the Growth and Resilience Department (GRD) emphasizes FNS as a priority for international
influencing and for the strengthening of evidence on best practice, cost and impact to improve and
scale up results for the poorest and most vulnerable in line with the commitments on agriculture and
food security made under the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI). 171 The eradication of hunger is
also likely to remain a priority for the post-AFSI and the post-2015 development agenda.
Agriculture
The Coalition Government reconfirmed an earlier UK commitment made at the G8 Summit in L’Aquila
to spend £ 1.1 billion between 2009 and 2012 to improve agriculture and food security. The DFID
Business Plan 2011-15 mentions agriculture as a sub theme to “wealth creation” and a priority for its
support to research172. It is implicit in other themes related to the MDGs, women and girls and climate
change. DFID’s Business Plan 2011-15 for the Growth and Resilience Department (GRD) describes
its support to agriculture as a sub theme to the priority of reducing global hunger and improving food
and nutrition security.173
Africa
Africa is a major focus region for DFID. 17 out of 27 major bilateral programmes are in Africa.
Between 2011 and 2015 the UK Government’s annual spending on Africa is set to grow by at least
30%. This is against the backdrop of DFID increasing its focus on fragile and conflict countries, of
which many are in Africa. Programmes are to follow a clear vision to generate wealth, reduce poverty
and achieve the MDGs.174 An important focus to reduce hunger and poverty and boost the equality of
opportunities will be on agricultural growth, including support to smallholders, and improved trade
conditions for agricultural produce to support further regional integration.175 Wealth from agriculture is
expected to result also from increased private sector investments, which together with governments,
DFID and other donors supporting an enabling environment, will benefit the poor and vulnerable,
including smallholders and in particular women, to work their way out of poverty.176
What difference will it make to poverty reduction and to poor people’s lives? Why should
DFID fund this?
Supporting such a programme will respond to DFID priorities in poverty reduction:
 focus on the poorest and most vulnerable to build resilience,
 supporting inclusive growth,
 boosting agriculture for wealth creation, and
 strengthening the food and nutrition security of poor people while providing clear benefits for
women and girls.
These are priorities at the global, regional and in many cases also national level, with delivery mostly
happening at the country level.
It will help DFID to
 deliver on its commitment to Africa, and
 towards catalysing programmes based on good evidence and existing knowledge
 at good value for money (VFM).
This is an important point in time to take such action internationally:
 It will provide further support to DFID when the UK is taking the chair in the G8, and,
 Support the strong UK position on nutrition at the wider international level, for the eradication of
hunger and under nutrition.
It will help DFID and its partners
 to take to scale what has been proven to have impact, and
 to follow through on its commitment to lead globally on resilience (which has food and nutrition
security at its very centre).
It will help GRD in DFID’s Policy Division
 to deliver on some of its core commitments,
 to contribute to four (items 1-4) of the five priorities of PD work177, and
 to deliver on DFID’s post-Foresight action points as laid out above.
Without DFID’s investment, the proposed programme may not go ahead, and an important
opportunity will be lost to provide strategic input at a suitable point when:
 donors and governments are scaling up their funding to meet the MDGs,
 resilient food and nutrition security has come up high on the international agenda in the wake of
a second food price spike, the Horn of Africa famine, the looming crisis in the Sahel and with
increasing concerns about how the global financial crisis will impact on the poorest and most
food insecure under conditions which are different from those in 2008,
 African governments have acknowledged need, demand and clear opportunities to take a leap in
agricultural production for food and nutrition security,
 DFID is considering a transformative “gold moment” on hunger in 2013,
 the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) initiative – a clear priority for HMG - will have its first major stocktake in 2013 and will require further support for nutrition-sensitive quick wins,
 the post-MDG agenda is starting to take shape with FNS being a likely priority and the proposed
programme having the potential to help shape this agenda further, and
 significant campaigning by non-governmental organisations is ongoing to boost FNS outcomes,
including through strengthened smallholder support, and to which DFID could add value by
leading with an important contribution to improve evidence and practice.
The proposed programme is co-funded by the BMGF. The support by this strategic development
partner for DFID would cover at least 25% of the core implementation cost. The BMGF also funds
other essential cost outside the realm of the proposed programme.
Without DFID’s investment:
 An opportunity to maximise impact at very good VFM will be lost.
 Increased agricultural finance will be less efficient and effective in reducing hunger and under
nutrition than it could be.
 Millions of poor smallholders will not receive appropriate support.
 Progress towards MDG1 will be reduced.
 DFID will have missed an opportunity to fulfil its commitment to food and nutrition security through
agriculture, by strengthening the evidence and rollout of what works and by maximising its
international influence towards these objectives.
How do we work in partnership with others on this issue? What are their plans? How does
DFID’s intervention fit in?
The proposed programme is co-funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF). The
BMGF is also providing additional funding outside this programme to support the convening and
engagement function. The BMGF is the largest privately operated foundation in the world. Since its
inception in 1994 it has invested over US$ 26 billion in global development, often by catalysing
innovative or scaled-up action or by funding research that is not of commercial but of development
interest.178 The elimination of hunger and undernutrition is one of the foundation’s strategic priorities.
This includes support to agriculture, with a focus on supporting smallholder farmers to improve their
agricultural productivity.179 Women farmers are a special focus, because they are the main farm
contributors but operate from a disadvantaged base.
Programmes supported by the BMGF work with crops and livestock that are relevant to the hunger
hotspots of SSA and South Asia while protecting scarce natural resources.
Research supported by the BMGF works to be responsive to farmers’ needs and aims to ensure
maximum farmer involvement. While trying to systematically leverage additional funding, the BMGF’s
investment priorities are (i) research and development, (ii) agricultural policies, (iii) access and
market systems.
The BMGF Agricultural Development programme collaborates with the DFID Agricultural Research
team as a strategic partner.180 The proposed programme will expand this strategic collaboration to
the policy area.
B. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
Impact
Hunger and undernutrition in SSA are significantly reduced through the implementation at scale of
well evidenced smallholder agricultural development projects in an enabling environment.
Outcome
Public and private development partners181 have a greater understanding of the factors that are
necessary and of the actions they can take to support smallholder agricultural development projects
at scale in SSA to boost food and nutrition security and support poverty reduction. They have been
strategically engaged to increase their efforts based on what works, and an increased number take
such action with demonstrable results.
What needs to happen for the outcome to be achieved? Why and how is the outcome
expected to contribute to the impact?
Existing good practice needs to be compiled, vetted for its replicability, scalability and value for
money. There will be one public output to support this: a report that reviews literature, and gathers
evidence from leading thinkers and practitioners in Africa, that builds on widespread conversations
with development partners and draws together a set of guiding principles or toolkit of rapidly scalable
approaches. These will show development partners how they might best support and guide
agricultural development partnerships and investments to go to scale.
A working hypothesis is that the role of well designed private sector and public-private partnerships
will be key to scaling up. The programme should use its inception phase to refine this hypothesis.
The programme needs to be implemented by a leading research organisation with excellent networks
in policy, research and implementation decision making both in the Northern hemisphere and in
Africa to support both the research and the influencing elements.
The report output is only one milestone towards the outcome. The analysis cum toolbox will be
published and strategically disseminated through three avenues:
(i) innovative online tools,
(ii) personal high level communication at international level, and
(iii) influencing via key governance stakeholders in the region.
The customer engagement strategy for and impact of this work should be devised and assessed by a
collaborating professional body, and the dissemination should be supported through innovatively
designed and low cost online communication technologies to reach the widest audiences.
Considering the opportune timing, the significant global leverage of the co-donor BMGF (which will
also cover communication cost), existing excellent networks of the implementing and disseminating
organisation, the publicity that this work will attract and the “handy” character of the tool (“recipes for
success”), it is expected that this will lead to significantly increased well-designed support to
smallholder agriculture and related rapid improvements in food and nutrition security.
Appraisal Case
The theory of change for the programme is identical for all implementation options. It may succeed
to varying degrees, depending on which option is selected.
Inputs
Programme
funding,
DFID advisor
time for M&E,
and DFID
programme
officer time for
financial
administration
Engagement with
partners
(governmental,
private sector
and civil society)
Activities
Process
Invest in policy
research to
better
understand what
works for
smallholder
agriculture to
produce
improved food
and nutrition
security
outcomes at
scale and define
the conditions
under which
what works can
be scaled up
Outputs
Outcome
Improved evidence
available, ‘ground truthed’
and formally launched
about the best ways to
support smallholder
agriculture to produce
improved food and
nutrition security
outcomes at scale and
clearly defined conditions
(guiding principles) under
which this can be scaled
up
International media
coverage (at least 10
pieces) on what works and
can be brought to scale
Social media support
(Twitter, Facebook,
Linked-in, blogs) to
maximise dissemination
Innovative multimedia tool
developed and executed
to support on- and off-line
dissemination
Face to face meetings
with change agents in
Europe and Africa to
promote toolbox of what
works and guidance for
scaling up
Impact
Public and
private
development
partners have a
greater
understanding of
the factors that
are necessary
and of the
actions they can
take to support
smallholder
agricultural
development
projects at scale
in Sub Saharan
Africa to boost
food and nutrition
security and
support poverty
reduction.
Hunger and
under
nutrition in
Sub Saharan
Africa are
significantly
reduced
through the
implementati
on at scale of
well
evidenced
smallholder
agricultural
development
projects in an
enabling
environment.
Change agents
have been
strategically
engaged to
increase their
efforts based on
what works, and
an increased
number take
such action with
demonstrable
results.
Assumptions that outputs will achieve outcomes:
1. Data, analysis and resulting toolbox for scaling up can be made available in a timely
and accessible format.
2. Evidence yields sufficiently clear-cut guidance to provide insights for decision-making.
3. Strategic dissemination and engagement reach change agents.
4. Decision-makers chose to use evidence to inform decision making, and decisions are
implemented.
Assumptions 1-3 can be managed, while assumption 4 requires further substantiation in two respects:
(i) how policy research work supported by DFID can result in improved impacts on the ground, and
(ii) based on what political theory and under which underlying conditions decision makers are most
likely to use improved evidence to guide their decision making.
(i) Evaluations of DFID-led policy work on gender182 and on social exclusion183 concluded that while
analytical work and knowledge generation were commendable, DFID had not managed for resulting
improved impacts sufficiently well, although it has the capacity to effect change in its own
programmes and also externally, through international influencing. The reports recommend an
additional strategic dissemination and engagement element to involve drivers of change directly and
facilitate change on the ground. Without strategic dissemination, sensitisation and advocacy to
promote the uptake of knowledge and approaches that have been proven to work is unlikely to
happen at scale.184
An independent evaluation of how Save the Children UK succeeded in raising DFID’s commitment to
nutrition concludes that independently commissioned policy reports, strategic personal lobbying of
change agents, and the inclusion of strategic complementary advocacy partners (e.g. research
institutions) were essential in bringing about change and related impact on nutrition outcomes. 185
While this is not the same as influencing mostly African decision makers in the public and private
sectors, the report includes important lessons for successful policy change in general.
A general assumption about tools used for dissemination was also borne out by an independent
evaluation of the UK-led Make Poverty History Campaign which found that mass market popular
communications, backed up by solid lobbying and traditional activism have significant political
impact.186 Criticism of the campaign that it utilised a stereotyped version of Africa but failed to deliver
transformational change187 is assumed to be avoided because the programme prioritises the inclusion
and engagement of African stakeholders at all essential stages.
(ii) Political context matters. Many pro-poor policy interventions were introduced during moments of
crisis rather than periods of ‘politics of usual’.188 There is increasing agreement that the global
financial crisis, combined with sub regional hunger crises, growing concerns about the sustainability
of the global food system, and at the same time significant opportunities for development in Africa
may facilitate such a critical moment to help eradicate hunger under malnutrition. A larger number of
African countries and the African Union via CAADP are leading and owning a political process of
change. African governments have also started to not just think about the quantity but also the quality
of the food that people eat: 17 countries have signed up to the Scaling Up Nutrition movement to
reduce hunger and undernutrition.189 They may be reaching what is considered as a ‘political
optimum’ stage to support FNS at scale. Donors as critical policy actors in many African countries 190
are well placed to support a step change in thinking and acting through strengthened evidence of
what makes a difference, combined with strategic advocacy and engagement of drivers of change. In
the social protection sector, DFID and other donors have been able to support change in a surprising
number of African countries, but also elsewhere191.
The underlying theory of policy and programme change through improved evidence and related
advocacy builds on elements of several theories192:
1. The “large leaps” or punctuated equilibrium theory (Frank Baumgartner and Brian Jones) –
assuming an opportunity for evolutionary seismic shifts in policy and institutions when the right
conditions are in place
2. The “coalition” theory or advocacy coalition framework (Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith) –
with policy change resulting from coordinated activity among a range of individuals with the same
core policy beliefs
3. To a large extent the theory of “policy windows” or agenda setting (John Kingdom) – assuming a
window of opportunity that successfully connects two or more key components of the policy process
(here global, regional, country need perceived and acknowledged, solutions identified, political
climate largely conducive, public aware and pro-active). Organisations using windows of opportunity
successfully must possess knowledge, time, relationships, and good reputation.
4. “Power politics” or power elites’ theory (C. Wright Mills) – effecting policy change through working
directly with those in power, while relying on key allies
5. To a lesser extent the “grassroots” or community organisation theory – supporting change through
collective action by members of the community working on changing problems affecting their lives
(what works is drawn from community-involving work; ground truthing also involves community)
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the Strategic case?
There are three options to address the need set out in the strategic case:
1. Fund the research and advocacy initiative Agriculture for Impact (AFI) at Imperial College
London (with co-funding from BMGF) as laid out in their proposal to DFID and this business case
2. Tender publicly for a suitable service provider for the same policy research and strategic
dissemination of results
3. Do the work in-house through DFID advisory capacity
Option 1: Fund the research and advocacy initiative Agriculture for Impact (AFI) at Imperial
College London (with co-funding from the BMGF)
What would it consist of?
Agriculture for Impact (AFI, http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/africanagriculturaldevelopment) has submitted
an unsolicited proposal to DFID Policy Division to execute a policy research and dissemination
programme to meet the need defined in the strategic case. AFI is an independent research and
policy initiative led by Professor Sir Gordon Conway, based in the Centre for Environmental Policy,
Imperial College London, with support from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. It consists of a
small team of professionals and collaborates with a significant network of policy makers, researchers,
practitioners and advocacy agents in Africa, Europe, and the United States.
AFI seeks increased and enhanced donor government support for productive, sustainable, equitable
and resilient agricultural development in SSA, focusing in particular on the needs of smallholder
farmers. AFI calls for developed country leaders to move the debate beyond summit statements and
political rhetoric, focus on the practical implementation of their commitments to Africa and
demonstrate results.193 It leads the work undertaken by the Montpellier Panel194 to boost support to
African agriculture through close partnerships between European and African decision makers.
Initially AFI’s work was supported by the BMGF under the title of ‘Africa and Europe: Partnerships in
Food and Farming’. At this stage, AFI started to examine how it might be possible for governments
and other large-scale donors to best support and build on agricultural investments in SSA that
showed promise; how the international community could channel any new investments to build on
success of the past – large or small-scale – to reach smallholders; and how to avoid re-treading old
ground in the rush for the international community to claim new and innovative initiatives. AFI
concluded that the factors that allow existing small-scale projects to grow, go to ‘scale’ and begin to
impact many millions of Africans through improvement in their food and nutrition security conditions
and reduce poverty, have not been well documented in a systematic and comprehensive way. One
working hypothesis that emerged was that going to scale in SSA would need to involve private sector
entities and public-private partnerships, in order to make best use of the comparative advantages of
these different institutional entities. AFI proposes to test and refine this hypothesis at an early stage
in its workplan.
How would it work?
AFI will collaborate with various other research, advocacy and evaluation partners:
 With experienced professionals from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)195 for research
and local ground truthing of preliminary results
 With AFI’s strategic consulting company Firetail196 for the customer engagement and influencing
strategy, to help bridge possible mentality differences between public and private sector and civil
society, and to lead the programme impact assessment
 With AFI’s strategic communication partner The Glasshouse Partnership197 for the innovative
and creative dissemination of programme outputs and related media work
 With DFID and the BMGF as co-funders of the programme.
Workplan and physical outputs: The programme will be for 18 months, ideally starting in January
2012 and ending in June 2013. The programme will have one main output (see logframe output 1,
being physical output 8 in the list below). This will be a set of guiding principles and practices or
toolkit for public or private development partners to show how they might best support and guide
agricultural development partnerships and investments to go to scale and also achieve good FNS
impacts. It will be based on analysis of existing literature of case studies and reports, a ground
truthing exercise and further data collection through regional workshops in Africa, and further primary
data collection through semi-structured interviews as necessary. Other products becoming available
during the course of the work will be as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
a precise workplan (month 2)
a customer position report (month 2)
a conceptual framework and key research questions for this work (month 3)
a list and summary of key literature (month 3)
an initial report that further refines the research questions and literature (month 6)
a comprehensive list of literature, matrix of relevant points and key recommendations (month 7)
a revised report highlighting additional factors (month 10)
the final report (draft in month 11, final in month 12)
a creative and innovative media messaging tool (month 14)
a project impact assessment report – the main physical programme output (month 18)
The programme’s inception phase will bring all partners together to align all aspects of the work:
strategy, research, policy, communications, evaluation and finance, resulting in an agreed workplan.
During this period (months 1 and 2) Firetail will evaluate the AFI baseline of development partner
understanding of scaling up in agricultural development. Initial development partner engagement will
also seek insight into what type of final product will be of most use to different public and private
development partners. The physical output (2) will be a customer position report.
In month 2, ODI and AFI will refine initial research questions and methodology and identify key
partners in ODI’s African networks. AFI and Glasshouse will also work with all project partners to plan
the dissemination plan for the end of programme report and messages.
Also in the first three months, AFI will refine the research methodology and key questions by holding
a workshop with key thinkers and broadening the network and contacts on this work. The physical
output (3) will be the conceptual framework and key research questions.
In months 2 and 3, ODI will carry out an initial literature review and produce a draft report to form the
basis for further data collection. The output (4) will be a list and summary of key literature. At this
point AFI will again engage closely with Firetail to ensure that the work responds to the needs of
identified change agent customers.
In months 3 to 6, ODI and AFI will prepare, research and plan three regional workshops in West,
East and Southern Africa to draw out in-country examples of successful and failed practice and
underlying reasons and conditions, and to ground truth initial conclusions of the first phase literature
review. The output (5) will be a report that further refines the research questions and literature.
In month 7, the second phase of the literature review will obtain and review any further literature and
examples. The output (6) will be a comprehensive list of literature, a matrix of relevant points and key
recommendations. At this point Glasshouse will also begin to work with all partners to develop a
creative and innovative media messaging tool around some of the key ideas emerging from the
report. At this point Firetail will again ensure that the work responds to customer needs.
In months 8-9, ODI and AFI will carry out supplementary data collection and analysis. This will be to
close gaps in the literature review and to gather further data when previous case studies have been
conducted in a way that does not fully answer the research question. It will also bring the analysis to
life, teasing out personal perspectives through semi-structured interviews of how objectives were
achieved (or missed). AFI and ODI will closely involve local researchers based in Africa with whom
they have an established and productive relationship. The output (7) will be a revised report
highlighting additional factors.
In month 11, ODI will draft the final programme report and circulate for review. In month 12, AFI will
lay out and publish the report (physical output 8).
In months 13 to 18, AFI will convene all project partners to disseminate the report’s
recommendations and toolbox. This will include a public launch of the report in London,
communications activity through traditional
and social media, and a creative and
innovative media messaging tool that helps
bring the messages of the report to life
(physical output 9). It will similar to the awardwinning media design on Agriculture and the
Green Economy198.
In months 17 and 18, Firetail will evaluate
and review the impact of the work on the
customers targeted at the beginning of the
project. The output (10) will be a programme
impact assessment report.
◄ Workplan: Project activities and timeline
Dissemination: Dissemination is essential for the study to achieve the outcome, have impact and
therefore deliver VFM. Results of the work undertaken in months 1-12 will be disseminated publicly
over a six month period (months 13-18). This period will start with a formal launch of this work in
London (first quarter 2013), followed by face-to-face meetings to present and discuss this work with
development partners in Europe and SSA, accompanied by media advisory and press release,
develop media lists and online influencers by topic and region, develop and schedule a series of
relevant Twitter posts and blogs (months 14-17) and disseminate to other influencers, pitch to
journalists and arrange briefings, profile slots, phone and/or in-person interviews, comment
opportunities, reactive media response. Gordon Conway from AFI will also work with the project
partners from ODI, Glasshouse and Firetail to achieve additional programme specific media
coverage. Glasshouse will develop a creative and innovative media messaging tool to further support
dissemination. This will likely be a multimedia tool such as a video, infographic or photography
campaign. The format will be decided in month 7 (mid-2012) though consultation with all partners.
A number of programme risks have been identified:
 Whether the programme will reach its outcome and will contribute to the desired impact depends
on the external political environment. Significant global events such as the financial crisis and
major natural disasters can divert the attention of government decision makers. This may mean
that agricultural development becomes lower priority and development partners devote fewer
resources to it. AFI’s core activity is to strive for continued policy maker focus on agricultural
development in SSA. While AFI cannot completely mitigate this risk, the programme will work
towards keeping this cause on global agendas under any circumstances.
 There is a risk that the literature and data collected from the regional workshops and further
interviews will not provide enough evidence to make strong recommendations for development
partners about scaling up. AFI will ensure that any guidelines or toolkit is evidence-based and

will caveat information where evidence is considered weak or unclear.
The perception and reception of the toolkit/principles by decision makers may be negative. AFI’s
development partner engagement work by Firetail at the beginning of the programme will seek to
ensure that the work remains relevant to the strategic target audience.
The evidence
The evidence of how agriculture strengthens food and nutrition security is mixed, This depends partly
on the fact that evaluations of agricultural programmes have often paid insufficient attention to
rigorously measuring FNS outcomes and cannot make reliable statements about impacts199. Another
reason is the fact that the enabling environment and specific local conditions determine a large
variety of programme approaches, with positive linkages between agriculture and FNS playing out in
specific settings. The evidence for improved FNS is mostly positive for smallholder support 200,
depending primarily on type and design of programme, agro ecological conditions and size of
holdings. To identify, package and catalyse the scaling up of scalable approaches that have the best
FNS outcomes is the objective of this programme which will thus strengthen evidence and action.
Specific DFID-related evidence of how policy research and strategic dissemination catalyses impact
is discussed under assumptions for the theory of change above.
AFI will utilise its numerous networks, research and policy circles (for example, in the UK: BIS,
DEFRA, FCO, House of Commons, Chatham House and other think tanks; in the EU: DG Dev, DG
Research and Innovation, Joint Research Commission, Piebalgs Cabinet, French Government; USbased: USAID, Chicago Council, World Bank, BMGF; pan-African organisations such as CAADP,
AGRA, FARA, FANPRAN, AATF, MIF, various national governments, social entrepreneur initiatives
such as the One Acre Fund, and various universities on all three continents) to deliver a significant
multiplier effect. It is also active via various media channels.201 Its collaborating partners also have
extensive networks on all three continents. As the AFI initiative has only existed since 2009, there
has not yet been an independent impact evaluation of its work. However, the programme will track
outputs and outcomes closely to ascertain programme success and expected impact. Towards the
end of the implementation period, Firetail will also carry out an impact assessment.
Option 2: Tender publicly for a suitable service provider for the same policy research and
strategic dissemination
What would it consist of?
The programme would be largely identical as described under option 1.
How would it work?
DFID Procurement Department would tender competitively for services from a best value for money
service provider. This might be a single organisation or a consortium of providers with a lead
organisation. The latter will be more likely due to the different demands of the programme on delivery
of cutting edge policy research and on strategic dissemination and targeted follow-up with change
agents. Procurement periods for policy research programmes of values exceeding £ 100,000 take at
least three months. It is assumed that procurement of the present programme might take even
longer, as interested parties for the different outputs will have agree on a consortium and delivery
approach before responding to DFID’s invitation to tender, and this might require an extended
deadline. Assuming an average timeframe for procurement, this option would mean that the
programme would miss the strategic opportunities at international, national and internal DFID-specific
level as set out in the strategic case.
The evidence for DFID and programme content is the same as in option 1. For performance by the
selected service provider this will depend on the outcome of the competitive procurement process.
Option 3: Do the work in-house through DFID advisory capacity
What would it consist of?
The programme would be largely identical as described under option 1.
How would it work?
The work would be led by advisory capacity in Policy Division, with inputs from Africa Regional
Department and through linkages with DFID country offices in Africa. Given the significant workload
of existing advisors (also reflected in the 2011 DFID People Survey) it is unlikely that existing staff
capacity would be able to deliver the programme. Given recent experience in Policy Division it takes
several months for approved new posts to be effectively filled and new advisors in place. It is
therefore assumed that work carried out on an in-house basis would be delayed, hence risk to miss
the strategic time-bound opportunities at international, national and internal (DFID-specific) level as
set out in the strategic case. In addition, while there is good evidence that the policy research
element could well be executed at top quality level, this will be less likely for the strategic
dissemination, as this relies heavily on excellent personal and organisational networks and
engagement strategies and on professional support through innovative dissemination strategies.
While DFID as an organisation certainly has these capacities, this is less likely the case for
individuals or small teams of advisors. Current restrictions on specific communications activities may
also prohibit that some of the dissemination work can take place. There might also be a risk in that
DFID as a UK Government Department might be seen as partial to certain approaches or have a
politicised agenda if the work is done on an in-house basis.
The evidence for DFID and programme content is the same as in option 1. Under current
communications restrictions it may be difficult to deliver on results pertaining to publication,
dissemination and strategic advocacy (programme elements funded by the BMGF in option1 ).
Analysis of options against critical success criteria (CSCs)
1
2
Data gathering expertise and analytical capability
Dissemination, networking, engagement through
strong communication and policy links and
transparency – data and methodology made
publicly and freely available, excellent global
networks
3
Strategically timed delivery of products/outputs to
accepted standards
4
VFM – can deliver outcomes at a reasonable cost
Weighted total score
Weighting (1-5)
Appraisal of Options against the CSCs
5
5
25
25
5
4
25
20
4
4
20
20
5
4
20
2
10
3
15
4
5
20
90
2
8
63
4
16
71
Score
Option 3
Weighted
Score
Option 2
(expectation
based on
existing
policy
research)
Score
Option 1
Weighted
Score
(Each CSC is
weighted 1 to 5,
where 1 is least
important and 5
is most
important based
on the relative
importance of
each criterion to
the success of
the intervention.)
5
5
Weighted
Score
Description
Score
CSC
Weighted Score: The same weighting is used as for CSC above. The score ranges from 1-5, where 1 is low contribution and 5 is
high contribution, based on the relative contribution to the success of the intervention.
Explanation of the critical success criteria202:
CSC 1: Data gathering expertise and analytical capability
For programme outputs to be accepted and strategically disseminated with resulting impacts on FNS
data collection and analysis must be of the highest standard.
CSC 2: Dissemination, networking, engagement through strong communication and policy links and
transparency – data and methodology made publicly and freely available, excellent global networks
As detailed during the discussion of the underlying theory of change even the best evidence will not
catalyse change unless strategically and transparently disseminated and promoted through targeted
customer engagement. This is equally important as obtaining high quality research outputs.
CSC 3: Strategically timed delivery of products/outputs to accepted standards
As set out in the strategic case, it is important for output and dissemination to happen according to a
tight strategic timeline to take advantage of a window of opportunity and add value to parallel efforts.
In this programme, compliance with the tight timing schedule is equally important to CSCs 1 and 2.
Option 1 is expected to deliver on this. However, pending actual delivery the rating was
conservatively set at 4 out of a possible 5.
CSC 4: Value for Money – can deliver outcomes at a reasonable cost
It is essential to deliver the outcome at VFM. This is easier for option 1 due to existing co-funding
from the BMGF and existing synergies with other work outside this very programme (e.g. combined
travel), with budgets likely being higher for option 2 without co-funding and synergies.
On the basis of the appraisal of options and the comparison of options, option 1 is preferred for
delivery of programme outcomes for the main reasons captured in the CSCs as set out above.
The “Do Nothing” counterfactual
There is no risk of a displacement effect. AFI has approached only DFID with its proposal and has
already received confirmation for the partial funding (> 25%) from the BMGF. The proposal and its
outcomes are strategically tailored to DFID’s needs and priorities as set out in the strategic case. If
DFID decides not to fund this programme, the programme will not be implemented.
If DFID decided to do nothing, staff time for managing the programme would be saved. But the lost
opportunities would far outweigh the limited staff cost. Doing nothing would be a lost strategic
opportunity to catalyse significantly increased impacts on food and nutrition security in Africa through
improved and scaled-up smallholder support. DFID would also miss significant opportunities to make
a valuable contribution to the food and nutrition security agenda at the international and national
level. In addition, DFID would miss important opportunities to deliver on its own priorities and add
value to envisaged campaigns and programmes led or supported by the UK Government.
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
In the table below the quality of evidence for each option is rated as either Strong, Medium or Limited
Option
1
2
3
Evidence rating
Strong (with all relevant conditions in place to make programme a success)
Medium (depending on chosen service provider or consortium)
Medium (strong for analytical work, limited for strategic dissemination and engagement within short
timeframe and with limited cost)
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment for each
feasible option?
Climate change is likely to have an extensive impact on agriculture around the world through
changes in temperature, precipitation, concentrations of carbon dioxide, and available water flows. 203
Assessing the impact of climate change on agriculture is challenged by the levels of uncertainty in
climate change models and significant local variations of expected impacts. A systematic review for
DFID found that overall; studies showed that climate change is likely to lead to a yield depression of
about 8% in Africa and South Asia. This figure masks large regional differences, with maize yield
losses for Southern Africa estimated at 27% for the 2030’s and 44% by the 2050s.204 At the current
rate of temperature increase, global average temperatures will have increased 1.5°C by 2050.
Studies quoted in a new report by the African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC)205 estimated average
production losses by 2050 for African maize will by then be at 22%, sorghum 17%, millet 17%,
groundnut 18%, and cassava 8%. The research also shows that warming over 1.5°C means severe
crop loss, displacement of pastoralists and agricultural production, and dangerous impacts on food
security for millions of people. By 2050 climate change and erratic weather patterns will have pushed
another 24 million children into hunger, with almost 50% in SSA, unless action is taken fast.206
The programme presents significant opportunities to reduce such negative impacts through
sustainable smallholder agriculture. Following the Durban climate change conference in December
2011 it is now a globally acknowledged fact that agriculture can be a game changer for climate
change. Emerging evidence207 suggests that resilient food and nutrition security through agricultural
support will have the best outcomes where programmes are climate smart and support natural
resource conservation and improved management, which has a particularly large potential in SSA208.
As a matter of principle, climate change adaptation and environmentally sustainable programmes will
be at the heart of this policy research. The programme will select easily scalable approaches from a
wide array of existing knowledge on how smallholder production for FNS can be intensified in a
sustainable, i.e. climate-smart and environmentally beneficial way209.
Possible negative programme impacts on climate change and the environment may result only from
necessary travel for stakeholder interviews and local ground truthing, personalised dissemination and
engagement. This impact is rated lowest for option 1, as AFI will combine some of the required flights
with other travel from other budgets, reduce emissions and increase VFM. These trips have already
been scheduled, and programme travel will be strategically added and covered through alternative
budgets. For options 2 and 3 such flexibility to combine travel will be limited or unrealistic.
Option
1
2
3
Climate change and environment risks and
impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
C (no risk)
C (low risk)
C (low risk)
Climate change and environment opportunities,
Category (A, B, C, D)
B (medium)
B (medium)
B (medium))
Categories: A, high potential risk / opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk /
opportunity; C, low / no risk / opportunity; D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
Option 1: DFID would cover £ 206,000, i.e. < 75 % of total programme cost. The BMGF covers
> £ 65,640 of the cost, including significant publication and other communication cost, which DFID
may presently not be able to cover. The DFID contribution will cover the following costs, with most of
these funds having to be committed upfront to get work started and meetings and workshops
organised to secure key customer participation:
Budget
Header
Description
1
Staff cost
2
Travel (UK-based, ODI)
3
Regional workshops (all. incl.)
4
5
Report layout and printing
Customer strategy + landscape
evaluation
6
Monitoring and impact assessment
7
Dissemination strategy and content
8
Media relations/press office/social media
9
AFI and Imperial College Administration
£ Total
DFID
£ Total
DFID
% share
BMGF
% share
£ BMGF
67,337+core funding*
67,377.00
*
Core funding*
1,245.00
1,245.00
100%
0
93,180.00
93,180.00
100%
0
0
Core funding
Core funding
18,200.00
100%
100%
0
21,000.00
0
21,000.00
100%
20,000.00
0
20,000.00
100%
Core funding
0
32,741.00
18,200.00
*
17,049.50
52%
Core funding
15,691.50
100%
48%
10
Contingency (AFI + ODI,
< 6.6% of direct cost)
Grand Total
17,897.00
8,948.50
50%
8,948.50
50%
> 271,640.00
206,000.00
<75%
65,640.00
>25%
* A significant share of the AFI core staff cost are already covered through a BMFG grant to AFI outside this programme and are therefore
not quantified in this programme budget. DFID funding will cover 100% of additional programme-specific staff cost which is not already
funded through BMGF.
In agriculture for food security a cost benefit analysis is usually programme and location specific, so
only examples can be provided with concrete monetary values. The significant return on investment
rates that even food security programmes can have while working with smallholders, if they are well
designed and adapted to local conditions, is illustrated e.g. for the DFID-funded Protracted Relief and
Recovery Programme in Zimbabwe: Maximum cost benefit ratios were established for sweet potato
promotion (17.2%), small livestock distribution (8.4%), WASH (5.4%), and irrigated kitchen gardens
(3.8%), all combined with intensive training interventions.210 Similar results were achieved in
evaluations of comparable protracted relief programmes in eastern Africa 2004-10. A community
based cost benefit analysis of a food security programme supported by Tearfund in Malawi had
remarkable results: For every $1 invested, the programme delivered $24 of net benefits for targeted
small scale agricultural communities to help them overcome food insecurity while building their
resilience to drought and erratic weather (conservative estimate and only based on quantifiable
benefits; as per Tearfund’s research report this could go up to $36 per $1 invested).211
Assuming this conservative estimate, the DFID investment of £ 206,000 would return quantifiable
benefits of at least £ 4,944,000 (1:24). Considering the direct cost covered by the BMGF, quantifiable
benefits increase to at least £ 6,519,360. Given that unquantifiable benefits (e.g. newly established or
strengthened linkages, motivation to overcome poverty with their own efforts) often account for the
more important medium to long term benefits to target groups, this figure will be much higher. This
programme will also catalyse funding to scale up what has been proven to work and is expected to
have multiplier effects. This and expected economies of scale will further increase benefits.
Summary of benefits table:
Stage 1: Description of who benefits, and how and
when they benefit
Month 12 of 18: Report on scalable approaches that
work available as global public good
Months 13-18: Dissemination and strategic customer
engagement
2013: Evidence and strategic toolbox for DFID to use as
part of its gold moment campaign
Stage 2: Quantification
1
At least 5 key development partners in Europe, 2 in
US and 10 in Africa involved in shaping contents of
research report by programme end
1
Stage 3: Monetary
value (not
discounted)
Benefits depend on
effective scaling up
of programmes
Option 2: Expected benefits would be the same as in option 1. Related direct costs would depend on
quotations received under a competitive tender. These costs are likely to be higher than in option 1
because option 1 is co-funded, has its basic office running cost for its London office covered outside
this programme and is in a position to make efficiency savings through combined travel and reduced
related cost.
Option 3: Expected benefits would be the same as in option 1. Related direct cost would depend on
the assumed required human resource capacity to carry out the work internally, plus cost for
dissemination and strategic engagement of change agents. The following is assumed as a realistic
capacity investment, assuming the same timing as in option 1, and identical cost for regional work:
No.
Description
No.
£ Unit Cost
(2011 Average)
Unit
No. of
Units
£ Total Cost
1
A2 Advisor Agriculture + Food Security
2
4,086.25
Salary/Month
18
147,105.00
2
A1 Advisor (quality assurance)
1
5,081.75
Salary/Month
2
10,163.50
3
Regional work
93,180.00
4
Strategic dissemination, engagement, media work (assuming
exemption from Comms restrictions): 1 A2 Comms staff
1
4,086.25
5
Travel for Communications staff (6 international trips)
1
3,500.00
Salary/Month
8
32,690.00
6
21,000.00
Total estimate
304,138.50
This calculation is a rough estimate. For DFID staff only salary costs as per pay scales 2010-12 (average at point 4 of pay grade) have
been used212. The estimate does not include any costs for strategic contact establishment and networking, costs for consulting external
experts and DFID staff outside Policy Division, UK-based travel, costs for peer review, or costs related to publication of report and
innovative media dissemination. The assumption that 6 international trips (with the EU and to and within SSA) for the Communications
professional will be sufficient for strategic dissemination and engagement is conservative.
D. What measures can be used to assess Value for Money for the intervention?
Comparison of Options against the 3Es as per above
Economy
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Cost-effectiveness
Option 1
Strong
Strong
Strong
Strong
Option 2 (subject to tender award
Medium
Medium
Strong
Medium
Option 3
Medium
Strong
Medium
Medium
VFM would be compromised if the strategic timeline could not be complied with.
E. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
Based on the VFM analysis of options, option 1 is preferred, with the main reasons summarised here:
 As the strategically timed delivery schedule is essential, option 1 is the only option where work
can start immediately and where the programme can deliver as per the strategic timeline.
 In Option 1 strategic creative dissemination and engagement work is covered by the co-funder. If
this were not the case, DFID might not be able to cover all related cost from its own funding due
to restrictions on communications activities.
 Option 1 may well be the only one with assured co-funding of at least 25% of direct cost and
some operational costs (core funding of London office) already covered outside this programme.
 Option 1 already has networks and linkages in place to deliver on the work without extra cost at
establishing them which would be likely with option 3 and might arise with option 2.
Commercial Case
Direct procurement
Not applicable
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention
B. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial advantage
for DFID?
Co-funding with the BMGF reduces programme cost for DFID.
C. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
D. What are the key cost elements that affect overall price? How is value added and
how will we measure and improve this?
E. What is the intended Procurement Process to support contract award?
F. How will contract & supplier performance be managed through the life of the
intervention?
Indirect procurement
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one for this
intervention, with this development partner?
The programme emerges from identified need in relation to DFID priorities and from an unsolicited
proposal by Agriculture for Impact (http://www.imperial.ac.uk/africanagriculturaldevelopment). AFI is
an independent not-for-profit research and policy initiative led by Professor Sir Gordon Conway,
based in the Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College London, with support from the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation. The proposal demonstrates excellent value for money as detailed above
(in particular due to existing co-funding with a strategic partner to DFID). It is therefore suggested
that an Accountable Grant (AG) is issued to AFI without further tendering.
B. Value for money through procurement
Key cost elements are (i) staff cost for the research, (ii) regional workshop for results vetting, further
data compilation and strategic engagement and (iii) dissemination and strategic advocacy. The latter
is fully covered by the co-funding BMGF. Unit costs for salaries are appropriate, and some of the AFI
staff costs are also covered through the BMGF’s pre-existing core funding to AFI. Costs for regional
workshops are average or lower than costs for comparable events funded in 2011 by DFID (e.g.
adaptive social protection workshop in Addis in March 2011, co-funded with the World Bank).
Additional value is added by AFI combining some pre-arranged travel with travel required under the
present programme so as to reduce the programme’s cost. This will be measured by meetings and
engagement activities having taken place without the programme being charged.
Staff costs are charged as per applicable organisational salary scale which was shared with DFID
and is within appropriate ranges. The workplan breaks down each activity into a given number of
work days which is considered to be the minimum necessary to execute the work.
Required travel and accommodation will be as per applicable DFID regulations (economy/2nd class,
best value for money offer). Costs for workshop (venue hire, catering, travel, etc.) have been broken
down and itemised with unit cost indicated and present good VFM. Regulations will apply irrespective
of whether the cost first originates directly with AFI or with any of their collaboration partners.
Budget lines covered solely by co-funder BMGF (e.g. report layout and printing, media work) are
subject to the Foundation’s procurement regulations.
Financial Case
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate
forecasting?
The total funding requested from DFID is £ 206,000, consisting of the following costs:
Budget
Header
Description
1
Staff cost
2
Travel (UK-based, ODI)
3
Regional workshops (all. incl.)
4
Report layout and printing
£ Total
DFID
£ Total
DFID
% share
BMGF
% share
£ BMGF
67,337+core funding*
67,377.00
*
Core funding*
1,245.00
1,245.00
100%
0
93,180.00
93,180.00
100%
0
0
Core funding
Core funding
*
100%
5
Customer strategy + landscape
evaluation
18,200.00
100%
0
6
Monitoring and impact assessment
21,000.00
0
21,000.00
100%
7
Dissemination strategy and content
20,000.00
0
20,000.00
100%
8
Media relations/press office/social media
9
AFI and Imperial College Administration
Contingency (AFI + ODI,
< 6.6% of direct cost)
10
Grand Total
18,200.00
Core funding
0
Core funding
100%
32,741.00
17,049.50
52%
15,691.50
48%
17,897.00
8,948.50
50%
8,948.50
50%
> 271,640.00
206,000.00
<75%
65,640.00
>25%
* A significant share of the AFI core staff cost are already covered through a BMFG grant to AFI outside this programme and are therefore
not quantified in this programme budget. DFID funding will cover 100% of additional programme-specific staff cost which is not already
funded through BMGF.
The required funding for the programme has been earmarked in the financial year 2011/12 budget of
the Food and Nutrition Security Team in DFID’s Policy Division.
B. How will it be funded: capital/programme/admin?
Funds will come from the programme budget of the Food and Nutrition Security Team in DFID’s
Policy Division. - There are no contingent or actual liabilities.
C. How will funds be paid out?
The programme will last for 18 months with almost all of the work funded by DFID being completed
within the first 12 months and the related budget lines spent. Due to contracting with collaborating
partners, travel and workshop booking (the main cost driver being the regional workshops which will
be completed after month 6 of the programme) as well as securing the best possible dates, venues
and conditions for major public events all of which have to be arranged early on, the entire budget will
be required within 3 months of the programme start. The BMGF is covering the main cost of
dissemination, strategic customer engagement into results and the impact assessment of the
programme. This means that the DFID share of programme funding will have to be disbursed at the
latest by the end of financial year 2011/12.
Funds will be transferred to a dedicated programme account held by AFI the details of which will be
set out in the Accountable Grant.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
Collaboration is proposed with Agriculture for Impact which is a trusted and well respected
development partner and has received core funding from the BMGF prior to this programme.
Discussions with the BMGF were very positive, and there is no reason to expect any financial risk.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
Reporting and audit requirements will be as per applicable standard in DFID’s accountable grants.
AFI is based in the Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College London, with which DFID has
collaborated in research programmes on numerous occasions. AFI will draw on Imperial College
institutional support to manage DFID’s financial contribution. These services will include oversight of
the funds to ensure that the money is spent in accordance with the conditions of the DFID AG,
including reporting requirements; advice and support from the purchasing team on contracts with
project partners; use of Imperial College finance systems and processes to record spending and
disburse the money; support from AFI’s host department the Centre for Environmental Policy to
navigate the system and ensure compliance with College procedures; and support from Imperial’s
research communications’ team.
Evidence about the proper use of the funds will be supplied through the receipt of Annual Audited
Accounts, which show funds received from DFID, or through a separate audited statement. The
detailed requirements will be set out in the standard Accountable Grant letter.
Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
AFI is a team of four people based at Imperial College London. Staff and office costs are fully funded
by the BMGF until September 2013 when the AFI initiative is scheduled to come to an end. AFI has
convened a group of dynamic and experienced research, advocacy and evaluation partners who will
contribute both to the completion of programme outputs and the dissemination of the work to achieve
the desired impact. AFI will sign the AG with DFID, have overall responsibility for the programme,
manage the funds for this work, and will arrange subcontracts with its partners ODI, Glasshouse and
Firetail as appropriate.
Structure of project financing and management:
DFID
BMGF
AFI
Glasshouse
ODI
Firetail
AFI’s work creating and launching a report with the Montpellier Panel was evaluated by civil society
consulting group Firetail in 2010 and 2011. Conclusions from this evaluation inform future work. AFI is
committed and funded to evaluate the impact of its work again through an external review by the end of
the initiative in September 2013. AFI proposes to use Firetail also to help the programme assess the
level of understanding by development partners of the factors that are necessary and the actions they
can take to support smallholder agricultural development projects at scale in SSA. This will be done
through interviews with private actors and public sector decision makers at the beginning and the end
of the programme period and through comparisons of intermediate stages with results enshrined in the
customer position report.
Being an impact-oriented policy initiative, AFI also keeps a regular record of its impact, using measures
such as: numbers of public speeches or presentations, meetings with policy makers, website hits, and
media articles generated.213
AFI will track progress by using logframe indicators and milestones (sometimes broken down into
further detail as agreed in the inception phase) if the programme work successfully contributes to:
 A new evidence-based enabling environment for European and African decision makers to deliver
concrete actions at scale that ensure political commitments benefit small holder farmers in a
productive, sustainable and equitable way by 2013;
 A new evidence-based toolkit publicly available that sets out practical and actionable pathways to
linking political commitments to on-the-ground activity by March 2013.
Upon signing of the AG, a DFID advisor will monitor programme progress and outcomes against the
logical framework. DFID will receive copies of all physical outputs as they become available (see
appraisal case option 1). DFID Policy Division will also be closely involved at the following stages:
 Kick-off meeting in month 1 to finalise a more detailed workplan
 Interview with Firetail as part of their stakeholder/customer evaluation work in month 1/2 – also
providing additional names and contact details for other key stakeholders
 Input on the dissemination strategy with Glasshouse and the finalising of the conceptual framework
for the work with ODI in months 2/3
 Participation in 3 regional workshops in SSA in months 4-6
 Important group discussion about initial report recommendations based on the workshops and what
additional research is needed in month 7
 Finalising details of the creative and innovative media messaging tool by Glasshouse in month 7
 Discuss evolving recommendations and agree on what further research is needed in month 9
 Final draft report for comments in month 11
 Participation in launch of agreed final version of report in month 13/14
 Participation in dissemination activities as agreed on case by case basis in months 13-18: Face-toface meetings with policymakers in Paris, Brussels, SSA and Washington D.C., media work, etc.
 Receipt of final activity and impact assessment reports by end of month 18 (funded by BMGF).
While participation in the dissemination and engagement meetings following the launch of the report
may be inappropriate, DFID will engage closely at all other critical programme stages.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
Risk
There is a risk that major crises and
emergencies which are beyond the
influence of this programme increase
hunger or distract targeted change
agents from programme focus
There is a risk that the literature and
data collected from the regional
workshops and further interviews will not
provide enough evidence to make strong
recommendations for development
partners about scaling up.
The perception and reception of the
toolkit/principles by decision makers may
be negative.
Impact/Probability of Risk
High
Medium
Low
Impact if
Realised
High
Probability of
Realisation
Medium
Mitigation
Medium
Low
AFI will ensure that any guidelines or toolkit
is evidence-based and will caveat
information where evidence is considered
weak or unclear.
High
Low
AFI’s development partner engagement
work by Firetail at the beginning of the
programme will seek to ensure that the work
remains relevant to the strategic target
audience (see also logframe output 2)
High
Medium
X
Improved anticipation and early action of
humanitarian assistance to avoid a
significant deterioration and strengthen
resilience
Low
X
X
The project has an overall LOW risk with the probability of each risk materialising being mostly low.
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
Not applicable
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
See logframe and A above, with evidence detailed in strategic and appraisal cases
Lograme
Quest No of logframe for this intervention: TBD
End Notes
1
Chatham House (2009), The Feeding of the Nine Billion: Global Food Security for the 21st Century, available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108957 – arguing for the figure 1.5 billion
See Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World? Second
Edition of the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 5 – arguing for the figure 2.5 billion
2
Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World? Second Edition of
the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 5
3
Interpress Third World News Agency (23 January 2012), Progress Towards A Food Secure Africa, available at
http://reliefweb.int/node/471881
See for example the UK Government of Science flagship report “The Future of Food and Farming” and its
numerous supporting case studies and publications (2011), available at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/ourwork/projects/current-projects/global-food-and-farming-futures/reports-and-publications
4
5
IFPRI, Welthungerhilfe (GAA), Concern (October 2011): Global Hunger Index 2011
In addition to updating the list of countries where hunger figures have improved or deteriorated, the GHI 2011
also provides an overview of hunger trends during the past 20 years. While significant successes have been
achieved in reducing morbidity and mortality of under-fives, prevalence of undernourishment across all age
groups has changed very little in the past 20 years. In some countries, undernourishment figures have
deteriorated. For further details see: http://www.ifpri.org/publication/2011-global-hunger-index
6
Dr Howard Buis, Director of Harvest Plus in APPG Roundtable on Better Crops for Better Nutrition: How
Agriculture can Reduce Malnutrition, 5 December 2011
7
With the FAO having withdrawn its food insecurity estimates of earlier years and not having published an
update with this year’s State of the Food Insecurity 2011 report (available:
http://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/en/ ), this figure is heavily caveated, pending a revised and significantly
improved methodology to estimate global food insecurity figures. For a discussion on the issue see also:
http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=7547
For an overarching critique of existing hunger indices see Masset, Edoardo (2011, In Press for Food Policy), A
review of hunger indices and methods to monitor country commitment to fighting hunger.
Household surveys have demonstrated that in some countries FAO data may underestimate the number of
hungry people by as much as a factor of three. For further details see Foresight Project on Global Food and
Farming Futures, Synthesis Report C11: Ending hunger, available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/ourwork/projects/current-projects/global-food-and-farming-futures/reports-and-publications
CFS Roundtable on Monitoring Food Security (September 2011), Technical background paper - Measuring food
security: Meangingful concepts and indicators for evidence based policy making, available at
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs.../Round_Table_technical_note.pdf
8
FAO, IFAD, WFP (2002), Reducing Poverty and Hunger, the Critical Role of Financing for Food, Agriculture,
and Rural Development, available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/Y6265e/y6265e00.htm and with 2010 data
also at http://www.fao.org/docrep/x0262e/x0262e05.htm
9
Often wage labourers are among the most food insecure in a developing country, because their wages do not
increase in line with food inflation or are not high enough to begin with. See, for example, a recent case study on
chronic food insecurity in Tanzania, by the Chronic Poverty Research Centre (2011), Hidden hunger in rural
Tanzania: what can qualitative research tell us about what to do about chronic food insecurity? - available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/SearchResearchDatabase.asp?OutputID=187317
10
World Bank (2011), World Development Indicators, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worlddevelopment-indicators?cid=GPD_WDI
11
UNDESA (2011), 2010 Revision of World Population Prospects, available at:
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=55479
FAO (2011), The State of the World’s Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture (SOLAW) Managing Systems at Risk, availale at http://www.fao.org/nr/solaw/the-book/jp/ The FAO claims that the bulk of
additionally needed food will be used as animal feedstuffs to satisfy increasing demand for meat and dairy
products.
12
13
UK Government Office for Science (2010), Global Food and Farming Futures,
Available: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/currentprojects/global-food-and-farming-futures/reports-and-publications
Chatham House (2009), The Feeding of the Nine Billion: Global Food Security for the 21st Century, available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108957
Exact projections of additional food demands by 2050 are difficult, not least because of changing dietary
patterns. The FAO assumes a need to increase agricultural productivity by at least 70%. See Jelle Bruinsma for
FAO (2009), The Resource Outlook to 2050 – By how much do land, water use and crop yields need to increase
by 2050? - available at
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/esa/Global_persepctives/Presentations/Bruinsma_pres.pdf
Ernst & Young (2011), Innovating for the Next 3 Billion – The Rise of the Global Middle Class – And How to
Capitalize on It, available at:
http://www.ey.com/UK/en/SearchResults?query=Innovating+for+the+Next+3+Billion+&search_options=country_
name
14
15
For a summarised scenario see Gordon Conway (2011), Can we feed 7 billion people? available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/professor-sir-gordon-conway/can-we-feed-seven-billion_b_1063464.html and
http://ag4impact.wordpress.com/2011/10/28/hungry-for-change/
16
For a brief overview of the scientific status on agriculture for food security in an era of climate change,
combined with an appeal to identify and scale up good responses quickly so as to ensure improved food security
through agriculture in an area of climate change see CCAFS Report No. 3. Agriculture, Food Security and
Climate Change: Outlook for Knowledge, Tools and Action (2011), available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/SearchResearchDatabase.asp?OutputID=188319
Oxfam (2011), Extreme weather endangers food security – 2010-11: a grim foretaste of future suffering and
hunger? available at http://www.oxfam.org/es/grow/node/25843
This new, heavily referenced policy brief by Oxfam argues that documents the effects of extreme weather events
in 2010 and 2011 on the food security of poor people and warns that extreme weather events in years to come
could cause overwhelming food insecurity in poor countries.
See also FAO (2011), The State of the World's Land and Water Resources for Food and Agriculture (SOLAW) Managing Systems at Risk, available at http://www.fao.org/nr/solaw/the-book/jp/
17
For an overarching analysis of relevant factors see FAO (2011), Looking Ahead in World Food and Agriculture,
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2280e/i2280e00.htm
For details related to resource scarcity see for example FAO (2011), The State of the World’s Land and Water
Resources for Food and Agriculture (SOLAW), available via http://www.fao.org/nr/solaw/solaw-home/en/
McKinsey (2011), Resource Revolution: Meeting the World’s Energy, Materials, Food and Water Needs,
available at http://www.mckinsey.com/en/Features/Resource_revolution.aspx
See also background SEI paper for Bonn conference (November 2011), The Water, Energy and Food Security
Nexus, available at http://www.water-energy-food.org/
On climate change see for example IFPRI (2010), Food Security, Farming and Climate Change to 2050 Scenarios, Results, Policy Options, available at http://www.ifpri.org/publication/food-security-farming-andclimate-change-2050
World Bank (2009), WDR 2010: Development and Climate Change, available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/0,,contentMDK:20227703
~pagePK:478093~piPK:477627~theSitePK:477624,00.html
For a summary of impacts of high food prices and price volatility on food security see:
Harvest Plus, Rising Food Prices Increase Hidden Hunger, http://www.harvestplus.org/content/rising-food-priceswill-increase-hidden-hunger
HLPE (2011), Price Volatility and Food Security, available at http://www.fao.org/cfs/cfs-hlpe/en/
Oxfam and with Globescan (2011), Economic Justice Campaign 2011, Global Opinion Research – Final Topline
Report, registering wide-spread negative food price impacts on nutrition choices in both developed and
developing countries, available at http://www.oxfam.de/praesentation-ergebnisse-essensumfrage
IFPRI (2011), The Impact of the Food Price Crisis on Calorie Consumption in Latin America, available at
http://www.ifpri.org/blog/impact-food-price-crisis-calorie-consumption-latinamerica?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+BlogWorldHunger+%28blog+
world+hunger%29
IRIN (2011), Tough lifestyle changes as food prices continue to rise, available at
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportID=93481
18
FAO (2011), Climate Change, Water, and Food Security, available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2096e/i2096e00.htm
19
For examples of the emerging evidence on high food prices and volatility contributing to conflict risk, see
PBS News Hour (2011), The Role of Rising Food Prices in Egypt’s Revolution, available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec11/egyptfood_11-30.html
Marco Lagi, Karla Z. Bertran, Yaneer Bar-Yam (2011), The Food Crises and Political Instability in North Africa
and the Middle East, available via the Cornell University Library at http://arxiv.org/abs/1108.2455
Rabah Arezki, Markus Brueckner in a working paper for the IMF (2011), Food Prices and Political Instability,
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=24716.0
20
Johanna Nesseth Tuttle for the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, 2011), Instability and
Global Food Supplies, available at http://csis.org/publication/instability-and-global-food-supplies
African Development Bank – Chief Economist Complex, Africa Economic Brief - Vol. 2 Issue 4 (May 2011), The
Impact of the 2010-11 Surge in Food Prices on African Countries in Fragile Situations, available at
http://www.afdb.org/.../AEB%20VOL%202%20Issue%204%20May%202011_AEB%20VOL%202%20Issue%204
%20May%202011.pdf
21
For a detailed discussion see for example Isabel Ortiz, Jingqing Chai, Matthew Cummins for UNICEF (2011),
Escalating Food Prices – The Threat to Poor Households and Policies to Safeguard a Recovery for All, available
at http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/Escalating_Food_Prices.pdf
World Economic Forum, New Vision for Agriculture – A Roadmap for Stakeholders, Available:
http://www.weforum.org/issues/agriculture-and-food-security
22
23
In addition to bilateral donors who have made a significant commitment to food and nutrition security (e.g. the
United States), there are multilateral initiatives (e.g. by G8 and G20, UN, the World Bank), programmes driven by
private foundations (e.g. BMGF) and non governmental organisations, national governments (e.g. CAADP), the
public sector and by alliances of these (e.g. WEF).
Commitments and progress in fighting hunger and under nutrition are measured in several ways. Among the
flagship publications are the following:
- The FAO publishes the State of Food Insecurity in the World report on an annual basis. It monitors progress
towards global hunger reduction targets and discusses risks and opportunities for the same, in 2011 for the first
time without providing a global estimate of food insecure people in the world, available at
http://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/en/.
- Hunger trends in countries with a significant hunger problem are tracked by the annual Global Hunger Index
(GHI); see: http://www.ifpri.org/publication/2011-global-hunger-index
- Progress in combating hunger among developing countries and donor commitments is measured by the
Hunger Score Card developed by ActionAid, available at
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/hungerfree_scorecard.pdf
- A broad hunger reduction commitment index has been developed by the Institute for Development Studies of
the University of Sussex together with leading UK NGOs working on hunger; see http://hrcindex.org/
- The 2009 L’Aquila commitments by G8 donors on food security and agriculture (for details see
http://www.g8italia2009.it/G8/Home/Approfondimenti/Sfide/G8-G8_Layout_locale1199882116809_SicurezzaAlimentare.htm ) are tracked among others by ONE, see
http://www.one.org/c/international/hottopic/3930/.
World Watch Institute (2011), State of the World 2011 – Innovations that nourish the planet, available at
http://www.worldwatch.org/sow11?utm_source=ntp%2Bnewsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=10,000t
h%2BSubscribe
24
World Economic Forum, New Vision for Agriculture – A Roadmap for Stakeholders, Available:
http://www.weforum.org/issues/agriculture-and-food-security
25
26
FAO (2010), Investing in Food Security, available at
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ag_portal/docs/i1230e00.pdf
27
IFPRI, Welthungerhilfe (GAA), Concern (October 2009): Global Hunger Index 2009, available at
http://www.ifpri.org/publication/2009-global-hunger-index
28
European University Institute, Robert Schumann Centre for Advanced Studies (2009),
European Report on Development 2009, Overcoming Fragility in Africa, available at http://erd.eui.eu/erd2009/final-report/
29
Claire Melamed, Renate Hartwig and Ursula Grant in ODI Background Notes (May 2011), Jobs, growth and
poverty: what do we know, what don't we know, what should we know? – available at
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=5752&title=jobs-growth-poverty-employment
30
World Bank (2011), WDR 2012, available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/0,,contentMDK:20227703
~pagePK:478093~piPK:477627~theSitePK:477624,00.html
FAO (2011): The State of Food and Agriculture 2011, available: at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i2050e/i2050e00.htm
31
FAO (2010), The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2010, available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1683e/i1683e.pdf
32ODI
Natural Resource Perspectives 105 (February 2007), Rural Recovery in Fragile States: Agricultural
support in countries emerging from conflict, available at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/7.pdf
33
FAO, IFAD, WFP (2002), Reducing Poverty and Hunger, the Critical Role of Financing for Food, Agriculture,
and Rural Development, available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/Y6265e/y6265e00.htm and with 2010 data
also at http://www.fao.org/docrep/x0262e/x0262e05.htm
34
For a detailed summary of the evidence on agriculture being more successful in poverty reduction see OECD
(2011), Agricultural progress and poverty reduction, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3746,en_33873108_39418603_48473309_1_1_1_1,00.html. It is interesting
to note that agricultural worker productivity grew because of growth in total agricultural GDP, and not because
the number of agricultural workers in the studied countries went down, a finding that “puts into question the
necessity of policies aimed at reducing surplus labour in agriculture to promote poverty reduction.” From the 25
studies it appears that large public budgets for agriculture were not the determining factor, but an enabling
environment and appropriate support to farms were important.
Julie Litchfield (January 2010, internal document), SRF, for DFID, Agriculture and Growth Theme Reviews, p. 2
Action Aid (September 2010), Hunger Score Card 2010, p. 20; Available:
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/hungerfree_scorecard.pdf
Global Harvest Initiative (October 2010), The Global Harvest Initiative’s 2010 and 2011 GAP Reports –
Measuring Agricultural Productivity”, available at
http://www.globalharvestinitiative.org/documents/GAP%20Report.pdf
Fan, Shenggen, Nestorova, Bella and Olofinbiyi, Tolulope (2010), China’s Agricultural and Rural Development:
Implications for Africa; IFPRI; Godoy, Julio (2010), Africa Should Take Lessons from China, IPS News, available
at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51590
World Bank (2007), WDR 2008, available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/0,,contentMDK:20227703
~pagePK:478093~piPK:477627~theSitePK:477624,00.html
UK Government Office for Science (2010), Global Food and Farming Futures, p. 203 f.; Available:
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/currentprojects/global-food-and-farming-futures/reports-and-publications
35
Michael Lipton in Steven Haggblade (2007), Returns to investment in agriculture, available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADI713.pdf
Agriculture played a significant role also until surprisingly late in most of today’s developed countries, including of
most European countries. Interesting lessons from past agricultural policies in today’s “rich” countries are
explained, compared to the “New Conventional Wisdom” for today’s often orthodox development support to
agriculture, and highlighted in their dependence on local conditions, readiness to experiment and take risks, and
on specific points in time to provide windows of opportunity in Chang, Ha-Joon (2009), Rethinking Public Policy
in Agriculture: Lessons from History, Distant and Recent, available at
http://www.hajoonchang.net/downloads/pdf/Chang814889_790755442_916388733.pdf.
36
OECD (2011), Agricultural progress and poverty reduction, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3746,en_33873108_39418603_48473309_1_1_1_1,00.html
37
Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet, World Bank Research Observer vol. 25, no.1 (2010), Agricultural
Growth and Poverty Reduction: Additional Evidence, available at http://wbro.oxfordjournals.org
38
Claire Melamed, Renate Hartwig and Ursula Grant in ODI Background Notes (May 2011), Jobs, growth and
poverty: what do we know, what don't we know, what should we know? – available at
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=5752&title=jobs-growth-poverty-employment
UK Foresight Government Office for Science (2011), The Future of Food and Farming, p.118, available at:
http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/global-food-and-farming-futures/reports-andpublications
39
Oxfam International Research Report (September 2009), Harnessing Agriculture for Development, available at
http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/harnessing-agriculture-for-development-112425
40
An initial systematic review commissioned by DFID did not lead to significant conclusive findings, in part due to
weak methodological rigour in existing programme evaluations, and partly because nutritional outcomes were
often not pursued as a priority of agricultural programmes in recent decades. There is evidence that:
- Nutrition-focused agricultural interventions are short term and cannot address the root causes of malnutrition
like chronic poverty and maternal health.
- While such interventions may increase income from one source, they may result in reduced income from other
sources which may mean no change in overall buying power.
- Agricultural interventions with an explicit objective to tackle malnutrition are not reaching the poorest and most
at risk to chronic hunger such as orphans and other vulnerable children.
- Many development agencies believe that fortifying foods with vitamins and minerals is a cost- and time-effective
way to tackle malnutrition, but more studies showing positive impact are needed for justifying further investment
in such programmes.
The systematic review is available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/R4D/SearchResearchDatabase.asp?ProjectID=60768.
For a global overview of agricultural potential to enhance health and nutrition outcomes see Chicago Council
(2011), Bringing Agriculture to the Table – How Agriculture and Food can Play a Role in Preventing Chronic
Disease, available at http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/.../Bringing_Agriculture_To_The_Table.pdf
41
See China and Brazil as examples of highlights among the emerging powers.
For a list of recent improvements across hunger hotspots, including in Africa, see GHI 2011 at
http://www.ifpri.org/publication/2011-global-hunger-index.
See for example on child malnutrition IDS (November 2011), Evidence Matters – Zero Child Hunger, available
at http://www.ids.ac.uk/idsproject/evidence-matters-a-briefing-series-providing-syntheses-of-impact-evaluation
42
Agriculture for Impact (2010, The Montpellier Report – Africa and Europe: Partnerships for Agricultural
Development, available at
http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/africanagriculturaldevelopment/themontpellierpanel/panelreport
43
44
Andrew Shepherd, ODI, Paper presented at the CPRC Poverty Conference, 8-10 Sept. 2010, Manchester,
Agriculture and Escaping Rural Poverty: an Analysis of Movements and Markets, available at
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/shepherd_060910.pdf
45
The change from rural to urban population majorities is projected to happen in SSA in 2025.
UNDP (2011), Human Development Report 2011, Sustainability and Equity – A Better Future for All, available
at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/
46
47
Chatham House & vivid economics (September 2010), Evidence for Action: Gender Equality and Economic
Growth, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109478
48
Elizabeth Daley of Mokoro Ltd. (Presentation at DFID on 21 October 2011, unpublished), Land Deals: The
Winners, Losers and Implications for Development
49
Luc Christiaensen and Lionel Demer for United Nations University (2010), The (Evolving) Role of Agriculture in
Poverty Reduction – An Empirical Perspective & Are African Countries Paying Too Much Attention To
Agriculture? - available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/newsletter/articles-2010/en_GB/04-2010Christiaensen-Demery/
50
There are approximately 400-500 million small farms (<2 ha) in the world. Given an average 4-5 members per
family farm this implies that over 2 billion people are dependent on smallholdings for their livelihoods. See
Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World? Second Edition of
the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 5
51
Andrew Shepherd, ODI, Paper presented at the CPRC Poverty Conference, 8-10 Sept. 2010, Manchester,
Agriculture and Escaping Rural Poverty: an Analysis of Movements and Markets, available at
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/shepherd_060910.pdf
52
For a position paper by the FAO on urban food security see FAO (2011), Food, Agriculture and Cities Challenges of food and nutrition security, agriculture and ecosystem management in an urbanizing world,
available at http://www.fao.org/index.php?id=28645
53
Andrew Shepherd, ODI, Paper presented at the CPRC Poverty Conference, 8-10 Sept. 2010, Manchester,
Agriculture and Escaping Rural Poverty: an Analysis of Movements and Markets, available at
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/shepherd_060910.pdf
54
Andrew Shepherd (ODI, paper presented at the CPRC Conference in Manchester in September 2010),
Agriculture and Escaping Rural Poverty: An Analysis of Movements and Markets, available at
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/shepherd_060910.pdf.
55
OECD (2011), Agricultural progress and poverty reduction, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3746,en_33873108_39418603_48473309_1_1_1_1,00.html
56
For an overview see Steve Wiggins (2009), The Future Agricultures e-Debate Report 5, Big farms or small
farms: How to respond to the food crisis? – available at http://www.future-agricultures.org/EN/edebates/Big_Farms/farm_debate.html
Landesa Rural Development Institute (2011), Is Bigger Better? A Fact Sheet on Large Scale Corporate Farming
Versus Small Family Farms in Developing Countries, available at http://www.landesa.org/wp-content/uploads/IsBigger-Better-Issue-Brief.pdf
“The time to act is now.” See Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we
Feed the World? Second Edition of the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 17
57
58
Foresight Project on Global Food and Farming Futures, Synthesis Report C11: Ending hunger, available at
http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/global-food-and-farming-futures/reports-andpublications
59
UK Foresight Government Office for Science (2011), The Future of Food and Farming, p.120, available at:
http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/global-food-and-farming-futures/reports-andpublications
60
Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World? Second Edition
of the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 17
High Level Taskforce on the Global Food Security Crisis (2010), Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action,
pp.12-14, available at http://www.un-foodsecurity.org/node/842
IFAD (2011), Conference on New Directions for Smallholder Agriculture, with papers and presentations available
at http://www.ifad.org/events/agriculture/index.htm
61
Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World? Second Edition
of the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 5
62
Oksana Nagayets (2005), Small farms: current status and key trends, Information Brief, Research Workshop
on the Future of Small Farms, Organised by IFPRI, Imperial College and ODI, Wye, June 2005, available at
http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.144.1658
Future Agricultures Policy Brief (2007), Agricultural Commercialisations – A Level Playing Field for
Smallholders? – available at http://www.futureagricultures.org/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=1066&limitstart=20
63
64
Prabhu Pingali (2010), Who is the smallholder farmer? Presentation at the 2010 Norman Borlaug International
Symposium “Take it to the farmer – reaching the world’s smallholders”, available at
http://www.worldfoodprize.org/documents/filelibrary/documents/borlaugdialogue2010_/2010transcripts/2010_Borl
aug_Dialogue_Who_Is_the_Sm_70428DF38B8BD.pdf&sa=U&ei=S7cTujjL4KzhAeazaS0Cw&ved=0CBMQFjAA&usg=AFQjCNHaNcWdanATP_879Az7lsaYaoVDGQ
65
FAO, IFAD, WFP (2002), Reducing Poverty and Hunger, the Critical Role of Financing for Food, Agriculture,
and Rural Development, available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/Y6265e/y6265e00.htm and with 2010 data
also at http://www.fao.org/docrep/x0262e/x0262e05.htm
66
Landesa Rural Development Institute (2011), Is Bigger Better? A Fact Sheet on Large Scale Corporate
Farming Versus Small Family Farms in Developing Countries, available at http://www.landesa.org/wpcontent/uploads/Is-Bigger-Better-Issue-Brief.pdf
Prabhu Pingali (2010), Ending the Debate over the World’s Smallholder Farmers, available via the BMGF
website at http://www.impatientoptimists.org/Posts/2010/10/Ending-the-Debate-over-the-Worlds-SmallholderFarmers
67
68
Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World? Second Edition
of the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 3
69
In December 2010, the United Nations published a report that stated that the benefits of agro-ecological
methods far outweigh those of industrial farming techniques. It added that we can double the world's food supply
if programmes support small farmers in a regenerative system that marries traditional local knowledge with
modern agricultural techniques and extension services. See UNCTAD (2010), Agriculture at a Crossroads:
Guaranteeing Food Security in a Changing Global Climate, available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/presspb20108_en.pdf.
Research by the Oakland Institute echoes the same conclusion. For instance, in Mali, where the system of rice
intensification has been adopted along the Niger River near Timbuktu, farmers have been able to attain yields of
five to 15 tons per hectare per year, for an average of nine tons per hectare. This is more than twice the
conventional irrigated rice yield in the area, and more than the provisions of the Moulin Moderne du Mali, one of
the major investors. This irrigation system involves plots of 35 hectares of land, shared by as many as 100
farmers, meaning each household has access to only one-third of a hectare. Still, from that piece of land, they
are able to earn $1,879 - more than double the average annual per capital income of $676. See
http://allafrica.com/stories/201111040824.html
World Bank (2010), Briefing Note: Agriculture and Rural Development Notes, Awakening Africa’s Sleeping
Giant, available at
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/ext/epic.nsf/ImportDocs/D09C8983F2A062E675257609003430A4?opendocument
&query=NP and its critique in Future Agricultures Policy Brief 36 (2010), Awakening Africa's Sleeping Giant? The
Potentials and the Pitfalls, available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/SearchResearchDatabase.asp?OutputID=184609.
70
Such arguments acknowledge Paul Collier’s and Stefan Dercon’s argument that this may be true of small farms
versus large farms, i.e. one ha versus 10 ha, but not versus very large farms, i.e. one ha versus hundreds of
thousands of ha. See Paul Collier and Stefan Dercon (2009), African agriculture in 50 years: smallholders in a
rapidly changing world, available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak542e/ak542e00.htm and
Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World? Second Edition of
the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 5
71
For an Africa-specific discussion of the issue see for example Steve Wiggins (2009), Future Agricultures
Working Paper 08, Can the smallholder model deliver poverty reduction and food security for a rapidly growing
population in Africa? – available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/ak542e/ak542e00.htm and at
http://www.future-agricultures.org/.../Smallholder_S-Wiggins_Jul-09.pdf
72
James C. Borel, Executive Vice President, DuPont, in his speech at the MDG Summit on 21 September 2010,
available at http://www.farmingfirst.org/2010/09/farming-firsts-jame-borel/.
73
Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World? Second Edition
of the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 4
74
ODI (2011), Countries vulnerable to a food price spike in 2011, available at
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/5297.pdf
World Bank (2010), Briefing Note: Agriculture and Rural Development Notes, Awakening Africa’s Sleeping
Giant, available at
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/ext/epic.nsf/ImportDocs/D09C8983F2A062E675257609003430A4?opendocument
&query=NP and its critique in Future Agricultures Policy Brief 36 (2010), Awakening Africa's Sleeping Giant? The
Potentials and the Pitfalls, available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/SearchResearchDatabase.asp?OutputID=184609.
75
76
A case in point is the recent Niger / Sahel food crisis which was one of access, not of availability as was the
case in 2005. A similar situation is true for the 2008-11 Horn of Africa food crisis. Food was available but
unaffordable, with affected rural people sliding further down the livelihoods scale with every new shock due to
insufficient and inappropriate assistance resulting from a lack of support from or corrupt behaviour by national
governments, limited support from donors, global financial crisis, poor infrastructure inhibiting market exchanges,
generally high food prices and regional and international markets not being responsive in a timely manner - all
this against a background of rapidly increasing climate change and extreme population growth. Sources: Steve
Wiggins et al. for ODI (Draft Version 1, September 2010), Briefing: 2010 Food Crisis in Niger; Examples 2008/09:
Maize scandal in Kenya involving key cabinet members, followed by scams involving fertiliser distribution and
subsidized maize flour; WFP Briefs 2009-10, et al.; ILRI for EC Delegation Kenya (May 2010), An assessment of
the response to the 2008-2009 drought in Kenya
For a summary on the emerging discourse on feeding growing cities see the notes from a seminar “Food for
the Cities” organized by the FAO during the Urban and Peri Urban Horticulture Symposium in Dakar, available at
http://dgroups.org/file2.axd/e5293949-93ae-40f3-b681-9b7754091e77/UPHsymposium-seminar-food-for-cities101206.pdf
77
For the first FAO position paper on the issue see Food, Agriculture and Cities - Challenges of food and nutrition
security, agriculture and ecosystem management in an urbanizing world (2011), available at
http://www.fao.org/index.php?id=28645
Oxfam GB and IDS (2011), Living on a Spike – How is the 2011 food crisis affecting poor people? - available
at http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/living-on-a-spike-how-is-the-2011-food-price-crisis-affectingpoor-people-133997
78
79
Future Agricultures Policy Brief (2010), Future Farmers? Exploring Youth Aspirations for African Agriculture,
available at http://www.future-agricultures.org/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=1066
80
Current global food price indices are based on weights derived from expenditure patterns in rich countries and
do not represent the experience of poor people in developing countries. Analysis based on these indices does
therefore not allow for conclusions to be drawn for the poor and food insecure in developing countries. See
Dorward at SOAS (2011), Getting real about food prices, available at http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/11094/
81
OECD (2011), Agricultural progress and poverty reduction, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3746,en_33873108_39418603_48473309_1_1_1_1,00.html
82
Anne Margrethe Brigham (2011), Agricultural Exports and Food Insecurity in Sub Saharan Africa: A Qualitative
Configurational Analysis, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.14677679.2011.00554.x/abstract
83
Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World? Second Edition
of the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 5
84
OECD (2011), Agricultural progress and poverty reduction, available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/29/0,3746,en_33873108_39418603_48473309_1_1_1_1,00.html
Ghana’s success story: Agriculture accounts for roughly one-third of Ghana’s GDP and employs more than
half of the workforce, including many small landholders. Ghana reflects the conditions in many African nations
where agricultural production is central to the lives of citizens. In terms of rapid poverty reduction Ghana is
ranked among the top 5 performers of the world. It will achieve MDG 1 before 2015, owing to its agricultural
growth of annually 5.1% since 1983. Sustained investment in agriculture has helped raise food production per
capita by > 80% since the early 1980s. The share of people in poverty fell from 52% in 1991/92 to 28.5% in
2004/06, with rural poverty falling from 64% to 40% during the same period. Child malnutrition has almost halved
since the 1980s. Productivity per hectare increased more quickly than the size of land under cultivation.
Improvements in the investment climate, support to private initiatives and investment mostly by small farmers,
agricultural research and extension, including in “unfashionable” crops such as cassava, built on a strategy of
progressively putting underused land and rural labour to work in agriculture. Since the 1980s, Ghana has
maintained a higher growth rate of TFP than the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, Ghana continues to face
many of the same constraints as the rest of the sub-continent, including low R&D spending and poor
infrastructure. More public and private investment is necessary to close the productivity and food system gaps,
including storage, processing and distribution. For further details see ODI Development Progress (September
2010), Ghana’s Story: Ghana’s sustained agricultural growth: Putting underused resources to work, available at
www.developmentprogress.com.
85
For a summary of Ethiopia’s agricultural transformation policy see Guardian (2011), Ethiopia invests in farmers
to achieve country's middle-income ambitions, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/2011/dec/21/ethiopia-boost-farming-agriculture-invest
86
87
For an overview and assessment of challenges and opportunities of agricultural policy and programmes in
Rwanda see Concern and Natural Resources Institute (2011), Farming for Impact – A Case Study of Smallholder
Agriculture in Rwanda, available at http://www.concern.net/unheard-voices/blog/new-report-farming-impact
88
Inter Press Third World News Agency (23 January 2012), Progress Towards A Food Secure Africa, available
at http://reliefweb.int/node/471881
89
While private funding of agriculture has grown, it has tended to focus on produce for exports, and privately
funded agricultural research has tended to focus on the crops of developed countries where the returns have
been greater. See Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World?
Second Edition of the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 1.
90
Samuel Benin, Adam Kennedy, Melissa Lambert for the Africa-wide Regional Strategic Analysis and
Knowledge Support System (ReKaSS, 2011), Annual Trends and Outlook Report 2010 - Monitoring African
Agricultural Development Processes and Performance – A Comparative Analysis, available at
http://www.nepad.org/foodsecurity/knowledge/doc/2306/monitoring-african-agricultural-development-processesand-performanc.
91
Samuel Benin, Adam Kennedy, Melissa Lambert for the Africa-wide Regional Strategic Analysis and
Knowledge Support System (ReKaSS, 2011), Annual Trends and Outlook Report 2010 - Monitoring African
Agricultural Development Processes and Performance – A Comparative Analysis, pages 36-38, available at
http://www.nepad.org/foodsecurity/knowledge/doc/2306/monitoring-african-agricultural-development-processesand-performanc.
92
John Kufour (November 2011), Agricultural Sustainability in Africa - The Role of Science, available at
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/11/agricultural-sustainability-in-africa-the-role-of-science/
93
US Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (2011), International Food Security Assessment
2011-21, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/gfa22/
94
FAO (2011), Crop Prospects and Food Situation No 4, December 2011, available at
http://www.fao.org/giews/english/cpfs/index.htm
95
For an updated map on rates of import dependency and related vulnerability to food price spikes see ActionAid
(2011), available at http://www.ewg.org/hot-spots-emerging-global-food-crisis
96
For a summary see http://farastaff.blogspot.com/2011_04_01_archive.html
Africa Progress Panel (2011), Africa Progress Report 2011 – The Transformative Power of Partnerships,
available at http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/files/7713/0441/.../APP_APR2011_FINAL.pdf
97
98
UNDESA (2011), 2010 Revision of World Population Prospects, available at:
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=55479
99
Professor Sir Gordon Conway and Dr Mo Ibrahim, From Food Security to Wealth Creation: Why African
Agriculture Matters (December 2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/professor-sir-gordonconway/from-food-security-to-wea_b_1120042.html
100
Charles Dan, Africa Director of the International Labour Organisation, to the World Economic Foundation on
Africa (May 2011), available at http://thinkafricapress.com/wef-no-ideas-jobs
101
Professor Sir Gordon Conway and Dr Mo Ibrahim, From Food Security to Wealth Creation: Why African
Agriculture Matters (December 2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/professor-sir-gordonconway/from-food-security-to-wea_b_1120042.html
102
World Bank (2007), WDR 2008, available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/0,,contentMDK:20227703
~pagePK:478093~piPK:477627~theSitePK:477624,00.html
103
UK Foresight Government Office for Science (2011), The Future of Food and Farming, p.127, available at:
http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/global-food-and-farming-futures/reports-andpublications
104
IFPRI (2011), What is the irrigation potential for Africa? A combined biophysical and socioeconomic
approach, available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030691921100114X
Mo Ibrahim Foundation (November 2011), African Agriculture: From Meeting Needs to Creating Wealth –
Facts and Figures, available at http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/media/get/20111113_Facts-andFigures.pdf
105
Given the fact that large tracts of arable land may be interpreted as “unused” while being left fallow
intentionally to give land the time to recover, while being used as seasonal pasture by pastoralists, or while used
as community land, forest or else, there is also a huge opportunity for Africa to generate wealth and ideally
reduce food insecurity. Africa has the largest area of arable land (theoretically) available, and import dependent
countries know this. See for example Africa's farmland in demand: 'Is there a better place than this?' (3
December 2011), available at http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1096210--video-africa-s-farmland-indemand-is-there-a-better-place-than-this.
106
Mo Ibrahim Foundation (November 2011), African Agriculture: From Meeting Needs to Creating Wealth –
Facts and Figures, available at http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/media/get/20111113_Facts-andFigures.pdf
107
108
Professor Sir Gordon Conway and Dr Mo Ibrahim, From Food Security to Wealth Creation: Why African
Agriculture Matters (December 2011), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/professor-sir-gordonconway/from-food-security-to-wea_b_1120042.html
109
The hopeful continent: Africa rising - After decades of slow growth, Africa has a real chance to follow in the
footsteps of Asia, in The Economist (3 December 2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21541015
McKinsey (2010), What’s driving Africa’s growth? – available at
https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Whats_driving_Africas_growth_2601
110
111
UK Foresight Government Office for Science (2011), The Future of Food and Farming, p.127, available at:
http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/global-food-and-farming-futures/reports-andpublications
112
Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World? Second Edition
of the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 5
113
The hopeful continent: Africa rising - After decades of slow growth, Africa has a real chance to follow in the
footsteps of Asia, in The Economist (3 December 2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21541015
Diana Hunt and Michael Lipton for Chatham House (2011), Green Revolutions for Sub Saharan Africa? –
available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109557
114
Torben M. Roepsdorff and Steve Wiggins, New global realities governing agribusiness, in UNIDO (2011),
Agribusiness for Africa’s Prosperity, available at http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Services/AgroIndustries/Agribusiness_for_Africas_Prosperity_e-book_NEW.pdf
Agriculture for Impact (2010, The Montpellier Report – Africa and Europe: Partnerships for Agricultural
Development, available at
http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/africanagriculturaldevelopment/themontpellierpanel/panelreport
115
116
See http://www.nepad.org/nepad/knowledge/doc/1787/maputo-declaration
117
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya,
Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, DRC,
Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo
118
For funding details see http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=102461
119
The Global Donor Platform is co-funded by DFID Policy Division. It is committed to evidence based advocacy
for increased investments and knowledge exchange in global agriculture and rural development. For details see
http://www.donorplatform.org/about
120
See http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/doc080709_04_en.html
121
See http://www.g8italia2009.it/G8/Home/Approfondimenti/Sfide/G8-G8_Layout_locale1199882116809_SicurezzaAlimentare.htm
122
See http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/.../2010%20-%20Seoul%20Summit%20ANNEX2.pdf
123
See http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/g20-action-plan-highlights-agriculture-and-food-price-volatility
124
For details see http://www.amis-outlook.org/amis-about/secretariat/en/
125
For details ee http://www.fao.org/cfs/en/
126
See http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/sectoral_development_policies/dv0012_en.htm
127
The EC food security framework addresses the four dimensions of food security along the following lines:
 Improving resilience of small-scale farmers,
 Ecologically efficient and sustainable agricultural production,
 Increased financing for agricultural research and innovation,
 And safety net mechanisms for the most vulnerable, and
 Emphasising the importance of nutrition.
This policy was endorsed by the Council in May 2010, becoming an EU policy framework for the Commission
and EU Member States. At the request of the Council, the Commission developed an Implementation Plan of the
EU food security policy framework together with the Member States, including an operational framework
reflecting actions to be undertaken by both the Commission and the Member States over the next 5 years.
Adoption is foreseen by the second half of 2012.
The main framework for EU cooperation with developing countries is through regional and country programmes
across the world. Food security as a major focus of country and regional programming is particularly present in
cooperation with Africa. In order to support the delivery of outcomes of its increased funding the Commission is
setting up a dedicated advisory service for its delegations.
Specific instruments include the ‘Food Security Thematic Programme’ (€250 million per annum; for further details
see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/dci/food_en.htm) and the ‘EC Food Facility’ (for details see
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/food-facility_en.htm). The latter, established in 2008 for the period
2009-11, assists 50 priority countries (covering around 50 million people) worst affected by the food price crisis
(2007/08) by providing €1 billion as a temporary response to bridge the gap between providing emergency relief
and long-term development support. Funds were disbursed via UN partners and NGOs. The Facility has been
able to demonstrate some important outcomes. An overall evaluation report is still pending.
Food security is also one of three areas (the other two being energy and WASH) targeted by the €1 billion MDG
Initiative for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.
Under AFSI, the EU pledged to support agriculture and food security with € 2.7 billion in 2010-2012, with 50% of
that pledge made available in 2010.
128
For details see http://www.feedthefuture.gov/
129
For details see http://www.gafspfund.org/gafsp/content/global-agriculture-and-food-security-program
130
Under the strategic leadership of 26 global partner companies of the WEF this initiative is developing a
shared agenda for action and to foster multi stakeholder, especially public-private, collaboration at global,
regional and national levels to achieve sustainable agricultural growth through market-based solutions. The
initiative has defined a vision that highlights the potential of agriculture as a positive driver of food security,
environmental sustainability and economic opportunity worldwide.
131
For the vision, roadmap and further details see http://www.weforum.org/issues/agriculture-and-food-security
132
BMGF (2011), Agricultural Development Strategy Refresh Memo
BMGF (2011), Working to Break the Cycle of Hunger and Poverty – Agricultural Development Fact Sheet,
available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/agriculturaldevelopment/Pages/overview.aspx
133
134
For details on the joint research programme for sustainable intensification see
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/SearchResearchDatabase.asp?ProjectID=60792.
135
For details and supporting documents see http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/projectsinitiative/workingwith-civil-society/2011-forum-in-tunis.html
136
For details see http://www.dfid.gov.uk/What-we-do/Who-we-work-with/Multilateral-agencies/Multilateral-AidReview-summary---Food-and-Agriculture-Organisation-FAO/
137
For details see
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTARD/0,,menuPK:336688~pagePK:149018~piPK:14
9093~theSitePK:336682,00.html. A recent evaluation of the World Bank agriculture programmes portfolio yielded
mixed results on impact for poor people. This led the Bank to develop and action plan to significantly improve its
agricultural performance.
138
For an overview of funding recipients and programmes http://www.dfid.gov.uk/What-we-do/Who-we-workwith/
139
Steven Haggblade and Peter Hazell (2010), Successes in African Agriculture - Lessons for the Future,
available at http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/ib63.pdf.
140
Rajul Pandya-Lorch and David J. Spielman (2009), Millions Fed - Proven Successes in Agricultural
Development, available at http://www.ifpri.org/publication/millions-fed.
141
GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) Sustainet (2006), Sustainable Agriculture: A
pathway out of poverty for East Africa’s rural poor -Examples from Kenya and Tanzania, available at
http://www.sustainet.org/download/sustainet_publication_eafrica_part1.pdf
142
The assessment process was initiated by the World Bank in open partnership with a multi stakeholder group
of organizations, including FAO, GEF, UNDP, UNEP, WHO and UNESCO and representatives of governments,
civil society, private sector and scientific institutions from around the world. It uses a strongly consultative
'bottom-up' process that recognizes the different needs of different regions and communities.
For the various reports see
http://www.agassessment.org/.../IAASTD/.../Agriculture%20at%20a%20Crossroads_Synthesis%20Report%20(E
nglish).pdf
143
For all Foresight reports related to the publication see
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/currentprojects/global-food-and-farming-futures/reports-and-publications
Foresight Project on Global Food and Farming Futures (2011), Synthesis Report C11 – Ending Hunger,
available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/currentprojects/global-food-and-farming-futures/reports-and-publications
144
145
UK Foresight Government Office for Science (2011), The Future of Food and Farming, p.128, available at:
http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/global-food-and-farming-futures/reports-andpublications
146
See http://www.bis.gov.uk/...farming/11-683-future-of-food-and-farming-action-plan
147
The work is led by Jules Pretty (University of Essex) and Martin Bwalya (Head of CAADP). An initial draft is to
be presented in Addis Ababa in January 2012.
148
Thirty of these were published in a special issue of the International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability
(Pretty et al, eds., February 2011), and the papers are available online – see
http://www.earthscan.co.uk/?TabId=102759&v=513585.
149
Only 9 countries have reached the Maputo target so far. See Mo Ibrahim Foundation (November 2011),
African Agriculture: From Meeting Needs to Creating Wealth – Facts and Figures, available at
http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/media/get/20111113_Facts-and-Figures.pdf and
http://www.caadp.net/library-country-status-updates.php
150
Neither of the two documents is available in its final version at the point of finalising this document.
151
Shenggen Fan, Joanna Brzeska (2010), How Can Government Promote Pro Poor Agricultural Growth,
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTRESPUBEXPANAAGR/.../ifpri1.pdf
152
Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World? Second Edition
of the Doubly Green Revolution, Chapter 3
153
For a summary see Shenggen Fan (Presentation to DFID in London on 27 September 2010), The Role of
Agriculture in Hunger and Poverty Reduction, available at http://www.slideshare.net/shenggenfan/the-role-ofagriculture-in-hunger-and-poverty-reduction
For an updated brief on DFID’s agricultural research portfolio see
http://teamsite/sites/knowledge/crd/agriculture%20research%20team/default.aspx
154
155
For details on DFID’s support of AgMIP see http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=202108
156
For an overview on their research see http://atai-research.org/about-atai/overview/what-atai
157
For details see http://www.researchintouse.com/
158
Jules Pretty et al. (2011), The Top 100 Questions of Importance to the Future of Global Agriculture, available
at http://www.julespretty.com/.../100%20Questions%20IJAS%202010%20Pretty%20et%20al%202010.pdf
See for example OECD (2011), Draft Policy Framework for Investment in Agriculture – Reaping the Benefits
of Investment in Africa’s Agriculture through an Integrated Policy Framework, available at http://www.partnershipafrica.org/content/nepad-oecd-africa-investment-initiative-draft-policy-framework-investment-agriculture.
159
For progress to date see Deauville Accountability Report – G8 Commitments on Health and Food Security,
State of Delivery and Results (2011), available at http://www.g20-g8.com/g8g20/root/bank_objects/Rapport_G8_GB.pdf
160
161
See for example Global Donor Platform (2011), Platform Knowledge Piece (PKP) 2 - Aid to agriculture, rural
development and food security, available at http://www.donorplatform.org/activities/aid-effectiveness/platformknowledge-pieces/aid-to-ard-and-food-security.html?tab=materials
162
Gordon Conway (forthcoming, draft 30 Nov 2011), A Billion Hungry: Can we Feed the World? Second Edition
of the Doubly Green Revolution
163
(U.S.) National Research Council's Science and Technology for Sustainability Programme (2011, publication
forthcoming), Exploring Sustainable Solutions for Increasing Global Food Supplies: Report of a Workshop,
available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13319&page=38
164
Global Donor Platform (2011), Platform Knowledge Piece (PKP) 2 - Aid to agriculture, rural development and
food security, available at http://www.donorplatform.org/activities/aid-effectiveness/platform-knowledgepieces/aid-to-ard-and-food-security.html?tab=materials
165
Gordon Conway of Agriculture for Impact in a discussion about knowledge gaps with the BMGF (2011). See
also BMGF (2011), Our Approach – Agricultural Development, available at
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/agriculturaldevelopment/Pages/overview.aspx#.
166
For the UK:
- For UK Cross-Government planning see the Global Food Security Strategic Plan 2011-16, available at
http://www.foodsecurity.ac.uk/assets/pdfs/gfs-strategic-plan.pdf
Specifically for DFID:
- For a general commitment on food security see http://www.dfid.gov.uk/What-we-do/Key-Issues/Food-andnutrition/Food-security/
- DFID (2011), Scaling Up Nutrition: The UK’s position paper on undernutrition
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/What-we-do/Key-Issues/Food-and-nutrition/Nutrition/
- DFID (2009), The Neglected Crisis of Undernutrition: Evidence for Action, available at
http://reliefweb.int/node/24300.
Key issues – food security, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/What-we-do/Key-Issues/Food-andnutrition/Food-security/
167
Key issues – hunger emergencies, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/What-we-do/Key-Issues/Food-andnutrition/Hunger-emergencies/
168
DFID (2011), Saving lives, preventing suffering and building resilience – DFID’s new humanitarian policy paper,
available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/latest-news/2011/saving-lives-building-resilience-and-preventingsuffering/
DFID (2011), Defining Disaster Resilience – A DFID Approach Paper, available at
http://reliefweb.int/node/460941
169
DFID Business Plan 2011-15, Version May 2011, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Sitesearch/?q=business+plan
See also DFIDs new Gender Vision (2011), available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/strategic-vision-girls-women.pdf
170
Over the next four years the UK will: reach 20 million children with nutrition interventions; ensure another four
million people have enough food throughout the year; and help more than six million of the world’s poorest
people to escape extreme poverty (with likely concurrent benefits for their food security).
See: UK Aid – Changing Aid, Delivering Results, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/Latestnews/2011/The-future-of-UK-aid/
And Scaling Up Nutrition – The UK’s Position Paper on Undernutrition, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Sitesearch/?q=under+nutrition
171
Version of April 2011, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Site-search/?q=growth+and+resilience+department
172
For an updated overview of DFID agricultural research portfolio see standing brief available at:
http://teamsite/sites/knowledge/crd/agriculture%20research%20team/default.aspx)
173
Version of April 2011, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Site-search/?q=growth+and+resilience+department
174
All data from DFID Africa Directorate Operational Plan, Version April 2011, available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/op/africa-dir-2011.pdf
175
DFID (March 2011), UK Aid: Changing Lives, Delivering Results, available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/.../BAR-MAR-summary-document-web.pdf
DFID Africa Regional Programme Operational Plan, Version April 2011, available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/op/afr-reg-2011.pdf
176
Africa is open for business, Andrew Mitchell's speech to the London School of Business looks at why trade,
investment and business is on the up in Africa, 11 July 2011, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/MediaRoom/Speeches-and-articles/2011/Andrew-Mitchell-on-why-trade-and-business-is-booming-in-Africa/
177
DFID Policy Division Vision, final version of September 2011 (internal document)
178
More detail is available at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/about/Pages/foundation-fact-sheet.aspx
179
See overview at http://www.gatesfoundation.org/agriculturaldevelopment/Pages/default.aspx, especially the
BMGF’s Agricultural Development Strategy Overview available on the same site.
180
For details on the joint research programme for sustainable intensification see
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/SearchResearchDatabase.asp?ProjectID=60792.
181
Here defined as governments, private sector investors and companies, philanthropic funders, civil society
organisations
Rikke Ingrid Jensen et al. (2006), Evaluation of DFID’s Policy and Practice in Support of Gender Equality and
Women’s Empowerment, available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/performance/files/ev669-volumeiii.pdf
182
Cathy Gaynor and Sadie Watson (2007), Evaluating DFID’s Policy on Social Exclusion, available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/.../evaluation/wp22-social-exclusion.pdf
183
See HR Wallingford et al (2011), Improving uptake of past research outputs – DFID Water for Food Inception
Report - Constraints to uptake + recommendations for effective dissemination, available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/SearchResearchDatabase.asp?OutputID=188351
184
Save the Children (2010), Food for Thought – Save the Children’s Influencing the UK Department for
International Development on nutrition - evidence and lessons – An Independent Evaluation, available at
http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/resources/online-library/food-for-thought-save-the-childrens-influencing-of-theuk-department-for-international-development-on-nutrition-evidence-and-lessons
185
Andy Martin et al. for Firetail Ltd. (2010), Make Poverty History – 2005 Campaign Evaluation, with summary
available at http://www.firetail.co.uk/MPH_Executive_Summary.pdf
186
187
Summarised in Graham Harrison in African Affairs (Oxford Journals, May 2010), The Africanization of
poverty: A retrospective on ‘Make poverty history’, available at
http://afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/109/436/391.full
188
Samuel Hickey (2006), The Politics of What Works in Reducing Chronic Poverty, available at
http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Document&id=3675&source=rss
189
For African country status in the SUN movement see http://www.scalingupnutrition.org/sun-countries/africa/
190
Samuel Hickey (2007), Conceptualising the Politics of Social Protection in Africa, available at
http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/resources/Working.../bwpi-wp-0407.pdf
191
Mark Davies (2009), DFID Social Transfers Evaluation Summary Report, available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/.../evaluation/dfid-soc-trsfrs-summ-rpt-wp-31.pdf
National Audit Office (2011), DFID: Transferring Cash & Assets to the poor, available at
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/1012/dfid_transferring_cash.aspx
192
For a summary and discussion see Sarah Stachowiak for Organisational Research Services (2009),
Pathways for Change – Theories about how policy change happens (chapter 6), available at
http://www.organizationalresearch.com/.../pathways_for_change_6_theories_about_how_policy_change_happen
s.pdf
193
For an overview of recent strategic work undertaken by Agriculture for Impact see
http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/africanagriculturaldevelopment/latestnews.
194
For details see http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/africanagriculturaldevelopment/themontpellierpanel
195
www.odi.org.uk
196
www.firetail.co.uk
197
www.glasshousepartnership.com
198
http://www.farmingfirst.org/green-economy/
See for example the DFID-funded systematic review “A systematic review of agricultural interventions that
aim to improve nutritional status of children” (2011), available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/Project.aspx?ProjectID=60768
199
200
For examples of strengthened FNS through improved consumption see
Concern and Natural Resources Institute (2011), Farming for Impact – A Case Study of Smallholder Agriculture
in Rwanda, available at http://www.concern.net/unheard-voices/blog/new-report-farming-impact
Bernadette M. Wanjala and Roldan Muradian (2011), Can Big Push Interventions Take Small Scale Farmers out
of Poverty? Insights from the Sauri Millennium Village in Kenya, available at
http://www.ru.nl/cidin/general/recent_publications/@831810/bernadette-wanjalaa/
IFPRI et al. (2011), Leveraging Agriculture for Improving Nutrition and Health, International Conference
(sponsored by DFID), 10-12 February 2011, New Delhi, Conference papers and proceedings, available at
http://2020conference.ifpri.info/publications/papers/
201
For a selection of recent activities see http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/africanagriculturaldevelopment/latestnews
202
Due to the similarity in approach and theory of change, the general criteria were selected based on similar
categories approved for the multiannual World Bank programme recently approved by DFID for funding
(December 2011) on “Improving Data on Agricultural and Firm Productivity, Innovation and Gender in Low
Income Countries” which aims to improved evidence-based policy making and practice in developing countries.
203
Ariel Dinar and Robert Mendelsohn at University of California in Riverside (December 2011), Handbook on
Climate Change and Agriculture, available at http://www.e-elgar.co.uk/bookentry_main.lasso?id=13942; with
summary available at http://newsroom.ucr.edu/2817
204
DFID Systematic Review - J.W. Knox, T.M. Hess, A. Daccache, M. Perez Ortola (2011), What are the
projected impacts of climate change on food crop productivity in Africa and South Asia? – available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/.../DFID-SR_CC-impacts-on-crops_Final_01April11.pdf
205
African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC, 2011), Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture in Africa and the
UNFCC Negotiations - Policy Implications of Recent Scientific Findings, available at
http://greenreview.blogspot.com/2011/12/african-agriculture-already-struggling.html
WFP (2009), Climate Change and Hunger – Responding to the Challenge, available at
http://www.wfp.org/content/climate-change-and-hunger-responding-challenge
206
For a comprehensive overview see the mega research programme launched by CGIAR in 2011on “Climate
Change, Agriculture and Food Security”, with details available at http://ccafs.cgiar.org/
207
World Bank (2009), World Development Report 2010 – Development and Climate Change, p. 2, available at
http://wdronline.worldbank.org/worldbank/a/c.html/world_development_report_2010/abstract/WB.978-0-82137987-5.abstract
208
For a comprehensive overview see FAO (2011), Save and grow - A policymaker’s guide to the sustainable
intensification of smallholder crop production, available at http://www.fao.org/ag/save-and-grow/
209
210
Technical Rod Woolcock & Killian Mutiro for the Learning and Coordination Unit (TLC) to the DFID Funded
Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) Zimbabwe (June 2007), Cost Benefit Analysis of PRP, internal document
211
Tearfund (2011), Building resilience for food security in Malawi: a cost–benefit analysis, available at
http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-49/building-resilience-for-food-security-in-malawia-costbenefit-analysis
212
213
http://dfidinsight/PeopleSight/PayBenefitsandPensions/Payreward/A1andbelow/index.htm
For an excellent summary of how to measure policy influence through use of different approaches and
channels see http://onthinktanks.org/2012/01/06/monitoring-evaluating-research-communications-digital-tools/.
The monitoring strategy for media based dissemination of programme results is expected to be agreed along
these lines.