WEEK #7
THE THEORY OF
RECOLLECTION, THE
METHOD OF HYPOTHESIS,
AND THE THEORY OF FORMS
(Phaedo)
(2-28-06)
Agenda
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Outline of Phaedo
The Theory of Recollection in Phaedo
The Method of Hypothesis in Phaedo
Does Plato have a Theory of Forms?
– Is Plato committed to the existence of Forms?
– What is it to be so committed?
• Evidence for a Theory of Forms
– Passages which refer to Forms
– Arguments for Forms
– Motivations for Forms
• Arguments for Forms
• Motivations for Forms
Cast of Characters: 59b-c
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Phaedo
Apollodorus - narrator of Symposium
Critobulus
Critobulus’ father - Crito - Apology 33d-e; Diogenes Laertius 2.121
Hermogenes - son of Hipponicus and brother of Callia (Ap. 20a) - in
Cratylus
Epigenes - in list at Apology 33d-e
Aeschines - Socratic fragments Antisthenes - reputed founder of the Cynic school - Socratic fragments
Ctesippus - in Lysis & Euthydemus
Menexenus - in Lysis & Menexenus
Simmias of Thebes (a center for Pytahgoreanism) - in Crito
Cebes of Thebes - in Crito
Phaedondes - Xenophon Memorabilia 1.2.48
Euclides of Megara - founder of the Megarian school - in Theaetetus
Terpsion of Megara - in Theaetetus
Aristippus (grandson was founder of Cyreniac), Cleombrotus, and
Plato are mentioned as absent
Outline of Phaedo
A. Prologue (57a-59c)
B. Socrates in prison (59c-69e)
1. Setting of scene (59c-61b)
2. Tension (61b-63e)
a. No one ought to commit suicide
b. Philosophers would be better off dead
3. Philosophers should willingly die (64a-69e)
Three Arguments that Wisdom is better acquired when soul is
separated from body
a. Bodily pleasures interfere with the pursuit of truth and
wisdom (64d-65a)
b. Perception is inaccurate/only reasoning (logizesthai) is
accurate (65b-d)
c. Forms, the objects of wisdom, cannot be viewed by
perception, but only by thought (dianoia) or reasoning
(logismos) (65d-66a)
C. The Argument(s) for the immortality of
the soul
1. The Cyclical Argument (70c-72d)
2. The Recollection Argument (72c-77a)
a. The Conditional: If TR -> immortality (73e373a6)
b. First Argument for antecedent (73a7-b2)
c. Second Argument for antecedent (73b3-76d)
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Principles concerning recollection (73b3-74a8)
The Equality Argument (74b7-c5)
The Recollection Argument (74c7-75d5)
Responses to objections (75d6-76d)
d. Recapitulation (76d-77a)
3. The Survival Objection (77b-c)
4. The Affinity Argument (78b-84b)
5. Simmias’ & Cebes’ Objections (85e-88b)
a. The soul as harmony (85c-86e)
b. The soul as a cloak (86e-88b)
6. Arguments Against Simmias/Harmony (91e95a)
7. Argument Against Cebes/Cloak (95a-107b)
a. Introduction (95a-96a)
b. Socrates’ Philosophical Biography (96a-102b)
i. Natural Science Phase (96a-97b)
ii. Anaxagoras Phase (97b-99d)
iii. Second Voyage/Method of Hypothesis (99d-102b)
X is F because x participates in F-ness
c. The Final Argument (102c-107b)
i. Simmias/Socrates/Cebes case (102b-103a)
ii. Objection and reply (103a-c)
iii. The Clever view (103c-105c)
X is F because x participates in G-ness and G-ness
entails F-ness
iv. The immortality argument (105c-107b)
D. The Myth (107c-115a)
E. The Death Scene (115a-118a)
General Structure of the Argument
from 64a-69e
1. Death is separation of the soul from the body
2. Philosophers seek wisdom and truth
3. Wisdom and truth can only (or best) be gained
when the soul is separated from the body
4. So, philosophers seek separation of the soul from
the body
5. So, philosophers seek death
6. So, philosophers should willingly die
Recollection in the Phaedo
• Second Argument for the Immortality of Soul
(72e-78b): If TR -> Soul is immortal
– Furthermore, Socrates, Cebes rejoined, such is also the
case if that theory (logos) is true that you are
accustomed to mention frequently, that for us learning
(mathesis) is no other than recollection (anamnesis)
[Phaedo 71e3-6; Grube trans.]
• Arguments for TR
– First Argument: the slave boy example (73a-b)
– Second Argument for TR (73b-76d)
Second Argument
1.
“if anyone is to be reminded of a thing, he must have known that thing at
some time previously.” [73c1-2; Gallop trans.]
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2.
“if someone, [a] on seeing a thing, or hearing it, or getting any other senseperception of it, [b] not only recognizes that thing, but also thinks of
something else, [c] which is the object not of the same knowledge but of
another, don’t we then rightly say that he’s been ‘reminded’ of the object of
which he has got the thought?” [73c6-d1; Gallop trans.]
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
x is reminded by y of z at t  x knew z before t.
[a] A perceives x, [b] A thinks of/knows y, and [c] knowledge of x ≠ knowledge of y 
A recollected y
There is equality (74a9-b1)
We know what it is (74b2-3)
We got this knowledge of equality by perceiving equal things (74b4-7) –
[2a]
Equality is distinct from equal things (74b8-74c6) – [2c]
We learn equality by perceiving equal things by noticing the latter’s
deficiency to the former (74c7-75a10) – [2b]
So, we knew equality before noticing this deficiency (75b1-c6)
Generalized to all forms (75c7-d5)
But, we have not always had this knowledge (75d6-76d6)
So, TR <-> Forms (76d7-77a5)
Differences between Meno &
Phaedo
• Meno: robust knowledge acquisition
Phaedo: concept formation ?
• Meno: mathematics
Phaedo: no mathematics
• Meno: no stress on sense perception
Phaedo: sense perception
• Meno: introduced to meet a problem
Phaedo: introduced to prove immortaltiy
• No commitment to Forms in Meno
Hypothesis in Phaedo
• The problem
– It is no unimportant problem that you raise, Cebes, for it requires a
thorough investigation of the cause of generation and destruction.
I will, if you wish, give you an account of my experience in theses
matters. Then if something I say seems useful to you, make use of
it to persuade us of your position. [95e9-96a4; Grube trans.]
• The method of the natural scientists [96a-97b]
– I do not any longer persuade myself that I know why a unit or
anything else comes to be, or perishes or exists by the old method
of investigation, and I do not accept it, but I have a confused
method of my own. [97b3-7; Grube trans.]
• The method of Anaxagoras [97b-99c]
– I would gladly become the disciple of any man who taught the
workings of that kind of cause. However, since I was deprived and
could neither discover it myself nor learn it from another, ... [99c69; Grube trans.]
• The method of hypothesis [99c-101e]
– ... do you wish me to give you an explanation of how, as a second
best, I busied myself with the search for the cause, Cebes? [99c9d2; Grube trans.]
The Method of Natural Science
When Socrates was young he was keen on the wisdom
(sophia) called natural (peri phuseos historian); he thought
it would be splendid to know (eidenai) answers to
questions like the following: (96a6-c1)
1. Do living things develop whenever the hot and the cold
give rise to putrefaction?
2. Is it blood, air or fire by which we think?
3. Or is it none of these, but is it that the brain provides the
senses, from which memory and doxa become?
4. Does knowledge come to be in this way from memory and
doxa when they acquire stability (heremein)?
5. How these things are destroyed?
Socrates discovers, however, that he
has no gift for this sort of inquiry
This investigation made me quite blind even
to those things which I and others thought
that I clearly knew before, so that I
unlearned what I thought I knew before,
about many other things, but specifically
about how men grew. [96c3-7; Grube trans.]
• Three sets of examples of things that Socrates
thought he could explain but no longer does:
(96c7-97b3)
a. the growth of a human being (96c7-d6)
b. one thing’s being larger than another (96d8-e4)
c. one thing’s becoming two (96e6-97b3)
Conclusion
• His reason for his
thinking(97b3-7)
that he can no longer
explain a thing’s becoming two is apparently that
it violates the following principle
• (Causal Law) x’s opposite must not be an aitia for
anything being F (97a7-b3, cf. 101b9-c2, c7-8)
Conclusion (97b3-7)
And I no longer believe that I know
(epistamai) by this method (methodou) even
how one is generated or, in a word, how
anything is generated or is destroyed or
exists, and I no longer admit this method,
but have another confused way of my own.
[97b3-7; Lamb trans.]
What Socrates had hoped to learn
from Anaxagoras (97b7-98b6)
• If then one wished to know the cause of each
thing, why it comes to be, or perishes or exists,
one had to find what was the best way for it to be,
or be acted upon, or to act. On these premises
then it befitted a man to investigate only, about
this and other things, what is best. The same man
must inevitably also know what is worse, for that
is part of the same knowledge (epistemen). [97c6d5; Grube trans.]
As I reflected on this subject I was glad to think
that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher
(didaskalon) about the cause of things after my
own heart, and that he would tell me, first,
whether the earth is flat or round, and then would
explain why it is so of necessity (anagken), saying
which is better (ameinon), and that it was better to
be so. If he said it was in the middle of the
universe, he would go on to show that it was better
for it to be in the middle, and if he showed me
those things I should be prepared never to desire
any other kind of cause. [97d7-98a2; Grube trans.]
• Once he had given the best for each as the
cause for each and the general cause of all, I
thought he would go on to explain the
common good for all, and I would not have
exchanged my hopes for a fortune. I
eagerly acquired his books and read them as
quickly as I could in order to know the best
and the worst as soon as possible. (98b1-6;
Grube trans.]
Socrates’ Disappointment (98b7-c8)
Imagine not being able to distinguish the
real cause from that without which the
cause would not be able to act as a cause. It
is what the majority appear to do, like
people groping in the dark; they call it a
cause, thus giving it a name that does not
belong to it. [99b2-6; Grube trans.]
Conclusion
• I would gladly become the disciple of any man
who taught the workings of that kind of cause.
However, since I was deprived and could neither
discover it myself (autos heurein) nor learn it from
another (par’ allou mathein), ... [99c6-9; Grube
trans.]
• ... do you wish me to give you an explanation of
how, as a second best (deuteron ploun), I busied
myself with the search for the cause, Cebes?
[99c9-d3; Grube trans.]
Metaphor of the Sun
After this, he said, when I had wearied of investigation
things (ta onta skopein), I thought that I must be careful to
avoid the experience of those who watch an eclipse of the
sun, for some of them ruin their eyes unless they watch its
reflection in water or some such material. A similar
thought crossed my mind, and I feared that my soul would
be altogether blinded if I looked at things (ta pragmata)
with my eyes and tried to grasp them with each of my
senses. So I though I must take refuge in discussions
(logou) and investigate the truth of things by means of
words (skopein ton onton ten aletheian). However,
perhaps this analogy is inadequate, for I certainly do not
admit that one who investigates things by means of words
is dealing with images any more than one who looks at
facts. [Phaedo 99d4-100a3; Grube trans.]
General Description
However, I started in this manner: taking as my
hypothesis (hupothemenos) in each case the theory
that seemed to me the most compelling, I would
consider as true, about cause and everything else,
whatever agreed (sumphonein) with this, and as
untrue whatever did not so agree. But I want to
put my meaning more clearly for I do not think
that you understand me now. 100a3-100a8; Grube
trans.]
Application
This, he said, is what I mean. It is nothing new,
but what I have never stopped talking about, both
elsewhere and in the earlier par of our
conversation. I am going to try to show you the
kind of cause with which I have concerned myself.
I turn back to those oft-mentioned things and
proceed from them. I assume the existence of a
Beautiful, itself by itself, of a Good and a Great
and all the rest. If you grant me these and agree
that they exist, I hope to show you the cause as a
result, and so to find the soul to be immortal.
Take it that I grant you this, said Cebes, and hasten
to your conclusion. [Phaedo 100b1-c2; Grube
trans.]
Phaedo 101d1-e3
But you , ..., would cling to the safety of your own hypothesis
and give that answer. If someone then attacked your
hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and would not
answer until you had examined whether the consequences
that follow from it agree with one another or contradict one
another. And when you must give an account of your
hypothesis itself you will proceed in the same way: you will
assume another hypothesis, the one which seems to you best
of the higher ones until you come to something acceptable,
but you will not jumble the two as the debaters do by
discussing the hypothesis and its consequences at the same
time, if you wish to discover the truth. [Grube trans.]
Examination/Confirmation of
Equivalent Question
• First one identifies a further hypothesis from
which the original hypothesis can be derived and
shows how this derivation goes until one reaches
something adequate and [upward path]
• Second one examines the consequences of the
hypothesis to be whether they are consistent with
other background beliefs or information
concerning the topic under discussion [downward
path].
Questions
• What are the alternative methods?
• Is the method of hypthesis second best?
– To the alternatives mentioned?
– To some other alternative?
• What is the hypothesis?
• Downward path
– Comes first in Phaedo
– ‘Agree with’
• Consistent with
• Entailed by
• Upward path
– What makes something adequate?
Does Plato Have a Theory of Forms
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Annas 1981
Is Plato committed to Forms?
What is it to be so committed?
Aristotle
– Eidos/idea
– Genos
– Ousia
Metaphysics XIII.4 1078b17-1079a4
The theory of Forms (peri ton eidon doxa) occurred to those who
enunciated it because they were convinced as to the true nature of
reality by the doctrine of Heraclitus, that all sensible things are
always in a state of flux; so that if there is to be any knowledge or
thought about anything, there must be certain other entities, besides
sensible ones, which persist. For there can be no knowledge of that
which is in flux. Now Socrates devoted his attention to the moral
virtues, and was the first to seek a general definition of these [20]
(…); and he naturally inquired into the essence of things; for he
was trying to reason logically, and the starting-point of all logical
reasoning is the essence (to ti estin). … There are two innovations
which, may fairly be ascribed to Socrates: inductive reasoning and
general definition. Both of these are associated with the startingpoint of scientific knowledge. But whereas Socrates regarded
neither universals nor definitions as existing in separation, the
Idealists gave them a separate existence, and to these universals
and definitions of existing things they gave the name of Ideas.
Metaphysics 1086a30-b14
… but as for those who speak of the Ideas, we can observe at the same
time their way of thinking and the difficulties which befall them. For they
not only treat the Ideas as universal substances, but also as separable and
particular. … The reason why those who hold substances to be universal
combined these two views was that they did not identify substances with
sensible things. They considered that the particulars in the sensible world
are in a state of flux, and that none of them persists, but that the universal
exists besides them and is something distinct from them. This theory, as
we have said in an earlier passage, was initiated by Socrates as a result of
his definitions, but he did not separate universals from particulars; and he
was right in not separating them. This is evident from the facts; for
without the universal we cannot acquire knowledge, and the separation of
the universal is the cause of the difficulties which we find in the Ideal
theory. Others, regarding it as necessary, if there are to be any substances
besides those which are sensible and transitory, that they should be
separable, and having no other substances, assigned separate existence to
those which are universally predicated; thus it followed that universals and
particulars are practically the same kind of thing.
Metaphysics 987a29-b13
The philosophies described above were succeeded by the system of Plato,
which in most respects accorded with them, but contained also certain peculiar
features distinct from the philosophy of the Italians. In his youth Plato first
became acquainted with Cratylus and the Heraclitean doctrines -- that the
whole sensible world is always in a state of flux, and that there is no scientific
knowledge of it -- and in after years he still held these opinions. And when
Socrates, disregarding the physical universe and confining his study to moral
questions, sought in this sphere for the universal and was the first to
concentrate upon definition, Plato followed him and assumed that the problem
of definition is concerned not with any sensible thing but with entities of
another kind; for the reason that there can be no general definition of sensible
things which are always changing. These entities he called “Ideas,” and held
that all sensible things are named after them sensible and in virtue of their
relation to them; for the plurality of things which bear the same name as the
Forms exist by participation in them. (With regard to the “participation,” it was
only the term that he changed; for whereas the Pythagoreans say that things
exist by imitation of numbers, Plato says that they exist by participation -merely a change of term. As to what this “participation” or “imitation” may be,
they left this an open question.)
Evidence
• Passages which presuppose the theory of
Forms
• Arguments for the theory of Forms
• Motivations for the theory of Forms
(Cherniss)
Arguments for the Theory of
Forms
• Phaedo 74a9-c5 – The Equality Argument
• Republic V.475d-476b – The Argument
from Opposites
• Republic X.596a5-b4 – The One Over
Many Argument
• Timaeus 51d3-e6 – The Argument from
Knowledge
The One Over Many Argument
Do you want us to begin our examination,
then, by adopting our usual procedure? As you know,
we customarily hypothesize a single form in
connection with each of the many things to which we
apply the same name. Or don't you understand?
I do.
Then let's now take any of the manys you like.
For example, there are many beds and tables.
Of course.
But there are only two forms of such furniture,
one of the bed and one of the table. (Republic
X.596a5-b4; Grube/Reeve trans.]
The Argument from Knowledge
If understanding and true opinion are distinct, then these "by
themselves" things definitely exist-these Forms, the objects not of
our sense perception, but of our understanding only. But if-as some
people think-true opinion does not differ in any way from
understanding, then all the things we perceive through our bodily
senses must be assumed to be the most stable things there are. But
we do have to speak of understanding and true opinion as distinct,
of course, because we can come to have one without the other, and
the one is not like the other. It is through instruction that we come
to have understanding, and through persuasion that we come to
have true belief. Understanding always involves a true account
while true belief lacks any account. And while understanding
remains unmoved by persuasion, true belief gives in to persuasion.
And of true belief, it must be said, all men have a share, but of
understanding, only the gods and a small group of people do.
(Timaeus 51d3-e6; Zeyl trans.)
Motivations for the Theory of
Forms
• TF accounts for objectivity in ethics
(Cherniss)
• TF accounts for the distinction between
knowledge and sensation/opinion (Cherniss)
• TF accounts for the instability in the
phenomena (Cherniss)
• TF accounts for how words get their
meaning (White)
Motivations from the Elenctic
Dialogues
• TF may provide substance to Socratic
Eudaemonism
• TF may account for the possibility of
inquiry (and knowledge in general)
• TF may provide a justification for the
Socratic concern with definition