Can Virtue be Taught?
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‘Old’ features:
Looking for a definition – in this case, what
virtue is and whether it can be taught – and,
in the first part of the dialogue, not finding
an answer.
Philosophy as a process of Q&A, not rhetoric
(speech making) or sophistry: examining your
beliefs critically
Caring for your soul – rather than money,
political power, etc. – is the most important
thing.
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Putting forward positive positions:
The possibility of inquiry and the theory of
recollection
Anamnesis: the soul is eternal, knows
‘everything’ but has to recollect it
Virtue as a form of wisdom
The difference between true belief and
knowledge
The beginning of a theory of Forms
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Lack of women
Almost no women in
Plato’s dialogues
Women had few rights
in Athens (different in
Sparta)
No vote: not allowed to
participate in political
life
Restricted to home
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Hints of male
homosexuality
Modern vs. Ancient
Educational component
Transitional
Interfemoral or
intercrural sex
Aristocratic practice
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Section 1: Meno's opening question and the
discussion about the meaning of virtue, a
section which ends with Meno's complaint
about Socrates merely leading him and others
into confusion without providing a clear
answer (up to 80b).
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Section 2: The discussion of knowledge as
recollection and the experiment with Meno's
slave, a section which ends with Socrates
urging us to seek for the truth within our own
souls (which carry all knowledge) (from 80b
to 86c).
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Section 3: The enquiry into whether virtue is
knowledge or comes by nature, whether there
is any difference between true opinion and
knowledge, a section which ends with the
apparently skeptical conclusion that virtue
comes neither by education nor by nature, so
it must be a gift from the gods (from 86c to
the conclusion of the dialogue).
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“Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be
taught? Or is it not teachable but the result of
practice, or is it neither of these, but men
possess it by nature or by some other way?”
(70a)
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Must know what x is before we can specify its
characteristics. In this case, we must know
what virtue is before we can know whether it
can be taught
Typical Socratic claim about ignorance
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There is a virtue for men (viz., being able to
manage public affairs, benefit his friends,
harm his enemies, & cause no harm to
himself), another for women (viz., manage
home well, preserve its possessions, & be
submissive to her husband), and others for
children, slaves, etc. (71e)
Typical Socratic response: looking for
overarching, essential characteristics for all
types of virtue. (72b-73c)
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Bee analogy (72b-c)
Meno: “I would say that they do not differ
from one another in being bees.”
Genus-species definition
Universals
Forms (eventually)
Socrates: “The same is true in the case of the
virtues. Even if they are many and various, all
of them have one and the same form which
makes them virtues…” (72c).
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Two key assumptions: first, that such a
universal exists (if not in the real world
around us, then in the intelligible world--if
we cannot see it with our eyes, we can
perceive it with our minds) and, second, that
a proper answer to the question about virtue
must focus on some way of reaching this
intelligible universal. Socrates doesn't
explicitly make either of those two claims,
but they are clearly implied by the question
and by Socrates' example of the definition of
shape.
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Virtue is the ability to rule (73d)
But: doesn’t apply to children or slaves
(therefore, the definition too broad)
But: perhaps it needs to specify that one rule
justly (making the original definition too
broad as well)
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Is justice a virtue or virtue itself (73 e) E.g.,
roundness is a shape not shape itself or all of
shape. This takes us once again to the issue
of universals.
Socrates insists that we can’t refer to
individual instances of things (whether they
be bees, shapes, or virtues) when we are
looking for the universal “virtue.” Note that
this universal will be both real and yet not
physical. We can touch, etc., instances of
things, but not the thing itself (i.e., the idea
of it, which Plato eventually will call its Form).
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In general, definitions must cover all
instances of a thing (i.e., be a universal)
without covering other things as well (not too
broad or too narrow), & must use language
that will be understood (i.e., not refer to
other words/concepts that are unclear)
E.g., Shape is the limit of a solid (76a)
This doesn’t help them discover the correct
definition of virtue, however.
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“Virtue is the desire for beautiful [i.e., good]
things and the power to acquire them” (77b).
Can we desire bad things?
When we desire something, we want to
possess it? The possession of bad things
brings us harm. Hence, when someone
desires something that is in fact bad, she
believes it to be good. Thus, no one desires
what they know to be bad, and knowingly
only desires good things (77b-78b)
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This is an odd claim from most contemporary
perspectives. E.g., in Christianity, sin is
typically thought of as knowing what the right
thing to do is, but not doing it.
Aristotle also thought somewhat similarly
with his notion of weakness of will (akrasia)
But if virtue really is a type of knowledge,
then Plato seems to have some point (even if
he’s wrong ultimately).
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Since every one desires good things, those
who are ‘better’ (or more virtuous) are those
who are more successful at acquiring good
things.
Meno suggests that good things are gold,
silver , and health and wealth.
But: this must be done justly – for to acquire
good things unjustly is the opposite of virtue.
But this leads to another ‘fragmented’ (i.e.,
non universal) definition since now “every
action is virtue if it is performed with a part
of virtue [justice]” (79b-c).
Socrates?
Torpedo fish?
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Meno’s paradox: “How will we look for it
[virtue], Socrates, when we do not know at all
what it is? How will you aim your search for
something you do not know at all? If you shall
meet with it, how will you know that this is
the thing that you did not know?” (80d)
A debater’s trick” he cannot search either for
what he knows or for what he does not know.
He cannot search for what he knows – since
he knows it, there is no need to search – nor
for what he does not know, for he does not
know what to look for” (80e)
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“We must not, therefore, believe that
debater's argument, for it would make us
idle, and fainthearted men like to hear it,
whereas my argument makes them energetic
and keen on the search” (81d-e).
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Seeking and learning are nothing but
recollection
Slave boy example:
Trying to get the slave boy, who has not been
educated, to figure out how long the side of a
square that is double the size of an original
is.
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Doubling the length
of one side (e.g.,
AD ->AL) won’t
work.
Choosing a
distance midway
between the two
will not work either
(i.e., 3 feet as
opposed to 2 in the
original or 4 as in
quadruple the size
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You have to square
the diagonal
We have within us
true opinions
which, with good
educators who use
questions and
repetition, can be
turned into
knowledge
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1) The slave boy either acquires knowledge or has
always had it.
2) If SB has acquired it, then he has done so in a
previous life since he has not been educated in this
one.
3) Knowledge was acquired when he was not in
human shape.
4) Given SB example, true opinions must be
transferred into knowledge.
5) If 4 is true, then the soul has always been in a
state of knowledge.
Conclusion: If 5, then the soul is immortal.
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How does immortality and reincarnation resolve
how we acquire knowledge? “As the soul is
immortal, has been born many times and has seen
all things here and in the underworld, there is
nothing which it has not learned… (81c-d). Does
the mere acquaintance with something (“seen”)
mean we know it?
“I do not insist that my argument is right in all
other respects, but … we will all be better men … if
we believe that one must search for things one
does not know… (86c).
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Method of hypothesis (87)
IF virtue is NOT knowledge, then it can’t be
taught (87c)
If virtue is a good and IF knowledge is also a
good, then goodness will be knowledge (87d)
IF virtue is a good, then it will benefit us.
Examples of benefit: health, strength, beauty,
wealth.
But these can be used badly as well.
Necessity of wisdom: if the soul is directed by
wisdom, things end in happiness (88c)
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IF virtue is always beneficial, it must be a
form of wisdom. (Not good by nature (89b))
BUT: IF knowledge is virtue, then there should
be teachers of it. And IF no teachers, then it
is not a form of knowledge. (89d-e)
Anytus enters
Crafts example: There are teachers for crafts
such as physicians, shoemakers, etc.
But who are the teachers of virtue?
Sophists (91b)
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Anytus skeptical (though he has no personal
experience with them.) Any Athenian man
would do a better job (92e)
Counterexamples: Lots of good men who had
bad sons (93-94)
Anytus leaves after a warning (94e-95).
Socrates concludes that since there are no
teachers of virtue, it can not be taught (96 BC).
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Knowledge = true belied that is justified
The Larissa example (97a-b)
“Correct opinion is neither inferior to
knowledge nor less useful in directing
actions… (98c). They are, though, more apt
to be forgotten (98a)
Knowledge is a gift from the gods (100b).
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True belief is required for inquiry, not
knowledge
Knowledge = (at least) justified true belief
The method of hypothesis: as in geometry,
assume x is the case and see what follows. All
that follows will be true but only given our
original assumptions.