THE FUTURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL LAW:
THE MACHINE STATE1
Abstract
Advances in technology will challenge and change the current manner in which legal regulation
occurs. It has always been possible to describe governance and law as a form of technology in
itself, but the growth of digital technologies provides a new means by which to regulate the
population. This article posits the theory that the inherent characteristics of technology will
become inherent within the digitisation of law. As law becomes an increasingly digital entity, it
will become more concerned with perfect reproduction of law upon the person, and so more
encompassing in its scope. In addition to that, the increasing use of digital technologies in
augmented reality, in 3d and 4d printing, both in solid and biological matter, poses a fundamental
change in the regulatory relationship between the State and the individual – a challenge which the
State will need to address.
Keywords:
Susskind, Heidegger, Giddens, Technology, Copyright.
1.INTRODUCTION
“If you really want to take a step back...I think what happens is that people in
their industry become very self-serving .. instead of thinking what is good for
the world .. I think you could become a bit myopic when you only deal with
your own industry because you don't get a larger picture of what's happening
and so maybe if I really was to extend it out and get a little more
philosophical about it, I would say that as humans one of the things we want
to do is to take the ideas that are in my brain and put them in your brain; and
so, we have developed amazing things to do this.”2
The development of technology leads inexorably to the development of a ‘machine State.’
Technology is responsible for enabling innovation, the industrial revolution, the Internet, war, peace
and the extermination machinery of Auschwitz. Within these events, the machinations of technology,
both unthinking and deliberate, are such that they cannot be ignored. In this brief thesis,
machination refers to the way in which a machine is capable of influencing not just our thought, our
conversation, our dialogue, our ‘being’ within society and the relations between individuals
themselves, but the manner in which individuals relate to the regulating State and how the State
relates to them. Technologies have always influenced us in this way, but as technology develops, as
we enter into a period of augmented reality, of 3d and 4d scanning and printing of both nonbiological and biological matter, of DNA programming, we are entering a period of hybridised reality
1
This research is in part based around qualitative empirical interviews that were funded by BILETA. The
funding was for the project “Property in Copyright.” My thanks to all those who contributed comments and
thoughts on the paper and its underlying thesis, in particular the two anonymous reviewers and the editor of
this journal.
2
Quote from research interview. The interviews were conducted on an anonymous basis, as explained within
the body text under section 3.
and hybridised law. This is the reality of thought through technology, of not just seeing the world
through technology, through Google Glass,3 but also a world where technology will increasingly
become a part of our inner being. It is a bio-synthesis, a machination of technology which will
similarly lead to a hybridised form of technology and law.
The regulation of tomorrow, if not today, is a technical machination. The scope of law and the scope
of technology are ever increasing, the machinations of the technology leading to a future of
regulation beyond anything yet envisaged: A ‘machine State’ both utopian and dystopian. This short
thesis will focus squarely upon the most divisive, pervasive and important type of regulation, that of
copyright law,4 and why the nature of technology will shape copyright law and in turn how that
shaping of copyright law will fundamentally change the development of the State. To do so, this
paper will follow the following structure: 1) A theoretical consideration of the assumptions made
about technology in society, 2) an empirical study into those assumptions, 3) the consequence of
this for future calls for legal reform, 4) the consequence of those calls for the development of society
and lastly, 5) a conclusion placing the thesis of this essay within context.
2. THE ASSUMPTIONS MADE ABOUT TECHNOLOGY
There is much literature available which considers the possible functions of technology, the degree
to which it does or does not inform our beliefs and our desires.5 This paper does not concern itself
directly with that wider question, for the purpose of this paper is to consider the machination of
technology in the legal regulation of society. First, a word is required on the meaning and purpose of
“technology.” It is used in the ‘historical’ Heideggerian sense, namely, to cover everything from
traditional technologies like spades and hammers through to the technologies of leadership, i.e.
bureaucracy (Heidegger (1954)). The technology of regulation is not by any means new, but perhaps
we should consider more overtly the means by which the tools of that technology operate.
The tools of which technology is comprised have self-evidently played a critical role in the
development of society. It is tools around which prehistoric society developed –the example is the
technology of sticks, axes and so forth.6 It is a means by which culture is created and recorded. The
tools of technology form an integral part of society, to the extent that over time the physical
function can become forgotten and neglected. Similarly, Heidegger talks of how a person using a
hammer as a tool will become one with a tool (Heidegger (1927)).7 However, we can go further
when considering this in relation to the State. Landowners are not so likely to consider their physical
land as a tool, i.e. of bureaucratic or state regulation. Likewise with schools as a physical tool
causing a physical change upon the developing mind and yet – not the usual way to consider a
3
See Google Glass documentation at http://www.google.co.uk/glass/start/ and see
http://googleglassforum.net/. For an example of this technology, see L Matthews, Google Glass becomes your
personal translator, Geek.com, available at http://www.geek.com/news/google-glass-becomes-your-personaltranslator-with-word-lens-acquisition-1594120/
4
For reasons explained below in section 2, it is the argument of this paper that copyright law will become the
most important law of the future, pre-empting most other laws.
5
For further discussion see below, this section, paragraph 4.
6
See inter alia Watson, Ideas, Part 1 (2005), Borstein, The Creators, Part III (1992), R Shumaker, K Walkup and
for further consideration B Beck, Animal Tool Behaviour: The Use and Manufacture of Tools by Animals (2011).
7
Heidegger, Being and Time (1927) Note SUNY edition trans. J Stambaugh (2010) at 100-101.
School, yet undeniably is a tool, a machinic assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari (1998))8 that leads to
physical changes in the developing mind.9 The divergence shows how the physical tool element in
technocratic regulation has become side-lined. The dialogic and discursive, intangible elements
become the focus: the effect of those elements rather than the physical nature of the tool
themselves.
The crucial element in this discussion is not the well-rehearsed nature of being, but the importance
of the tool. We can strip concepts such as land ownership bare of its semantic and legal
connotations. The tool (once identified) is a critical core component. It does not extend just to land
and schools. Capitalism is a complex physical tool, a representation of objects. Using something as a
unit of exchange may also be described as a technology - the technology of money. Naturally, the
technology of money is something that regulation has encouraged. It has been encouraged in a way
that permits free competition and enables the individual to easily buy and sell. Most importantly, it
is a technology that has allowed the individual to interact with the law on a daily basis - for instance,
through contracts governed by contract law. Indeed, the technology itself forms a multifaceted
matrix, and interfaces with the many other types of technology. The selling of objects is often
dependent upon the underlying technology involved in their manufacture. Moving beyond
capitalism, the body itself is even a physical tool – part of the ‘bio-power’, we might argue, of which
Foucault writes (1978-1979). As with the notion of sexuality which Foucault identified in The History
of Sexuality (1976), we could suggest that there is within society a desire to move away from the
baseness of the idea of the tool. Indeed, to call someone a “tool” is even considered as an insult in
the West. Yet, this lack of openness and engagement has led to a situation - which we now find
ourselves in – of having made assumptions and overbearing decisions about the nature of the world
that we live in. We make assumptions of the most basic things, yet those assumptions may have an
enormous technological impact in our daily life.
The historical interplay between the individual and technology is complex. Much has been written
about it. For instance, there are views about how technology has affected the development of the
human mind,10 the way in which technology affects society,11 and affects the way in which we see
the world around us.12 However, what we tend not to think about is how the relationship of law and
technology affects the nature of legal regulation.13 These assumptions are such that they can pose a
considerable impact upon the involvement of the people within society. Jon Bing, in whose memory
and honour this issue is published, was a great advocator of access to justice. Throughout his many
articles and works he was keen to consider the impact of technology upon both the public and legal
professions. His last article, for instance, focused upon the impact of technical regional databases
8
G Deleuze and F Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (1998) at 4 and at 504-508. The Rhizome analysis in Chapter 1
could apply here.
9
This analysis is similar to the notion of the visible and the articulable in Foucault, The Order of Things (1966).
10
Meant primarily In the Heideggerian sense that technology is an outcome of our technological view of the
world – Heidegger (1954) but one could also focus upon the use of tools more generally within animal species,
e.g. inter alia R Shumaker, K Walkup; B Beck, Animal Tool Behavior, supra n.6.
11
B Steigler, Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (1998), B Latour, Reassembling the Social: An
Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (2005).
12
D Ihde Technology and the Lifeworld: From garden to earth (1990), i.e. embodiment relations (quite literally
too – he discusses glasses at 73 and 94).
13
Most works cited above skirt around the issue of legal regulation. An exception would be R Susskind, The
Future of the Law (1996).
upon our understanding of global legal concepts. His approach is neatly summed up in the following
quote:
“We need to utilise the advantages of global spread of legal information. We
need to find possibilities of exploiting the advantage of other jurisdictions
having legal material which may be of interest. Current principles of using
material across frontiers have been forged in a situation where it has been
difficult to exploit case law or legislative reviews from other countries. … We
should be guided by the vision of WorldLII, and look for knowledge-based
solutions that seek out and consolidate material upon request of the
professional user. If this is realised, we will see that the dynamics of the legal
system itself, where a legal argument takes into consideration prior decisions,
may over time work itself into a more harmonised view as courts and other
institutions puzzle together not only the pieces of their national systems, but
also try to make them fit within a bigger, international picture.”14
The technology itself, the regulation of that technology, and most importantly, the gaps in-between,
have a direct impact upon the way in which we interface with our law and our regulators. Copyright
regulation is increasingly important in this relationship because of the way in which technology is
being characterised as a technological work. Computer software can be covered by copyright
because it comprises of human readable code (the source code), works made using that software
will also often be considered a copyrightable work, and even the hardware can be. With the growth
in technologies such as 3d printing and scanning, objects can begin to be copyrightable under
existing law in a way in which they previously might not have been. The advent of 3d printing with
DNA also poses a challenge in that content containing DNA will, under current law, also be
protectable through copyright law so long as it meets the usual (low) subsistence requirements.15
The more digital technology will enable and regulate uses, the more the reach of copyright will
spread, protecting the software which is interpreted as an underlying literary work.16 This increasing
reach of copyright law, which is occurring through the increasing infiltration of digital technology in
everyday life, is an event which could substantially change the relationship of the individual with the
State. It changes the dialogue, with the machinations of the technology acting as an intermediary
though which the State can extend the scope of regulation, or be a new means for individuals to
evade it. This is the new machine State.
So, copyright protection is achieved through forms of technology and laws regulating technologies,
but copyright principles have been increasingly utilised in a technological manner which can affect
individuals’ ability to be able to interact and influence those laws. The ability of the individual to be
able to interface with technology will influence the freedom with which they can be involved within
dialogue – the dialogue between the technology and the State regulation of that technology. Hence
the statement:
14
J Bing, Let There Be Lite: A Brief History of Legal Information Retrieval EJLT 1(1) (2010).
For a comprehensive overview see N Caddick, G Davies, G Harbottle (eds), ‘Copinger and Skone James on
Copyright’, 16th edition (2010), Chapter 3.
16
N Caddick, G Davies, G Harbottle (eds), ‘Copinger and Skone James on Copyright’ ibid., at §3-30.
15
“.. when people try to do really innovative things, with business models around
creative content, it is difficult to automate it because no one understands the
value of the use.”17
Such value needs to be captured though technology and, symbiotically, through law – in the manner
that books were historically protected by the scarcity of the printing press alongside legal protection.
The ability of certain groups, particularly the creators of content, to be engaged in the technological
copyright dialogue has also come under the spotlight in the minds of the publishers and distributors
themselves:
“So they [creators] kind of find themselves on the bottom as well- they have the recording
but don't really know what the requirements are to be able to properly license the product.”18
“Quite often if you license from an artist they are not quite sure about whether or not they
have done a cover version of somebody else’s musical work, and then they can't actually give
you permission in that they can give you permission in their recording [but not the original
work] - they don't understand that really.”19
It is not just judicial recognition,20 but also technical recognition, of these groups that affects the
manner in which the individual compare and access copyright law. As recognition is affected by the
arguments of parties in cases, it is important that the judiciary and regulators are aware of these
differing creative flows.21 For instance, it is clear from the empirical research that was carried out
during this study that there is a tendency of many firms to favour the collection of information
concerning viewing habits. To this end they will favour and prefer the use of legislation that protects
object identifiers and law that is increasingly technological in nature. This in turn will affect the use
of other types of copyright legislation. Consequently this is why the judiciary and regulators need to
be aware of different creative flows of different types of companies, because their competing
technical demands in terms of the types of law that they favour will impact the ability of certain
individuals to be able to be involved within the broader social dialogue.
3. EMPRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT TECHNOLOGY IN THE COPYRIGHT SECTOR
This paper is, in part, based around empirical research and was carried out between 2011 and 2013.
20 interviews were carried that were qualitative in nature. These were among book publishers and
music distributors. The majority of the interviews lasted for around one hour in duration. The legal
knowledge of these groups was considerable and reflects the amount of legal interface that takes
place on a daily basis – revealing far more legal knowledge than that likely to be held by the general
public. This in itself represents a challenge when considering the issues about access to the legal
system for individuals creating or reusing copyright works. What the interviews revealed was a
17
Empirical interview, see note Error! Bookmark not defined..
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
A reference to the rule of recognition – JLA Hart, Concept of Law (1961).
21
See a parallel discussion on information flows, N Elkin- Koren, 'Cyberlaw and Social Change: A democratic
approach to copyright law in cyberspace', 14 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 215 (1996), N ElkinKoren, The Rule of the Law and the Rule of the Code, in N Elkin-Koren, and N Netanel, 'The Commodification of
Information', Kluwer, The Hague (2002).
18
desire to shift towards using legal technology in digital form to regulate copyright works, with a
focus on that aspect to the detriment of consideration of the wider impact upon society.
The firms that were interviewed varied considerably in size. Some were self-employed individuals,
others had several hundred employees. As a generalisation, those firms that were small in size
preferred the current operation of copyright law and technology to those larger companies which
were more open to change. The change favoured by large companies is a shift away from existing
copyright protection and to focus upon the information concerning the usage of copyright content –
and it is here where legal protection currently falls short. This is probably not what the reader would
expect, and this paper will suggest that this is due to underlying technological change.
In relation to the point concerning the assumptions made about technologies generally, it became
apparent that some right holders were primarily working within the existing framework and were
not keen to operate outside of that framework. These were companies that favoured the existing
legal and technological structure:
“I can't say that I have had any big cases where things ended up on the internet. I think maybe
ten years ago that happened frequently but quite fast people learned that was not the way to
go.”22
It is the interplay between the technology and the regulation that has led to this situation. It is by no
means the first time; specifically within the context of cultural works, we could cite the historical
regulation of the book trade which was predicated around the technological characteristics of the
printing press. Outside of that context, we can go back to prehistory and focus upon the technology
of those times. The important aspect is how existing technology influences and informs the
perceptions of certain key players as to the scope of regulation.
“I don’t know what to say, other than for me it [property rights in copyright] is a given”23
The existence of the technology provides a horizon (Habermas (1984 & 1987)) against which the
norm of use is predicated. The above quote was in reply to a question about the centrality of
property to copyright regulation, and represented the usual response as to whether copyright
required property rights in order to function. Despite the lucidity of replies when it came to
discussing the details of case law, this was not so to the same extent with the analysis of the
property right itself. To recall, property is both a technical and legal concept, and the technology, so
to speak, behind the right is something that provides the basis for the State-individual dialogue.
Property as technology matches in key respects with property as law, at least so far as right holders
of copyright works are concerned. Each mechanical reproduction of tangible or intangible objects
can be perceived as being owned, whether or not reproduced by that right holder.
The technology of property has allowed right holders to be able to exert their rights over certain
property in order to make financial returns. It is that link through to the technology of money that
has allowed the right holders to be able to produce and distribute works. When the property
technology and the money technology begin to fail, to interface and to engage with the public, a lack
of returns ensues for the right holder:
22
23
Empirical interview, see note 2.
Ibid.
“The record company is...if our bank manager was hearing ... about this sort of
conversation that we probably are gonna have, he probably would withdraw all his
support from my over- draft because there is no... I can't see any reason why any
record company should be existing anymore. We do because that's what we do.”24
This naturally has had some negative effects for certain right holders:
“ We never ever gonna see a great album again. You are never gonna hear
another... a new L.P. You never gonna hear a new band, no, so there is no
justification for doing it [piracy]. So our record label, we are earning from
downloads, a sort of like seven or eight per-cent of what we have lost on
physical sells. “25
“And again going back to the music industry I'm sure and I can see it happening
in published books, is that people are becoming increasingly reluctant compose
music, produce books if there is no perceived value in it for them. I am not sure
how you protect... how you change that by making new laws. I think you have
to simply strengthen the laws that there are and to bring the internet and
people, you know Google and so on to heal.” 26
The future for such right holders is one that reveals a decline in the ability to use the traditional
technologies of legal property for distribution of copyright works due to a split between that legal
regulatory technology, the technology of the physical format, and the public interfacing with them.
In this particular example, the public shifted to other formats, to other means of distribution which
will include piracy of the copyrighted proprietary works. Importantly, the technology available has
enabled this. Despite legal cases such as MP3.com,27 Napster28 or Grokster,29 file sharing of copyright
work continues apace.30
The question this paper seeks to address is whether this disjunct between the technologies of
distribution, the technologies of the law of the State and the technologies available to the individual
will remain. One historical parallel that has existed is that the lack of ‘bite’ that the law has had with
technology has historically mirrored the ability of the technology to be able to avoid regulation.
Difficulties in making copies was mirrored in law by a lack of regulation – after all, why would there
be a need for regulation if the technology did not enable the reproduction to take place? The
difference initially arose with the Internet in that reproduction could take place on a large scale – of
which, of course, much has been written (inter alia Lessig (1999), Vaidhyanathan (2001), Boyle
(1997), Benkler (2006)). However, the underlying technology is changing and once again the
alignment of the technology with the legal rules is beginning to take place.
4. THE DESIRE FOR SURVEILLANCE
24
Ibid.
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
28
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (CA 9, 2001)
29
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (US Supreme Court, 2005)
30
See inter alia G Lunney, Empirical Copyright: A Case Study of File Sharing and Music Copyright, Tulane Public
Law Research Paper No. 14-2 (2014), Lessig, Free Culture (2004) p.67.
25
The start of the alignment between technology and legal rules concerns State management and
surveillance of the Internet. China was one of the countries which originally focused upon the issue
of surveillance using the Golden Shield system which predicted the actions of the populace through
IP monitoring (Feir (1997)). Of course, since then, the systems used for surveillance have revealed a
much broader approach to the relation with State regulation.31 With that increasing breadth comes
three impacts upon the general relationship between the technologies of regulation and the
technologies of distribution. First, the technologies concerned are increasingly digital in nature and
thus can more easily interface with each other. Second, the technologies involved in distribution are
being more implicated in the everyday activities of individuals moving away from just the central
core of copyright. Third, the technologies of surveillance enable the technologies of prediction.
These factors combined mean an increasing parallel between the technology of State regulation and
the digital technologies used in the distribution of works. The parallel is in part a consequence
between the surveillance of the State and the desired surveillance of the customer of copyright
works, and the capitalist-compliant underpinning of the Internet. In the same way that the Internet
is an open system is beneficial for companies who wish to observe the actions of users, so the
openness of the Internet is an advantage to States who wish to observe what the users are doing.
Much initial technological development went into the systems of surveillance which are now likely to
feed into the systems of observation for commercial advantage:
““They created essentially... part of what I was describing they are trying to put all
the information into a single database, they have already done this. Do you know
that company at all? It's called Decibel, they are based here. It was started by an
American because he was working with both the City of New York with Mayor
Giuliani and the FBI and this was around the 9/11 period, essentially what they are
saying was ‘how does this shit happen, like the first bombing of the world Trade
Centre, how come we didn't know that because we should have known this.’ If this
guy lives here and he is working with that guy and we know that guy knows the
other one in some country in the middle east, how come that we can't put that
simple relationship together, if A knows B and B knows C. So he built a very
sophisticated database so that they could start to make the connections in
terrorist networks… to put all the people together we know this is a known
terrorist, who are his friends and business associates lets load them in a data base
and they are related to another group of people and all of a certain you see
relationships… so he built this. He then took this and he said, because he was a big
jazz “aficionado” with a massive collection, he said I should do this for .. [his].. own
collection of music.”“32
The technology of regulation has therefore been able to maintain step with the technological
developments. Of course, in recent history, arguments of right holders have focused around how the
law has not kept pace with technological change (Lessig (1999), Vaidhyanathan (2001)) – however,
as can be observed, what has instead happened is that regulation of digital technologies has been
achieved through greater use of digital technologies by the law enforcement agencies. In turn, it is
this use of technology by the enforcement agencies that is leading to similar methods being
31
32
Consider the revelations of Snowden (Guardian, 2013) and Manning (Wikileaks, 2010).
Empirical interview, see note 2 .
employed by right holders to monitor users, and to consequently then lobby for change which is
more technologically centric, more ontologically correct for technical regulation.
This marks a step change away from some of the traditional views about the nature of law and the
relationship of it with the broader populace. The judiciary have been perceived as a key means
through which the population perceive the law as current, by the judicial application of it. This is the
notion of ‘living law’ (Ehrlich (1936), Brandeis (1915-16)). However, what is happening today is not
the judiciary keeping the law ‘current’ – instead, it is the action of public and private enforcement
agencies. The law has remained steadfastly analogue in a digital age. The digital creation and
application of law has been achieved in the field of enforcement. This creates a substantive law
deficit in the digital realm.
The substantive law deficit is one that occurs on two levels. Firstly, there is the issue that the
vagueness of analogue rules causes uncertainties alien to a digital world. Digital technologies have
traceable content, a detectable stream of information, which is not acknowledged under our
analogue laws but is through their application by enforcement. This is leading to some changes – for
instance, in the UK law of private copying which would appear to be being (finally) legalised33 – but
the larger issues of infringement remain – namely, the uncertainties caused through the current
qualitative tests of taking of a substantial part and derivation. When enforcement takes place, this is
enforcement of a vague law, whose vagueness is the antithesis of digital technology. For example, it
may be unclear whether a character in a novel has copyright but an enforcement agency may decide
it does and begin infringement proceedings. This creates a noticeable deficit between the law and
the enforcement of law, made more noticeable in the online context where, for instance, fan fiction
might not be infringing yet copyright enforcement agencies may decide that it is. Such works being
online means that they are more identifiable as targets of prosecution threats – and there are no
legal provisions to deal with this.34
The second, related, deficit relates to the difference of scope between the digital and the analogue.
Digital works of any sort are typically accessed, and this has led to an increased emphasis upon the
licensing of works (Efroni (2011), Rifkin (2000)). Furthermore, convergence and network effects are
at play within digital technologies which means that those technologies are constantly multiplying
and extending their scope. A method of enforcing law and order generally is likely to spread to
other areas, as has indeed happened with State surveillance methods spreading to more general
Internet usage. Likewise, the notion of licensing of works would have begun with the need to access
data on a computer to be able to use it, and so licensing arose as the technically most appropriate
means of regulation rather than the traditional proprietary sale. Indeed, this has led to calls for
reform based around the notion of licensing:
“Very specifically, yes, for me for copyright law I would do very specific things.
One, I would give unlimited access to citizens and compensate rights-holders with
some sort of a levy or tax scheme and I wouldn't restrict it to music, it should be for
everything, because you can't do everything at once although later you would be able
33
See http://www.ipo.gov.uk/types/hargreaves/hargreaves-copyright/hargreaves-copyright-techreview.htm
for recent developments.
34
See J Griffin and A Nair, Scientia Potentia Est, International Review of Law, Computers and Technology 1
(2013).
to stack things and obviously you can listen to music and read a book at the same
time but essentially it's 24 hours in a day- it’s not hard to cover it up we can see what
they are doing .. and instead of looking at it based on file size or anything else, it's
just about time you spent with something which gives you a pro rata share of that
kind of license fee or whatever.
Second, I think on top of that create a scheme where people then build businesses so
that it's not the end of the monetisation.
Third, I think copyright should be modified so that the term is actually reduced for the
exclusivity period and then there is a longer tail of, OK you can just collect some
money but you no longer have a real say of the destiny of your work… or what people
can do with it… how they can chop it up you get a fee for it… you don't own it for the
next 50 years plus now”35
The calls for these reforms stem directly from the deficits between the State, the technology, and
the public. These deficits have been characteristic of the disjuncture between traditional law and the
recent developments in technology. It has primarily been an issue of enforcement but now the
means to enforce the law have caught up. What does this imply about the current and future
direction of the law? If we cast our minds back to the mid-1990s, there was much debate about the
introduction of laws for ‘Digital Rights Management’ mechanisms, or to give them another name,
technological protection measures.36 Even more debate ensued as to how these laws would be
enforced. In the event, whilst many bottles of ink were spilled discussing how these laws could (and
indeed, did) extend beyond the traditional boundaries of copyright law, (inter alia Lessig (1999, 2001,
2004), Boyle (1997), Vaidhyanathan (2001), Reese (2002-03)) it remained the case that the
mechanisms were circumvented, that (illegal) copies were distributed, and that the right holders had
to turn to other means, to secondary liability,37 authorisation rights,38 filtering39 and ISP legislation40
to attempt to make it difficult for the works to then be distributed. These were attempts by
analogue laws to regulate what the digital technology could and could not do, and it is best
characterised as a reasonably futile attempt to make the general public adhere to copyright rules.
Recent State surveillance techniques mark a shift in regulation in that the means of surveillance are
not analogue but exist embedded within the digital realm. It is, in effect, a non-democratic
enforcement of digital law; a non-democratic detailing of the analogue domestic law. It is a growth
of analogue law that because of network effects, because of the interconnected nature of digital
technologies, has become deeply enshrined within the connected technologies. It is an effect that
we can also expect to see extend into other laws. We can start to observe it within the field of
copyright law where, as mentioned above, the surveillance tools are being deployed to predict and
guess what users will want to see, to know what their habits are, to know what they think before
35
Empirical interview, see note 2.
In particular see J Litman, Digital Copyright (2001), L Lessig, Code (1999), S Vaidhyanthan (2001).
37
In the UK, under s.24-s.27 CDPA 1988, in the US, under the vicarious and contributory liability doctrines.
38
In the UK, s.16 CDPA 1988, in the US, under 17 USC §106.
39
Consider in the EU, C-70/10 Scarlet v SABAM [2011] ECR I-11959 and in the US, MGM v Grokster 518
F.Supp.2d 1197 (CD Cal, 2007).
40
In the UK, the Digital Economy Act 2010, and in the US, there is the Copyright Alert System of the Center for
Copyright Information – see http://www.copyrightinformation.org/the-copyright-alert-system/ .
36
they themselves know what to think – and the calls in turn for this to be further protected by digital
law, digital enforcement.
The current legal rules that may protect such measures were passed at the same time as the DRM
laws – notably the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act 199841 and the EU’s Copyright Directive
200142 – which protect what is known as ‘Copyright Management Information.’43 We need to first of
all note that the notion of “copyright information” is a bit of a misnomer in that any work involving
something copyright related will likely qualify for protection.44 The names of authors, what can and
cannot be copied, can be stored in this information, as can be more “active” information, for
instance digital watermarks and other forms of tracking technologies.45 However, the legislation
concerned remains analogue law, in that they do not directly interface with the original digital
content. Indeed, it was many years subsequent to the introduction of the specific provisions that
they appeared to have any applicability, and they have been the ugly step-sister to the main set of
DRM and TPM provisions with which they were enacted.
This situation has begun to change, with an increasing emphasis upon the digital nature that
regulation needs to hold if it is to be effective. It needs, in essence, to be digital regulation - not an
analogue law about the subject matter of digital content, but an actual interfacing digital law, that is
to say, a truly digital law. The proposed EU copyright code (at the time of writing in 2014) is
significant in this regard – the European Commission consultation paper refers to ‘identifiers’46
which may initially sound redolent of the CMI provisions, but there is a distinction – these identifiers
are designed to interface directly with the digital content. With the CMI provisions there was more
of an analogue gap between the law and the implementation through code, but the identifiers
mentioned in the European Commission paper are quite evidently moving towards a direct digital
interface – to quote, “to create a linked platform, enabling automated licensing across different
sectors.”47
Whilst the formal machineries of Government are working towards an understanding of the
interface with code, private industry is making greater headways into areas beyond State
surveillance. As noted earlier, the open structure of the Internet is such that it mirrors commercial
interests in surveillance. Much of the State surveillance technology was produced by private
companies and it is natural that this has now been utilised by other private companies to assess the
41
‘The Digital Millennium Copyright Act’, Pub. L. 105-304, October 28th 1998, 112 Stat. 2860
Directive 2001/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 167/10.
43
See 17 USC §1202, Art 7 EUCD.
44
The CMI provisions refer to “copyright works” which in practice will be the whole copyright work as
distributed rather than broken down to each copyright element. There is, however, no concrete authority on
the point.
45
For a discussion of those types of watermark see E Ferrill, and E Moyer, 'A survey of digital watermarking', at
Elizabeth.ferill.com/papers/watermarking last accessed in 2002 – no longer available, R Jones, 'Wet footprints?
Digital watermarks: a trail to the copyright infringer on the Internet' 26 Pepperdine Law Review 559 (1999) and
T Page, 'Digital watermarking as a form of copyright protection', 14(6) Computer Law and Security Report 390
(1998).
46
European Commission, Public Consultation on the review of the EU Copyright rules available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/docs/consultationdocument_en.pdf (2013) at 15.
47
Ibid.
42
actions of users in establishing, for instance, what sort of products a consumer may wish to purchase
– which is how Netflix operates:48
“Web 3.0 is where technology starts to work for us instead of the other way around…
so instead of me logging into Spotify to figure out what I want. It's already created
stuff for me, but again all that's underpinned by information and the lack of
information in this industry is stifling. We can't get to a 3.0 world unless we have
basic information.”49
It is that future, that of being able to assess what users want before they know it, which will provide
the source of financial revenue rather than the sale of copyright content. It is as important as the act
of licensing itself. The information about the use of content needs to be protected, yet there is as of
yet no direct means by which all of this information itself can be protected through legal regulation:
“Going back to that iTunes audit that we had…their number one asset… the
part from obviously their eco system of selling i-products to the world…the
number one asset for iTunes is the database, so they jealously guard it and
they have very draconian rules on how the metadata should be
presented.“50
This could lead – and is likely to lead – to calls for direct protection of this sort of information, but
care is required for the network effects of the technology are such that there could be consequences
upon future uses. For instance, the existence of tracking technology in observing how users utilise
content51 could extend to cover the use of content in the real world – especially with the rise in
demand of devices such as Google Glass.52 If that sort of device can recognise real world objects –
which it surely will in time – then it is not such a jump to realise that licensing of real world products
may be required to view them, that real world objects will be altered at the view point of the user –
to enhance the object, or to reduce the usability of the object. The world is likely to become
increasingly fluid in its relationship between the real world and the virtual world,53 and this fluidity is
important if private enforcement of the virtual world is not to trample all over the real world.
Already this overlap has become apparent with the programs of State surveillance, but if our
everyday activity is affected then, quite clearly, there is a need for direct regulatory intervention to
protect the interests of the user.
48
A Madrigal, How Netflix reverse engineered Hollywood, The Atlantic, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/01/how-netflix-reverse-engineeredhollywood/282679/ ; Z Bulygo, ‘How Netflix Uses Analytics To Select Movies, Create Content, and Make
Multimillion Dollar Decisions’ KISSmetrics blog, available at http://blog.kissmetrics.com/how-netflix-usesanalytics/ , A Leonard, How Netflix is turning viewers into puppets, Salon, available at
http://www.salon.com/2013/02/01/how_netflix_is_turning_viewers_into_puppets/
49
Empirical interview, see note 2.
50
Ibid.
51
For example, see http://www.fastcodesign.com/3025318/asides/eyetracking-study-reveals-what-peopleactually-look-at-when-shopping-online.
52
See Google Glass documentation at http://www.google.co.uk/glass/start/ and see
http://googleglassforum.net/. For an example of this technology, see L Matthews, Google Glass becomes your
personal translator, Geek.com, available at http://www.geek.com/news/google-glass-becomes-your-personaltranslator-with-word-lens-acquisition-1594120/
53
Consider virtual fluid architecture – M Novak, Liquid Architectures in Cyberspace, in M Benedickt,
Cybserspace (1992).
5. THE FUTURE - SYMBIOSIS
The transposition of State surveillance technologies by private companies further into the realm of
everyday activities reveals is an increasing technocratisation not just of our relationship with the
State, or even with private companies, but also between ourselves. The technology of State
regulation, of the distributor, and of the individual is moving ever closer together. The implications
of this are way beyond anything which we have experienced so far, and probably beyond our current
imagination. The digital future is starting here, the future in which the technology around us directly
interfaces with us. Bio-power, the brain child of Foucault (1976), is about to take a radical turn, a
turn where we can begin to identify a powerful symbiosis between the individual and the technology
of the State. Google Glass is one such example, where the glasses are a digital interface between us
and the world, but other examples abound. For instance, 3d printing could lead to a situation where
the same content identifiers are used to influence the manner in which objects can be 3d ‘scanned’
and then reproduced with a printer (Ernesto (2013), Whitwarn (2012)). They could even be used
where content is printed biologically, i.e. using what is known as 4d printing where the printing
material also prints itself54 – which could be done with man-made materials but also biological
material using programmed DNA. This is the future symbiosis of which we need to be aware, if we
are to make informed choices for the future technology of regulation and the future of biosynthesis.
If regulation is likely to become symbiotic with the human body, then we should also plan for that as
we plan for the near future.
We can observe the basis for the ever increasing technological symbiosis in the prehistory of man.
The tools, the use of them, the development of State and the regulation of the State, all is down to
the use of technologies, just as Heidegger identified in his hammer example where the tool and the
man enter a form of symbiosis (Heidegger (1927)).55 Technology is the basis and the means by which
individuals have come to interact with one another, from the technology of speech to the
technology of the Internet; from the technology of peace to the technology of war. War machines
even bring together human minds,56 eliminating difference - the unending, ceaseless, sometimes
unedifying and ugly truth of technology. The unavoidable future is an ever greater union between
man and machine, between the technology machines of the State and of the people. Our
architectures, our ways of being, will become increasingly virtual and biological, and thus it is
necessary for an informed future of regulation to be ontologically correct, for the law to be able to
engage with this way of being: to engage with the technology of and within the body, and to be
aware of its thinking and unthinking machinations.
The technology affects the way in which individuals communicate and rationalise with each other,
and with the way in which the State itself has developed. State regulation has often been invasive in
some form or other, be that through principles relating to censorship, copyright, privacy – the
technical State of digital technocracy. The rise first of all of CMI, then of Identifiers, and then more
invasive and involving direct digital regulation, indicates a phase shift towards the observation of the
individual and the actions of that individual. Furthermore, the technological feed of the future, web
54
See for instance Skylar Tibbits TED lecture of how this works – TED Lectures, How 4d printing works (2013)
see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0gMCZFHv9v8 esp. at 4”10’ for a demonstration.
55
Supra n. 7
56
Chiefly a reference to G Deleuze and F Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (1998) supra n 8 Chapter 12. Consider
also F Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882) trans. W Kaufmann (1974) at §109, §110.
3.0, will provide users with an individualised Internet, but in all probability through surveillance
algorithms which will lead the user in particular directions. The debate as to the rights and wrongs in
terms of driving individuals towards them ‘thinking’ what they want has been well covered by
Adorno and Horkheimer (1944, trans. 1972), and their discussants. Future regulation should be
aware of the continued convergence of technologies in addition to the subject matter. The
architecture of control will become increasingly important.
6. CONCLUSION: THE MACHINE STATE
Assumptions have been common in the development of the State – from the assumptions made
about the importance of the technologies, through to the assumptions made about the necessity of
the technologies of capitalism and economy. These assumptions are insidious, in that they can lead
to failings in dialogue within society between various groups (Derrida (1988)). Roberto Unger (1976),
a proponent of group pluralism, identified the importance of groups to the development of a society.
Technology has played a critical role in the formation of these groups, in the ways in which they
interact. Likewise, Foucault, in The Order of Things (1970, Chapter One esp.), also is indirectly
referencing back to the importance of technologies within the individual’s perception of the world
and of history – even if the perception may not be realised or side-lined by more traditional
interpretations. The assumptions that are made about technology have a direct impact in the initial
and on-going formation of groups. Bing discussed how the gathering of information could distort our
understanding of our immediate world view. It can also influence us as to the formation of future
groups which are the cause and reason for the technology. The structure of the society, as created
by the technology, is the consequence of earlier groups and so future structures are a combination
of these groups. There is an analogy with Gidden’s view of structuration, with the groups’ own
dynamics and social life causing change to the structure of society and vice-versa (Giddens (1984)).
The machination of the technology provides another process to consider, perhaps even the most
central for it is upon technologies that all societies depend.
So, whilst technology has played a critical function in the development of group plurality, technology
in future may also be said to play a critical role. It is likely to form the basis of the development of
further group pluralities, because law will form new pluralities between groups if it takes a directly
interventionist form. The closer the integration, the greater we can assume the influence of the law
– particularly in relation to digital factors, where the more certain flows of digital technologies and
more certain flows of law will influence the forming and evolution of pluralist groups. For example, if
the law becomes increasingly ‘coded’ in form and meaning, then the language of that code, the
architecture of the code,57 the dialogue of the code, will form and influence future debate and
future groups. If a dialogue evolves in a language and form technically alien or opposed to another
language or form, then the technology itself, with its network effects, will lead to clashes and
collisions. We see this in the history of clashes between civilisations in different stages of technical
development; those tribes who were obliterated by Western civilisations. We also see it in the
current development of coding groups, not just computer coding groups but groups which define
their own coda, their own values and judgments, arising phoenix-like from the ashes of the failed
technologies of others: Competing clans of computer uses (Amiga v Atari, Apple v PC), competing reusers of content, users v creators, creators v publishers, so the codas of groups will clash. The
57
Recall L Lessig, Code (1999) in particular the appendix chapter concerning architecture.
complex technological interrelations are key. An example of how subtle dialogue change can take
place is with regard to the ways in which re-users alter existing content. Re-users may wish to edit or
make changes to software, but if that software is protected with a DRM or TPM mechanism, then in
many circumstances the re-user will need to know how to either circumvent the technical
mechanism or use other software to do so, which still require some technical skill. A technical
meritocracy emerges – perhaps the default position of any technical order. The structure of DRM
and TPM is likewise influenced by legal provisions. Taking this further, consider how certain groups
in society may be unable to interact with technology on an equal footing, due to economic or other
social issues (e.g. denying access to hardware necessary to perform certain actions); likewise,
consider the situation of Google Glass, where it is possible that certain levels of hardware will need
to be used by individuals in certain physical locations in order to be able to fully interact with a
hybridised reality.
In essence, the interflow of social groupings and technology could be characterised as losing its
subtlety. In early human history the technologies would act as an initiator, an enabler, of societal
groupings, e.g. the stone axes and other such technical tools. If bureaucracy is being characterised as
technology (as it was by Heidegger (1954)), bureaucracy marks a gradual shift in that it begins to
classify certain acts, certain aspects, groups and layers in society as less desirable, shifting the
development of society in certain nuanced ways. Limits to regulation exist, for instance in the extent
to which it can interface with the human mind, to its enforceability in general. However, technology
which utilises the forms of enforcement mechanisms of the sort possible with widespread
surveillance can be far more invasive both in terms of the precision and detail of its regulation using
that technology, in terms of its invasiveness in the actual perception of the world by individuals, and
in terms of the creation of new technical zones (Dyer (2012)) of the physical world.58 Jacob
Bronowski (1973) had suggested in his work looking at science and society that complete control in
the scientific way over life was only possible in a “push button order,”59 namely to destroy life
completely. However, what we can see is that a form of push button order is possible through the
nuanced interventions of digital regulation – a complex world of 0s and 1s, or a complex push button
order. This is not to say that digital technology is inherently nefarious, but that it is a characteristic of
the technology. Technology itself is invariably about control, internal and external, and so if a
technology develops which inherently enables complex communications with individuals, then it can
inherently lead to more control within that field.
The current regulatory system with the emphasis upon surveillance has thus far one significant issue,
in that the surveillance system and its direct interface with the technologies of the populace is one
which though it will influence the actions of the populace, is not regulation which has stemmed from
the traditional sources of law, namely the democratic institutions. As argued earlier, the democratic
bodies responsible for passing laws have passed laws that are analogue in nature, in that the
technologies of such laws themselves do not directly interface with the actions of individuals. The
surveillance system can directly enter into dialogue, instruction, with code used by individuals – and
because of the increasing symbiosis between this technology and the individual, there exists the risk
58
Consider, for example, Google Glass being the only means by which to access augmented reality screens
placed around city centres, access dependent on monthly subscription fee. Note the reference to Dyer in the
main text is a work about the Tarkovsky film Сталкер (Stalker, 1979).
59
J Bronowski, The Ascent of Man (1973) at 374.
of non-democratic control of individual thought. So, a starting point for any future regulation would
be some consideration of whether such a situation of direct interface with code is desirable,
whether it is something which should be legislated against, or whether there should be a direct
attempt by legislators to directly regulate through code. With the growth of technologies such as
Google Glass, 3D and 4D printing technologies, and biotech printing, it is arguable that ontologically
speaking there is a need for the state to engage if it is to be able to remain relevant, to appear
rational, in the way in which it regulates its people.
If that is to be so, then the manner in which the State interfaces with digital technologies will need
to be considered. Already we can see the gradual establishment of such an approach within fields
such as Internet Governance, Pornography and Copyright Licensing. Within each field bodies either
exist or will exist – e.g. inter alia ICANN, 60the Internet Watch Foundation,61 and the proposed
Copyright Hub.62 Direct regulation therefore exists in the form of needing to register new domain
names, of the possibility of that registration being revoked due to the content contained on the
computer hardware, or the deletion of content or licensing links for, e.g. the failure to pay licensing
fees. However, the exact nature of the intervention, the form of that physical technological
intervention, is not the sort of issue that tends to receive public debate but it should be – for it is a
form of dialogue which can influence other group interactions. Ideally, then, there should be a
means by which to consider the digital language of a legislation code – that is, not just the legal code,
but also the directly interfacing code, be that software or hardware based.
The technological spider web of regulation thus has multiple and multi-faceted impacts upon the
development of society and of the State itself. Technology today, let alone tomorrow, is already in
essence within one large techno-biosphere, with increasing convergence and homogeneity among
the various component elements. Inherent convergence, and inherent network effects, of
technologies is such that the digital geography of the space of the State will become of ever
increasing importance. Much has been written of digital architectures, and the architectures of the
real world, as expressed in code (e.g. Lessig (1999)). However, we need to step beyond this, to
consider how the State will directly interface with code and how that code will interface with each
and every human being. The techno-biosphere is all encompassing, and an all-embracing
representation of the dialogue of human society.
However, the issue of network effects poses a significant challenge to the rationality of the State
through the eyes of the populace. The machination of the technology is simple – it is a means by
which reproduction becomes possible, not just in the production of things but in the technology
itself. It is a perfect replicator which stands in direct contrast to the human being, existing as we do
as a result of accidental mutations, of imperfect creation and imperfect death. Technology exists
akin to a hive colony, its beauty is in perfect reproduction, perfect harmonisation. In contrast, the
beauty of the human mind is in its difference, in its ability to create and make from a harmonious
blank canvas. Technology may gradually undermine these differences, these mutations, for they do
not represent the perfect core of technology, of infinite perfect reproduction. If we think of the
future, of the possibility of printing in DNA strands, of rDNA, and the ability to print life from
technology in the same way as we procreate through our imperfect acts of human reproduction,
60
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers -see www.icann.org
The Internet Watch Foundation – see https://www.iwf.org.uk/
62
See the proposals here: http://www.ipo.gov.uk/hargreaves-copyright-dce
61
what will this pose for the future of the human race? Technology and its perfected-ness does not
need to value our creative values, for just the purity of reproduction is valuable, and therefore we
are introducing a system of regulation into the human life which if left unchecked will provoke a
clash of values, between that of perfect and imperfect reproduction. This is the ultimate
machination of technology, of the machine State. It is the ultimate realisation of the science-society
debate, but one which realises that technology does imply a degree of determinism, not through its
use or even its structure, but because of its existence as a means of enabling perfect reproduction.
Google Glass, all these technologies through which we will interface with the world, through which
we may be ultimately reproduced in the virtual world, will become a means by which the virtual
world will ultimately affect our own real world. The perfection of reproduction, the innate
requirement of sameness, will come to inflict itself upon us if there is no realisation by the analogue
State of the consequences of digital control. In 1973 Jacob Bronowski, when he discussed the ‘push
button order’,63 described a world of blunt technologies, of where 1 and 0 related to the nature of
the technology vis-à-vis the existence of a human life, but today that technology is more nuanced,
more able to interface with the thoughts of a human and the inputs to the human brains.
Furthermore, what of the future, of 3d printing of biological matter with DNA, of computers built
with DNA rather than binary code, which may or may not of themselves value change due to their
DNA makeup? It is to these challenges, both current and potential, and the machinations of the
technology, that the State needs to address. To quote a music distributor on the relationship of
technology and the person:
“Starting with the lyrics several hundred thousand years ago, it.. [was not
realised by earlier].. humans that what makes homo-sapiens specialist is
our ability to do complex language through voice, [being] able to get my
ideas or more complex ideas from my brain to your brain … as we moved
from writing, to the printing press, into things like recording devices
..creating new forms of getting things from my brain to yours... More
creative ways of saying what's in my brain instead of merely facts… we
moved to higher levels.”64
REFERENCES:
Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Entitlement (1947) trans. J Cumming (1972)
Benkler, Wealth of Networks (2006).
Bing, Let There Be Lite: A Brief History of Legal Information Retrieval EJLT 1(1) (2010).
Borstein, The Creators, Part III (1992).
Boyle, Shamans, Software and Spleens (1997) .
Brandeis, The Living Law 10 Illinois Law Review 461 (1915-16).
Bronowski, The Ascent of Man (1973).
Bulygo, ‘How Netflix Uses Analytics To Select Movies, Create Content, and Make Multimillion Dollar
Decisions’ KISSmetrics blog, available at http://blog.kissmetrics.com/how-netflix-uses-analytics/ ,
63
64
J Bronowski, The Ascent of Man supra n.59.
Empirical interview, see note Error! Bookmark not defined..
Caddick, Davies, Harbottle (eds), ‘Copinger and Skone James on Copyright’, 16th edition (2010).
Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (1998).
Derrida, Limited Inc (1988).
Dyer, Zona (2012).
Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1936).
Efroni, Access-Right (2011).
Elkin- Koren, 'Cyberlaw and Social Change: A democratic approach to copyright law in cyberspace',
14 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 215 (1996).
Elkin- Koren, The Rule of the Law and the Rule of the Code, in N Elkin-Koren, and N Netanel, 'The
Commodification of Information', Kluwer, The Hague (2002).
Ernesto, 3d printing aims to stop next-gen pirates, Torentfreak, at https://torrentfreak.com/3dprinting-drm-aims-to-stop-next-gen-pirates-130827/ (2013)
European Commission, Public Consultation on the review of the EU Copyright rules available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/docs/consultationdocument_en.pdf (2013)
Feir, “Regulations restricting Internet access: Attempted repair of rupture in China’s Great Wall
restraining the free exchange of ideas” 6 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 361 (1997).
Ferrill and Moyer, 'A survey of digital watermarking', at Elizabeth.ferill.com/papers/watermarking
last accessed in 2002 – no longer available,
Foucault, (Ed. Senellart, trans Burchell), The Birth of Biopolitics, Lectures at the Collège de France
1978-9 (2004/2008).
Foucault, The Order of Things (1970).
Foucault, The History of Sexuality (1976).
Gadamer, Truth and Method (1960).
Giddens, The Constitution of Society (1984).
Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action Vols I & II (1984 & 1987)
Hart, Concept of Law (1961).
Heidegger, Being and Time (1927) Note SUNY edition trans. J Stambaugh (2010).
Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology (in Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze (1954), trans.
1977 in Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977).
Ihde Technology and the Lifeworld: From garden to earth (1990).
J Litman, Digital Copyright (2001)
Jones, 'Wet footprints? Digital watermarks: a trail to the copyright infringer on the Internet' 26
Pepperdine Law Review 559 (1999)
Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (2005).
Leonard, How Netflix is turning viewers into puppets, Salon, available at
http://www.salon.com/2013/02/01/how_netflix_is_turning_viewers_into_puppets/
Lessig, Code (1999).
Lessig, Free Culture (2004).
Lessig, The Future of Ideas (2001).
Lunney, Empirical Copyright: A Case Study of File Sharing and Music Copyright, Tulane Public Law
Research Paper No. 14-2 (2014).
Madrigal, How Netflix reverse engineered Hollywood, The Atlantic, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/01/how-netflix-reverse-engineeredhollywood/282679/ ;
Matthews, Google Glass becomes your personal translator, Geek.com, available at
http://www.geek.com/news/google-glass-becomes-your-personal-translator-with-word-lensacquisition-1594120/
Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882) trans. W Kaufmann (1974).
Novak, Liquid Architectures in Cyberspace, in Benedickt, Cybserspace (1992).
Page, 'Digital watermarking as a form of copyright protection', 14(6) Computer Law and Security
Report 390 (1998).
Reese, 'The first sale doctrine in the era of digital networks', 44 Boston College Law Review 577
(2002-2003).
Rifkin, The age of access (2000).
Shumaker, Walkup and Beck, Animal Tool Behaviour: The Use and Manufacture of Tools by Animals
(2011).
Steigler, Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (1998).
Susskind, The Future of the Law (1996).
Tarkovsky, Сталкер (1979) [Stalker, film]
TED Lectures, How 4d printing works (2013) see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0gMCZFHv9v8
Unger, Law in Modern Society (1976).
Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs (2001).
Watson, Ideas, Part 1 (2005).
Whitwarn, How DRM will infest the 3d printing revolution at
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/137955-how-drm-will-infest-the-3d-printing-revolution
(2012)