Business Organizations 2009-2010 Lectures PARTNERSHIPS, CORPORATIONS AND THE VARIANTS PROF. BRUCE MCCANN SPRING SEMESTER LECTURE 5 TAKEOVERS PP. 739-785 Directors and Tender Offers The “Enhanced Business Judgment Rule” Directors must determine if takeover proposal is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. If they act to repel the takeover, their decision are shielded by the BJR if Directors first establish that they had reasonable grounds for believing that the takeover posed a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness. Burden is satisfied by showing “good faith” and “reasonable investigation” Lec. 5 Sem 2, 2011 Corps Prof. McCann Unocal Is offer in the best interests of the corporation? If contend it is not, the board must show: Offer is threat to corporate policy or effectiveness Via evidence of investigation The defensive response is “proportional” to the threat. Lec. 5 Sem 2, 2011 Corps Prof. McCann Revlon Once board takes steps to sell the corporation (or where sale inevitable) duty of board is to maximize the price. Defensive measures are “moot”. Triggered at lease two ways: When corporation initiates active bidding process to sell itself or When a corporation seeks to reorganize in such a way that it involves a clear break-up of the company Lec. 5 Sem 2, 2011 Corps Prof. McCann Paramount v Time Even an “all cash” sale can be a threat under Unocal where sale will defeat corporate strategic alliance of potentially greater benefit So long as response does not preclude future offer for the combined alliance it is reasonable. Where Board’s only response to a takeover is defensive and not an abandonment of the corporation’s continued existence, Revlon is not implicated Lec. 5 Sem 2, 2011 Corps Prof. McCann Paramount v Time Unocal analysis: 1. Did the Paramount offer pose a threat to corporate policy or effectiveness? Threat was the disruption of the strategic plan and risk shareholders would not be able to learn of greater potential of the Warner merger Board’s determination of whether threat exists in an all cash deal may go beyond examining whether offer is below fair value 2. Was the response “proportional”? Decision to restructure the transaction with Warner was not out of proportion to the threat the Board perceived. Paramount retained the freedom to take over the new company Lec. 5 Sem 2, 2011 Corps Prof. McCann Paramount v Time Directors are obligated to chart a course for the corporation without regard to a “fixed investment horizon.” Board is not under a per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term. Lec. 5 Sem 2, 2011 Corps Prof. McCann Paramount v. QVC Directors face enhanced scrutiny where they approve of a transaction resulting in a sale of control while simultaneously adopting defensive measures to defeat another suitor. Lec. 5 Sem 2, 2011 Corps Prof. McCann Omnicare Chronology Jul 20, 2001 ~ Mar ??, 2001 Joel Gemunder (OMN CEO) f proposes Omnicare Inc. buy in bankruptcy asset sale for $ conditioned on due diligence NCS Healthcare defaults on $350 m in debt, shares reach $.09 Thu, Mar 1, 2001 Fri, Mar 2, 2001 Fri, Jul 20, 2001 Omnicare Chronology Jul 20, 2001 Aug ??, 2001 Joel Gemunder (OMN CEO) for Omnicare Inc. proposes Omnicare Inc. buy NCS Healthcare in bankruptcy asset sale for $225m conditioned on due diligence Omnicare Inc. increases bid to m in BK asset sale (less than N Healthcare outstanding debt). Shareholders would receive ze Fri, Jul 20, 2001 Sat, Jul 21, 2001 Wed, Aug 1, 2001 Omnicare Chronology Jan ??, 2002 Aug ??, 2001 Genesis is contacted by Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders re N Healthcare and enters into con agreement. Starts due diligenc investigation of NCS Healthcar Omnicare Inc. increases bid to $270 m in BK asset sale (less than NCS Healthcare outstanding debt). NCS Shareholders would receive zero. Wed, Aug 1, 2001 Thu, Aug 2, 2001 Tue, Jan 1, 2002 Omnicare Chronology Jan ??, 2002 May 16, 2002 Genesis is contacted by Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders re NCS Healthcare and enters into confidentiality agreement. Starts due diligence investigation of NCS Healthcare. Tue, Jan 1, 2002 Genesis makes clear not interested in being Stalking Ho Wed, Jan 2, 2002 Thu, May 16, 2002 Omnicare Chronology Jun 26, 2002 May 16, 2002 At urging of NCS Healthcare Genesis increases offer to $24m Genesis stock for NCS Shareho but demands exclusivity agreem Genesis makes clear not interested in being Stalking Horse Thu, May 16, 2002 Fri, May 17, 2002 Wed, Jun 26, 2002 Omnicare Chronology Jul 3, 2002 Jun 26, 2002 Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholde exclusivity agreement, signs. G of merger agreement plus shar for Outcalt (NCS Chair) and Sha hold majority of NCS Healthcare At urging of NCS Healthcare Genesis increases offer to $24m in Genesis stock for NCS Shareholders but demands exclusivity agreement Wed, Jun 26, 2002 Thu, Jun 27, 2002 Wed, Jul 3, 2002 Omnicare Chronology Jul 26, 2002 Omnicare Inc. , aware somethin because NCS Healthcare share faxes proposal to NCS Healthca NCS Healthcare debt with inter NCS Shareholders. Offer cond due diligence and receiving ce Jul 26, 2002 Jul 3, 2002 Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders meets to consider exclusivity agreement, signs. Genesis delivers form of merger agreement plus shareholder agreements for Outcalt (NCS Chair) and Shaw (NCS CEO) (who hold majority of NCS Healthcare voting shares) Judith Mencher (AHC rep) calls Joel Gemunder (OMN CEO) to warn due diligence "out" was a deal breaker. Omnicare Inc. decides will not eliminate requirement Jul 26, 2002 Omnicare Inc. calls NCS Healthcare to discuss fax but N Healthcare does not respond because of exclusivity agreeme Jul 26, 2002 Independent Committee of NCS meets re Omnicare Inc. fax and jeopardizing Genesis offer to b Omnicare Inc. but does go back improved terms based on the O Wed, Jul 3, 2002 Thu, Jul 4, 2002 Fri, Jul 26, 2002 Omnicare Chronology Jul 26, 2002 Omnicare Inc. , aware something is going on because NCS Healthcare share price increasing, faxes proposal to NCS Healthcare offering to pay NCS Healthcare debt with interest plus $3/sh for NCS Shareholders. Offer conditioned on completing due diligence and receiving certain consents Jul 28, 2002 Independent Committee of NCS Bo Members meets for less than an ho consider Genesis offer. Votes unan to recommend board accept the of Jul 28, 2002 Joel due diligence are Inc. ement Jul 27, 2002 Jul 26, 2002 Omnicare Inc. calls NCS Healthcare to discuss fax but NCS Healthcare does not respond because of exclusivity agreement Genesis improves its terms to retire the notes altogether, increaser ration of stock swap in favor of NCS Shareholders added interest to debt payback. Required deal by midnight of next day. Jul 26, 2002 Independent Committee of NCS Board Members meets re Omnicare Inc. fax and decides not worth jeopardizing Genesis offer to bargain further with Omnicare Inc. but does go back to Genesis to seek improved terms based on the Omnicare Inc. fax Fri, Jul 26, 2002 Sat, Jul 27, 2002 Full board then met and first appro Chair) and Shaw (NCS CEO) votin making NCS Shareholders approv regardless of future offers from O else. Board then approves merge agrees it will recommend merger t Jul 28, 2002 NCS Healthcare board signs merge (a) requires they relay merger vote even if the board withdraws its sup prohibits NCS Healthcare from ent with 3rd party unless have "good fa proposal likely to result in superior Sun, Jul 28, 2002 Omnicare Chronology Jul 28, 2002 Independent Committee of NCS Board Members meets for less than an hour to consider Genesis offer. Votes unanimously to recommend board accept the offer. Aug 1, 2002 Omnicare Inc. files suit to enjoi Healthcare merger with Genesi announces tender offer at $3.50 Jul 28, 2002 Full board then met and first approves Outcalt (NCS Chair) and Shaw (NCS CEO) voting agreements, thus making NCS Shareholders approval a "fait accompli" regardless of future offers from Omnicare Inc. or anyone else. Board then approves merger agreement and agrees it will recommend merger to NCS Shareholders Jul 29, 2002 Omnicare Inc. faxes letter to NCS Healthcare with draft merger agreement having already issued press release. Jul 28, 2002 NCS Healthcare board signs merger agreement which (a) requires they relay merger vote to NCS Shareholders even if the board withdraws its support, and (b) prohibits NCS Healthcare from entering into discussions with 3rd party unless have "good faith" belief 3rd party proposal likely to result in superior transaction. Sun, Jul 28, 2002 Mon, Jul 29, 2002 Thu, Aug 1, 2002 Omnicare Chronology Aug 1, 2002 Omnicare Inc. files suit to enjoin NCS Healthcare merger with Genesis and announces tender offer at $3.50/sh Aug 8, 2002 Omnicare Inc. begins tender offer and seeks meeting with NCS Healthcare NCS r agreement release. Thu, Aug 1, 2002 Aug 8, 2002 Independent Committee of NCS Members and full board meet s and confer with outside counse to determine whether Omnicare offer "superior" because of con Fri, Aug 2, 2002 Thu, Aug 8, 2002 Omnicare Chronology Aug 8, 2002 Omnicare Inc. begins tender offer and seeks meeting with NCS Healthcare Aug 19, 2002 Independent Committee of NCS Members and full board meet o separately and confer with outs Still unable to determine wheth Inc. offer "superior" because o Aug 8, 2002 Independent Committee of NCS Board Members and full board meet separately and confer with outside counsel. Unable to determine whether Omnicare Inc. offer "superior" because of conditions Thu, Aug 8, 2002 Fri, Aug 9, 2002 Mon, Aug 19, 2002 Omnicare Chronology Aug 19, 2002 Sep 10, 2002 Independent Committee of NCS Board Members and full board meet once more separately and confer with outside counsel. Still unable to determine whether Omnicare Inc. offer "superior" because of conditions NCS Healthcare requests, and a waiver of merger agreement p to allow NCS Healthcare to disc Omnicare Inc. despite no findin offer Mon, Aug 19, 2002 Tue, Aug 20, 2002 Tue, Sep 10, 2002 Omnicare Chronology Sep 10, 2002 NCS Healthcare requests, and Genesis grants, a waiver of merger agreement prohibition to allow NCS Healthcare to discuss with Omnicare Inc. despite no finding of superior offer Tue, Sep 10, 2002 Wed, Sep 11, 2002 Oct 6, 2002 Omnicare Inc. irrevocably commits to purchase of all shares for $3.50 in cash Sun, Oct 6, 2002 Omnicare Chronology Oct 21, 2002 NCS Healthcare board withdraws support for Genesis merger Mon, Oct 7, 2002 Mon, Oct 21, 2002 Stalking Horse The initial bidder with whom the debtor negotiates a purchase agreement is called the "stalking horse" bidder. The term is an old hunting term referring to either a real horse or an image of a horse (typically some type of screen) behind which a hunter would hide to conceal himself from, and get closer to, his prey. Lec. 6 Sem 2, pp 739-774 Corps Prof. McCann DGCL Section 251 - Mergers Board of each corporation must first adopt resolution approving merger agreement. Agreement shall set forth terms of the merger, mode of bringing into effect, manner of converting shares. The agreement shall then be submitted to the shareholders of each corporation for vote on no less than 20 days notice. Merger is not effective until requisite number of shares approve it. Lec. 6 Sem 2, pp 739-774 Corps Prof. McCann Omnicare Refinements to Unocal Where defensive measures are invoked to protect a merger agreement, Unocal proportionality test is applied as follows: 1. Court must first determine if the measures are preclusive or coercive. If either, measures are illegal. 2. If measures pass that threshold test, then the Board must establish their measures were within a “range of reasonable responses.” Lec. 6 Sem 2, pp 739-774 Corps Prof. McCann “Force The Vote” Provisions Refers to board commitment to suitor that the board will submit the proposed transaction to the shareholders for a vote even if the board does not recommend that the shareholders approve the transaction. Such provisions now expressly permitted under Delaware law and the Model Act Why bother? Because often the merger agreement is signed simultaneously with voting agreements binding the majority of shares to vote for the transaction if it is put to a vote. The suitor knows the transaction will be approved even if, under a “fiduciary out,” the board must withdraw its approval. Lec. 6 Sem 2, pp 739-774 Corps Prof. McCann Break Up Fee Also known as a “Termination Fee”, it is a fee commonly paid to a prospective purchaser if a contemplated transaction is not consummated for reasons specified in the purchase agreement, including the seller’s acceptance of a competing bid. It is intended both to reimburse a "stalking horse" bidder for costs incurred in connection with due diligence and to compensate for the time, resources, effort and lost opportunity costs and risks incurred by a disappointed purchaser. Lec. 6 Sem 2, pp 739-774 Corps Prof. McCann