CW2 R. MANDELL
UNCLASSIFIED
Goal of the SAEDA
Program
• To secure the assistance of every DA member
in the deterrence and detection of intelligence
and terrorist threats to the Army.
SAEDA Brief Objectives
Describe the foreign intelligence threat
Identify indicators of possible espionage
related activity
Know where to report questionable acts
or attempts by a Foreign Intelligence
Service to collect information.
Governing
Regulations
ARMY
AR 381-12
Dept. of Defense
5200.1-R
NAVY
REG 5510.1F
AIR FORCE
AFR 205-57
Applicability
Army Regulation 381-12 applies to all
Department of the Army personnel
(Military and Civilian) and members of
the Army National Guard and the US
Army Reserves
Local National Employees as
governed by SOFA / Treaties
• SUBVERSION
Advocating, causing, or attempting to
cause insubordination, disloyalty,
mutiny, or refusal of duty by any
member of the armed forces of the
United States or by Department of
Defense civilian personnel with the
intent to interfere with, impair, or
influence the loyalty, morale, or
discipline of such armed forces.
(see 18 USC 2387-88)
• ESPIONAGE
The act of obtaining, delivering,
transmitting, communicating, or
receiving information in respect to
the national defense with an intent or
reason to believe that the information
may be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of
any foreign nation.
(18 USC 792-798 and Article 106a, UCMJ)
• SPYING
In time of war, the act of clandestinely
or under false pretenses collecting or
attempting to collect information with
the intent to convey it to a hostile
party.
(see Article 106, UCMJ)
Foreign Intelligence
Service
An organization that is part of a foreign government
and engages in intelligence activities
FIS
FIS EXPLOITS...
Landbased
Seaborne
Overhead
Diplomatic Personnel
Commercial Visitors
Merchant Ships
Students
Open Source
Aircraft
Satellite
-High Resolution
-Low Resolution
The Army’s
Vulnerability...
• Conception that Foreign governments aren’t
interested in anything I’m doing.
• Volunteer Spy
• Data exchange agreements
• Foreign government’s Increasing need for
technologies
• Americans are very lax with who is listening or
with operational security
Your Vulnerability
• Are You a Lucrative Source ?
– Duties & Position
– Travel
– Access to Information (Classified or
Unclassified)
Persons - Special
Vulnerability
•
•
•
•
•
Frequent official overseas travel
Resided in a foreign country
Relatives in a foreign country
Born/raised in a foreign country
Persons with access to classified defense
information
• Persons having extraordinary financial
difficulty
Countries of Special
Concern
• Director of Central Intelligence Directive
(DCID) number 1/20, Security Policy
Concerning Travel and Assignment of
Personnel with Access to Sensitive
Compartmented Information, dated 29
December 1991. (AR 381-12, 15 Jan 93)
Countries of Special
Concern
Afghanistan
Albania
Bulgaria
PR of China
Colombia
Cuba (exc. US Navy Base)
Estonia
Iran
Iraq
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Libya
Lithuania
Myanmar (form. Burma)
Nicaragua
North Korea
Peru
Romania
South Africa
Syria
Vietnam
States-Former USSR
Territory-Former Yugoslavia
Who Is Spying on the
U.S.?
Traditional Adversaries
Former Soviet Union
Hungary
North Korea
Former Republic Yugoslavia
Iraq
Pakistan
Iran
Poland
Czech Republic
China
Cuba
Who Is Spying on the
U.S.?
Non-traditional Adversaries
Israel
France
Germany
Japan
South Korea
India
Saudi Arabia
Taiwan
United Kingdom
All others
Where Do They Collect?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
R&D Centers
Military Installations
Civilian Contractor Facilities
Universities
Conferences & Symposiums
Technical Exhibitions
Any other place that may be a lucrative
source of information they are seeking
What Do They Want?
• Technology in development of arms and
armament
• Project information on policies and intentions
of DoD Worldwide
• Scientific & Industrial technology
• Readiness Posture
This list is by no means complete!
Recruitment Cycle
ESPIONAGE
Recruitment Cycle
SPOT
Recruitment Cycle
SPOT
ASSESS
Recruitment Cycle
SPOT
ASSESS
RECRUIT
Espionage Recruitment Cycle
SPOT
ASSESS
RECRUIT
Past Cases
•
•
•
•
Indicators
Vulnerabilities
Methods & Techniques
Convictions & Sentences Received
Case Study - POLLARD
• Indicators
1) Excessive photocopying
2) Boasting - Association with Mossad
• Vulnerabilities
1) Swaying ideologies
2) Greed
• Methods & Techniques
1) Sold numerous classified documents
2) Vainly sought asylum at Israeli Embassy
• Conviction & Sentence Received
1) Jonathan - 4 Mar 87 - Life Imprisonment
2) Anne - 4 Mar 87 - 5 years
Case Study - HALL
• Indicators
1) Discovery of Large Sums of Money
2) Living style was far beyond his pay scale
3) Excessive photocopying
• Vulnerabilities
1) Greed
• Methods & Techniques
1) Conduit: Huseyin Yildirim
• Conviction & Sentence Received
1) J. Hall - 9 Mar 89 - 40 yrs / $50,000. / Dish.
2) Yildirim - 20 Jul 89 - Life Imprisonment
Case Study - CONRAD
• Indicators
1) Recruited by Zoltan Szabo
• Vulnerabilities
1) Greed
• Methods & Techniques
1) Took suitcases of doc’s off base
2) Recruited others to collect for him
• Conviction & Sentence Received
1) Conrad - 6 Jun 90 - Treason by German Court
with Life Imprisonment
Case Study - SOMBOLAY
• Indicators
1) Foreign Travel
2) Disgruntled employee
• Vulnerabilities
1) Greed
2) Financially distressed
• Methods & Techniques
1) Stole items from work
2) Contact with embassies outside Germany
• Conviction & Sentence Received
1) Convicted to 34 years hard labor
2) Plea bargained for 19 years
Case Study - AMES
• Indicators
1) Disgruntled employee
2) Living Above Means of Income
• Vulnerabilities
1) Greed
2) Professionally unsatisfied
• Methods & Techniques
1) Contacted Soviet embassy officials in D.C.
2) stole class info. from CIA
• Conviction & Sentence Received
1) Pled guilty to charge of espionage on 28 Apr 94, sentenced
to Life w/out parole.
AR 381-12
Reporting
Requirements
.
415th Military Police Detachment
Criminal Penalties
• Death Penalty has been enacted under the
UCMJ (military) and Title 18 USC (civilians
and military) for peacetime espionage.
U.S. Supreme Court
Failure to Report...
Failure to report a SAEDA incident may be used as
a basis for disciplinary action under the UCMJ and
other authority as applicable.
(Article 92, UCMJ)
When in doubt,
REPORT IT:
Reporting Requirements
• Attempts by unauthorized persons to
obtain DoD information
• Acts of Espionage by Army personnel
• Contacts by DA (Military or Dependent)
Personnel with foreigners that show undue
interest in the service member and their
duties, etc.
• Information concerning international or
domestic terrorism when it threatens the
US
Reporting Requirements
• Attempts to encourage violation of laws,
disobey orders or regulations (Subversion)
• Acts of Treason by Army personnel
• Army persons advocating unconstitutional
Overthrow of US Government (Sedition)
• Unauthorized disclosure of classified
information regardless of the circumstances
Reporting Requirements
• Intrusions into Classified or Unclassified
Automated Information Systems.
Other Matters of Counter
Intelligence Interest
• Discovery of Listening Devices
• Unauthorized absence of persons who have
had access to Top Secret information
• Attempted or actual suicide of DA member
who has had access to classified
• COMSEC insecurities (except administrative)
• Assassinations--attempted/planned
• Defection/attempted defections
• Detention of DA member by foreign
government or entity
Other Matters of CI
Interest
• Impersonation of Army intelligence and/or
unlawful possession of MI badge &
credentials
• Compromise of Intelligence Personnel in a
covert status
• When Foreign countries try to employ US
Nuclear Weapons specialists
When in doubt,
REPORT IT.
Indicators
• Attempts to expand access
• Unauthorized removal of classified
materials from the work area
• Extensive use of automation equipment
• Extra work hours
• Bringing unauthorized electronic
devices into classified data areas (i.e.
Sensitive Compartmented Information
Facility)
Indicators
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Unexplained/undue affluence
Opening several bank accounts
Frequent unexplained short trips
Unexplained visits to foreign embassies
Repeated Security Violations
Homesteading
Joking or bragging about involvement with
FIS
• Sudden reversal of financial situation
Reporting Procedures
Persons having knowledge of a SAEDA incident:
Nearest supporting CI office
Unit S2/ Security Manager
If assigned or traveling OCONUS and there
is no Army CI element, report to the
nearest:
US Military Authority
US Embassy
Consulate Security Office
Reporting Procedures
Do’s:
• Recall as many details as possible
–
–
–
–
–
Date, time, place, circumstances
I.D. data and physical description
Vehicle license number and description
I.D. of any witnesses
Details of conversation or correspondence
• Record immediately after the incident
Reporting Procedures
Do Not:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Conduct your own investigation
Take Money or Sign anything
Divulge any sensitive information
Agree or Disagree to cooperate
Tell family & friends of the incident
Put yourself in any dangerous situation
TERRORISM
WORLD TRADE CENTER
NEW YORK CITY
FEDERAL BUILDING
OKLAHOMA CITY
. .
RYDER
TERRORISM
Any activity that --
• Uses violence or the threat of
violence to attain goals through
intimidation, coercion, or instilling
fear. Terrorism involves a criminal
act that is often symbolic in nature
and intended to influence an
audience beyond the immediate
victims.
TERRORISM
• THREAT
– Domestic
– International
• Who’s Vulnerable?
– DA Personnel
– Family members
TERRORISM
• Operational Planning Involves
– Target Selection
– Weapons Acquisition
– Target Surveillance
– Attack Rehearsals
General Guidance
(overseas)
• Avoid publicity (demonstrations, etc.)
• Keep a low profile (avoid US specific
apparel)
• Vary your daily routine
• Keep staff and family aware of
itineraries (even your daily itinerary)
• Attract as little attention as possible
• Additional info. can be found in AR
523-13, Antiterrorism
Protect Your
Automobile
Lock Doors & Shut Windows
ZS#$
Look for anything out of the ordinary!
Protect Your Home
•Alarm System
•Dead Bolts
•Thick Doors
•Intimidating Pets
•Windows Locked
USE COMMON SENSE !!!
Travel Security
• Move to secured areas quickly when in a
terminal if something should happen
• Use tourist passport for high risk areas
• Wear uniform only when necessary
• Avoid US-unique apparel
Be Observant !
• Watch others
– If followed, do NOT confront surveillants !!
– Reach safe haven and call police
• Stay in busy thoroughfares or walkways.
• Watch surroundings
– Unattended items--briefcases, pouches, etc.
– Vehicles--actions, unusual characteristics, etc.
• Remember/record details if suspicious.
Questions??
• This concludes
the briefing.
Does anyone
have any
questions?