Terrorism Reps K
1NC Securitization Shell
Apocalyptic nuclear or terror rhetoric justifies violence and limitless government
intervention, and demonizes the other. Only the alt’s emancipatory politics allows a
release from incapacitation
Gay 6 [William C. Gay, UNC Charlotte Philosophy professor with a PhD in Philosophy, and associate at the Center of Professional and
Applied Ethics; “Apocalyptic Rhetoric Versus Nonviolent Action” pg 45-47; Spiritual & Political Dimensions of Nonviolence & Peace; January
2006; accessed 07/20/2015; <http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/wcgay/ApocalypticThinkingversusNonviolentAction.pdf>.]
Since 11 September 2001, many people, especially in the United States, have come to regard terrorism as if it
represents a comparably grave moral problem. In fact, some people are so afraid that they are willing to let
government go to virtually any limits to reduce this threat. This time, governments are the ones using fear; they
are using fear to motivate the public to accept as necessary and justified the military responses employed to
counter terrorism. Apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears face factual, psychological, political, and moral pitfalls. First, because
the claims are so extreme, they are often not credible. For example, when scientists raised solid factual objections, scientists
and government officials dismissed the prophets of nuclear apocalypse as misinformed extremists. The scientists and government officials
belittled the fear that the nuclear prophets sought to exploit when they exaggerated their portrayals. But some
people do not want
to let facts get in the way of a good argument. For some, persuasion is a more important goal than truth. If
you believe that exaggeration, especially when it generates fear, can bring about a good result, you may throw prudence to the wind. You
may justify your lapse into distortion as benevolent deception, but the fact remains that it is like Plato’s royal lie and
may be exposed. Are we now seeing a similar phenomenon with respect to how government is using public fear of
terrorism? Critics of the current policy are doing little to counter governmental exaggerations about the international terrorist threat. Are
their exaggerations benevolent deceptions or something much less noble? Beyond the prospect for factual rebuttal, apocalyptic
thinking and exaggerated fears run a psychological risk. Compare the responses to the nuclear threat and the
terrorist threat. Regardless of whether the big boom will bring on global doom, does belief in nuclear war as apocalyptic
motivate people to eliminate this threat? Much of the public protest against governmental plans relied on the myth of the
motivating power of fear to spur otherwise apathetic citizens to rally around the anti-nuclear cause. But as we well know, the antinuclear
bandwagon is not exactly overflowing these days. Initially
after the events of 11 September 2001, many people were
motivated to act. Unfortunately, already many people are beginning to suppress their fear. Suppressing negative
emotions or entering a state of denial represents the psychological risk that faces apocalyptic thinking and
exaggerated fears. The saying that the main responses to fear are fight or flight is instructive. We have no way to guarantee
that people frightened by accounts of the horrors of nuclear war or terrorist attacks will fight back. Many
people take flight, especially when they feel disempowered in the political arena and see how limited the success of
past efforts has been. These persons may suffer from psychic numbing. When fear is suppressed, the call to action is avoided. Even when fear
is not suppressed, it can be misdirected. The political risk resulting from apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears is that these
concerns can get co-opted. How are we to fight off apocalyptic or global terrorism? Nuclear prophets like Jonathan Schell say we must rid the
world of nuclear weapons. Current anti-terrorist
politicians say we must rid the world of terrorists; we must wage
a war against terrorism. Ironically, political leaders argue that the possession of nuclear weapons is the means for preventing the
apocalyptic horrors of nuclear war. Just in case deterrence fails, government officials now tell us a missile defense system should be in place.
Six months after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the George W. Bush administration announced plans to use
modified nuclear weapons to destroy terrorist stronghold stashes of weapons of mass destruction, or to respond to terrorist
attacks that make use of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. Officials have told us for quite some time that governmental possession of
chemical and biological weapons is one of the means of preventing evil governments or terrorist organizations from using weapons of mass
destruction. Now, the claim is also made that the modified nuclear weapons being urged by the Bush administration for possible use in the
“war on terrorism” will also function to deter terrorism. In the past, and again currently, governmental leaders, by preying
on public
fears, achieve acquiesce to an ideology that portrays international adversaries as totally diabolical and
completely untrustworthy. Under these conditions, and supposedly in order to “save” their citizens from the “absolute evils,” military and
political leaders present military preparedness and military actions as the only, or best, insurance against nuclear apocalypse and terrorist
attacks. The final risk facing apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears is moral. Apocalyptic
thinking and exaggerated fears
are too farsighted. Farsightedness or hyperopia is the pathological condition in which vision is better for distant than near objects. For
example, nuclear prophets do bring into sharp focus a hopefully distant object—the prospect that somewhere down the road we will reach an
omega point where the destructiveness of war will in fact be apocalyptic. The judgment is surely correct that the precipitation of global doom
would be a profoundly immoral act. But people who are farsighted fail to bring nearby objects into sharp focus. Even
if nuclear apocalypse or
further terrorist attacks of the magnitude of 11 September might not be very far down the road,
numerous other war-like objects are much closer to us. In fact, they surround us. Since World War II, no year has passed in
which fewer than four wars were being waged somewhere on this planet. When we devote too much of our attention to
imagining the worst that could happen, we risk inflicting moral hyperopia on ourselves. Just as we are
being myopic when we focus primarily on crime in the streets when confronting the problem of human
violence, even so we are being hyperopic to focus predominantly on the threats of nuclear apocalypse and global terrorism
when confronting the problems of large-scale violence. Apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears risk leaving us morally
shortchanged when they lead us to fail to fight against the horrors of violence that are not distant or possible threats but everyday realities. We
need to respond to on-going atrocities in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa that are on a scale quite adequate for moral outrage, and
we need to seek feasible protection from devastating harms such as AIDS, hunger, and environmental
degradation that actually are currently afflicting us.
Legal solutions mask the Otherization of the Terrorist that allows violent atrocities
and killing civilians under the guise of preemptive strikes and neutralizing threats
Heathcote 11 (Gina, BA, LLB (ANU); LLM (Westminster); PhD (LSE/Lond). Senior Teaching Fellow,
School of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies. Melbourne Journal of International Law, Volume
11 “FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON THE ‘END’ OF THE WAR ON TERROR”
https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1G1-252086730/feminist-reflections-on-the-end-of-the-waron-terror)
The global war against terrorism developed (at least) three types of narratives to project legality on to the political rhetoric.
The first type of narrative centred on prior international legal debates over the possibility of anticipatory force and
attempts to expand self-defence under the conditions of the global war against terrorism to encompass pre-emptive self-defence. That is,
the use of force may be justified in response to low-level and persistent terrorist threats. The second type of
narrative focused on past Security Council resolutions and contended that states may use force if force can be justified through implied authorisations found in prior
Security Council resolutions. The third range of narratives argued that the use
of force is justified in failed states, as well as in
response to potential threats from rogue states with the perceived capacity to build weapons of mass
destruction, due to a lack of stable or democratic government. More recent articulations of this justification have used the terminology of a ‘material breach’
of the Security Council resolutions by Iraq, and thus cast the US-led invasion as some form of counter-measure or enforcement tool. Under the first narrative, the
controversial customary international law category of anticipatory
self-defence came to include a narrative on the
possibility of the use of pre-emptive force to track down, kill or capture the ‘hard core of the terrorists’.
Reisman and Armstrong suggest this is more likely to involve ‘strategic preemptive strikes against weapons of mass destruction or terrorist training camps’ than
‘[l]arge-scale attacks on states’.29 This
description constructs terrorist camps and WMD production facilities as
(strangely) outside of the territory of states, implicitly suggesting that these are something ‘Other’ to the
political independence and territorial integrity encompassed by the prohibition on the use of force articulated in the Charter of the United Nations (‘UN
Charter’) under art 2(4). Although the 2010 National Security Strategy appears to dismiss the Bush Doctrine, the Obama strategy states: The United States
is waging a global campaign against al-Qa’ida and its terrorist affiliates. To disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa’ida and
its affiliates, we are pursuing a strategy that protects our homeland, secures the world’s most dangerous weapons and material, denies al-Qa’ida
safe haven, and builds positive partnerships with Muslim communities around the world. Success requires a broad, sustained, and
integrated campaign that judiciously applies every tool of American power — both military and civilian — as well as the
concerted efforts of like-minded states and multilateral institutions. This somewhat oblique statement must be read alongside continued US
military strikes in Pakistan and other states identified as harbouring the al-Qaeda threat, often through the
controversial use of unmanned drones that mimics rather than rejects the Bush policy of pre-emptive strikes. The Obama and Bush
justification for these military acts remains that of homeland security. The 2010 National Security Strategy further states: ‘we are working with partners
abroad to confront threats that often begin beyond our borders’ while acknowledging that ‘[w]e must deny these groups the ability to conduct operational plotting
from any locale, or to recruit, train, and position operatives’. These statements
avoid direct engagement with the international
law on the use of force. US state practice since the Obama Administration came to power, however, indicates that the perceived terrorist threats
abroad have been denied the capacity to materialise through pre-emptive strikes on civilian communities.34
Vote Neg to refuse the affirmatives representations of terrorism
Milojević 2 [Ivana Milojević, searcher and educator with the background in sociology, gender, peace and futures studies, and Visiting
Professor at the Association of Centres for Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies and Research, University of Novi Sad; “Gender, Peace
and Terrestrial Futures: Alternatives to Terrorism and War”; University of Queensland; 2002; accessed 07/20/2015;
<http://www.metafuture.org/articlesbycolleagues/IvanaMilojevic/Ivana_Milojevic_-_Gender_peace_and_terrestrial_futures.htm>.] Author’s
first language is Serbian.
Social and economic strategies
require radical transformation and restructuring of societies and economies. This means working
towards the objectives of equality, development and peace by improving employment, health and education (The Beijing Platform for Action, The Fourth World
Conference on Women, Beijing, in Peterson, Runyan, 1999:218). Approximately 3,000 deaths from terrorist attack on Unites States are 3,000 deaths too many. But
so are estimated 24,000 deaths of people who died of hunger on the same day, 6,000 children killed by diarrhea and 2,700 children killed by measles on the 11
September 2001 (New Internationalist, 2001:18-19). If we become aware that the number of malnourished children in developing countries is about 149 million, the
number of women who die each year of pregnancy and childbirth about 500,000 and number of illiterate adults 875 million it is clear that where priorities should
be. Preventing terrorism by policing is crucial but so is ‘the holy war’ against injustice, structural and cultural violence, poverty. These problems are, as is terrorism,
global problems. The
understanding of ‘security’ predominately in terms of national security or the security of
the state is becoming obsolete by the day. Although the USA did not in any way ‘deserve’ the attacks that occurred on the 11th September,
we should still become aware that all violence (in the international, national or family realms) is interconnected (Tickner, 1993:58). Which
means that there is an intimate connection between both direct, structural and cultural violence, as well
as domestic and international violence. Thus, any serious attempt to end war must involve significant
alterations in local, national, and global hierarchies (Peterson and Runyan, 1999:228). This includes addressing
sexism, racism, classism, heterosexism, and gendered nationalism which have all been vital to sustaining
militarism and the ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality that goes along with it (Peterson and Runyan, 1999:228), One of the most
important strategy, connected to socio-economic trasformations is demilitarization. Availability of weapons may not be sufficient factor for war and terrorism but
certainly it is necessary. Particular
cultural cognitive maps determine how are technologies to be used. Still, the general
production, availability and the trade of weapons directly support various wars as well as terrorism. Unfortunately, the direction taken after 11th September has
been further militarisation, because the new ‘reasons’ for further militarisation have been activated. The logical response should instead had been redirection of
resources from the military towards civilian needs and requirements. This would include a redirection of resources towards development of international courts
system, towards initiatives that work on inter-cultural understandings, communication and alliances. The overall problem of course is that the patriarchal worldview
determines that life-taking activities are better funded than life-giving ones. For example, worldwide, over half the nations of the world still provide higher budgets
for the military than for their countries’ health needs. In the USA alone, the Pentagon received $17 billion more than it requested in both 1996 and 1997 (“The Ohio
story”, quoted in Peterson and Runyan, 1999:125). The awaited ‘peace dividend’ after the end of the cold war has not materialized because 6 years later the
Pentagon in the USA still receives 5 times what is spend on education, housing, job training and the environment combined (“The Ohio Story”, in Peterson and
Runyan, 1999:120). Demands for de-militarisation are underlined by the more acute awareness that peace is not a state but a process. The focus is on peacebuilding, peace-making and peace-keeping, contesting the belief that peace is “a kind of condition or state which is achieved or simply occurs” (Boudling, 1990:141).
Or as something that happens only after the military intervention is over. The
awareness that “peace never exists as a condition,
only as a process” (Boulding, 1990:146) means that military involvement – or ‘doing war’ - is seen as directly
opposite from ‘doing peace’, that is, from various peace-making activities. The patriarchal worldview implies that waging
wars is sometimes necessary to maintain the peace. Alternative perspectives to this worldview imply that peace cannot be
defined only as the absence of war and that both direct and structural forms of violence need to be
addressed. Therefore, peace does not merely depends on the absence of war, but rather on constant
efforts to achieve equality of rights, equal participation in decision making processes and equal
participation in distribution of the resources that sustain society (Borelli in Brock-Utne, 1989:2). In that sense, peace either
happens now, as well as yesterday and tomorrow, or it does not. Its temporal and geographical locations almost entirely depend on peace activities and result from
active practicing of peace promoting activities. ‘Doing
war’ is therefore, not a necessary condition for achieving
reconciliation, but directly opposite condition that can best be defined as the absence of peace, and
peace promoting activities. The list of previously mentioned strategies is by no means exclusive, but it is an example of how different visions for the
future as well as a different worldview bring different understanding of how conflicts are to be understood and resolved. Current and traditional
means of resolving conflicts have resulted in a well-documented violent history. If future histories are
to be changed, traditional, neo-liberal, ‘realists’ and patriarchal discourses, with their trademark
short-term orientation, need to be abandoned. They could be replaced with alternatives that
provide an expanded sense of time and long-term orientation as well as a more balanced views on
war/violence, human nature, history, conflict, power, sovereignty, security, strength, identity, peace and
future. This means that it is those alternatives that are, in effect, more ‘pragmatic’, ‘realistic’ and viable.
The emerging global order requires constant negotiations and building of alliances between all our diversities. It requires global justice and fairness rather then the
‘might is right’ approach currently practiced by individualistically oriented and self-centered nation states. In our globalized, ‘compressed’, ‘hyperreal’ and ‘hybrid’
world the alternatives that aim to develop both unified and diversified terrestrial futures have not become less, but rather more urgently needed and necessary.
Consequently,
they could potentially be one important path that can be taken in order to, epistemologically
and strategically, support the efforts and struggles toward global peace and global security.
1NC Islamophobia Shell
Their representations of terrorism are inherently violent and Islamophobic
Alghamdi 15 (Emad A. Alghamdi, English Language Institute, King Abdulaziz University, “The
Representation of Islam in Western Media: The Coverage of Norway Terrorist Attacks”, May 1st, 2015,
International Journal of Applied Linguistics & English Literature,
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/259481741_The_Representation_of_Islam_in_Western_Medi
a_The_Coverage_of_Norway_Terrorist_Attacks, JAS)
While myriad sources of information contribute to the discordant image of Islam and Muslims in
western public perceptions, many scholars argue the media are the most influential (Kanso & Nelson, 2010). The
negative representation of and the dissemination of propaganda against Islam and Muslims in
mainstream western media is not a new phenomenon. Studies in media or political discourse have
revealed that the portrayals of Islam and Muslims in western media tends to emphasize stereotypes and
discriminatory rhetoric, casting, as such, an unfavorable light on Muslims and Islam. The depiction of
Islam and Muslims as a negative ‘Other’ for western societies and the general illformed and uninformed
conceptions of Islam and Muslim are strongly attributed to the western media representations of Islam
within two frames; “in clash with the west and associated with terrorism/extremism or violence” (Eid, 2014,
p. 104). Language has always been a key factor in forming, constructing and later revealing the ill-formed perceptions of Islam and Muslims in
westerners’ minds. Reath (1998) asserted that language
is a pivotal means in which "attitudes towards groups can be
constructed, maintained or challenged" (p.54). Through a manipulative use of language and word choices,
Muslims in western media have been irrationally portrayed as social deviants, irrational, backward,
uncivilized, and as posing security threats to western societies. As part of the discourse on security and terrorism, “the
association of Islam with terrorism and violence has come to be accepted, to the extent that terms such
as “Muslim” and “terrorist” have become almost synonymous” (Eid & Karim, 2014, p.105). Explicit and implicit
allegations of Muslims as being accountable for any terrorist attacks occurring in the world have been
vividly pronounced in media discourse post 9/11. According to Poorebrahim and Zarei (2012) “the image of Muslims
as social deviants and security threats is being regenerated against the backdrop of the ' war on terror'.
Heightened security concerns have made the Muslims community an easy target for an extraordinary
level of media scrutiny” (conclusion, para.1). Due to this propaganda, many Islamic countries, especially Middle Eastern
countries, have encountered considerable pressure for making new reforms and changes in their political
and educational systems. Saudi Arabia, of instance, has faced considerable international and local pressures for change in recent years
(Elyas & Picard, 2010). Because of the fear from producing more Islamic fundamentalists, and the fear of losing its strong connection with the
first initial stage of introducing English and its culture to the
primary schools (not previously taught at that stage) (Elyas, 2008). 5. Conclusion In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in
Norway, some western media institutions made news coverage reports and published news articles in which
Islam and Muslims were allegedly held accountable for the attacks. Using media discourse analysis, the present study
White House, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has begun its
linguistically analyzed a video report and a collection of biased news articles towards Islam and Muslims. The analyses revealed that these
western media institutions used word choices, implicature, and modal expressions to hold Muslims
accountable for the attacks. However, the tone of allegation varied dramatically from one article to
another ranging from a mere suspicion to an overt accusation. The varying degrees of uncertainty or assertion of the
authors’ statements were reflected in the varied linguistic forms and devices used within the discourse.
Islamophobia is racism
Musharbash 14 (Yassin Musharbash, deputy editor in the investigative department of German
newsweekly Die Zeit, “Islamophobia is racism, pure and simple”, December 10th, 2014, the guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/10/islamophobia-racism-dresden-protestsgermany-islamisation, JAS)
Over the past few years the advance of Islamophobia can
be easily observed. Anti-Muslim websites such as Politically
Incorrect have expanded and become more aggressive, cherry-picking reports of crimes by Muslim
perpetrators in order to confirm their prejudices; books with a clear anti-Muslim agenda – such as that of Thilo
Sarrazin, a former Berlin finance senator – have sold hundreds of thousands of copies, including claims that Muslim immigrants are “dumbing
down” Germany; parties such as Pro Köln, which hysterically warn of an “Islamic land grab”, have been founded. It is against this backdrop that
we have to look at the weekly protests in Dresden against the “Islamisation” of Germany. Few
of those attending are neo-Nazis
or classic rightwing radicals. Instead, the vast majority are normal citizens. Interestingly, and perhaps tellingly, there
are hardly any Muslims in Dresden. Islamophobia apparently has as much to do with imagination as with reality. To be sure, Islamophobia
is no German speciality. In the Netherlands, for example, similar developments started years earlier. In fact, Islamophobia is on the rise
across western Europe, not least in the UK. As a journalist with an Arabic name, I receive a fair amount of Islamophobic hate mail, as
do many colleagues with a similar background. Three years ago, when we realised this was happening to all of us and had become more
frequent, we started to stage public events at which we read from these letters to an audience. But we don’t just read the letters. We have
created a show around it – a party, if you like – called Hate Poetry Slam, during which we compete over who has received the meanest, most
racist, most hateful letter. It is a public act of catharsis. But much more importantly, when read out loud in front of hundreds of people, the full
extent of idiocy, the lack of logic, the hysteria in these letters becomes palpable. And laughable. Advertisement Of course, Islamophobia
can’t be laughed away and ours is just small way of dealing with it. But what’s clear is that traditional racist
arguments are now more likely to come in the form of abuse on the basis of religion. The argument is often that
Jews share the same values as Christians, and Vietnamese immigrants are good at integrating, but for Muslims neither is true; plus,
they want to take over. Which is why their religion is in fact an ideology; which is why it is OK to be against it; which in
turn makes you a freedom fighter. What’s feeding this? Clearly 9/11 and other Jihadist terrorist attacks play a role. But that’s not all. There is
fear of losing
out economically, for which Muslims are scapegoated; there’s the challenge of living in a society
changing rapidly in the light of globalisation; there’s anger about the increasing visibility of immigrants.
The organisers of the Dresden demonstrations claim to be responding to street fights between Salafists and Kurds that broke out in western
Germany a few weeks ago. But framing
this and other problems as part of a phenomenon of Islamisation is
ridiculous. And yet it is time we started to take this seriously. Those people in the streets of Dresden may be nonviolent but they have been
infected with a smug contempt for a minority, and may embolden the more radical fringes of the
Islamophobic spectrum. Politicians here have sensed that something is building. But until very recently, they mostly just maintained
that people’s grievances should be taken seriously, rather than criticising the racist sentiment that came with their
complaints. This needs to change – now. It needs to be made clear that Islamophobia in Germany is no
legitimate expression of anger or frustration and most certainly nothing to be proud of. It’s racism, plain
and simple.
Must reject racism –
Memmi 2000 (Albert, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris, RACISM, translated by Steve
Martinot, pp.163-165)
The struggle
against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never
achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without
concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a
mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to
diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear,
injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It
is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an
outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the
dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle,
difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the
prologues to the ultimate passage from animality
to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral
conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its
consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order
for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One
cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative
order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to
violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language,
racism is “the truly capital sin.”fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsel respect for
the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for
orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments.
Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in
banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong
enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest.
One day, perhaps,
the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is
probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall,” says the bible, “that
you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that
It is an ethical and a practical appeal – indeed, it is a contract, however
implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality.
Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society
accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and
destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager,
but the stakes are irresistible.
you risk becoming once again someday.
Links
Terrorism – Securitization
The Intelligence community is the reason we fear terror today, every so called “terror
plot” is started by them
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,”
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)
This alarmist bias generated by the IC is fed through leaks to journalists who disseminate them, fueling a
peculiar American hysteria on terrorism, which forces politicians to be responsive and show that they
are tough on terrorism, continuing a vicious spiral of continuous terror. The alarmist bias is self-protective. Usually IC
products follow the rule that the recent past42 is the best predictor of the future, and their estimate is often that, with a caution that negative
events can happen. If nothing bad happens, then their authors can celebrate being right for the most part. If things improve, they won’t be
blamed for a conservative estimate. However, if bad things happen, they can always point out that their caution anticipated such outcomes. In
truth, people are more likely to get blamed for not anticipating bad things than for not foreseeing good things. The result is that most
This bias is then also
directly communicated to policy makers, who, in turn, perpetuate the politics of fear, which is amplified
by the press and government friendly experts. Rather than calming the public, politicians are generally
alarmists, both as a need to respond to their constituents’ fears and as a result of the bias of their
advisers.
intelligence estimates play it safe and, with rare and courageous exceptions, build in a negative and alarmist bias.
Terrorism must be evaluated as a discursive construct
Bartolucci and Gallo 13 (Valentina Bartolucci and Giorgio Gallo, Department of Computer Science,
University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, “Terrorism, System Thinking and Critical Discourse Analysis”, August 16th,
2013, Systems Research and Behavioral Science,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/sres.2206/pdf, JAS)
Terrorism, it seems, is everywhere. It is widely present in daily conversations and political debates, in TV programmes, newspaper
articles and books. With its associated narratives and interlinked discourses, it is articulated within academic,
political, media and cultural productions up to the point that it has become so pervasive as to be found
in popular jokes, tattoos, novels and even children books (see also Croft, 2006). Terrorism is also the object of many
states’ regulations and is frequently stated as one of the principal reasons for military interventions.
Nevertheless, often its pervasive influence goes unnoticed, despite the fact that its diffuse effects
impact on several aspects of the public and private lives of individuals and groups, conditioning many
dimensions of contemporary life (Bartolucci, 2012). Today, terrorism is also a major focus of scholarly research with thousands of
books and articles published every year. Crucially, ‘the fact that terrorism is not strictly an abstract academic field of
study, but now infuses and impacts upon virtually every aspect of modern life’ (Jackson et al., 2011, p. 2)
demands a change of paradigm. This paper precisely seeks to propose a different approach to ‘terrorism’ that
consists in putting at the forefront the discursive dimension of the phenomenon and in grounding its
analysis in a systems perspective. Terrorism is here approached not as an objective, freestanding, *
Correspondence to: Giorgio Gallo, Department of Computer Science, University of Pisa, Via Largo Bruno Pontecorvo 3, 56127 Pisa, Italy. E-mail:
gallo@di.unipi.it Received 12 March 2013 Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 8 July 2013 Systems Research and Behavioral
Science Syst. Res. 32, 15–27 (2015) Published online 16 August 2013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/sres.2206
self-evident phenomenon, but rather as a discursive construction that, although loaded with
assumptions, cultural biases and moral charges, is often used uncritically and unreflectively with farreaching consequences (Jackson, 2007; Jackson et al., 2011; Bartolucci, 2010, 2012). Approaching terrorism as a social
construction embedded in a specific geographical, temporal and sociopolitical contextualization has
obvious implications for the way it is approached as an object of study. In particular, it means that its
study needs to be focused on the often complex relationship between the actual event labelled as
‘terrorism’, the representation of the same event and, following from that, the necessity or
effectiveness of responses to terrorism, both at a theoretical as well as practical level. In this context, critical
discourse analysis (CDA) seems to be the ideal framework to address the importance of the discursive dimension of
terrorism by providing an analysis of discourses and discerning connections between language and other
elements in social life that are often opaque (Fairclough, 2003). It is worth pointing out that to approach terrorism as
a discursive construction, which is applied to certain acts (and not others) in a specific sociopolitical
context as well as geographical and temporal settings, is not the same thing as arguing that terrorism
acts are not real, that real people do not harm or kill other people. Rather, it is to say that the representation of real
acts of violence as terrorism is conditioned by a complex series of political, social and discursive practices located in a specific context. In other
words, ‘the actions
and pronouncements of politicians, academics, lawyers and others transform a
particular act of violence – such as a bombing or murder – into an act of “terrorism” ’ (Jackson et al., 2011, p. 3).
The awareness of the role of the context and of the many and diverse actors proper of CDA suggests the need to ground the analysis
within systems theory as an epistemic theoretical framework. System thinking (ST) is an ideal approach, to understand
complex phenomena and problems, by seeing reality as a system and taking into account the complex pattern of interrelations between its
parts as well as their interactions with the environment (for an application of ST in conflict analysis, see Gallo, 2012). The paper is structured in
the following way. The
section following the introduction contains a critical analysis of the US political
framing of the 11 September 2001 events as terrorism and of the US intervention in Afghanistan. The
Terrorism, Discourse and Context section proposes a different approach to terrorism and
counterterrorism analysis that consists in putting at the forefront the discursive dimension of the
phenomenon and in grounding it in an ST perspective. CDA is a mode of research traditionally associated with the academic
field of applied linguistics. It is aimed both at providing an analysis of discourses and at discerning connections between language and other
elements in social life that are often opaque (Fairclough, 1992). Operationally, CDA complements
the linguistic analysis
with an interdisciplinary approach directed at the deconstruction of the whole sociopolitical and
historical contexts in which discourses are embedded. The Systems Theory and Critical Discourse
Analysis section addresses the dynamics of terrorism, enlightening some key elements of ST that can
enhance the understanding of terrorism, among which are causal loops and feedbacks, delays, emergent
properties and overshoot-and-collapse. The discussion is enriched by a discussion on the Afghanistan war and the Peace for
Galilee operation. The speeches reported in the text have been coded and reported in Appendix A.
Terrorism – Islamophobia
“Terrorism” is proxy for race, for Muslim
Daulatzai 12
(Sohail, Born at the Af-Pak border and raised in L.A. near the U.S-Mexico border, Sohail Daulatzai writes about race, culture, and politics,
Associate Professor in the Department of Film and Media Studies and the Program in African American Studies at the University of California,
Irvine, BLACK STAR, CRESCENT MOON The Muslim International and Black Freedom beyond America, Kindle Edition, p.172)
In the post-9/ 11 era, the rhetoric of “terrorism” has become a proxy for race, generating tremendous
political and ideological capital for U.S. nationalism and the implementation of a whole infrastructure
and apparatus of control through the “War on Terror.” The embodiment of “terrorism” has been the
Muslim, a highly racialized figure that has been mobilized to reinforce American hegemony abroad and
also to contain anti-racist and economic justice movements domestically. This threat of “terrorism” to
American interests abroad has justified a violent reassertion of American power and militarism to
extend Cold War alliances, further American geopolitical dominance, and refashion the United States as
the sole power in a unipolar world through “preemptive war,” covert intervention, aggressive militarism,
and unilateralism. Domestically, the threat of “terror” from the immigrant Muslim has justified a highly
racialized crackdown on immigrants in the United States, resulting in the normalization of deportations,
detentions, and disappear-ance. Muslims now occupy a space where the rule of law has determined
that the rule of law does not apply, and they embody a condition in which they do not have the right to
have rights.
Nuclear Terrorism
Fearing nuclear terror is government hype to action – it’s unlikely, alt causes, and lack
of realistic considerations
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,”
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)
the fear of nuclear terrorism has had mainly negative effects
on the lives of millions of people around the world, including in the United States, and even affects
negatively the prospects for a more peaceful world. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama
If the fear of nuclear war has thus had some positive effects,
bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons (see Mowatt-Larssen, 2010), and some terrorists no doubt
desire to obtain such weapons, evidence
of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear
weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent. This may be due to a
combination of reasons. Terrorists understand that it is not hard to terrorize a population without committing mass murder: In 2002, a single
sniper in the Washington, DC area, operating within his own automobile and with one accomplice, killed 10 people and changed the behavior of
virtually the entire populace of the city over a period of three weeks by instilling fear of being a randomly chosen shooting victim when out
shopping. Terrorists who believe the commission of violence helps their cause have access to many explosive materials and conventional
weapons to ply their trade. If public sympathy is important to their cause, an apparent plan or commission of mass murder is not going to help
The acquisition of
nuclear weapons by terrorists is not like the acquisition of conventional weapons; it requires significant time, planning,
resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work. It requires putting
aside at least some aspects of a group’s more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation
that no terrorist group has previously accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence (as
then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld kept reminding us during the search for Saddam’s nonexistent nuclear weapons), it is
reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the
threat. As Brian Jenkins, a longtime observer of terrorist groups, wrote in 2008: Nuclear terrorism ...turns out to be a world of truly
worrisome particles of truth. Yet it is also a world of fantasies, nightmares, urban legends, fakes, hoaxes, scams,
stings, mysterious substances, terrorist boasts, sensational claims, description of vast conspiracies,
allegations of cover-ups, lurid headlines, layers of misinformation and disinformation. Much is
inconclusive or contradictory. Only the terror is real. (Jenkins, 2008: 26)
them, and indeed will make their enemies even more implacable, reducing the prospects of achieving their goals.
“Islamic Terrorism”
The notion of Islamic terrorism statistically unfounded and homogenizes Islam
Jackson 07
(Richard Jackson, University of Otago, National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, “Constructing
Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse”, June 21st, 2007, Government and
Opposition, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x/pdf, JAS)
The ‘Islamic
terrorism’ discourse is susceptible to both firstand second-order critiques. A first-order critique
reveals that the discourse is predicated on a number of highly problematic and contestable labels,
assumptions and narratives, while a second-order critique exposes the ways in which the discourse
functions politically to naturalize and legitimize particular forms of knowledge and political practices.
First-Order Critique Employing the same social scientific modes of analysis, terminology and empirical categories used by the ‘Islamic terrorism’
texts, it can be argued that many
of the key terms, labels, assumptions and narratives of the ‘Islamic terrorism’
discourse are highly contestable, and the discourse as a whole consists of a number of oversimplifications, misconceptions and mistaken inferences. At the most fundamental level, it can be
argued that it is profoundly misleading to use terms like ‘the Muslim world’, ‘Islam’, 70 This narrative is
expressed in Husain Haqqani, ‘Islam’s Medieval Outposts’, Foreign Policy, 133 (2002), pp. 58–64. 71 In one of the most cited texts on religious
terrorism, Mark Juergensmeyer states that ‘the young bachelor self-martyrs in the Hamas movement . . . expect that the blasts that kill them
will propel them to a bed in heaven where the most delicious acts of sexual consummation will be theirs for the taking’, Juergensmeyer, Terror
in the Mind of God, p. 201. In fact, a surprising number of ‘Islamic terrorism’ texts, in discussing the Islamic tradition of martyrdom, mention the
‘seventy blackeyed virgins’ in paradise, with its implicit promise of sexual fulfilment, as being a primary motive for suicide bombings. See
Wiktorowicz, ‘A Genealogy of Radical Islam’, p. 93. 412 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION © The Author 2007. Journal compilation © 2007
Government and Opposition Ltd ‘Islamism’, ‘Islamic terrorists’, ‘jihadists’ or any of the other core labels as guiding analytical categories. There is
simply too much variation within ‘Islam’ and Islamic movements for meaningful or illuminating
generalizations, not least because ‘Islam’ consists of over a billion people from more than 50 countries,
languages and cultures, five major doctrinal groupings and hundreds of smaller sects, theological
traditions and cultural-religious variants.72 Even terms like ‘extremism’, ‘fundamentalism’, ‘Islamism’ or
‘moderates’ require careful qualification and contextualization.73 There are great variations in Islamic
fundamentalist and Islamist movements, not least between Sunni and Shia, violent and non-violent,
political and quietist, utopian and accommodationist, nationalist and internationalist and those that fall
between and cross over such crude divisions. Every Islamist group is a product of a unique history and context, and comparing
Islamists in Saudi Arabia with Uzbek, Somali, Bangladeshi or Malaysian Islamists, for example, usually serves to obscure rather than
illuminate.74 In practice, the dividing
line between ‘extremists’ and ‘moderates’ is not only context specific, but
also highly porous. Terms like ‘extremist’ and ‘fundamentalist’ also obscure the fact that Islamist groups engage in an array of political,
social and cultural activities, few of which could be described as radical. Moreover, when it is used to describe a single category of people, the
label ‘Islamic terrorists’ in itself is highly misleading because it lumps together an extremely diverse set
of groups, cells, movements and individuals, and conceals the importance of local contingencies in their
form and development.75 At the very least, it obscures the way in which 72 See John Esposito, ‘Political Islam: Beyond the Green
Menace’, Current History, 93: 579 (1994), pp. 19–24. 73 This point is powerfully made in Guilain Denoeux, ‘The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating
Political Islam’, Middle East Policy, 9: 2 (2002), pp. 56–81. Denoeux argues that the term ‘fundamentalism’ is particularly misleading when
applied to Islam because the word has connotations derived from its origins in early twentieth-century American Protestantism. See also
Zaheer Kazmi, ‘Discipline and Power: Interpreting Global Islam: A Review Essay’, Review of International Studies, 30 (2004), pp. 245–54; and M.
E. Yapp, ‘Islam and Islamism’, Middle Eastern Studies, 40: 2 (2004), pp. 161–82. 74 See Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and
Islamism, London, I.B. Tauris, 2006. 75 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, London, Penguin, 2003, p. 24. CONSTRUCTING
ENEMIES 413 © The Author 2007. Journal compilation © 2007 Government and Opposition Ltd different groups split, merge and move away or
towards violent actions; a great
many Islamist groups have rejected violent struggle as a strategic necessity due
to theological or pragmatic reassessment, while others have adopted violence when non-violent
struggle failed.76 In contradistinction to most ‘Islamic terrorism’ texts, there is a large and sophisticated body of research
that confirms that Islamic doctrine and practice, including varieties of ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamic
fundamentalism’, is not typically or necessarily violent, antidemocratic or incompatible with secularism
and modernity.77 This research suggests that not only are Islamic values compatible with democracy,78 but,
as opinion polls have consistently shown over many years, the great majority of individuals in Muslim
countries prefer democracy over other kinds of political systems.79 Nor is it the case that ‘Islamists’ are opposed to
democracy; in many countries they constitute the only viable vehicle for democratic participation and opposition in relatively closed political
systems.80 As Mumtaz Ahmad has noted: ‘The Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Turkish, Malaysian, Egyptian, Jordanian, Algerian, Tunisian and Moroccan
Islamists have already accepted the Islamic legitimacy of popular elections, the electoral process, the multiplicity of political parties and even
the authority of the popularly elected parliament to legislate not only on socio- 76 See Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics. 77 It is as true for
Islam as it is for Christianity that ‘the fundamentalist emphasis on personal purity often takes an individual rather than a collective and political
expression’ – that greater religious devotion more often leads to political withdrawal than to militancy. Joseph Schwartz, ‘Misreading Islamist
Terrorism: The “War against Terrorism” and Just-War Theory’, Metaphilosophy, 35: 3 (2004), p. 278. 78 See John Esposito and John Voll,
Democracy and Islam, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996; Niaz Kabuli, Democracy According to Islam, Pittsburgh, PA, Dorrance
Publications, 1994; and Anthony Shahid, Legacy of the Prophet: Despots, Democrats, and the New Politics of Islam, Boulder, CO, Westview
Press, 2001. 79 World Values Survey data from 1995–2001 support this finding, discussed in Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, ‘Public Opinion
Among Muslims and the West’, in Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion Just (eds), Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government,
and the Public, London, Routledge, 2003. In other words, the
problem would seem to be not that Islam is antithetical to
democracy but that repressive regimes, often with the support of Western powers, have suppressed
democratic movements. 80 Esposito, ‘Political Islam’, p. 23. 414 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION © The Author 2007. Journal
compilation © 2007 Government and Opposition Ltd economic matters but also on Islamic doctrinal issues.’81 We should also note that
Islamist movements like Hamas, Hizbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood (referred to simply as ‘Islamic
terrorists’ in most texts), as well as Islamist parties in several Central Asian states,82 have not only
participated in national elections, but have well-established internal democratic processes. In fact, Islamist
groups have adopted a multitude of strategies and approaches to their interaction with the state and other social actors and are engaged in a
variety of locally defined projects, most of which are focused on winning power. From this perspective, Islamism
is perhaps better
understood as a dynamic set of processes rather than a fixed or essential identity. Arguably the most
important challenge to the discourse pertains to the notion of ‘religious terrorism’ as an analytical
category and to the narratives of the religious foundations of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in particular. In the first
instance, as Fred Halliday notes, ‘it is nonsense to seek the causes, as distinct from legitimation, of violence in the texts or traditions of any
religion’, because all religions have texts or traditions that allow a violent (or a pacifist) reading.83 It is not that the rhetorical justifications of
violence are unimportant or that terrorist groups never appeal to religious ideas, simply that they are secondary to the strategic decision to
employ violence in pursuit of political goals. Similarly, it
is a logical fallacy to assume that some shared characteristic
among terrorists – including a common religion – is necessarily linked to their terrorist actions: the fact
that the majority of terrorists are men, for example, does not mean that being male predisposes one to
terrorism.84 81 Mumtaz Ahmad, ‘Islam and Democracy: The Emerging Consensus’, Milli Gazette, 2 October 2002, quoted in Takeyh and
Gvosdev, ‘Radical Islam’, p. 94. Ahmad also notes that several Islamist parties have revised their opposition to women holding political office.
Similarly, Schwartz notes that when
Islamist parties have gained mainstream political influence, their political
stance has often evolved in strikingly moderate and pragmatic directions. Schwartz, ‘Misreading Islamist Terrorism’,
p. 280. 82 See Anna Zelkina, ‘Islam and Security in the New States of Central Asia: How Genuine is the Islamic Threat?’, Religion, State & Society,
27: 3–4 (1999), pp. 355–72; and Shirin Akiner, ‘The Politicisation of Islam in Postsoviet Central Asia’, Religion, State & Society, 31: 2 (2003), pp.
97–122. 83 Halliday, Two Hours that Shook the World, pp. 46, 78. See also, Burke, Al-Qaeda, p. 32. 84 Sageman, Understanding Terror
Networks, p. 144. CONSTRUCTING ENEMIES 415 © The Author 2007. Journal compilation © 2007 Government and Opposition Ltd In addition,
and contrary to widely held beliefs, every major empirical study on the subject has thrown doubt on the purported link between religion and
terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism, for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to
2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection
between suicide terrorism and Islamic
fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’.85 Some of the key findings of the study that support this assessment
include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic
fundamentalism; the leading
practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist–Leninist Tamil Tigers,
who committed 76 attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166 or 43
per cent were religious; there were 41 attacks attributed to Hizbollah during this period, of which eight were carried out by Muslims,
27 by communists and three by Christians (the other three attackers could not be identified); and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can
be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign that has a secular and strategic goal,
namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation.86 Similarly, Sageman’s widely quoted study compiled detailed
biographical data on 172 participants of ‘Islamic terrorist’ groups. Some of the relevant findings of his study include, among others: only 17 per
cent of the terrorists had an Islamic religious education; only 8 per cent of terrorists showed any religious devotion as youths; only 13 per cent
of terrorists indicated that they were inspired to join solely on the basis of religious beliefs; increased religious devotion appeared to be an
effect of joining the terrorist group, not the cause of it; there is no empirical evidence that the terrorists were motivated largely by hate or
pathological prejudice; ‘Islamic terrorist’ groups do not engage in active recruitment, as there are more volunteers than they can
accommodate; the data, along with five decades of research, failed to provide any support for the notion of religious brainwashing; and there is
no evidence 85 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, New York, Random House, 2005, p. 4. 86 Ibid, pp. 4, 17,
139, 205, 210. Pape’s findings are supported by recent ethnographic research. See Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill, New York, Columbia University
Press, 2005. 416 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION © The Author 2007. Journal compilation © 2007 Government and Opposition Ltd of any
individual joining a terrorist group solely on the basis of exposure to internet-based material.87 Interestingly, the data compiled in these two
projects also demonstrate
that the notion that ‘Islamic terrorism’ results from poverty, disaffection and
alienation is unsupported. In fact, both of these studies show that the overwhelming majority of ‘terrorists’ are
middle or upper class, of above-average educational standing, professionally employed, often married
or in relationships, are well integrated into their communities and generally have good future prospects.
Robert Pape concludes that the typical profile of a ‘terrorist’ resembles ‘the kind of politically conscious
individuals who might join a grassroots movement’ rather than a religious fanatic.88 In addition to quantitative
research, content and interpretive analysis of so-called jihadist literature suggest that the central aims, goals and concerns are political and
nationalist in the traditional sense, and the use of religious language and symbols is instrumental rather than primary. Halliday, for example,
argues that Islamist discourse, although often expressed in religious terms, is a form of secular or nationalist protest at external and internal
domination and forms of exclusion.89 Within such a reading, Islamism is
probably more accurately described as a
revolutionary ideology than a violent religious cult.90 This conclusion is also drawn by several studies of al-Qaeda, the
quintessential ‘Islamic terrorist’ group.91 These texts 87 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, pp. 93, 97, 110, 115, 121–5, 163. Other
studies that question the relationship between Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism include: Stephen Holmes, ‘Al Qaeda, September 11,
2001’, in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Making Sense of Suicide Missions, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 131–72; Ariel Merari, ‘The
Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East’, in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism, New York, Cambridge University
Press, 1990; and Ehud Sprinzak, ‘Rational Fanatics’, Foreign Policy, 120 (2000), pp. 66–73. 88 Pape, Dying to Win, p. 216. Sageman similarly
suggests that ‘from all the evidence, many participants joined in search of a larger cause worthy of sacrifice’, Sageman, Understanding Terror
Networks, p. 97. 89 Halliday, Two Hours that Shook the World, pp. 129–31. See also, Tarak Barkwai, ‘On the Pedagogy of “Small Wars” ’,
International Affairs, 80: 1 (2004), pp. 19–37. 90 See Roxanne Euban, ‘Killing (for) Politics: Jihad, Martyrdom, and Political Action’, Political
Theory, 30: 1 (2002), pp. 4–35. 91 Jason Burke concludes that bin
Laden’s ‘grievances are political but articulated in
religious terms and with reference to a religious worldview. The movement is rooted in social, economic
and political contingencies.’ Burke, Al-Qaeda, pp. xxv–xxvi. See also, Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin
Laden, London, CONSTRUCTING ENEMIES 417 © The Author 2007. Journal compilation © 2007 Government and Opposition Ltd reveal a fairly
nuanced political analysis and a clear set of political goals, including: support for the establishment of a Palestinian state; ending US military
occupation of the Arabian peninsular and its ongoing support for Israel; overthrowing corrupt and oppressive Arab regimes; supporting local
insurgencies in Kashmir, Chechnya, the Philippines and elsewhere; and the expulsion of Western forces from Iraq and Afghanistan.92 In fact,
after examining al-Qaeda’s mobilization rhetoric, and based on the aforementioned empirical analysis of the group’s members and targeting
strategies, Pape concluded: ‘Al-Qaeda is less a transnational network of like-minded ideologues... than a cross-national military alliance of
national liberation movements working together against what they see as a common imperial threat. For al-Qaeda, religion matters, but mainly
in the context of national resistance to foreign occupation.’93 In short, in-depth qualitative studies suggest that terrorism is always local; that
is, it is driven by identifiable political grievances and issues specific to particular societies and locales.
Counter Terrorism
Representations of hegemony and counterterrorist narratives fail to address structural
inequalities, inefficiencies, replication of terrorism, and state sponsored violence
Milojević 2 [Ivana Milojević, searcher and educator with the background in sociology, gender, peace and futures studies, and Visiting
Professor at the Association of Centres for Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies and Research, University of Novi Sad; “Gender, Peace
and Terrestrial Futures: Alternatives to Terrorism and War”; University of Queensland; 2002; accessed 07/20/2015;
<http://www.metafuture.org/articlesbycolleagues/IvanaMilojevic/Ivana_Milojevic_-_Gender_peace_and_terrestrial_futures.htm>.] Author’s
first language is Serbian.
Given that the current global
hegemonic discourse is predominantly based on neo-liberal and rationalist
theories, it is this worldview that helps form ‘common sense’ notions of ‘success’ and ‘failure’. However, as feminist
authors in the field of International Relations such as V. Spike Peterson, Cynthia Enloe, Jan Jindy Pettman, Rebecca Grant, Kathleen Newland
and others have shown, a
different worldview suggests different solutions to conflicts between and among
states. For example, if the impacts on environment and human relatedness are included in the analysis
different understanding on whether military solutions work emerges. That is, if environment and human
relatedness are protected and enhanced, the solution is successful. On the other hand, if they are damaged then it
obviously is not. The latest military action by the USA has been provoked by a violent and murderous attack which occurred on American soil.
There is nothing wrong with people demanding perpetrators brought to justice. Except that those directly involved are already all dead. But it is
also justifiable to attempt to bring to justice those that have either organized or in any other ways facilitated these horrible attacks; except that
retaliation has brought other grievances and increased the overall death toll. We do not really know what
motivated those men to fly airplanes into WTC buildings and Pentagon on September 11th. We can only
guess. One possibility is that they sought to damage symbols of American economic and political power
because of the damage this power does to others. Another guess is that they were waging some sort of holy war
against the Christian West because of the damage it has done to Islam. Yet another guess is that their action was also facilitated by their
desire to die as martyrs, achieving a one-way direct ticket to heaven. But what we do know with higher certainty is that they
believed that higher goals justify the sacrifice of some human lives. We are also a bit clearer on what motivated
the USA to conduct its military campaign in Afghanistan, because their representatives communicate to us
through global media. What we are told is that Afghanistan has been bombed because its then government
cooperated with and protected terrorists. And we are yet again reminded that sacrifice of some human lives
is necessary. While there are important and crucial differences between these two ‘players’ in the current conflict it seems that both
establishments operate from a similar paradigm and a similar worldview. Both accept the category of
‘collateral damage’ when it comes to the lives of those seen and defined as the other. Both seem to worry more
about strategic goals rather then the impacts their actions might have on the system as a whole. Both
believe that violence is the only language ‘the other’ will understand and consequently promote violent
and military solutions to the problem. Both promote violent hypermasculinities, either overtly or covertly,
contributing towards the creation, maintenance and further enhancement of global culture of war. And, with their either total exclusion or
tokenistic inclusion of women’s and/or feminist’s perspectives, both are deeply patriarchal. There
is no doubt that, at least at the level
of litany and obvious, violence ‘works’. In that sense, despite all the efforts not to ‘give in’ to terrorism, terrorist
actions do ‘work’. The terrorist action on September 11th produced not only very concrete results in terms of destruction it has created,
it has also brought attention to all range of problems – from structural inequalities to American involvement in the Middle East. But
terrorist actions were ‘successful’ in other ways too. In fact, one of the strongest impacts terrorist actions
have brought with them is their counter-productivity. Destruction of symbols of American (or Western?) economic and
political power further hurt the most vulnerable. Those that were on the receiving end of structural violence prior to
the attack have suffered even more as a result of it. The exacerbated recession, the redirection of resources towards military
and the redirection of aid for victims of retaliatory military campaign have all further hurt those in whose name the terrorist actions were
possibly taken. If men who hijacked and crashed the planes thought they were helping Islam, again they could not be more wrong.
Governments throughout Islamic world have not been overthrown and replaced by the alleged ‘true’ version of Islamic governance. On the
other hand, Muslims were killed not only in the direct attack on WTC but also in its aftermath, e.g. during demonstrations in Pakistan. A Muslim
nation, Afghanistan, has suffered immensely. Muslims living in predominately non-Muslim states have also suffered from increased racism and
racial hatred. Some have even been killed. How
then did the terrorist attack address current world imbalances or
challenging existing power hierarchies? The similar question can be asked in relation to American
retaliation. That is, how are piece-meal strategies, such as direct military involvement in Afghanistan going to produce real changes,
addressing the root causes of terrorism? How is the extensive use of force and demonization of ‘the other’ - the
enemy, not going to confirm what the USA is already accused of? How are ultimatums and strategic alliances based on
exercising the existing worldwide power going to help support equitable diplomacy and true international cooperation?
Iran
Discursive representations of Iran aren’t neutral, but rather biased to present it as
irrational, and failed
Morgan No date
(David Morgan, B.A. (Hons.) International Relations, “A Discourse of Legitimation”, After 2012,
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/media/wwwlboroacuk/content/phir/documentsandpdfs/topstudentessays/D%
20Morgan%20-%20Dissertation.pdf, JAS)
Chapter 1: Sketching the ‘war on terror’ discourse onto Iran The process of ‘recontextualisation’ as described by Fairclough and Van Leeuwen is
the procedure by which semiosis in a ‘war on terror’ discourse can be operationalised into political discourse specific to Iran. It is in this light
that we approach the objectives of this chapter. Firstly, through the application of a discursive analytical framework onto G.W. Bush’s State of
the Union Address 2002 (SUA02)5 the semiotic elements that are used to develop a ‘war on terror’ discourse were identified. Secondly, the
results6 from this process were compared with President Barack Obama’s SUA in January 2012 (SUA12)7 and his speech to the American Israeli
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)8 in March 2012. Obama’s SUA12 was chosen as a key Presidential speech to the American public, where he
addresses foreign policy issues and, the AIPAC speech as a key Middle East foreign policy speech. The framework applied to Bush’s SUA02 is
largely an adaptation of the strategies identified by Antonio Reyes, introduced in the literature review9 above. My
framework
demonstrates three key strategies that actors employ to legitimise action: 1) an appeal to emotions that
evoke a sense of fear; 2) speech proposals of a hypothetical future, and; 3) rationality of the decision
process. This was also 5 See Appendix 1 6 See Appendix 2 7 See Appendix 3 8 See Appendix 4 9 See page 7 - Literature Review David Morgan
B011513 14 Chapter 1: Sketching the ‘war on terror’ discourse onto Iran informed by Van Leeuwen’s (2007)
four categories of legitimisation – ‘authorisation’, ‘moral evaluation’, ‘rationalisation’ and
‘mythopoesis’10. By identifying direct utterances from the SUA02 to Obama’s language from a strict list of findings could lead me to
overlook occurrences of recontextualisation that may inform my wider evaluation. However, I have chosen this process because it denies any
extra interpretation on my part as the researcher that may lead me to more subjective conclusions. In any case, as is shown in the analysis that
follows, there is substantial evidence to suggest recontextualisation has occurred. Strategy 1: an appeal
to emotions that evoke a
sense of fear In the first strategy, speakers evoke certain feelings by making reference to emotions
through their speech. By appealing to emotions that give the audience a sense of fear, action is
legitimised as a necessary precaution to avert the consequence the speaker is proposing (Reyes 2011) – live
or die may present equally strong feelings but they are at quite different ends of broad spectrum. A key
feature to achieving this strategy is the construction of the adversary, ‘them’, in relation to the familiar
group, ‘us’11 (Wodak, Meyer 2001). Wodak (2001, 2002) describes how this distinction is created through three speech
strategies – referential, nomination, and predicative – to construct the other. Firstly, ‘referential’
strategies develop systems for referring to the enemy, i.e. terrorists, extremists, regimes etc. as can be
seen in Bush’s language in (1): 10 See page 6 - Literature Review 11 For an interesting study see ODDO, J., 2011. 'War legitimation
discourse: Representing 'Us' and 'Them' in four US Presidential speeches'. Discourse and Society, 22(3), pp. 287-314 David Morgan A Discourse
of Legitimation: Beyond the ‘war on terror’ and towards Iran 15 (1) [T]he terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear
weapons (Bush 2002). In (1), the referential
strategy used to identify ‘terrorists and regimes’ is bound to the
pursuit of weapons that evokes a sense of fear. Therefore, they become intertextually linked to the language in (2) and (3)
from Obama: (2) The regime [Iran] is more isolated than ever before (Obama 2012a). (3) No Israeli government can tolerate a nuclear weapon
in the hands of a regime [Iran] that denies the holocaust, threatens to wipe Israel off the map, and sponsors terrorists groups committed to
Israel’s destruction (Obama 2012b). Furthermore, a dramatisation
of the enemy’s actions appeals to fear responses
through a tactic, introduced by Reyes (2008: 34), called ‘Explicit Emotional Enumeration’ (EEE). ‘Politicians state the threat
enumerating the negative actions of the enemy (EEE) and they provide the solution (war) to eliminate
that threat’ (Reyes 2008: 35). This strategy is realised by breaking the object under discussion into a descriptive
list, whilst presenting no new information to the listener. It is purely used as an appeal to emotions (Reyes
2008). Excerpt (1) above demonstrates the breakdown of weapon types, where (4) shows EEE in reference to terrorist groups: (4) A terrorist
underworld – including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Jaish-i-Mohammed (Bush 2002). The EEE in this case, then, allows simplified
reference through intertextuality to these groups as they have been explicitly named beforehand. This is seen in (5) by using the referential
phrase ‘Iran’s proxies’: David Morgan B011513 16 Chapter 1: Sketching the ‘war on terror’ discourse onto Iran (5) [I]t would embolden Iran’s
proxies, that have carried out terrorists attacks from the Levant to Southeast Asia (Obama 2012b). This strategy
can also be used to
define the victims of terrorism, demonstrating that the ‘other’ does not discriminate in their attacks. In
(6), Bush describes events in Iraq to demonstrate his point. In (7), Obama recontextualises this to Iran: (6) This is a regime
that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens – leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children
(Bush 2002). (7) We will stand for the rights and dignity of all human beings – men and women; Christians, Muslims and Jews (Obama 2012b).
The joint
effort of referential strategies in describing what the ‘other’ is, and the appeal to emotion that
the speaker can achieve through EEE, provides the initial building block towards constructing the
adversary. This image can then be brought to life by the second strategy of ‘nomination’. ‘Nomination’
strategies, refer to, ‘[w]hat traits, characteristics, qualities, and features are attributed to them?’ (Wodak,
Meyer 2001: 73), i.e. killers, murderers. Essentially, this constructs what threat the ‘other’ presents to the listener: (8) We
have seen the depth of our enemies’ hatred in videos, where they laugh about the loss of innocent life (Bush 2002). (9) Thousands of dangerous
killers, schooled in the methods of murder (Bush 2002). As part of my discursive framework, I applied a Transitive Model from Systemic
Functional Grammar (SFG) as developed by Michael Halliday (Halliday, Matthiessen David Morgan A Discourse of Legitimation: Beyond the ‘war
on terror’ and towards Iran 17 2004), to outline
verbal, mental and material verb-types. Specifically chosen verbs are
linguistically linked to the nouns that ‘nomination’ strategies wish to highlight. In (10), the noun ‘regime’ becomes
linked to material verb-type ‘brutalised’ and in (11) ‘Iran’ is linked to mental verb-type ‘threaten’. Both examples below are
from Obama: (10) … a regime that has brutalised its own people (Obama 2012b). (11) And we will safeguard America’s own security against
those who threaten our citizens, our friends, and our interests. Look at Iran (Obama 2012a). This is not dissimilar to Bush in 2002, where in (12)
‘Iran’ is linked to both ‘pursues these weapons’, ‘exports terror’ and ‘repress’, which are certainly material but also mental verb-types, and (13)
links ‘regimes’ with ‘sponsor’, ‘threatening’ also as material and mental: (12) Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while
an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom (Bush 2002). (13) Our goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from
threatening America or our friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction (Bush 2002). Halliday’s (2004) work demonstrates how
particular nouns that have pre-existing ideological meanings are distinguished for reoccurring use in
certain discourses. This means speakers can use these words efficiently when constructing discourse as
they do not need to explain their disagreement towards them at each use. Furthermore, Bush’s use of
‘aggressively’ in excerpt (12) demonstrates the third ‘predicative’ strategy. David Morgan B011513 18 Chapter 1:
Sketching the ‘war on terror’ discourse onto Iran In order to cement an appeal to the listener’s
emotions, ‘predicative’ strategies attach particular attributes to the ‘other’ in order to emphasise the
extent of the threat. This is achieved by using a clause or adjective to state something about the subject beyond the initial
understanding of a verb or noun (Halliday, Matthiessen 2004). Key to our study is the recontextualisation from the predicates Bush attaches to
the general nouns ‘regimes’ and ‘weapons’ in (14), to the specific case of Iran in Obama’s speech in (15): (14) The United States of America will
not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons (Bush 2002). (15) Iran’s nuclear
program – a threat that has the potential to bring together the worst rhetoric about Israel’s destruction with the world’s most dangerous
weapons (Obama 2012a). Furthermore, once
the predicative strategy has been employed, and the predicate
accepted by the listener, an argumentation tactic is used to build a scenario where this may become
reality for the listener. Argumentative strategies allow ‘specific persons or social groups [that] try to justify
and legitimise the exclusion, discrimination, suppression and exploitation of others’ (Wodak, Meyer 2001: 73,
Wodak, Pelinka 2002). This can allow the speaker to achieve highly persuasive utterances to legitimise actions that become naturalised into
social practices of exclusion and discrimination through a description of what the ‘other’ has done (Reyes 2011). In (16), Bush is describing
Iraq’s actions towards weapons inspectors that ultimately constituted the main argument for the US invasion in 2003: David Morgan A
Discourse of Legitimation: Beyond the ‘war on terror’ and towards Iran 19 (16) This is a regime that agreed to international inspectors – then
kicked out the inspectors (Bush 2002). Essentially, where the
‘argument’ of the speaker succeeds, some form of social
action will transpire because this is microcosm of the struggle for predominance between orders of
discourse as described by Fairclough12. The predominance of the ‘war on terror’ order of discourse in American
political and military institutions gives Obama’s recontextualisation of nuclear proliferation issues with
Iran in (17) added significance: (17) But a peaceful resolution of this issue is still possible, and far better, and if Iran changes course
and meets its obligations, it can rejoin the community of nations (Obama 2012a). This is of great pertinence here because it
would seem that the revelations of not finding WMD’s in Iraq should create a reluctance of the public to
accept any actions towards Iran on the same basis. However, this feeling is anesthetised because of the perennial emotional
appeal of what Iran represents that is constructed in the ‘war on terror’ discourse, which has been recontextualised to the Iranian issue.
Therefore, an appeal
to emotions in the Iranian case is cemented by the employment of referential,
nomination and predicative strategies, supported by an argumentative strategy to show what they have
actually done. This evokes a sense of fear in the audience as ‘they’ are distinguished from ‘us’, and so the
next stage to gaining acceptance for action is the hypothetical circumstances this situation may lead us
to. 12 See Methodology David Morgan B011513 20 Chapter 1: Sketching the ‘war on terror’ discourse onto Iran Strategy 2: speech proposals of
a hypothetical future The second strategy proposes circumstances that may transpire if the speaker’s warnings or suggestions are not heeded.
This is most effectively
achieved through a linkage of problems in the past with the future to develop
intertextuality13, allowing the speaker to suggest immediate action in the present (Reyes 2011). Key to accomplishing
legitimisation here are conditional structures that employ ‘markers of modalisation’ such as would and could, to
allow speculation on future events (Reyes 2011: 794). Bednarek (2006: 21-23) describes this as ‘epistemic modality’ that ‘conveys the speaker’s
degree of confidence in the truth of the proposition’. Excerpt (18) and (19) demonstrate how general
hypothetical future
structures constructed by Bush have been recontextualized specifically to Iran by Obama. Interestingly here,
Obama gives a detailed scenario of what could happen, which further appeals to the listeners emotions: (18) By seeking weapons of mass
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these to terrorists, giving them the means to match their
hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be
catastrophic (Bush 2002). (19) There are risks that an Iranian nuclear weapon could fall into the hands of a terrorist organisation. It is almost
certain that others in the region could feel compelled to get their own nuclear weapon, triggering an arms race in one of the world’s most
volatile regions (Obama 2012b). 13 See page 9 - Methodology David Morgan A Discourse of Legitimation: Beyond the ‘war on terror’ and
towards Iran 21 Furthermore, actors
can propose a hypothetical future without epistemic modality, which
suggests complete confidence in the proposition to give the statement added significance. Again, Bush’s
general words about terrorism are recontextualized by Obama to Iran: (20) So long as training camps operate, so long as nations harbour
terrorists, freedom is at risk (Bush 2002). (21) A nuclear armed Iran is completely counter to Israel’s security interests. But it is also counter to
the security interests of the United States (Obama 2012b). Over the course of my analysis it became clear that Obama
presents
statements without epistemic modality much more frequently than Bush. This suggests something about his
personal oratory style and shows that when this is constructed as part of a fearful scenario, the future becomes a place where
political actors can situate ideological utterances in order to exert power and control (Dunmire 2009). Another
element of the hypothetical future strategy is reference to altruistic motivations. A hypothetical future that benefits others through proposed
action, allows the speaker to avoid suggestions that their wider motives are self-interested (Reyes 2011). Bush refers to the invasion of
Afghanistan that happened shortly before his SUA02 in (22): (22) The last time we met in this chamber, the mothers and daughters of
Afghanistan were captives in their own homes, forbidden from working or going to school. Today women are free, and part of Afghanistan’s
new government (Bush 2002). David Morgan B011513 22 Chapter 1: Sketching the ‘war on terror’ discourse onto Iran Many
of the same
themes can be seen in (23) from Obama, relating to rocket fire from Palestinian militants in Gaza: (23) [A]s
President, I have provided critical funding to deploy the Iron Dome system that has intercepted rockets that might have hit homes and hospitals
and schools in that town and in others. Now our assistance
is expanding Israel’s defensive capabilities, so that more
Israelis can live free from the fear of rockets and ballistic missiles (Obama 2012b). In both (22) and (23) EEE can be
identified – Bush refers to the victims whilst Obama makes reference to civilian buildings. What is interesting in
Obama’s speech is the connection to ballistic missiles that relates to wider discourses linked to Saddam
Hussein’s scud missile attacks on Israel in the 1991 Gulf War. This technology is outside the capability of
Gaza militants such as Hamas but is still referred to here as it becomes intertextually linked to Obama’s
words as he identifies ‘Iran’s proxies’ shown in excerpt (5) 14, above. Further to altruistic references, the protection of
values is presented as a legitimising tactic, which is described by Van Leeuwen (2009) as ‘moral evaluation’. The speaker uses a
threat to value systems as a reason for social action (Reyes 2011). Excerpts (24) and (25) show how many of the themes in Bush’s language are
picked up by Obama as he makes reference to Iran, showing recontextualisation: (24) America will stand firm for the non-negotiable rights of
human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal justice; and religious
tolerance (Bush 2002). 14 See page 15 David Morgan A Discourse of Legitimation: Beyond the ‘war on terror’ and towards Iran 23 (25) The
United States and Israel share interests, but we also share those human values Shimon spoke about: a commitment to human dignity, a belief
that freedom is a right that is given to all of God’s children (Obama 2012b). The semiosis here demonstrates
the pervasiveness
of the hypothetical future strategy because, as Reyes (2011: 795) states, ‘[t]hese legitimisations do not respond to
an ideological position, nor are they idiosyncratic characteristics of a particular political actor’ (democrat,
republican, liberal, or realist), they are simply presented as American. This greatly facilitates the process of recontextualisation as it
allows the actor to extend the demonization of the abstract ‘other’ to real perceived threats, such as Iran
(Reyes 2011). Therefore, it can be seen how recontextualisation from a ‘war on terror’ discourse can aid the construction of Iran as the enemy
in strategy 1, and the hypothetical
threats they pose suggested in strategy 2 can make an audience accept the
challenges Iran presents. However, the break between the threat and the proposed action against it still
needs to be traversed in order to legitimise action. This is done by demonstrating rationality of the actions
taken against those threats. Strategy 3: rationality of the decision process The third strategy presents the decision to
conduct social practices as rationally considered, in order to present them as the right thing to do (Reyes
2011). This process can only occur within a shared belief system of society that defines what is ‘right’. Therefore, actors can identify
what is culturally considered as an acceptable approach to decision making and situate their actions
within this operating system to legitimise action (Reyes 2011). David Morgan B011513 24 Chapter 1: Sketching the
‘war on terror’ discourse onto Iran A key element to this strategy is the process of naturalisation that
occurs, especially once a demonisation of the ‘other’ is complete via strategy 115. If a context is constructed where
the threat of the ‘other’ is just ‘the way things are’, this belief system can be naturalised in society (Reyes 2011: 798). This allows the actor to
provide a limited catalogue of the options for action whilst presenting it as complete. Furthermore, a greater effect is to demonstrate that
these options have been produced through a diligent process of wider consultation. This allows
the reinforcement of the
Us/Them binary by reassuring listeners that there is support for proposed actions. The similarities between
Bush’s words in (26) and Obama’s in (27) as he talks about economic sanctions against Iran, are stark: (26) America is working with Russia and
China and India, in ways we have never before, to achieve peace and prosperity…. Together with our friends and allies from Europe to Asia, and
Africa to Latin America, we will demonstrate that the forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of freedom (Bush 2002). (27) Some of you will
recall, people predicted that Russia and China wouldn’t join us to move toward pressure. They did…. Many questioned whether we could hold
our coalition together as we moved against Iran’s central bank and oil exports. But our friends in Europe and Asia and elsewhere are joining us
(Obama 2012b). Support can be stated but does not necessarily generate support in itself, so an important
discursive device is to
back up the legitimation of social action through stating the outcome to the listener. Obama follows his
statements in (27) with: 15 See Strategy 1: an appeal to emotions that evoke a sense of fear David Morgan A Discourse of
Legitimation: Beyond the ‘war on terror’ and towards Iran 25 (28) That is where we are today – because of our work. Iran is isolated, its
leadership divided and under pressure (Obama 2012b). Excerpt (28) demonstrates
rationality based on success of the
action to show that the social practice produced an intended outcome. This is described as ‘instrumental
rationality’ by Van Leeuwen (2007) and, gives the purpose of the social practice to the listener. However, purposes are not
synonymous with legitimations16, so to achieve such acceptance a moralisation can be attached to the purpose to fully take
advantage of the legitimation strategy. In both Bush’s and Obama’s language, this moralisation is stated as defence of the
nation: (29) We will work closely with our coalition partners to deny terrorists and their state sponsors the
materials, technology and expertise to make and deliver weapons of mass destruction…. All nations should
know: America will do whatever is necessary to ensure our nation’s security (Bush 2002). (30) I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a
nuclear weapon. And as I have made clear time and time again during the course of my presidency, I will not hesitate to use force when it is
necessary to defend the United States and its interests (Obama 2012b). This is clear recontextualisation from
Bush’s words that
vaguely identifies ‘state sponsors’ with the production of WMD’s, with Obama’s words that simply
sketch this scenario directly onto Iran. The turn towards military action is representative of an
ideological position that, it can be argued, has infiltrated the US executive. Excerpts 16 See page 6 - Literature
Review David Morgan B011513 26 Chapter 1: Sketching the ‘war on terror’ discourse onto Iran (29) and (30) show how morally
acceptable rationalisations can legitimate action because the possession of, or the progress towards, a
nuclear weapon is now linguistically linked to the US ‘use of force’. What ‘necessary’ action entails is withheld from the
listener, but the practice is legitimised because society accepts it on the basis of its morality, i.e. to defend the
United States, which naturalises it as just the way things must be. Summary The analysis above demonstrates the recontextualisation of Bush’s
wider ‘war on terror’ discourse towards Iran by Obama in 2012. Furthermore, the linkage of the three strategies is clearly evident. The
construction of the enemy in strategy 1 appeals to the listener’s emotions, allowing the development of
hypothetical futures in strategy 2 based on the enemies identified characteristics. This picture of the ‘other’ is
bridged into the reality of social practices by strategy 3, which demonstrates rationality of the decision making process. The analysis in this
chapter shows that where particular reference to emotions exists, as we would expect to see in discourse relating to the September 11 attacks,
highly persuasive textual structures have the potential to legitimise many forms of social action. This is made
possible by changes in
the semiosis that corresponds to social practices by altering one, two, or all three of its elements17. 9/11
is a clear example of how a social event caused the elements of the existing order of discourse to shift
by altering society’s perception of the world. This facilitates new forms of social action so that, where
recontextualisation occurs onto 17 See Methodology David Morgan A Discourse of Legitimation: Beyond the ‘war on terror’ and towards Iran
27 the Iranian issue, the practices legitimised by reconfiguration of the order of discourse in 2002 would be expected to reoccur where the
same discourse informs the social events of 2012 and beyond. Where changes
were indeed achieved in 2002, a ‘war on
terror’ discourse would be naturalised as part of specific social practices into a linkage of, ‘the world’s
most dangerous regimes…pursue…weapons of mass destruction…’ (Bush 2002), ‘I will take no options off the
table…aimed at isolating Iran…and, yes, a military effort to be prepared for any contingency’ (Obama 2012b). However, in the case of
a move towards military action against Iran, if the ‘war on terror’ discourse can be ‘operationalised’ in
the international community such action could achieve greater support and legitimation.
ISIS
The ISIS threat is hyped by the media
Timm 15
(Trevor Timm, Freedom of the Press Foundation, “Our media's Isis threat hype machine: government
stenography at its worst”, July 6th, 2015, The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/06/isis-cnn-terrorism-threat-hype-machinegovernment-pr, JAS)
If you turned on US cable news at any point last week, you might have thought this July 4 holiday would be our last weekend on earth – the
supposed terrorist masterminds in Isis and their alleged vast sleeper cell army were going to descend upon America like the aliens in
Independence Day and destroy us all. CNN has led the pack in whipping
Americans into a panic over the Isis threat,
running story after story with government officials and terrorism industry money-makers hyping the
threat, played against the backdrop of scary b-roll of terrorist training camps. Former CIA deputy director Mike
Morell ominously told CBS last week that “I wouldn’t be surprised if we weren’t sitting here a week from today talking about an attack over the
weekend in the United States.” MSNBC and Fox joined in too, using graphics
and maps right out of Stephen Colbert’s
satirical “Doom Bunker,” suggesting World War III was just on the verge of reaching America’s shores.
Nothing happened, of course. But it was an abject lesson in how irrational government fear-mongering still controls
our public discourse, even when there wasn’t a shred of hard evidence for any sort of attack, only a
feeling that one might happen. The media totally bought into this frenzy, despite the fact that the FBI and
other intelligence agencies openly admitted they did not have any “specific” or “credible” threat
information to hinge the holiday-weekend warnings on. Naturally, we didn’t find this out until several paragraphs down in
any of the articles about the subject, and on television it sometimes wasn’t mentioned at all. Even when it was, the lack of push-back or
questioning was startling. For example, this report from NBC News: Authorities told NBC News that they are unaware of any specific
or credible threat inside the country. But the dangers are more complex and unpredictable than ever. You almost have to appreciate the
amount of discipline it takes to write two back-to-back sentences like that without expressing even a hint of skepticism: we have no
evidence proving you’re in danger, but you absolutely should be very afraid! It was an incredible turnaround from
just a week before, even for the American fear-mongering machine. Following the tragedy in Charleston, where a white supremacist terrorist
killed nine innocent churchgoers, there was – finally! – widespread acknowledgement that the Islamic terrorism threat in this country is vastly
exaggerated, and that white supremacists actually kill many more Americans than Muslim extremists do. As Glenn Greenwald wrote at the
time, you are more
likely to be struck by lightning, stung to death by bees or killed your own falling furniture
on you than you are by a Muslim terrorist. Yet there we were, less than a week later, back to an “Isis is going
to kill us all” mentality. Bill Maher complained this weekend that, “Cable news is Isis’ best ally.” And he’s absolutely right. While CNN
was by far the loudest and most idiotic – the dildo-laden Isis flag at London’s gay pride parade was only a particularly laughable taste of the
network’s alarmism – all the cable news channels have happily played along. Yet hardly
any of the talking-head “experts”
bothered to ask whether our military’s continued bombing of the Middle East might be exacerbating the
chances of a terrorist attack on US soil, rather than dissipating it. Journalist Adam Johnson went back a
decade and found 40 other times the FBI and Homeland Security have issued similar threats around
national holidays or major events, none of which actually was followed by a terrorist attack. It’s more than a
little disturbing how much CNN and others have seemingly grown to rely on these nebulous warnings to keep viewers hooked. As Johnson
quipped on Twitter earlier this week, “Can the FBI break its terror-predicting 0-40 losing streak this weekend? Tune into CNN to find out!” All of
this doesn’t mean that a terrorist attack on US won’t eventually happen. Simple math tells us that, no matter the precautions taken or the civil
liberties taken away, one may get through. But it is a rare event, and one which human beings have lived with throughout our history. By
magnifying it and terrifying everyone, we’re only doing the terrorists’ job for them. No one is suggesting
we ignore the existence of Isis. The savage attack on civilians in Tunisia was a deplorable tragedy, and
the group actively threatens many people in the Middle East. But even as we mourn the victims and
steel our resolve, the idea that we should upend our way of life based on an extremely remote
possibility that we, in the end, have no ability to control is absurd. As for those vague terror warnings that didn’t
materialize over the weekend? They’ve been extended.
Even if ISIS is a threat, constructing extinction level threats romanticizes and
empowers terrorist groups and recruiting processes
Fryer-Biggs 4/14 [Zachary Fryer-Biggs, national security reporter and Newsweek editor; “Is The Media Feeding the ISIS Monster?”;
Newsweek; 04/14/2015; accessed 07/14/2015; <http://www.newsweek.com/feeding-isis-monster-321982>.]
“[ISIS] provides a clearly defined identity that tells you what your mission is.” Which is exactly why stories
about the power of ISIS
may actually help reinforce group’s brand. The same goes for speeches by American politicians. During a press
briefing about ISIS last year, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel mentioned the September 11 attacks three times,
implying that the jihadist group may be capable of devastating attacks inside the U.S. “They are an
imminent threat to every interest we have, whether it’s in Iraq or anywhere else,” he said. “This is beyond anything
that we’ve seen.” Moghaddan says Hagel and others “have really overreacted. They’ve used overblown
rhetoric...focusing on aspects of ISIS that actually romanticize the whole movement.” For his part, President
Barack Obama has been much more measured, calling ISIS and its ideology a “medium- and long-term threat” to the U.S. But the whirl of
reports about ISIS spreading its tentacles across the world—from the Gaza Strip to New York City’s Times Square—has
made the group look larger than life. “In American and Canadian rhetoric they’re being posed as an
imminent threat,” says Taylor. “They’re not just a rag-tag bunch of hoodlums...and that helps lure those looking for a clearly defined
mission.”
“Failed States”
The definition of a state as “failed is based in neo-colonial and western
understandings of statehood
Thiessen 15
(Ben Thiessen, Department of International Studies, College of Arts and Science, University of
Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada, “Conceptualizing the ‘Failed State’: The Construction of the Failed
State Discourse”, 2015, University of Saskatchewan Undergraduate Research Journal,
http://usurj.journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/usurj/index.php/usurj/article/view/72, JAS)
Underpinning the whole discourse is a European or Western universalism. The identification of failed states is
achieved through the construction of a state/failed state dichotomy built on a fixed, universal standard
of what constitutes a successful state. The state failure literature’s promotion of African states as the deviant
‘Other’ stems from how it identifies failed states. The successful state standard constructed by this
literature is based on the concept of positive sovereignty, which is in turn based on Max Weber’s ideal
state. 14 The Weberian model is based on the classical European state, which has become the model for all
other modern states. Given this, “African states, failed and nonfailed alike, are compared with a model of statehood that is based upon
strictly European values, customs, practices, 11 Daron Acemonglu, and James A. Robinson, “The 2012 Index,” Foreign Policy 194, (2012):
accessed November 9, 2013. http://web.ebscohost.com.cyber.usask.ca/ehost/detail?sid =2843741f-beb7-4217-9f895d506b7f1168%40sessionmgr15&vid=2&hid=28&bdata =JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=777 21357. See Appendix Figure 1.
12 Jones, 2013, 64. 13 Ibid., 64. 14 Hill, 146. organizations and structures.” 15 Bear in mind that the European model of state development was
able to evolve and consolidate in the nearly four hundred years following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Thus, it is believed
the
inability of certain African states to replicate the political, economic, social and cultural conditions of the
Western norm has resulted in their failure, without considering the historical context of decolonization
and the process of drawing ‘national’ boundaries in Africa. Failed state analysts constitute the identities of ‘failed’
African societies in relation to Western societies, attributing negative characteristics to the former and
positive to the latter. The differences between these two categories of states are not simply portrayed as different, but failed states
are presented as abnormal in the pejorative sense. Within the narrative, one of the determining criteria of a successful state
is the possession of positive sovereignty. The concept of positive sovereignty is most closely associated with Robert Jackson but is based on
Weber’s ideal state. 16 According to Jackson, positive sovereignty presupposes capabilities which
enable
governments to be their own masters: it is a substantive rather than a formal condition. A positively
sovereign government is one which not only enjoys rights of non-intervention and other international
immunities but also possesses the wherewithal to provide political goods for its citizens. It is also a
government that can collaborate with other governments in defense alliances and similar international
arrangements and reciprocate in international commerce and finance. 17 Given this, a successful state
not only has international legal or de jure recognition of its statehood, but the government of that state
also possesses “the capabilities to project and protect their authority throughout the entirety of their
sovereign territory and enter into collaborative agreements 15 Ibid., 148. 16 Ibid., 146. 17 Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty,
International Relations, and the Third World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 29. Conceptualizing the ‘Failed State’ Narrative
(Thiessen) University of Saskatchewan Undergraduate Research Journal 132 with other governments.” 18 This is what Jackson refers to as de
facto statehood that distinguishes positively sovereign states from negatively sovereign states. 19 Thus, the sovereignty of a positively
sovereign state is both de facto and de jure, whereas the sovereignty of a negatively sovereign state is solely de jure. According to this model,
negatively sovereign states do not control their territory, may be faced with armed insurgents that
render them unable to uphold its monopoly of violence and have very little ability to implement policies
or promote economic development. 20 However, Jonathan Hill notes the positive/negative sovereignty binary does not precisely
mirror the state/failed state binary: “while all successful states are positively sovereign and all failed states negatively so, not all negatively
sovereign states are failed.” 21 This has aided in the proliferation of various categories of
states – from quasi, weak,
collapsed and failed – that represents an important ambiguity within the failed state narrative. In addition to
the positive/negative sovereignty binary, failed states are also examined through their inability to provide political
goods to their citizens. This approach, as represented by authors such as William Zartman and Robert Rotberg, sees the state first and
foremost as a service provider. 22 Both authors distinguish between a variety of services that states may provide, ranging from “security to rule
of law, the protection of property, the right to political participation, provision of infrastructure and social services such as health and
education.” 23 These services constitute a hierarchy where security is a condition for the provision of all other services. Hill outlines two
common elements of this approach. First, the failed state is identified as “being either ‘unable’ and/or ‘unwilling’ to 18 Hill, 146. 19 Jackson, 27.
20 Stein Sundstol Eriksen, “’State Failure’ in theory and practice: the idea of the state and the contradictions of state formation,” Review of
International Studies 37, no. 1 (2011): 232. 21 Hill, 146. 22 Eriksen, 230. 23 Ibid., 231. perform the functions they should. The second is a
definition of what these functions are, namely, the provision of welfare, law and order, and security.” 24 Underpinning
the
descriptions of failed states is therefore a predetermined definition of what constitutes a non-failed
state or successful state. Stein Sundstol Eriksen adds that this approach can be problematic in that
viewing the state as essentially a service provider can lead to the promotion of normative prescriptions
under the guise of positivism science: “Instead of developing concepts which are better suited to
analyze existing states, the gap between ideals and empirical reality is treated as justification for
intervention which aims to close this gap, and make empirical reality conform to the model.” 25 The lack of
congruency between the ideal and reality is taken to indicate a lack, not in the concept, but in the object to which it refers. According to this
approach, the absence
of certain features associated with statehood constitutes an argument for changing
the world to make it fit the concept of statehood. Hence, the policy manifestations of the failed state
narrative are ahistorical, decontextualized, and based on a one-size-fits-all model. Eriksen warns that with this
move, one moves away from the domain of theory as a tool of understanding and moves towards the realm of normative theory. 26 Branwen
Gruffyd Jones identifies three characteristics of the discourse that determine its ahistorical nature and, thus, its inadequate explanatory power:
First is the enormous proliferation of descriptive terminology… This rich
array of descriptors functions in a manner which
appears self-evident, acting by way of tautology to form a substitute for historically informed social
analysis and explanation… Second, ‘state failure’ is characterized as being primarily of local origin… The generic form of explanation
locates the causes of ‘failure’ in terms of internal agency…with little serious regard to history, structure and the international. Third, the
analytical/descriptive approach operates through 24 Hill, 145. 25 Eriksen, 231. 26 Ibid., 232. Conceptualizing the ‘Failed State’ Narrative
(Thiessen) University of Saskatchewan Undergraduate Research Journal 133 a logic of
comparison with an ideal and
ahistorical notion of what ‘the state’ is or should be. 27 This comparative approach makes it extremely
difficult to adequately explain the development of individual states. The implication of both perspectives is that any
deviations from their definitions of statehood can only appear as a deficiency. 28 Jones draws a linkage
between the identification of some lack or inferiority and the legitimation of imperial intervention. 29 In
the colonial era, distinguishing between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ states legitimized formal occupation. The
current discourse of state failure, with its hierarchical categories of weak, fragile, failed and collapsed, aids
in legitimizing intervention by identifying lack, inferiority and incapacity. 30 Rather than explaining why the sociopolitical problems of an individual state have developed, this comparative approach merely highlights that African states are different and are
ahistorical and decontextualized in their analysis. Through this approach, “states
are merely identified not by what they are,
but what they are not, namely, successful in comparison to Western states.” 31 This raises questions as to how
useful it is to start with such a conception of statehood. The failed state narrative conveys “Western conceptions of the polity;
it reactivates a developmentalist approach that considers the model of the Weberian state as the
appropriate institutional solution to restoring order and stability in fragile contexts.” 32 Pinar Bilgin and Adam
David Morton observe: [there is a tendency to] abstract the post-colonial state from its socio-historical context,
leading to an inability to account for historically specific 27 Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “The global political economy of
social crisis: Towards a critique of the ‘failed state’ ideology,” Review of International Political Economy 15, no. 2 (2008): 184. 28 Eriksen, 234.
29 Jones, 2008, 197. 30 Ibid., 198. 31 Hill, 148. 32 Nay, 328.
ideologies and practices or the social bases of state power
that may constitute or sustain social order… [There is] no account of how a postcolonial state comes into being in the first place,
how it is constituted or reproduced. There is also a further tendency to reify the post-colonial state by abstracting it
from the international sphere. 33 Thus, for Bilgin and Morton, the overall result of analysis of the post-colonial ‘failed’ state ends up
overlooking the historically contingent processes of state formation and more complex patterns of state-civil society relations. 34 The
conceptual language
of the failed state discourse “meshes easily with a broader and deeply entrenched
Western imagination of chaos and anarchy in Africa: a general lack of capacity to develop, to rule or to
be peaceful.” 35 Furthermore, Jones argues, “underpinning the apparent empirical precision and objectivity of
analyses of state failure in Africa are a set of features that betray the position of this approach in a
longer genealogy of imperial discourse.” 36 Although the explicit language of race in its modern colonial form disappeared from
legitimate international discourse with the demise of formal colonial rule, the “position of this new hierarchy of state capacity to govern…are
now specified with reference to a general notion of the functional capacity of states, often combined with some sense of ultimate threat.” 37
This has been made possible by the language of ‘good governance’ that resonates with already existing features of common sense about Africa.
However, Jones notes that the failed
state discourse emerged not directly from the colonial ideology of racial
civilization but is the immediate predecessor of the sanitized language of development and
modernization. 38 The development and modernization discourse was born out of the processes of decolonization. Jones argues that it
served to “legitimize the practices of Western governments 33 Bilgin and Morton, 63. 34 Ibid., 63. 35 Jones, 2013, 49. 36
Ibid., 50. 37 Ibid., 61. 38 Ibid., 61. Conceptualizing the ‘Failed State’ Narrative (Thiessen) University of Saskatchewan Undergraduate Research
Journal 134 and international organization in providing ‘policy
advice’ and ‘technical assistance’ in a range of matters of
political, economic and social concern to newly independent countries, the new vocabulary helping to
disguise essential continuities with colonial relationships.” 39 Neocolonial Underpinnings By ignoring historical and
contextual aspects, the dominant approach to failed states presents state failure as a consequence of domestic
weakness. This view of state failure as a predominantly internal or domestic problem is reinforced by the various solutions to
state failure offered by different development actors and analysts. Under neoliberal globalization, formal
democratization has been represented as the political corollary of economic liberalization. This has been reflected in the adoption of
aid conditionally and structural adjustment programmes by international financial institutions like the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in favour of democracy promotion. 40 In this way,
external actors are presented as benevolent, restorative forces while the domestic sphere of failed
states are perceived as compromised, lacking in agency and, therefore, incapable of looking after
themselves. Furthermore, Hill argues, “external actors are in no way implicated in contributing to or exacerbating a state’s so-called
failure.” 41 The privileging of internal factors over external ones not only leads the failed state discourse to
ignore the interplay between domestic and international contexts, it also means that the influence of
external actors on socio-political crises are ignored. While failed states are framed as the result of domestic factors,
simultaneously, foreign governments and international development agencies and organizations are
portrayed as the only forces capable of rectifying these problems. Labeling state failures is not just a
rhetorical exercise; it is used to delineate the acceptable range of policy options that can then be
exercised against those 39 Ibid., 62. 40 Hill, 149. 41 Ibid., 149. states. 42 As such, Western caretaker states see little relevance in the
internationally recognized sovereignty or local capacities of African nation-states. What results is a “paternalistic defense of Western
imperialism in both its historical and contemporary forms.” 43 As Michael Ignatieff argued months before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Imperialism
used to be the white man’s burden. This gave it a bad reputation. But imperialism doesn’t stop being necessary just because it becomes
politically incorrect. Nations sometimes fail, and when they do, only outside help – imperial power – can get them back on their feet. Nation-
building is the kind of imperialism you get in a human rights era, a time when great powers believe
simultaneously in the right of small nations to govern themselves and in their own right to rule the
world. 44 Explicit in Ignatieff’s argument is the ‘fact’ or need of imperialism as a set of benevolent policies and practices oriented towards the
South’s development of national security and human rights. He frames Western intervention in the optimistic language of ‘nation-building’ as
opposed to recognizing the violent and disempowering nature of their intervention. Sium adds that Ignatieff leaves
strategic moral and military space for the West’s intervention in the South as an exercise of its ‘right to rule the world.’ 45 Through this selfappointed right, “the West
awards itself narrative control over which the world’s geographies require
imperialism and which are permitted to participate in acting it out.” 46 42 Morten Boas, and Kathleen M. Jennings,
“Failed states and state failure: Threats or opportunities?” Globalization 4, no. 4 (2007): 478. 2 Sium, 3. 44 Michael Ignatieff, “Nation-Building
Lite,” New York Times, last modified July 28, 2002, accessed November 10, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/28/magazine/nationbuilding-lite.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 45 Sium, 3. 46 Ibid., 3. Conceptualizing the
‘Failed State’ Narrative (Thiessen) University of Saskatchewan Undergraduate Research Journal 135 The categories of
fragility and
failed states cannot be isolated from the conditions under which they emerged and entered the
Western political lexicon on issues like security and development. They were a product of the post-Cold War
period, created by Western actors based on an attempt to advance new strategic options in security,
defense, humanitarianism and international cooperation. It was also a key feature of the George Bush administration’s
policy discourse on the ‘war on terror’ by connecting the American foreign policy agenda with the new national security strategy launched after
9/11. 47 Additionally, the relationship established between state fragility, underdevelopment and security reflected the new development aid
strategies pursued by major multilateral organizations. It helped those institutions representing Western countries’ interests, especially the
World Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED) and IMF, to develop a new agenda towards non-performing
countries after Western donors shifted towards performance-based allocation mechanisms for distributing development assistance. 48 Oliver
Nay argues it is for these reasons that “the rhetoric on
failed and fragile states cannot be dissociated from the
Western powers’ military doctrines, diplomatic options and economic choices.” 49 It provides grounds for
policy interventions to resolve regional conflicts, counter transnational terrorism and combat
international organized crime, or for interference in the internal affairs of war-torn or poor countries. 50
The discourse on failed states becomes a policy narrative that serves to justify peace-building and statebuilding interventions which has contributed to the development of neocolonialism that involves
international domination that no longer relies on the military conquest of territory, but instead results
from the establishment, by the great powers and for a limited time, of governance systems that bring
together international organizations, Western bilateral agencies and domestic authorities in countries
rebuilding after 47 Nay, 330. 48 Ibid., 329. 49 Ibid., 330. 50 Boas and Jennings, 388. conflict or disaster – such as Bosnia,
Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and South Sudan. 51 The emergence of the failed state narrative
has not primarily served the needs of populations suffering from war situations and poor governance.
Instead, it mainly reflects strategic and financial concerns shared by a limited number of Western
governments. It is a policy label “that fuels ‘operational doctrines’ on international security and development… and has been instrumental
in the production of legitimate discourse in international relations.”
“Fundamentalism” - Securitization
Hegemonic discourse of patriarchal binarism – “the free world vs. fundamentalist
Islam” – is a barrier to embracing an alternative peace
Milojević 2 [Ivana Milojević, searcher and educator with the background in sociology, gender, peace and futures studies, and Visiting
Professor at the Association of Centres for Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies and Research, University of Novi Sad; “Gender, Peace
and Terrestrial Futures: Alternatives to Terrorism and War”; University of Queensland; 2002; accessed 07/20/2015;
<http://www.metafuture.org/articlesbycolleagues/IvanaMilojevic/Ivana_Milojevic_-_Gender_peace_and_terrestrial_futures.htm>.] Author’s
first language is Serbian.
In addition, the created military-solution-oriented
post September 11th discourse has also become one more
example of the dominance of “malestream” patriarchal perspective especially when it comes to conflict analysis
and resolution. The masculinist bias could easily be found in predominantly masculinist rhetoric, patriarchal logic
and the general invisibility of women. While women have consistently been either invisible or only present as objects
of the inquiry (e.g. victimhood of Afghani women), on the other hand, men have been both real and symbolical subjects
– movers and shakers of our history and our present. From terrorists to political, military and religious leaders, to heroic fire fighters and
rescue workers - the life taker, the decision-maker, the hero, the powerful one has almost always been a man. But most
importantly, the patriarchal worldview has the strongest grip on definitional power. For example, the patriarchal
discourse has been present in the focus on abstract categories, such as ‘nations’, ‘free-world’,
‘fundamentalists’, etc. It has also been present in the “predominance of strategic discourse of national interest and national security …
and inductive reasoning [that has] … effectively removed people as agents embedded in social and historical contexts…” (True, 1996:210).
Binary thinking, considered by many feminists to be one of the main characteristics of patriarchal reasoning has
also roamed wild. Examples include ‘free-world vs. totalitarian states’ and ‘either with us or against us’
choices on offer. In fact, as feminist authors in the area of international relations have shown, all the key concepts central to how states and
the international system currently operate, such as power, sovereignty, security and rationality (True, 1996:225-236) embody a patriarchal
worldview. The main problem with this is that the existence of hegemonic
patriarchal discourse that cuts through all
these categories seriously limits spaces for the emergence of alternative strategies. That is, it can be equally
embodied in neo-liberal, rationalist discourses or within the worldview of ‘the terrorists’ but also sometimes even
in so called ‘progressive’ and ‘leftist’ approached. For example, the patriarchal worldview is embodied in Marxist understandings of historical
change and view that the violence is somehow the ‘midwife’ of history. It may come as no surprise then that Marxists and neo-Marxists are
often sympathetic towards ‘liberation’ movements that too often incorporate violent strategies into their modus operandi. Of course, Marx’s
famous statement that the ‘violence is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one’ is one of the better examples of misusing
women’s experiences and interpreting them from within a patriarchal worldview.
“Fundamentalism” = Islamophobia
Conflates all Muslims with stereotypical violent radicalism
Renold 2 (Leah, Professor of Religious Studies at St. Lawrence University. "Collateral Language: A
User's Guide to America's New War. Pg 95)
When the term "fundamentalist" is used in the media in association with Islam, it is rarely defined.
Such usage suggests a common understanding of the term. While most Americans are not familiar with
the different schools of thought within Islam, they are acquainted with fundamentalism in the Christian
context, where the term is used in common parlance to refer, often negatively, to a certain brand of
Christianity. When the term fundamentalism appears as an appendage of Islam, the reading public can
only assume that the same connotations associated with Christian fundamentalism most also apply.
Fundamentalism becomes a blanket term, shrouding Islam in Western perceptions of
fundamentalism. In using the term, the media manages to associate large numbers of Muslim people
with certain attitudes and behavior of a backward and inherently dangerous nature. In instances
where the term fundamentalism is defined, stereotypical images are only re-enforced, without specific
mention of historical, political, social, or theological developments within Islam. Fundamentalism is
applied as an essential term, implying that there is a certain characteristic, a core essence of the
phenomenon, which transcends distinctions of specificity.
Should reject the term “fundamentalism”
Renold 2 (Leah, Professor of Religious Studies at St. Lawrence University. "Collateral Language: A
User's Guide to America's New War. Pg 106.
Are fundamentalists our enemy in the current crisis? Fundamentalism loosely defined can refer to a
great horde. There are millions of people in the world with deeply entrenched religious worldviews. If
we include as our enemy everyone who fits into the vague stereotypical image of a fundamentalist,
the enemy looms very large. As globalization brings competing worldviews closer and closer, there is a
tendency, it seems, for people to want to affirm their distinctiveness. Where we might think others
would welcome the flood of images, ideas, and products from the West, to many the onslaught of
Westernization threatens to bring about a disintegration of their own culture and identity. Thus we see
the rise of movements around the world that attempt to strengthen a collective sense of uniqueness
Religion, which is closely interwoven with other aspects of society, is often held up as a badge of honor,
as the defining characteristic of the culture. Should we regard all these people, including those
Americans who place religion at the center of their worldview and their politics, as enemies? In
defining fundamentalists as enemies, are we saying that ,such people have no place in the modem
world? Are we denying them the right to self-identity and the right to embrace a worldview of their
own selection? Must they embrace Western conceptions of modernity or else become branded as
fundamental enemies? Can freedom of thought be applied only to expressions that correspond to the
liberal Western ideology? Has liberal thought become so imperialistic? Questioning the boundaries of
Western hegemony does not imply total relativity; it does not imply that the ideologies of totalitarian
governments, for instance, have an equal right of expression. It certainly does not condone murder. But
it should lead us to consider the implications of and the ideology behind the targeting of worldviews
that do not correspond to our own, especially those that are branded fundamentalist. It should lead
us to abandon the use of the term fundamentalist as a category into which we shove large numbers of
Muslims.
Impacts
Turns Aff - Endless War
Threat construction obscures realistic perceptions of time, creates self-fulfilling
feedback loops, cedes political agency, and causes endlessly justified nuclear war
Zulaika 12 [Joseba Zulaika, Professor and Co-Director at the Center for Basque Studies at the University of Nevada, Reno; “Mythologies
of Terror: Fantasy and Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in U.S. Counterterrorism” pg 9-11; Kroeber Anthropological Society; 03/08/2012; accessed
07/15/2015; <http://kas.berkeley.edu/documents/Issue_102-103/2_Zulaika.pdf>.] Edited for gendered language
Self-Fulfilling Prophecies “Time”
is the difference between science fiction, where there is no requirement of real time, and
actual reality. It is the play with time that is most revealing of the manipulations of associative magic, as shown in divination.
The oracle, based on secret knowledge, reveals whether witchcraft has transpired and whether its danger looms ahead. Counterterrorist
thinking has also a peculiar relation to temporality, as threats are largely based on the inevitability of
waiting. Actual historical temporality becomes subservient to the feared future. If there are no terrorist
attacks, the counterterrorist can claim success in preventing them; but if the attack does occur, then the
counterterrorist can say “I told you so,” and argue that he was right in his predictions. At this point terrorism foretold
becomes prophecy fulfilled. Such imperviousness to error in actual historical events points to a time warp that
goes to the heart of counterterrorist mythology. Such waiting implies in fact that historical time has
surrendered itself to a fateful future. The result of this passive temporality regarding events we can do
nothing to prevent is a fateful mindset in which the terror events are closer to nature than society and politics, and
there is hardly any point in looking into the intellectual premises or subjective motivations that guide terrorist actions. The great political
victory of the suicide
bombers is that they imposed on U.S. politics their own suicidal temporality of waiting
and a culture grounded on the oracular knowledge of secret intelligence, which then justified the War on
Terror. “The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning,” writes sociologist Robert Merton, “a false definition of the
situation evoking a new behavior which makes the original false conception come true. This specious validity
of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. For the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was
right from the very beginning—such are the perversities of social logic” (Merton 1968:477). It was false that there was al-Qaeda
in Iraq before the invasion, but then it became true after the invasion. Anti-American radical Islamists could never
afford to have anti-aircraft missiles, until the CIA provided Stinger missiles to Afghan rebels battling the Soviets during the 1980s. Similarly, over
forty countries are currently developing drone technology to be used as military robots, with the likelihood that in a not far away future they
might fall in the hands of terrorists. Such self-fulfilling prophecy of counterterrorist drones being used by terrorists, we are told, “is not far
away” (Caryl 2007:58). A central dimension
of terrorism, and one that is crucial to show its self-fulfilling quality, has to do with
threats and their perception and the reactions they provoke. A threat plays with the sign as representing a future
event, while we never know whether the issuer actually means it or not, or whether he they might change his their
opinion in the future. The Unabomber brought the traffic in California airports to a halt by simply sending a letter to a newspaper with the
threat of bringing down an airliner, while he sent another letter to another newspaper admitting that the threat was a “prank.” The actual
reality of the threat might be nothing but play -- a zero that can yet have deadly serious consequences. Counterterrorism is a prime example of
what Merton labeled “the Thomas theorem:” “If men define situations as they are real in their consequences” (Merton 1968:475). Once the
situation is defined
as one of inevitable terrorism and endless waiting, what could happen weighs as much as what is actually
the case; once a threat, whose intention or possibility is unknown to us, is taken seriously, its reality requires that we
must act on it. Terrorism is the catalyst for confusing various semantic levels of linguistic, ritual and military
actions. Anthropologists have examined phenomena such as divination, which manipulates the axis of time in a cultural context of magic and
witchcraft. They have compared pre-modern mystical notions of causation and temporality to our own modern standards of rationality. The
central premise of counterterrorism
thinking is the oft-repeated formula that “it is not if, but when.” Hypotheticals are
premised with the conditional if— “if A, then B.” What characterizes basic counterterrorist knowledge about the next
impending attack is that it will happen. In a mind-set that parallels Azande witchcraft, the counterterrorist axiom of “not if” rules out
mere hypotheses.2 The revelations are thus “unfulfilled hypotheticals” that will become real with time. Counterterrorist
projections are the equivalent to oracular certainties—the horror will happen no matter what. This leads in pragmatic terms to
the fatalistic attitude of disregarding actual knowledge and not taking responsibility for actual
decisions—what does it really matter what we decide since it is going to happen anyway and whatever happens is out of our hands? What
matters, therefore, is that we sort of divine what the course of action will be. The practical aspect of this temporality of
waiting, in which the certainty of the impending evil is beyond any hypothetical (“not if”), is that we need to act preemptively
now against events that are to happen in the future. The rationale behind nuclear deterrence was that developing armaments
now, ready to strike at the push of a button, guaranteed that they would not be used in the future. Many commentators saw in such logic
the quintessence of technological madness. But that was not enough. Since future nuclear attacks by terrorists
are only a matter of time, we must wage war now preemptively even in a nuclear context, thus breaking
the historic assumption that nuclear arsenals were for deterrence, not for actual usage. Thus the formula of
“not if, but when” becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The counterterrorist thinking makes it an imperative that the war
must start now— against Saddam Hussein, against al-Qaeda, against Iran, against all potential terrorists. This is how the American public,
including the liberal media, accepted the rationale to go to war against Iraq.
Turns Aff – Increases Surveillance
Fear of terrorism used to justify increased surveillance
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,”
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)
Lowering the risk of terrorism, particularly the nuclear kind, is the
quintessential reason that the mandarins of the national security state have given for employing the
most invasive national surveillance system in history. Finding the needle in the haystack is how some describe the effort to
discern terrorist plots from telephone metadata and intercepted communications. But the haystack keeps
expanding, and large elements of the American population appear willing to allow significant
encroachments on the constitutional protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. The fear of
terrorism has produced this change in the American psyche even though there is no evidence that the
collection of such data has resulted in the discovery of terrorist plots beyond those found by traditional police and
intelligence methods. It is doubtful that we shall soon (if ever) see a return to the status quo ante regarding
constitutional protections. This reduction in the freedom of Americans from the prying eyes of the state
is a major consequence of the hyping of terrorism, especially nuclear terrorism. This is exemplified by the blithe conclusion
The rise of the national surveillance state.
in the previously referenced paper by Friedman and Lewis (2014), in which readers are advised to be more proactive in supporting our
government’s actions to ameliorate potential risks. The National Security Agency should love this.
Turns Case – Increases Surveillance = Islamophobia
Security concerns are used to justify baseless profiling, detention, and harassment of
Muslims and those perceived as such
LoCicero 14(Alice LoCicero, practicing psychologist at the Boston Medical Center, “Domestic Consequences of US Counter-Terrorism
Efforts: Making it Harder to Prevent Homegrown Terrorism,” http://benthamopen.com/contents/pdf/TOPSYJ/TOPSYJ-8-32.pdf, 12/18/14)
Thirteen years after the 9/11 attacks, security concerns have led to a
monstrously huge security and intelligence apparatus in the US. Citizens, as well as noncitizens,
are still being profiled, detained without explanation, inconvenienced, and indeed, hassled
without cause. More than a decade after 9/11, even permanent residents of the US worry
about traveling outside the country. They fear being viewed with suspicion or having difficulty
returning to the country. Law enforcement has been infiltrating Muslim communities,
aggressively seeking informants, or creating fake terrorist plots and attempting to draw young
Muslims in. Federal agents interview thousands of young Arab American and Muslim men “with
no individualized suspicion of criminal activity” [12].
SECURITY OVER FREEDOM
War
Fear of terror used to justify war – Iraq proves
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,”
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)
Insiders in the George W. Bush administration have revealed that when the administration was seeking
internal support for the decision to attack Saddam’s Iraq, there were disagreements over how the
decision should be framed. Saddam had been tagged as a supporter of terrorism, and he had begun a nuclear program that was
halted as a result of the Desert Shield campaign in 1991 but whose status of dismantlement required more verification following 9/11, a task
being carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In a 2003 Vanity Fair telephone interview conducted by Sam Tannenhaus
with Paul Wolfowitz, transcribed by the Defense Department, in which the reasons for going to war again with Iraq were raised, Wolfowitz
states: The
truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the US government bureaucracy, we settled
on the one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction as the core
reason. He then elaborates, saying that among fundamental concerns the overriding one was the connection between weapons of mass
destruction and support for terrorism (Defense Department, 2009). Recall also Condoleezza Rice’s comment of not waiting for a mushroom
cloud as a threat warning. So the IAEA investigation was shoved aside, President
Bush made his speech, and the war was
launched, ostensibly to prevent Saddam from manufacturing nuclear weapons that he might turn over to terrorists. The war has
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians, exceeding the number who died at
Hiroshima or Nagasaki, and has spawned the rise of offshoots of Al Qaeda like the Islamic State, whose brutality
matches or exceeds that of the original. All this has occurred even though-as revealed by the failure to find
weapons of mass destruction following the war-Saddam’s nuclear program had been completely shut down in the wake of
the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
Democracy
Governmental policies of fear that build support for the War on Terror become
autocratic and kill the potential for democracy
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,”
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)
Human history displays many examples of political
leaders who manipulate public fears to gain support for policies
that, in the end, produce disastrous outcomes for large numbers of people. Racist fears helped Nazis obtain
support for the oppression and ultimate murder of millions of Jews, Slavs, homosexuals, and Roma. Eliminating Nazi
predations required a war that cost 50 million lives. Excessive fear of communism built support for a war in
Vietnam that resulted in two million lives lost in that country and another two million lost on the killing fields
of a destabilized Cambodia. Today, the fear of terrorism brought on by 9/11, coupled with the fear of
nuclear weapons, has become the source of policies that threaten the destruction of American
democracy because of a lack of perspective in the public discussion of these issues.
Structural Violence
Fear of terror has caused us to ignore systemic structural violence
LoCicero 14(Alice LoCicero, practicing psychologist at the Boston Medical Center, “Domestic Consequences of US Counter-Terrorism
Efforts: Making it Harder to Prevent Homegrown Terrorism,” http://benthamopen.com/contents/pdf/TOPSYJ/TOPSYJ-8-32.pdf, 12/18/14)
Over the years since 9/11, fear of terrorism has morphed into what might be called hysteria. By hysteria, I
refer to two elements: Excessive fear, and inability to assess the fear rationally. While the so-called Islamic State
deliberately engenders fear, Americans’ fear of the so-called Islamic State group is disproportionate to the
actual risk. That is not to suggest that there is no danger from terrorism. Consider, however, that there is
much less palpable panic, much less news reporting, and much less money invested in the dangers of
smoking, alcohol use, automobile accidents, firearms, poverty, or obesity, all of which kill far more
Americans than terrorism. Terrorism hysteria is just what terrorists want to create: Confusion, panic,
paralysis, inability to create an effective response.
Nuke War o/ws Nuke Terrorism
Nuclear weapons are a greater threat – nuclear terrorism is just fearmongering and
unlikely
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,”
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)
Fear of nuclear weapons is rational, but its extension to terrorism has been a vehicle for fear-mongering
that is unjustified by available data. The debate on nuclear terrorism tends to distract from events that
raise the risk of nuclear war, the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks.
And the historical record shows that the war risk is real. The Cuban Missile Crisis and other confrontations have
demonstrated that miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a close call regarding nuclear war. Although there has
been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons,
evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition
of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by
terrorists requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an
acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group’s more immediate activities and goals for an
attempted operation that no terrorist group has accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence, it is
reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the
threat.
Islamophobia = Dehumanization
Their view of the terrorist other leads to the dehumanization of Muslims
Merskin 4 (Debra Merskin, School of Journalism & Communication University of Oregon, “The
Construction of Arabs as Enemies: Post-September 11 Discourse of George W. Bush”, 2004, MASS
COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY,
http://web.asc.upenn.edu/usr/ogandy/C45405%20resources/Merskin%20the%20construction.pdf, JAS)
This article links
stereotypes of Arabs, enemy image construction, and ideology to the rhetoric of President
George W. Bush as delivered during five speeches and a memorial service subsequent to the September
11, 2001, attacks.1 Spillman and Spillman’s (1997, pp. 50–51) model of enemy image construction is used as a framework for an
interpretive textual analysis (Chandler, 2002; Hall, 1975) that chronologically traces the development of the Arab enemy image in this rhetoric.
This model posits that feelings
and reactions to enmity can be described as a syndrome, one that draws on a
historically constructed foundation from which stereotypes are built and enemy images emerge. The
resultant extraction of an enemy image reinforces ancient ideological dichotomies of good versus evil
and us versus them, rigidifying an agreed upon stereotype with referential function. Over time, an enemy
image, defined as a “culturally influenced, very negative and stereotyped evaluation of the ‘other’” (Fiebigvon Hase, 1997, p. 2), is reinforced and reinvigorated via the words of political opinion leaders and mass
media representations. This study reveals that the accumulation of historically, politically, and culturally
cultivated negative images of Arabs resembles the word choices and allusions used in the carefully constructed, post-September
11 speeches of President George W. 158 MERSKIN 1Rhetoric, as used in this article, is defined as “discourse calculated to influence
an audience toward some end” (Gill & Whedbee, 1997, p. 157). Bush. A necessary part of this analysis is to “bracket the
historical question of guilt and innocence, and focus on the recurring images that have been used … to
characterize the enemy” (Keen, 1986, p. 13). The analysis demonstrates how presidential verbal rhetoric was built
on and informed by cultural artifacts (movies, television, newspaper stories, and comics) and is consistent with Spillman and
Spillman’s (1997) model of enemy image construction. There is a standard repertoire of propagandistic words and images
that serves to dehumanize the “other” as part of the construction of an enemy image in the popular imagination and thus makes
a retaliatory backlash against human beings seem logical and natural. The results of this study are important for scholars, governmental
decision makers, media creators, and citizens. They add to the limited literature on the construction of enemy images and Arab stereotyping in
the media and extend and exemplify the Spillman and Spillman (1997) model. As evidenced by
policies such as those enacted
by the newly created Department of Homeland Security, the Patriot Act, and detainment of suspects
without due process of the law, these findings have human rights as well as foreign and domestic policy
implications (Feehan, 2003; Valbrun, 2003). MAKING ENEMIES Nations “need” enemies. Governments use the idea of a
common enemy as a method of social control, of reinforcing values of the dominant system, and of
garnering participation in the maintenance of those beliefs (Keen, 1986; Spillman & Spillman, 1997). As a hegemonic
device, a common enemy can serve to distract attention and divert aggression and energy toward a common
threat. In addition, a common enemy is important in organizing evolutionary-based survival strategies that rely
on perceptual and behavioral patterns that are a fundamental part of human nature. Differences in age, race, religion, culture,
age, or appearance can be the characteristic(s) that stimulate resentment toward other groups. The unfamiliar and strange evoke strong
emotions and reactions such as aggression, fear, hate, aversion, and expulsion. Xenophobic and racist
reactions create “an artificial binary opposition that is resolved through the physical annihilation of one
side by the other” (Kibbey, 2003, paragraph 2). The resultant “we-they” dichotomy produces a kind of “group think”
that supports separation of particular racial, religious, ethnic, or cultural groups, positioning them as
hostile and alien. As Said (1997) pointed out, “Sensationalism, crude xenophobia, and insensitive belligerence
are the order of the day, with results on both sides of the imaginary line between ‘us’ and‘them’ that are
extremely unedifying” (p. xlviii). Cultural factors also play an important role in forming and regulating
human behavior as part of the “phenomenology of the hostile imagination” (Keen, 1986, p. 13). Despite changing
times and circumstances, the “hostile imagination has a cerCONSTRUCTION OF ARABS AS ENEMIES 159 tain standard repertoire of images it
uses to dehumanize the enemy” (Keen, 1986, p. 13).ThisprocessincludeswhatJungreferstoastheshadowarchetype,which,inthis case, becomes
the “archetype of the enemy ” (Hyde & McGuinness, 1994, p. 86). In the collective sense, according to this theory, shadowy qualities and
unsavory characteristics are often projected onto other people resulting in “paranoia,
suspiciousness,andlackofintimacy,allofwhichafflictindividuals,groups,andevenentirenations” (Hopcke, 1989, p. 82). Spillmann and Spillmann
(1997) explained the development
of the collective unconscious that comes to support viewing others as
enemies. They describe enemy image construction as a syndrome of deeply rooted perceptual
evaluations that take on the following characteristics: • Negative Anticipation. All acts of the enemy, in the past, present,
and future become attributed to destructive intentions toward one’s own group. Whatever the enemy undertakes is meant to
harm us. • Putting Blame on the Enemy. The enemy is thought to be the source of any stress on a group.
They are guilty of causing the existing strain and current negative conditions. • Identification With Evil.
The values of the enemy represent the negation of one’s own value system and the enemy is intent on
destroying the dominant value system as well. The enemy embodies the opposite of that which we are
and strive for; the enemy wishes to destroy our highest values and must therefore be destroyed. • ZeroSum Thinking. What is good for the enemy is bad for us and vice versa. • Stereotyping and De-Individualization. Anyone who
belongs to the enemy group is ipso facto our enemy. • Refusal to Show Empathy. Consideration for
anyone in the enemy group is repressed due to perceived threat and feelings of opposition. There is
nothing in common and no way to alter that perception (pp. 50–51). STEREOTYPES AND PROPAGANDA First the image,
then the enemy. (Keen, 1986, p. 10) Thought of as over-generalized, reductionist beliefs,stereotypes are collections of traits or characteristics
that present members of a group as being all the same. This signifying
mental practice provides convenient shorthand in
the identification of a particular group of people. As available methods for organizing the “great blooming,
buzzing confusion of the outer world” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 81), stereotypes “get hold of the few simple, vivid,
memorable, easily grasped, and widely recognized characteristics about a 160 MERSKIN person, reduce
everything about the person to those traits, exaggerate and simplify them, and fix them without change
or development to eternity” (Hall, 1997, p. 258). Certainly, it would be impossible to function in the world without
simplifying visual and verbal information to manageable units. As Gandy (1998) suggested, “It seems likely that
stereotypes become part of our understanding of our surroundings from the first moments of our
efforts to make sense of the world around us” (p. 83). Stereotypes serve as building blocks of the “fortress” of
social tradition (Lippmann, 1922, p. 96). They are part of the “maintenance of social and symbolic order” that facilitates the binding of
people together as an us and sends those who are not us into “symbolic exile” as them (Hall, 1997, p. 258). Once an individual is
constructed as an outsider, this person is no longer thought of as having humanity. The intimidating
outsider is “surely an animal in human form” (Green, 1993, p. 327). In the absence of direct personal experience, stereotypes
serve as a way of filling in the blanks in terms of expectations (or lack thereof) of those different from the individual imagining them.
Construction of an enemy image becomes the “mental background for aggression, distrust, guilt, projection, identification with all evil, and
stereotyping” (Fiebeg-von Hase, 1997, p. 2). The people
and government of the United States, for example, have a
long history of selectively demonizing and dehumanizing others, including their own citizenry, in the
interest of acquisition and preservation of resources and power (Said, 1997; Takaki, 1993; Zinn, 1995). Worth (2002)
pointed out that America’s discovery of an enemy who is not merely an enemy, but “evil,” has impeccable
historical credentials. In a long history of responding to real and perceived threats, it seems clear that
this large, heterogeneous country defines itself in part through its nemeses. Such bellicosity can serve as a
convenient tool for unification where differences among “us” can be minimized, erased, or overlooked with a powerful “them” or “other.” (p.
1) Further, a joining of politics and religion is useful in propagating hegemonic beliefs. To accomplish this, both theologians and
political rhetoricians frequently invoke images of Satan (Pagels, 1996). This practice can be traced at least as far back as
Luther, when rebelling peasants were declared to be “agents of the devil” (Keen, 1986, p. 27). For purposes of this article, however, there are
ample examples in the recent past that can best be explained under the rubric of two structural factors tied to enmity: (a) “some
concrete
facts that permit the enemy image to appear as plausible and real” and (b) “the political system itself”
(Fiebig-von Hase, 1997, p. 24). Attitudes among European-Americans that would permit extermination attempts
of indigenous
Americans, enslavement of Africans, and Japanese internment are a few examples of the extremes to
which CONSTRUCTION OF ARABS AS ENEMIES 161 enemy construction has reached. These beliefs are not simply
erased over the passage of time. Rather, through the messages of dominant social and cultural institutions, such as
the government and the media, selective versions of “reality” are presented in a way that provides
justification for past, present, and future action and reaction to constructed enemies. The political system is the
second structural source of social conflict and enmity (Fiebig-von Hase, 1997). In American bureaucracy, tension often arises
between an individual’s beliefs and expectations of government and political control. In the guise of
political rhetoric, propaganda, defined in its broadest sense as “the technique of influencing human
action by the manipulation of representations,” is often used to ameliorate psychological dissonance
(Lasswell, 1934/1995, p. 13). Propaganda can be found in “spoken, written, pictorial or musical” forms and has been used as a way of mobilizing
sentiment around an idea, image, or product. Moreover, it attains
“eminence as the one means of mass mobilizations
that is cheaper than violence, bribery, or other possible control techniques” (Lasswell, 1934/1995, p. 17).
Islamophobia = Cultural Homogenization
Media depictions of all Muslims as Arabs violently homogenize all Muslims
Ridouani 11
(Driss Ridouani, School of Arts and Humanities Meknes, “The Representation of Arabs and Muslims in
Western Media”, 2011, Ruta, www.raco.cat/index.php/Ruta/article/download/243531/326280, JAS)
The sense
of recognizing the real identity or rather identifying Arabs and Muslims is really a problematic
issue in Western conception. Roughly they do not discriminate among the different ethnic groups, different races, different dialects,
and even worse different religious beliefs. The Arab world is so complex that it could not be compressed or simplified
in one term as it has been ignorantly conceived by the West. However, a succinct analysis of the reason why
the West generalize the Arab world in one specific term, in the sense that what can be attribute to one
person it can be related to “All Arabs”. Or Shaheen pointed out Muslims are lumped together and our
expectations are based more on stereotyping than on empirical research, according to Esposito. All too
often the "coverage of Islam and the Muslim world concludes there is a monolithic Islam out there
somewhere, believing, feeling, thinking and acting as one." The stereotypical Muslim presented to
Americans resembles Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, Libya's Moammar Gadhafi, or Iraq's Saddam Hussein; the
imagery "has profoundly affected American perceptions of Islam and the Middle East. The identity of Arab Muslims
is unified in one particular term; such overgeneralization engenders very critical repercussions chiefly when the
West fails to notice the different ethnicities and different religious beliefs. When referring to the geographical
territory that expands from the very shores of the Atlantic Ocean in North Africa to the Gulf in Asia, the Western media designates it racially as
Arabs and religiously as Muslims, excluding thus radically the different racial and religious minorities. Racially this territory includes Amazigh
race especially in North Africa and religiously it coexists with Christians especially in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Palestine. One may
wonder why the Western media overlook such multi-differences for which the Arab world is reputed. Is
it out of the West ignorance of the multi-race and multi-religion of this territory? How can the West ignore
these plain facts while it did subdue this territory for more than half century (it lasted for more than a century i.e.
Algeria)? To generalize the identity of such large territory in two terms Arabs and Muslims is a deliberate
and conscious strategy which makes things easy for the West t stereotype both the race and its religion.
This population, despite its multi-race, multi-culture, multilanguage and multi-religion, is racialized as Arabs and religionized as Muslims. Not
surprisingly, these two terms are archetypes of negative attributes which represent a threat for the West. The maintained cliché
that
says, “seen one seen ‘em all” divests Arab Muslims from their diversity while compressing them in one
individual. The stereotypes created by the Western media do indeed have dangerous effect on Western public in
producing a holistic conception of Arabs and Muslims. Once a name of a political or religious leader is
invoked, allegedly all Arabs and all Muslims are incarnated and personified in that name. In view of the
West, all Arabs think in the same way, react in the same manner, respond holistically. In this respect, they are
all, like Saddam Houssein, think and plan to destroy the world with ‘mass-destruction weapons’ which G.W. Bush – petromaniac – is still looking
all Muslims organize and plot terrorist acts, in other
words they are all someone called Ben Laden. They are also all as religiously fanatic as Ayatollah,
refusing to coexist with the other religions, be they monotheist or polytheist. Despite the different races that are included
under the banner of Islam (Arabs, Persians, Asians etc.), in view of the West all Muslims are Arabs. In other words, far from
being a multicultural, multiracial, and multiethnic groups, Muslims are stereotypically embodied in one persona which is
endowed by all sorts of devilish deeds. Conclusion The Arab spectators will not be surprised when watching a film about Arabs,
for, but he finds petrol instead and he is satisfied and calmed down ;
nor do the readers who go through the columns of newspapers or magazines that treat a subject concerning Muslims, nor the listeners who
follow the news that deal with Arabs, because the Western media preserve unanimous stereotypes for the Arab Muslims whether they are
televised, printed or broadcasted. These problems
are so amassed, so ramified that they are jeopardized and
problematized. The question is not confined in a casual unnoticed stereotypes and distortions of reality, but
it is extended to the rationalization of the issue. The Western media endeavour at whatever costs and power
to legitimize the prejudices and give the sense of credibility. It is noticeable, therefore, that the Western
media shore their claims up with “evidences”, “arguments” and “facts” in order to demonstrate that the
Arabs’ “actions”, “thought” and “intention” are demonic. The Western media, then, is responsible for infusing and
inculcating the Western public with biased and fabricated preconception about Arabs and Muslims. If the Western media change their minds
towards the Arab Muslims, they will get a reciprocally mutual response from their public.
Alternative
PIC
Vote negative to reject the discourse of the 1ac, you can endorse the plan absent the
representations that link – The affirmative should be held accountable for the
rhetorical choices they made in constructing the 1ac and the justifications they offer
for the plan, critical to argumentative responsibility and in depth education. Calls to
vote for the plan in a vacuum are a reason to vote negative on presumption.
Clark 7 (Phillip G, Post-Doctoral Fellow in Ethics and Public Policy, Wesleyan University, "Understanding Aging and Disability
Perspectives on Home Care: Uncovering Facts and Values in Public-Policy Narratives and Discourse," Canadian Journal on Aging / La Revue
canadienne du vieillissement 26 (suppl 1) : 47 - 62 (2007) 47 doi: 10.3138/cja.26.suppl 1.47)
The development of a critical lens through which to examine policy discourse requires an
understanding of the role that values play in framing and solving significant public policy problems.
Policy makers often like to believe that the provision of enough factual information about a complex social problem – empirical data based on
careful research – is sufficient to make informed choices from alternative ways of solving it. However, as Potter (1969) reminds us, every
public policy ‘‘problem’’ consists of both an empirical description of the state of affairs and a
normative dimension in which some cherished value or set of values is affected. Thus, the definition of
any social ‘‘problem’’ and a set of recommended ‘‘solutions’’ to it are also a function of the interplay between
facts and values. Values give us the questions to ask, and we gather facts in our pursuit of answers to questions – which, in turn, force us
back on our original intentions in asking those questions (Rein, 1983). Values shape the facts in which we are interested,
the ways by which we seek to determine them, and the amount of credibility we place on them.
Similarly, facts may enhance, diminish, or otherwise call into question our values and value assumptions. The relationship between empirical
evidence and ethical interpretation may be made even more apparent in cross-national comparative analyses, such as between Canada and the
United States (Clark, 1993a, 1993b, 1999). This line of inquiry is especially important in the Canadian context because of the overt attention
devoted to values and values-language in the policy arena. For example, in their research on uncovering meanings in Canadian public
policy statements, Iannantuono and Eyles (1997) draw attention to the power of language used in policy
discourse, suggesting the importance of analyzing patterns and uses of language to construct and
deconstruct the world of public policy; or, as they put it, ‘‘the meaning of words and the wording of meanings’’ (p. 1611).
Similarly, Fast and Keating (2000) state that ‘‘the words we use, and how we use them, are critical to both research and
policy making’’ (p. 2). For example, in empirical analyses the numerical and technical language of science can be used to
lend power and authority to official pronouncements or positions. In contrast, values may be more implicit in the
type of language used in policy documents, and uncovering them may require explicit interpretive analysis. Reflecting on the power
of language used in policy discourse, Kenny (2004) concludes, ‘‘The words used highlight some beliefs and
values and obscure others. The framing of the discourse therefore influences the construction of
meaning and the valuing of beliefs’’ (p. 5). The tasks of identifying the values underlying particular public
policy problems and elucidating proposed policy options in light of relevant moral principles have been described as
the role of ‘‘public ethics’’ by Jonsen and Butler (1975). Kelman and Warwick (1978) suggest a similar approach to analyzing the
ethical dimensions of social interventions and present an explicit framework for doing so. Importantly, there is a strong vein in Canada of using
this approach to understanding the values underlying public policies. For
example, Peters (1995) conducted an empirical
study of public opinion polls and augmented it with extensive focus group discussions of the
interrelationships between public policies and social values. She concludes that values emerge from public
discourse and are essential ingredients in framing the ways in which policy options are stated and
selected. Similarly, the work on values in Canadian healthpolicy analysis by Giacomini and colleagues (2001, 2004) recognizes the
importance of values as drivers of policy development and implementation, though values, rhetoric, and discourse are complicated. Stated
values can be used as powerful imperatives or empty platitudes; they can be employed as genuine guidelines or as confusing guideposts to
obscure and obfuscate. Marmor, Okma, and Latham (2002) recognize the suspicion with which social scientists have traditionally regarded the
concept of ‘‘national values’’, but they also suggest that such values
may play an important role in ‘‘creating a political
community and in guiding its actions. Statements of values may inspire, unite, even ‘constitute’ a
people’’ (p. 2). Kenny (2004) states that ‘‘public policy is a moral endeavour that involves decisions about who
we are and who we desire to be as a country’’ (p. 2).
Alt Solves
Only a conceptual and representational mindset shift solves – a focus on
multidimensional analysis, refusal of binarism, legal justice over militarism, internal
rogue resolution, productive instead of coercive power, and an obligatory
commitment to peace outside the political realm
Milojević 2 [Ivana Milojević, searcher and educator with the background in sociology, gender, peace and futures studies, and Visiting
Professor at the Association of Centres for Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies and Research, University of Novi Sad; “Gender, Peace
and Terrestrial Futures: Alternatives to Terrorism and War”; University of Queensland; 2002; accessed 07/20/2015;
<http://www.metafuture.org/articlesbycolleagues/IvanaMilojevic/Ivana_Milojevic_-_Gender_peace_and_terrestrial_futures.htm>.] Author’s
first language is Serbian.
Conceptual and theoretical strategies work
on redefining the way the events are understood and explained.
Recalling divisions, creating abstract categories of ‘enemies’, and then embodying them in a particular group
or person are problematized. This is because such conceptualizing does not enhance communication but only creates
circles of revenge and retaliation. Rather, the main focus ought to be on understanding exactly ‘who’ and exactly ‘why’ did such horrific
acts of violence. The analysis of the technicalities of the attack would be equally important but not the only
discourse used. There would be refusal to categorize some people as quintessentially evil, although there would be a
demand that they answer about their evil actions and behaviors. If terrorism is basically about ‘lawlessness’, arbitrary use of
military might needs to be prevented, because it only confirms that ‘the might is right’ and that ‘violence
is the only language that they understand’. The focus should rather be on bringing those responsible for criminal
actions to the International Justice Court, which would have its quarters in several locations in various world regions. Civilizational
and cultural differences would not have equally strong ground in discounting courts and justice processes themselves if they were seen as fair
and balanced. Certainly, Islamic
countries are not incapable of enforcing ‘the rule of law’. In circumstances where atrocity
cultures and societies that could most successfully address
fundamentalists ‘cultures of war’ that steam from their own tradition as well as be more successful in
bringing the perpetrators to justice. International Courts based in various regions of the world would enhance ‘holy peace’ culture
from within which would be seen as less threatening for the people of the region. Fundamentalists doctrines would therefore
loose some of their raison’s d’être, some of the appeal that streams from addressing genuine inequalities and
grievances. The conceptual shift would also include refocusing from power-over in the direction of power-for,
power-to, power-with, power-within and power-toward. This means a shift from coercive power to the approach that
focuses on empowerment, on enabling power to create positive change. It also means questioning both the validity but also
the efficacy of power-over as ‘the mechanism for organizing world politics or solving world problems’
(Peterson and Runyan, 1999:216). This redefinition is crucial because, as Peterson and Runyan (1999:216) explain: If this model is used, world
order looks less like a pyramid, where few are on the top and many are on the bottom, and more like a rotating circle in
which no one is always at the top and no one is always at the bottom. Instead, all participate in complex webs
of interdependence. Interests, rather than being defined in opposition to each other, are developed through
relationships with others. Conflicts are resolved not by force or its threat but in nonviolent interaction and
mutual learning. Another conceptual shift is from ‘reactive to relational autonomy’. When players in the world
politics are seen in terms of ‘reactive autonomy’ (values independence and order, promotes separateness and independence that is a
reaction against others, assumes that cooperative relations are virtually impossible without coercion)
expectations of hostile and competitive behavior are reproduced. (Peterson and Runyan, 1999). This in turn
generates uncooperative and defensive responses. On the other hand, relational autonomy values
interdependence and justice, basing identity within the context of relationships rather than in opposition to them. It also
assumes that cooperation typifies human relations when they are relatively equal and that cooperation is
destroyed in the presence of inequality and coercion (Hirschmann, 1989, Sylvester, 1993, Peterson and Runyan, 1999). Seeing the world
is allegedly made ‘in the name of Islam’ it should be Islamic
in terms of its interconnectedness implies a commitment towards equality, as an obligation. So far, the
commitment to international conventions and institutions has been on voluntary basis only and too often seen as
some sort of ‘harassment’ to individualized and individualistic sovereign states. Terrorists, for their part, also
obviously define power as power-over that is based on reactive autonomy, with the main goal of reaching the top of
the pyramid rather then questioning the structure that reproduces such hierarchies. Underlining views on reactive
vs. relational autonomy are different understandings of conflicts and consequently how are conflicts to be resolved. For example, conflicts
are usually presented in terms of human nature seen in negative terms (competition, capacity for aggression and
violence). According to Eisler (2000) such a presentation streams from the dominator cultural paradigm, which
represents only part of the picture of what it means to be human. Both the capacity for violence and capacity for peace are
evolutionary features of human ‘nature’. The dominator discourse represents only negative aspects of
human nature as ‘realistic’, forgetting about equally valid positive human characteristics such as capacity
for sharing, altruism, non-violence, peaceful conflict resolution, cooperation, caring, negotiation and
communication. (Eisler, 2000). More gender-balanced narratives on evolution and history provide examples of not
only warfare but also of long periods of peace (Eisler, 2000, Boulding, 1990). Other fundamental concepts, such as
sovereignty and strength are also defined differently if we step away from dominant worldview. For
example, an ecological perspective sees the sovereignty of the Earth as preceding and still superceding
human sovereignties (Patricia Mische, 1989). This means that the sovereignty to nation states needs to be balanced with
subnational and supranational entities – both with lived local communities and the world as a whole. The nation-state is then
simultaneously ‘too big and too small’ to effectively co-ordinate effective responses that would address direct and structural violence. But in
other ways it is also ‘just right’ because actions
are necessary at all and the every level of human organization. The
redefinition of what constitutes strength prevents current seesaw of one-sided ultimatums and shortsighted
stubbornness as a response. Because, to be willing to negotiate with the opponents would not be seen as the sight of weakness but rather as
that of strength. This would also be the case with attempts to reconcile, continuously communicate, provide concessions, cooperate and accept
mediation. Unfortunately, current diplomacy is based predominantly on the strength of weapons which dictates
terms of engagement, priorities and issues rather then on true desire to resolve grievances to common satisfaction of all stakeholders and
parties involved. Of course, when
security is understood in terms of both direct violence, such as war, as well as the
structural violence, it is believed that actions need to be taken not only in the realm of the ‘political’ but
also in the realm of social and economical. As authors such as Jan Jindy Pettman (1996) have shown security from women’s
perspective is more likely to be defined as security of employment, education, health and security from domestic violence rather then in terms
of a protection from an external threat to a nation-state. Therefore, global security is also to be defined differently. It is only logical that this
means neither acquiring huge arsenals of weapons of mass-destruction nor their frequent use. But the
hegemony of patriarchal discourse assures that these alternative readings are rarely taken seriously.
Answers To
AT Case Outweighs – Discourse First
We should privilege discursive analysis
Bartolucci and Gallo 13
(Valentina Bartolucci and Giorgio Gallo, Department of Computer Science, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy,
“Terrorism, System Thinking and Critical Discourse Analysis”, August 16th, 2013, Systems Research and
Behavioral Science, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/sres.2206/pdf, JAS)
SYSTEMS THEORY AND CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS As mentioned earlier, a system of human
activities ‘is really the
manifestation of a perpetual flow, an open system in a dynamic steady state [maintaining] itself in a non
equilibrium state by taking in a continuous supply of energy and exchanging components with its
environment’ (Hammond, 2003, p. 116). A system is part of the environment in which it is situated and with which it has
continuous interactions and interchanges. Disregarding this, it may lead to poor understanding and to misguided
actions. Also within CDA, the context is of paramount importance. A discourse can only be understood as located in a
specific context. The capacity to grasp the different components of a system is shaped by the observer’s
epistemic community. At this purpose, CDA provides the researcher with an effective interpretative tool to
analyze language seen as a social practice and as embedded in a sociopolitical context. CDA draws on a
functional theory of language and seeks to complement the linguistic analysis of texts with an interdisciplinary approach directed at the
deconstruction of the whole sociopolitical and historical contexts in which discourses are embedded (Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 2001). The
focus of CDA, as Wodak (1996, 17) states, is not ‘upon language or the use of language in and of
themselves, but upon the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures’. Specifically,
CDA aims at critically investigating structural relations of power, control and domination as constituted, expressed and legitimized in discourse
(Weiss and Wodak, 2003). Within CDA, discourses
are not seen as neutral ways of describing the world but as ways
of reproducing or challenging relations of power and dominance in society. Discourse is thus intended as
‘a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing
the world in meaning’ (Fairclough, 1992, p. 64). The assumption of the neutrality of language is challenged, and
the attention devoted at exploring the implications deriving from the use of particular words 3 The clock
metaphor was used by Karl Popper in his paper ‘Of Clouds and Clocks: An Approach to the Problem of Rationality and Freedom of Man’ (1972).
Syst. Res. RESEARCH PAPER Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Syst. Res. 32, 15–27 (2015) DOI: 10.1002/sres.2206 Terrorism, System
Thinking and Critical Discourse Analysis 19 and grammatical forms in specific contexts (Taylor, 2001). The
response to the
September 11 attacks, culminated with the Afghan war, stems from a narrow and limited vision of the
events that could only be understood if it is analyzed as located in a specific discursive community,4 in
this case the one expressed by President George W. Bush’s discourse. The US presidential discourse on
terrorism has been taken here as the framing discourse for its capacity of ‘dictat[ing] its employment
everywhere in the world’ (Erjavec and Volcic, 2006, p. 298). Following the 11 September 2001 events, ‘truth was asserted and
obedience exhorted, with the administration imposing a lesser standard of evidence upon itself’ (Wolf, 2003, p. 5). The course of this conflict is
not known, yet its outcome is certain: Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral
between them. 5 God told me to strike at Al Qaida and I struck them: then he instructed me to strike at Saddam, which I did; and now I am
determined to solve the problem in the Middle East (Bush to Abu Mazen. In Blumenthal 2004). The discourse,
characterized by a
limited range of effective rhetorical devices and quite simple argumentative structures, has been
extremely successful, in being widely perceived as a selfevident truth towards which there is no room
for discussion and in building the necessary consent around the administration. At the same time, its
oversimplicity, unwarranted assumptions, cultural biases and heavy moral charges hampered the
capacity to understand the complexity of the events and of the wider context in which they took place.
The system was indeed seen as closed, and there was a lack of appreciation of the fact that it was actually a system in
continuous dynamic exchange with a wider Muslim area containing groups and individuals characterized
by a common ideological base, outraged by the perceived oppression of Muslims and sharing the
aspiration for a reconstituted caliphate of which Al-Qaeda has become the symbol.6 The situation proved to be
much more complex than expected, and today, after 10 years from the ‘Mission Accomplished’ speech, the war is still going on, and few
analysts harbour optimism about its final result. A direct
consequence of the idea of open system is that the analysis
of a system implies the choice of the elements and of the relations deemed relevant with respect to the
phenomenon under analysis. This is what is called the choice of the boundaries. The same context in which the event
originates is not objectively given once and for all. It is us as observers who define it and its boundaries.
Indeed, ‘the boundary concept lies at the heart of system thinking: because of the fact that everything in the Universe is directly or indirectly
connected to everything else, where the boundaries are placed in any analysis becomes crucial’ (Midgley, 2000, pp. 128–29). In
choosing
the system’s boundaries, it is not only necessary to look outward to the wider system of which ours is a
subsystem but also to look inward to the diverse components that can be found within it, being well
aware that each component is in itself a system containing other components. These two processes, the outward
one and the inward one, are almost limitless: it is always possible to find new wider super-systems or smaller sub-systems. The outward process
leads to the definition of the boundary between the system and its context, whereas the inward process leads to the definition of the level of
granularity of the system.7 In this respect, the discursive community in which the 4 This community is often referred to with the label of ‘neoconservative’. 5 Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
20/09/2001. 6 Some of these groups are well organized and, within the common motivation, have their proper agenda (see, for instance, the
Salafi group Boko Haram in Nigeria or Pakistan’s Tehrik-i-Taliban); others tend to be amateurish, if occasionally lethal. These groups and
individuals represent what Jones (2012) calls the third and fourth tiers of Al-Qaeda. The more internal first and second tiers are formed by the
Al-Qaeda leadership and operatives and by a growing list of officially affiliated groups, such as Somalia’s al Shabab. 7 For instance, it is at this
level that one decides whether a political organization should be considered as a unit in the system representation or whether it is necessary to
go deeper in the analysis, considering smaller units, such as the different groups or factions that operate inside the organization. RESEARCH
PAPER Syst. Res. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Syst. Res. 32, 15–27 (2015) DOI: 10.1002/sres.2206 20 Valentina Bartolucci and
Giorgio Gallo observer is located plays a crucial role. The
same context in which the system is located is not objectively
given once and for all. It evolves over time, and even small variations of it may have unpredictable and
unexpected effects on the events unfolding within the system. Thus, the way the system’s boundaries are chosen by the
observer is of crucial importance for a proper understanding of the system and for a correct interpretation of the events within it. In particular,
the choice of the boundaries shapes the idea we have of the situation in which a terrorist behavior arises and has deep effect in how we tackle
it. In fact, the choice of the boundaries depends also on the objectives and on the value system of the researcher, being the analyst part of the
wider system in which the events under analysis are located.
AT Experts = Terrorism Real
Governmental data is kept secret – at best, their authors rely on undetailed
secondhand sources
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,”
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)
A serious impediment to scholars, whether fully dedicated to terrorism studies or only occasionally participating in such a study, is the lack of
The U.S. government has neither released relevant data about
terrorist plots nor funded the methodological accumulation of detailed and comprehensive data that
might shed some light on the question of the turn to political violence. A funding contract officer once
asked me, ‘‘Why should I fund the gathering of publicly available information?’’ It seems that the
government’s strategy has been to fund research, but withhold any detailed evidence, which is still
classified. Data available to academics via popular search engines are, at best, secondary sources
coming from journalistic investigation or, worse, erroneous claims by self-appointed experts. These
are mostly based on politically motivated government leaks and government claims about ‘‘terrorists’’—
often made for political reasons. They tend to justify the government’s actions (providing the prosecutorial case in
an upcoming trial), and obfuscate more than they clarify.
the availability of comprehensive and reliable data.
They rely on flawed news and press knowledge solely put out by the government
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,”
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)
Government statements and leaks provide fragmentary and biased information to journalists.
Unfortunately, since there is so little information, the press amplifies this patchy information to the
point of distortion through an echo effect, where repeats of the claims are taken as corroboration for the
original leak. One dimensional and sensational portraits of alleged terrorists, packaged in the
fivehundred-words-or-less limit of a newspaper article or a television sound bite, dominate our
understanding of this phenomenon. Nor is there any incentive in the press to try to correct erroneous
initial information, which is forever memorialized on the Internet, now the repository of all information, good and bad.
Self-appointed cyber sleuths who constitute the vast majority of so-called terrorist researchers create
far-fetched theories about terrorists and terrorism from these very fragmentary caricatures. Indeed, from
such a distorted foundation, anything is possible. Unfortunately, many scholars also rely on these government
officials’ statements, which are political, directed at a given audience for specific reasons, such as advocacy for
one’s department or agency, defending it before a Congressional inquiry, self-promotion, or a request to increase its budget. These
statements have a definite spin and present only one side of the issue, usually one as favorable as possible to the
briefer. They deal in generalities and ignore any inconsistent information. Usually, they are simply
misleading, but at times, they are outright lies, such as cabinet officers claiming that the U.S. did not torture terrorist
suspects27 or that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction to the United Nations.28 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz guaranteed
to the House Budgetary Committee that the Iraq War would not cost much to the American public.29 Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano declared, ‘‘The system worked’’ when we narrowly escaped an airplane bombing catastrophe due to the ineptitude of the
bomber.30 Generally, government cabinet members try to be careful in their messages to the press because they know that the press will
officials of lesser rank, who originate most erroneous
disseminated information, as the provider knows that the press won’t be able to check classified
information.
scrutinize them. This same level of care is not present among
All of their terror evidence is written from a flawed perspective that stems from the so
called “experts” in the field of terrorism
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,”
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)
the post-9=11 money surge into terrorism studies and the rush of newcomers into the
field had a deleterious effect on research. The field was dominated by laymen, who controlled
funding, prioritizing it according to their own questions, and self-proclaimed media experts who
conduct their own ‘‘research.’’ These ‘‘experts’’ still fill the airwaves and freely give their
opinions to journalists, thereby framing terrorist events for the public. However, they are not
truly scholars, are not versed in the scientific method, and often pursue a political agenda. They
are not trained to detect or analyze trends, but they certainly like to make sensational
statements. They cannot be relied upon to advance the field of terrorism research, as they are
more advocates than objective scholars. The press plays a role in echoing the most outrageous
and sensationalist claims. Ultimately, ‘‘new findings’’ are not debated in the academy in a
collegial way, but on television and the Internet as arguments to advance political agendas. The
voice of true scholars is drowned in this hysterical cacophony of political true believers.
Overall,
Lack of terror experts has been a problem since the beginning
Stampnitzky 14 (Lisa Stampnitzky, Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield, “Disciplining terror how
exports invented terrorism,” http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/sociology/political-sociology/disciplining-terror-howexperts-invented-terrorism?format=PB, August 2014)
The absence of specialized "terrorism experts" is apparent at the first US conference on
terrorism, which was organized by the Department of State and the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism on October 24, 1972.
Most of those brought in as experts at this conference were called upon for their prominence
in fields such as collective behavior, social movements, or social psychology, rather than for
their expertise in the area of terrorism, per se. Nor did the presenters at this conference include
any of those individuals who would come to constitute the core of the terrorism studies
community in later years. Presentations were made by Thomas Thornton, of the Department of State, and author of the oft-cited
(1964) essay "Terror as a weapon of political agitation"; sociologist Irving Louis Horowitz of Rutgers University; Karl Schmitt of the University of
Texas; Carl Leiden of the University of Texas and the National War College; Edward Gude of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International
Affairs, who had written on counterinsurgency; and psychologist Sheldon Levy of Wayne State University, who had served as co-director of the
Assassination and Political Violence task force of the Violence Commission under Presidents Johnson and Nixon.21 The relative position of the
earliest conferences as outliers in the later field of expertise is evident in the network diagrams: while most of the other conferences form a
dense web of connections, this conference (labeled no. 2 in Figures 2.2 to 2.6) had very few ties to later events.
Terror authors are flawed and most are one time writers and all are unqualified
Stampnitzky 14 (Lisa Stampnitzky, Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield, “Disciplining terror how
exports invented terrorism,”
http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/sociology/political-sociology/disciplining-terror-how-experts-invented-terrorism?format=PB,
August 2014)
Furthermore, the self-identified "terrorism mafia" constituted only a minor portion of those involved in some way in the production of
There were a whole series of others, traversing this very porous
boundary of the nascent world of "terrorism studies," coming in and making claims about
terrorism and then disappearing. A large fraction of those publishing in journals or presenting
at conferences had no particular background in the field, and often would not continue to do
further work in the area.32 Thus, although I emphasize in this chapter the emergence of a terrorism studies community and the
knowledge about terrorism at this point.
"terrorism mafia," the larger arena of terrorism expertise continued to be dominated by people who were not (and perhaps did not want to
be) terrorism experts in this specialized sense. Of 1,796 individuals presenting at conferences on terrorism between 1972 and 2001, 1,505 (84
found more
than 80 percent to be by one-time authors (Silke 2004b: 69), and another study found that core
journals in terrorism studies had significantly higher rates of contributions from non-academic
authors than journals in political science or communications studies (Gordon 2001). These factors all
contributed to the structuring of a relatively uninstitutionalized field of terrorism expertise
with highly permeable boundaries. In contrast to theories of professions and scientific fields, which often tend to presume
that the social structures of expertise will be composed of tightly bounded self-regulated units, the field of terrorism studies
has been characterized by weak and permeable boundaries, a population of "experts" whose
backgrounds and sources of legitimation are highly heterogeneous, and a lack of agreement not just over
percent) made only one appearance.33 Similarly, a recent study of journal articles published on terrorism during the 1990s
how expertise should be evaluated but even over how to define the central topic of their concern.
Expertise is constructed in an interstitial space involving multiple biased parties
Stampnitzky 14 (Lisa Stampnitzky, Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Sheffield, “Disciplining terror how
exports invented terrorism,”
http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/sociology/political-sociology/disciplining-terror-how-experts-invented-terrorism?format=PB,
August 2014)
While the sociological literature on cultural fields, disciplines, and professional projects tends to highlight the importance of
institutionalization, terrorism
experts have rarely succeeded in consolidating control over the production
of terrorism discourse and terrorism expertise. Rather than looking like a discipline or a closed "cultural field/'
terrorism expertise is constructed and negotiated in an interstitial space between academia, the
state, and the media. The boundaries of legitimate knowledge and expertise are particularly open to
challenges from self-proclaimed experts from the media and political fields, and this has had
significant consequences for the sorts of expert discourses that tend to be produced and
disseminated. Experts, however defined, were not in control of the production of other experts, or the definition of their object of
"terrorism/' as illustrated in the continual tension over whether terrorism should be approached primarily as a moral problem or as a
rational problem to be addressed through causal social-scientific analysis.
AT: Nuclear Terrorism Real
Fear of nuclear terrorism has risen despite the lack proof for it
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,”
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)
predictions of nuclear catastrophe at the hands of terrorists have become an accepted
part of the national security debate, overshadowing to some extent the concerns about proliferation of national nuclear
For nearly two decades,
programs. It appears that a belief in the effectiveness of deterrence has assuaged the fears of many people about nuclear war waged by
belief that terrorists cannot be deterred has raised
nuclear terrorism fears more than ever. These fears have been fanned in published predictions of
nuclear terror attacks (within a given 10- year period) by prominent persons in nuclear security circles, or by
informal polls, such as the one issued nine years ago by Sen. Richard Lugar when he chaired the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. The poll asked persons working in nuclear policy areas what they thought
the risk was of a nuclear terrorist attack over a 10-year period, with guesses suggesting a high threat but
based on no hard data that was provided or referenced.
countries (whether justified or not), while at the same time the
And, their scenarios are biased Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, “On fear and nuclear terrorism,”
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)
When nuclear safety became subject to government
regulation, a question frequently raised during public and private debates about regulation was
formulated as: How safe is safe enough? Although the risk of nuclear terrorism is very low, there is no
public debate on the issue of acceptable risk. No politician will publicly allow that we are or will ever be
safe enough from a nuclear terrorist attack. Indeed, reputations have been made and enhanced in the
public and private spheres by loud proclamations that we are not safe enough and that more needs to
be done if we are to avoid catastrophe. There is no surer way for the national labs or the intelligence
agencies to receive more money from the Treasury than by hyping the terrorist threat, particularly if the
word nuclear can be attached to it, and by claiming that one’s work is directly applicable to mitigating
the threat. And there is no surer way for politicians to give themselves immunity from a charge of
supporting wasteful spending than by citing their votes as protecting the country from terrorism, nuclear or
Distortion of national politics and government spending.
otherwise.
AT Framework – Securitization
Our interpretation is that the judge is an educator evaluating the systemic discourse of
the plan and the world which it creates.
1. Our interpretation is predictable –the judge really is an educator; and limited –
we can only critique discourse for which a literature base exists
2. Even if they win their interpretation, they don’t meet it – a rational policymaker
considers the implications of the plan for ethical concerns, policy equivalent of
rejecting the aff means we don’t have to win the alt, just that their scholarship
is bad and would make the world worse
3. Discourse is the most educational rubric for evaluation, representations are
how we understand the world
The role of the ballot is to interrogate the discourse of the 1AC.
The criticism is an impact turn to their rhetoric: allowing them to sever their reps
would let them sever impact turns, which are the only indisputable negative ground.
The 1AC is 10 seconds of plan 7:50 of justifications: Make them defend those
justifications.
We ought to place discursive analysis before policy implementation, because
discourse molds policy making
We need to prioritize discursive analysis: it has massive implications for policy making
Jackson 07
(Richard Jackson, University of Otago, National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, “Constructing
Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse”, June 21st, 2007, Government and
Opposition, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2007.00229.x/pdf, JAS)
THE ANALYSIS OF DISCOURSE The analytical
approach employed in this study falls broadly under the mantle of
discourse analysis.3 A form of critical theorizing, discourse analysis aims primarily to illustrate and describe
the relationship between textual and social processes. In particular, it is concerned with the politics of representation – the
manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another. Although discourse
theorizing is employed within a range of different epistemological paradigms – poststructuralist,
postmodernist, feminist and social constructivist – it is predicated on a shared set of theoretical
commitments. Broadly speaking, these include:4 an 3 For an insightful discussion of discourse analytic approaches in international
relations, see: Jennifer Milliken, ‘The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods’, European Journal of
International Relations, 5: 2 (1999), pp. 225–54. See also: Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, ‘Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the
Study of International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, 3: 2 (1997), pp. 193–237; Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt, ‘Discourse,
Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology . . .’, British Journal of Sociology, 44: 3 (1993), pp. 473–99; and Albert Yee, ‘The Causal Effects
of Ideas on Politics’, International Organization, 50: 1 (1996), pp. 69–108. 4 These shared commitments are explored in detail in Milliken, ‘The
Study of Discourse’. CONSTRUCTING ENEMIES 395 © The Author 2007. Journal compilation © 2007 Government and Opposition Ltd
understanding of language
as constitutive or productive of meaning; an understanding of discourse as
structures of signification that construct social realities, particularly in terms of defining subjects and
establishing their relational positions within a system of signification;5 an understanding of discourse as being
productive of subjects authorized to speak and act, legitimate forms of knowledge and political practices
and importantly, common sense within particular social groups and historical settings; an understanding
of discourse as necessarily exclusionary and silencing of other modes of representation; and an
understanding of discourse as historically and culturally contingent, intertextual, open-ended, requiring
continuous articulation and re-articulation and therefore, open to destabilization and counterhegemonic struggle.
Prefer our education claims – it’s not 1940, kritiks are a thing they should have used
their infinite prep to pick better advantage ground
1. Competing ideas: basis of learning and challenging internalized biases that
replicate the impact daily
2. Methodology gives us real world application
3. Education is the only real world skill – roleplaying cedes the agency we need;
and fairness only matters in terms of this single debate, make them prove in
round abuse
AT Framework - Islamophobia
Our interpretation is that the judge is an educator evaluating the systemic discourse of
the plan and the world which it creates.
4. Our interpretation is predictable –the judge really is an educator; and limited –
we can only critique discourse for which a literature base exists
5. Even if they win their interpretation, they don’t meet it – a rational policymaker
considers the implications of the plan for ethical concerns, policy equivalent of
rejecting the aff means we don’t have to win the alt, just that their scholarship
is bad and would make the world worse
6. Discourse is the most educational rubric for evaluation, representations are
how we understand the world
The role of the ballot is to interrogate the discourse of the 1AC.
The criticism is an impact turn to their rhetoric: allowing them to sever their reps
would let them sever impact turns, which are the only indisputable negative ground.
The 1AC is 10 seconds of plan 7:50 of justifications: Make them defend those
justifications.
We ought to place discursive analysis before policy implementation, because
discourse molds policy making
Alghamdi 15
(Emad A. Alghamdi, English Language Institute, King Abdulaziz University, “The Representation of Islam
in Western Media: The Coverage of Norway Terrorist Attacks”, May 1st, 2015, International Journal of
Applied Linguistics & English Literature,
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/259481741_The_Representation_of_Islam_in_Western_Medi
a_The_Coverage_of_Norway_Terrorist_Attacks, JAS)
2. Theoretical Framework Media discourse has been a focus of critical analysis conducted by scholars from various disciplines: linguistics,
semiotics, pragmatics, and discourse studies. Garrett and Bell (1998) attribute the
interest in media discourse to four major
reasons: firstly, media is a rich source of data that can be easily accessed for research and teaching;
secondly, media usage influences and reflects people’s use of and attitude towards language; thirdly,
media can give us a clear insight into social meanings and stereotypes conveyed through language and
communication; and fourthly, and most importantly, media reflects and plays an essential role in
forming and articulating cultural, political and social life. In the literature, there are many theoretical and critical
frameworks that provide a powerful and practical approach to media discourse. “These approaches implement
either completely or partially distinctive methodology in analyzing media discourse given the different theoretical grounds they are based on
and the different lens through which these approaches view media discourse” (Wodak, 2001). One of the most influential and widespread
approaches is Van Dijk’s cognitive-structural model. Van Dijk is a leading theorist and advocate of discourse analysis who has produced an
extensive body of literature in the field including, but not limited to, the following books: Macro-Structures (1980), Handbook of Discourse
Analysis (1985), News as Discourse (1988), and News Analysis (1988). Van Dijk’s (1988) framework
offers an interdisciplinary
approach in which (1) social functions, (2) cognitive structures, and (3) discursive expression and
production are all integrated to provide a comprehensive analysis of discourse. Van Dijk’s (1988) framework is
concerned with the relationship between the “structures of news, the process of news production, and the
processes of news comprehension on one hand, and the social practices within which these three
elements are embedded” (Bell & Garrett, 1998). In this model, ideologies and opinions play an essential role
shaping and comprehending news texts. Van Dijk (2005) believes that “the main social function of ideologies is
the co-ordination of the social practices of group members for the effective realization of the goals of a
social group, and the protection of its interest” (p. 24). Ideologies and opinions are both mental representations and beliefs,
which do not usually reflect personal but rather social, institutional, or political interest. Members of a particular society tend to
develop and maintain certain ideologies, which reflect the basic criteria that give this particular society
its social identity. Moreover, ideologies play an essential role in forming members of a particular society’s perception of what is socially
acceptable or unacceptable or right or wrong. Ideologies, more importantly, determine the manner members of a
society see and represent themselves in regard to members of different societies. When interests of two
societies conflict, some societies’ ideologies encourage polarization in which a distinction between the
representations of Self and Others (We are Good and They are Bad) would be a common thread in the
opinions of that society’s members. Thus, van Dijk (1998b) stresses that “opinions and ideologies a particular
society perceive as a ‘truth’ should not “make them factual in our sense (p. 30)” As far as analyzing the structure of
the news is concerned, Van Dijk (1988a) sees news texts as consisting of ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ structure. The
macrostructure refers to the ‘thematic’ structure (the overall content of a text) and the ‘schematic’
structure (the overall form of a text). The themes and topics of news texts adhere to the “relevance
principle.” Therefore, they are organized or ordered hierarchically in which the more general theme
precedes the more specific. Texts’ themes and topics are introduced to the text based on the schematic
structures of the text, which are the particular order of the small units that a news text is built on. Van Dijk
(1988a) suggests how news report is formed based on what he calls News Schema Categories. News articles or reports start typically with one
or more headlines, which are distinguished by larger font. Headlines are followed by leads, which are typically the first sentence of the article.
The role of headlines and leads is important in introducing the main or overall theme of the text. Van Dijk (1988a) points out “This is vitally
important because the topic acts as a major control instance on the further interpretation of the rest of the text” (p. 34). The headline and lead
are followed by Main Events (the main story of the news). Main events may or may not be followed by Consequences which, depending on
their severity, determine the ‘newsworthiness’ of the event. For better understanding of the news event, readers often require a Background.
Finally, there are categories such as Verbal Reactions usually by major participants in the news and Comments by journalists or the newspaper.
Comments can take the form of evaluation or expectation of subsequent events. Microanalysis of news texts involves analyzing microelements
such as lexical choice, clause grammar, and clause combination, semantics, coherence between sentences or propositions and so forth.
Analyzing such microelements is fruitful in uncovering the implicit ideologies and opinions embedded within the discourse. In addition, other
helpful descriptive tools are commonly used in media discourse analysis. These are: referential and predicational strategies, passivization,
transitivity, scalar implicatures, quantification and modality. 2.1 Referential and Predication Strategies IJALEL 4(3):198-204, 2015 200 At the
micro level of discourse, word choice is a good indicator of a journalist’s attitude towards an event or agent in the story. Referential
strategies refer to the word chosen to refer to the agent of the story. For example, there is a significant
difference between saying “a terrorist was arrested” and “a Muslim terrorist was arrested.” On the other
hand, predictional strategies refer to “the very basic process and result of linguistically assigning qualities
to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena” (Wodak, 2001). 2.2 Transitivity and Passivization
At the syntax level of the discourse, Halliday’s concept of transitivity is a powerful semantic concept, an essential
linguistic tool used recurrently in the analysis of representations (Fowler 70). In traditional grammar,
transitivity refers to the syntactic difference between transitive and intransitive verbs in which the
former requires an object (a) Mark broke the window and the later does not (b) Mark is swimming. On
the other hand, Halliday’s semantic transitively focuses on the semantics of the sentence (Halliday, 1994): the
two verbs above (broke vs. swim) designate two different actions. In sentence (a), the verb broke designates an effect on other entity ‘the
window’ while in sentence (b) the verb swim designates an effect only on the actor. In other words, semantic transitivity
indicates
the semantic relations between the agent, object, and patient in which the agent (actor) does an action,
which can have an effect on object (thing) or patient (human). In passivization however, the role of the agent is
deemphasized while the role of the object or action is emphasized. 2.3 Implicatures and Quantification The concept of
implicatures, coined by H. P. Grice (1975), refers to cases where the intended meaning of an utterance differs from what was actually said.
Journalists may use implicatures in order to avoid expressing directly or explicitly what they mean. The use of implication is common in
journalism. Another
linguistic tool that journalists use to avoid being held accountable for their claims in
the news discourse is the use of quantification words such as some, many, almost or nearly all. 2.4 Modality
Modal expressions are endemic and frequently used in mass media given their useful communicative or
expressive functionalities. Fowler (1991) perceives modality as a ‘comment’ or an ‘attitude’ which can be divided into four categories:
truth, obligation, permission, and desirability. 2.4.1 Truth The speakers or writers use modal expressions (e.g. “Will/not”, Could/not, Certainly)
to signify judgments as a truth by indicting their strong commitment to what they perceive as true or to predict the degree of likelihood of an
event or actions they describe. 2.4.2 Obligation The speakers or writers use modals such as Must, Should, and Ought to in order to stipulate an
action that ought to be performed by a particular person, organization…etc. 2.4.3 Permission
The speakers or writers use
modal expressions such as May and Can to give or bestow permission for someone to perform an action.
2.4.4 Desirability The speakers or writers use model expressions to indicate approval or disapproval of a
statement. This modality is explicit in a range of evaluative adjectives and adverbs (e.g. Right and
Wrong).
Prefer our education claims – it’s not 1940, kritiks are a thing they should have used
their infinite prep to pick better advantage ground
4. Competing ideas: basis of learning and challenging internalized biases that
replicate the impact daily
5. Methodology gives us real world application
6. Education is the only real world skill – roleplaying cedes the agency we need;
and fairness only matters in terms of this single debate, make them prove in
round abuse
AT Perm – Do Both
Their understanding of the world necessitates war and violence – too late for a perm,
their values already influenced their decision-making and understanding of the Other
Der Derian 1 (James Der Derian is Professor of International Relations (Research) at Brown University, where he directs the
INFO/tech/war/peace project (www.infopeace.org), and Professor of Political Science at UMASS/Amherst, “The War of Networks”, Theory &
Event, https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4derderian.html
Without falling into the trap of 'moral equivalency', one can discern striking similarities. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
and others have made much of the 'asymmetrical' war being waged by the terrorists. And it is indeed a canny and even
diabolical use of asymmetrical tactics as well as strategies when terrorists commandeer commercial aircraft and
transform them into kinetic weapons of indiscriminate violence, and then deploy commercial media to counter the military
strikes that follow. Yet, a fearful symmetry is also at work, at an unconscious, possibly pathological level,
a war of escalating and competing and imitative oppositions, a mimetic war of images. A mimetic war is a battle
of imitation and representation, in which the relationship of who we are and who they are is played out
along a wide spectrum of familiarity and friendliness, indifference and tolerance, estrangement and hostility. It can result
in appreciation or denigration, accommodation or separation, assimilation or extermination. It draws physical boundaries
between peoples, as well as metaphysical boundaries between life and the most radical other of life, death. It separates human
from god. It builds the fence that makes good neighbors; it builds the wall that confines a whole people. And it sanctions
just about every kind of violence. More than a rational calculation of interests takes us to war. People go
to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine, and speak of others: that is, how they
construct the difference of others as well as the sameness of themselves through representations. From Greek tragedy
and Roman gladiatorial spectacles to futurist art and fascist rallies, the mimetic mix of image and violence has proven to be more powerful than
the most rational discourse. Indeed, the medical definition of mimesis
is 'the appearance, often caused by hysteria, of
symptoms of a disease not actually present.' Before one can diagnose a cure, one must study the
symptoms -- or, as it was once known in medical science, practice semiology.
AT Perm – Plan w/out Reps that Link
you can’t sever reps, perm can’t reconcile the radical new world of the alt with your
terrorist explanations – severance is a voting issue because ____________________
Their understanding of the world necessitates war and violence – too late for a perm,
their values already influenced their decision-making and understanding of the Other
Der Derian 1 (James Der Derian is Professor of International Relations (Research) at Brown University, where he directs the
INFO/tech/war/peace project (www.infopeace.org), and Professor of Political Science at UMASS/Amherst, “The War of Networks”, Theory &
Event, https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v005/5.4derderian.html
Without falling into the trap of 'moral equivalency', one can discern striking similarities. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
and others have made much of the 'asymmetrical' war being waged by the terrorists. And it is indeed a canny and even
diabolical use of asymmetrical tactics as well as strategies when terrorists commandeer commercial aircraft and
transform them into kinetic weapons of indiscriminate violence, and then deploy commercial media to counter the military
strikes that follow. Yet, a fearful symmetry is also at work, at an unconscious, possibly pathological level,
a war of escalating and competing and imitative oppositions, a mimetic war of images. A mimetic war is a battle
of imitation and representation, in which the relationship of who we are and who they are is played out
along a wide spectrum of familiarity and friendliness, indifference and tolerance, estrangement and hostility. It can result
in appreciation or denigration, accommodation or separation, assimilation or extermination. It draws physical boundaries
between peoples, as well as metaphysical boundaries between life and the most radical other of life, death. It separates human
from god. It builds the fence that makes good neighbors; it builds the wall that confines a whole people. And it sanctions
just about every kind of violence. More than a rational calculation of interests takes us to war. People go
to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine, and speak of others: that is, how they
construct the difference of others as well as the sameness of themselves through representations. From Greek tragedy
and Roman gladiatorial spectacles to futurist art and fascist rallies, the mimetic mix of image and violence has proven to be more powerful than
the most rational discourse. Indeed, the medical definition of mimesis
is 'the appearance, often caused by hysteria, of
symptoms of a disease not actually present.' Before one can diagnose a cure, one must study the
symptoms -- or, as it was once known in medical science, practice semiology.
Refuse the policy – Linguistic choices cannot be separated from the policies they
justify
McGregor 3 (Dr. Sue L. T. McGregor is Professor, Department of Education, Mount Saint Vincent
University, "Critical Discourse Analysis-A Primer," www.kon.org/archives/forum/l5-l/mcgregorcda.html)
Discourse and language can be used to make unbalanced power relations and portrayals of social
groups appear to be commonsense, normal, and natural when in fact the reality is prejudice, injustice.
and inequities. Using just words, those in power, or wishing to be so, can misdirect our concerns for
persistent, larger systemic issues of class, gender. age, religion, and -seem petty or nonexistent. Unless
we begin to debunk their words, we can be misled and duped into embracing the dominant
worldview (ideology) at our expense and their vain. Although the term discourse is slippery, elusive, and difficult to define (Henry 62 Tator,
2002), we must try. When discourse is effective in practice. evidenced by its ability to organize and regulate
relations of power. it is called a "regime of truth" (Foucault, 1980). It is this regime. a system by which a
political system is controlled, that is revealed when we engage in critical discourse analysis. How can we
say we "empower individuals and families" if we do not teach ourselves. and them. how to debunk and unveil the truth behind the regime?
AT Sageman Presses
Sageman has seen the government terror studies up close, our author is way more
qualified
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,”
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)
Terrorism research is now mostly and secretly conducted within governments, specifically within the IC, which has not shared much
information about terrorist plots with the academic community. One might reasonably ask whether the intelligence community has developed
During the past eight years, I was
privileged to be a member of the IC, with daily access to highly classified information streams on
terrorist threats, and able to observe the developments in the IC’s understanding of this turn to
violence.
insights into the turn to political violence of which the academic community is unaware.
AT Intelligence Community Sources
Even the IC is in shambles
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, “The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,”
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)
The IC has not been able to advance terrorism studies because of inherent limitations in the process of
collecting, disseminating, analyzing, and generating its products for policy makers. Even more than the
academic community, it functions largely at the whims of politicians and their concerns, which set the
frame and tone of its research. The potential perversion of this system was illustrated by the requirements to find justifications for
the invasion of Iraq and the widespread belief in the IC that Saddam Hussein did possess weapons of mass destruction, when the UN inspection
The processing of intelligence is also faulty. All source
analysts are supposed to have access to all information, but generally, they rely on disseminated
intelligence reports. These reports are already products crafted by a collector or an analyst and contain
inherent biases. For instance, raw information such as intercepted communications or even
interviews=interrogations of suspects are transcribed into relatively short intelligence reports that
decontextualize statements worthy of intelligence. I have compared such raw information and its
derived intelligence report, and observed that much is lost in the transcription. Not infrequently, the reports read
teams on the ground were casting strong doubts about this belief.
like a prosecutor’s brief, with the worst interpretation given full attention and potentially disconfirming evidence casting doubt on the gist of
The bias is toward an alarmist (and therefore worthy of attention and personal
promotion) interpretation.40 On topics of interest, several of these reports are then collected and
summarized in a ‘‘finished product’’ warning consumers of new trends. These finished products of
course further abstract from the raw data and again accentuate what may be new and sensational,
which is often more alarmist than necessary. Drowning in this ocean of potential threats and false
alarms, analysts have trouble identifying truly unusual occurrences indicative of an actual threat. For instance, while wives in custody
the report is neglected.
disputes occasionally accuse their husbands of being terrorists, it is very rare for parents to go out of their way to report their children to the IC.
Ideally, intelligence analysts should dedicate more resources to satisfactorily resolving the allegations in the second scenario than those in the
first one. However, as was the case with the underwear bomber, this won’t get done because they are under pressure to process huge numbers
of mostly false leads, which were erroneously generated by the IC in the first place. Throwing more analysts at the problem compounds the
issue as it creates more false leads for analysts who err on the side of security.
AT: But Islam is responsible for a lot of violence/death
Islam is vastly superior if the criteria is violence
Cole 13 [Juan, Prof of History –U of Michigan, “Terrorism and Other Religions,” April 23,
http://www.juancole.com/2013/04/terrorism-other-religions.html]
Contrary to what is alleged by bigots like Bill Maher, Muslims are not more violent than people of other
religions. Murder rates in most of the Muslim world are very low compared to the United States. As for
political violence, people of Christian heritage in the twentieth century polished off tens of millions of people
in the two world wars and colonial repression. This massive carnage did not occur because European
Christians are worse than or different from other human beings, but because they were the first to
industrialize war and pursue a national model. Sometimes it is argued that they did not act in the name of religion but of
nationalism. But, really, how naive. Religion and nationalism are closely intertwined. The British monarch is the head of the Church of England,
and that still meant something in the first half of the twentieth century, at least. The Swedish church is a national church. Spain? Was it really
unconnected to Catholicism? Did the Church and Francisco Franco’s feelings toward it play no role in the Civil War? And what’s sauce for the
goose: much Muslim violence is driven by forms of modern nationalism, too. I
don’t figure that Muslims killed more than a 2
million people or so in political violence in the entire twentieth century, and that mainly in the Iran-Iraq War
1980-1988 and the Soviet and post-Soviet wars in Afghanistan, for which Europeans bear some blame. Compare that to
the Christian European tally of, oh, lets say 100 million (16 million in WW I, 60 million in WW II– though some of those were
attributable to Buddhists in Asia– and millions more in colonial wars.)
Instances of Christian extremism are ignored – prove Islam isn’t uniquely more violent
Cole 13 [Juan, Prof of History –U of Michigan, “Terrorism and Other Religions,” April 23,
http://www.juancole.com/2013/04/terrorism-other-religions.html]
As for Christianity, the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda initiated hostilities that displaced two million
people. Although it is an African cult, it is Christian in origin and the result of Western Christian
missionaries preaching in Africa. If Saudi Wahhabi preachers can be in part blamed for the Taliban, why
do Christian missionaries skate when we consider the blowback from their pupils? Despite the very large
number of European Muslims, in 2007-2009 less than 1 percent of terrorist acts in that continent were
committed by people from that community.
AT: “But they ARE religiously motivated”
Every major empirical study undermines the supposed link between Islam and
terrorism.
Jackson 7 (Richard, (Department of International Politics, University of Wales, “The Core
Commitments Of Critical Terrorism Studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8
In addition, and contrary to widely held beliefs, every major empirical study on the subject has thrown
doubt on the purported link between religion and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism,
for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some
315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic
fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’. 85 Some of the key findings of the study that
support this assessment include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be
associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners
of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist–Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed 76 attacks; of the 384
individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166 or 43 per cent were religious; there were 41
attacks attributed to Hizbollah during this period, of which eight were carried out by Muslims, 27 by
communists and three by Christians (the other three attackers could not be identified); and 95 per cent
of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign that has a secular
and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation. 86 Similarly, Sageman’s
widely quoted study compiled detailed biographical data on 172 participants of ‘Islamic terrorist’
groups. Some of the relevant findings of his study include, among others: only 17 per cent of the
terrorists had an Islamic religious education; only 8 per cent of terrorists showed any religious devotion
as youths; only 13 per cent of terrorists indicated that they were inspired to join solely on the basis of
religious beliefs; increased religious devotion appeared to be an effect of joining the terrorist group, not
the cause of it; there is no empirical evidence that the terrorists were motivated largely by hate or
pathological prejudice; ‘Islamic terrorist’ groups do not engage in active recruitment, as there are more
volunteers than they can accommodate; the data, along with five decades of research, failed to provide
any support for the notion of religious brainwashing; and there is no evidence of any individual joining a
terrorist group solely on the basis of exposure to internet-based material. Interestingly, the data
compiled in these two projects also demonstrate that the notion that ‘Islamic terrorism’ results from
poverty, disaffection and alienation is unsupported. In fact, both of these studies show that the
overwhelming majority of ‘terrorists’ are middle or upper class, of above-average educational standing,
professionally employed, often married or in relationships, are well integrated into their communities
and generally have good future prospects. Robert Pape concludes that the typical profile of a ‘terrorist’
resembles ‘the kind of politically conscious individuals who might join a grassroots movement’ rather
than a religious fanatic.
AT: Ableism K
Islamophobia isn’t ableist. You’ve confused the word Phobia with the Suffix Phobia
Beck 12 (Laura, Editor at Jezebel, Nov 26, “The AP Says No More 'Homophobia," 'Islamophobia,' or
'Ethnic Cleansing', http://jezebel.com/5963481/the-ap-says-no-more-homophobia-islamophobia-orethnic-cleansing)
In the past few months, the AP has removed homophobia, Islamophobia, and ethnic cleansing from their Style Book,
explaining that "'-phobia,' 'an irrational, uncontrollable fear, often a form of mental illness' should not be used 'in political or social contexts,'
including 'homophobia' and 'Islamophobia.' It also calls 'ethnic cleansing' a 'euphemism,' and says the AP 'does not use 'ethnic cleansing' on its
own. It must be enclosed in quotes, attributed and explained.'" Interesting. However, a commenter on Politico points out that "[t]his
is
completely wrong. They have confused the WORD "phobia" with the SUFFIX '-phobia'. The word
"phobia" is just what they said: a technical term denoting an extreme, debilitating fear. The suffix 'phobia', on the other hand is much broader. It can mean not just fear of, but also dislike of, aversion
to, prejudice against, having a really bad (physical) reaction to, etc. Consider 'Anglophobia', 'Francophobia',
'hydrophobia', photophobia, etc. It has become an all-purpose (suffix) antonym to '-philia'. (bibliophilia,
bibliophobia)." Hmm...
Anti-Muslim isn’t sufficient. We need to use the word islamophobia - It is multifaceted
& nuanced – focusing on this generates better analysis
Hammer 13 (Juliane, Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, UNC Chapel Hill, “Center Stage”,
Islamophobia in America: The Anatomy of Intolerance, p. 108-9)
Before proceeding in this direction, I want to offer some clarifica¬tions on how I understand and use the
term Islamophobia. Literally meaning "fear of Islam," Islamophobia is not about innate or natu¬ral fear
of Islam or Muslims. Rather, it is an ideological construct produced and reproduced at the nexus of a
number of political and intellectual currents that need to be taken into consideration and assessed
critically in each instance or event of Islamophobic dis¬course and practice. I see it at the intersection
of the following:
•
Shifts in domestic politics in which Islam and Muslims become tools for renegotiating political
allegiances, identities, and power structures;
•
Imperial wars as extensions of colonial and neocolonial projects;
•
Expressions of racism and bigotry in response to shifting demo¬graphic and political
constellations;
•
Negotiations of the nature and significance of feminism;
•
Political exclusion and discrimination as part of shifting state powers and applications of liberal
ideology;
•
Civilizational discourses on moral and cultural superiority of "Western" powers, foremost
among them the United States.
It might seem frustrating to fragment the neat and overarching framework inherent in the ways in which
Islamophobia is currently most often used in academic analysis; and one could argue that such
fragmentation is weakening the political power of the intellectual critique of Islamophobia. However,
it is intellectually more honest to acknowledge that Islamophobia is not the product of a conspiracy
against Islam and Muslims, originating from one source that can conveniently be pinpointed and
called out. In what follows I attempt to situate both the victims of Islamophobic discourse and those
producing and disseminating it within the nexus described above. This requires focusing on specific
examples and identifying just how in each instance, several but not all of these forces are at work. This
kind of nuanced analysis can arguably be more productive in empowering activist strategies that
address the causes and remedies for Islamophobia.
Aff Answers
No Link – Discourse doesn’t shape reality
Discourse can’t shape reality – 4 warrants
Roskoski and Peabody 94 (Matthew, Joe, Florida State University, “A Linguistic and Philosophical
Critique of Language ‘Arguments’”,
http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques)
Initially, it is important to note that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis does not intrinsically deserve
presumption, although many authors assume its validity without empirical support. The reason it does
not deserve presumption is that "on a priori grounds one can contest it by asking how, if we are unable
to organize our thinking beyond the limits set by our native language, we could ever become aware of
those limits" (Robins 101). Au explains that "because it has received so little convincing support, the
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has stimulated little research" (Au 1984 156). However, many critical scholars
take the hypothesis for granted because it is a necessary but uninteresting precondition for the claims
they really want to defend. Khosroshahi explains: However, the empirical tests of the hypothesis of
linguistic relativity have yielded more equivocal results. But independently of its empirical status,
Whorf's view is quite widely held. In fact, many social movements have attempted reforms of language
and have thus taken Whorf's thesis for granted. (Khosroshahi 505). One reason for the hypothesis being
taken for granted is that on first glance it seems intuitively valid to some. However, after research is
conducted it becomes clear that this intuition is no longer true. Rosch notes that the hypothesis "not
only does not appear to be empirically true in any major respect, but it no longer even seems profoundly
and ineffably true" (Rosch 276). The implication for language "arguments" is clear: a debater must do
more than simply read cards from feminist or critical scholars that say language creates reality.
Instead, the debater must support this claim with empirical studies or other forms of scientifically valid
research. Mere intuition is not enough, and it is our belief that valid empirical studies do not support the
hypothesis. After assessing the studies up to and including 1989, Takano claimed that the hypothesis
"has no empirical support" (Takano 142). Further, Miller & McNeill claim that "nearly all" of the studies
performed on the Whorfian hypothesis "are best regarded as efforts to substantiate the weak version of
the hypothesis" (Miller & McNeill 734). We additionally will offer four reasons the hypothesis is not
valid. The first reason is that it is impossible to generate empirical validation for the hypothesis. Because
the hypothesis is so metaphysical and because it relies so heavily on intuition it is difficult if not
impossible to operationalize. Rosch asserts that "profound and ineffable truths are not, in that form,
subject to scientific investigation" (Rosch 259). We concur for two reasons. The first is that the
hypothesis is phrased as a philosophical first principle and hence would not have an objective referent.
The second is there would be intrinsic problems in any such test. The independent variable would be the
language used by the subject. The dependent variable would be the subject's subjective reality. The
problem is that the dependent variable can only be measured through self- reporting, which - naturally entails the use of language. Hence, it is impossible to separate the dependent and independent
variables. In other words, we have no way of knowing if the effects on "reality" are actual or merely
artifacts of the language being used as a measuring tool. The second reason that the hypothesis is
flawed is that there are problems with the causal relationship it describes. Simply put, it is just as
plausible (in fact infinitely more so) that reality shapes language. Again we echo the words of Dr. Rosch,
who says: {C}ovariation does not determine the direction of causality. On the simplest level, cultures are
very likely to have names for physical objects which exist in their culture and not to have names for
objects outside of their experience. Where television sets exists, there are words to refer to them.
However, it would be difficult to argue that the objects are caused by the words. The same reasoning
probably holds in the case of institutions and other, more abstract, entities and their names. (Rosch
264). The color studies reported by Cole & Means tend to support this claim (Cole & Means 75). Even in
the best case scenario for the Whorfians, one could only claim that there are causal operations working
both ways - i.e. reality shapes language and language shapes reality. If that was found to be true, which
at this point it still has not, the hypothesis would still be scientifically problematic because "we would
have difficulty calculating the extent to which the language we use determines our thought" (Schultz
134). The third objection is that the hypothesis self- implodes. If language creates reality, then different
cultures with different languages would have different realities. Were that the case, then meaningful
cross- cultural communication would be difficult if not impossible. In Au's words: "it is never the case
that something expressed in Zuni or Hopi or Latin cannot be expressed at all in English. Were it the case,
Whorf could not have written his articles as he did entirely in English" (Au 156). The fourth and final
objection is that the hypothesis cannot account for single words with multiple meanings. For example,
as Takano notes, the word "bank" has multiple meanings (Takano 149). If language truly created reality
then this would not be possible. Further, most if not all language "arguments" in debate are
accompanied by the claim that intent is irrelevant because the actual rhetoric exists apart from the
rhetor's intent. If this is so, then the Whorfian advocate cannot claim that the intent of the speaker
distinguishes what reality the rhetoric creates. The prevalence of such multiple meanings in a debate
context is demonstrated with every new topicality debate, where debaters spend entire rounds
quibbling over multiple interpretations of a few words.1
Alt Fails
Critical terrorism studies fails to meet tests of rigorous, unique, considerate
scholarship, allowing government cooption
Smyth et al. 9 [Marie Breen Smyth, Chair of International Politics at University of Surrey; Jeroen Gunning, Reader in Middle East
Politics, and Conflict Studies at Durham University’s School of Government and International Affairs; Richard Jackson, Deputy Director at the
National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies; “Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda” pg 219; Routledge; 2009.]
Related to the above point, and as Ranstorp, Silke, Toros and Gunning, Sluka, and Breen Smyth note in this volume, there is a more general and
widely noted tendency for terrorism
studies scholars to over-rely on secondary sources and a simultaneous
failure to undertake primary research, particularly in terms of face to face engagement with individuals and groups widely
described as ‘terrorists’. Primary research which engages directly with the subjectivity of ‘terrorists’ is still something of a taboo in terrorism
studies (Zulaika, 2008) – although there have been some notable exceptions involving face to face interviews in recent years (see, among
others, Horgan, 2008, 2005; Stern, 2003; Bloom, 2005) – and a great many terrorism ‘experts’ have never even met a ‘terrorist’. Although not
all terrorism related research topics require primary research of this kind, the
notion that there is no need to engage one’s
research subjects face to face would be unthinkable in cognate disciplines such as anthropology,
psychology, and criminology. Clearly, such a situation raises real questions about the veracity and quality of
much orthodox terrorism research, and a consequence of these tendencies is that the literature frequently consists of
analytically thin, narrative-based, and descriptive accounts of terrorism. Another concerning issue in terrorism
studies can be described as what has in the Critical Security Studies literature been termed the ‘fetishization of parts’
problem (Wyn Jones, 1999; see Toros and Gunning, this volume). In the context of our field, it concerns the tendency to study
terrorism separately from the social movements, state structures, conflicts, history, contexts, and
international relations within which it occurs (see Gunning, Toros and Gunning, Dalacoura, this volume). This problem is, in
turn, partly a consequence of several other weaknesses, including the broader absence of social theory in terrorism
studies, rigid disciplinary boundaries and the lack of theoretical cross-fertilisation, and the tendency to exceptionalise terrorist violence in
relation to other forms of violence and political action. A more recent trend is the so-called ‘instant expert’ problem;
that is, the extremely large number of new terrorism scholars following 11 September 2001 who lack
adequate grounding in the existing literature, let alone detailed field knowledge, and who can parade as ‘experts’ in the
absence of accepted procedures for ‘gate-keeping’, particularly if they reinforce the dominant views of orthodox terrorism
studies (see Ranstorp, Silke, this volume). The broader de-contextualisation and de-historicisation of terrorism which
these tendencies engender, again, has a distorting effect on terrorism ‘knowledge’ and functions
ideologically to reify state hegemony.
Perm Do Both
Perm do both – it’s the only way to incorporate data and appropriate safety measures
while maintaining an ethical decisionmaking calculus
Need to create linkages between academia and intelligence analysts
Sageman 14 Their Author(marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, “The Stagnation in
Terrorism Research,” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)
we have a system of terrorism research in which intelligence analysts know
everything but understand nothing, while academics understand everything but know nothing. This critique
is but the last of a long jeremiad going back almost forty years about the poor quality of the research in the field.48 At this point, the
government funding strategy and its refusal to share accumulated data with academia has created the
architecture of the IC=academic divide preventing us from developing useful and perhaps counterintuitive insights into the factors leading people to turn to political violence. The solution is obvious: we
need more productive interactions between the two communities.49 But this would require political courage and will.
To draw my point to its extreme:
Meanwhile, we still don’t know what leads people to turn to political violence.
Even their critique cannot escape the power and influence of the state – perm is the
best way to apply the removed academia of the K to policy action
Smyth et al. 9 [Marie Breen Smyth, Chair of International Politics at University of Surrey; Jeroen Gunning, Reader in Middle East
Politics, and Conflict Studies at Durham University’s School of Government and International Affairs; Richard Jackson, Deputy Director at the
National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies; “Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda” pg 220-221; Routledge; 2009.]
It also has a tendency, dissenters again notwithstanding, to reproduce a number of dominant myths about, among other things, the role of
religion in causing terrorism, the threat of the ‘new terrorism’ and WMD terrorism, the non-involvement of Western states in the practice of
terrorism, and the efficacy of force-based counterterrorism. This
widely accepted terrorism ‘knowledge’ provides a very
poor foundation for further research, policymaking, and public debate, and functions ideologically to reify state
power and promote particular partisan projects. In our view, many of the problems described thus far are linked to a general
failure by many scholars to adopt a critically reflexive attitude which acknowledges the ontological
instability of the terrorism label, remains cognisant of the effects of the cultural context on knowledge production in social science,
is sensitive to the politics and consequences of labelling, and recognises the ethical challenges and consequences of conducting research on
political violence. Instead, we find that the orthodox terrorism
studies literature, particularly its international
relations-based sections, tends to treat ‘terrorism’ as an objective, ontologically stable phenomenon that can be
studied in a politically disinterested and unproblematic manner. In part, this particular criticism is rooted in an
alternative ontology which recognises the way in which ‘terrorism’ is constructed as a subject through a series of
identifiable discursive practices which also naturalise particular responses to it. But, even if one adopts a positivist
ontology, there is nonetheless a frequent failure of many scholars to appreciate and reflect upon the observable ‘politics of
naming’ with regard to ‘terrorism’, and an insufficient appreciation of the ‘real-world’ consequences of different modes of
representation and definition. A related weakness in the field is the dominance of what can be called ‘problemsolving’
approaches to the study of political terror which fail to interrogate the role of the status quo and
existing power structures in perpetuating insecurity and violence (Gunning, 2007a). The adoption of a problem-solving
approach is in part a consequence of the frequently compromising ethical-political relationships
between states and their security agencies, and some scholars and analysts engaged in the study of non-state terrorism
(Ranstorp, Raphael, this volume). This is the so-called ‘embedded experts’ or ‘organic intellectuals’ problem, whereby the leading
scholars
constitute an influential epistemic community directly linked to state power (see Burnett and Whyte, 2005;
Jackson, 2007f). The dominance of this intellectual network is in part maintained through the operation of closed, static, and selfreferential
systems of knowledge production which function to exclude scholars with dissenting or counter-hegemonic views (see Reid, 1993). But it is also
a function of the dominance of state-centric, realist perspectives among the leading scholars within the field. A particularly deleterious
consequence of adopting a problem-solving perspective is the prioritisation of topics tailored to the demands of policymakers for practically
useful knowledge in the fight against terrorism, or, the securitisation of research.
Policy relevance is crucial to keeping critical terrorism studies alive – condemning the
state as a whole replicates the binarism they critique just as much
Gunning 7[Jerome Gunning, Reader in Middle East Politics, and Conflict Studies at Durham University’s School of Government and
International Affairs; “babies and bathwaters: reflecting on the pitfalls of critical terrorism studies” pg 239-241; Symposium; Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV), Department of International Politics, University of Wales; 2007.]
At the heart of the critical project lies the
notion of ‘emancipation’. As McDonald notes in this symposium, contending critical schools
approach this concept differently. Some denounce it as too implicated in grand meta-narratives and normative projects, including
past, and not so past, (neo)-colonial projects (Alker, 2004: 202). Yet, an increasing number of voices have observed that all critical
projects derive from an underlying conception of a different order (Wyn Jones, 2004: 217–20; Alker, 2004: 192). Even
some of those most critical of the term (notably Derrida, 1996: 82; see also Alker, 2004: 202; Wyn Jones, 2004: 219) have (re)-embraced the
notion. To
be ‘critical’, it seems, one has to have some normative notion of what is wrong and how things
should be different. This need not involve a predetermined blueprint of utopia; indeed, such a blueprint is anathema to contemporary
conceptions of ‘critical’. Or, with Hutchings, because ‘the notion of emancipation is itself authoritative and exclusionary’, critical scholars must
always ‘acknowledge that no normative position is nonexclusive or unchallengeable’ (Hutchings, 2001:90; see also Wyn Jones, 2004:230; Booth,
2004a: 182). If
emancipation is central to the critical project, CTS cannot remain policy-irrelevant without
belying its emancipatory commitment. It has to move beyond critique and deconstruction to reconstruction and
policy-relevance (Booth, 2004b; Williams and Krause, 1997). The challenge of CTS is to engage policy-makers – as well
as ‘terrorists’ and their communities – and work towards the realisation of new paradigms, new practices, and the
transformation of political structures. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of ‘immanent critique’. Striving to be
policyrelevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop
investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that all research must have policy-relevance or that
one has to limit one’s research to what is relevant for the state, since the critical turn implies a move beyond
statecentric perspectives. End-users could, and should, include both state and nonstate actors, as long as the goal is to
combat both political terror and political structures encouraging terror. However, engaging policy-makers raises the issue of
co-optation. One of the fears of critical scholars is that by engaging with policy-makers, either they or their research become co-opted. A
more intractable problem is the one highlighted by Rengger that ‘the demand that theory must have a praxial dimension
itself runs the risk of collapsing critical theory back into traditional theory by making it dependent on
instrumental conceptions of rationality’ (Rengger, 2001: 107). A related problem is that by becoming embedded in the existing
power structures, one risks reproducing existing knowledge structures or inadvertently contributing to counter-terrorism policy that uncritically
strengthens the status quo. Such dilemmas have to be confronted and debated; non-engagement is not an option. Engagement is
facilitated by the fact that, as counter-terrorism projects flounder, advisors to policy-makers are
increasingly eager for advice, even when it is ‘critical’. The problem is thus not access per se, but the level of access and how advice is
acted upon. Whenever I have addressed foreign affairs personnel, the response to my research has been positive. However, according to those
present, the advice they produce seldom influences official policy, as other more pressing concerns affect actual policymaking. Because of
this distance between critical academics and policy-makers, the advice becomes too diluted. For obvious
reasons, ‘embedded’ terrorism scholars and traditional thinktanks have enjoyed a much closer relationship with policy-makers, allowing them
both more institutionalised and more direct access. This is partly structural, since critical
studies are inherently critical of
existing power structures. ‘Critical’ scholars have also at times unnecessarily burned bridges by issuing blanket
condemnations of all things statist. It is important that ‘critical’ scholars do not indulge in the
demonising of all state actors, in the same way they argue against the blanket demonising of
‘terrorists’. This also extends to think-tanks with close links to power: just because a piece of research comes from RAND does not
invalidate it; conversely, a ‘critical’ study is not inherently good. Just as Halliday cri tiqued those who privileged voices from ‘the South’ as
somehow more authentic, critical scholars must guard against either privileging ‘terrorist’ voices or uncritically critiquing state or staterelated
actors (Halliday, 1996: 211–13). Critical
scholars have to think carefully about how to increase access to power
without losing critical distance. The establishment of dedicated critical journals, seminars, and conferences that actively
seek to engage policy-makers is one way forward, as are collaborative efforts with traditional
conferences already habitually attended by policy-makers. The creation of dedicated research centres and thinktanks may
similarly be necessary. But engaging policy-makers is not the only way forward; engaging ‘terrorists’ and ‘suspect communities’, as well as civil
society actors more generally, is equally important. In the age of the blog, alternative news websites and trans-national grassroots activism,
CTS must be at the forefront of creating counter-hegemonic discourses. It can do this at universities. But it can also
do this through partnerships with ‘suspect communities’, or publicly challenging new laws or directives, as
many have already begun to do.
Permutation is mutually beneficial – scores of knowledge are lost without it, and
critically minded experts solv
Gunning 7[Jerome Gunning, Reader in Middle East Politics, and Conflict Studies at Durham University’s School of Government and
International Affairs; “babies and bathwaters: reflecting on the pitfalls of critical terrorism studies” pg 237-238; Symposium; Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV), Department of International Politics, University of Wales; 2007.]
However, this introduces a fundamental tension. To
be critical in the first sense, a critical field must explicitly challenge
state-centric, problem-solving perspectives and call into question existing definitions, assumptions, and power structures. To
be critical in the second sense, it must attempt to be inclusive, to enable the convergence of not only explicitly
critical perspectives but also the more rigorous traditional, problem-solving perspectives of both cognate and
‘terrorism studies’. Much of interest has been written by, for instance, those traditional conflict resolution scholars who
have moved beyond a narrow military understanding of security and placed violence in its wider social context (see also
Toros, 2006). Similarly, traditional scholars within terrorism studies have produced significant research that challenges
accepted knowledge and that we ignore at our peril (see also Gunning, 2007a; Jackson, 2007). Research from outside
‘terrorism studies’, however strong in other aspects, is often marred by a lack of familiarity with core insights from the
traditional ‘terrorism studies’ literature (see also Merari in Silke, 2004: 188–91). Conversely, traditional ‘terrorism’ scholars would
benefit greatly from exposure to cognate or critical perspectives. Further complicating this dynamic is that the term
‘critical’ is itself highly contested. Post-structuralists and Critical Theorists have a very different understanding of what constitutes ‘critical’, or
indeed of what the chief aims of a critical field ought to be. Debates rage, for instance, over whether a ‘critical’ field should attempt to be
policy-relevant or whether it should focus solely on powerknowledge issues. In this respect, important
lessons can be learned
from the critical turn in cognate fields. Critical security studies (CSS) is of particular interest, since
terrorism studies emerged in part from security studies. Within CSS, there are widely different trends. Williams and Krause for
instance, propose an inclusive approach to bring together self-reflexive perspectives that fall outside of the
discipline’s mainstream (Williams and Krause, 1997). Booth, conversely, advocates a more normative Critical Theory approach that
demands not just critical self-reflexivity but a full-blown theory of CSS (Booth, 2004a). Booth holds that a field without a coherent organising
theory is too eclectic to withstand internal contradictions. Krause and Williams argue that too
normative a straightjacket will
prevent the creation of a critical mass. Even though these internal divisions have triggered rich and insightful debates, the impact
of CSS has arguably been muted by them. CSS has furthermore only partially succeeded in making security studies as a
whole more selfreflexive. Though the creation of a separate field has highlighted the main field’s shortcomings
and created space for critical approaches, it has also helped to create something of an intellectual ghetto alienation that has left the rest of the
field to its original traditional tendencies. CTS
has to reflect upon how to proceed in the light of this experience. It
must grapple with how to create sufficient space for critical studies without ghettoising alienating itself and
leaving the ‘mainstream’ to its traditional tendencies; how to ensure inclusion of both critically minded
traditionalists and the wide variety of critical perspectives; and how to prevent itself from imploding under the burden
of either internal divisions, or too much eclecticism.
Squo Solves
There is limited public support for high-threat terrorism analysis now, and the
government’s moves toward the war on terror are decreasing into policing moves
Buzan 9 [Barry Buzan, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and honorary professor at the
University of Copenhagen and Jilin University; “Barry Buzan on International Society, Securitization, and an English School Map of the World”;
Theory Talks, an interactive forum for discussion of debates in International Relations with an emphasis of the underlying theoretical issues;
12/19/2009; accessed 07/18/2015; <http://www.theory-talks.org/2009/12/theory-talk-35.html>.]
A question on securitization. A threat—such as terrorism—needs an audience to accept the securitizing
such. What happens if, as for instance the ‘terror thermometer’ of the US, a threat gets discursively sustained yet the threat- or
move as
securitization-level normalizes and people get used to it? Is that desecuritization? In other words: what’s the current status
of the terrorism-securitization? I think the current status of the terrorism securitization is indeed somewhat
declining. I think I got it right in 2006 when I wrote Will the Global War on Terror be the new Cold War? (International Affairs, 2006, read pdf
version here): the war on terror is not going to be a new Cold War in terms of a global dominant macrosecuritization which the US can use to structure alliances and frame itself in a good position in global
security concerns. Even in the US, nowadays, the term ‘war on terror’ hardly appears at all: in that sense, it is
becoming desecuritized, partly because many people are simply not coming on board with a continuous
high securitization of the war on terror. Rather, as Mary Kaldor has argued in Theory Talk #30, people would rather
treat this as a criminal matter involving policing. Yet, it is not taken off the register entirely, there’s obviously still a problem
there.
CounterTerrorism Good
Counterterrorism is necessary – judge has a moral obligation endorse the use of force
against murderous terrorist acts
Beres 5 [Louis Rene Beres, IR lecturer and publisher on terrorist studies; “Terrorism’s Executioner”; The Washington Times; 05/30/2005;
accessed 07/18/2015; <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/may/30/20050530-094029-7128r/?page=all>.] We do not endorse
gendered language
Our world is "normally’ silent in the face of evil. At worst, many are directly complicit in the maimings and
slaughters. At best, the murderers are ignored. In this unchanging world Israel must soon decide whether to face the
evil of Palestinian terrorism as a pitiable victim or to use whatever reasonable force is needed to remain
alive. The use of force is not inherently evil. Quite the contrary; in opposing terrorist mayhem, force is
indispensable to all that is good. In the case of Israel, Palestinian terrorism is unique for its cowardice, its
barbarism and its genocidal goal. Were Israel to depend upon the broader international community for relief- upon the so-called
road map - its plea would be unheard. All states have a right of self-defense. Israel has every lawful authority to forcibly confront
the still-growing evil of Palestinian terror. Facing even biological and nuclear forms of terrorism, it now has the clear
legal right to refuse to be a victim and to become an executioner. From the standpoint of providing security to its own
citizens, this right even becomes an obligation. Albert Camus would have us all be "neither victims nor
executioners," living not in a world in which killing has disappeared ("we are not so crazy as that"), but one wherein killing has
become illegitimate. This is a fine expectation, yet the celebrated French philosopher did not anticipate another evil force for whom
utter extermination of “the Jews" was its declared object. Not even in a world living under the shadow of recent Holocaust did Camus consider
such an absurd possibility. But Israel lacks the quaint luxury of French philosophy. Were Israel to follow Camus’ genteel reasoning, perhaps in
order to implement Mr. Sharon's disengagement, the result would be another boundless enlargement of Jewish suffering. Before and during
the Holocaust, for those who still had an opportunity to flee, Jews were ordered: "Get out of Europe; go to Palestine." When they complied
(those who could), the next order was: "Get out of Palestine." For my Austrian-Jewish grandparents, their deaths came on the SS-killing grounds
at Riga, Latvia. Had they made it to Palestine, their sons and grandsons would likely have died in subsequent genocidal wars intended to get the
Jews "out of Palestine." Failure
to use force against murderous evil is invariably a stain upon all that is good. By
declining the right to act as a lawful executioner in its struggle with terror, Israel would be forced by Camus'
reasoning to embrace its own disappearance. Barring Mr. Sharon's disengagement, the Jewish state would never accept collective suicide. Why
was Camus, who was thinking only in the broadest generic terms, so mistaken? My own answer lies in his presumption ofa natural reciprocity
among human beings and states in the matter of killing. We are asked to believe that as greater numbers of people agree not to become
executioners, still greater numbers will follow upon the same course. In time, the argument proceeds, the number of those who refuse to
accept killing will become so great that there will be fewer and fewer victims. But Camus'
presumed reciprocity does not exist,
indeed, can never exist, especially in the jihad-centered Middle East. Here the Islamist will to kill Jews remains
unimpressed by Israel's disproportionate contributions to science, industry, medicine and learning. Here there are no Arab plans for a "twostate solution,” only for a final solution. In counterterrorism, Jewish executioners must now have an honored place in the government of Israel.
Without them, evil would triumph again and again. For Hamas, Islamichhad, Hezbollah and Fatah, murderedJews are not so much a means to
an end as an end in themselves. In this unheroic Arab Islamist world, where killingJews is both a religious mandate and sometimes also a path
to sexual ecstasy and personal immortality, an Israeli unwillingness
to use necessary force against terror will invite
existential terror. Sadly, killing is sometimes a sacred duty. Faced with manifest evil, all decent
civilizations must rely, in the end, on the executioner. To deny the executioner his their proper place
would enable the murderers to leer lasciviously upon whole mountains of fresh corpses.
Threats Real & Not Islamophobic
The threats of terrorism are real and there portrayal is not Islamophobic
Weiss 12 (Rusty Weiss, Contributor at Newsbusters, “Dear Media, Accurately Portraying Muslim Rage
as Muslim Rage is Not Islamophobic”,September 18th, 2012, NewsBusters,
http://newsbusters.org/blogs/rusty-weiss/2012/09/18/dear-media-accurately-portraying-muslim-ragemuslim-rage-not-islamophob#sthash.HqV1hANi.dpuf, JAS) We don’t endorse gendered or ablest
language
This week we learned what really gets the liberal media in a ... well ... rage. It
isn't the act of perpetrating violence upon the
innocent. No, it's calling out that rage for everyone to see. In Liberal Land, words speak louder than
actions. The media on the left side of the aisle took more umbrage with a Newsweek article titled, Muslim Rage, than they did with the
incidents that demonstrated that rage - the killing of four Americans in Libya, including Ambassador Christopher Stevens, and the hoisting of
Islamist flags on sovereign U.S. soil. Outlets like Think Progress called the Newsweek cover, which featured an image of a group of obviously
agitated Muslims, Islamophobic. Newsweek for their part did not apologize for their portrayal of events in the Middle East saying: "This weeks
Newsweek cover accurately depicts the events of the past week as violent protests have erupted in the Middle East (including Morocco where
the cover image was taken).” Rather
than focusing on the real issues here, the liberal media is doing everything
in its power to avoid pointing the finger at radical Islamists. They point it at Mitt Romney for his statements, they point it
at Newsweek, at the author, Ayaan Ali Hirsi, and they point it at an obscure film heretofore unknown to the general public. None of these are
justification for the scene currently spreading throughout the Middle East. And most assuredly, the rage is not a response to an antiMohammad film, despite what the White House would have you believe. The
rage has been consistent and perpetual, and it
has long been evident prior to any version of any anti-Mohammad film. During the Iran hostage crisis in
1979. At the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. At the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in
1998. With the USS Cole bombing in 2000. At the Fort Hood massacre in 2009. And of course,
September 11th. This to name a few. The rage is tangible, and it is very closely associated with radical
Islam. Giving terrorists built-in excuses such as an obscure film only serves to add fuel to their fire.
Appeasement does not work. What the left clearly needs are more people of reason, more people like Kirsten Powers who wrote: "...
our leaders shouldn't let our enemies know that when they kill our people and attack our embassies that
the US Government will act like a battered wife making excuses for her psychotic husband. Wake up: we weren't attacked
because of a movie made by an American. We were attacked because there are crazy religious fanatics
who hate the United States. We didn't ask for it." Say it along with her - Crazy. Religious. Fanatics. Muslim rage. Do not fear
it. Fearing words only serves to embolden the enemy, and they know it. While we continue to fight over
those words, extremists continue to point their RPG's at our foreign diplomats, storm our embassy
walls, burn American flags, call for beheadings and public hangings, and on and on. All the while, the media
criminally continues to whistle through the graveyard. That said, I would like to propose a change in how the media labels
things of this nature. I'd like to redefine the term Islamophobia. The phrase, much like the race card, has been
overused by the left and has been played out. It has outlived its usefulness. It no longer sticks as a term
of bigotry or intolerance toward radical Muslims. To quote the classic line from The Princess Bride - I do not think it means
what you think it means. Instead, the meaning should revert to a more literal translation. Islam-phobia. The phobia
involves those in the media continually capitulating to the radicals and terrorists killing in the name of
their religion. The phobia involves Democrats who continually bow down to the unreasonable demands of terror-linked domestic
organizations such as CAIR, or the ICNA, and are willing to release known terrorists in a foolish attempt to establish peace. The phobia equates
to fear. That is why liberals
refuse to stand up to radical Islam, and it is why the media refuses to accurately
portray the level of rage being executed in the name of the tenets of radical Islam. They are afraid. No
more. Journalism is a profession. Stop acting like amateurs. Stop being Islamophobes. At some point, you will have to grow a
spine when it comes to the threat of radical Muslim rage.
Iran Threats real
History reliably proves Iran is a real threat
Byman 15 (Daniel L. Byman, Research Director, Center for Middle East Policy Senior Fellow, Foreign
Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, “State sponsor of terror: The global threat of Iran”, February 11th,
2015, Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/02/11-byman-iran-sponsorshipof-terrorism, JAS)
Iran's leaders have used terrorism since they took power in 1979. Over 35 years later, Iran continues to use
terrorism and to work with an array of violent substate groups that use terrorism among other tactics.
Iran’s strategic goals for supporting terrorists and other violent substate groups include: Undermining
and bleeding rivals. Iran uses insurgent and terrorist groups to weaken governments it opposes. In the
1980s, this included bitter enemies like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and also lesser foes like the rulers of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Power projection.
Tehran’s military and economy are weak—and with oil prices plunging and sanctions in place, this weakness is becoming more pronounced. Nor
is its ideological appeal strong. Nevertheless, Iran’s
regime sees itself as a regional and even a world power, and
working with terrorists is a way for Iran to influence events far from its borders. Iran’s support for the
Lebanese Hizballah, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and Hamas make Iran a player in the Israeli-Palestinian and
Israeli-Arab disputes, and Iran’s backing of Houthis in Yemen give it influence on Saudi Arabia’s southern
border. Playing spoiler. Iran has supported groups whose attacks disrupted Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian
peace negotiations—a victory for Iran, which sees the negotiations as a betrayal of the Muslim cause and as a means of isolating the
clerical regime in Iran. Intimidation. Working with violent substate groups gives Iran a subversive threat, enabling
Iran to press its neighbors to distance themselves from the United States or to refrain from joining
economic or military efforts to press Iran. Such efforts, however, often backfire: because these states see Iran as meddling in
their domestic affairs and supporting violence there, they often become more, not less, willing to support economic or even military pressure
directed at Tehran. Deterrence. Iran’s
ties to terrorist groups, particularly the Lebanese Hizballah with its global
infrastructure, enable it to threaten its enemies with terrorist retaliation. This gives Iran a way to respond to military
or other pressure should it choose to do so. Revenge. Iran also uses terrorism to take revenge. It has attacked dissidents,
including representatives of non-violent as well as violent groups, even when they posed little threat to
the regime. Iran attacked France during the 1980s because of its support for Iraq, and it has tried to target Israel because of its belief that
Israel is behind the deaths of Iran’s nuclear scientists and in retaliation for the 2008 killing of Hizballah’s operational chief, Imad Mughniyah,
which is widely attributed to Israel. Preserving options. As a weak state in a hostile region, Tehran
seeks flexibility and prepares
for contingencies. Iran’s neighbors have often proved hostile, and rapprochements short-lived. Iran seeks ties to a range of
violent groups that give it leverage that could be employed should suspicion turn to open hostility. Iran,
often working with Hizballah, has repeatedly tried to use terrorism against an array of Israeli and
Western targets and interests, and this pattern has continued in recent years. Recent plots reportedly
range from plots against an Israeli shipping company and USAID offices in Nigeria in 2013 to
reconnoitering the Israeli embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan, for a possible attack. Hizballah operatives planned an attack
in 2014 against Israeli tourists in Bangkok, and in October 2014 Hizballah operatives were arrested in Peru for planning attacks against
Israeli and Jewish targets there. The last successful Iranian terrorist attack against the United States outside a theater of war was
the 1996 strike on Khobar Towers, which killed 19 Americans. In 2011, the United States disrupted an Iranian plot early in
the planning stages to bomb a restaurant in Washington frequented by the Saudi ambassador. Although the
target was the Saudi ambassador, the Iranian effort would also probably have killed many U.S. citizens eating at the
restaurant. Iran’s nuclear program complicates the counterterrorism dilemma. It is too recent to draw firm conclusions, but Iran’s use of
extra-regional terrorism directly against the United States appears to have declined since negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program began in
earnest. Iran has not repeated any plot similar to the 2011 attack on the Saudi ambassador to the United States; the 2013 Nigeria arrest is
worrisome, but that occurred before negotiations became serious, and publicly available information is incomplete in any event. An
Iran
with a nuclear weapon would be a more dangerous force in the region, and preventing this should be a
priority for any U.S. administration. A nuclear weapon probably would embolden Iran. Iran could become
more like Pakistan: after Islamabad acquired nuclear weapons, it gained a shield from India’s conventional superiority
and became more aggressive in backing anti-India substate groups.
Iran has a rational incentive to shut down the Strait of Hormuz, to gain leverage and
humiliate America
Holmes 12 (James Homes, co-author of Red Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic Monthly Best Foreign
Affairs Book for 2010 and a former US Navy surface warfare officer, “The Real Iran Threat”, October 29th,
2012, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/the-real-iran-threat/, JAS) We don’t endorse
gendered language
Yesterday we established that anti-access is
neither novel nor especially radical. It is a method the weak use to
overcome the strong when the strong venture onto their home ground. Coastal defenders can hope to win despite
their overall inferiority. Or they can hope to prevail without fighting, persuading stronger yet far away powers that the costs of operating
offshore exceed the payoffs from doing so. If so, they can dissuade adversaries from making the attempt. They win by
convincing prospective antagonists to keep their distance. Iran, like China, wants to keep U.S. forces at bay. Can it do so? Before undertaking
warlike competition, Clausewitz urges strategists to survey each belligerent’s political stakes, its strength and situation, and the capacity of its
government and people, as well as the likely sympathies and actions of third parties. A quick
survey of these factors illuminates
the differences between Iranian and Chinese anti-access strategy. Leave aside the glaring disparities between the two
coastal states’ populations, economic capacity, and other indices of material strength. The Islamic Republic clearly cannot field the imposing
array of anti-access weaponry China does. But Tehran’s
capacity for mischief-making remains considerable. Look at
the map. As it gazes eastward across the Pacific Ocean, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy must defend a broad, distended front—
namely the China seas—against oncoming U.S. forces and America’s Asian allies. U.S. forces must approach the Persian Gulf
along a narrow front. They must traverse the very predictable route through the focal point at Hormuz.
The Iranian military, accordingly, can simplify its anti-access problem by closing the Strait of Hormuz. If
Iranian commanders deploy their limited military capabilities adroitly, they can threaten to pummel U.S. naval forces trapped
within the Persian Gulf while holding U.S. reinforcements at risk outside the Gulf, along the Gulf of Oman
approaches to Iran’s coasts. Am I predicting that Tehran can render the Strait permanently impassable? No. But think about the
politics, rather than the hardware and tactics, of access denial. Clausewitz observes that you can win wars in
three ways: disarm your enemy, rendering him powerless to resist your demands; show him he’s unlikely to win; or
convince him the costs of winning will be exorbitant, far beyond the value he places on his political stakes. Defeating the U.S.
military outright probably lies beyond Iranian capacity, but Clausewitz’s other options remain open to Tehran. Tehran, that is, can put
Washington on notice that it will pay a high if not unacceptable price for access to the Gulf region. A U.S.
president might hesitate before making a decision of this gravity in times of strife; he might modify U.S. deployment patterns, forcing U.S.
airmen and seamen to fight inside the Persian Gulf from aircraft carriers and land bases outside the Strait of Hormuz; he might abjure the effort
altogether. Tehran
would either prevail or, more likely, gain time to accomplish its goals. That could be a win
from the Iranian standpoint. Americans must not assume the mismatch between U.S. and Iranian
military capabilities guarantees automatic victory in the Gulf. This barely scratches the surface of a large topic. But
examining the geospatial aspects of strategy is always a good way to begin parsing such topics. In my next post we’ll survey how North Korea
approaches the anti-access question.
“Islamophobia” Ableism Turn
Rhetoric of “Islamophobia” is ableist – works to shame people with phobic disabilities
Emily 11 (“Why you shouldn’t conflate bigotry and phobia”, April 30,
https://eateroftrees.wordpress.com/2011/04/30/why-you-shouldnt-conflate-bigotry-and-phobia/)
Phobias are real things that impact the lives of many people. Bigotry and oppressive forces are also a
thing that impacts the lives of many people. But they’re not the same thing. At all. Specifically phobias are when
something or other produces an extremely strong unpleasant emotional reaction, mostly fear or panic. You see a bee, and you completely freeze up and can’t move
because the bee is going to hurt you (even though, logically, you know that’s unlikely and if it did the pain would be annoying and not serious) Phobias are not
generally taken very seriously. This is a recurring problem; wherein people will try to expose you to your phobia for a variety of reasons, possibly because they think
you need exposure therapy and have decided to skip the informed consent stage. Or possibly because they find it funny, or any variety of reasons. All of which are
extremely ableist; at best trying to “help” you in a way that denies your agency, at worst outright abuse. And further, people will often treat people with phobias
very condescendingly. Insisting that you should just magically get over it or that your emotional reaction is a sign of weakness or any other variety of derogatory
treatment for it. People will completely disregard the needs of their readers, and, for example, illustrate their writing with pictures of blood or insects in ways that
make it hard to avoid said pictures; assuming that their readers emotional safety is just a concern to be casually tossed aside. (Further ignoring the fact, of course,
that if you trigger your readers, they are unlikely to remain your readers.) The thing is, the suffix “-phobia” is used for two completely different things. One thing is
phobias; which are a mental process that is rather disruptive and tends to preclude clear thinking. The other is bigotry. Bigotry
is hate. It’s treating
people as less than human. It’s systematically denying people basic rights and disrupting their lives. But
it’s not a phobia. Calling it one gives reasonability to the panic defense; when someone claims that they
just panicked because the victim of a hate crime was different and that made them commit said crime.
Because phobias do result in an inability to think clearly, although they don’t usually result in violence so much as hiding. Further calling bigotry a
phobia serves to make oppressors sympathetic. After all, their bigotry is just an out of control emotional reaction. It says that they are
the ones who are suffering, not the people who they are oppressing. Using “-phobia” to discuss bigotry shames phobias as well.
Telling people that their emotional reactions are as bad as forces that systematically dehumanize and kill
people on a regular basis prevents people from being able to discuss their reactions without being read
as terrible people. It prevents people from being able to deal with their phobias in useful ways, whether by avoiding them or by attempting to find
treatment for them. It encourages people to hurt themselves by entering painful situations and ignoring the pain, because the pain is seen as a manifestation of
their own personal failures. Using
“-phobia” for bigotry is an example of bigotry and is definitely oppressive. This
becomes especially a problem because occasionally oppression and phobias overlap. If you spend your life shamed for expressing a personality trait or because of
your mind, and are constantly harassed and demeaned because of something about you, and see people around you who exhibit said trait be harassed and treated
as jokes or disguisting or terrible people, you can quickly develop a phobia of said trait. But then, when you have that reaction, everyone around you uses the words
to describe your reaction to describe the people who hate you. Who’s oppression has caused this reaction in the first place. You have panic attacks when you try to
transition because you’ve been bombarded by messages that trans people are terrible and freaks. Only then, you can’t talk about it. You can’t say “Oh hey I have a
phobia of being trans” because transphobia isn’t anxiety about stepping outside of prescribed gender roles, it’s oppression of people who do that. Calling
oppression of trans people transphobia is likely to be oppressive to trans people .
Fighting bigotry with bigotry isn’t just helping one
group at the expense of another, it’s hurting the group you’re trying to help, and makes their oppressors
sympathetic. This is, understandably, problematic.
Use the ballot to reject ableist rhetoric
Cherney 11 (James, Wayne State University, “The Rhetoric of Ableism”, Disabilities Study Quarterly,
Vol. 31 No. 3, http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/1665/1606)
If we locate the problem in disability, then the ableist absolves his or her responsibility for
discrimination and may not even recognize its presence. If we locate the problem in ableism, then the
ableist must question her or his orientation. The critic's task is to make ableism so apparent and
irredeemable that one cannot practice it without incurring social castigation. This requires substantial
vigilance, for ableist thinking pervades the culture. For example, as I write this, I am tempted to use
medical metaphors to explain the task and script something like "we cannot simply excise the tumor of
ableism and heal the culture, for it has metastasized and infiltrated every organ of society." Yet this
metaphor relies on an ableist perspective that motivates with the fear of death and turns to medical
solutions to repair a body in decay. Using it, I would endorse and perpetuate ableist rhetoric, just as I
would by using deafness as a metaphor for obstinacy ("Marie was deaf to their pleas for bread") or
blindness to convey ignorance ("George turned a blind eye to global warming"). The pervasiveness of
these and similar metaphors, like the cultural ubiquity of using images of disabled bodies to inspire pity,
suggest the scale of the work ahead, and the ease with which one can resort to using them warns of the
need for critical evaluation of one's own rhetoric. Yet the task can be accomplished. Just as feminists
have changed Western culture by naming and promoting recognition of sexism, the glass ceiling, and
patriarchy—admittedly a work in progress, yet also one that can celebrate remarkable achievements—
we can reform ableist culture by using rhetoric to craft awareness and political action.