Getting Serious about
Stakeholder Analysis
Piloting Political Science Methods in
World Bank Operational Work
Why Do We Need Stakeholder
Analysis?
Experience suggests many Banksupported reforms fail because of low
client commitment
Understanding the dynamics of
potential support and opposition for
different policy measures can help
reformers design programs that will
“work” politically
What If?
Gorbachev had developed a strategy to defuse
opposition to his program to transform political
and economic structures in the USSR?
Hillary Clinton had been able to manage
friends and foes in her efforts to push radical
reform on health care in the U.S.?
George Bush had analyzed stakeholder
positions before going to a vote in the UN
Security Council on the war in Iraq?
Could Stakeholder Analysis have changed
history…..???
Stakeholder Analysis
Background
Potential winners and losers of policy
reforms can actively influence reform
outcomes
To account for role of politics, Bank has
performed intuitive analyses of stakeholder
preferences
Need for more systematic political
stakeholder analysis
Pilot studies conducted by EASPR using the
Expected Utility Stakeholder Model
Stakeholder Analysis
Objectives of Pilot Study
1. Operationally useful analytic tool that
factors politics into Bank’s
understanding and design of
interventions
2. Insights to help Bank staff make
informed decisions about operational
priorities
3. Share modeling findings with country
clients (subject to comfort level of
country and regional management)
Stakeholder Analysis
East Asian Pilot Program
Pilot Program Analyzed Politics of High Profile
Governance Issues in 2 East Asian Client
(Low and Middle-Income) Countries
Country A (Low-income):
Anti-corruption (Broad reform initiative plus
customs and procurement reform)
Civil Service Pay and Employment Reform
Country B (middle-income):
Anti-corruption (Broad reform initiative plus
customs, procurement, and revenue
reforms)
Stakeholder Analysis
Operational Questions for the Bank
What was the likelihood of movement on
desired governance reforms?
Which reform areas should Bank
emphasize or de-emphasize in its
programs?
Which actors were pivotal in reform
process?
How should the Bank position itself in the
reform process and debate?
Stakeholder Analysis
What the Model Can Do
Identify stakeholder positions on policy
reform, weigh their potential influence
and assess the strength of their
commitment
Simulate round-by-round negotiations
to gauge whether proposed reforms are
feasible as designed
Determine possible strategic options for
optimizing reform levels using
knowledge about political dynamics
How the Model Works
Data Collection Process
Interviews with country experts
Explain context and relationships related to
reform issues
Define reform steps in order of difficulty
Describe stakeholders and place them
along this continuum according to their
preferences
Not opinions or predictions
Cross-checked for internal consistency and
comparability
How the Model Works
Data Components
Defined policy issue
Steps in the reform process
List of stakeholders with an interest in
the policy outcome and those with a veto
Each stakeholder’s initial bargaining
position
Relative power of each stakeholder on this
issue
Salience of issue to each stakeholder
How the Model Works
Simulation Bargaining Process
Stakeholders try to influence each other
to secure an outcome they see as
favorable
Model provides a round-by-round
simulation of prospective political
bargaining
Predicts how key stakeholders will shift
their positions
Assesses the level of consensus in
support of a particular outcome
How the Model Works
Determination of Expected Outcome
Objective assessment of likely outcome
for a reform issue
Extent of reform to be attained
Level of support for this outcome
Model can estimate effect of different
initial stakeholder positions on likelihood
of reform success and level of policy
consensus
Stakeholder influence = stakeholder resources * stakeholder salience
Extreme
stakeholder
position
Stakeholder
A position
Stakeholder C
position
Stakeholder B
position
Opposite
extreme
stakeholder
position
Round x: Stakeholder positions and influence are
analyzed to determine the winning outcome based on
each stakeholder’s expected utility.
Iteration
Model goes through risk propensity, stakeholder
perceptions, policy proposals, and stakeholder policy
shifts to simulate bargaining process.
Outcome forecast,
predicted timeframe
Negotiations stop if stakeholders see no
further gains from continuing discussions
Case Study – Country A
Macro Anti-corruption Agenda
Corruption a high profile issue
Prime Minister
Veto player
No reforms without PM approval
Adopting a cautious approach to reform
Government has outlined a broad anticorruption strategy a Basis for issue
definition
Country A – Anti-Corruption
Step One: Defining the Issue
Policy Steps of the Reform Process
220
Pass & Implement Asset Decl. Law
185
Implement Customs Reform
135
Passage of Customs Reform
100
Passage of Tax Reform
85
Passage of Freedom of Info/Press
50
Draft Anti-Corruption Legislation
30
Publish Fees for Basic Services
15
Media/Public Awareness Campaign
10
Implement Code of Ethics
0
No Reform
0
15
30
50
85
100
135
185
220
Publish fees for
basic services
Begin drafting anticorruption legislation
in National Assembly
Pass & Implement
Freedom of
Press/Information
Support Tax Reform
Support Customs
Reform
Support
Implementation
of Procurement
Law
Pass &
Implement Asset
Declaration Law
10
Begin Public & Media
awareness campaign
No Reform
Implement
Code of Ethics
Low
Influence Exerted
(Power * Salience)
High
Country A – Anti-Corruption
Step Two: Positions and Influence
WB
IMF
EU
Unions
Academics
PM
DominantParty(Anti-Reformists)
MinJustice
CustomsAdmin
JuniorCoalitionParty
Large Business
MinInteriorStaff
Small Business
PolicyThinkTank
Position Advocated
Country A – Anti-Corruption
Step Three: Bargaining Dynamics
Pass & Implement Asset
Declaration Law
WB, Donors & OppositionParty
Support Implementation of
Procurement Law
Support Customs Reform
NGOs
Support Tax Reform
Pass & Implement Freedom of
Press/Information
JuniorCoalitionParty, Business
MoE
Begin drafting anti-corruption
legislation in National
Assembly
Publish fees for basic
services
CoM
DomParty
Pro-reform
MoJ & DominantParty-Anti-Reform
Begin Public & Media awareness
campaign
PM & Judiciary
Military, AdminReformUnit
Implement Code of Ethics
1
2
3
Time
4
5
6
0
15
30
50
85
100
135
185
220
Publish fees for
basic services
Begin drafting anticorruption legislation
in National Assembly
Pass & Implement
Freedom of
Press/Information
Support Tax Reform
Support Customs
Reform
Support
Implementation
of Procurement
Law
Pass &
Implement Asset
Declaration Law
10
Begin Public & Media
awareness campaign
No Reform
Implement
Code of Ethics
Low
Influence Exerted
(Power * Salience)
High
Country A – Anti-Corruption
Step Four: Anticipated Outcome
Large Business
PolicyThinkTank
MinInteriorStaff
MinJustice
DominantParty(Anti-Reformists)
WB
IMF
EU
Unions
Academics
PM
Position Advocated
Domestic
support for
reform is too
limited to
expect
substantive
progress on the
overall agenda.
Small Business
Country A – Anti-Corruption
Step Five: Potential for Further Reform
Re-analyzed using various donor
starting positions above and below
current positions
Results suggest that changes to current
Bank policy would be unproductive
Can get PM to agree to higher reform,
but not without lowering domestic
reform consensus
Case Study – Country A
Customs Reform
High priority for reform
Pervasive corruption
Low capacity
Government has initiated customs reform,
including draft customs code
Prime Minister desires a slow and steady
approach – favors quiet consultations with
key stakeholders
Country A – Customs
Step One: Defining the Issue
Policy Steps of the Reform Process
160
Implement Modern Customs Authority
120
Streamline Customs Administration
70
Strengthen Anti-Smuggling Task Force
60
New Customs Code to Parliament
25
New Customs Code to Council of Ministers
5
Upgrade Computers & Telephones
0
No Reform
0
5
25
60
70
Position Advocated
120
Organization
restructuring & HR
development
Teachers
Students
MinJustice
Judiciary
Begin streamlining
customs
administration
Low
PM
Military
MinEconomics
CouncilMinisters
LargeBusiness
Strengthen antismuggling task force
& budget
Submit new Customs
code to National
Assembly for passage
Submit new Customs
code to
CoM for review
Upgrade computer and
communications
infrastructure
No Reform
Influence Exerted
(Power * Salience)
High
Country A – Customs
Step Two: Positions and Influence
WB
RegDevBank
IMF
UN
Unions
Media
CivilServAdmin
NGOs
160
Country A – Customs
Step Three: Bargaining Dynamics
Organization restructuring & HR
development
OppositionParty
WB & Donors
Customs
Staff
Begin streamlining customs
adminstration
DominantParty - ProReform
NGOs
PM, MEF,
Business,
MoC,
Military,
CoM &
AdminRfm
Strengthen anti-smuggling task
force & budget
Submit new Customs code to
National Assembly for passage
JuniorCoalitionParty, MoE,
Judiciary & MoJ
DominantParty – AntiReform
Submit new Customs code to CoM'
for review
Petrol
Upgrade computer and
communications infrastructure
Customs Administrators &
Tobacco
Round 1
Round 2
Round 3
Round 4
Round 5
Time
Round 6
Round 7
Round 8
Country A – Customs
High
Step Four: Anticipated Outcome
Influence Exerted
(Power * Salience)
PM
CouncilMinisters
MinJustice
Judiciary
LargeBusiness
Teachers
Students
CivilServAdmin
NGOs
Pro-reform
stakeholders
pressure PM to
move agenda
forward. New
customs code
and
strengthened
anti-smuggling
measures
likely.
WB
RegDevBank
IMF
UN
Unions
Media
Position Advocated
120
160
Organization
restructuring & HR
development
70
Begin streamlining
customs
administration
60
Strengthen antismuggling task force
& budget
25
Submit new Customs
code to National
Assembly for passage
5
Upgrade computer and
communications
infrastructure
No Reform
0
Submit new Customs
code to
CoM for review
Low
Military
MinEconomics
Country A – Customs
Step Five: Potential for Further Reform
Re-analyzed using various donor starting
positions above and below current
positions
Results suggest that changes to current
Bank policy would be unproductive
Can make small gains in policy outcome
by pushing for most comprehensive
reform target (modern customs authority)
But only at the cost of societal consensus
Case Study – Country A
Summary
Despite comprehensive anti-corruption
agenda, little domestic support for more
than cosmetic reform
More potential for progress in specific,
targeted interventions (i.e. customs
reform)
Resources not best spent on general
anti-corruption initiatives
Benefits of the Model (1)
Why We Liked It
Wide applicability
Has been used to analyze a diverse set of
negotiated issues from business to
economics to politics
Can be applied to broad range of Bank
issues – not just governance
Track Record of Accuracy
More accurate than traditional methods
using expert opinion (approximately 90%
in real-time prediction of thousands of
cases since 1981)
Benefits of the Model (2)
Tighter Approach than Existing Methods
Structured format for data collection
Offers more systematic results than expert
opinions or predictions
Facilitates clear definition of the issues and
the scale of potential outcomes
Provides consistent format to summarize
experts’ views of current power structure
Allows quantification of estimates, enabling
scientific analysis and comparison across
experts
Benefits of the Model (3)
Analysis is Nuanced –Permits Small
Calibrations in Bank Policy
Dynamic analysis – Can estimate how
bargaining behavior will play out over time
Predicts the types of coalitions that may form
in support of different levels of policy reform
(e.g. not just thumbs-up or down on firstbest solutions; can help steer support to
small but significant steps along the way)
Allows dual analysis of a macro issue along
with its component policy parts for better
reform targeting (e.g. broad anti-corruption
or specific procurement measures)
Limitations of the Model (1)
What We Didn’t Like
Garbage in, garbage out a Quality of
data collection is critical
Shortage of qualified experts on some
issues
Need for in-depth country knowledge
greater than expected
Access to country-based informants
awkward; extensive interviews required
with busy people
Limitations of the Model
What We Didn’t Like
Ability to forecast has not yet been
tested for Bank-related policy issues
Operational utility depends on close
alignment with country program tasks
No in-house capacity to run the model
Works best on narrowly focused issue;
commonly confronted Bank problems
often multivariate, complex
Internal Challenges to
Mainstreaming this Approach
Fear of leaks – Worry that explicit material will get
out in country or international press
Questions of access within the Bank: How closely
held should results be and at what hierarchical level?
Lack of comfort, familiarity with methods, jargon
from political science
Uncertainty about what to do with findings
Funding political stakeholder analysis is low priority
when competing with traditional Bank tasks
Questions about how to fit stakeholder analysis into
Bank knowledge and operational cycle (CAS, projects,
AAA, one-off initiative)
Seriously Getting Serious
Next Steps
Establish framework within country and
regional operations for ongoing application of
these techniques)
Embed this tool in broader field-based,
political analysis approaches
Pilot studies on additional countries/issues
Develop in-house modeling capacity
Assess further experience, including accuracy
of forecasts and recommendations