Major Peebles
2.1543 In my opinion, Peebles’ visits to the TDF
on Sunday and Monday must have caused him
to realise that the Detainees were being
mistreated, not only by the guards but also by
the very fact of being kept hooded and in stress
positions. To let these processes continue for
such a long time as 36 hours was, in my view,
wholly unjustified and unacceptable.
Vol I, page 371
Lt Craig Rodgers (retired)
2.1472 The fact that Rodgers at no stage
remonstrated with or controlled his Multiple or
reported what he must have known was going
on to a superior officer is, in my opinion, a very
serious breach of duty which had very serious
consequences. It was a failure to demonstrate
the moral courage required of any officer of
whatever age or rank. If he had taken action
when first he knew what was going on, Baha
Mousa would almost certainly not have died.
Vol I, page 358
Col Mendonca (retired)
2.1644 If Mendonça had appreciated that there was such
a risk, as in my opinion he ought to have, he should have
either banned the use of stress positions and hooding as
well, or himself raised the matter formally with Brigade.
Mendonça’s failure in this regard was a very significant
one. As the Commanding Officer, he had a nondelegable responsibility to ensure that detainees were
treated humanely. In permitting the process of
conditioning of detainees he failed to appreciate that the
use of hoods and stress positions to gain intelligence
was totally unacceptable.
Vol I, page 391
Lack of discipline and moral
courage
2.1330 It hardly needs saying that the events I have
described raise very serious concerns about discipline
within 1 QLR. The assaults were not perpetrated by just
one or two rogue individuals. I have found that at least
nineteen different men were involved in assaulting the
Detainees. They did so in the middle of the Battlegroup’s
main camp, in a building with no doors, apparently with
little regard for the consequences of being caught. At
least three senior NCOs were personally involved in the
assaults. And I have found that several officers must
have been aware of at least some of the abuse. There
was undoubtedly a severe breakdown in military
discipline on this particular occasion.
Father Peter Madden
2.844 I find it inconceivable that when Madden
went into the TDF he could not have observed
what others had seen and described, namely
the appallingly squalid conditions in the TDF
and the obvious distress of the Detainees.
Having reached this conclusion, it is inevitable
that Madden, in my opinion, ought either to
have intervened there and then or, more
realistically, straight away reported it up the
chain of command. It is a matter of regret that
he did not find the courage to do either.
Vol I, page 231
Dr Derek Keilloh
MOD Training
16.356 …. the MoD would do well to
reflect and act upon the shortcomings that
have permitted ongoing training in breach
of the prohibition on the five techniques to
continue up until September 2010, seven
years after Baha Mousa’s death.
Vol III, page 1248
Harshing
16.191 …. the MoD has previously
permitted the harsh approach to include
practices which are entirely unacceptable
and should never have been taught.
Vol III, page1201
Tactical Questioning Practices
16.157 ….. I have significant concerns that
hitherto there has been a systemic failure
to scrutinise practices relating to tactical
questioning and interrogation with
sufficient vigour.
Vol III, page 1194
Systemic Failure
318. I attribute the main fault for the inclusion of
inappropriate training and/or exclusion of appropriate
material to a systemic failure over a number of years.
Vol III, page 1334
293. This position had developed over decades and was
the product not only of failings but also of missed
opportunities. In those circumstances, although I make
comments about the role played by some individuals at
certain times, it is fair and appropriate to conclude that
the position outlined above was as a result of a
corporate failure by the MoD.
Vol III, page 1330
Interrogation Policy
7.221….To this extent, in my opinion, the
MoD did not have a grasp on, or adequate
understanding of, its own interrogation
policy.
Vol II, page 698
Why it mattered
7.223….the absence of a clear statement in the
Directive that conditioning and the five
techniques were prohibited in prisoner handling
and tactical questioning operations may have
contributed to the failure to prevent such
conduct. Had there been such a clear statement
disseminated to all units it may have prevented
at least some of what happened in the TDF.
Vol II, page 698
MOD Defensiveness
15.177 Against this background, it would have
been better had the MoD faced more squarely
and more openly the mistakes and shortcomings
that had already been identified in relation to
hooding and tactical questioning. Many of the
difficulties stemmed from what I detect was at
times something of a corporate approach of
taking overly defensive lines in response to
difficult questions.
Vol III, page 1153
Inaccurate MOD statements
15.173 …. I find that there was an
unsatisfactory pattern of too many
inaccurate assurances and explanations
being given within the MoD statements
and briefing materials.
Vol III, page 1152