Working Paper
By
Peter W. Connors, PhD
8165906821
COLLAPSE OF THE TALIBAN IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN
Few had anticipated the rapid collapse of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan.
Master Sergeant John Bolduc, leader of Operational Detachment Alpha 585—one of
several US Army Special Forces’ elite A-teams—had expected the worst. The day before
the team infiltrated Afghanistan near the village of Dasht-e-Qaleh, he informed his men
that they might not survive and advised them to fight to the death rather than surrender or
be taken prisoner.1 Yet, in just over six weeks, Bolduc and approximately 100 additional
special operations Soldiers assisted the Northern Alliance in both decisively defeating
Taliban military forces and in liberating all six provinces of northern Afghanistan.
How did this happen? What factors contributed? This chapter will examine the
unique set of circumstances that ultimately shaped events in the North, beginning with
President Bush’s call-to-arms and General Tommy Franks’ plan to employ multiple lines
of operations. The discussion will then describe the mobilization of US forces; the
opening days of the OEF bombing campaign; the infiltration of CIA and SOF teams; the
overwhelming dominance of US air power; the battles for Mazar-e Sharif, Taloqan, and
Konduz; and the insurrection at Qala-i Jangi prison. Additionally, concurrent logistics,
civil/military, and humanitarian relief operations will be discussed in detail. Finally, the
1
implications of such a surprising victory over the Taliban in northern Afghanistan will be
reviewed and analyzed.
On 12 September 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the
development of realistic military options in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As
chapter 3 has already established, nine days later, General Tommy R. Franks, then
Commander in Chief, US Central Command (CENTCOM) submitted a plan to President
Bush calling for the destruction of al-Qaeda and the illegitimate Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. Subsequently, Secretary Rumsfeld approved a mission analysis/military
course of action and presented the plan to the President, who then directed that combat
operations commence on 7 October.
General Franks proposed the simultaneous application of multiple lines of
operation that included obtaining basing, staging, and over-flight rights; setting the
conditions for executing and supporting sustained combat; directly attacking al-Qaeda
and Taliban leadership; destroying the Taliban military and denying them safe-haven;
directing operational fires using SOF; maintaining the capability of using conventional
forces if necessary; and keeping the Afghan people informed. Adhering to these lines of
operation allowed a small contingent of US combat forces to seize the initiative and
defeat the Taliban, while avoiding the appearance of an outright invasion. 2 On 22
December, just 78 days after combat operations began, General Franks and his wife,
Cathy, attended inauguration ceremonies for President Hamid Karzai and the new Afghan
interim government in Kabul.
Composition of the Taliban – Summer 2001
2
The term Taliban is typically used in reference to all enemy forces operating in
Afghanistan. By the summer of 2001, three principal Taliban sub-groups, with
approximately 45,000 total combatants, had emerged: indigenous Afghan Taliban, nonAfghan Taliban, and al-Qaeda (those forces trained by and associated with Osama bin
Laden). 3 The non-Afghan component was comprised predominantly of Arabs,
Pakistanis, Uzbeks, Chechens, and Central Asians.
Having formed in the chaotic aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, the Taliban, led
since the mid-1990s by ethnic Pashtun Mullah Mohammed Omar, was a militant group
intent on establishing an Islamist government in Afghanistan and on driving foreign
influence from the country. Affiliation with al-Qaeda in 1996 signaled the Taliban’s
expanded intentions of spreading global Islamist extremism beyond Afghanistan.4 By
2001, the Taliban controlled an estimated 80 percent of Afghanistan.5
Funding for Taliban activities in Afghanistan came primarily from Pakistan;
however, sympathetic worldwide Muslim organizations also contributed. Logistics
support for Taliban operations originated almost entirely in Pakistan as well. Taliban
forces were generally armed with Kalashnikov (AK-47) assault rifles, 7.62mm PK
general-purpose machine guns, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, rocket and grenade
launchers, mortars, makeshift armed vehicles (pickup truck cavalry), and a limited
number of Soviet-era tanks and artillery pieces.6 Stephen Biddle, a scholar at the US
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, summarized the overall condition of
Taliban fighting forces prior to the US intervention by describing them as inexperienced
with low morale, poorly trained and unmotivated, lacking Afghan support, susceptible to
3
high levels of defections, vulnerable to surprise attacks, and overly dependent on fragile
outside sources of support.7
Insight into the Northern Alliance
The anti-Taliban Northern United Front espoused a less severe form of Islam than
did the Taliban, and was led during the summer of 2001 by ousted President Borhanuddin
Rabbani and his military commander, Ahmad Shah Masoud. Since its forces eventually
gained control of several Northern Afghan provinces, the UF has been referred to as the
Northern Alliance (NA) from 2001 onward.8
In 1992, mujahideen fighters loyal to Rabbani seized control of Kabul from the
regime that had been previously supported by the Soviets. These forces coalesced into
the organization that officially became the Northern United Front/Northern Alliance. The
NA was unable to unite the country, and subsequently lost control to the Taliban in
1996.9 As of 2001, the Alliance controlled only the Panjshir Valley, the Shomali plain
north of Kabul, and several small enclaves in the mountains of northern Afghanistan.10
Tragically, General Masoud was killed on 9 September 2001 in Takhar province
by two al-Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists. Shortly after his death, dire
predictions arose regarding the possible disintegration of the Northern Alliance. Masoud,
known as the “Lion of Panjshir,” had distinguished himself resisting the Soviet invasion,
and was appointed Afghan Defense Minister after the 1992 recapture of Kabul. He was
considered an exceptional military strategist and successfully built key, enduring
coalitions among disparate anti-Taliban guerilla groups that effectively strengthened the
Northern Alliance.11
4
After General Masoud’s death, four primary components emerged within the
Alliance. The largest contingent was made up of ethnic Tajik forces, commanded by
General Mohammed Fahim Khan. Fahim, former head of intelligence for the NA, was
promoted to senior military commander immediately following General Masoud’s
demise. In Ghor and Herat provinces, General Mohammed Ismael Khan took charge of
additional ethnic Tajik NA forces. Known as the “Lion of Herat,” Ismael had been a
mujahideen commander during the Soviet invasion and was previously governor of Herat
province. Ustad Atta Mohammed was another NA Tajik general allied with Fahim in
northern Afghanistan. Ethnic Uzbeks, under General Abdul Rashid Dostum, formed a
third element of the Alliance. In the 1980s, General Dostum’s militia controlled six
provinces in northern Afghanistan. His stronghold had been the city of Mazar-e-Sharif,
which he captured from the Taliban, only to lose it in 1999. The final faction of the NA
was the Hizb-i-Wahdat (Unity Party), comprised of ethnic Hazara Shi’a fighters and led
by Karim Khalili. This group had been driven out of central Afghanistan in 1998 by the
Taliban, yet managed to retain several locations throughout the region.12
During the summer of 2001 prior to the US intervention in Afghanistan, the NA
was short on manpower, inadequately trained, and poorly equipped. It was capable only
of maintaining stalemate conditions with the Taliban. Although troop strength estimates
varied at the time, it was likely that the NA could muster only about 18,000 combat
forces to support upcoming US operations.13 Northern Alliance armaments included AK47 rifles; PK machine guns; ZGU-1 heavy machine guns; single and multi-barrel rocket
launchers; and a limited number of artillery pieces, tanks, and other armored vehicles.
Also, the NA retrofitted light trucks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles with 32-shot
5
57mm rocket pods recovered from Russian Mi-24 and Mi-25 combat helicopters. In
addition, the Alliance was thought to have had at the time eight Mi-17 and six Mi-8
helicopters, along with four Soviet-built helicopter gunships. Logistics support for the
Northern Alliance was difficult at best. Supply routes to Tajikistan were long, arduous,
and susceptible to Taliban interdiction. Food and other perishable supplies were often
purchased on the local market.14
The Beginning of OEF: The US Central Intelligence Agency in Afghanistan
In a televised address on 20 September 2001 to a joint session of Congress and
the American people, President Bush described the 9/11terrorist attacks as “an act of war
against our country.” 15 To thunderous applause, he went on to say that the US response
“will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and
defeated,” and that such a response might include dramatic strikes and “covert operations,
secret even in success.”16 Bush then issued a presidential finding authorizing the CIA to
kill or capture terrorist leaders including Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda
members.17
The CIA already had extensive experience in Afghanistan, having provided covert
support to the mujahideen rebels during the Soviet occupation. Since 1999, CIA
paramilitary units had been operating secretly in Afghanistan and had established
important contacts with Northern Alliance leaders prior to 9/11. The agency also had two
Afghan war plans prepared, one titled “Going to War” and the other “Worldwide Attack
Matrix.” On 13 September, Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet and J. Cofer
Black, Director of the CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC), briefed these plans to
6
President Bush. Two days later, Tenet and Black made the same presentation at a Camp
David war cabinet meeting attended by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld; Assistant
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Army General Hugh
Shelton; and JCS Chairman Select, Air Force General Richard Myers. After this
meeting, the president authorized the CIA to proceed with their plans and gave the
agency all the necessary resources, approvals, and legal authority to do so. The CIA
would be the first “boots on the ground” and would lead the way for the military.18
Less than a week after the President’s congressional address, a team of ten CIA
officers (code named JAWBREAKER and commanded by the CTC) left Dushanbe,
Tajikistan in a Russian-built Mi-17 helicopter, entered Afghan airspace, crossed the
Hindu Kush Mountains through the 14,500 foot-high Anjuman Pass, and landed deep in
the Panjshir Valley near the village of Barak. JAWBREAKER was the first US unit of
any kind to enter Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. They
brought three million dollars in cash with them, and would eventually receive $10 million
more, all to be used in garnering support from the Northern Alliance. Their mission was
to link up with the Northern Alliance and convince them to assist the CIA and the US
military in hunting down bin Laden and al-Qaeda. They were also tasked with assessing
the military readiness of the NA, recommending methods for improving NA capabilities,
developing preliminary intelligence data, preparing initial target designation information,
and laying the groundwork for the arrival of US SOF. Typically, a Northern Afghanistan
Liaison Team from the CIA Special Activities Division would have been assigned a
mission such as this; however, Director Tenet selected Cofer Black to assemble the new
team and to direct agency activities in Afghanistan.19
7
US Forces on the Move
On 14 September 2001, Congress authorized the use of military force against the
terrorist groups responsible for the 9/11 attacks.20 Also, President Bush authorized the
activation of 35,500 military reservists (approximately 10,000 of these were Army
Soldiers).21 In addition, the following US active duty military units were ordered to
deploy over the next few weeks:22
552nd Air Control Wing, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma
22nd Air Refueling Wing, McConnell AFB, Kansas
2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale, Louisiana (B-52)
5th Bomb Wing, Minot AFB, North Dakota (B-52)
28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth, South Dakota (B-1)
1st Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Virginia (F-15)
20th Fighter Wing, Shaw AFB, South Carolina (F-16)
27th Fighter Wing, Cannon AFB, New Mexico ((F-16)
388th Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, Utah (F-16)
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Camp Pendleton, California
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Camp LeJeune, North Carolina
26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Camp LeJeune, North Carolina
10th Mountain Division, US Army, Fort Drum, New York
355th Wing, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona (A-10)
366th Fighter Wing, Mountain Home, Idaho (F-15, F-16)
US Army Special Operations Units, Fort Campbell, Kentucky
USS Bataan Amphibious Assault Group, Norfolk, Virginia
USS Carl Vinson Carrier Battle Group, Bremerton, Washington (F-14, F-18)
USS Enterprise Carrier Battle Group, Norfolk, Virginia (F-14, F-18)
USS Kearsage Amphibious Assault Group, Norfolk, Virginia
USS Kitty Hawk Carrier Battle Group, Yokosuka, Japan (F-18)
USS Peleliu Amphibious Assault Group, San Diego
USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Battle Group, Norfolk, Virginia (F-14, F-18)
The USS Enterprise and USS Carl Vinson Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups were
already on station in the Arabian Sea. Attached to the Enterprise Group were two
submarines, two cruisers, and five destroyers with a combined capacity to launch
approximately 500 conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Carl Vinson was
accompanied by two submarines, two cruisers, two destroyers (400 Tomahawk missiles), an
amphibious assault ship and a dock landing ship, along with the USS Peleliu Amphibious
8
Ready Group (ARG). On the Peleliu was the special operations capable 15th Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU), plus AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft, and AH-1W (Super Cobra),
CH-46, CH-53, and UH-1N helicopters. On 19 September, the USS Theodore Roosevelt
Battle Group (configured similarly to the Vinson Group) and the USS Bataan Amphibious
Ready Group with the 26th MEU on board left Norfolk for the Arabian Sea. Finally, on 30
September, the USS Kitty Hawk Battle Group departed Yokosuka, Japan for OEF duty.
Onboard, however, in addition to F-14 and F-18 Navy aircraft, were Army MH-60
Blackhawk and MH-47 Chinook helicopters and USAF MH-53 Pave Low helicopters, along
with nearly 1,000 special operations personnel from the US Army Special Operations
Command, the Naval Special Warfare Command, the Air Force Special Operations
Command, and the Joint Special Operations Command.23
By the end of September, USAF long-range precision strike aircraft were ready for
combat missions and many had been repositioned to forward operating bases such as Diego
Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean. These aircraft included the B-2A Spirit stealth bomber
based at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. With several in-flight refuelings, the B-2A
was capable of flying round trip, non-stop, from Whiteman to Afghanistan and back, and
could deliver thousand-pound GBU-31 and GBU-32 joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs),
as well as GBU-36 and GBU-37 (deep penetrating) precision guided bombs on each mission.
B-1B Lancer supersonic bombers, based at Diego Garcia and in Oman, were also capable of
carrying JDAM precision guided munitions, plus CBU 87/89/97 cluster bombs and Mk 82
500-pound iron bombs. Numerous B-52 Stratofortresses, also forward-deployed to Diego
Garcia, had been modified to carry AGM-86C air-launched cruise missiles (CALCM), along
with JDAMs and cluster bombs. Also, a large number of additional USAF aircraft (e.g. F15s, F-16s, and KC-135 air-to-air refueling tankers) had been flown to the Middle East,
Turkey, and Pakistan in preparation for OEF.24
9
In late September 2001, the United States secured basing rights from the Republic of
Uzbekistan to use the former Soviet airbase at Karshi Kandabad (K2) about 100 miles
north of the Afghan border. By early October, nearly 2,000 US military personnel were
operating at K2. Among them were lead elements of Joint Special Operation Task ForceNorth (JSOTF-N / TF Dagger); members of the 160th Special Operations Aviation
Regiment (SOAR / “Night Stalkers”); Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC)
personnel, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division Soldiers to serve as a
quick reaction force and provide base security; along with numerous support forces
(logistics, signal, civil affairs, PSYOPs, etc.). The 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) from
Fort Campbell, Kentucky formed the core of JSOTF-N. This group had previously been
assigned to the CENTCOM area of responsibility, and its Soldiers were language
qualified, culturally trained, and regionally oriented for the OEF mission.25 On 19-20
October, ODA 555 and ODA 595 from the 5th SFG would become the first US military
units to infiltrate Afghanistan.
The 160th SOAR provides aviation support for special operations forces. The
Regimental mission statement asserts that the 160th will “organize, equip, train, resource,
and employ Army special operations aviation forces worldwide in support of contingency
missions and the warfighting commanders.” 26 Night Stalker missions are flown under
the cover of darkness whenever possible; the pilots are equipped with aviator night vision
goggles and forward-looking infrared devices. Nearly 2,000 officers, men, and women
serve in the 160th, which is comprised of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company,
three Aviation Battalions, and a Special Operations Training Company. The 1st Battalion
has a Light Assault Company (MH-6 helicopters), a Light Attack Company (AH-6s), and
two Assault Companies (MH-60K Blackhawks and MH-60L integrated direct action
10
penetrator helicopters). Second Battalion, with three Heavy Assault Companies, flies
MH-47E Chinooks, while 3rd Battalion has two Assault Companies (MH-60Ls) and one
Heavy Assault Company (MH-47Ds).27
The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is the USAF component
of the USSOC. AFSOC forces “conduct infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, refueling, and
precision firepower missions” in support of SOF operations worldwide.28 Airborne
broadcasting; advising foreign governments; and providing combat controllers,
weathermen, and para-rescuemen are among AFSOC’s unique capabilities. Additional
mission-oriented tasks include shaping the battlefield, information operations, precision
engagement, SOF mobility, combat support, and aerospace interface. The most
formidable aircraft in the AFSOC arsenal is the AC-130 Gunship. These aircraft are
armed with side-firing weapons systems coupled with highly sophisticated sensors and
can provide either “surgical firepower” or “area saturation” in support of SOF ground
forces. The AC-130H (call sign Spectre) and the AC-130U (call sign Spooky) are armed
with L60 40mm Bofors cannons and M102 105mm Howitzer cannons. “U” models also
now have 25mm GAU-12 Gatling guns. Other AFSOC aircraft include the EC-130J
Commando Solo (airborne broadcasting), HC-130P/N (search and rescue), MC-130E/H
Combat Talon (infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, psyops, helicopter air refueling), MC130P Combat Shadow (clandestine, low visibility, helicopter air refueling), MH-53J/M
Pave Low helicopters (low-level, long-range penetration), U-28A (utility aircraft
support), and the MQ-1 Predator (armed, remote-piloted aircraft). There are nearly
13,000 active-duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian personnel in the
Air Force Special Operations Command.29
11
Additional strategic airborne assets, including the RQ-4 Global Hawk highaltitude unmanned aerial vehicle (Brave Axe), U-2 (Dragon Lady) High Altitude
Reconnaissance aircraft, E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)
aircraft, EC-130 Compass Call, E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system
(AWACS), and RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft were also deployed to the war
zone. Also, two supplementary task forces were established. Task Force Sword,
comprised of Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D/Delta Force),
would concentrate on capturing/killing Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders,
while Task Force Bowie would gather human intelligence data in support of the OEF
mission.30
Finally, international participation in OEF was limited initially to Great
Britain, Canada, Australia, and Turkey. Britain, for example, deployed units from the
Special Air Service Regiment (SAS), an Air Mobile Brigade, a Parachute Regiment, and
the Royal Marines.31 British aircraft including Nimrods (air-sea rescue), Canberras
(reconnaissance), E3-D Sentries (airborne early warning), VC-10s tankers, and Tristar
transports; three Tomahawk cruise missile-equipped nuclear powered submarines were
also dispatched to the theater.32 Eventually, 27 coalition countries would send more than
14,000 troops to Afghanistan in support of the United States and OEF.33
The Air Campaign Begins
Having been in Afghanistan for more than a week, the JAWBREAKER team was
anxious for the US bombing campaign to begin. The team had already completed a series
of GPS surveys of Northern Alliance frontline positions as well as those of the opposing
Taliban. This had been done in an effort to prevent possible collateral damage to NA
forces. Gary Schroen, JAWBREAKER’s team leader, was convinced that:
12
Taliban frontline positions offered a clearly defined, target-rich environment
made to order for US airpower to strike, and that a concentrated bombing
campaign on the Taliban lines would be devastating to their morale and
effectiveness. Taliban troops had never suffered the kind of bombardment and
punishment they would face from American airpower in the coming fight. Heavy
casualties, continuing for days on end, would break the Taliban.”34
Northern Alliance General Ismail Kahn concurred, stating, “If their [Taliban]
front lines are heavily damaged, my forces can complete their destruction.”35 He too,
along with all of the NA leadership, was anxiously awaiting the promised US air strikes.
At 9:10 PM on 7 October 2001, cheers and celebration erupted at the CIA camp in the
Panjshir Valley. Explosions could be seen off in the direction of Kabul; the long-awaited
bombing campaign had begun.
Delays resulted from a number of issues involving primarily combat search and
rescue capabilities, proper target designation, a shortage of approved targets, and a heavy
emphasis on collateral damage avoidance. All potential targets were scrutinized in
painstaking detail. In fact, military attorneys in the Pentagon, at the Combined Air
Operations Center (CAOC), at CENTCOM, and onboard Navy aircraft carriers routinely
assessed potential target lists and approved raids and air strikes.36 Frustrated with the
situation, General Franks stepped in and put a stop to at least some of the
micromanagement from the Pentagon by declaring to JCS Chairman, General Richard B.
Myers “that I am not going along with Washington giving tactics and targets to our kids
in the cockpits and on the ground in Afghanistan.”37
The campaign was directed by US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF)
Commander and Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) for OEF, Lieutenant
General Charles Wald, from the newly established Combined Air Operations Center
13
(CAOC) at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Wald’s mission statement was clear:
“On order, Combined Forces Air Component Command provides air support for friendly
forces working with the Northern Alliance and other opposition forces in order to defeat
hostile Taliban and al-Qaeda forces and to set the conditions for regime removal and
long-term regional stability.”38
In a televised address to the nation on 8 October, President Bush announced that
“On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes.”39 Although effective, the
first night of bombing was far from overwhelming. Only 31 preplanned strategic targets
in the vicinities of Kabul, Kandahar, Shindand, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Shibarghan
were hit. No frontline Taliban positions were struck. The opening-round attacks were
conducted by Air Force B-2 stealth bombers from Whiteman AFB, Missouri; B-1B and
B-52 bombers from Diego Garcia; and by Navy F-14 and F/A-18 fighters from aircraft
carriers in the Arabian Sea. Also, US Navy cruisers, destroyers, and submarines (along
with two British submarines) launched Tomahawk missiles in support of the initial
offensive.
Later that first night, C-17 Globemasters from Ramstein Air Base in Germany
began dropping food and medical supplies to Afghan refugees who were fleeing the
cities. A US Agency for International Development (USAID) Disaster Assistance
Response Team (DART) had been working (since the previous summer) with refugees
who were forced to leave their homes due to devastating drought conditions. An official
humanitarian crisis already existed in Afghanistan prior to the beginning of OEF. Years
of war, unproductive agriculture, and failure of the government to provide basic services
had left a majority of Afghanistan’s 26 million citizens impoverished.40 During the first
14
four nights of the air campaign, C-17s airdropped nearly 150,000 humanitarian daily
rations (HDRs) to these needy Afghans.41 Two and one-half million HDRs would be
dropped in Afghanistan before the end of the year, and by April 2002, the World Food
Program and the USAID had distributed 343,000 metric tons of food throughout the
country.42
Surprisingly, the propaganda war had started two days before the initial OEF air
strikes. On 5 October, EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft, from the 193rd Special
Operations Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, began broadcasting radio
transmissions over Afghanistan. A Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF),
activated on 4 October at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, developed a variety (different
themes, objectives, and target audiences) of Commando Solo radio scripts such as this
one aimed at the Afghan people: “On September 11, 2001, thousands of people were
killed en masse in the United States…policemen, firefighters, teachers, doctors, mothers,
fathers, sisters, brothers all killed. Why?”43 The overall messages were designed to
encourage the Taliban to cease support of al-Qaeda, to undermine Taliban/al-Qaeda
morale, to promote the legitimacy of US operations, and to convince Afghan citizens that
they were not the target of US attacks.44 Eventually, Commando Solo aircrews would
accumulate nearly 4,000 flight hours in support of OEF.
JPOTF also developed and printed hundreds of thousands of leaflets that were
shipped to Diego Garcia and initially disseminated by B-52 bombers over Afghanistan
beginning 15 October. Up to 80,000 leaflets could be packaged in a single MK-129 or
modified Rockeye leaflet bomb.45 In due course, F-16, F-18, A-6, and MC-130 aircraft
would also perform high altitude leaflet drops in the AOR. One such leaflet, written in
15
both Pashto and Dari, described US intentions in Afghanistan as honorable, and pictured
an Afghan man and an American Soldier shaking hands. Another portrayed radio towers
and gave the frequencies for receiving Commando Solo broadcasts. Thousand of
transistor radios (many tuned to the now destroyed former Taliban station frequency)
were also airdropped, allowing more Afghans to listen to Commando Solo messages.
Other leaflets explained how to properly use the daily rations and warned Afghans to stay
clear of unexploded ordnance.46
Meanwhile, the goal of the initial wave of attacks was to gain uncontested control
of Afghan airspace and to destroy Taliban air defense capabilities. To this end, US
planners placed Scud missile launchers; surface-to-air (SAM) missile sites; early warning
radars; and Taliban command-control-communications facilities, airfields, and aircraft on
the primary target list. Also hit were Taliban tanks and artillery, the headquarters of two
divisions, and the former bin Laden training camp south of Jalalabad. Thirty-five
additional targets were attacked on the second day, and by the third day, strikes were
conducted during daylight hours. On the fifth day, Air Force aircraft dropped 5,000
pound GBU-28 laser-guided bunker buster bombs on Taliban mountain cave sanctuaries
for the first time. AC-130 gunships with their own combat controllers (special operations
forces had as yet been unable to enter Afghanistan) and F-15E Strike Eagles from Jaber
Air Base in Kuwait (the first use of land base fighters) entered the fray during the second
week and began attacking Taliban troop concentrations and vehicles. During the second
week of OEF, the target list expanded, signifying a shift in emphasis from preplanned to
pop-up (emerging) targets, also called “targets of opportunity.”47
Special Operations Forces Infiltrate
16
Extensive inclement weather, treacherous terrain, and Taliban anti-aircraft fire
had delayed the helicopter insertion of Special Forces A-Teams. Since the beginning of
the air campaign, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had been pushing for a SOF
presence in Afghanistan. “When are the Special Forces people going to get in?” he asked
every day.48 Rumsfeld had championed using SOF, and at a news conference, he
commented on the limitations of aircraft (and the bombing), stating “there are certain
things they (aircraft) can’t do – they can’t crawl around on the ground and find people.”49
On the evening of 19-20 October, however, the first of several SF elements
infiltrated Afghanistan. The 11-member ODA-555 arrived late in the evening from K2 at
the Astaneh JAWBREAKER camp in the Panjshir Valley on board MH-53 Pave Low
helicopters. Within a few days, ODA-555 would link up with NA General Bismullah
near Baghram. That same night, ODA-595 (12 men) infiltrated the Darya-e Suf Valley
on MH-47 Chinooks to join General Dostum’s forces some 70 miles south of Mazar-e
Sharif. Not long after, two additional SF members joined 595 and the detachment split
into four three-man teams. On the 24 October, ODA 585 landed near Dasht-e-Qaleh then
moved south to join General Bariullah Khan’s NA forces near Konduz. October 31st saw
the insertion of ODA 553 into Bamian to support Hazara Commander Khalili. Next an
eight-man command-and-control element, Operational Detachment Charlie (ODC-53),
was inserted to assist General Dostum and his staff on 3 November. On 4 November,
ODA-534 landed 24 miles west of Darya-e Suf at Darya-e Balkh to support Northern
Alliance General Mohammed Atta. This detachment soon split into two six-man teams;
one remained with Atta’s command group, while the other moved ahead to accompany
forward NA elements. Finally, ODAs 586 and 594 were flown to a remote landing zone
17
near the Tajikistan border on 8 November. From there, 586 flew south onboard an NA
Russian-built helicopter to link up with General Daoud near Farkhar. Detachment 594
moved farther south to the Panjshir Valley.50
The 5th Special Forces Group A-Teams had been kept in isolation facilities
(ISOFAC—no family, no phones, guarded location) at Fort Campbell prior to leaving for
K2. Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, Commanding General of the United States
Army Special Forces, met with the teams at the ISOFAC to explain their mission:51
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Infiltrate the operational area
Link up and build rapport with the Northern Alliance
Kill the enemy with precision weapons or sniper rifles
Equip the NA forces
Recruit and build the NA forces
Plan, advise, and coordinate the battles
Provide “ground truth” to US commanders, and
Survive.
This complex mission would soon be consolidated into a single, straightforward,
statement for all TF Dagger Soldiers once they reached K2: “Advise and assist the
Northern Alliance in conducting combat operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.”52
This overly broad statement provided TF Dagger with freedom to command, no
operational constraints, and the appropriate amount of leeway necessary to get the job
done. ODA 534 team leader, Captain Mark Newman, recalled that “his entire mandate
consisted of a handful of PowerPoint slides that told him to conduct unconventional
warfare, render Afghanistan no longer a safe haven for terrorists, defeat al-Qaeda, and
coup the Taliban.”53 How he accomplished those goals was up to him. “We were given
an extraordinarily wonderful amount of authority to make decisions.”54
18
General Dostum Reclaims Mazar-e Sharif
“Make no mistake, The United States will hunt down and punish those
responsible for these cowardly acts.” 55 Those remarks by President Bush at Barksdale
Air Force Base on 11 September were about to come to life on the ground in
Afghanistan.
In early November, Mazar-e Sharif became the first Taliban-controlled city to fall to
Northern Alliance forces. Strategically situated in the Balkh River valley some 35 miles
south of Uzbekistan along the 4000-year old Silk Road, Mazar is the capital of Balkh
province and has been a major regional trading center since the days of Alexander the
Great. As the second largest city in Afghanistan and with a population (U.N. estimate
2001) of 200,000 Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens, Mazar (tomb of the saint) was named in
honor of the son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, Hazarate Ali, who was enshrined
there in a blue-tiled mosque built during the twelfth century.56
In 1997, the Taliban briefly seized control of Mazar-e Sharif from a mujahideen
militia group commanded by General Abdul Rashid Dostum. The Taliban were repulsed
in just a few days, but returned in force the next year to re-take the city with a vengeance
(“the massacre of Mazar-e Sharif”). Dostum’s militia force, along with two others, led
by General Mohammed Atta and General Mohammed Mohaqqeq, respectively, were
forced to withdraw south through the Balkh Valley to a number of enclaves in the Hindu
Kush Mountains.57 A stalemate would exist between the Taliban and these militia
groups, soon to be known collectively as the Northern Alliance, until US forces arrived to
support the NA in the October 2001.
19
Pakistani government resistance to the prospects of a Northern Alliance (Uzbeks
and Tajiks; no Pashtuns) take-over of Kabul had resulted in the United States’
temporarily withholding SOF support of NA operations even in northern Afghanistan.58
By mid-late October 2001, however, that attitude had changed dramatically. Senior
officials in the Bush administration realized that fully backing the NA offered the best
opportunity the US had for defeating the Taliban.59
Meanwhile, ODA 595 had wasted little time calling in its first series of air strikes
on 21 October against Taliban positions in the village of Chapchal.60 General Dostum
was pleased with this first strike. He radioed the opposing Taliban commander and
announced, “This is General Dostum speaking. I am here, and I have brought the
Americans with me.”61 In quick succession, NA forces then took the villages of
Bishqab, Cobaki, and Oimetan, assisted in great measure by numerous additional air
strikes directed by ODA 595. By this time, General Dostum had his full compliment of
US support personnel (CIA officers, SF teams, an SF command and control element, and
Air Force terminal attack controllers who carried LST-5 satellite radios for contacting
strike aircraft and Laser Acquisition Markers [SOFLAM] for pinpointing enemy targets),
and he was ready to move north and re-take Mazar-e Sharif. Toward that end, US cargo
aircraft dropped much needed food, ammunition, and supplies to NA forces in the Darya
Suf Valley.62 Additionally, since no vehicles were available and terrain in the Darya
Valley was so treacherous (winding mountain trails at elevations in excess of 6,000 feet)
NA forces and their American counterparts were forced to travel on horseback and by
mule.
20
Next, ODA 534 linked up with General Mohammed Atta’s forces in the Balkh
River Valley on 4 November.63 The intent at this point was for Dostum to keep moving
through the Darya Suf Valley, while Atta pushed north in the Balkh. Once they met, the
combined force (which also included an NA group led by General Mohammed Mohaqiq)
would continue up the Balkh Valley and attack the Taliban stronghold at Tangi Gap.
On 5 November, General Dostum’s men were again on the move and carried out a
classic cavalry charge against well-entrenched Taliban troops at Bai Beche. The
astonished Taliban defenders retreated northward toward Tangi.64 At about the same
time, Taliban forces surrendered to General Atta at Aq Kuprok, only to retake the village
in a surprise counterattack. Assisted by US air strikes, Atta’s militia was able to regain
control of Aq Kuprok the next day. Hundreds of Taliban reinforcements had been
slaughtered by additional air strikes as they first moved south to assist at the battles of
Bai Beche and Aq Kuprok, then once again as they retreated north in disarray.65 The next
village north, Sholgerah, fell with little resistance. Then on 9 November, B-52 strikes,
directed by SOF controllers, ended last-ditch efforts by the Taliban to fight at the Tangi
Gap (twelve miles south of Mazar at the northern end of the Balkh Valley). Later that
day, NA forces crossed the Pul-e-Imam Bukhri Bridge and seized the Beh Dadi civilian
airport.66 The next day, General Dostum and his Special Forces advisers rode into town
to the cheers of a grateful local citizenry.
Fighting in the city would resume, however, when several hundred Taliban, who
had taken refuge in the former Sultan Razia girl’s school, refused to surrender. An
estimated 300 Taliban fighters, mostly Pakistanis and non-Afghans, were subsequently
killed when US air strikes (called in by Special Forces) destroyed the school.67 Finally,
21
the Northern Alliance took nearly 3,000 Taliban prisoners in Mazar-e Sharif and the
surrounding area.68 “This is a great victory,” proclaimed NA Deputy Defense Minister,
Atiiqullah Baryalai, “Our forces have captured the city. The Taliban are fleeing.”69 Soon
thereafter, Abdul Henan Hemat, head of the Taliban Bakhtar News Agency, conceded
victory to the Northern Alliance. “For seven days continuously they have been bombing
Taliban positions. They used very large bombs,” Hemat acknowledged reluctantly. 70
Victory at Mazar-e Sharif would represent Operation ENDURING FREEDOM’s first
noteworthy success.
Northern Alliance Captures Taloqan and Konduz
The ten-man Special Forces A-Team 585 was inserted by helicopter into a landing
zone near the village of Dasht-e-Qaleh close to the Tajikistan border on 25 October.
From there, they made their way south to rendezvous with local Northern Alliance
commander, General Bariullah Khan near the Taliban stronghold of Konduz. Their
mission was to assist General Bariullah’s forces in taking several small villages and
ultimately capturing Konduz. ODA 585 split into two elements on 28 October—one to
help equip Bariullah’s forces with additional supplies for the move to Konduz and the
other to continue directing air strikes on the Taliban trench lines and command bunkers
that lie ahead. At one point, the team doubled back through Tajikistan and re-entered
Afghanistan behind Taliban lines.71 From there, they called in devastating bombing runs
on the Taliban reverse slope defensive positions. Northern Alliance fighters then overran
Taliban positions at Kal-a-Khata, captured the town of Chickha, and pushed south to the
perimeter of Konduz.72
22
While General Bariullah and ODA 585 were approaching Konduz from the north,
A-Team 586 and Northern Alliance forces commanded by General Daoud Kahn were
moving toward Konduz from the southeast. Initially, ODA 586 flew to a remote landing
zone near the Tajikistan border on an MH-47E Chinook helicopter. From there, they
flew on a Northern Alliance (Russian-built) helicopter to Farkhar for the link-up with
General Daoud. By 11 November, the team was calling in air strikes for Daoud’s forces
as they attacked the city of Taloqan. NA General Massoud had made Taloqan (located
40 miles east of Konduz) his headquarters until the Taliban seized the city in September
2000.73 Although an initial assault faltered, NA troops, with the help of US airpower,
successfully reconquered Taloqan on 13 November. Ten days later, Daoud captured the
city of Khanabad (not to be confused with K2 in Uzbekistan) fifteen miles east of
Konduz.74 ODA 586 controllers had directed dozens of air strikes against Taliban and alQaeda troops, trucks, tanks, mortar positions, and bunkers along the approach to
Khanabad.
At the same time that General Daoud was closing on Konduz from the east and
General Bariullah was approaching from the north, General Dostum was moving in from
the west. Thirty thousand NA troops surrounded the city.75 Each general conducted his
own surrender negotiations. After holding out for several days, the Taliban (along with
numerous Uzbeks, Chechens, Pakistanis, and Arabs) finally acknowledged the bleakness
of their desperate situation and surrendered Konduz to the Northern Alliance over a four
day period from 23-26 November. Dostum set Afghan Taliban free, while foreign
fighters and al-Qaeda were held prisoner. With the fall of Mazar-e Sharif, Taloqan, and
Konduz, the entire northern tier of Afghanistan was now in the hands of Northern
23
Alliance forces. Much of this success was accomplished through devastating US
airpower coupled with SOF operators on the ground pinpointing lucrative targets. “The
more people we get on the ground, the better the targeting information is,” Defense
Secretary Rumsfeld explained after the siege of Konduz.76
An unusual series of events transpired during the last few days of the Konduz
fight. Northern Alliance forces claimed that several Pakistani aircraft had flown into
Konduz to rescue Pakistanis who had been fighting along side the Taliban. Observers
claimed that the planes were flown by the Pakistani Army Inter-Services Intelligence
Agency (ISI) and that those evacuated included Pakistani generals, intelligence agents,
and al-Qaeda leaders. Both the US and Pakistani governments denied the reports. JCS
Chairman, General Richard B. Myers, responded to a Pentagon news conference question
by declaring that “the runway there is not usable….[too]short for your standard transport
aircraft. So we’re not sure where the reports are coming from.”77 Nevertheless,
apparently a significant number of potentially valuable human intelligence sources were
able to elude capture. Eventually, many would conclude that the US allowed the airlift in
exchange for Pakistan’s continued support in the War on Terrorism.78
Qala-i Jangi Prison Uprising
After the Taliban collapse in northern Afghanistan, thousands of Taliban and alQaeda fighters surrendered to victorious Northern Alliance forces. True to the Afghan
fighting tradition, NA leaders accepted at face value the word of the captured Taliban that
they would not engage in any further hostilities. As such, the captives were never
thoroughly searched for weapons. What the NA may have failed to realize, however, was
24
that the majority of those surrendering were non-Afghan Taliban (Pakistanis, Chechens,
and al-Qaeda) who would neither abide by Afghan custom, nor honor their pledge of
surrender. About 500 of these prisoners were taken to the 19th-century Qala-i Jangi
fortress (six miles west of Mazar-e Sharif) that had served as a Taliban military base and
most recently as General Dostum’s headquarters. 79
On 24 November, the day of their arrival at the makeshift Qala detention facililty,
Taliban captives killed two NA commanders in separate hand grenade suicide attacks. 80
Despite these unexpected attacks, the NA failed to expand the force guarding the prison
(only about 100 NA soldiers).81 The next morning, two CIA officers, unaccompanied by
security, arrived to interrogate the Taliban and to search for al-Qaeda members. Rather
than questioning prisoners one-on-one in private, the officers interrogated small groups of
Taliban outdoors in the central courtyard of the prison complex.82 Several Taliban
wandered freely within the compound, having been untied by the guards in order to wash
and pray.83 The American presence provoked the Taliban and one attacked a guard with
a rock and grabbed the guard’s AK-47.84 Within minutes, the Taliban seized control of
the prison and the remaining guards fled. One of the CIA officers escaped; however the
other, 32 year-old Johnny Michael Spann, after having shot three Taliban, was killed in
the uprising, thus becoming the first American hostile-fire casualty in Afghanistan.85
Later that afternoon, US Special Forces and British SAS soldiers arrived at Qala-i Jangi
and took control of the situation. For the rest of the day, they called in air strikes on the
south end of the compound where the Taliban had concentrated. On 26 November,
additional SF troops and Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division (having been flown in
from K2 to serve as a quick reaction force) joined the US and British forces at the prison.
25
They established a new command post and positioned an NA tank in the northeast corner
of the facility. Unfortunately, a misdirected 2,000 pound bomb struck the north wall of
the command post later that morning, killing several NA soldiers and wounding five US
and two SAS Soldiers.86 That evening, two AC-130 Spectre gunships strafed the Taliban
end of the prison with cannon fire for more than two hours. By the next day, the
surviving Taliban were nearly out of food, water, and ammunition. NA tanks shelled a
building where the remaining prisoners held out. By late that afternoon, the fighting
ended and a Special Forces team was able to recover “Mike” Spann’s body.
A group of Taliban survived, however, by hiding in the basement of the prison
complex. For several days they refused to come out despite being doused with burning
oil.87 Finally, on 1 December, 86 Taliban emerged and surrendered after the basement
was flooded with frigid well-water. Among the survivors was the so-called “American
Taliban,” John Walker Lindh, who then was treated at the Afghan hospital in
Sheberghan, detained for debriefing at Camp Rhino (the US Marine Corps base in
southern Afghanistan), and held in solitary confinement aboard the USS Peleliu in the
Arabian Sea before being handed over to the US Justice Department. 88 Many of the
Taliban involved in the Qala-i Jangi insurrection were among the first arrivals at the
newly established Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.89
General Dostum felt betrayed by the Taliban uprising at the prison. He had hoped
that his humane treatment of the prisoners would be seen as a gesture of reconciliation.
As a result, he chose to not search the prisoners as thoroughly as he should have. “We
treated them humanely….we did not search them well enough because we trusted them,”
he would later remark. “That was a mistake.”90
26
Dominance of SOF Directed Air Power in Support of the Northern Alliance
SOF-directed joint air power was clearly the decisive factor in the early Northern
Alliance victories in Afghanistan. During the first three months of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM, 120 stationary targets, 400 vehicles, and numerous Taliban/alQaeda troop concentrations were destroyed in US bombing attacks. Air Force, Navy, and
Marine Corps aircraft flew more than 6,500 strike sorties and dropped 17,500 munitions
(57% were precision-guided) on Taliban targets.91 Carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18
aircraft accounted for 75% (4,900) of strike sorties flown, while US Air Force fighters,
bombers, and special operations aircraft flew 11%, 10%, and 3% of strike sorties,
respectively (Figures 1 and 2).92
Interestingly, however, despite flying fewer sorties, Air Force aircraft delivered
more than 70% of the ordnance dropped during the October to December 2001
timeframe. This was due primarily to the large payload capacity of the eight B-1 and 10
B-52 bombers that were deployed at Diego Garcia and their extended loiter-time
capabilities—missions often lasted up to 15 hours. In addition, B-1s dropped the
majority of JDAMs (2,800), more than all other aircraft combined. In one instance, four
B-1s delivered 96 JDAM bombs in a 20 minute period.93 Conversely, B-52 bombers
delivered the preponderance of Mk 82 500-pound, free-fall, unguided general purpose
(dumb) bombs (approximately 6,000).94 Mk 82 accuracy had improved significantly since
Operation DESERT STORM due principally to radar improvements and new weapons
ballistics computers on the aircraft.95
27
Above and beyond the OEF strike sorties, more than 17,000 aerial support
missions took place in the initial months of the conflict. The United States and Germany
flew 125,000 tons of military materiel and humanitarian relief supplies to the AOR
(4,800 airlift missions). Also, the Air Force, Navy, and Royal Air Force flew 8,000
tanker missions in support of the air war. The extended-range operations undertaken for
OEF could not have been accomplished without the sustained in-flight refueling
capability that tankers provided. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
flights accounted for an additional 1,300 sorties, flown by Predator, Global Hawk, U-2,
RC-135, E-3, E-8, and EC-130 aircraft. Finally, Coalition aviation components flew a
wide variety of OEF-related missions (approximately 3,000).96
Increased use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) emerged as the dominant
trend in the Afghanistan air campaign. Having represented only nine percent of the
ordnance used in Operation DESERT STORM, PGMs now accounted for 57 percent of
the bombs dropped during the early stages of OEF. Likewise, the ratio of PGMs to
sorties rose from 0.32 during DESERT STORM to 1.66 for OEF. Discussions at the
CAOC would now address how many targets could be destroyed during a single mission
as opposed to how many missions would be required to destroy a single target.97
Logistics Challenges Encountered During Early OEF Combat Operations
Currently, the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has a more
robust organic logistics support capability than it did in the early months of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM. Prior to OEF, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF)
were accustomed to deploying/operating in small teams. As a result, their logistics needs
were fairly limited. At the time, the existing, non-deployable, Special Operations
28
Support Command (SOSCOM) with one support battalion, two forward support
companies, and one headquarters company was sufficient to meet ARSOF team-oriented
logistics requirements.
However, when the 5th Special Forces Group deployed to K2, the assigned
forward support element (members of “A” Company, 528th Special Operations Support
Battalion) was nearly overwhelmed with the enormity of logistics requests. There were
only approximately 400 Soldiers in the entire 528th Support Battalion to provide combat
service support for 15,000 Special Operations Forces in ARSOF. This ratio appears
inadequate in contrast to conventional force levels (3,300 support personnel for a 15,000
troop heavy division, for example).98 Nevertheless, the 528th performed admirably at K2
by quickly establishing a warehouse, a clothing distribution center, a 24/7 dining facility,
and ration and refueling points. The 507th Corps Support Command replaced the 528th in
December 2001 after SF combat operations in northern Afghanistan had subsided.99
Soldiers and Army civilians from the 200th Materiel Management Center
(MMC), 21st Theater Support Command (TSC) in Kaiserslautern, Germany also
provided much needed logistics support to CIA and SOF personnel during the early days
of OEF. A special OEF cell was established at 200th MMC headquarters to provide, as
they claimed, “corner-cutting, on-the-fly, I-want-it-now, customer-driven” support
services as “unconventional as the war being fought.”100 The cell operated 24 hours a
day and was in direct contact with US troops on the ground in Afghanistan via satellite
phones and email. When certain items were not readily available in the system, MMC
members used their government credit cards to make the necessary purchases on the local
German economy. When cargo parachutes were in short supply, the cell had hundreds
29
more sent to Germany by Federal Express. During the first 60 days of OEF, the 21st
TSC air-dropped dozens of western saddles, 12,000 pounds of horse feed, two million
humanitarian meals, two million pounds of wheat, 93,000 blankets, specialized batteries,
nonmilitary tactical gear, camping equipment, mountaineering clothing, plus tons of extra
equipment and supplies.101
Without doubt, the workhorse airlift aircraft thus far in Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM was the C-17 Globemaster III. The Air Force had recently purchased 80 of
these aircraft to replace the aging C-141 fleet for intertheater mobility missions. C-17s
carried a larger payload and could operate from smaller, unimproved, airfields.
Typically, C-5 Galaxy or commercial aircraft airlifted personnel and equipment from US
aerial ports of embarkation to staging bases. To accommodate this movement, the Air
Force established two air bridges—one flowing eastward from Moron Air Base in Spain,
Rhein-Main and Ramstein air bases in Germany, and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey; the
other moved westward from Andersen Air Base on Guam to Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean. At these intermediate staging bases, aircrews transferred cargo from the larger C5s to C-17s for delivery to the theater. Unfortunately, a single C-17 could not
accommodate all the cargo from a C-5 transport. This discrepancy caused considerable
backlog and congestion at the various staging bases and resulted in split theater
shipments.
From the beginning of the air war until mid-December 2001, C-17s air-dropped
more than two million humanitarian daily rations for the Afghan people.102 Since there
were no in-theater bases initially, these food drop missions often lasted up to 30 hours
and required a third pilot joining the C-17 crews in order to rotate rest periods. Despite
30
the fact that there had been no CENTCOM or Air Mobility Command off-the-shelf plan
for airlift to Afghanistan, the U.S Air Force executed this phase of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM (and dealt with the various problems that arose) in a highly
professional manner.103
Concurrent Civil Military Operations
Since the principal objective of OEF was to disrupt, destroy, and defeat the
Taliban and al-Qaeda, CENTCOM did not consider nation building and stability
operations to be high priority issues. As a result, CENTCOM planners did not include a
robust civil military operations (CMO) component in the OEF plan. Nevertheless, to
support humanitarian relief assistance for the Afghan people, CENTCOM requested that
the US Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) establish an appropriate organization
to coordinate these relief activities. A Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task
Force (CJCMOTF), composed of elements from the 377th Theater Support Command,
the 122nd Rear Operations Center, and the 352nd Civil Affairs Command, subsequently
formed in Atlanta and Tampa, then moved to Kuwait, and eventually deployed to Kabul
in early December 2001.104
Relatedly, just four days after the OEF air war began, an officer from the 96th
Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), US Army Civil
Affairs and Psychological Operations Command deployed to Islamabad, Pakistan to
establish a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and to organize Coalition
Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC), the primary functions of which were to de-conflict
humanitarian vs. combat operations, conduct assessments, and identify potential relief
31
projects. Also, a Liaison Officer and several Civil Affairs teams from the 96th CA
deployed to K2 during the October-December timeframe in support of the 5th Special
Forces Group. Two of these teams relocated to Bagram and Mazar-e Sharif, respectively,
in late November.
During this same time period, Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams from the
96th CA joined infiltrated SOF A-Teams. Their mission was to assist Northern Alliance
leaders (and their families) and to initiate collaborative efforts with local Afghan civilian
leadership groups. Some Survey Team members began wearing civilian clothes in an
effort to blend in with Afghans. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) complained
about this practice, however, thinking that locals would be unable to distinguish between
Soldiers (in civilian attire) and NGO personnel. Shortly thereafter, CENTCOM ordered
CA Soldiers in Afghanistan back into uniform.105 After the NA victory in Mazar-e
Sharif, 96th CA, 5th SFG, and 10th Mountain Division Soldiers began working to open a
new hospital and to rebuild the Sultan Rasia girl’s school.106
Analysis of the Sudden Taliban Collapse in Northern Afghanistan
Many US civilian and military officials had expected that defeating the Taliban in
northern Afghanistan would take much longer than it actually did. However, the speed
with which the Northern Alliance routed the Taliban resulted from a unique combination
of military effects that had never previously been employed together. Special Operations
Forces directed precision-guided munitions air strikes in support of an indigenous ally
(the NA) against enemy forces (Taliban) while often not even in contact. Precision
directed US airpower was the combat multiplier that enabled an outnumbered NA to
32
destroy Taliban infantry and armor and to liberate northern Afghanistan in just over six
weeks.
Despite al-Qaeda-led counterattacks at Bai Beche and Konduz, US SOF suffered
no casualties in the battles for Mazar-e Sharif, Konduz, and Taloqan. The principal
reason for the lack of casualties was that Air Force terminal attack controllers attached to
SF A-Teams used laser illuminators and GPS equipment to engage Taliban fighters at
significant stand-off distances. For example, controllers were able to acquire Taliban
targets at ranges of up to 10 kilometers at the village of Bishqab and five kilometers at
Ac’capruk.107 The resulting technique took on a new name, ground-directed interdiction
(GDI), and differed from typical close air support in which supported forces are normally
in direct contact with the enemy. GDI facilitated attacks on moving targets, ensured
compliance with CENTCOM rules of engagement, and enabled the concentration of
devastating effects without concentrating physical forces.108 US Army Colonel Mike
Findley (former Commander, Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command)
argued. however, that although the mix of players in the GDI equation was
unprecedented, the Northern Alliance (along with its SOF advisers) was essentially no
different than any other conventional ground maneuver force requiring periodic joint fire
support.109 Matching concentrated fire power with nimble ground maneuver elements to
vanquish an enemy force has always been a principle factor for success in warfare. As
such, JSOTF-North became by default the functional ground force (supported)
commander directing A-Team/NA maneuver units against the Taliban and employing
complementary US air support whenever needed.
33
In addition, some have suggested that the Taliban was simply a rag-tag, poorlytrained, incompetent, and reluctant-to-fight enemy force.110 This may have been true
during the first few days of special operations forces (SOF)-directed US bombing, when
the enemy was exposed and easily acquired. The Taliban learned quickly however, and
by November 2001 had adopted a variety of cover-and-concealment techniques and
began taking cover and dispersing their troops. These efforts proved at least partially
successful in minimizing the devastating effects of American air strikes, and would serve
the Taliban well in future operations such as Tora Bora and Anaconda. Also, although
Afghan Taliban were often hesitant to stand and fight, the al-Qaeda forces—many of
whom had received sophisticated military training—were significantly more likely to
engage in combat, and proved to be formidable adversaries (as demonstrated at Bai
Beche and Konduz, for example).
Furthermore, there were a number of noteworthy aviation component
accomplishments during the initial months of OEF in addition to the unique SOF/strike
aircraft teamwork described above. The expanded use of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) (Predator and Global Hawk) provided both faster reaction times and longer dwell
times than did traditional orbital assets. This enabled significantly improved ISR data
fusion, near constant surveillance of Taliban activity, a substantial shortening of the kill
chain, and major reductions in sensor-to-shooter link times. Unfortunately, teams on the
ground could not communicate directly with UAV operators. Overall, however,
improved capability to communicate data permitted aircrews to retarget in flight and to
re-strike targets if necessary.111
34
Despite some initial growing pains, the CAOC at Prince Sultan Air Base provided
an unprecedented level (quality and quantity) of timely air support for Special Forces ATeams and the Northern Alliance. Joint service cooperation/integration (Air Force/Navy)
was harmonious from the start, as all CAOC members focused on sharing information
and on the common objective of defeating the Taliban. Improved technology provided
CAOC operators with proximate real-time theater connectivity, situational awareness,
and the ability to deliver devastating firepower on demand.112
A few controversies did arise, however. Military/civilian personnel at
CENTCOM and in Washington may have exercised undue levels of centralized control
over mission planning and execution, thereby interfering with timely target approval
decision cycles.113 This, coupled with excessively restrictive rules of engagement (JAG
officers influencing target choices), rear-area scrutinizing of live Predator data, inherently
lengthy mission distances (up to15 hours from Diego Garcia), limited loiter capability,
and the fact that CENTCOM and CAOC were separated by eight time zones may have
detracted from air power reaction times as new targets emerged. Additionally, the CIA
often secretly flew armed Predators within the AOR in support covert SOF/other
governmental organization (OGA) operations without advising the CAOC. To address
this issue, liaison officers at CENTCOM, CAOC, and JSOTF-N developed a broad-based
coordination plan that integrated all friendly OEF participants—SOF, covert SOF, OGA,
and the Northern Alliance.114 Eventually, JSOTF-N established a limited Air Support
Operations Center (ASOC) to coordinate joint fires and began using killbox procedures
along with blue-force tracking to help eliminate friendly-fire incidents.115
35
Fortunately, commanders quickly resolved the few difficulties that arose early on
in OEF. For example, JSOTF-N’s assumption of the role of “supported” command
clarified command relationships among the participants. Also, CENTCOM requested the
first time ever use of commercial satellites to address skyrocketing data transmission
bandwidth demand.116 This, however, did not completely alleviate occasional range and
reliability problems with targeting systems, data links, and FM tactical radios
encountered by infiltrated special operations forces. In addition, extensive mountain
flying operations revealed high-altitude lift limitations with MH-60 Black Hawk
helicopters. Although Black Hawk crews flew hundreds of dangerous OEF support
missions, several such missions involving flights into mountainous terrain were, of
necessity, shifted to MH-47 Chinooks (maximum gross weight of 50,000 pounds vs.
22,000 pounds for the Black Hawk). Taking time to assess variations in aircraft
capabilities complicated mission planning for SOF commanders.117 Special Forces teams
also had to contend with minor language barrier issues. ODA-534 was advised that
General Atta spoke Arabic. No problems were anticipated, since several team members
spoke the language. Shortly after their insertion into the Balkh River Valley, 534 learned
that Atta in fact spoke Pashto and Dari, but not Arabic. The team quickly improvised by
finding a few older NA soldiers who spoke Russian. These Afghans then served as
translators for ODA-534 (most team members spoke Russian) for the remainder of the
mission.118
In fewer than two months, the Northern Alliance, supported by US SOF and air
power, decisively defeated the Taliban, put al-Qaeda on the run, and liberated six
northern provinces, seven key cities, and nearly 50 additional smaller towns and
36
villages.119 NA forces killed nearly ten thousand enemy soldiers and took several
thousand more prisoners. A rare fusion of small SOF teams (trained eyes on the ground),
strike aircraft/bombers, and precision-guided munitions brought about the remarkable
accomplishments realized during combat operations in northern Afghanistan. SOF also
provided tactics, techniques, and procedures advice to the NA and dealt adroitly with
various Afghan factions, rivalries, and tensions. Only roughly 100 SF Soldiers infiltrated
northern Afghanistan (seven A-Teams and one ODC), thereby adhering to “limited
footprint” directives and proving that devastating firepower can be brought to bear by
small, highly trained, units.120 Also, American forces gained valuable insight into how
the Taliban and al-Qaeda would fight. Moreover, CENTCOM had demonstrated to
doubters that the US could rapidly project destructive land, sea, and air power over
exceptionally long distances. In addition, US combat participants proved the concept of
“jointness” both viable and workable, as all—CIA, SOF, conventional Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marines—cooperated unselfishly in support of the OEF mission. Finally, both
the Mazar-e Sharif airport and the Freedom Bridge to Uzbekistan reopened, thus enabling
large inbound shipments of humanitarian assistance. Afghan refugees were able to return
in significant numbers to Takhar, Konduz, Samangan, Balkh, Jozjan, Sar-e Pul, and
Faryab provinces. Would the battles for Kandahar and Tora Bora, or Operation
Anaconda be as successful?
Phillip O’Connor, “Two Men Who Fought Terror,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 22 February 2004, sec. A,
p. 1
2
Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, 107 Cong., 27
February 2002, 7-8.
3
Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 13.
4
“Taliban.” Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 20 December 2005, 2. http://www8.janes.com/.
5
Ali A. Jalali, “Afghanistan: The Anatomy of an Ongoing Conflict,” Parameters (Spring 2001), 92-93;
Biddle, 22, implies that as much as ninety percent of Afghanistan was controlled by the Taliban in 2001.
1
37
6
Ibid., 92-94.
Biddle, 12.
8
B. Muralidhar Reddy, “The Northern Players,” Frontline 18, no. 24 (November 24 – December 7, 2001):
2, http://www.hinduonnet.com (accessed 8 February 2007). The UF was also known as the United Islamic
Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIF).
9
Library of Congress – Federal Research Division, “Country Profile Afghanistan,” May 2006, 3,
http://lcweb2.loc.gov (accessed 6 February 2007).
10
Fiona Symon, “Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance,” BBC News Online (19 September 2001), 3,
http://news.bbc.uk (accessed 31 January 2007).
11
“Analysis: Masood’s Regional Allies,” BBC News Online (11 September 2001), 1-3, http://news.bbc.uk
(accessed 7 February 2007).
12
Fiona Symon, 2.
13
Rory McCarthy, “Warlords Bury their Differences in Readiness for Long and Bloody Battles,” Guardian
(7 November 2001), 1, http://www.guardian.co.uk (accessed 9 February 2007).
14
Jalali, 92-95.
15
George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” 20 September
2001, 1-5, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases.
16
George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” 20 September
2001, 1-5, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases.
7
James Risen and David Johnston, “Bush Has Widened Authority of C.I.A. to Kill Terrorists,” The New
York Times, 15 December 2002, sec. 1, p. 1.
18
Ambassador J. Cofer Black, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 14 December 2006, McLean, VA, 3;
George Tenet, interview by Scott Pelley, CBS News 60 Minutes, 25 April 2007, Washington, D.C., aired
29 April 2007, accessed 30 April 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/04/25/60minutes/main2728375.shtml
19
Gary C. Schroen, First In (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), 15-16, 67-78.
20
Congress, Joint Resolution, Authorization for Use of Military Force, 107 Cong., S.J. Res. 23,
Congressional Record , Vol. 147 (18 September 2001), http://www.usconstitution.net/newsarch_01.html,
accessed 20 February 2007.
21
“Bush Calls on U.S. to Defend Freedom: Authorizes Guard and Reserve Call-ups,” TALON, 7, no. 38 (22
September 2001): 4.
22
Stephan Baker and Emily Clark, “Forces in Play,” Center for Defense Information Bulletin (26 October
2001): 4, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm, accessed 12 February 2001.
23
John D. Gresham, “Forces Fighting for Enduring Freedom,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings,
127, no. 11 (November 2001): 45-48.
24
Stephan Baker and Emily Clark, “Forces in Play,” 3.
25
General Bryan “Doug” Brown, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 11 January 2007, Tampa, FL, 3.
26
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), “Fact Sheets,” http://www.campbell.army.mil,
accessed 16 February 2007.
27
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), “Fact Sheets,” http://www.campbell.army.mil,
accessed 16 February 2007.
17
Air Force Special Operations Command, “Fact Sheets,” http://www.af.mil/factsheets, accessed 14
February 2007.
29
Air Force Special Operations Command, “Fact Sheets,” http://www.af.mil/factsheets, accessed 14
February 2007.
28
Michael Smith, “Donald Rumsfeld’s New Killer Elite,” Timesonline (12 February 2006): 3,
https://timesonline.typepad.com/mick_smith/2006/02/donnald_rumsfeld.html, accessed 23 April 2007;
Richard Stewart, Operation Enduring Freedom: The United States Army in Afghanistan October 2001 –
March 2002 (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 2004), 20.
31
David Ben-Aryeah, “British Troops Face the Reality That is Afghanistan,” Asia Times Online (16
November 2001), 1-3, http://www.atimes.com, accessed 16 February 2007.
32
Stephan Baker and Emily Clark, “Forces in Play,” 4-5.
30
38
The White House, “Operation Enduring Freedom: One Year of Accomplishments,” (7 October 2002), 16, http://www.whitehouse.gov, accessed 14 February 2007; Nora Bansahel, The Counterterror Coalitions:
Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 10, 55.
33
34
Gary C. Schroen, First In, 99.
Ibid., 125.
36
Esther Schrader, “Response to Terror; War, on Advice of Counsel,” Los Angeles Times, 15 February
2002, sec. A, p. 1.
37
General Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 295.
38
Benjamin S. Lambeth, Airpower Against Terror (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), 83.
39
Patrick Tyler, “U.S. and Britain Strike Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps; Bush Warns
‘Taliban Will Pay a Price,” The New York Times, 8 October 2001, sec. A, p. 1.
40
U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID Fact Sheet on Humanitarian Aid for Afghanistan,”
(26 April 2002), 1-12, http://geneva.usmission.gov/press2002, accesses 23 January 2007.
41
Gerry J. Gilmore, “Air Force fliers Continue Afghan Food Drop Operations,” American Forces Press
Service, 12 October 2001, 1-2, http://www.defenselink.mil, accessed 17 January 2007.
42
U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID Fact Sheet on Humaintarian Aid for Afghanistan,”
(26 April 2002), 4, http://geneva.usmission.gov/press2002, accessed 23 January 2007.
43
Douglas W. Jaquish, “Uninhabited Air Vehicles for Psychological Operations-Leveraging Technology
for PSYOPS Beyond 2010,” Air & Space Power Journal-Chronicles Online (6 April 2004): 2,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles, accessed 14 March 2007.
44
Christopher J. Lamb and Paris Genalis, Review of Psychological Operations Lessons learned from
Recent Operational Experience (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2005), 45-46, 172.
45
COL (Ret) James Treadwell, interview by Lynne Chandler Garcia, 8 January 2007, Tampa, FL, 5.
46
Herbert A. Friedman, “Psychological Operations in Afghanistan,” Perspectives, the Journal of the
Psychological Operations Association, 14, no. 4 (2002), 1-4.
47
Benjamin S. Lambeth, Airpower Against Terror, 79-102.
48
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, interview by FRONTLINE, 7,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/wolfowitz.html. accessed 23 January
2007
49
U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers,” DefenseLink
News Transcript, 18 October 2001, 8, http://www.defenselink.mil, accessed 21 February 2007.
50
Andrew Birtle, Afghan War Chronology (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History
Information Paper, 2002), 3; Gary Berntsen, Jawbreaker (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005), 109, 136,
142.
51
Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden, 40-42.
52
“The Liberation of Mazar-e Sharif: 5th SF Group Conducts UW in Afghanistan,” Special Warfare,15,
no. 2 (June 2002): 39.
53
Max Boot, “Special Forces and Horses,” Armed Forces Journal (November 2006): 18-25.
54
Max Boot, “Special Forces and Horses,” Armed Forces Journal (November 2006): 18-25.
55
The White House, “Remarks by the President Upon arrival at Barksdale Air Force Base,” (11 September
2001), 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov, accessed 26 February 2007.
56
Kyra Phillips, “Where and What is Mazar-e Sharif?” CNN.com Transcripts (9 November 2001), 1-3,
http://www.transcripts.cnn.com, accessed 24 February 2007.
57
“The Heartbreak of Mazar-e Sharif,” CBC News Online (27 January 2004) 1-2, http://www.cbc.ca/news,
accessed 23 February 2007.
58
Thomas E. Ricks and Alan Sipress, “Attacks Restrained by Political Goals,” The Washington Post, 23
October 2001, sec. A, p. 1.
59
Alan Sipress and Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Uncouples Military, Political Efforts; Officials Decide to Step Up
Bombing Without a Postwar Government Arranged,” The Washington Post, 1 November 2001, sec. A, p.
18.
60
Dale Andrade, The Battle of Mazar-e Sharif, October-November 2001 (Washington: U.S. Army Center
of Military History Information Paper, 2002), 2.
61
Max Boot, “Special Forces and Horses,” Armed Forces Journal (November 2006): 18-25.
35
39
Thom Shanker and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Special Forces Step up Campaign in Afghan Areas,” The
New York Times, 19 October 2001, sec. A, p. 1.
63
“The Liberation of Mazar-e Sharif: 5th SF Group Conducts UW in Afghanistan,” Special Warfare,15, no.
2 (June 2002): 37.
64
Dale Andrade, The Battle of Mazar-e Sharif, October-November 2001, 2.
65
Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 10.
66
Dale Andrade, The Battle of Mazar-e Sharif, October-November 2001, 2.
67
Carlotta Gall, “A Deadly Siege At Last Won Mazar-e Sharif,” The New York Times, 19 November 2001,
sec. B, p. 1.
68
Andrew Birtle, Afghan War Chronology (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History Information
Paper, 2002), 4.
69
Dexter Filkins and Thom Shanker, “Afghan Rebels Report Capture of Major City from the Taliban,” The
New York Times, 10 November 2001, sec. A, p. 1.
70
Ibid., sec. A, p. 1.
71
Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden, 112.
72
Andrew Birtle, Afghan War Chronology, 5.
73
Jon Lee Anderson, “The Surrender,” New Yorker, 77, no. 39 (10 December 2001): 70.
74
Satinder Bindra, “Northern Alliance Takes Khanabad,” interview by Catherine Callaway, CNN.com
Transcripts (25 November 2001): 1, http://transcripts.cnn.com, accessed 19 January 2007.
75
Johanna McGeary, Massimo Calabresi, Mark Thompson, et al., “Shell Game,” Time, 158, no. 24 (3
December 2001): 26.
76
Eric Schmitt and James Dao, “Use of Pinpoint Airpower Comes of Age in New War,” The New York
Times, 24 December 2001, sec. A, p. 1.
77
U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,” DefenseLink
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78
Seymour M. Hersh, “The Getaway,” The New Yorker, 77, no. 45 (28 January 2002): 36-41.
79
Jennifer Whittle and Steve Alvarez, “Special Forces Officer Honored for Heroism in Mazar-e Sharif
Prison Battle,” DefendAmerica News, 14 November 2003, 1-2, http://www.defendamerica.mil, accessed 23
January 2007; Carlotta Gall, “In Tunnels Full of Bodies, One of Them Kept Firing,” The New York Times,
30 November 2001, sec. B, p. 3.
62
Alex Perry, “Inside the Battle at Qala-i Jangi,” Time, 158, no. 25 (10 December 2001): 52.
Bay Fang, “They Were All fighting to Die,” U.S. News & World Report, 131, no. 24 (10 December
2001): 18-21.
82
Christopher Marquis, “Before He Died, C.I.A. Man Interrogated U.S. Captive,” The New York Times, 7
December 2001, sec. B, p. 4.
83
Bay Fang, 18-21.
84
Carlotta Gall, “U.S. Bomb Wounds G.I.’s as Battle Rages at Fort,” The New York Times, 27 November
2001, sec. A, p. 1.
85
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Press Release, 28 November 2001, George J. Tenet, Director of CIA,
“Statement on the Death of A CIA Officer in Afghanistan.”
86
Kalev Sepp, “Uprising at Qala-i Jangi: the Staff of the 3/5th SF Group,” Special Warfare, 15, no. 3
(September 2002): 17.
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Carlotta Gall, “In Tunnels Full of Bodies, One of Them Kept Firing,” sec. B, p. 3.
88
Cable News Network, “CNN Presents House of War: “The Uprising at Mazar-e Sharif,” air date 3
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York Times, 10 December 2001, sec. B, p. 3; Daniel Klaidman and Michael Isikoff, “Walker’s Brush with
bin Laden,” Newsweek, 139, no. 1(7 January 2002): 20-21.
89
U.S. Department of Defense, “Rumsfeld Visits, Thanks U.S. Troops at Camp X-Ray in Cuba,”
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90
Bay Fang, 18-21; Alex Perry, 51.
80
81
40
William Arkin, “Response to Terror; Military Memo; Old-Timers Prove Invaluable in Afghanistan Air
Campaign,” Los Angeles Times, 10 February 2002, sec. A, p. 12.
92
John Mazach, “The 21st Century Triad,” Sea Power, 45, no.3 (March 2002): 51-55; Benjamin S.
Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 248-249.
93
Anthony H. Cordesman, The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force
Transformation, and Nation Building (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004),
26-33.
94
William Arkin, sec. A, p. 12.
95
Benjamin Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 250.
96
Ibid., 251.
97
Christopher J. Bowie, Robert P. Haffa, Jr., and Robert E. Mullins, Future War: What Trends in
America’s Post-Cold War Military Conflicts Tell Us About Early 21st Century Warfare (Arlington, VA:
Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, 2003), 46-47.
98
Jorge E. Rodriguez, “What’s Missing in ARSOF Logistics?” Army Logistician, 36, no. 1
(January/February 2004): 7-9.
99
Richard L. Kiper, “We Support to the Utmost: the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion,” Special
Warfare, 15, no. 3 (September 2002): 13-15.
100
Dennis Steele, “Unconventional Logistics,” Army, 52, no. 11 (November 2002): 58.
101
Ibid., 58-59.
102
Olga Oliker, Richard Kauzlarich, James Dobbins, et al., Aid During Conflict (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2004), 47.
103
Daniel L. Haulman, Intertheater Airlift Challenges of Operation Enduring Freedom (Maxwell AFB, AL:
Air Force Historical Research Agency, 2002), 1-12.
104
Olga Oliker, et al., 43-50.
105
William Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute, 2004), 17-48, 91.
106
Jim Garamone, “Humanitarian Success Story in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Press Service, 18 January
2002, 1-2, http://www.defenselink.mil, accessed 18 January 2007; Kathleen T. Rhem, “Officials Laud
Rebuilding of Afghan Girls School,” Armed Forces Press Service, 31 October 2002, 1-2,
http://www.defenselink.mil, accessed 18 January 2007.
107
Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, 26.
108
Michael Noonan and Mark Lewis, “Conquering the Elements: Thoughts on Joint Force
(Re)Organization,” Parameters (Autumn 2003), 38.
109
Mike Findley, Robert Green, and Eric Braganca, “SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield,” Military
Review (May/June 2003), 11.
110
See for example - Anthony H. Cordesman, The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting,
Intelligence, Force Transformation, and Nation Building (Washington: Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2004), 16-23.
111
Defense News, 3 January 2002, 1.
112
Benjamin Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 280-284.
113
See for example - LTG (Ret) Paul T. Mikolashek, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 13 December 2006,
Arlington, VA, 9.
114
Benjamin Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 353.
115
Mike Findley, Robert Green, and Eric Braganca, 12-13.
116
Anthony Cordesman, The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force
Transformation, and Nation Building (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
2004), 43.
117
Conrad Crane, Final Report: The U.S. Army’s Initial Impressions of Operation Enduring Freedom and
Noble Eagle (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002), 4.
118
Robin Moore, 64.
119
Mark D. Nutsch, interview FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror,” 8 September 2002,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/595.html
91
120
LTG (Ret) Paul T. Mikolashek, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 13 December 2006, Arlington, VA, 11;
Richard Stewart, 20.
41
42