Review
The Idea Theory
Partly
Resembles
Dog
Sees
Mind
Idea of a Dog
Dog
Connotes
Dog
Mind
Idea of a Dog
Dog
Conventional Relation
Dog
Mind
Idea of a Dog
Dog
Conventional Relation
Dog
Natural Relation
(Resemblance)
Mind
Idea of a Dog
Dog
Denotes
Dog
Mind
Idea of a Dog
Dog
Problems for Idea/ Resemblance Theory
1. Can’t distinguish concepts and propositions.
2. Resemblance is an equivalence relation, representation is not.
3. Resemblance is in some ways more and in some ways less
determinate than representation.
1. Concepts and Propositions
The idea theory seems to have trouble distinguishing concepts and
propositions.
Are mental pictures truth-evaluable?
• If they are, then concepts aren’t ideas.
• If they aren’t, then propositions aren’t ideas.
2. Resemblance as an Equivalence Relation
Resemblance, like identity, is an equivalence relation, meaning it’s
reflexive, symmetric, and transitive:
• Reflexive: for all X, X resembles X. (Everything resembles itself.)
• Symmetric: for all X and Y, if X resembles Y, then Y resembles X.
• Transitive: for all X, Y, and Z, if X resembles Y and Y resembles Z, then
X resembles Z.
2. Representation Is Not and Eq. Relation
Problem for the idea theory: resemblance is an equivalence relation,
but representation is not. Therefore representation ≠ resemblance.
3. Pictures and Determinacy
Verificationism
Verificationist Semantics
#1. The meaning of a sentence is the set of experiences that would
verify it.
#2. Observation sentences are directly connected with their verification
conditions: we can immediately tell whether they are verified in any
particular circumstance.
Immediate Experience
RED
LOUD
THREE
PAIN
Non-Observation Sentences
#3 All the other meaningful sentences (according to the verificationist)
are defined in terms of the protocol sentences and the logical
vocabulary (AND, OR, NOT, ALL, SOME, NO, etc.).
Example: Definition of ‘Arthropod’
‘That is an arthropod’ :=
• That is an animal
• AND it has a jointed body
• AND it has segmented legs
Perfectly
correlates with
“Dagger”
Experiences
Mind
Experience of
a wound
Dagger
Connotes
“Dagger”
Mind
Experience of
a wound
Dagger
Conventional Realation
“Dagger”
Mind
Experience of
a wound
Dagger
Connotes
“Dagger”
Mind
Natural Relation
(Correlation)
Experience of
a wound
Dagger
Denotes
“Dagger”
Mind
Experience of
a wound
Dagger
Too Little Is Meaningless
If you think “The Absolute is
Perfect” and “God exists” are
meaningless, then you probably
think “Either some socks are
cotton or the Absolute is Perfect”
and “Either God exists or snow is
purple” are also meaningless.
But the latter two clearly have
conditions that would verify them.
Too Much Is Meaningless
A bigger focus of criticism, however, was that according too the
verifiability criterion, too much is meaningless, including:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Statements about the past or future.
Negative existentials.
Positive universals.
Certain positivist doctrines.
4. The Verifiability Criterion Itself
Consider the verifiability criterion: “a sentence is meaningless unless
some finite procedure can conclusively verify its truth.”
If this criterion is meaningful, then it must be that some finite
procedure can conclusively verify this claim.
But what procedure would that be?
The Problem
For many theoretical terms, it
took years or decades after their
introduction for us to discover any
way of verifying claims about
them.
Consider the claim: “DNA has a
double-helical structure.” This
claim seems to be meaningful.
The Problem
But Watson and Crick had to
discover how to verify it.
The Problem
The reason we discover methods
of verification, rather than
stipulate them in advance, is that
confirmation is theory dependent.
Our theories advance, and
according to the new theories,
certain experiences confirm
certain phenomena.
The Problem
If our theories change, those same
experiences may no longer
confirm those same phenomena.
The experiences that confirm a
statement shouldn’t be tied to its
meaning unless we want to accept
that meaning is theorydependent.
The Problem
So positivism seems to suggest that claims about DNA, electrons,
positrons, mesons, or whatever did not mean anything until we
discovered ways of verifying them.
At that time we discovered their meanings.
Definitions Theory
Partly
Resembles
Dog
Sees
Mind
Idea of a Dog
Dog
Connotes
Dog
Mind
Idea of a Dog
Dog
Conventional Relation
Dog
Mind
Idea of a Dog
Dog
Denotation
But there’s another sense in which the word ‘dog’ means dogs (those
furry smelly barking things): it applies to dogs and it’s true of dogs (and
false of everything else).
Denotation involves the relation between words and the world– what
words apply to/ are true of.
Conventional Relation
Dog
Natural Relation
(Resemblance)
Mind
Idea of a Dog
Dog
Denotes
Dog
Mind
Idea of a Dog
Dog
Circularity
For any finite set of definitions containing only words that have
definitions in the set: some word w defines w. (For example,
“ambagious” defines “ambagious”)
So in order to learn what w is true of, I have to already know what w is
true of.
Particular Definition Theories
The way to go then is to adopt a particular definition theory. On such
an account, not every word has a definition for its meaning, only some
particular subclass of all the words.
The Problem of Examples
Philosophers are fond of ‘bachelors are unmarried men.’ Why?
Because it’s really hard to find examples of definitions that work–
where the defining part means the same thing as the defined part.
‘Bachelor’ isn’t even obvious (is the pope a bachelor? Are 14 yearolds?). Kinship terms and animal terms are about the only good bets.
The Causal-Historical Theory
The Mirror Universe
Secondary Qualities
Possibility of Massive Error
The Causal-Historical Theory
Let’s call that
baby ‘Feynman’
Feynman
Feynman
Feynman
Feynman
The Causal-Historical Theory
Let’s call that
baby ‘Feynman’
Feynman
Feynman
Feynman
Historical Chain of Transmission
Feynman
The Causal-Historical Theory
Feynman
Feynman
Feynman
Feynman
Denotation
Natural Kinds
The Causal-Historical Theory
Let’s call that
thing a “tiger.”
TIGER
TIGER
TIGER
TIGER
The Story of Madagascar
Let’s call that
place ‘Mogadishu’
Madagishu
Madagascu
Madagasceir
Madagascar
C.H. Theory Predicts
Let’s call that
place ‘Mogadishu’
Madagishu
Madagascu
Madagasceir
Madagascar
Denotation
C.H. Theory Predicts
Let’s call that
place ‘Mogadishu’
Madagishu
Madagascu
Madagasceir
Madagascar
Denotation
Wrong!!!
Real Denotation
Let’s call that
place ‘Mogadishu’
Madagishu
Madagascu
Madagasceir
Madagascar
Denotation
Madagascar
The “Madagascar” case illustrates a general point: the Causal-Historical
Theory cannot account for unintentional meaning change.
Gareth
Saul
Saul
Gareth
Twins Switched at Birth
Now imagine it’s 73 years later
and we’ve been calling one man
“Saul” for 72.99 years, even
though (unknown to us) he was
baptized “Gareth.”
Saul
Twins Switched at Birth
TRUE or FALSE: Saul is wearing a
hat.
Saul
The Use Theory
The Use Theory
The Use Theory
and
The Use Theory
means
AND
and
The Use Theory
A and B
B
AND
A and B
A
A, B
A and B
follows
The Use Theory
A et B
B
ET
A et B
A
A, B
A et B
follows
The Use Theory
AND
ET
same concept
Summary of Principles
1. Words mean concepts, and “meaning” is univocal– it always means
just “indication.”
2. For any word, all of its uses may be explained by a basic acceptance
property: a regularity in the use of the word, that explains irregular
uses as well.
3. Concepts are individuated by the basic acceptance properties of the
words that express them.
Inference Rules
A tonk B
B
A
A tonk B
.
Proof Involving Tonk
Michael is a philosopher = A
Michael is the greatest philosopher = B
1. A
2. A tonk B
3. B
Premise
Tonk Rule #2
Tonk Rule #1
Inference Rules
A tonk B
B
A
A tonk B
.
When “B” is false, “A tonk B” must be false.
Inference Rules
A tonk B
B
A
A tonk B
.
When “A” is true, “A tonk B” must be true.
Inference Rules
A tonk B
B
A
A tonk B
.
So what happens when
“B” is false and “A” is true?
Tonk vs. the Use Theory
• The rules are supposed to be the meanings, but it seems like ‘tonk’
doesn’t mean anything, even when we know its meaning.
• If the rules are just the meaning of the word, then why is it wrong to
use the word this way. And if it isn’t wrong, does that mean that
Michael is the greatest philosopher!
Convention
The Disarmament Game
Country 2
Disarm
Don’t Disarm
10
15
Country 1
Disarm
10
-15
-5
Don’t Disarm
5
0
0
Equilibria
An equilibrium point is a square on the grid where no player can
improve his position through unilateral deviation.
Unilateral deviation is when one player changes strategy and all the
other players do not.
The Disarmament Game
Country 2
Disarm
Don’t Disarm
10
15
Country 1
Disarm
10
-15
-5
0
Equilibrium
Don’t Disarm
5
0
Equilibria as Solutions
An equilibrium strategy is a
“solution” to a game. It’s what we
predict will happen, and it’s what
“rational” players will choose.
John Nash proved that there’s
always an equilibrium (if we allow
mixed strategies).
Coordination Problem: Meeting
Suppose two people want to meet, but they have no way of
communicating with each other.
It does not matter where they go, as long as they go to the same place.
The Meeting Game
Person 2
Place 1
Place 2
1
0
Person 1
Place 1
1
0
0
Place 2
0
1
1
Convention: First Definition
It is a convention for a group to follow a rule in a certain situation, if
whenever they are in that situation:
1. Everyone follows the rule.
2. Everyone expects everyone else to follow the rule.
3. The situation is a coordination problem.
4. Everyone following the rule is a solution to the coordination
problem.
5. The reason why they follow the rule is (3) and (4).
Example: Money
Throughout history, people have used different things as money: gold,
silver, sea shells, salt (whence ‘salary’), goats, cigarettes (in prison),
coins and paper currency.
It doesn’t matter to me what I accept in exchange for my goods and
labor as long as it’s what everyone else accepts (as long as I can spend
it).
The Currency Game
Person 2
Accepts HKD
Accepts AUD
100
-500
Person 1
Accepts HKD
100
-500
-500
Accepts AUD
-500
100
100
Language and Convention
Many aspects of language are also conventional:
• The meaning of each word.
• Some facts about the grammar.
• How the words get pronounced.
What the Word Means
Person 2
“dog”
“dog”
1
0
Person 1
“dog”
1
0
0
“dog”
0
1
1
Word Order
Person 2
SOV
SVO
1
0
Person 1
SOV
1
0
0
SVO
0
1
1
What Word We Use
Person 2
“Dog”
“Chien”
1
0
Person 1
“Dog”
1
0
0
“Chien”
0
1
1
Compositionality
Recursion and Language
Here’s how language might do it:
NOUN PHRASE:
(i) “man” is a noun phrase
(ii) If NP is a noun phrase then “old” + NP is a noun phrase.
From this recursive definition, it follows there are infinitely many noun
phrases.
Infinite Use of Finite Means
This is one sense in which language “makes infinite use of finite
means.” There are finitely many words, and the rules of grammar are
presumably finite. But recursion generates infinite complex expressions
from a finite “base.”
Compositionality
The meanings of complex expressions depend on– and depend only
on– the meanings of their simple parts and the ways that those parts
are combined.
What’s at Stake?
Before we consider arguments for or against compositionality, let’s look
at what’s at stake.
At various points, compositionality has been used to argue against all
of the theories of meaning we have considered in class.
Color
Brown
Brown
Brown
Brown
Brown
Red
White
Black
Orange
Animal
Dog
Ant
Pig
Goat
Cow
Cow
Cow
Cow
Cow
Threat Level
Safe
Safe
Safe
Safe
DANGER!
Safe
Safe
Safe
Safe
Brown Cows are Dangerous
However, suppose that the small
number of dangerous cows and
the small number of dangerous
brown things are all brown cows.
Thus the meaning of “brown cow”
contains the experience of bodily
harm. That experience confirms
the presence of brown cows.
Brown Cows are Dangerous
But how is this possible?
Neither the set of experiences
that is the meaning of “brown”
nor the set of experiences that
is the meaning of “cow”
contains the experience of
bodily harm.
Brown Cows are Dangerous
The meaning of “brown cow”
thus seems to depend on
something other than the
meanings of its parts, “brown”
and “cow”:
Verificationism violates the
principle of compositionality.
Vs. the Use Theory
Does knowing how word W1 is used and how W2 is used suffice for
knowing how [W1 W2] is used?
This seems unlikely.
Imagine teaching a
Martian how the word
‘black’ is used.
We might show it color
samples or something.
Similarly we might teach the
Martian how ‘people’ is used, by
giving examples.
Black Person?
Against Locality
As we saw before, compositionality is local.
In the expression [old [brown dog]] what “brown dog” means cannot
depend on what “old” means, even though that’s also part of the
expression containing “brown dog.”
Donkey Sentences
Normally, sentences S(‘a donkey’) are made true by the existence of a
donkey who satisfies S(x). For example:
• A donkey pooped on the train.
• John punched a donkey.
Geach Sentence
However, consider the following sentence (due to Peter Geach):
• Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
This sentence is (emphatically!) not made true by a donkey who
satisfies “Every farmer who owns x beats x.”
Against Semantic Closure
Compositionality includes semantic closure: the meanings of
expressions depend only on the meanings of their parts and how
they’re combined, not things other than their meanings.
Pure Quotation
Pure quotation is an interesting phenomena. Consider that “bachelor”
and “unmarried man” are synonymous. The substitutability criterion
(compositionality) says:
“For any sentence S(E) containing some expression E as part, if E and E*
have the same meaning, then S(E) and S(E*) have the same meaning.”
A Counterexample
So let
E = “bachelor”
E* = “unmarried man”
S(E) = “‘bachelor’ used to mean squire.”
S(E*) = “‘unmarried man’ used to mean squire.”
The substitutability criterion fails!
Propositional Attitudes
Common Three-Way Equivalence:
• Sentence meanings
• The objects of the attitudes
• The referents of ‘that’-clauses
We can call whatever is all of these things a “proposition.” Now we
have the question: what are propositions?
Facts
Facts are complex entities composed of objects, properties, and
relations “going together” in the world– e.g. objects instantiating
properties and multiple objects instantiating relations.
Facts as Propositions?
There aren’t any “false facts.” But there are:
• Sentences that are false.
• Beliefs that are false.
• Attitude ascriptions that ascribe false attitudes (e.g. beleifs).
States of Affairs
States of affairs are like facts (composed of objects, properties, and
relations “going together”), but they can be merely possible.
The state of affairs Michael is not wearing pants exists, even though
Michael is not not wearing pants. It exists but it fails to obtain. It is
merely possible.
States of Affairs as Propositions?
1. There are no impossible states of affairs, but we can believe or
mean impossible things.
2. The state of affairs Superman can fly is the same state of affairs
Clark Kent can fly, but I can believe that Superman can fly without
believing Clark Kent can fly.
3. States of affairs are not truth-evaluable, but we might think
propositions are: the things we believe are true or false.
4. Compositionality
Compositionality Worry
TRUE: Lois Lane believes
Superman can fly.
FALSE: Lois Lane believe Clark
Kent can fly.
What a Theory of Propositions Needs
Propositions should be:
• Fine-grained
• Truth-evaluable
• Sometimes necessarily false (impossible)
• Compositionally determined
Possible Worlds Semantics
One way of understanding truth conditions is with possible worlds:
The meaning of a sentence S is the set of all possible worlds where that
sentence is true, {w: S is true in w}.
Fine-Grainedness
One of the problems with treating states of affairs as meanings was
that the state of affairs wherein Clark Kent flies is the same state of
affairs wherein Superman flies.
Sets of possible worlds have the same problem: the set of worlds
where Clark Kent flies is the set of worlds where Superman flies.
Thus, on this account, if you believe the one proposition, you believe
the other as well.
Syntactic Structure
Michael
likes
Paisley
Lexicon
The lexicon is a pairing of words with their meanings.
“Michael” →
“Likes” →
“Paisley” →
Structured Proposition
Grain Too Fine?
However, the structured propositions theorist will also be forced to
admit that these are different propositions:
A
&
B
B
&
A
Meaning of “Superman Flies”
Meaning of “Clark Kent Flies”
Senses
Dog
means
grasps
Mind
?
determines
Sense of
“Dog”
Dog
Senses
For Frege, senses are objective: two people who grasp the sense of
‘horse’ are grasping one and the same thing. The sense of a word is
grasped by everyone who understands it
grasp
Thinkers
?
determines
Sense of
“Dog”
Dog
Senses
Each object can be the referent determined by many (perhaps infinite)
senses. That is, many different locutions (with different meanings) can
all pick out the same thing. Some senses have no referent, e.g. ‘the
least rapidly converging series’ or ‘Odysseus.’
Sense of “Michael’s favorite animal”
Mind
?
determines
grasps
?
Sense of “Canine”
?
Sense of “Dog”
Dog