Slovak Transition from
Communism to Capitalism
Jan Pokrivcak
SAU Nitra, Slovakia
jan.pokrivcak@uniag.sk
The Slovak Experience
Slovak Republic
Area: 49 036 km2
Population: 5.4 million
Pop. density: 109 per sq km
Pol. system: parl. democracy
Ethnicity of the population:
Slovak (86%)
Hungarian (10%),
Romany (2%), Czech (1%),
Rusyn, Ukrainian, Russian,
German, Polish and others(1%)
GNI per capita (2005):
US$ 7,600
GDP growth (2007): 8.7%
Contents
• General Overview of Communist
Economic System
• Transition to Capitalism
• The Case of Slovakia and other Central
European Countries
General Overview of Communist Economic System
• Communist economic system = central
planning + state ownership of production
factors
• Communist economic system applied in
countries with one third of the world population,
covering Russia and Mongolia, Central Europe,
Balkan, Baltic Countries, and China, Vietnam
and other offshoots.
• It started in relatively backward agrarian
countries like Russia in 1917.
General Overview of Communist Economic System
Behind Iron Curtain
Source: DeLong: Macroeconomics
General Overview of Communist Economic System
• At the beginning it was not clear which system
(communist or capitalist) more efficient
• Many economists in the West advocated
socialism
• It turned out that communist economic system
is less efficient than free market system
General Overview of Communist Economic System
Planned Economy vs. Market
Source: DeLong: Macroeconomics
General Overview of Communist Economic System
There were still some positive
outcomes of communist economies
•
•
•
•
•
equitable distribution of incomes,
general access to education, health care,
job security,
industrialization (from agrarian countries)
growth of production (in early years)
General Overview of Communist Economic System
But negative outcomes prevailed
• shortages or surpluses,
• slow economic growth in later periods
• technological backwardness because of slow
innovation
• environmental damage by heavy industry
• stagnating social indicators, health, life expectancy,…
• intrusive government due to lack of private incentives
• governments NOT maximizing social welfare but
seeking own advantages (principal-agent problem)
• lack of freedom – dictatorship
General Overview of Communist Economic System
Why communist economies poorer
than market economies?
– Initial conditions (communist countries were
poorer in the first place)
– Communist economies generated lower
rates of economic growth
General Overview of Central Planning
Economic growth in communist period
(% per capita p.a. )
Period
EAST
WEST
1950s
1960s
1970s
1980s
4.5
3.6
2.8
0.8
3.7
4.5
2.8
2.0
Communist economy good at mobilizing resources in
short term, not able to sustain growth in long term.
General Overview of Central Planning
What caused poor performance of
communist economies?
• Central planning
• Property rights
General Overview of Central Planning
Problems with central planning
Imbalances NOT eliminated by price adjustments and
prices do not send signals what is scarce or
prospective and what abundant and useles.
Quantities set directly by central planners. The whole
economy is managed like a single firm (monopoly).
But central planners unable to manage such a huge
firm (ECONOMY): poor info and incentives.
PRICE MECHANISM PERFORMS BETTER THAN
CENTRAL PLANNING.
General Overview of Central Planning
Problems with central planning
Central planning is the story of huge government
failure stemming from:
- inability to collect relevant information on
preferences of consumers, availability of production
methods and technology
- inability to set long-term sustainable goals
Free market economy often faces MARKET FAILURE
Government failure bigger than market failure
General Overview of Central Planning
P
S
K
PA
L
P*
PB
E
N
M
D
Q*
QDA
QSA
Q
General Overview of Central Planning
Problems with property rights
• Rights to use assets and enjoy income from the
use of assets
• In communism all assets owned by the state
• Prices and profits irrelevant.
• Managers not motivated to make profit but to
fulfill quantitative plans.
• Inability to motivate people to work hard
• Punishment for increasing efficiency and
innovation.
Transition
Collapse of communist experiment
and transition
• Communist system failed and was followed by TRANSITION
from central planning to market economy
• During TRANSITION all “rules of the game” (constitution, laws,
codes of behavior, habits, property rights) changed.
i.e., Market economy based on profit seeking
entrepreneurial behavior while entrepreneurship in
communism is considered to be speculation and
trying to avoid hard work and therefore illegal.
Transition
Speed of Transition
•
Two options
1. Big Bang or Shock Therapy
2. Gradual reforms
•
Scope of reforms
–
–
Economic reforms: Liberalization, stabilization,
dismantling communist institutions (CMEA) and subsidies,
privatization, banking system, safety net
Institutional reforms: large-scale privatization, market
oriented legal system and institutions, financial, labor,
retirement regulations (in summary laws, regulations,
institutions)
Transition
Speed of transition
• CEEC and FSU big bang in economic reforms
and variability in institutional reforms.
Havel: “Cannot cross a chasm in two leaps”
• CHINA gradual reforms only.
Deng Xiaoping: “feeling stones to cross the
river”
Transition
Speed of transition
• China vs. CEEC and FSU
– China dictatorship while CEEC and FSU became
democracies, in China reforms conducted by communists in
CEEC by democrats.
– Chinese approach not used in CEEC as reformers (former
dissidents) worried of Russia and return of communists in
their own countries used WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY to
make reforms irreversible.
Transition
Outcome of transition depends on
• Initial conditions
Some countries remembered pre-communist
period and had market skills
Some countries implemented institutions from the
scratch (Slovakia)
Some countries started transition with stable
economy while others from macroeconomic
imbalances
Transition
Outcome of transition depends on
• Liberalization and stabilization policies
– In general the stronger the liberalization the faster recovery
of production
– Stabilization macroeconomic policies crucial
– Important to establish hard budget constraint
Transition
Outcome of transition depends on
• Privatization and regulation
Private firms more efficient than state owned
Methods of privatization
Financial regulation, labor code, regulation of
pension system, taxation
Enforcement of contracts
Functioning of legal system
Transition
Outcome of transition depends on
• Political system
Avoidance of government failure
Elimination of redundant redistribution and rent
seeking
Economic and legal predictability
Sequencing of reforms
EU accession
The Slovak Experience
Short history
•
•
•
•
1918 -1992 Slovakia part of Czechoslovakia.
1948 -1989 - communist country.
1993 - Independent Slovakia in 1993.
2004 - a member of the European Union.
The Slovak Experience
Short economic history – communist
years
• Most of Slovakia agrarian before 1948
• 1950s – 1960s – industrialization and
economic growth
• 1970s – 1980s – economic stagnation
• 1990s – transition to market system and
democracy
The Slovak Experience
Short Economic History – Transition
Years
• Initial decline of output caused (1990 – 1992)
- Creative destruction
• Economic recovery (1993 – 97)
- Fruits of economic reforms
• Slowing down and fiscal problems (1999 – 01)
- Lack of institutional reforms and bad politics
• Strong economic growth (2002 – current time)
- Institutional market reforms and EU accession
The Slovak Experience
Adoption of EURO
ERMII
Slovakia –
consensus
Czech Republic
– cons.
Poland –
consensus
Hungary –
consensus
ERMII Euro adoption
parity
date*
Final
conv.rate*
SKK
rate*
2006
38
2009
35.0
2008
30.4-31
2010-2014
28.5
1.23
2008
3.85*
2009-2012
3.7
9.5
2008 255-260
2012-2014
255
13.7
The Slovak Experience
Current economic performance
• Currently, Slovakia is a fast growing economy
with GDP growth of about 10 % in 2007
• Unemployment rate remains high but declining
(about 10 % in 2009).
• Regional differences: rich Western Slovakia,
poor Eastern Slovakia.
The Slovak Experience
GDP Growth in Slovakia
15
10
5
0
1991
%
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
-30
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
The Slovak Experience
Economic growth
6.0
5.2
3.6
3.9
4.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
2001
2002
2003
2004
Czech Republic
2005
Hungary
2006f
Poland
2007f
2008f
Slovak Republic
average
The Slovak Experience
Unemployment rate
20%
19%
18%
17%
16%
15%
14%
13%
12%
11%
10%
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
Core Unemployment (average)
01
02
03
LT average
04
05
The Slovak Experience
Material distress
14.0%
700
12.0%
600
10.0%
500
8.0%
400
6.0%
300
4.0%
200
2.0%
100
0.0%
0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
number (ths)
% of total population
Note: People in material distress include unemployed as well as people on social benefits that qualify. Material distress is
defined as income below life minimum. However, the number of the poor is greater as the data does not include low income
people (such as pensioners, etc). Some estimates put the poor at 10% instead of 7% in 2005. Source: Ministry of Labour
The Slovak Experience
Structure of Economy
Agriculture
3,5
Services;
67,1
Industry;
29,4
The Slovak Experience
• In the world perspective, SLOVAKIA is an
upper middle income country with a Gross
National Income per capita of US$ 7,600
in 2005.
• In European perspective, Slovakia
achieves about 55% of average income of
25 countries of the EU
0
Latvia
Poland
Lithuenia
Slovakia
Estonia
Hungary
Portugal
Czech R,
Slovenia
Greece
Spain
EU25
Italy
France
Germany
Sweden
UK
Austria
Netherlands
Ireland
GDP per capita
GDP per capita in 2005 in PPS EU25=100%
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
The Slovak Experience
Size of the market
US (1)
Germany (4)
Poland (22)
Czech
Republic (40)
Hungary (44)
Slovak
Republic (50)
GDP (EURbn)
Relative to
German
market
Populat.(m)
Relative to
German
population
10,119
513
265.6
324
1,973
100
81.9
100
403
20.4
38.7
47
170
8.6
10.3
13
139
7.0
10.1
12
62
3.1
5.4
7
Note: GDP adjusted by Purchasing Power Parity, 2004 data. Source: EUROSTAT
The Slovak Experience
Productivity comparison
GDP per hour worked Germany = 100
US
Germany
Austria
UK
Source: OECD
108
100
99
94
Hungary
Slovakia
Czech Republic
Poland
52
49
45
41
Mexico
32
The Slovak Experience
Working habits
Hours worked per year
# of hours
Czech Republic
Poland
Slovakia
USA
UK
Italy
Austria
Germany
France
Netherlands
Source: OECD
1 972
1 956
1 814
1 792
1 673
1 591
1 550
1 446
1 431
1 354
OECD Rank Germany=100%
2
3
7
12
16
18
21
24
25
26
136%
135%
125%
124%
116%
110%
107%
100%
99%
94%
The Slovak Experience
Education
% of population 25-64 having completed at least
upper secondary education
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Germany
UK
Poland
Austria
Hungary
Netherlands
France
Source: Eurostat, 2002 data
Percentage
Rank
87.8
85.8
83.0
81.7
80.8
78.2
71.4
67.6
64.1
1
3
5
7
9
11
14
15
17
The Slovak Experience
Economic freedom
Czech Republic
(21)
Slo vakia (34)
big impro vement in 2004
Hungary (40)
P o land (41)
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
2003 2004 2005 2006
Source: The Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal, Index of Economic Freedom.
The lower the value, the greater the economic freedom.
3
The Slovak Experience
Doing business
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Ease of Doing
Business
Slovakia
Starting a
Business
Dealing w ith
Licenses
Czech republic
The smaller the number, the better
Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2006
Hiring and
Firing
Hungary
Registering
Property
Poland
Getting Credit
Germany
The Slovak Experience
Labor market
Difficulty Rigidity of
of hiring
hours
index
index
Difficulty Rigidity of
of firing employme
index
nt index
Firing
costs
(weeks)
CE average
Czech
Republic
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
18
55
28
34
24
33
20
20
24
22
11
11
17
80
60
60
20
30
40
37
34
39
34
25
13
Germany
44
80
40
55
67
The smaller the number, the better
The Slovak Experience
Informal economy
% of GNI
Informal economy
(% GNI, 2003)
Slovakia
18.9
Czech Republic
19.1
Hungary
25.1
Poland
27.6
CE average
Germany
23
16.3
The Slovak Experience
FDI inflow
% of GDP
12
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
R
ia
s
us
)
l
)
(*
zi
(*
co
i
d
a
a
n
si
ex
Br
y
la
i
M
a
a
al
Th
M
C
na
i
h
)
)
)
ia
R
*)
ry
nd
(*
(*
(*
k
l
(
a
a
d
h
n
n
ce
va
ol
ga
ai
ng
ec
o
e
la
u
P
p
l
u
z
t
e
e
r
S
r
S
H
C
Ir
G
Po
The Slovak Experience
FDI inflow: CE comparison
Slo vakia
P o land
Hungary
Czech Republic
-1,000
1,000
3,000
5,000
7,000
US$
1989-1999
2000-2008
The Slovak Experience
Most attractive sectors in CE in the future
according an Ernst&Young Survey
Car industry
Mass consum
Heavy industry
Telecommunication
Transport
Tourism&leisure
Telecom
Hi-tech services
Chemicals
Hi-tech equipment
Real estate/construction
Financial industry
Pharmacy
0%
28%
28%
27%
19%
16%
12%
12%
11%
11%
10%
9%
9%
7%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
The Slovak Experience
Hourly labor costs in EUR
% of CE
% of EU15
avg
1996
2004E
Feb-06
2.6
5.5
6.5
116.3
24.6
2.7
2.7
2.3
5.2
4.2
4.4
5.7
5.1
5.1
101.0
91.4
91.3
21.3
19.3
19.3
CE Average
2.6
4.8
5.6
100.0
21.1
EU Average
20
25.9
26.6
100.0
25.3
30.4
31.0
116.4
Czech
Republic
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Germany
The Slovak Experience
Corporate profit taxation
Hungary(*)
Slovakia
Poland
Czech Republic
Germany(**)
Netherlands
France
Austria
EU15 average
2004 Corp
tax rate(%)
2006 effective
tax rate(%)
Tax on
dividends(%)
17.6
19
19
28
39.35
34.5
34.3
34
31.3
18.1
16.7
18.0
21.1
36.0
20.0
0.0
20.0
15.0
23.5
The Slovak Experience
Personal tax rate
2004 marginal
tax rate
Slovakia
19
Czech Republic
32
Hungary
38
Poland
40
The Slovak Experience
Government’s role in the economy
revenues as % of GDP
55
50
45
40
35
30
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
1998
2003
Slovakia
The Slovak Experience
Government’s role in the economy
revenues as % of GDP
Conclusions
• Communist experience taught us that:
– Government failure bigger problem than market
failure
– Governments lack information and incentives to
manage economy appropriately
– Property rights play an important role, common
property invites shirking, hinders activity
Conclusions
• Transition taught us that:
– Free market mechanism indispensable
– Soft budget constraint invites irresponsible behavior
– Private property rights important
– Institutions “rules of the game” that reward
productivity rather than redistribution of income are
crucial, “people respond to incentives”
– Good legal system “enforcing contracts” decisive
– Transparent politics promotes economic growth
AGRICULTURAL TRANSITION
2nd part of presentation
Introduction
• In communist countries (before 1989) all economic
activities directly regulated by state, the whole
economy like a single firm.
• Central planners set:
– What firms have to produce
– Trade flows among companies
– Allocation of resources among companies
• Prices set centrally and did not send right signals to
producers and consumers.
Introduction cont.
• Agriculture centrally regulated too.
• Land and farms (cooperatives) de facto owned by
state. Decisions made centrally.
• Land concentrated into large cooperatives.
• Average farm size 1 457 ha in Poland 124 770 ha in
Turkmenistan.
• Farm size in market economies (USA, EU, …) much
smaller.
Average farm size
Workers per 1000 ha
Tractors per 1000
ha
Workers/Tractors per
1000 ha (B/C)
Albania
1 907
628
20
32
Bulgaria
19 464
156
10
15
Czechoslovakia
2 988
156
24
6
Hungary
3 559
158
10
16
Poland
1 157
259
29
9
Romania
2 696
209
15
14
Estonia
4 490
92
16
6
Latvia
4 041
102
15
7
Lithuania
3 094
109
15
7
Armenia
1 621
167
10
16
Azerbaijan
2 765
164
10
17
Belarus
3 417
125
14
9
Georgia
2 148
209
10
21
Kazakhstan
75 555
9
1
7
Kyrgyzstan
21 626
41
3
14
Moldova
2 519
279
25
11
Russia
8 473
50
7
7
Tajikistan
8 352
114
9
12
124 770
7
1
10
Ukraine
3 930
145
11
13
Uzbekistan
13 637
77
7
11
Turkmenistan
Farm size during communism
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Average
farm size
(ha)
1 907
19 464
2 988
3 559
1 157
2 696
4 490
4 041
3 094
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Average
farm size
(ha)
1 621
2 765
3 417
2 148
75 555
21 626
8 473
8 352
124 770
3 930
13 637
Farm size in market economies
Average farm size (ha)
Japan
EU-15
USA
1.24
18
197
Introduction cont.
• 1989 – The Fall of Berlin Wall – collapse of
communist regimes in CEE and FSU
• Transition from centrally planned economy to market
economy.
• Transition involves institutional change (change of
rules of the game in the form of laws, regulations,
property rights, norms, …).
• Institutions constrain behavior of individuals and
through this have impact on productivity of the
economy.
• Market institutions support private incentives.
Communist institutions hinder private incentives.
Introduction: cont.
•
Transition of agriculture involves:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Privatization
Farm restructuring
Price liberalization
Formation of market institutions
Privatization
• During communism land and cooperatives
owned by state. State ownership inefficient.
Incentives to work higher in the case of private
ownership of resources.
• To increase efficiency property rights transferred
from state to private hands – privatization.
• Privatization in agriculture:
– Privatization of land
– Privatization of assets of cooperatives and state farms
Privatization cont.
• Privatization of land in FSU and CEE:
– Restitution to former owners
– Distribution to farm workers
– Combination of restitution and distribution
• Restitution to former owners:
– Land restituted to owners from before nationalization and
collectivization. Historical injustice caused by communism
undone.
– Restitution took place in CEE (except Albania) and in Baltic
States.
– Restitution
feasible
because
nationalization
and
collectivization took place in recent past (after WWII),
documentation exists and former owners or their children
still alive.
Privatization cont.
• Distribution of land among farm workers :
– Land distributed among farm workers in order to create
equitable land ownership.
– Applied in FSU and Albania.
– Restitution infeasible in FSU because of search costs, missing
documentation. Communist regime introduced in FSU after
WWI.
– Combination of distribution and restitution :
– Some land restituted to former owners and some land
distributed among farm workers.
– Applied in Hungary and Romania.
• In some countries (Byelorussia,
Turkmenistan) privatization very limited.
Kazakhstan,
Distribution
Albania
Bulgaria
Czech R.
Hungary
Slovakia
Romania
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kyrgyzstan

Russia

Ukraine

Restitution
Distribution and
restitution












Belarus
Limited privatization
Kazakhstan
Limited privatization
Turkmenistan
Limited privatization
Privatization cont.
• Privatization of farm assets :
– Privatized by restitution and distribution.
– Restitution served to undo former injustice while distribution
compensated workers for their contribution to farm surpluses
created and invested back into cooperatives.
Farm restructuring
• During communism cooperatives and state farms
centrally managed. Farms had to fulfill central plan.
• Restructuring aim was to transform farms such that
they would react to market signals (prices and
competition).
• Two approaches to restructuring:
– New owners could withdraw land from cooperatives
(cooperatives could be dissolved) and establish family farm,
these are the farms prevalent in developed market economies.
– Remaining
cooperatives
transformed.
Communist
cooperatives changed into cooperatives of owners of
property, joint stock companies or limited liability companies.
Farm restructuring cont.
• During restructuring process the average farm
size declined.
• In Slovakia, Czech Republic and in most FSU
countries there are transformed cooperatives
after restructuring.
• In Albania, Baltic States family farms are
dominant.
• Both types of farms present in other countries.
Family farms
Share on land
Farm size (ha)
(%)
Albania
Bulgaria
Czech R.
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Estonia
Latvia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Ukraine
96
44
28
59
87
55
12
94
63
90
32
9
16
24
20
11
7
0.3
4
17
1
20
4
8
2
42
2
12
Transformed coops
Share on land (%)
4
55
72
41
13
45
88
6
37
10
68
91
84
76
80
89
93
99.7
96
83
Farm size (ha)
861
937
312
274
1185
327
297
6 100
2 100
Price liberalization
• Prices are important in market economy. Prices provide
signals to market participants how scarce commodities
are.
• High price may signal high demand. Profit maximizing
firms therefore increase production. Firms allocate
resources to goods with the highest demand which
results in efficient allocation of resources.
• In communism prices regulated by the state. Prices
actually used only as an accounting tool to monitor
state owned firms. Communist regimes therefore
created surpluses of some goods and shortages of other
goods.
Price liberalization cont.
• Price liberalization was an integral part of reforms.
• Generally price liberalization lead to increase of price
level.
• The highest increase of prices observed for agricultural
inputs while prices of agricultural outputs increased
less. The reason was shortage of inputs and surplus of
outputs prior to liberalization.
Development of prices in Slovakia
Development of prices in Hungary
Development of prices in Russia
Formation of market institutions
• Former communist countries had to create institutions
supporting market system.
• They include the creation of safe private ownership
rights, regulations supporting competition and contract
enforcement.
• Many countries, especially FSU, adopted laws
preventing sales and renting of land which laead to
inefficient allocation of resources.
Formation of market institutions cont.
• Some countries lacked full definition of ownership
rights.
• For example, in FSU new owners received shares of
cooperatives not entitlement to a particular parcel.
Direct relationship between land and individual was not
created.
• Better informed managers could constrain rights of less
informed owners.
• There was less of the problem in CEE.
Formation of market institutions cont.
• In overall, in CEE and Baltic States ownership rights
and law enforcement was stronger than in FSU.
The impact of transformation on
agricultural production
• All transition countries experienced the fall of
agricultural production in the first years of transition.
• After 4 years of transition agricultural production
decreased by 40% in Baltic States, 30% in FSU, and by
20% in CEE.
• The initial fall reflected the destruction of the old
system of exchange of commodities while the new
system was just being implemented.
• After the initial fall stabilization ensued. Production in
many countries started to rise. The biggest increase
occurred in Albania, Slovenia and Romania.
The impact of transformation on
agricultural production cont.
• Agricultural production reached pre 1989 level only in
Albania, Slovenia, and Romania.
• In FSU decline of production was bigger than in CEE
and the subsequent rise smaller. The reason is that
property rights were better defined and law
enforcement was stronger in CEE. Agricultural
resources were therefore more efficiently used in CEE
than in FSU.
Development of agricultural production in transitive countries
Kazakhstan
Russia
100
BRSZ
Albania
Index
Czech R.
Poland
Romania
KVSE
Estonia
Baltic States
Počet rokov od začiatku transformačného obdobia
30
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Growth of GAO in Transition Countries (index equals
100 in first year of reform)
Country
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Albania
Bulgaria
Romania
Slovenia
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Belarus
Moldova
Russia
Ukraine
Years after start GAO index in
reform with
year of lowest
lowest GAO
GAO
5
6
5
10
2
7
3
3
8
9
9
9
9
8
9
75
69
77
68
77
57
75
65
41
37
64
57
42
58
51
GAO index after GAO index after
5 years of
10 years of
reform
reform
75
70
77
77
100
63
93
81
55
50
69
61
66
64
69
77
73
85
68
113
62
93
79
55
50
69
61
66
64
69
Growth of ALP (Output per Farm Worker) (index equals
100 in first year of reform)
Country
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Albania
Bulgaria
Romania
Slovenia
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Belarus
Moldova
Russia
Ukraine
Year with
lowest ALP
1
1
3
0
2
9
9
3
1
8
5
4
8
5
8
ALP index in
year of lowest
ALP
99
99
96
100
77
60
59
61
76
49
62
69
41
63
52
ALP index after
5 years of
reform
ALP index after
8 years of
reform
126
175
99
110
108
69
67
85
139
54
62
71
58
63
65
177
220
144
132
104
63
63
Na
163
65
77
87
41
65
52
Growth of Input Use Indexes in Transition Countries (index
is 100 in first year of reform)
Country
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Albania
Bulgaria
Romania
Slovenia
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Belarus
Moldova
Russia
Ukraine
Fertilizers
Tractors
Land
Labor
Animal Stock
5
10
5
10
5
10
5
8
5
10
29
15
35
17
19
25
27
56
17
21
10
25
42
11
24
24
18
38
15
14
14
17
52
20
53
16
40
2
9
11
58
72
114
89
74
69
106
56
106
82
118
92
93
82
92
82
61
113
77
68
51
110
118
109
89
137
62
78
61
68
103
94
99
100
101
98
100
91
107
99
100
98
102
98
100
103
95
98
100
102
98
100
83
106
97
100
97
102
98
99
54
43
89
71
92
92
118
95
40
79
113
8
114
100
106
44
37
97
60
107
99
110
87
35
77
103
73
111
92
102
69
59
81
65
121
47
63
86
50
38
52
79
64
74
75
53
51
69
46
107
42
50
82
32
6
41
64
32
47
41
Growth of Index of Agricultural Yields in Transition
Countries (100 in first year of reform)
Country
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Albania
Bulgaria
Romania
Slovenia
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Belarus
Moldova
Russia
Ukraine
Average agricultural yield
after 5 years of transition
96.3
79.7
87.3
92.3
94.0
68.7
100.7
Na
86.0
82.7
80.7
72.3
Na
72.3
78.3
Average agricultural yield
after 10 years of transition
115.3
98.0
100.0
107.3
100.0
75.7
102.7
Na
100.3
103.7
91.3
75.3
Na
74.7
71.0
Thank you for your attention