Efficiency: Waste

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Prerequisites

Almost essential

Welfare and Efficiency

EFFICIENCY: WASTE

MICROECONOMICS

Principles and Analysis

Frank Cowell

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

Agenda

 Build on the efficiency presentation

• Focus on relation between competition and efficiency

 Start from the “standard” efficiency rules

• MRS same for all households

• MRT same for all firms

• MRS=MRT for all pairs of goods

 What happens if we depart from these rules?

 How to quantify departures from efficiency?

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

Overview

How to evaluate inefficient states

Efficiency: Waste

Background

Basic model

Model with production

Applications

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

The approach

 Use standard general equilibrium analysis to…

• Model price distortion

• Define reference set of prices

 Use consumer welfare analysis to…

• Model utility loss

 Use standard analysis of household budgets to…

• Model change in profits and rents

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

A reference point

 Address the question: how much waste?

 Need a reference point

• where there is zero waste

• quantify departures from this point

 Any efficient point would do

 But it is usual to take a CE allocation

• gives us a set of prices we’re not assuming it is the “default” state

• just a convenient benchmark

 Can characterise inefficiency as price distortion

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

A model of price distortion

Assume there is a competitive equilibrium

If so, then everyone pays the same prices

But now we have a distortion

What are the implications for MRS and MRT?

p

1 p p

2

3

~

= p

1

~

= p

2

~

= p

3 consumer prices

=

… p n

~

= p n

[1

+d]

Distortion firms' prices

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

Price distortion: MRS and MRT

Consumption:

Production:

• for commodities 2,3,…, n

• But for commodity 1…

July 2015

For every household marginal rate of substitution = price ratio

MRS

ij h p

= —

p i j

MRT

MRT

1 j

2 j p j

= — p

1 p j

= — p

2

MRT

3 j p j

= — p

3

… … …

MRT n j p j

= — p n

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste

[1+ d

]

Illustration …

Price distortion: efficiency loss

x

2

• x

• x* Producers

Production possibilities

An efficient allocation

 Some other inefficient allocation

 At x * producers and consumers face same prices

 At x producers and consumers face different prices

 Price "wedge" forced by the distortion p*

0

July 2015

Consumers

How to measure importance of this wedge … x

1

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste

Waste measurement: a method

 To measure loss we use a reference point

 Take this as competitive equilibrium…

• …which defines a set of reference prices

 Quantify the effect of a notional price change:

D p i

:= p i

– p i

*

• This is [actual price of i ] – [reference price of i ]

 Evaluate the equivalent variation for household h :

• EV h = C h (p*, u h ) – C h (p, u h ) – [ y* h –

This is

D

(consumer costs) –

D

(income) y h ]

 Aggregate over agents to get a measure of loss,

L

• We do this for two cases…

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

Overview

Taking producer prices as constant…

Efficiency: Waste

Background

Basic model

Model with production

Applications

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

If producer prices constant…

C ( p , u

)

 x

2

DP

 Production possibilities

 Reference allocation and prices

Actual allocation and prices

 Cost of u at prices p

 Cost of u at prices p*

 Change in valuation of output

C ( p* , u

)

• x

July 2015

0

• x* p p*

 Measure cost in terms of good 2

 Losses to consumers are

C ( p* , u

)

C ( p , u

)

L is difference between

C ( p* , u

)

C ( p , u

) and DP u x

1

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste

Model with fixed producer prices

 Waste

L involves both demand and supply responses

 Simplify by taking case where production prices constant

 Then waste is given by:

Use Shephard’s Lemma

• x i h = H hi ( p , u h ) = C i h ( p , u h )

Take a Taylor expansion to evaluate

L

:

L is a sum of areas under compensated demand curve

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

Overview

Allow supply-side response…

Efficiency: Waste

Background

Basic model

Model with production

Applications

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

Waste measurement: general case

C ( p , u

)

 x

2

DP

 Production possibilities

 Reference allocation and prices

Actual allocation and prices

 Cost of u at prices p

 Cost of u at prices p*

 Change in valuation of output

C ( p* , u

)

 Measure cost in terms of good 2

• x

• x* p p* u

 Losses to consumers are

C ( p* , u

)

C ( p , u

)

 L is difference between

C ( p* , u

)

C ( p , u

) and DP

July 2015

0 x

1

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste

Model with producer price response

 Adapt the

L formula to allow for supply responses

 Then waste is given by:

• where q i

(∙) is net supply function for commodity i

Again use Shephard’s Lemma and a Taylor expansion:

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

Overview

July 2015

Working out the hidden cost of taxation and monopoly…

Efficiency: Waste

Background

Basic model

Model with production

Applications

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste

Application 1: commodity tax

 Commodity taxes distort prices

• Take the model where producer prices are given

• Let price of good 1 be forced up by a proportional commodity tax t

• Use the standard method to evaluate waste

• What is the relationship of tax to waste?

 Simplified model:

• identical consumers

• no cross-price effects…

…impact of tax on good 1 does not affect demand for other goods

 Use competitive, non-distorted case as reference:

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

A model of a commodity tax

p

1 revenue raised = tax x quantity

D p

1 p

1

* compensated demand curve

L

 Equilibrium price and quantity

 The tax raises consumer price…

 …and reduces demand

 Gain to the government

 Loss to the consumer

Waste

 Waste given by size of triangle

 Sum over h to get total waste

 Known as deadweight loss of tax

D x

1 h x

1

* x

1 h

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

Tax: computation of waste

An approximation using Consumer’s Surplus

The tax imposed on good 1 forces a price wedge

D p

1 is the untaxed price of the good h’ s demand for good 1 is lower with the tax:

= tp

1

* > 0 where is p

1

* x

1

** rather than x where x

1

** = x

1

*

1

*

+ D x

1 h and

D x

1 h < 0

Revenue raised by government from h :

• x

1

** = x

Absolute size of loss of consumer’s surplus to h is

T h = tp

1

*

1

**

D p

1

|D

CS h

| = ∫ x

1 h d p

1

≈ x

= T h − ½ t p

1

**

1

*

> 0

D p

D x

1

1 h

− ½ D x

> T h

1 h

D p

1

Use the definition of elasticity

• e

:= p

1

D x

1 h / x

1 h

D p

1

< 0

Net loss from tax (for h ) is

L h =

|D

CS h

| − T h = − ½ tp

= − ½ t eD p

1 x

1

** = − ½

1

* t e

D x

T h

1 h

Overall net loss from tax (for h ) is

• ½

| e| tT uses the assumption that all consumers are identical

July 2015 Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste

Size of waste depends upon elasticity

p

1 p

1 compensated demand curve

 Redraw previous example

 e low: relatively small waste

 e high: relatively large waste

D p

1 p

1

* x

1 h

D p p

1

1 p

1

*

D x

1 h

D p

1 p

1

* p

1 x

1 h

D p

1 p

1

*

D x

1 h

D x

1 h x

1 h x

1 h

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

D x

1 h

Application 1: assessment

 Waste inversely related to elasticity

• Low elasticity: waste is small

• High elasticity: waste is large

 Suggests a policy rule

• suppose required tax revenue is given

• which commodities should be taxed heavily?

• if you just minimise waste – impose higher taxes on commodities with lower elasticities

 In practice considerations other than waste-minimisation will also influence tax policy

• distributional fairness among households

• administrative costs

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

Application 2: monopoly

 Monopoly power is supposed to be wasteful…

• but why?

 We know that monopolist…

• charges price above marginal cost so it is inefficient …

…but how inefficient?

 Take simple version of main model

• suppose markets for goods 2, …, n are competitive

• good 1 is supplied monopolistically

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

Monopoly: computation of waste (1)

Monopoly power in market for good 1 forces a price wedge

D p

1 p

1

** p

1

*

= p

1

* * − p

1

*

> 0 where is price charged in market is marginal cost (MC) h’ s demand for good 1 is lower under this monopoly price:

• x

1

**

= x

1 where

D x

*

1 h

+ D x

< 0

1 h ,

Same argument as before gives:

• loss imposed on household h : loss overall:

− ½ D p

1

− ½ D p

1

D x

1 h

D x

1

, where x

1

> 0 is total output of good 1 using definition of elasticity e

, loss equals

− ½ D p

1

2 e x

1

* *

/ p

1

* *

To evaluate this need to examine monopolist’s action…

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

Monopoly: computation of waste (2)

 Monopolist chooses overall output

• use first-order condition

• MR = MC:

 Evaluate MR in terms of price and elasticity:

• p

1

* * [ 1 + 1 / e

]

FOC is therefore p

1

* * hence

D p

1

= p

1

* * −

[ 1 + 1 /

MC = − p e

] = MC

1

* * / e

 Substitute into triangle formula to evaluate measurement of loss:

• ½ p

1

* * x

1

* * / | e|

 Waste from monopoly is greater, the more inelastic is demand

• Highly inelastic demand: substantial monopoly power

• Elastic demand: approximates competition

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

Summary

 Starting point: an “ideal” world

• pure private goods

• no externalities etc

• so CE represents an efficient allocation

 Characterise inefficiency in terms of price distortion

• in the ideal world MRS = MRT for all h , f and all pairs of goods

 Measure waste in terms of income loss

• fine for individual

OK just to add up?

 Extends to more elaborate models

• straightforward in principle

• but messy maths

 Applications focus on simple practicalities

• elasticities measuring consumers’ price response

• but simple formulas conceal strong assumptions

Frank Cowell: Efficiency-Waste July 2015

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