Ethics of Climate Change

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Responding to Global Warming:
Ethical Dimensions
Sean McAleer, Ph.D.
Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
UW - Eau Claire
27 March 2013
ECON 268
Topics
1. Basic Concepts
2. The Tragedy of the Commons
3. Justice
4. Pascal’s Wager and Global Warming
1. Basic Concepts
a. Moral Agency: the capacity to act on/for moral
reasons
b. Moral Standing: who/what counts morally
[i.e., whose interests ought a moral agent
consider]
c. Moral Significance: how much something counts
morally [i.e., how much weight ought a moral
agent give x’s interests?]
d. A criterion: x has moral standing iff …
… x is rational?
… x is sentient?
… x is alive?
2. Tragedy of the Commons
Suppose a grazing pasture is a commons, regulated
only by voluntary self-restraint; what will happen?
Carrying capacity
What is individually rational may be collectively
irrational.
How might the tragedy be avoided?
– Central authority
– Privatization
Is the atmosphere a commons?
Problems of collective action/agency
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Other
You
Confess
Don’t Confess
Confess
< 5, 5 >
< 10, 1 >
Don’t Confess
< 1, 10 >
< 3, 3 >
What should you do, acting in your own interest?
If the other confesses then you should ……… ?
If the other doesn’t confess then you should ……… ?
The other will either confess or not confess.
Therefore, you. should ……… ?
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Other
You
Confess
Confess
< 5, 5 >
Don’t Confess
< 1, 10 >
Don’t Confess
< 10, 1 >
< 3, 3 >
Won’t the other do the same, if she’s rational?
How do you both end up, acting from self-interest?
Suppose you can confer before entering your plea -- what deal
should you make?
What should you say, when you’re asked for your plea?
A less artificial example
Other
Egoist
Egoist
Altruist
Dog-eat-dog King of the
world
You
Altruist
Sucker!
Pretty Good
What should you be, acting in your own
interest?
If the other is rational, what will the outcome be?
Even if you’ve made a deal, do you have an
incentive to free-ride?
3. Justice
a. Distributive Justice: How should access to a finite
resource be allocated?
Justice and equality?
Think of the atmosphere as a sink into which we
dump our waste gasses.
b. Compensatory Justice: How much does A owe B
for harming B?
3a. Distributive Justice
i. Time-slice principles (e.g., Rawls’ egalitarianism)
ii. Historical principles (e.g., Nozick’s voluntarism)
Access-allocation is just if …
Equal Share: … every country has equal per capita access to
the sink
Benefit the Worst-off: … it is to the benefit of the worst off
countries
Economic Activity Principle: … every country has equal per
unit of economic activity access to the sink
Economic Efficiency Principle: … every country’s access is
proportional to its economic efficiency
Utilitarianism: … it leads to the greatest net happiness for all
Voluntarism: … it is the result of voluntary exchange
Choosing principles of distributive justice
Rawls’s Veil of Ignorance procedure:
1. Imagine that you are ignorant of various material facts that might make
you select principles that would benefit only you or members of your
group(s) – e.g., race, sex, education level, ethnicity, religious
affiliation, nationality, etc.
2. Assume rational self-interest.
3. Choose principles of distributive justice that will further your interests.
Rawls: Principles chosen from this original position of equality would
be fair (because they would secure unanimous consent).
No reasonable, self-interested person would choose a principle
benefiting white men, for example, since from behind the veil of
ignorance you don’t know whether you’re white or a man.
Relevance to global warming?
Rawls’ Difference Principle(s)
Rawls thinks that from behind the veil of ignorance
you’d choose the following principle:
Goods are to be distributed equally …
unless an unequal distribution would
(a) benefit everyone OR
(b) benefit the least well-off
Nozick’s Argument Against
Time-Slice Principles
Suppose some time-slice principle allocates
x. How could subsequent voluntary
exchanges of x fail to be just, even if the
subsequent distribution violates the time-slice
principle?
Conditions on voluntariness:
 mental competence;
 adequate information;
 absence of fraud;
 absence of coercion.
4. Global Warming, Pascal’s Wager,
and the Precautionary Principle
a.
b.
c.
d.
Examples of the PP
Structure of the PP
Pascal’s Wager
Precaution and paralysis?
4a. Examples
Rio Declaration (1992):
Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.
4a. Examples
The Wingspread version (1998):
Where an activity raises threats of harm to
the environment or human health,
precautionary measures should be taken
even if some cause and effect relationships
are not fully established scientifically. In this
context the proponent of an activity, rather
than the public bears the burden of proof.
4a. Examples
UNESCO (2005):
When human activities may lead to morally
unacceptable harm that is scientifically plausible but
uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish
that harm.
Morally unacceptable harm refers to harm to humans or the
environment that is
• threatening to human life or health, or
• serious and effectively irreversible, or
• inequitable to present or future generations, or
• imposed without adequate consideration of the human
rights of those affected.
4b. PP: Structure
DAMAGE CONDITION
KNOWLEDGE CONDITION
REMEDY
Serious
Possible
Ban
Harmful
Suspected
Moratorium
Catastrophe
Reasonable
Promote Alternatives
Irreversible
Not proven beyond ……
that the activity won’t
create the damage
Reduce uncertainty
Diminish negative
consequences
4c. The PP & Pascal’s Wager
What you believe and how you act
Theism
Atheism
God exists
What the
facts are
God doesn’t
exist
Pascal’s wager gives a prudential reason for theism,
not an epistemic reason.
4c. The PP & Pascal’s Wager
What you believe and how you act
What the
facts are
Theism
Atheism
God exists
Eternal bliss
Eternal
torment
God doesn’t
exist
Minor loss
Minor gain
4c. The PP & Pascal’s Wager
What you believe and how you act
Drastically cut
CO2
What the
facts are
GW is real &
anthropogenic
GW isn’t real or
anthropogenic
Don’t
drastically cut
CO2
4c. The PP & Pascal’s Wager
What you believe and how you act
GW is real &
anthropogenic
Avoided
catastrophe
Don’t
drastically cut
CO2
Enabled
catastrophe
GW isn’t real or
anthropogenic
Minor (?)
economic loss
Minor (?)
economic gains
Drastically cut
CO2
What the
facts are
What happens if we apply the to the remedy PP suggests?
Many Gods objection to Pascal’s Wager.
4d. Precaution and Paralysis
The worry: as commonsensical as it sounds,
strong versions of the PP lead to paralysis
•the remedy the PP proposes might itself be
potentially catastrophic
•not adopting the potentially catastrophic
remedy might itself be potentially
catastrophic
What are the odds of dying?
… in a motor-vehicle accident
… from a fall involving furniture
… from falling out of a building
… by accidentally drowning
… from exposure to smoke, fire, flames
… ignition or melting of nightwear
… from exposure to natural cold
… being struck by lightning
… suicide
… assault by firearm
… legal execution
… alcohol poisoning
one year
lifetime
1 / 6,584
1 / 329,319
1/ 475,100
1 / 83,365
1 / 95, 968
1 / 59,672,595
1 / 574,880
1 / 6,348,148
1 / 8,960
1 / 23,326
1 / 6,215,895
1 / 847,622
1 / 85
1 / 4,238
1 / 6,115
1 / 1,073
1 / 1,235
1 / 767,987
1 / 7,399
1 / 81,701
1 / 115
1 / 300
1 / 79,999
1 / 10,909
Source: The National Safety Council
<http://www.nsc.org/news_resources/injury_and_death_statistics/Documents/Odds%20of%20Dying.pdf>
Some Resources
Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (Yale University
Press, 2004).
Neil Manson, “Formulating the Precautionary Principle.” Environmental
Ethics 24 (2002): 263-74.
Stephen Gardiner, “Ethics and Global Climate Change.” Ethics 114
(2004): 555-600.
Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction (Cambridge
University Press, 2008).
Stephen Gardiner et al., eds., Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (Oxford
University Press, 2010).
Cass Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle
(Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Jonathan Westphal, ed., Justice (Hackett, 1996).
Andrew Brennan, “Environmental Ethics.” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/
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