Is America Heading Toward
Partisan Realignment?
Thomas F. Schaller
Guest Lectures, Dr. Nick Miller
POLI 100, Spring 2008
Partisan Realignments
• Sudden, significant and durable shift in partisanship
– Measurable in partisan changes among both masses (i.e., voting,
registration, identification) and elites (i.e., offices held, majority
control, parties’ apparatus and resources)
– Realigning elections hallmark the start of a party era/system in
which one party dominates for an extended period; deviating
elections punctuate that dominance, as the minority party wins
presidency, congressional majorities and/or subnational offices
• Partisan cycling effects
– Newly-emergent issues, coupled with the inevitable generational
replacement of old voters with new, reduces the dominant party’s
control, leaving power at an imbalance
– A period of partisan instability ensues, marked by creative
destruction and the rise of splinter or third parties, new coalitions,
and party converts
Brief History
1860
•
Lincoln wins with a 40 percent plurality of the vote, but wins re-election decidedly. Slavery provides
issue catalyst that coalesces vestiges of Whigs and nascent parties into Republican Party, which
dominates electoral politics for next three decades – interrupted only by the two, non-consecutive
deviating terms won by Grover Cleveland, each with only a plurality of the vote.
1896
•
On the heels of a catastrophic economic downturn, William McKinley wins two terms, commencing
another, albeit distinct period of GOP dominance for the ensuing three decades, interrupted only by the
two deviating terms of Woodrow Wilson, each won with only a plurality of the vote.
1932
•
Fueled by the economic hardships of the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt wins the first of four
solid victories (five straight for the Democrats, counting Harry Truman’s 1948 win), with only moderate
war-hero Republican Dwight Eisenhower’s two terms interceding between FDR and LBJ.
1968
•
The partisan wheels come off. Richard Nixon wins with a plurality of the vote, becoming the first
president in American history in his initial election whose party fails to carry at least one chamber of
Congress. Though winning in a landslide, he is forced to resign to avoid impeachment.
What follows is a period of dealignment and unprecedented divided (and often divisive) government:
– All but Carter’s four years, Clinton’s first two, and Bush43’s recent two are split governments.
– Partisan registration and attachments decline, and an entire post-Vietnam, post-Watergate
generation fails to be socialized politically as earlier generations had.
– Independents, soft partisans and split-ticketing voting rise.
– Two impeachment attempts, various congressional scandals, rejected Court nominations, etc.
AND YET, amid the chaos there is a gradual, quantifiable rise in the Republican Party’s
fortunes, hallmarked by Ronald Reagan’s solid election and re-election, the Newt
Gingrich-led House revolution and subsequent maintenance of congressional majorities.
Partisan Control of State Legislatures
1 00%
80%
6 0%
4 0%
2 0%
Dem ocrats
Repu blicans
2004
2000
1996
1992
1988
1984
1980
1976
1972
1968
0%
Div ided
Partisan Control of Governorships
1 00%
80%
6 0%
4 0%
2 0%
Dem ocrats
Repu blicans
2001
1997
1993
1989
1985
1981
1977
1973
1969
0%
Independents
Purple Parity America?
• Presidency: George Bush elected by 271-267
electoral vote margin and negative popular vote
margin of 0.5% nationally; re-elected by smallest
percentage of re-elected presidents in a century.
• Congress: GOP had 30-seat House majority and 10seat Senate edge before 2006 Dems now have 30seat House majority, 2-seat Senate majority.
• Governors: Relatively divided—GOP had 28-22
before, Dems now have 28 governors.
• State legislative majorities: Before 2006: GOP 20,
Dem 19, split 10; after: Dem 23, GOP 15, split 11.
• State legislators. Prior to 2006 were GOP 49.5; Dem
49.5 – GOP edge was just 64 seats nationally, now a
Democratic edge of about 258 seats.
Electoral College Trends
• You just lived through the two most stable presidential
elections in American history: Just three states (NH, IA,
NM) flipped between 2000 and 2004—the fewest since
Washington ran the table back-to-back in 1788 & 1792.
• The map is highly bifurcated: In 1960, an election won
by .2% in popular vote, there were 14 “comfortable”
statewide wins (10%+), 6 of which were “blowouts”
(20%+); by 2000, an election “won” by -.5%, there were
28 comfortable wins, of which 14 were blowouts.
• The Non-Southern calculus is here: Democrats won the
popular vote three of past four elections, and got 270
non-southern electoral votes in 1992 and 1996, and
came within one state of doing so in 2000 and 2004.
The End of the “Vital Center”
Abramowitz (2007), CCES data
Simon & Schuster
October 2006
Democratic Party Decline in the South, 1960-2004
100
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
US S e n a t e
US Ho u s e
Go v e rn o rs
S t a t e Ho u s e
'04
'02
'00
'98
'96
'94
'92
'90
'88
'86
'84
'82
'80
'78
'76
'74
'72
'70
'68
'66
'64
'62
10
'60
Percentage of Seats
90
The Non-Southern Strategy
Makes sense no matter how you slice it:
 Ideology: Why would the more liberal and progressive of the
two parties start to rebuild itself in the most conservative
region of the country?
 Demography: Why would a female-led, multi-racial, unionoriented, urban/inner-suburban, more secular party rebuild
itself in the least gender-gapped, most racially-polarized,
least unionized, most rural and evangelized region?
 History: The Northeast and West outvoted the South from
1860-1932; the Northeast flipped and, along with the South,
outvoted the West from 1932-1968; the South flipped and,
along with the West, outvoted the Northeast from 1968 to
today. The West is due to flip next, recreating the same map
the GOP used to dominate politics from 1860-1932.
 Numerics: The South has basically cast the same share of
electors for 13 decades—between 27 percent and 31 percent.
Regional Share of Electoral Votes, 1880-2000
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1880s
1890s
1900s
1910s
1920
South
1930s
1940s
Northeast
1950s
Midwest
1960s
Far West
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
Where the Seats Were Won
• Governors: 5 of 6 new Democratic governors (84%)
won outside the South: AR, CO, MD, MA, NY, & OH.
• Senate: 5 of the 6 new Democratic senators (84%) won
outside the South: MO, MT, OH, PA, RI & VA.
• House: 24 of 30 new Democratic House members
(83%) from non-southern districts, including 21 from
the Northeast and Midwest alone.
• State legislatures: All but two dozen of the 300+ net
new Democratic state legislators (92%) from outside
the South, including all 10 chambers majorities—and
17 of 18 chambers won during 2004 & 2006 cycles.
• President: Kerry won 14 states by 5+%→183 electors;
Bush won 25 by 5+%→213. They split other 12, only
one of which is in South: Florida. The remaining 11
are: CO, IA, MI, MN, NV, NH, NM, OH, OR, PA & WI.
Are we poised for a realignment?
Yes
• Cyclical effect times out nearly to perfection
– 1860 + 36 = 1896 + 36 = 1932 + 36 = 1968 + 36 = 2004!
• Realigning issue of 9/11 (favors Republicans?)
– Long-held GOP issue advantage on defense/foreign policy
– Bush the incumbent ran hard on post 9/11 realigning issue: terrorism
• Secular demographic trends (favor Democrats?)
– Ethnic minority share of population increasing (Hispanics surpass Blacks)
– Progressive “ideopolis” growth (Judis/Teixeira)
– Increased social/religious tolerance
No
• Postmodern citizen preference for divided government (Fiorina)
– Too many registered independents, self-identified non-partisans
– Partisan polarization, inter-party dislike relatively stable
• Electoral system less responsive to political shocks
–
–
–
–
Redistricting immunizes incumbents of both parties; produces ideologues
Blue state/red state polarization (from 14/6 in ’60 to 28/14 in ’00)
Parties (or surrogates) equally adept in GOTV efforts and fundraising
Media interest in partisan balance, fractiousness