A REVIEW OF BOUNDARY LAW, Thomas B. Olson, November 2010
INTRODUCTION
Much has changed, while some remains the same, with boundary resolution in 2010.
People still care passionately about land they purchased, or thought they owned. They can be
surprised with the outcome of a survey; surveyors can disagree (gasp); monuments cannot be
found; and in outstate, much surveying remains to be done as methodology has changed.
This article describes the developments in the law of adverse possession and boundary by
practical location, the two theories under which boundary disputes are litigated. It will focus
attention on the impact of case law and statutory change over the past 5 years.
Adverse Possession is an action which is, in a sense, created by a statute of limitation. The
statute simply says that one cannot recover land that one has not held in one’s possession within
15 years. Another section authorizes the action to determine boundaries, whether abstract or
Torrens property.
Practical Location is a separate approach where boundaries can be established, that can—under
some circumstances—be achieved in less than 15 years.
KEY ISSUES
Issues in resolving boundary disputes involve a few key elements.

Usually, it will be unnecessary to have paid real estate taxes in order to successfully claim
ownership to land adversely, but there are exceptions. When and under what circumstances?

While a Torrens title is perfect against a claim of adverse possession, a boundary may be
established in certain limited circumstances by Practical Location. The claimant needs to
know where he believes the boundary to be. Under Practical Location pleading is more
rigorous, and one cannot hope to prove Practical Location when one has only pleaded
Adverse Possession.

The claimant can often, but not absolutely always, rely on his predecessor’s possession, a
process called tacking. With the huge increase in foreclosures, it is not clear whether the
foreclosing lender has the same right to a boundary.
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com

When is the statute of limitations tolled? When is the running of the statute of limitations
interrupted, and when is it not?
Counseling is necessary, perhaps emotional as well as legal. One must assert one’s rights; but
one could get more than one’s hand slapped if one relies on self-help, and oversteps.
We will consider these key issues individually before discussing the separate avenues of adverse
possession and boundaries by practical location.
REAL ESTATE TAXES
In boundary cases, it is usually not a requirement to have paid property tax to claim the
property successfully.1 The general rule is that tax payment by the claimant is not required in a
boundary line case2, however, when tax payment is obligatory, five years of consecutive payment
is required. The exception is where a claim comprises a separate tax parcel.3 Where the claim is
to a large portion of a tax parcel, the claimant is not protected by the boundary line exception; he
must have paid the real estate taxes.4
In LeGro v. Saterdalen, the court held that real estate taxes need not have been paid even
though, arguably, the claimant sought ownership of a separately taxed parcel, The facts indicate
some confusion in the tax assessor’s office with the court concluding the claimant had paid the
taxes as occupied.5
TACKING and PRIVITY.
In today’s market, a client seldom owns a piece of real estate for at least 15 years. If a
claim will rely on possession by earlier owners, then the plaintiff must have been in privity with
them. Customarily, a direct chain of title suffices, such as when Blackacre was sold by Olson to
Johnson; Johnson sold to Nelson; Nelson sold to Anderson; and Anderson sold to Peterson.
The claimant of adverse possession does not need to show that she or he held possession
of the property for 15 years if their predecessors in title can be shown to have possessed
the property.6
Privity exists if the relation between various parties comes about through deed, voluntary
conveyance, will, or descent.7
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
In a 2009 Court of Appeals decision, the court rejected the claimant’s tacking effort. The
court required a showing that each former owner was in privity and maintained hostile
possession.8
The ownership of a corporation might also be tacked; but the court has required some
overt use of the property by an officer of the corporation.
But since appellant's predecessor in title was a corporation, and there was no showing
that corporate officers or agents used the land, Kroiss and appellant are not in privity.
Thus, Kroiss's ownership cannot be tacked to appellant's to satisfy the requirements for
adverse possession.9
As noted, the rise in foreclosures may give rise to additional issues. Given the volume of
foreclosures that have occurred, one might expect that case law would have resolved the
existence of privity by some foreclosing lender or its successor. This author frequently
represents lenders in contested title litigation, at times including boundary or access issues. No
truly dispositive decision has been found to date.
There is one old case which sheds some
light on this issue. In Hanson v. Sommers10, following foreclosures on both sides of a tangled
chain of title, Hanson remained in possession of the property. Hanson permitted a tenant to take
over for the remainder of the statutory period. The Supreme Court ruled: “No doubt can arise
that there was here a privity of estate between the successive wrongful holders requisite to enable
allowance of the privilege of tacking.” But this decision does not adequately resolve the issue
because the Court deemed Hanson and his tenant’s possessions in sequence had adequate
standing alone and apart from the foreclosure.
Dictum from another decision may imply that when a mortgagee becomes owner and
does not take physical possession, the actual and continuous possession might be interrupted.
The case actually turned on the decision that an earlier quiet title action went uncontested by the
defaulting fee owners, whose rights were forfeited along with those of the lender who was not
even named in the action.11
Plainly, privity exists between an owner and a lender. It may be seen as problematic if
the lender forecloses the owner and an assignee of a judgment creditor of the owner, or of a
holder of a townhouse lien purchases the Sheriff certificate and redeems from the foreclosure
sale. While it is not clear how the modern court might treat some foreclosing lender’s
succeeding lien holder’s subsequent purchaser, this nonetheless provides some indication that a
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
foreclosure in the chain does not wipe out every vestige of rights. Personally this author would
argue that it is better for society that the requirement of privity be relaxed in favor of the more
important factor: permanent resolution of boundary disputes where use and possession has been
constant.
TOLLING
An attorney should resist the temptation to appear tough and forceful to clients by
assisting them to demolish a fence, set fire to a shed or chain off an access road. And don’t
permit clients to do it without you, either. There may be instances where some forceful act really
is necessary, such as when some right is expiring. On occasion, though very seldom, it will be
essential to stop the running of the statute of limitations (tolling the statute).
Tolling is important to an attorney who wants to prevent the 15-year statute from running
against his/her client. A lawsuit will generally toll the statute of limitations, provided the lawsuit
is maintained to its conclusion. The general rule is that commencement of a lawsuit usually
stops the running of the statute of limitations in adverse possession cases.12
Osgood v. Stanton,13 involves an unusual intersection between the Court of Appeals’
rejection of the claimants’ effort to tack periods of possession and the consequence of tolling of
the statute of limitations. The outcome of this case may, in part, be attributed to evident irascible
behavior of a litigant. Osgood possessed a tract of land for well over 15 years, but the 15 year
period was interrupted by two lawsuits. He sought to include part of his own period of
possession prior to one of the lawsuits to reach the required 15 years. The Court of Appeals
essentially ruled that one of the cases was pursued to conclusion and therefore interrupted the
running of the statute of limitations, and that the two periods could not be tacked together. The
conclusion drawn is that the way to interrupt the running of a statute of limitations is to sue, but
the claimant must complete the lawsuit. Otherwise, the statute can continue running and then
expire.
A lawyer must also not allow a client to interfere with a surveyor asking to enter land to
do field work.
It is lawful for any surveyor to enter upon any land for the purpose of locating
existing survey or reference monuments or landmarks, provided, however, such
surveyor shall be responsible to the landowner for any and all damages as a result
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
of such entry, and no surveyor may enter upon any land unless first notifying the
owner or occupant of the intended entry for such purpose.14
It should be noted also that no surveyor may remove older stakes.15
BASICS OF ADVERSE POSSESSION
Ganje v. Schuler establishes the basic elements of Adverse Possession.
To show adverse possession, the disseizor must show, by clear and convincing evidence,
an actual, open, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession for the requisite period of time
which, under our statute, is 15 years.16
As a general rule, adverse possession is unavailable against registered Torrens property. 17 One
decision states:
By affording a method of acquiring a decree of registration and a certificate of
title free from all adverse claims and encumbrances not noted on the certificate,
the Torrens law confers a conclusive title on the holder of a certificate.18
Perhaps counter-intuitively, boundaries established by adverse possession or by practical
location of boundary will supersede the outcome of an indisputably correct survey.19
To establish actual possession the claimant must have some domination and control over
the property. The degree of possession will vary based on the type of property. Working farm
land for the summer has been sufficient.20
In one case, “substantive and frequent” agricultural
and homestead-related uses of the land, including mowing the lawn, was sufficient.21
The 15-year period may involve a period that ended/was interrupted before the lawsuit.
Because ownership effectively transfers at the completion of a 15-year period of possession
meeting all the statutory requirements, a period of a few years could then ensue where another
has taken possession, ousting the former adverse possessor. But if the claimant’s possession
ripened into title by passage of 15 years, then even though interrupted by a new possession, the
property can be recovered and title settled in the name of the claimant (provided a new 15-year
period of adverse possession has not expired).22
Sporadic use is not enough to constitute actual possession. One of the most troublesome
areas is analysis of the type of use to determine whether it both meets actual and continuous
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
rules. This is truly determined on a case-by-case basis. Uses that were not sufficient in one
decision turn out to be just enough to transfer title in another as evidenced in the following cases:

Sporadic use of lake property to store a dock, play equipment, mowing the grass and
allowing children to play on property has been held to be insufficient by itself.23

In contrast, a recent, although unpublished Court of Appeals case24 distinguished
Stanard although it involved use that was comparable. Possibly an unstated rationale for
the decision was that the claimant had deeded the land away inadvertently. The court
found very slight maintenance to be sufficient to warrant grant of ownership based on
both adverse possession and boundary by practical location.

In Nash v. Mahan,25 staking land was not enough; but mowing a part of the land did
suffice.

In a case the author tried, appellant argued the claimed area was wild, not maintained,
and therefore not possessed. The court held claimant’s use was appropriate to the area as
the owners had gone for walks in the wooded area, children had ridden BMX bikes, and
horses were ridden there. The District Court and Court of Appeals held the possession
was sufficient and appropriate to the area.26

Along those same lines, the use required in a rural area may be less than in more
developed areas. In a 2009 unpublished Court of Appeals opinion, cattle pasturing and
duck hunting was enough for various areas.27
That possession must be continuous seems fairly obvious, but there are a few nuances.
Possession must be uninterrupted in any way.28 Further, though the possession is subsequently
interrupted, if it had continued for 15 years before the interruption, title has ripened and should
be established. To maintain a title acquired by adverse possession, it is not necessary to continue
the adverse possession beyond the time when title is acquired.29 However, a four month absence
from the state was ruled not a substantial interruption in the continuity of possession.30
While the possession must be open, this does not mean that the owner must have seen it;
just that the possession is visible. In this context the author has argued that a buried pipeline or
invisible dog fence does not constitute open possession.
“The Hickersons argue that the improvements were not ‘open, notorious, and
hostile’ because the improvements may not have been visible to their
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
predecessors in title from adjoining Green Gables Road. We construe ‘open,’
however, to mean visible from the surroundings, or visible to one seeking to
exercise his rights.”31
Where a statute of limitations is operating to bar his rights, the record “legal” owner should be on
notice through the claimant’s open possession that his property is being seized.
Exclusive possession will not be defeated by a “brief and insubstantial entry” by the true
owner.32
Hostile possession simply refers to an intention to claim the property as one’s own, a use
that goes on without permission by the true owner.
To establish hostility, which does not mean personal animosity or physical violence, the
disseizor must “enter and take possession of the lands as if they were his own... with the
intention of holding for himself to the exclusion of others.” Id. at 110; hle v. Prosser, 293
Minn. 183, 190, 197 N.W.2d 458, 462 (1972). The disseizor's actions must provide
“unequivocal notice to the true owner that someone is in possession in hostility to his
title.” Skala v. Lindbeck, 171 Minn. 410, 413, 214 N.W. 271, 272 (1927). “Hostility is
flexibly determined by examining the character of the possession and the acts of
ownership of the occupant.”33
A variety of actions can defeat a claim of hostility, including acknowledging another’s
ownership, consent, or even implied consent. A claimant can defeat his own claim where he
admits the ownership of his neighbor. An acknowledgment by the adverse claimant of the
owner's title before the statute has run in his favor breaks the continuity of his adverse
possession, and it cannot be tacked to any subsequent adverse possession.34
One recent decision distinguishes an offer to purchase that was only an effort to clear a
disputed title:
But whether Siegel's attempted purchase was intended only to perfect the title or instead
demonstrated that he had never considered the land to be his own is a fact
question. Siegel's attempt to purchase the land is but one fact among several that support
the district court's finding that Siegel's possession was never hostile.35
However, the opposite result was reached in Winfield v. Kasel,36 where an adverse claimant first
executed a lease for the disputed land, then prosecuted this suit successfully claiming he owned
up to a fence by virtue of adverse possession. The Court relied on the fact the statute of
limitations had already expired.37
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
A wise attorney will therefore carefully denominate any offer of settlement to purchase,
take an easement, etc., as protected under Rule 408, Minnesota Rules of Evidence, pertaining to
offers of compromise.
In order for possession to be adverse, it cannot be commenced or continued with the
consent of the legal owner. The consent makes the possession non-hostile.
…where an occupant's original possession of land was permissive the statute of
limitations did not commence to run against the owner until the occupant had
subsequently declared or otherwise manifested an adverse holding and notice
thereof had been brought to the attention of the owner.38
While formal consent clearly defeats the hostile element that is required, even an implied consent
has been ruled to overcome hostile possession.
The Court has implied consent where there
was a close family relationship between original owners and the ownership was then separated.
This can occur when a farmer sells off and divides part of the farm to a son or daughter who
holds part of the land still within the seller’s legal description. Until the daughter or son sells to
a non family member, the use is deemed permissive.39
There are other limits on adverse possession. Minnesota statute holds that a private
citizen may not adversely possess adjoining public lands even though he would otherwise meet
all the tests.40 One may not acquire a state swamp,41 or a public school grounds.42
However, a municipality may compromise a disputed boundary location and later be
forced to honor it.43 For abandonment of public property to be shown, there must be some
affirmative or unequivocal acts of the municipality representing intent to abandon.44
A further counter to a claim of adverse possession or practical location is a threat of an
action for damages: compensatory or—in rare cases—punitive. One may bring an action for
damages for trespass if one has genuine loss. Often, however, there may be little proof of actual
damages.
The Supreme Court has ruled with regard to damages for trespass:
The general rule is that damages in an action for trespass upon real property may
be such as are appropriate to the tenure by which the plaintiff holds. Possession
alone will entitle him to recover damages for any injury solely affecting it. If he
seeks to recover for the future, he must show that his title gives him an interest in
the damages claimed, and he can recover none except such as affect his own right,
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
unless he holds in such relation to other parties interested that his recovery will
bar their claim. 45
Although the Court commented above regarding future trespass damages, usually the
remedy would be the removal of the trespass rather than the award of future damages. Damages
may not be based on speculation or guess.
Without actual provable damages, a claimant may be limited to nominal damages.46 Rare
cases have permitted punitive damages. Minnesota law provides that punitive damages are
allowed in civil actions upon clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's acts show
deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of others.47. A defendant acts with deliberate
disregard for the rights or safety of others if the defendant acts intentionally in disregard of facts
that create a high probability of injury to the rights or safety of others.48 Brantner Farms, Inc. v.
Garner,49 involved a large punitive damages award ($50,000) made despite the fact the jury gave
only nominal actual damages ($800). It seems reasonable to suggest that a good faith claim to
adverse possession should bar consideration of punitive damages or claimants may be unfairly
prohibited from bringing such claims for fear of disproportionate punishment.
However, no punitive damages can be awarded for a trespass if there were no actual
damages.50 One Supreme Court decision allowed “double dipping” when a trespass included
damage to trees. The Court there said the claimant could recover both treble damages (under the
tree statute) and punitive damages:
Appellants argue that treble damages for the destruction of trees, shrubs or bushes
are punitive in nature. Therefore, appellants claim permitting both treble damages
and punitive damages effectively permits an unfair double recovery for the same
injury.51
Flexibile application of equity has been ruled unacceptable by appellate courts. In Gabler v.
Fedoruk,52 a claimant proved a boundary was established by practical location but the trial court
granted only a prescriptive easement and gave damages to the losing landowner. The Court of
Appeals said a court’s equity powers are not so elastic. Rather, if one is entitled to it, he
deserves confirmation of his title; then there is no basis for damages to the forfeiting owner. The
decision drew a dissenting opinion. But in a case decided in late August of 2010, the Court of
Appeals reiterated that the trial court must follow the law and award ownership when the right is
proven; the court cannot use elastic equity to fashion a different result:53
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
An attorney should take note that the burden of proof on a claimant is by clear and
convincing evidence.54
This burden is considerable because “every presumption [is] against
[the disseisor].”55 Also, adverse possession (as wells as boundary by practical location) claims
are almost universally fact driven and summary judgment is seldom, if ever, available; although
the Mauer decision referenced above is a rare exception. For example, in Bruers v. Wherly,56 the
Court of Appeals reversed a grant of summary judgment.
While this section has focused on adverse possession, an attorney would do well to plead
all theories, both adverse possession and practical location. Though similar, the two theories are
not identical and may require different proof. In one decision, the Court of Appeals inferred that
it might bar a party from establishing practical location of a boundary if the party had proceeded
solely on an adverse possession theory through the trial without ever mentioning the practical
location theory. The court went on to state that “relief cannot be based on issues that are neither
pleaded nor voluntarily litigated.”57
In Quast v. Brose,58 in a seeming close decision, the court allowed practical location to be
raised for the first time in post-trial memoranda. However, in a recent decision, the claimant
pleaded too precisely, claiming only practical location by agreement. He was not allowed to
argue practical location by acquiescence theory on appeal.59
Also, one very recent decision makes it clear you must timely assert a demand for
arbitration under an agreement and can forfeit the right to insist on it as alternate dispute
resolution.60
BASICS OF BOUNDARY BY PRACTICAL LOCATION.
The second theory under which boundary disputes are resolved is the establishment of a
boundary by “practical location.” It is often founded on the location of a fence, not infrequently
a fence that has been in place long enough to have wire grown into trees near it. It virtually
always requires presence of some structure locating the boundary:
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
At a minimum, case law requires that a boundary line established by practical location by
acquiescence must have some type of physical demarcation.61
The two distinct theories may be confused because they are used somewhat interchangeably.
This theory looks to the neighbors’ actions and understanding respecting a boundary which may
be inferred often through circumstantial evidence. Boundary by practical location is not applied
to a large parcel of land. A claim to a larger parcel is simply not a true boundary dispute.62
Three conditions to establish a boundary by practical location are identified in
Romanchuk v. Plotkin:
Ordinarily, in order to establish a practical location of a boundary line it must
appear (1) the location relied on was acquiesced in for the full period of the
statute of limitations; or (2) the line was expressly agreed upon by the parties and
afterwards acquiesced in; or (3) the party barred acquiesced in the encroachment
by the other, who subjected himself to expense which he would not have done if
there had been a dispute as to the line.63
The statute of limitations requires the boundary to be acquiesced in for 15 years.64 While the
statute of limitations literally applies to boundaries established via acquiescence, boundaries
which can be established either through an express agreement or through an estoppel do not
require passage of the 15-year period. Therefore, if neighboring landowners expressly agree on a
boundary, they do not need to demonstrate acquiescence for the full 15 years to establish a
claim.65 What precise length of ensuing acquiescence will suffice is an open question, but likely
relates to providing confirmation of the express agreement.
Neighbors can come to an agreement followed by acquiescence for the statutory period.
Recently, the court made it clear that the express agreement theory requires clear proof of an
agreement: “We hold that an ‘express agreement’ requires more than unilaterally assumed,
unspoken and unwritten ‘mutual agreements’ corroborated by neither word nor act.”66
More often cases involve acquiescence without formal express agreement. The classic
example of Practical Location of Boundaries is the barbed wire fence installed by two farmers
with adjoining property that remains for many years. But other landmarks can work as well,
particularly where acquiescence is pled, so long as the landmark is intended to serve as a
boundary line marker. Here the court adds a different requirement: that the parties attempted to
put the fence as close as possible, as an alternate requirement.67
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
The Torrens Statute was recently amended to make clear that although one may not
adversely possess registered property, still a boundary may be established by practical location:
No title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or by adverse possession, but the common law doctrine
of practical location of boundaries applies to registered land whenever registered.
Section 508.671 shall apply in a proceeding subsequent to establish a boundary by
practical location for registered land.68
In contrast to adverse possession, in the case of practical location it is possible to estop a city,
township, or other entity from claiming ownership of property, though the standard is high:
We recognize that municipal corporations are afforded an added degree of
protection as regards their property: The doctrine of estoppel is not applicable to
municipal corporations as freely and to the same extent that it is to individuals.
When it is applied, the basis of application is usually not because of the nonaction
of the officers of the municipality, but because they have taken some affirmative
action influencing another, which renders it inequitable for the corporate body to
assert a different set of facts.69
In addition, the court in one recent case discussed a perceived lack of good faith on the part of
the claimant as though it was a requisite element.70
CONCLUSION
Boundaries and access issues will continue to be a source of real property litigation well
into the future. When the author mediates these cases for other lawyers, he explains to
participants “how it grinds in everyone’s gut to return home at night from work only to see the
encroaching fence, shed, or roof overhang which detracts from the client’s property.” He
strongly encourages efforts to resolve these disputes via compromise, and routinely asks them
how much the land is really worth monetarily versus what they guess litigation will cost them.
Then he describe the time it will take to get to trial, get a decision after the end of post trial
motions, work through appeals, and await the outcome of a contested Court of Appeals’
decision. Such factors often spur parties to move toward a negotiated resolution.
1
Minn.Stat. 541.02. “No action for the recovery of real estate or the possession thereof shall be maintained unless it
appears that the plaintiff, the plaintiff's ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seized or possessed of the premises in
question within 15 years before the beginning of the action. Such limitations shall not be a bar to an action for the
recovery of real estate assessed as tracts or parcels separate from other real estate, unless it appears that the party
claiming title by adverse possession or the party's ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, or all of them together, shall
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
have paid taxes on the real estate in question at least five consecutive years of the time during which the party claims
these lands to have been occupied adversely. The provisions of paragraph two shall not apply to actions relating to
the boundary line of lands, which boundary lines are established by adverse possession, or to actions concerning
lands included between the government or platted line and the line established by such adverse possession, or to
lands not assessed for taxation.”
See Wagner v. McPhaill, 2008 WL 4909420 (Minn.Ct.App. 2008)(failure to pay real estate taxes didn’t bar
adverse possession); Mellenthin v. Brantman, 1 N.W.2d 141, 144 (Minn. 1941) (tax payment was not required).
2
3
Minn.Stat. 541.02.
4
Grubb v. State 433 N.W.2d 915, 921 (Minn.App.,1988).
5
LeGro v. Saterdalen 607 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn.App.,2000).
6
Burns v. Plachecki, 223 N.W.2d 133, 136 (Minn. 1974).
7
Pederson v. Smith 2000 WL 821682, 2 (Minn.App.,2000); Houdek v. Guyse 2005 WL 406217, 2
(Minn.App.,2005).
8
Mauer v. Otter Tail Power Company, 2009 WL 2225820 (Minn.Ct.App. 2009).
9
Forbes v. Kociscak, 2002 WL 264576 (Minn.Ct.App. 2002).
10
Hanson v. Sommers, 117 N.W. 842, 843 (Minn. 1908)
11
Ford Consumer Finance Co., Inc. v. Carlson and Breese, Inc., 611 N.W.2d 75, 78 (Minn.Ct.App. 2000).
12
Minn.Stat. §541.02.
13
Osgood v. Stanton, 2009 WL 1586943 (Minn.Ct.App. 2009).
14
Minn.Stat. §505.31
15
Minn.Stat. 505.32.
16
Ganje v. Schuler 659 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn.App.,2003)
17
See Minn.Stat. §508.02; Minn.Stat. §508.25 (specifying a certificate holder’s rights against adverse claims).
18
Petition of Geis, 576 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Minn.Ct.App. 1998) citations therein omitted.
19
Wojahn v. Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 298, 304 (Minn. 1980).
20
See e.g., Voegele v. Mahoney, 54 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Minn. 1952).
21
Schauer v. Zellman, 2001 WL 1530630, 3 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001).
22
See LeeJoice v. Harris, 404 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Minn.Ct.App. 1987)(where rule was confirmed though not applied).
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
23
Stanard v. Urban, 453 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn.Ct.App. 1990).
24
Holz-Kinney v. Thaler, 2009 WL 4040789 (Minn.Ct.App. 2009)
25
Nash v. Mahan, 377 N.W.2d 56, 56 -57 (Minn.Ct.App. 1985).
26
Ronning vs. Nikolai, 2001 WL 799681 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001).
27
Schwarz v. Finseth, 2009 WL 4910552 (Minn.Ct.App. 2009).
28
Application of Stein, 99 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1959);Simms v. William Simms Hardware, 216 Minn. 283, 12
N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 1943).
29
Fredericksen v. Henke, 209 N.W.257 (Minn. 1926).
30
Nygren v. Patrin, 179 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 1970).
31
Hickerson v. Bender, 500 N.W.2d 169, 171 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993). See also, Holiday House II, LLC v. State, 2009
WL 1587090, 1 (Minn.Ct.App. 2009).
32
Ebenhoh v. Hodgman, 642 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Minn.Ct.App. 2002). Also, Ronning v. Nikolai, 2001 WL 799681,
3 (Minn.App.,2001).
33
Mauer v. Otter Tail Power Co. 2009 WL 2225820, 2 (Minn.App.,2009).
34
Olson v. Burk, 103 N.W. 335 (Minn. 1905).
35
Siegel v. Nagel 2008 WL 668131, 2 (Minn.App.,2008). Likewise, a lease defeated a claim in Sage v. Rudnick, 69
N.W. 1096 (Minn. 1897).
36
Winfield v. Kasel, 2009 WL 174211 (Minn.Ct.App. 2009).
37
Hanson v. Sommers, 117 N.W. 842, 843 (Minn. 1908).
38
Norgong v. Whitehead, 31 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. 1948).
39
Norgong v. Whitehead, supra. See also Boldt v. Roth, 618 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 2000).
40
Minn.Stat. §541.01.
41
Scofield v. Schaeffer, 116 N.W. 210 (Minn. 1908).
42
Junes v. Junes, 196 N.W. 806 (1924).
43
Magnuson v. City of White Bear Lake, 203 N.W.2d 848, 851 (Minn. 1973).
44
Rein v. Town of Spring Lake, 145 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Minn. 1966). See also Denman vs. Gans, 607 N.W.2d 788
(Minn.Ct.App. 2000) Where the Court held that waterfront property which was dedicated to the use of a small,
Thomas B. Olson, Olson & Lucas, 7401 Metro Blvd., Minneapolis (Edina); www.olson-law.com
defined group of property owners was not properly dedicated to a public use, and therefore not insulated against a
claim of adverse possession by another.
45
Williams v. Lynd Tp., 312 N.W.2d. 110, 113 (Minn. 1981).
46
Lake Mille Lacs Inv., Inc. v. Payne, 401 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn.Ct.App. 1987).
47
Minn.Stat. § 549.20, subd. 1(a).
48
Id. at subd. 1(b)(1), (2).
49
Brantner Farms, Inc. v. Garner, 2002 WL 1163559, 2 (Minn.Ct.App. 2002),
50
Meixner v. Buecksler, 13 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 1944).
51
Johnson v. Jensen, 433 N.W.2d 472, 476 (Minn.Ct.App. 1988).
52
Gabler v. Fedoruk, 756 N.W.2d 725 (Minn.Ct.App. 2008).
53
Juntti v. Bedore 2010 WL 3306932, 4 (Minn.Ct.App. 2010).
54
Stanard v. Urban, 453 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn.Ct.App. 1990).
55
Vill. of Newport v. Taylor, 30 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Minn. 1948); Houdek v. Guyse, 2005 WL 406217, 1
(Minn.Ct.App. 2005).
56
Bruers v. Wherly, 2000 WL 369504, 2 (Minn.Ct.App. 2000).
57
Roberge v. Cambridge Co-Op. Creamery Co., 67 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Minn. 1954).
58
Quast v. Brose, 2001 WL 1035039, 2 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001).
59
Kaukola v. Menelli, 2009 WL 1374172, 2 (Minn.Ct.App. 2009).
60
Juntti v. Bedore, 2010 WL 3306932, 2 (Minn.Ct.App.) (Minn.Ct.App.,2010).
61
Kaukola v. Menelli 2009 WL 1374172, 4 (Minn.App.,2009)
62
Skelton v. Doble, 347 N.W.2d 81 (Minn.Ct.App. 1984); Ampe v. Lutgen, 2007 WL 2034381, 2 (Minn.Ct.App.
2007).
63
Romanchuk v. Plotkin, 9 N.W.2d 421, 427 (Minn. 1943).
64
Minn.Stat. § 541.02.
65
See Nadeau v. Johnson, 147 N.W. 241, 242 (Minn. 1914)(finding existence of boundary line by practical location
based on express agreement, when landowners measured, located, and staked boundary line, expressly agreed on
dividing line between lots, and treated line as boundary for 10 years)See also Ampe v. Lutgen, 2007 WL 2034381,
2 (Minn.Ct.App. 2007); Amato v. Haraden, 159 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Minn. 1968).
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66
Slindee v. Fritch Investments, LLC, 760 N.W.2d 903, 909 (Minn.Ct.App. 2009).
67
Kaukola v. Menelli 2009 WL 1374172, 3 (Minn.App.,2009).
68
Minn.Stat. §508.02.
69
Halverson v. Village of Deerwood, 322 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Minn. 1982).
70
Pomphrey v. State ex rel. St. Louis County, 2008 WL 3288623, 2 (Minn.Ct.App. 2008).
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