P.S. 161. BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Spring 2012 (MONDAY-WEDNESDAY 10:05-11:20am, PHYSICS 259)
Instructor: Herbert Kitschelt (Perkins 504)
teaching assistant: Frank Orlando
e-mail: h3738@duke.edu
e-mail: fjo@duke.edu
phone: 660-4343
office hours: and by appointment
office hours: Tuesday 10am-12noon
and by appointment
Capitalist market economies have proved superior compared to a range of fundamentally different
economic systems, especially socialist planned economies. Nevertheless, also capitalist systems come in
rather different “varieties that involve political institutions and alignments of political forces (interest groups,
parties). The course will analyze political foundations and influences on market economies, particularly the
arrangement of (1) corporate governance and capital markets and (2) industrial relations and wage
bargaining. These have consequences for macro-economic policy-making and the development of the welfare
state.
The course will examine the extent to which such arrangements have been influenced by the
globalization of markets for goods, services, capital and labor. The final part of the course will then apply
knowledge of the different institutions and their dynamics under conditions of globaliztion to shed light on
the two big crises in the advanced capitalist economies and polities:
(1) the financial crisis of 2008+ most closely associated with the United States, Britain, and Ireland;
(2) the unfolding EURO crisis since 2009;
The course will argue that different institutions of capitalism contributed to both crises and affect
their impact on contemporary democracies.
Required Readings:
There are six books to be purchased from the bookstore or other retailers (see below). In addition, there
will be a fairly large number of journal articles to be retrieved from Duke Library’s electronic journal
collection or from Duke undergraduate reserves or through channels announced by instructor and teaching
assistant.
Books:
George A. Akerlof and Roibert J. Shiller. 2009. Animal Spirits. How Human Psychology Drives
the Economy and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press. 978-0691145921
Robert J. Barro. 1997. Determinants of Economic Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
0-262-52254-3.
Jonas Pontusson. 2005. Inequality and Prosperity. Social Europe vs. Liberal America. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press. 0-8014-8970-9
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Dani Rodrik. 2011. The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy.
New York: Norton. 978-0393341287
Martin Wolf. 2004. Globalization Works. New Haven: Yale University Press. 978-0801895739
Martin Wolf. 2008. Fixing Global Finance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 0-300-10777-3
Course Requirements:
1. take-home midterm at the end of the February 15 session (due on Tuesday, February 20 at 10:05 am);
The mid-term accounts for 30 % of the course grade. Late penalty: -.33 grade points per day.
2. research paper: On one of the following topics in one postindustrial democracy:
 corporate governance institutions and capital markets within that country;
 labor union mobilization and industrial relations with that country;
 the interests on how to cope with the EURO crisis articulate by parties and economic interest
groups within that country.
Countries available for analysis: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, United States
In order to create diversity of research papers, submit a list of (1) a rank order of your three
favorite countries, including at least one small country (< 20 million inhabitants) and (2) a rank order of
your topics (corporate governance, labor mobilization, or country interests in the EURO crisis)
Paper should not exceed the 3,000 – 4,000 word range and document intelligent use of a minimum of
ten academic sources (research journal articles or books), we well as quantitative evidence. The paper
accounts for 30% of the course grade and is due on April 9. Late penalty: -.33 grade points per day.
3. final exam (to be determined whether take-home or in class). Officially scheduled in-class exam time:
Tuesday, May1, 7-10pm. The final exam accounts for 30% of the grade.
4. Course participation accounts for 10% of the grade.
For unexcused absences from more than two (2) course sessions, points will be taken off the course
grade. If you are missing more than seven (7) course sessions (25% of the course meeting time), you may
be ineligible for a passing grade in the course.
0.1. Introductory Session (January 11)
no session: January 16 (Martin Luther King Jr. Day)
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PART I: MARKETS, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1.1. What is Economic Growth? How Does It Play Out? What are Alternative
Measures of Economic Performance? (January 18)
Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2004. chapters 1 and 2, pp. 1-33. (Blackboard course documents/or SAKAI)
Charles I. Jones, Introduction to Economic Growth. Second edition. New York: Norton, 2002.
chapters 1.1. and 1.2. (“the facts of economic growth”), pp. 3-18. (Blackboard/SAKAI)
ALSO SKIM:
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. (Joseph E Stiglitz,
Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi). 2010. Mis-Measuring our Lives. Why GDP Doesn’t Add Up.
Download at: http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf
Short articles from The Economist: (made available as .pdf files on Blackboard/SAKAI)
* “Economics Focus: A Productivity Primer. The Most Common Way to Measure Economic
Efficiency Is Not the Best.” November 6, 2004.
* Measuring Economies: Grossly Distorted Picture.” February 11, 2006: 72.
* “GDP Growth. A Numbers Racket.” February 18, 2006: 72.
* “The American Economy. Slow Road Ahead.” October 28, 2006: 79-80.
* “Happiness and Economics. Economics Discovering Feelings.” December 23, 2006: 33-35.
* “Whose lost decade? Japan’s economy works better than pessimists think” November 19, 2011: 80.
1.2. Comparing Economic Systems. Politics and Markets …. and Human Psychology
(January 23 and 25)
Key themes:
 The institutional embeddedness of markets;
 Different modes of social coordination: markets, hierarchies, communities,
associations;
 Criteria for comparing economic systems;
 Transaction costs as a limit to market governance;
 Human behavior as a limit to market governance;
George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller. Animal Spirits. How Human Psychology Drives the Economy,
And Why It Matters for Global Capitalism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009.
Introduction and Part One: Animal Spirits (pp. 1-56);
J. Barkley Rosser, Jr. and Marina V. Rosser, Comparative Economics in a Transforming World
Economy. Second Edition. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2004. chapter 1: “How to Compare
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Economic Systems.” Pp. 1-21. (electronic copy on Blackboard/Sakai)
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. Chapter 4: “Societies and
Economic Systems,” pp. 43-55. (Blackboard/Sakai)
Dani Rodrik, Globalization Paradox, chapter 1 (“Of Markets and States”) and (“Why Doesn’t Everyone Get
the Case for Free Trade?”)
Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. chapters 3-5
on fundamentals of market economics (24-76). Skim chapter 6 which will be relevant
in part 5 of the course.
1.3. Explaining Economic Growth. A Global (and long-term) View. Special
Consideration of Politics and State. (January 30 and February 1)
Key themes:



The multiplicity of factors that impinge on growth: not all (or most) is politics;
The empirical role of politics and the state in economic growth;
Implications of trade and capital market openness (“globalization”);
Robert J. Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth. A Cross-Country Empirical Study.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997. chapters 1 and 2. [chapter 3, pp. 89-118, optional]
Michael Bleaney, and Akira Nishiyama, “Explaining Growth: A Contest Between Models,”
Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 7, (2002), No. 1: 43-56. [ e-journal]]
Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth. chapter 7: “Institutions and Politics.” (111-43)
(Blackboard/Sakai)
Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox. Chapters 2, 7, and 8. (pp. 24-46; 135-183)
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PART II: BUSINESS AND LABOR IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM.
“VARIETIES” OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CHANGE
2.1. The Institutionalization of Business in Contemporary Capitalism
(4 sessions: February 6 and 8, February 13 and 15)
Key topics:
 differences in capital market organization and corporate governance?
 two or three “varieties” of capitalism?
 Patterns of technological innovation in different capitalist “varieties”?
 Change over time toward liberal capitalism?
Start with these texts on basic cross-national differences in post-1945 business institutions and their
embeddedness in broader differences of contemporary capitalist institutions:
Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, Comparing Financial Systems. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 2001, chapter 4, “Corporate Governance.” pp. 79-126. (Blackboard/Sakai)
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership
around the World,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 54 (1999) 2: 471-517. (e-journal)
Karel Landoo, “A European Perspective on Corporate Governance,” Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 37 (1999) 2: 269-94. (e-journal)
Jonas Pontusson, Inequality and Prosperity, chapter 2 (“Varieties of Capitalism”)
Ross Schneider, Ben and David Soskice. 2009. “Inequality in developed countries and Latin America:
coordinated, liberal and hierarchical systems.” Economy and Society. 38, 1: 17-52.
David Soskice, “Divergent Production Regimes. Coordinated and Uncoordinated Market Economies in the
1980s and 1990s,” pp. 101-34 in Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, John D. Stephens, (eds.),
Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999
(Blackboard/Sakai)
Andrew Tylecote. “The Role of Finance and Corporate Governance in National Systems of
Innovation.” Organization Studies. Vol. 28 (2007) 10: 1461-81. (e-journal)
Then these texts address the resilience or change of business institutions:
Helen Callaghan and Martin Höpner, “European Inegration and the Clash of Capitalisms: Political
Cleavages over Takeover Liberalization.” Comparative European Politics (2005) 3, 307–332
(e-journal)
Enriques, Luca, and Paolo Volpin, “Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe.”
Journal of Economic Perspectives. 21 (Winter 2007) 1: 117-40. (e-journal)
Mary O’ Sullivan, “The Political Economy of Comparative Corporate Governance.” Review of
International Political Economy, vol. 10, ((2003), 1: 23-72. (e-journal)
TAKE HOME MIDTERM WILL BE HANDED OUT FEBRUARY 15, DUE ON
FEBRUARY 20 at 10:05am
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2.2. Labor Organization: Labor Unions, Industrial Relations, and Social Policy
(four sessions: February 20-22; February 27-29)
Key topics:
 The differential organization of labor unionism: centralization, encompassingness;
 Corporatism and its decline;
 Wage formation and inequality;
 The rise of the modern welfare state;
 Labor markets and educational systems;
Reading first:
Pontusson, Inequality and Prosperity, 2005:
 chapter 3 (“Income Distribution and Labor Markets”), pp. 32-66;
 chapter 4 (“Employment Performance”), pp. 67-94
 Chapter 6 (“Participation, Security, Mobility, and Skills”)
 Part of chapter 7 (“Welfare States, Redistribution, and Economic Growth”), pp. 142-62;
Alan Siaroff, “Corporatism in 24 Industrial democracies: Meaning and Measurement,” European
Journal of Political Research, Vol. 36 (1999) 2: 175-205. (e-journal)
Change over time:
Philip Du Caju, Erwan Gautier, Daphne Momferatou, and Melanie Ward-Warmedinger. 2008. Institutional
Features of Wage Bargaining in 23 European Countries, the US and Japan. Frankfurt: Europea
Central Bank, Working Paper Series No. 974, December 2008. http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp974.pdf
Anke Hassel. Universalism and segmentalism - adjustment patterns of economic interests in postindustrial
Economies. Paper presented at the Conference on the Future of Democratic Capitalism, Zurich,
June 16-19, 2011.
Maarten Keune. “Introduction: Wage moderation, decentralization of collective bargaining and low pay.”
Pp. 7-27 in Bela Galgoczi. Ed.. 2008. Wages and Wage Bargaining in Europe. Development Since
the mid-1990s.” Brussels: European Trade Union Institute (ETUI).
Kathleen Thelen. Varieties of Liberalization and Trajectories of Change in Industrial Relations. Paper
presented at the Conference on the Future of Democratic Capitalism, Zurich, June 16-19, 2011.
Jelle Visser. “Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries.” Monthly Labor Review. January 2006: 38-49.
(Blackboard-Sakai)
Michael Wallerstein and Bruce Western. 2000. "Unions in Decline? What Has Changed and Why."
Annual Review of Political Science 3: 355-377. (e-journal)
Then on welfare state and education/skill investments, read:
Torben Iversen and David Soskice. 2009. “Distribution and Redistribution: The Shadow of the Nineteenth
Century.” World Politics Vol. 61, 3: 438-86. (E-journal)
Torben Iversen and John D. Stephens. 2008. “Partisan Politics, the Welfare State, and Three Worlds of
Human Capital Formation.” Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 41, 4/5: 600-37. (e-journal)
Ben Ansell, “University Challenges Explaining Institutional Change in Higher Education.”
World Politics. Vol. 60 (January 2008) 2. (e-journal: read only the non-mathematical sections at
the beginning and the end)
Philippe Aghion et al. 2007. Why Reform Europe’s Universities?” Bruegel Policy Brief (electronic
copy on BLACKBOARD/Sakai)
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.
PART III: INSTITUTIONS AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE. 1989-2010
3.1. Capitalist Varieties and Macro-Economic Performance. The Conventional View
and Some Amendments. (March 12, 14, and 19)
Key elements:
 The interaction between government partisanship and industrial relations in shaping
macro-economic (fiscal) policy and outcomes (inflation, unemployment, growth)
 Limits of this perspective: closed economy; no monetary policy; no political psychology;
 Pitfalls of the “pure,” consistent varieties of capitalism: inertia in coordinated
capitalism;
 What are “mixed” economies? … and how do they affect economic performance?
Start out with:
1. Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, “The Politics of Growth. Strategic Interaction and Economic
Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980,” Journal of Politics,
Vol. 47 (1985) 3: 792-827. (e-journal)
2. Lyle Scruggs, “The Politics of Growth Revisited,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 63 (February 2001),
No. 1: 120-40. (e-journal)
3. Pontusson, Inequality and Prosperity, chapter 5 (“Macro-Economic Management and Wage Bargaining”)
pp. 95-114.
4. Peter A. Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich. 2009. Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities
In the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis.” British Journal of Political Science. Vol. 39:
449-82.
5. Akerlof and Shiller, Animal Spirits, chapters 8-10, pp. 97-130.
Some heterodox accounts:
Herbert Kitschelt „The Demise of Clientelism in Affluent Capitalist Democracies,“ pp. 298-321 in Patrons,
Clients or Policies? Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition. co-edited with
Steven Wilkinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007. (Blackboard-Sakai)
Herbert Kitschelt and Wolfgang Streeck. “Introduction: From Stability to Stagnation. Germany at the
Beginning of the Twenty-First Century,” West European Politics, Vol. 26 (October 2003) 4: 1-34
(Blackboard-Sakai)
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3.2. The Sources of Welfare State Crisis Politics I: Innovation/Deindustrialization and
Demographics as Causes of Welfare State Retrenchment?
(March 21 and 26)
Key points:
 Deindustrialization as a source of mobilization for social protection (“compensation
hypothesis” versus “competition” hypothesis)
 The role of demographics as partially endogenous condition of retrenchment pressure
James P. Allan and Lyle Scruggs, “Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced
Industrial Societies,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48 (2004) 3: 496-512
(e-journal)
Francis Castles, The Future of the Welfare State. Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004. (pp.117-66) (Blackboard/Sakai)
Silja Häusermann and Bruno Palier. “The State of the Art. The Politics of Employment-Friendly
Welfare Reforms in Post-industrial Economies.” Socio-Economic Review. Vol. 6 (2008) 3:
559-586. (e-journal)
Jonas Pontusson, Inequality and Prosperity. Social Europe vs. Liberal America. chapter 8
(“Welfare States in Retrenchment”, pp. 182-203) and chapter 9 (“Directions for
Progressive Reform,” pp. 204-19)
Andre Sapir. Globalization and the Reform of European Social Models. Bruegel Policy Brief.
Issue 2005/01 (November 2005). (electronic copy on BLACKBOARD)
Barbara Vis, “Goverments and unpopular social policy reform: Biting the bullet or steering clear?”
European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 48 (2009) 1: 31-57. (e-journal)
3.3. The Sources of Welfare State Crisis Politics II: Globalization and Race to the
Bottom? (March 28 and April 2)
Key points:
 Laying out the logic of “race to the bottom” through globalization;
 Inspecting the contradictory evidence;
 Discussing the controversies about the conflicting findings
Alicia Adsera and Carles Boix, “Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political
Underpinnings of Openness,” International Organization, Vol. 56 (Spring 2002) 2: 229-62.
(e-journal)
Francis Castles, The Future of the Welfare State. Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities. chapters 2-3.
pp. 21-72. (Blackboard/Sakai)
Stuart Soroka, Keith Banting and Richard Jonston, “Immigration and Redistribution in the Global
Era.” pp. 261-288 in Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles and Michael Wallerstein, eds.,
Globalization and Egalitarian Redistribution. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univeristy Press,
2006. (Blackboard/Sakai)
Martin Wolf, Why Globalization Works. Chapters 1-2 (pp. 3-21), 6-8 (pp. 77-135), and 9 (“Incensed
about inequality,” pp. 138-72) and 12 (“Sad about the State”, pp. 249-77).
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(Partially) Dissenting views:
Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox, chapters 9 (“The Political Trilemma of the World
Economy”) pp. 184-206.
Detlef Jahn, “Globalization as ‘Galton’s Problem’: The Missing Link in the Analysis of Diffusion
Patterns in Welfare State Development.” International Organization, Vol. 60, 3: 400-31.
Fritz W. Scharpf. “The asymmetry of European integration, or why the EU cannot be a ‘social
market economy’,” Socio-Economic Review, 8 (2010) 2: 211-50. (e-journal)
3.4. The European Union Crisis: What have the Difficulties of the EURO to Do with
Economic Production Regimes? An Only Partially Explored Pathway.
(April 4 and 9)
Key points:
 The differential fiscal crises of the Euro-zone are only the symptom not the cause of the
EURO’s problem; hence a suppression of fiscal disparity will be difficult to implement,
and even if implemented, will not solve the problem;
 Also central bank autonomy is not the cause;
 KEY I: production regimes with differential capacity to deliver wage restraint and
economic productivity growth; devaluation as the past compensatory mechanism no
longer available; true problem: industrial relations regime and corporate governance;
 KEY II: an unexplored pathway through non-class politics, clientelism, state-led
economic growth to fiscal deficits and low fertility…
David Cameron. European Responses to the Economic Crisis. Paper prepared for presentation at the 2010
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 2-5.
P. Hall and R. Franzese 1998. “Mixed Signals: Coordinated Wage Bargaining, Central Bank Independence,
and EMU.” International Organization, Volume 52: 505 – 53.
Robert Thomson. “Actor Alignments in the European Union Before and After Enlargement.” European
Journal of Political Research. Vol. 48, 2009. No.8: 756-81.
Beat Weber and Stefan W. Schmitz. 2011. “Varieties of helping capitalism: politicoeconomic determinants
of bank rescue packagesin the EU during the recent crisis.” Socio-Economic Review 9 (2011)2:
639-69.
Skim:
Uri Dadusch. Paradigm Lost. The Euro in Crisis. Report for the Carnegie Foundation. New York:
2010. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Paradigm_Lost.pdf
Barry Eichengreen et al., Public Debts: Nuts, Bolts, and Worries. Geneva Reports on the World
Economy. Geneva: International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies. September
2011. 139pp. especially chapter 4 “Europe’s Public Debt Challenge,” pp. 47-64.
download from http://www.cepr.org/pubs/books/cepr/Geneva13.pdf
FURTHER READINGS, AS THE CRISIS EVOLVES?
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Part IV: The Global Debt Crisis and Liberal Market Capitalism
4.1. The Logic and Psychology of Financial Crises (April 11)
Akerlof and Shiller, Animal Spirits, chapters 6-7/appendix (pp. 59-96) and 11-12 (pp. 131-57);
Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 2009. This Time is Different. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press. Chapter 4. “A Digression on the Theoretical Underpinnings of Debt Crises.”
(pp. 51-67) (Blackboard/Sakai)
Martin Wolf, Fixing Global Finance. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008,
Chapters 1-3 (pp. 1-57)
4.2. The Unfolding of the Crisis (April 16)
Dani Rodrik. The Globalization Paradox. Chapters 4-6 (pp. 67-134)
Martin Wolf. Fixing Global Finance, chapters 4-5 (pp. 58-150)
Hamid Faruquee, Alasdair Scott, and Natalia Tamirisa. “In Search of a Smoking Gun: Macroeconomic
Policies and the Crisis. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 4, 2009, pp.553–
580.
4.3. Crisis Aftermath and Reform (April 18 and 23)
Miguel Almunia, Agustín Bénétrix, Barry Eichengreen, Kevin H. O’Rourke and Gisela Rua. “From Great
Depression to Great Credit Crisis: similarities, differences, and lessons.” Economic Policy. April
2010. pp. 219-65. (e-journal)
Reinhart and Rogoff. This Time is Different. (see above), chapter 14, “The Aftermath of Financial Crises,”
pp. 223-39. (Blackboard/Sakai)
Nouriel Roubini and Sephen Mihm. Crisis Economics. A Crash Course in the Future of Finance.
New York: Penguin Books, 2011. Chapter 9: “Radical Remedies” (pp. 211-37)
(Blackboard/Sakai)
Joseph E. Stiglitz. Freefall. America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy. New York:
Norton, 2010. Chapter 9, “Reforming Economics” (pp. 238-74).
Concluding Session (April 25)
In-class final exam time: May 1, 2011, 7pm-10pm
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ADDITIONAL SOURCES FOR THE LECTURES
1.1. Economic Growth
Angus Maddison, The World Economy. Historical Statistics. Paris: OECD, 2003.
OECD, Going for Growth. 2005. Paris: OECD. (plus plethora of OECD economic statistics).
The World Bank, Where is the Wealth of Nations? Measuring Capital for the XXI Century.
Draft of July 15, 2005, downloaded from www.worldbank.org.
1.2. Markets and Politics
Robert Boyer, “The Variety and Unequal Performance of Really Existing Markets: Farewell to Doctor Pangloss?” pp.
94-126 in J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism. The Embeddedness of
Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Neil Fligstein, “Markets as politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions,” American Sociological
Review, Vol. 61 (August 1996): 656-73.
James Fulcher, Capitalism. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970.
J. Roger Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer, “Coordination of Economic Actors and Social Systems of Production,” pp. 147 in Hollingsworth and Boyer, eds., Contemporary Capitalism. The Embeddedness of Institutions. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Michael C. Jensen, Foundations of Organizational Strategy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Paul Milgrom and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1992.
(esp. Chapter 4: “Coordinating Plans and Actions” (pp. 88-124) and chapter 9: “Ownership and Property Rights,”
pp. 288-324)
Gary J. Miller, Managerial Dilemmas. The Political Economy of Hierarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992.
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press, 1990.
Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press, 1985.
Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory,” pp. 77-107 in Neil J. Smelser and
Richard Swedberg, eds., The Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton University Press, 1994.
Charles J. Wolff, Markets or Government: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press,
1990.
1.3. Determinants of Economic Growth. A Global and Long-term View
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development. An Empirical
Investigation,” American Economic Review, Vol. 91, (2001) 5: 1369-1401.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run
Growth,” pp. 385-472 in Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, eds., Handbook of Economic Growth.
Volume 1A. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005.
Aghion, Philippe and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Growth, Inequality and Globalization. Theory, History and Policy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Alesina, Alberto, and R. Perotti, “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment,”
European Economic Review, 40 (1996): 1203-28.
Alesina, Alberto and Dani Rodrik, “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, (1994) No. 2: 465-91.
Easterly, William, The Elusive Quest for Growth. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001.
Easterly, William and Ross Levine, Tropics, Germs, and Crops. How Endowments Influence Economic
Development. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 9106.
Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy. States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Gary Gereffi and Donald L Wyman, eds., Manufacturing Miracles. Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and
East Asia. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Haggard, Staffan. Pathways from the Periphery. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.
Jones, Charles I., Introduction to Economic Growth. Second Edition. New York: Norton, 2002.
Knack, Stephen, (ed.) Democracy, Governance and Growth. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 2003.
Landa, Dimitri and Ethan Kapstein, “Inequality, Growth, and Democracy,” World Politics, Vol. 53, (2001), No. 2: 264-96.
Landes, David S. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Why Some Are so Rich and Some So Poor. New York: Norton 1998.
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North, Douglass C. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton 1981.
Olson, Mancur Jr. Power and Prosperity. Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), The Sources of Economic
Growth in OECD Countries. OECD: Paris, 2003.
Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development. Political
Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Quinn, Dennis P. and John T. Woolley, “Democracy and National Economic Performance: The
Preference for Stability,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 45, No. 3: 634-51.
Rodrik, Dani. “Where Did All the Growth Go? External Shocks, Social Conflict, and Growth Collapses.”
Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 4 (2000) 4: 385-412.
Rodrik, Dani. 2007. One Economics. Many Recipes. Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The Primacy of
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Revised paper,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 2002.
Woo-Cumings, Meredith, ed., The Developmental State. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999.
World Bank Policy Research Report, Globalization, Growth, and Poverty. Building an
Inclusive World Economy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
2.1. The Institutionalization of Business in Modern Capitalism
Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,1996.
Jürgen Beyer and Martin Höpner, “Corporate Goernance and the Disintegration of Organized Capitalism in the
1990s.” West European Politics, Vol. 26 (2003) 4: 179-98.
Laura Bottazzi and Marco Da Rin, “Venture Capital in Europe and the Financing of Innovative Companies.” Economic Policy. April
2002: 231-63.
Robert Boyer, Elsie Charron, Ulrich Juergens, Steve Tolliday, eds., Between Imitation and Innovation. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998David Coates, Models of Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000. chapter 6, pp. 145-90.
Paul Diederen, Paul Stoneman, Otto Toivanen, and Arjan Wolters, Innovation and Research Policies. An
International Comparative Analysis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999. [country studies, book on reserve]
Richard Deeg, Finance Capitalism Unveiled. Banks and the German Political Economy. Ann Arbor: Michigan
University Press, 1998.
Neil Fligstein, Architecture of Markets, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, chapters 6-8 (pp. 123-90)
Jan Fagerberg, Paolo Guerrieri, Bart Verspagen, The Economic Challenge for Europe. Adapting To Innovation Based
Growth. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999Ronald Dore, Stock Market Capitalism : Welfare Capitalism. Japan a
nd Germany versus the Anglo-Saxons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
James Foreman-Peck and Giovanni Federico, eds., European Industrial Policy. The Twentieth Century Experience.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. [country studies, on reserve]
Christopher Freeman, Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan. London: Pinter, 1987.
Christopher Freeman, The Economics of Industrial Innovation. Third Edition. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 2000. esp.
chapters 12 (pp. 295-316) and 16 (pp. 373-95).
Christopher Freeman and Francisco Louca, As Time Goes By. From the Industrial Revolutions to the Information
Revolutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Goyer, Michel, “Varieties of Institutional Investors and National Models of Capitalism: The
Transformation of Corporate Governance in France and Germany.” Politics and Society.34 (September 2006) 3: 399-430
Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control. The New Global Politics of Corporate
Governance. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005.
Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, “The Trouble with Stock Options,” Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 17, (2003) 3: 49-70.
Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism, 2001: chapters by Wood (247-74), Hancké (207-35),
Vitols (337-60), Lehrer (361-86) and Kasper (387-416);
Martin Höpner, “European Corporate Governance Reform and the German Party Paradox.” MPIfG discussion
paper 02/3 (download from Max Planck Institute Cologne).
Michael C. Jensen, Foundations of Organizational Strategy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Michael C. Jensen, “The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems,” Journal of
Finance, Vol. 48 (1993): 831-80.
Michael C. Jensen, and William Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 (1976): 305-60.
Herbert Kitschelt, “Industrial Governance Structures, Innovation Strategies, and the Case of Japan: Sectoral or CrossNational Comparative Analysis?” International Organization, Vol. 45 (1991) 4: 453-94.
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “Investor Protection and Corporate
Governance.” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58 (2000) 1: 3-27.
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “Law and Finance.” Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 106 (1998) 6: 1113-55.
Andrew MacIntyre, ed., Business and Government in Industrializing Asia. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994.
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Richard Nelson, ed., National Innovation Systems. A Comparative Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Mary O’Sullivan, “The Political Economy of Comparative Corporate Governance.” Review of International Political
Economy, Vol. 10 (2003) 1: 23-72.
Orru, Mario, Nicole W. Biggard and Gary G. Hamilton, “Organizational Isomorphism in East
Asia,” pp. 361-89 in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: Chicago University Press 1991.
Richard Nelson, ed., National Innovation Systems. A Comparative Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. T.. J. Pempel, ed.,
The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Carlota Perez, Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital. The Dynamics of Bubbles and
Golden Ages. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002
Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, “The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth
century.” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 69 (2003), No. 1: 5-50.
Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press, 1990.
Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Mark Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance. Political Context, Corporate Impact. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,2003.
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 52 (1997) 2: 737-83.
Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism. The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965
Wolfgang Streeck, Social Institutions and Economic Performance. London: Sage 1992.
Rene M. Stulz and Rohan Williamson, “Culture, Openness, and Finance.” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 70,
(2003) 2: 313-349.
Wolfgang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter, eds., Private Interest Government. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985.
John Zysman, Governments, Markets and Growth. Financial Systems and the Politics of
Industrial Change. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1982.
2.2. Labor Organization, Industrial Relations, and Welfare States.
Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote, “Whu Doesn’t the United States Have a European-Style
Welfare State?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2001, No. 2: 187-277 (including discussion).
Peter Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity. Class Bases of the European Welfare State1875- 1975. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Suzanne D. Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
David Bradley, Evelyne Huber, Stephanie Moller, Francois Nielsen, and John D. Stephens, “Distribution and
Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies,” World Politics, Vol. 55 (2003) 2: 193-229.
Colin Crouch, Industrial Relations and European State Traditions. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994.
Di Tella, Rafael, and Robert MacCulloch, The Consequences of Labour Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence Based
on Survey Data. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School paper, November 25, 1998.
Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999.
Miriam Golden, Michael Wallerstein, and Peter Lange, “Postwar Trade-Union Organization
and Industrial Relations in Twelve countries,” pp. 194-230 in KLMS 1999 (see 2.1.).
Alexander Hicks, Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties
and Policies in Global Markets, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Torben Iversen, Capitalism, Democracy, and Welfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Jason Jordan, “Mothers, Wives, and Workers. Explaining Gendered Dimensions of the Welfare State.” Comparative
Political Studies, Vol. 39 (2006) 9: 1109-32.
Lane Kenworthy, "Wage-Setting Measures: A Survey and Assessment." World Politics 54, 2001, 1: 57-98 (e-journal)
Walter Korpi, “Power Resources and Employer-Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and
Varieties of Capitalism.” Protagonists, Consenters, and Antagonists.” World Politics, Vol. 58 (2006) 2:167-206.
Peter Lindert, Growing Public. Social Spending and Economic Growth Since the Eighteenth Century. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004. 2 volumes
Julia Lynch, Age in the Welfare State. The Origins of Social Spending on Pensioners, Workers, and Children.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Jeff Manza, “Race and the Underdevelopment of the American Welfare State.” Theory and Society, Vol. 29 (2000): 819-832.
Isabela Mares, The Politics of Social Risk. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Daniel J. Minnich, “Corporatism and income inequality in the global economy: A panel study of 17 OECD
Countries,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 42 (2003): 23-53.
Stephanie Moller, David Bradley, Evelyn Huber, Francois Nielsen, and John D. Stephens, “Determinants of Relative
Poverty in Advanced Capitalist Societies,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 68, (February 2003).
Edward C. Prescott, “Why Do Americans Work so Much More than Europeans?” National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper 10316. February 2004. (www.nber.org/papers/w10316)
David Rueda, and Jonas Pontusson, “Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism,” World Politics, Vol. 52 (2000) 3: 350-83.
Diane Sainsbury, ed., Gender and Welfare State Regimes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Peter Swenson, Capitalists Against Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States in the United States
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and Sweden, Oxford, 2002.
Bruce Western, Between Class and Market. Postwar Unionization in the Capitalist Democracies. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1997
3.1. Varieties of Capitalism and Macro-Economic Performance
Suzanne D. Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Olivier Blanchard, “The Economic Future of Europe.” National Bureau of Economic Research Paper Series.
Working Paper 10310. February 2004. (www.nber.org/papers/w10310)
Di Tella, Rafael, and Robert MacCulloch, The Consequences of Labour Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence Based
on Survey Data. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School paper, November 25, 1998.
Franzese, Robert J. “Institutional and Sectoral Interactions in Monetary Policy and Wage-Price Bargaining,” pp.
104-44 in Hall and Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism Or: Franzese, Macro-Economic Policies in
Developed Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, chapter 4.
Garrett, Geoffrey, and Christopher Way, “Public Sector Unions, Corporatism, and Macroeconomic Performance,”
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 32 (1999) 4: 411-34.
Miriam Golden, Michael Wallerstein, and Peter Lange, “Postwar Trade-Union Organization
Organization, 52 (Summer 1998): 469-504.
Torben Iversen, Contested Economic Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson, and David Soskice, eds., Unions, Employers, and Central Banks. Macroeconomic
Coordination and Institutional Change in Social Market Economies. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000.
Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets. Industrial Policy in Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1985.
Lane Kenworthy, “Institutional Coherence and Macro-Economic Performance,” Socioeconomic Review, Vol. 4
( 2006) 1: 69-91.
Fritz W. Scharpf, Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991.
Franz Traxler and Bernhard Kittel, “The Bargaining System and Performance. A Comparison
of 18 OECD Countries,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 33 (2000) No. 9: 1154-90.
3.2. and 3.3. Welfare State Crisis: Innovation, Demographics, Globalization
William Adema and Mazime Ladaique. Net Social Expenditure, 2005 Edition. More comprehensive measures of
social support. OECD Social, Employment, and Migration Working Papers. (2005) 8.
Michele Boldrin, Mariacristina De Nardi, and Larry E. Jones, Fertility and Social Security. National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 11146. February 2005.
Sarah M. Brooks, “Interdependent and Domestic Foundations of Policy Change: The Diffusion of Pension
Privatization Around the World.” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49 (2005) 2: 273-94.
Gøsta Esping-Andersen and Marino Regini, eds., Why Deregulate Labour Markets? Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Gøsta Esping-Andersen, (with Duncan Gallie, anton Hemerijck and John Myles) Why We Need a New Welfare State.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Mauricio Ferrera and Martin Rhodes, eds., Recasting European Welfare States. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
Christoffer Green-Pedersen, The Politics of Justification: Party Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment
in Denmark and the Netherlands from 1982 to 1998, Amsterdam University Press, 1999.
Jonathan Gruber and David A. Wise. Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World. Fiscal
Implications. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 11290. April 2005.
Jacob S. Hacker, “Review Article: Dismantling the Health Care State? Political Institutions, Public Policies and the
Comparative Politics of Health Reform,” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34 (2004) 4: 693-724.
Alexander Hicks, Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999.
Especially chapters 6 (Growth and Crisis of the Welfare State) and 7 (Course and Causes of the Crisis)
Alexander Hicks and Christopher Zorn. “Economic Globalization, the Macro Economy, and Reversals of Welfare:
Expansion in Affluent Democracies, 1978-94.” International Organization, Vol. 59 (Summer 2005: 3: 631-62.
Robert Holzman, Landis MacKellar and Michal Rutkowski, “Accelerating the European Pension reform Agenda:
Need, Progress, and Conceptual Underpinnings.” Pp. 1-45 in ibid., eds., Pension Reform in Europe:
Process and Progress. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, February 2003. [download from:
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000094946_03071512065263 ]
Torben Iversen and Thomas R. Cusak, “The Causes of Welfare State Expansion:
Deindustrialization or Globalization?” World Politics, Vol. 52 (2000) 3: 313-49. (e-journal)
Kees van Kersbergen, “Contemporary Christian Democracy and the Demise of the Politics of Mediation,” pp. 346-70 in KLMS1999.
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Desmond King and Steward Wood, “The Political Economy of Neoliberalism: Britain and the United States in the
1980s,” pp. 371-97 in KLMS 1999.
Herbert Kitschelt, “European Social Democracy between Political Economy and Electoral Competition,” pp. 317-45 in KLMS 1999.
Herbert Kitschelt, “Partisan Politics and Welfare State Retrenchment. When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies?”
pp. 265-303 in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles and Michael Wallerstein, eds., Globalization and Egalitarian Redistribution.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univeristy Press, 2006 (particularly useful for a consideration of advanced
capitalist democracies are chapters by Choi, Bowles, and Moene/Wallerstein)
Hyeok Yong Kwon and Jonas Pontusson. “Unions, Globalization and the Politics of Social Spending Growth in OECD
Countries, 1962-2000. paper Princeton University, October 2007.
Assar Lindbeck and Mats Persson, “The Gains from Pension Reform.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLI (2003) 1: 74-112.
Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Elmar Rieger and Stephan Leibfried, Limits to Globalization. Welfare States and the World Economy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.
Fritz Scharpf and Vivien A. Schmidt, eds., Welfare to Work in the Open Economy. Two volumes. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000.
Martin Schludi, The Reform of Bismarckian Pension Systems. A Comparison of Pension Politics in Austria, France,
Germany, Italy and Sweden. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2005.
Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, Silke van Dyk, and Martin Roggenkamp, What Do Parties Want? An Analysis of Programmatic Social Policy
Aims in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. Zentrum für Sozialpolitik working paper 01/2005.
Beverly J. Silver, Forces of Labor. Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003.
Duane Swank, Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
4. A Few More Globalization Readings
Robert Boyer, “The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still the Century Of Nations?” pp. 29-59 in
Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity And Global Capitalism. Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1996.
Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, The Political Economy of Modern Capitalism. London and Beverly Hills:
Sage, 1997.
Geoffrey Garrett, “Shrinking States? Globalization and National Autonomy in the OECD?” Oxford Development
Studies, Vol. 26 (1998) 1: 71-97.
Guillen, Mauro F. Corporate Governance and Globalization. Arguments and Evidence Against Convergence. Ms.
Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, September 1999.
Peter Hall, “The Political Economy of Europe in an Era of Interdependence,” pp. 135-63. In KLMS 1999.
Jude C. Hays, Globalization, Domestic Institutions, and the New Politics of Embedded Liberalism. forthcoming.
especially chapter 2, “Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD.”
Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks and John D. Stephens, “Convergence and Divergence in Advanced
Capitalist Democracies,” pp. 427-460 in KLMS 1999.
Bernhard Kittel and Hannes Winner, “How Reliable is Pooled Analysis in Political Economy? The GlobalizationWelfare State Nexus Revisited.” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 44 (2005) 3: 269-93.
Daniel J. Minnich, “Corporatism and Income Inequality in the Global Economy: A Panel Study of 17 OECD
Countries.” European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 42 (2003) 1: 23-53.
James Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Michael Gilligan, Dani Rodrik and Ronald Rogowski, “The Political Economy of
International Trade,” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29 (1996), No. 6.
Bruno Amoroso, On Globalization. Capitalism in the 21st Century. London: Palgrave 1998.
Geert Bekaert, Campbell R. Harvey and Christian Lundblad, “Does Financial Liberalization Spur Growth?” Journal
of Financial Economics, Vol. 77 (2005) 1: 3-55.
Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Clive Crook, “Globalisation and its Critics. A Survey of Globalization.” The Economist, September 29, 2001.
Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Peter Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986.
John Gray, False Dawn. The Delusions of Global Capitalism. London: Granta, 1998.
Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.
Charles R. Hankla, “Party Strength and International Trade. A Cross-National Analysis.” Comparative Political
Studies, Vol. 39 (2006) 9: 1133-56.
15
Michael Hiscox, International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “The Making of a Polity: The Struggle over European Integration,” pp. 70-97 in
KLMS 1999.
Timothy J. McKeown, “The Global Economy, Post-Fordism, and Trade Policy in Advanced Capitalist States,” pp.
11-35 in KLMS 1999.
Douglas A. Irwin, Free Trade Under Fire. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Peter Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978.
Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985.
Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., Internationalization and Domestic Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Paul Krugman, Pop-Internationalism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996.
Paulette Kurzer, Business and Banking: Political Change and Economic Integration in Western Europe. Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993.
Layna Mosley, Global Capital and National Governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press, 1990.
Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997.
Ronald Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989.
Beth A. Simmons, “The Internationalization of Capital,” pp. 36-69 in KLMS 1999.
4.1. An Emerging Literature on the Fiscal Crisis and its Consequences
Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richarson. Eds. Restoring Financial Stability. How to Repair a Failed
System. New York: Wiley, 2009.
Miguel Almunia, Agustín Bénétrix, Barry Eichengreen, Kevin H. O’Rourke and Gisela Rua. “From Great
Depression to Great Credit Crisis: similarities, differences, and lessons.” Economic Policy. April 2010. pp. 219-65.
Marco Buti, Alessandro Turrini, Paul Van den Noord and Pietro Biroli. “Reforms and Reelections in OECD Countries.” Economic
Policy, January 2010 pp. 61–116.
Stijn Claessens, M. Ayhan Kose and Marco E. Terrones. “What happens during recessions, crunches and Busts?” Economic Policy.
October 2009. Pp. 653-700.
Stijn Claessens, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan and Lux Laeven. “Cross-Country Experiences and Policy Implications from the
Global Financial Crisis.” Economic Policy. April 2010. Pp. 267-93.
Barry Eichengreen. Exorbitant Privilege. The Rise and Fall oftheDollar and the Future of the International Monetary System.Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011.
Paul Krugman. The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: Norton, 2009.
Michele Lenza, Huw Pill and Lucrezia Reichlin. “Monetary Policy in Exceptional Times.” Economic Policy.April 2010: 295-339.
John Mauldin and Jonathan Tepper. Endgame. The End of the Debt Supercycle and How it Changes Everything. New York: Wiley,
2011.
Gretchen Morgenson and Joshua Rosner. Reckless Endangerment. How Outsized Ambition, Greed, and Corruption Led to Economic
Armaggeddon. New York: New York Times Book, 2011.
Jeffrey D. Sachs. The Price of Civilization. Reawakening American Virtue and Prosperity. New York Random House, 2011.
Joseph E. Stiglitz and Members of a UN Commission of Financial Experts. The Stiglitz Report. Reforming the International
Monetary and Financial Systems in the Wake of the Global Crisis. New York: The New Press, 2010.
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