THE POTENTIAL FOR STEREOTYPE CONTROL:
A Dual-Process Approach
Much of the controversy surrounding stereotypes centers around the possibility that, as
schemas that organize knowledge about the meaning of group membership (Lutz, 2008), they
may also have negative implications. Indeed, schemas have the power to direct attention, guide
the encoding of relevant information and memory, as well as influence judgment (Fiske, 1994).
Given the ability of schemas to effect processing in such salient ways, a key question becomes
whether or not it is possible to control the influence of stereotypes. This essay examines the
potential for controlling the impact of stereotyping on judgment and behavior at multiple levels
of processing and across situations.
In order to understand the possibility of controlling stereotyping, it is necessary to
understand first how it happens. A review of dual-process models reveals several important
overarching features. Most importantly, each conceptualizes stereotyping as occurring along a
continuum. Beginning with identification (Brewer, 1988) or stereotyping (Fiske, Lin, and
Neuberg, 1999), dual-process models argue for the possibility of moving beyond simple
schematic processing to integrate salient information about the target piece by piece to achieve
individuation (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, Lin, and Neuberg, 1999). The heuristic-systematic model
(Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly, 1989) is another dual-process model similar to the one described
above. Chaiken et al. posit a process by which we move from heuristic processing, relying on
previous knowledge such as schemas and stereotypes, to systematic processing which enables us
to examine detailed qualities and behaviors of the target.
These models also share an implicit understanding of the distinction between automatic
and controlled processing. Automatic processing occurs at the beginning of the continuum and
is unintentional, initiated by environmental cues that activate prior knowledge (Tesser, 1994).
Thus, it is more difficult to inhibit than controlled processing, which requires active intention and
the intentional activation of information in memory (Tesser, 1994). These two levels of
processing provide a framework within which we can examine the potential for stereotype
control.
Evidence of the ability to control the influence of stereotyping on judgments at a
controlled level is demonstrated in studies asking both low- and high-prejudice subjects to list
their thoughts on a particular social group (e.g Devine, 1989). High-prejudice subjects generally
name negative traits (e.g. lazy), while low-prejudice subjects are more likely to list positive
beliefs (e.g. we are equal). These results indicate that it is possible for motivated perceivers to
prevent the influence of stereotyping on judgments at the controlled level.
This is not to say, however, that it is easy to stop the effects of stereotyping. Even as
perceivers consciously attempt to control their behavior, their processing may still be biased. A
number of challenges are presented to individuals attempting to control the influence of
stereotyping. For example, selective attention (Darley and Gross, 1983; Fiske, Lin, and
Neuberg, 1999) dictates that perceivers pay more attention to facts that confirm their original
hypothesis. Individuals also consider consistent facts to be more relevant to their judgment
(Lutz, 2008) and discount or reinterpret inconsistent information (Darley and Gross, 1983).
Thus, awareness of processing biases such as these is important to recognizing the potential
impact of stereotyping on judgment.
While this is clearly difficult, certain factors do encourage stereotype control. Situational
factors, such as time (Devine, 1989), are necessary for perceivers’ ability to process information
at a deeper, i.e. more individuated, level. Additionally, as we can only integrate knowledge we
have access to, available information may limit our potential for individuation. Personal factors
also determine the level of processing individuals engage in. Cognitive capacity (Devine, 1989)
must be present in order for deeper processing to occur, as well as motivation (Fiske, Lin, and
Neuberg, 1999) and commitment (Moskowitiz, 1999). Practice has also been shown to be
central to stereotype control (Moskowitiz, 1999; Sassenberg and Moskowitz 2005). These
factors are important to reducing and preventing the influence of stereotypes because the wellestablished nature of such automatic processes makes them difficult to bypass.
Recent evidence suggests, however, that it is possible to control the effect of stereotyping
at the automatic level. By showing long-term commitment to egalitarian goals, perceivers can
encounter category members without activating the relevant stereotype (Moskowitz, 1999).
This, of course, requires practicing non-activation until it replaces stereotyping as the default
response for each social group the perceiver encounters.
Although this is an effective method of automatic stereotype control, it is tedious for even
the most motivated (and egalitarian) perceivers to practice non-activation to this extent for each
social group they wish to think and behave toward in an individuated manner. Luckily, at least
one alternative has been shown to have the same effect. Perceivers in a creative mindset are less
likely to rely on existing knowledge to process information (Sassenberg and Moskowitz, 2005).
The finding that this mindset leads to preconscious inhibition is an important new way of
understanding our ability to control the influence of stereotyping.
The idea that we are able to control stereotyping at both the automatic and controlled
levels has several implications for behavior. It seems likely that decreasing or preventing
activation of stereotypes upon contact with a target will reduce the chance of behaving in a
stereotypical manner toward that target (Sassenberg and Moskowitz, 2005). However, this may
not always be the case. Even when the schema is not activated, it is still possible that we may
behave stereotypically. For example, one of the most common stereotypes of African Americans
is that they are hostile. Imagine that a perceiver dedicated to egalitarian goals and well-practiced
in non-activation is having a bad day and gets into an argument with an African American man
who accidentally bumps into her on the sidewalk. This could be representative of stereotypical
behavior (the bump was interpreted as hostile), or it could be unique situational and personal
factors leading an otherwise low-prejudice person to behave in an atypical manner. Thus, our
ability to control stereotyping is only one determinant of our behavior.
There is one other major implication of our ability to control stereotyping at automatic
and controlled levels. That is, we have a responsibility to do so. While it is true that
stereotyping, as a heuristic, can be useful in reducing the amount of environmental information
we are forced to process, we must also recognize that allowing this heuristic to activate and
influence our judgment and behavior can have negative effects. Thus, in order to counter these
potentially damaging consequences of stereotyping, it is important to recognize our ability for
stereotype control and situations that are conducive to that process.
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