The George Washington University
Professor Charles Glaser
Political Science 8452
Theories of International Security
Spring 2012
Course Description: This seminar focuses on theoretical questions about the role of military
policy in both generating and managing international conflict. The course emphasizes the role of
structure in international relations, including its impact on competition and cooperation broadly,
and more specifically on alliances, arms races and arms control, and war and war termination.
The course also provides an introduction to the deterrence and coercion literature—including
deterrence of motivated aggressors and tacit bargaining, debates over the effectiveness of deterrent
threats, and specific issues in nuclear and conventional deterrence—and address a few other key
issues including nuclear proliferation, military effectiveness and flawed military policies. Many
important issues are not covered, trading depth for breadth in an attempt to give students the
opportunity to fully engage some topic. Students should have some familiarity with some of these
topics before taking this course.
Course Requirements: Students are expected to attend every session and to complete all of the
required reading prior to each class. Grades will be based on:
1) Class attendance and participation (25%)
2) Pre-class questions: before each class, students should e-mail two questions on the week’s
reading to me. These should be questions that you would use to guide the discussion if you
were leading it. Questions can address key themes, shortcomings, relationships to other
parts of the IR literature, etc.
3) Papers: (75%)
a) Three short papers that critique readings from the class sessions. Paper topics will
be handed out in class and due the following week. OR
b) Literature review paper: Papers will critically engage a major body of IR theory that
is covered in the course. Students will choose their own topic. The paper should
summarize and organize the literature under discussion; identify the theoretical
questions it attempts to answer; explain key concepts and arguments; discuss some of
the major theoretical and empirical contributions; locate logical flaws, empirical
shortcomings, and unanswered questions; and suggest directions for future research.
The required readings can serve as the core of the literature that is analyzed, but
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students will be expected to read and analyze well beyond them. Students should meet
with me by the 4th week of the course to discuss their topic and then at least one
additional time during the semester. Papers will be due on April 30.
Readings and Books:
Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton,
2004/2006)
Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and
Cooperation (Princeton, 2010)
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Norton 2001/2003)
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966/2008).
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Waveland, 1979/2010)
These books are available at the GW bookstore. The other readings are available on the course
Blackboard site.
Office Hours: Monday, 1:30-3:30 or by appointment
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COURSE SCHEDULE
Week 1, January 19: Introductory meeting
Week 2, January 26:
(a) Strategic Interaction and International Structure:
David A. Lake and Robert Powell, “International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach,” in
Lake and Powell, eds., Strategic Choices and International Relations (Princeton University
Press, 1999).
James D. Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International
Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1, (1998), pp. 289-313.
Robert Powell, “Game Theory, International Relations Theory, and the Hobbesian
Stylization,” in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, eds., Political Science: The State of the
Discipline (Norton 2002), pp. 764-778.
(b) Structural realisms:
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley, 1979), Chp. 6 and 8.
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Norton 2001), Chps. 1, 2, 5.
Robert Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 1303-1320.
Further reading:
Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to
Structural Realism (Columbia 1993).
Colin Elman, “Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America’s Rise to
Regional Hegemony,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 4 (November 2004),
pp. 563-576.
Eric Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,” Security
Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49.
Christopher Layne, “The Poster Child for Realism: America as a Global Hegemon,” Security
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Winter 2002), pp. 120-164.
John Gerald Ruggie, “World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” World Politics, Vol. 35,
No. 2 (January 1983), pp. 261-285.
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Glenn H. Snyder, “Process Variables in Neorealist Theory,” Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3
(Spring 1996), pp. 167-192.
Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security:
A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Summer 2002), pp. 149-173.
Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?,”
Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 7-53.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Politics is Not Foreign Policy,” Security Studies, Vol. 6, No.
1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 54-57.
Week 3, February 2: More realisms, or just rationalist theories
Charles L. Glaser, Theory of Rational International Politics, chps 1-3, pp. 93-102, 137-147.
Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton 2005), chp. 2.
Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,”
Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 114-155.
Randall Schweller, “Neorealim’s Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?,” Security
Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 90-121.
Jeffrey Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical
realism, the state, and foreign policy,” in Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Recommended: read if you haven’t already:
Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1
(1978), pp. 167-170, 186-214.
Further reading:
Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (summer
1997), pp. 445-477.
David Edelstein, “Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great
Powers,” Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Autumn 2002), pp. 1Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976), Chp Three. The classic statement of the spiral model.
Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the
Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992).
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Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help,” International Security,
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1995/95), pp. 50-90.
Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October
1997), pp. 171-201.
Andrew Kydd, “Game Theory and the Spiral Model,” World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April
1997).
Evan Branden Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance,
and the Problem of Uncertainty,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Fall 2006).
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,”
International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 2001), pp. 128-161.
Brian Rathburn, “A Rose By Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and
Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,” Security Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2008), pp. 294321.
Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics, Vol.
51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172
Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World
Conquest (Columbia 1998)
Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role
(Princeton University Press, 1998).
Week 4, February 9: Alliances
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Cornell University Press, 1987), chp. 2.
Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4
(July 1984), pp. 461-495.
Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,”
International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.
Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance
Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137168.
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Norton 2001), Chp. 8.
Timothy W. Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power
Politics,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 155-189.
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Further reading:
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations
and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton University Press, 2008).
James D. Morrow, “Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security,” International
Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring 1993).
Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power (Princeton University Press, 1999), chp. 5.
Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliance 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in
Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (University Press of
Kansas, 1976).
Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Cornell University Press, 1997).
Thomas J. Christensen, “Perceptions and Allies in Europe, 1865-1940,” International
Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997).
James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?,” in Annual Review of Political
Science, ed. Nelson Polsby (Annual Reviews, 2000).
Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist View of
Underbalancing,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 159-201.
Mancur Olsen and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48, No. 3 (1966).
William C. Wohlforth et al, “Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History,” European
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 13, No. 2 (20007), pp. 155-185.
Week 5: February 16: Arms Races—Causes and Consequences; Cooperation—Arms Control and
Institutions
Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International
Relations (St. Martin’s Press, 1987), pp. 69-113.
Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results,” Public Policy, Vol. 8 (1958),
pp. 41-86; reprinted in Art and Waltz, The Use of Force, 4th ed. (University Press of America,
1993).
Charles L. Glaser, “The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races,” Annual Review of
Political Science, ed., Nelson Polsby (Annual Reviews, 2000), Vol. 3, pp. 251-276.
Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics, chp. 9.
Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: The
Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), reprinted by Pergamon-Brassey, 1985, pp. 1-24.
Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 248-259.
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Celeste A. Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the
Cold War (Cornell 1999), Chp. 2.
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, “A framework for the study of security communities,” in
Adler and Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 29-65.
Further reading:
George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control
(Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1990).
George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and
Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 118-146.
Nils Petter Gleditsch and Olav Njolstad, eds., Arms Races: Technological and Political
Dynamics (Sage, 1984).
Colin S. Gray, "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing," World Politics, Vol. 26,
No. 2 (January 1974), pp. 207-233.
Andrew Kydd, “Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective,” American
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 2 (April 2000), pp. 222-238.
Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986),
Chapter 3.
George W. Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," Scientific American (April 1969),
reprinted in Russett and Blair, Progress in Arms Control? (San Francisco: Freeman, 1979).
Susan G. Sample, “Arms races and dispute escalation: resolving the debate,” Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 7-22.
Thomas C. Schelling, "A Framework for the Evaluation of Arms Control Proposals,"
Daedalus, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Summer 1975), pp. 187-200.
Graham T. Allison and Frederic A. Morris, "Exploring the Determinants of Military
Weapons," Daedalus, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Summer 1975), pp. 99-129.
Paul Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy (Ayelsbury, England: Fontana, 1984), Chapter 3.
Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power (Princeton University Press, 1999), chp. 2.
Malcomb W. Hoag, "On Stability in Deterrent Races," World Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July
1961), pp. 505-527.
Michael D. Wallace, "Armaments and Escalation," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26,
No. 1 (March 1982), pp. 37-56.
Paul F. Diehl, "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look," Journal of Peace Research, Vol.
20, No. 3 (1983), pp. 205-212.
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Paul F. Diehl and Jean Kingston, "Message or Messenger?: Military Buildups and the
Initiation of Conflict," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 49 (1987), pp. 803-813.
Randolph M. Siverson and Paul F. Diehl, “Arms Races, the Conflict, and the Onset of War,”
in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp.
195-218.
George W. Downs, "Arms Races and War," in Philip Tetlock, et al., eds., Behavior, Society
and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 73-109.
Donald G. Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security (New York:
George Braziller, 1961).
Bernard Brodie, "On the Objectives of Arms Control," International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1
(Summer 1976), pp. 17-36.
Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass, eds., Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record
Straight (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987).
Steven E. Miller, "The Limits of Mutual Restraint: Arms Control and the Strategic Balance,"
(Ph.D. diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1988).
Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western
Options," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 48-77.
Thomas C. Schelling, "What Went Wrong with Arms Control?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No.
2 (Winter 1985/86), pp. 219-233.
Michael J. Mazarr, "Virtual Nuclear Arsenals," Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), pp.
7-26.
Charles L. Glaser, “The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament,” Survival, Vol. 40, No. 1
(Spring 1998), pp. 112-128.
Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, Imperfect Unions: Security
Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford 1999).
Week 6, February 23: War
James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, Vol. 49,
No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-414.
Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” Annual Review of Political
Science (2002), pp. 1-30.
Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power (Princeton University Press, 1999), chp. 3.
Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Cornell 2000), chp. 2.
Stephen Van Evera, “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War,” International Security, Vol.
22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43.
Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics, pp. 112-123.
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Further reading:
Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (Free Press, 1988).
Alexander B. Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Cornell University Press, 2008).
M. Taylor Fravel, “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking the Internal and External Conflict,”
Security Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2010), pp. 307-341.
Stacy E. Goddard, “Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy,”
International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter 2006), pp. 35-68.
Peter Liberman, Does Conquest Pay: The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies
(Princeton University Press, 1996).
John E. Mueller, The Remnants of War (Cornell University Press, 2004).
Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1
(March 2003), pp. 27-43.
Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War (Cornell 1999).
Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring
1993), pp. 27-47.
Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization, Vol. 60
(Winter 2006), pp. 169-203.
R. Harrison Wagner, “Peace, War, and the Balance of Power,” American Political Science
Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 593-607.
R. Harrison Wagner, “Bargaining and War,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44,
No. 3 (July 2000), pp. 469-484.
Jonathan Kirshner, “Rationalist Explanations for War?,” Security Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1
(Autumn 2000), pp. 143-150.
Week 7, March 1: War Duration and Termination:
H.E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World
War (Princeton 2000), Chp. Two.
Dan Rieter, How Wars End (Princeton 2009), Chp. Three.
Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (Columbia University Press, 1971), chp. *
James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others,” Journal of
Peace Research, Vol. 41 (May 2004), pp. 275-301.
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Further Reading:
Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace
(Princeton University Press, 2004).
Paul Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton
University Press, 1983).
Donald Wittman, “How War Ends: A Rational Model Approach,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 1979), pp. 743-763.
Week 8, March 8: Basics of deterrence and coercion
Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton
University Press, 1961), pp. 3-40.
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), Chps.
1-3.
Timothy W. Crawford, “The Endurance of Extended Deterrence: Continuity, Change, and
Complexity in Theory and Policy,” in T.V.Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz,
Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age (University of Chicago Press, 2009)
Todd S. Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,” International
Organization, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Fall 2010).
Further reading:
Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace
(Cornell University Press, 2003).
Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, 2nd edition (Beverly Hills: Sage,
1983), Chp. Two.
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1960).
Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making
and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).
T.V.Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the
Global Age (University of Chicago Press, 2009)
Week 9, March 22: Effectiveness of deterrence and coercion
Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical
Debates,” in Annual Review of Political Science, Nelson W. Polsby, ed. (Annual Reviews,
1999).
James D. Fearon, “Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 236-269.
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James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International
Disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577-592.
Jessica L. Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,”
International Organization, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Winter 2008), pp. 35-64.
Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Cornell 1996), Chp. 1.
Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Cornell 2005),
Chp. 1.
Further reading:
Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues,
Vol. 43, No. 4 (1987), pp. 5-71.
Paul K. Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," American Political Science
Review, Vol. 82, No. 2 (June 1988), pp. 423-443.
Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,"
World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3 (April 1990), pp. 336-369.
Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," World
Politics, Vol. 42, No. 4 (July 1990), pp. 466-501.
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (Columbia
University Press, 1974).
Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (January 1979),
pp. 289-324.
Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1981)
Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1985).
Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (Yale University Press, 1988).
"The Rationale Deterrence Debate: A Symposium," special issue of World Politics, Vol. 41,
No. 2 (January 1989).
Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great
Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three
Competing Models,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 1 (March 1993), pp.
61-73.
Anne E. Sartori, “A Reputational Theory of Communication in Disputes,” International
Organization, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 121-149.
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Week 10, March 29: Conventional and Nuclear Deterrence and Coercion
John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983),
chapter 2.
Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe,"
International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 32-56.
Robert A. Pape, Jr., Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1996), Chp. 2: “Explaining Military Coercion.”
Harold Brown, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress (January 1981), “The
Countervailing Strategy,” pp. 37-45, 52-59.
Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
94, No. 4 (Winter 1979/80), pp. 617-633.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science
Review,” Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 731-746.
Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture
Review’s New Missions,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 84-126.
Further reading:
Richard K. Betts, "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence,"
World Politics, Vol. 37, No. 2 (January 1985), pp. 153-179.
Barry R. Posen, "Crisis Stability and Conventional Arms Control," in "Arms Control: Thirty
Years On," Daedalus, Vol. 120, No. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 217-232.
William Kaufmann, ed., Military Policy and National Security (Princeton University Press,
1956).
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton University Press, 1959).
Klaus Knorr and Thornton Read, eds., Limited Strategic War (Praeger, 1962).
Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (St. Martin's Press, 1981).
Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Cornell University Press, 1984).
Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospects for
Armageddon (Cornell University Press, 1989).
James H. Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: U.S. National
Security Policy after 9/11 (Routledge 2006).
Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton
University Press, 1989).
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Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton University Press, 1990).
Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Policy,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 40-92.
Michael S. Gerson, “No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy,” International
Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7-47.
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The End of MAD?: The Nuclear Dimension of U.S.
Primacy,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Spring 2006), pp. 7-44.
Robert R. Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Problem of Credibility (Cambridge
University Press, 1990).
Robert Powell: “Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile
Defense,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 86-118.
Week 11, April 5: Nuclear Proliferation
Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a
Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 54-86.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Toward Nuclear Peace,” in Art and Waltz, eds., The Use of Force, 4th
edition (University Press of America, 1993).
Scott D. Sagan, “More Will Be Worse,” in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: A Debate Renewed (Norton, 2003).
S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia is Not Like
Cold War Europe,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 127-152.
Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons (Cornell, 2010), chp. 1.
Matthew Fuhrmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear
Cooperation,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Summer 2009), pp. 7-41.
Further reading:
Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and
Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
T.V. Paul, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2000).
Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A
Quantitative Test,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6 (December 2004), pp. 859885.
Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton
University Press, 2007).
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Week 12, April 12: Military Effectiveness
Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of Military
Organizations,” in Millett and Murray, Military Effectiveness: Vol. 1, The First World War
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998/2010).
Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton,
2004/2006), Chaps. 2-4.
Risa A. Brooks, “The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on
Military Effectiveness,” in Creating Military Power, eds. Brooks and Stanley (Stanford:
Stanford UP, 2007), pp. 1-26.
Risa Brooks, “Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed?” International
Security, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2003), pp. 149-191.
Barry Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International Security, Vol.
18, No. 2 (1993), pp. 80-124. (read the theory, skim the history)
Further reading:
Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, “Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the
Developing World,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1996), pp. 171-212.
Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, “Democracy and Military Effectiveness,” Journal of
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 4 (2004), pp. 535-546.
Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton University Press, 2002).
Michael Desch, Power and Military Effectiveness: the Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 2008).
Alexander B. Downes, “How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of
Democratic Victory in War,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Spring 2009), pp. 9-51.
Week 13, April 19: Flawed Military Policies
Robert Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat,” in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow
and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1985).
Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the
World Wars (Cornell University Press, 1984), chp. 2.
Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Cornell
University Press), chp. 2.
Randall L. Schweller, “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist View of
Underbalancing,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 159-201.
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Stephen Van Evera, “Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation By States and
Societies,” in Andrew K. Hanami, ed., Perspectives on Structural Realism (Palgrave, 2003).
Further reading:
Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some
Policy Implications,” World Politics, Vol. 24 (Spring 1972), pp. 40-79.
Chaim Kaufmann, “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling
of the Iraq War,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 5-48.
Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings,
1974).
Week 14, April 26: Regime Change and Occupation:
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Readings to be added
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