The Never-Ending Iraqi Crisis: Dual Containment and the “New World Order”
Bjørn Møller
March 1999
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
Since the autumn of 1997 the world has seen an intense international dispute over Iraq,
which culminated in December 1998 in a new war:
Operation Desert Fox, which has been followed by almost daily bombardments of
military targets in Iraq by the United States and Great Britain.
In the following these events shall be analyzed from several different angles: The
analysis of the legal, strategic and political aspects of the crisis 1
is followed by a tentative analysis of the accompanying discourse. The paper concludes
by sketching an alternative to the present American
strategy of “dual containment”.
1. Legal Analysis
There is little doubt that Iraq was in blatant violation of the 1991 ceasefire agreement in
general and of the famous “mother of all resolutions”,
UNSCR 687 (3 April 1991) in particular, in which the extent and modalities of the
disarmament of the defeated aggressor were detailed: 2
The Security Council.....
8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering
harmless, under international supervision, of:
a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related
subsystems and components and all research,
development, support and manufacturing facilities;
b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres...
34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be
required for the implementation of this
resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.
The main issue of controversy has, paradoxically, not so much been Iraq’s actual
holdings of the proscribed weapons as the international
supervision of their destruction. Iraq has on several occasions placed obstacles in the way
of, and eventually even completely refused access to,
the UN’s appointed representatives, i.e. the inspectors of UNSCOM (United Nations
Special Commission). In response, the United States
began threatening, as well as materially planning for, a military campaign against Iraq in
early 1998. After a year’s Iraqi provocations and US
threats, the crisis was escalated, as the US and the UK launched Operation Desert Fox,
subsequent to which Iraq demanded the total and
irreversible withdrawal of UNSCOM. At the time of writing it seems very unlikely that
the inspectors will ever be allowed to return—also
because both Russia and France are working for a new inspection regime. 3
Even though it does not legally justify Iraq’s behaviour, it has recently been revealed that
Iraq was basically correct when it accused UNSCOM
of allowing itself to be abused as a cover for espionage. 4 This might surely be accepted
as a significant mitigating circumstance, especially in view
of the strong probability that information gathered by these illicit means was used for the
subsequent aggression against Iraq.
The Iraqi violations of resolution 687 and others notwithstanding, both the US and British
threats and their subsequent implementation
represented clear breaches of international law, in casu nothing less than the UN Charter.
This states unequivocally that not merely the actual use
of force, but also the mere threat thereof is illegal, regardless of the underlying intentions.
The only institution with the right to use, or mandate the
use of force is the UN Security Council, as clearly stated in the Charter. 5
Article 4(2): All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.
Article 24(1): In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security
Council acts on their behalf.
Article 39: The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security.
Article 42: Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate,
it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members of the United Nations.
The advocates of military intervention (the United States, followed by the UK and
various other countries, including Denmark) have argued that
prior Security Council resolutions entailed an “implicit authorization” to use force,
referring primarily to UNSCR 678 (29 November 1990):
The Security Council.....
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless
Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully
implements... the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and
implement Security Council resolution 660
(1990)b and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and
security in the area.
4. Requests the States concerned to keep the Council regularly informed on the
progress of actions undertaken pursuant to
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this resolution.
This reading of the resolution, however, does not seem tenable, above all because it
clearly refers to a previous resolution (UNSCR 660 of 2
August 1990), which had nothing to do with the disarmament of Iraq, but only with a
condition that had already been met, namely the restoration
of the sovereignty of Kuwait.
The Security Council.....
2. Demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all of its forces to the
positions in which they were located on 1
August 1990.
Even though several subsequent resolutions have condemned Iraq for non-compliance,
none of them have contained anything that might be
construed as an authorization to use force (for a complete list see Table 1) 6.
The world was thus in February 1998 heading towards a clear breach of international law
perpetrated by two of the Security Council’s
permanent members. This threatened to seriously undermine the UN’s authority, as there
would be very little the rest of the UN could do, if only
because the US and UK would be able to veto any condemnation in the Security Council,
to say nothing of actual reprisals.
Fortunately, however, UN Secretary General Kofi Anan managed to “snatch victory from
the claws of defeat”. His negotiations in Baghdad
produced a Memorandum of Understanding, dated 23 February 1998, between Iraq and
the UN, in which Iraq pledged to “cooperate fully with
UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)”, in return for “the
commitment of all Member States to respect the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Iraq”. Concretely, Iraq promised “to accord to UNSCOM and
IAEA immediate, unconditional and unrestricted
access”, but the UN promised to “respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to
national security, sovereignty and dignity”, which was to be
ensured by having the controversial eight Presidential Sites inspected by a special group
headed by a Commissioner appointed by the
Secretary-General. The UN further promised to bring the matter of a lifting of sanctions
“to the full attention of the members of the Security
Council”.
After some haggling in the Security Council, with the United States and Britain pushing
for a resolution that would make the use of force an almost
automatic response to Iraqi non-compliance, a compromise resolution (UNSCR 1154)
was passed on 2 March 1998.
The Security Council,
3. Stresses that compliance by the Government of Iraq with its obligations, repeated
again in the memorandum of understanding, to
accord immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to the Special Commission
and the IAEA in conformity with the relevant
resolutions is necessary for the implementation of resolution 687 (1991), but that any
violation would have the severest
consequences for Iraq;
5. Decides, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter, to remain actively
seized of the matter, in order to ensure
implementation of this resolution, and to ensure peace and security in the area.
While threatening “the severest consequences” of any breach of the agreement, the
resolution clearly left the decision to the Security Council of
how to respond in case of continued Iraqi obstruction or obfuscation: an interpretation
that was not merely logical, but which was also explicitly
advocated by Secretary General Anan. 7 In any case, there is no doubt that the Security
Council is the supreme authority on the interpretation of
its own resolutions, which cannot even be overruled by the ICJ (International Court of
Justice), much less by individual states, however powerful.
8
When the US and the UK in December 1998 thus used the report by UNSCOM chairman
Richard Butler as the pretext for launching Operation
Desert Fox, it was thus, legally speaking, a war of aggression undertaken by two of the
permanent members of the Security Council. Not only did
the aggressors have no explicit mandate, but the three other permanent members made it
abundantly clear that they were opposed to the use of
force. The United States and the UK even had the audacity and arrogance to launch the
strikes while the Council was in session and in the midst
of its deliberations on the matter. In Russian President Yeltsin’s words:
The resolutions on Iraq adopted by the UN Security Council do not provide any basis
whatsoever for actions of this sort. By
carrying out unprovoked military action, the USA and Britain have crudely violated
the UN Charter and the universally-accepted
principles of international law as well as the norms and rules governing the
responsible conduct of states in the international arena.
The military strike was delivered precisely at the moment when the Security Council
was discussing the Iraq problem. This can
essentially be regarded as a step that undermines the entire system of international
security, of which the UN and its Security Council
are the linchpins. 9
Operation Desert Fox was called off on 19 December, but has been followed by two
other, almost equally serious, breaches of international law
on the part of the United States and to some extent Great Britain:
First of all, the post-war period has seen nearly daily attacks against Iraqi air defence
systems in the so-called “No-Fly Zones” in northern and
southern Iraq (see map). These zones have no US mandate and thus represent a clear
infringement of Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
with their prohibition against both military and civilian flight, combined with a daily
patrolling by US, British and (until 1996) French military
aircraft. In a Department of Defense News Briefing, 26 January, 1999, it was claimed that
The zones, created after the Gulf War, were mandated by U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 678, 687, and 688 to deter Iraq’s use
of aircraft against its people and its neighbors.
In fact, however, none of the quoted resolutions mention the zones at all. UNSCR 678
(29 November 1990) authorized the use of force to evict
Iraq from Kuwait; UNSCR 687 mandated Iraq’s disarmament, yet without any
authorization to use force; and UNSCR 688 condemned “the
repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently
in Kurdish populated areas”, demanded “that Iraq, as a
contribution to remove the threat to international peace and security in the region,
immediately end this repression” and insisted “that Iraq allow
immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of
assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all
necessary facilities for their operations”. Not only was there no mention of no-fly zones,
but the resolution explicitly reaffirmed “the commitment
of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of
Iraq”.
Secondly, the Clinton Administration has begun implementing the Iraq Liberation Act of
5 October 1998, which says that
It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime
headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq
and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime.
This included, in addition to support for propaganda and humanitarian purposes, also
military assistance, including “defense articles” (i.e.
weapons), military education and training for insurgents, to an amount not exceeding 97
million dollars. 10
Whatever one may think of the Iraqi regime and hope that it will one day be replaced by a
democracy, for one state to thus explicitly declare its
intention to remove another state’s government by military means (among others), is a
clear violation of the UN Charter, as well as of several UN
Security Council resolutions, all of which have pledged respect for Iraq’s sovereignty.
The Iraq Liberation Act is also a violation of the UN
General Assembly’s Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their
Independence and Sovereignty, which was adopted in 1965 with only one abstention (the
UK, but not the United States), and in which it was
stated:
No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in
the internal or external affairs of any other state.
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted
threats against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements are condemned. 11
The United States has thus been in clear breach of international law in several respects
during the protracted Iraqi crisis. That this crisis is not an
isolated exception to a general rule of law-abidance shall be argued and documented
below.
Table 1. UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq/Kuwait, 1990-1998
No.
Date
Topic
Decision
1990
660
02.08
Iraqi invasion of K.
Demand withdrawal
661
06.08
Occupation of K.
Embargo against Iraq
662
09.08
Annexation of K.
Declare null and void
664
18.08
Hostages
Demand right to leave
665
25.08
Non-compliance
Impose naval blockade
666
13.09
Humanitarian
Authorize food/medicine supply
667
16.09
Diplomatic staff
Demand release
669
24.09
Side-effects of sanctions 12
Examine requests for assistance
670
25.09
Sanctions
Implementation measures
674
29.10
Foreign nationals
Demand release/human rights
677
28.11
Demographic manipulation
in Kuwait
Retain copy population register
678
29.11
Iraqi non-compliance with
former resolutions
Authorization to use “all necessary
means to uphold and implement
resolution 660 (1990) and all
subsequent relevant resolutions and to
restore international peace and
security in the area”
1991
686
02.03
End of war
Demand release of POWs,
reparations, etc.
687
03.04
End of war
Demand demarcation of Iraq-Kuwait
border; removal of, and promise not
to acquire, chemical and biological
weapons, ballistic missiles with ranges
> 500 km. under international
supervision; full compliance with the
NPT; special commission to supervise
688
05.04
Repression of Kurds
Condemn, demand stop to
repression, appeals to all member
states for humanitarian relief
689
09.04
Report on Res. 687
Set out modalities for implementation
692
20.05
Reparations
Establishment of Fund
699
17.06
Disarmament of Iraq
Implementation of Res. 687
700
17.06
Disarmament of Iraq
Implementation of Res. 687
705
15.08
Reparations
Sets out reparations as share of oil
revenues
706
15.08
Health situation
Authorizes “Oil for Food” programme
707
15.08
Non-compliance Res. 687
Demands compliance
712
19.09
Oil for Food
Specifies implementation
715
11.10
IAEA/Special Commission
Specifies modalities
1992
773
26.08
Iraq-Kuwait border
Specifies modalities of demarcation
778
02.10
Humanitarian needs
Demands compliance with “Oil for
Food”
1993
806
05.02
Border incidents
Authorizes redeployment of
UNIKOM
833
27.05
Border demarcation finished
Demands compliance
1994
899
04.03
Border demarcation
Unfreezes private Iraqi assets
949
15.10
Troop movements
Demands withdrawal
1995
986
14.04
Humanitarian needs
Specifies Oil for Food implementation
1996
1051
27.03
Iraqi imports
Regulates imports of dual-use items
1060
12.06
UNSCOM Inspections
Demands unimpeded access
1997
1111
04.06
Oil for Food
Extends program, specifies regulations
1115
21.06
UNSCOM Inspections
Demands unimpeded access
1129
12.09
Oil for Food
Extends program, specifies regulations
1134
23.10
UNSCOM Inspections
Demands unimpeded access
1137
12.11
UNSCOM Inspections
Demands unimpeded access
1143
04.12
Oil for Food
Extends program, specifies regulations
1998
1153
20.02
Oil for Food
Extends program, specifies regulations
1154
02.03
SG’s mediation
Demands access to presidential sites,
etc.
1158
25.03
Oil for Food
Extends program, specifies regulations
1175
19.06
Oil for Food
Extends program, specifies regulations
1194
09.09
UNSCOM Inspections
Demands unimpeded access
1205
05.11
UNSCOM Inspections
Demands unimpeded access
1210
24.11
Oil for Food
Extends program, specifies regulations
2. Strategic Analysis
The crisis had thus seen some very “creative” attempts at reinterpretation of international
law, as well as quite explicit breaches of it. However, all
of this might (perhaps) have been justified, if the prevailing assessment of the severity of
the problem had been true, in which case a bending or
breach of the rules might have been necessary. 13 Unfortunately, this does seem to be the
case.
The crux of the matter was Iraq’s refusal of access for UNSCOM to the presidential sites
and various other locations, where it was believed it
might conceal either actual weapons of mass destruction or production facilities for
WMDs, i.e. for either chemical or biological weapons, or
both. The question is whether the implicit danger was serious enough to warrant a breach
of international law.
Chemical weapons, to be sure, certainly have some very unappealing features. Except for
very unlikely scenarios (such as very accurate strikes
against very dense congregations of unprotected victims), however, the damage they can
produce is fairly modest. In other words, quite large
quantities are required for chemical weapons to really deserve the label “weapons of
mass destruction”—quantities which it would be hard for
Iraq to conceal, and even harder to deliver to the envisaged target. Ballistic missiles
generally have too limited throw-weights to be suitable for
such missions, while aircraft are better, albeit less sure to be able to penetrate the air
defence array of the target. Finally, a wide range of
protective measures are available, which are cumbersome but quite effective.
Biological weapons are, in principle at least, genuine weapons of mass destruction, 14 as
some of them (anthrax, for instance) can cause infections
of epidemic proportions. Moreover, the small quantities required makes it easy to conceal
them—the more so, the less stringent the safety
precautions taken by the possessor. There are, however, several drawback to any use of
biological weapons:
Their impact is very difficult to control, hence their use may also affect the country
using them, including its (invading or occupying) armed
forces. The collateral damage would also be considerable, and those segments of the
population that might have been singled out as
supporters would not be immune. For instance, an Iraqi biological weapons attack
against Israel would inevitably have a large toll of
Palestinian casualties besides the intended (Jewish) victims.
Certain agents have too long incubation times to make them suitable for supporting a
surprise attack.
Certain agents may be difficult to deliver, for instance, by means of ballistic missiles,
as the micro-organisms would be killed either during
the boost or impact phase.
While vaccines are available that may project against some agents, mass inoculations
would surely be detected, which would alert the
envisaged target country, to which the same vaccines might be available. 15
There have been speculations about genetic engineering to overcome some of these
problems, but this would surely require a level of
sophistication beyond that available to a country such as Iraq, especially when under
close and intrusive supervision. 16
Even if Iraq should succeed in producing significant stockpiles of chemical and/or
biological weapons, it is hard to fathom what would be their
possible utility, even in the hands of a ruthless dictator like Saddam Hussein. A few
possibilities immediately spring to mind, but none of them
(with the possible exception of no. 1) seem to make much sense:
1.As a “defensive deterrent”, i.e. intended to protect Iraq against an attack with
unlimited objectives, posing an “existential” threat to the
country or regime. This would, however, only be relevant in case such a threat exists.
2.As an “offensive deterrent”, under the protection of which Iraq might launch a
conventional attack, taking advantage of its possession of
WMDs to neutralize the deterrent effects of WMDs in the hands of the victim of
aggression or its allies. This would, however, only really
matter against conventionally inferior opponents, while Iraq would undoubtedly be up
against a crushing conventional superiority in the
event of a renewed attack against Kuwait or other neighbours.
3.As a means of “offensive compellence”, where Iraq would use the threat of strikes
with WMDs (i.e. “WMD blackmail”) to compel
another state to concessions. The entire case for such blackmail is, however, extremely
vague and could probably safely be dismissed as a
figment of the imagination, especially in the case of its use against countries aligned
with a nuclear-armed superpower. 17
4.As a political “bargaining chip”, which Saddam might “cash in” for concessions such
as, for instance, a complete lifting of
sanctions—perhaps in analogy with what may have been the North Korean strategy
underlying its threat to withdraw from the NPT. 18 As
such a lifting of sanctions is preconditioned on Iraqi compliance with UNSCR 687,
however, any clandestine development that would
automatically be labelled as non-compliance would seem to defeat its purpose.
While all of the above might make some strategic sense, the purpose most often alluded
to would not, namely terror bombardments against
neighbouring countries. The stigma that is attached to biological weapons would deprive
the country using them of all, or at least most,
international support. It might further help lifting the taboo against nuclear first-use,
implying that a biological attack could provoke nuclear
retaliation—as has been intimated by both Israel and the United States. Why should the
deterrence strategy on which the national security of both
the United States and NATO was premised throughout the Cold War not work against a
foe such as Iraq which is, after all, much less of a threat
than the mighty Soviet Union?
While it would thus be cynical to trivialize B and C weapons, they cannot really compare
with the actual nuclear weapons that are deployed by,
inter alia, the United States, the UK and Israel, but which have been almost completely
forgotten in the uproar over potential Iraqi WMDs.
Moreover, to the extent that B and C weapons are regarded as a serious danger, the most
promising approach to solving the problem would be
negotiations on the establishment of a zone free of WMDs covering the entire Middle
East/Persian Gulf region. 19 This would surely have been
preferable to an attack in breach of international law such as Operation Desert Fax.
This operation involved more than 30,000 U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf and 10,000
more from outside Central Command; more than 600
sorties; and more than 40 ships performing strike and support roles, launching more than
300 cruise missiles (to say nothing of the British
contribution). 20 Its objectives were never made entirely clear, but the following were
mentioned by President Clinton in his announcement of the
operation:
They are designed to degrade Saddam’s capacity to develop and deliver weapons of
mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to
threaten his neighbours. At the same time, we are delivering a powerful message to
Saddam. If you act recklessly, you will pay a
heavy price. (...) The credible threat to use force, and when necessary, the actual use
of force, is the surest way to contain
Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction programme, curtail his aggression and prevent
another Gulf War.
When calling off the campaign four days later, he declared that
We began with this basic proposition—Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to
develop nuclear arms, poison gas, biological
weapons or the means to deliver them (...) We have inflicted significant damage on
Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction
programmes, on the command structures that direct and protect that capability, and on
his military and security infrastructure. 21
In his testimony to the Senate Armed Forces Committee 28 January 1999, General
Anthony C. Zinni, the military officer who commands
American forces in the Arabian Gulf and who directed Desert Fox operations claimed
that
Our objectives for this operation were: reduce Iraq’s capability to produce WMD;
degrade strategic and tactical command and
control facilities, damage industrial infrastructure used for the smuggling of gas and
oil; and the overall reduction of Iraq’s capability
to threaten its neighbors in the region. Primary targets struck during Operation
DESERT FOX were installations associated with
development of WMD, units providing security to IKMD programs, and Iraq’s
national command and control network. Additional
targets included selected Republican Guard facilities, airfields, and the Basrah oil
refinery that was involved in production of illegal
gas and oil exports. Iraq’s integrated air defenses and surface-to-air missiles (SAM)
sites were also heavily struck in order to ensure
the safety of coalition aircraft. Due to the destruction of key facilities and specialized
equipment, we assess that Iraq’s ballistic
missile program has been set back one to two years. Several of Iraq’s most sensitive
security units suffered attrition and the Iraqi
command and control network was disrupted, with some degradation remaining today.
Regarding the success of Operation
DESERT FOX, over 80 percent of the designated targets were hit and damaged.
Additionally, every security unit attacked suffered
damage. Iraqi claims of civilian casualties and collateral damage remain
unsubstantiated. Finally, these successes were realized with
no casualties to our coalition forces.
There thus seem to have been, at least, four different objectives:
1.destroying Iraq’s WMDs;
2.hampering Iraq’s production of WMD’s;
3.compelling Saddam Hussein to comply with the UN’s requests;
4.deposing Saddam Hussein.
Laudable though (some of) these goals may be, the selected strategy seems entirely
unsuitable to achieve any of them.
ad 1) A destruction of the presumed Iraqi stocks of biological and/or chemical weapons
is virtually impossible, even with the high-precision
concrete-penetrating missiles shown in the media, as surgical strikes presuppose the
availability of accurate and reliable target coordinates. While
such would be available for possible production sites for nuclear weapons (as
demonstrated by the Israeli attack against the Ossirac nuclear
reactor), production sites for B and C weapons could be much more dispersed and easily
moved. In fact, this was exactly what the US accused
Saddam of doing: delaying access for the inspection teams and in the meantime moving
the proscribed materials to other locations. Finally, even in
the hypothetical event that the attacks should actually succeed in destroying all existing
stocks and production facilities, there could never be any
complete certainty thereof.
ad 2) Striking at the presumed locations might be partially successful, but would have
to be followed up with renewed strikes ad infinitum.
This would be a form of gradual attrition and would surely do something to hamper and
postpone any Iraqi access to WMDs, but there would
also be drawbacks:
First of all, an inevitable collateral damage which Saddam might deliberately increase
by placing production sites in densely populated
areas (viz his usage of hostages during the Kuwait crisis).
Secondly, the costs to the United States would be substantial, especially as such an
open-ended campaign could, most likely, not be able
to count on Arab or Turkish support indefinitely. We have seen Iraqi threats against
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait that they will have to “bear
the consequences of providing bases for aggression against Iraq”, as well as
negotiations with Turkey. Even though the latter have not, so
far, produced the intended result, in due course they may well do so. 22 Eventually,
the strikes may thus have to be launched from aircraft
carriers on station in the Gulf, which are extremely costly.
ad 3) It was surely conceivable that one or several series of air strikes against important
targets in Iraq might have compelled Iraq into
submission. However, what if it did not, but Saddam remained recalcitrant in the face of
attack that were massive but not fatal? It does not
appear that the United States had any strategy to guide its air strike tactics, as this would
have to entail plans for several rounds of moves and
counter-moves.
Would the US simply continue the strikes? If so, for how long?
Or discontinue them after a “decent interval”, yet without having accomplished what
they were intended to achieve—with an inevitable loss
of face as a result? There is something strategically very wrong with campaigns that
end when religious holidays commence (or shortly
after), i.e. which cannot have been intended as means to any serious ends. Wars for
less-than-serious ends had better not be fought at all.
Or gradually escalate the attacks until the goal was reached? If so, would escalation be
sought by quantitative or qualitative means—i.e. by
simply increasing the intensity of the strikes, or by proceeding to more important
targets, or by using more destructive means of attack,
perhaps even WMDs? 23
The strategy of gradual escalation was attempted by both the Kennedy, Johnson and
Nixon administrations during the Vietnam War, but to
absolutely no avail. Eventually the United States had to withdraw and accept defeat,
leaving behind it a trail of destruction of both Vietnamese
society and environment. 24 This was surely not a strategy for emulation, but the US
nevertheless seems to have settled for a similar strategy of
gradual attrition today.
ad 4) It might have been possible to depose Saddam, either by means of successful
“surgical” strikes against his presumed whereabout (the
Presidential palaces, for instance) or by marching all the way to Baghdad. Indeed, several
observers have argued that it was a mistake not to
have proceeded to the Iraqi capital in 1991—but better late than never! 25
First of all, however, there are surely more effective ways of doing this than by means
of air bombardments or AirLand Battle-type
operations, e.g. by means of special forces or agents “with a licence to kill”, which
would have the advantage of being more “discrete”.
Even though such an assassination of Saddam, or an instigated coup against him,
would be unlawful as well as unethical, such activities
would at least be deniable. At worst, the perpetrator might have to sack a few highranking officials, but it need not be officially implicated
in a breach of international law, hence would create no unfortunate precedents.
Secondly, an attack “to get Saddam” would be an even more blatant violation of
international law than an attack to ensure compliance with
UN resolutions. 26
Thirdly, such an operation would presuppose that there would be somebody ready to
take the place of Saddam Hussein, most likely a
group of rebellious officers. Their prospects of being accepted as legitimate by the
Iraqi population would, however, be jeopardized by
their being seen (correctly) as the agents of foreign powers. Were they to be regarded
as illegitimate by (all or large parts of) the
population, continuing discord and turmoil would be the most likely consequence.
The concrete implications of the Iraq Liberation Act remain undecided, but it seems very
doubtful that it will succeed in bringing to (and
maintaining in) power a viable replacement for Saddam Hussein.
3. Political Analysis
Even if successful according to the above criteria, an attack is likely to have severe
negative repercussions, both regionally and globally.
First of all, any attack without UNSC authorization is a blatant violation of the KelloggBriand Pact of 1928 as well as of the UN Charter and
other elements of international law, as argued above. International law explicitly
proscribes war, and does so in the form of a general prohibition
with certain explicit exceptions: Only wars of self-defence and of collective security are
permitted, and in both cases the legitimacy is conditional
upon Security Council approval, either ex ante or ex post. 27 This outlawing of war
constitutes one of the most significant advances in the
progressive civilizing of international relations. Just compare the present situation with
that of the 19th century when war was a matter of
expediency: If the prospects of success were high enough, it was regarded as perfectly
legitimate (perhaps even imperative) to go to war for
political goals, such as territorial expansion. A violation of these rules thus contributes to
making war, once again, a legitimate means to political
ends, and the more so as it could not even be condemned by the United Nations (if only
because of predictable US and British vetoes), whereby
a most unfortunate precedent has been set. What should prevent other states from using
war as a means to their political ends in the future, if only
they have the requisite military strength?
Secondly, the assembled anti-Iraqi coalition has crumbled significantly compared to that
of 1990/91. There were no attempts at enlisting regional
support prior to Operation Desert Fox, and no discernible interest in creating a regional
coalition which might, in due course, come to constituted
a regional collective security system in embryo. Instead, the US-British “coalition” must
have looked very much like a real-life manifestation of
the Huntingtonian vision of a war of “the West against the rest” 28, yet with the
unfortunate twist that “the West” was cast in the role of the
aggressor.
The immediate response to this war of aggression were protest rallies in several Arab
countries. The longer-term effect could well be stronger
anti-western sentiments in the Arab and muslim world (including Turkey), 29 which may
well manifest themselves in a growth of radical islamist
parties and groupings. As several of the regimes in the region have a fragile basis, it is
quite conceivable that some of them (Saudi Arabia, for
instance) could be overturned in favour of radical islamist rule—or, even worse, would
be replaced by stateless chaos. 30 One could also
envisage endangered regimes adopting more repressive means of government (or military
rule) as a safeguard against democratic victories for the
radicals (as happened in Algeria). A renaissance for pan-Arabist or pan-Islamist policies
would also seem a possibility, even though the plethora
of rivalries would probably prevent this from proceeding from rhetoric to actual politics.
31
A worst-case scenario would involve a virtual dissolution of Iraq, for instance as a result
of the aforementioned political instability caused by a
future “Western” (or U.S.) attack aimed at dethroning Saddam—which might escalate to
civil war. The Shi’ites in the southern parts of Iraq might
secede, perhaps in order to merge with Iran; and the Kurds in northern Iraq might secede
to create an independent Kurdistan, which would put
further pressure on the other states hosting Kurdish minorities, i.e. Syria, Iran and
Turkey. 32 Both eventualities would put severe strains on the
already extremely delicate balance of power in the Persian Gulf region, especially if
combined with political instability in Saudi Arabia.
4. Discourse Analysis
None of the above political or military strategies make much political sense, not even for
a United States that has a track record of choosing
disastrous strategies for this particular part of the world (just remember the Nixon
Doctrine). 33
An alternative explanation may be that the US is trying to create a new set of rules for the
“unipolar moment”, i.e. the rules applying to a “ Pax
Americana ”. 34 Perhaps rules bringing to mind those advocated by the Athenians in the
famous Melian Dialogue recorded by Thucidides: “the
strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept”.
35 Paradoxically, however, from beginning to end the
handling of the Iraqi crisis have been embedded in a discourse on “the New World
Order”, the connotations of which are not those of
superpower domination, but rather the exact opposite thereof.
In his message to a joint session of the US Congress, 11 September 1990 (i.e. during the
“Desert Shield” phase of the Gulf conflict), President
George Bush described the “new world order” in the following words:
Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can emerge: a
new era, free from the threat of terror, stronger
in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the
nations of the world, East and West, North and
South, can prosper and live in harmony 36.
This vision was further elaborated in a similar presidential statement to Congress after the
victorious operation Desert Storm, 6 March 1991:
Now we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is a very real
prospect of a new world order (...) a “world
order”, in which “the new principles of justice and fair play.. protect the weak against
the strong...” A World where the United
Nations, freed from the Cold War stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its
founders. A world in which freedom and
respect for human rights find a home among all nations 37
The Clinton Administration has couched its policies in similar terms. In the White House
document of October 1998 A National Security
Strategy for a New Century, it was thus stated that
As we approach the beginning of the 21st century, the United States remains the
world’s most powerful force for peace, prosperity
and the universal values of democracy and freedom. Our nation’s challenge—and our
responsibility—is to sustain that role by
harnessing the forces of global integration for the benefit of our own people and
people around the world (....) At this moment in
history, the United States is called upon to lead-to organize the forces of freedom and
progress; to channel the unruly energies of the
global economy into positive avenues; and to advance our prosperity, reinforce our
democratic ideals and values, and enhance our
security. 38
Few would disagree with such lofty goals: freedom, justice, peace, human rights, rule of
law, etc. In fact the vision is couched in terms that
command consent. Even though one may disagree on what the terms imply, one cannot
be against “justice” or “freedom”. However, as argued
above, the reality underlying this discourse is almost the exact opposite, namely breaches
of international law, an undermining of the authority of
the United Nations, and a general militarization of international relations.
This conclusion takes us into the somewhat nebulous realm of “discourse analysis”. Even
though it is somewhat inspired by the writings of David
Campbell and others, the following does not pretend to be a “genuine” analysis of the
discourse accompanying the action of the Iraq crisis. 39 The
ambition is simply to highlight some paradoxical features of the language used about the
crisis, both by politicians and the media.
Some of them can be explained with reference to the findings of what one might call “the
social psychology of conflict”:
The quest for avoidance of “cognitive dissonance” that was highlighted by Leon
Festinger, 40 according to whom individuals seek world
views without contradictions, i.e. cognitive consonance. If Saddam is “bad”, then all
his actions are surely objectionable; and if the United
States is “good”, then so are its actions. No need for further analysis.
The proclivity for developing stereotyped, or even demonized, “enemy images” of
one’s opponent which become nearly unrefutable. 41 As
Saddam is unquestionably a gross violator of human rights, 42 all his foreign policy
initiatives surely bear the same demonic traits. Once
again: no need for concrete analysis.
The well-documented phenomenon of “group think” which was described by Irving
Janis 43 as a mechanism that ensures conformity,
thereby narrowing the span of options in complex decision-making situation. Dissent
is depicted as illoyal behaviour, a pattern that
apparently also holds true for alliance politics, especially in NATO, where member
states have shown a similar propensity for groupthink.
The propensity for what one might call “action-reaction inversion”, where one’s own
actions are viewed as reactions to what the other side
does as a matter of free will. Alter is acting, i.e. is on the offensive, while Ego is
merely reacting defensively 44—while in real life of is
nearly always a chicken-and-egg situation.
The widespread use of images 45, myths and spurious historical analogies. which
“in a split-second conjure up in the minds of audiences and readers certain
associations, which the writer or orator wants to
evoke. They are consequently a swift and effective way of communicating an idea,
the shorthand for an argument. It is thus
not surprising that they are used particularly by people trying to persuade quickly:
journalists and politicians. [...] Moreover,
the invoking of historical myths, by pretending that there is a law of historical
repetition, serves as pseudo-rationalisation,
furnishing bogus scientific evidence for a decidedly unscientific argument. 46
Others features might be explained with reference to the need of the (American and, to a
lesser extent, British) “military industrial complex”
(MIC) for an enemy to replace the USSR. Even though defence planning can, in
principle, proceed without an enemy, it is much easier with one.
47 Had Saddam Hussein not existed in real life, it would thus have been in the
Pentagon’s interest to create him. By combining despotic features
and an alien culture (Islam) with “the right size”, he represents “the ideal enemy”.
The social-psychological and the economic explanation are, of course, not mutually
exclusive. It is entirely conceivable that the MIC pursues its
vested interest by capitalizing on familiar cognitive patters such as the above, inter alia
by means of a manipulation of the mass media 48.
However, it is also possible that (at least parts of) the intelligence services and other
employees of the MIC have themselves fallen prey to these
patters, hence have come to believe in enemy images of their own creation.
Regardless of their explanation, the following are some of the anomalies of the
“discourse” on Iraq which is intertwined with the above on the
“New World Order”:
The comparison of Saddam Hussein with Hitler, and the accompanying “Munich
analogy”. 49 The logic is that, just as it was wrong to
placate Hitler and to believe in his peaceful rhetoric, it would be naive and dangerous
to compromise with his modern counterpart—as
allegedly proposed by, e.g., the Russians or the French or the United Nations with
their preparedness to “go the extra mile” diplomatically.
However, regardless of their personal characteristics, there are more differences than
similarities between Hitler and Saddam Hussein. The
former was the leader of a European great power on the rise and with obvious
aggressive ambitions, while the latter is the leader of a minor
power which has already been quite decisively defeated.
The talk about “punishing Iraq”, which alludes to an analogy with criminal justice or
even with pedagogy. However, while it may be fair to
punish a felon or a disobedient child, it is quite something else to “punish” the Iraqi
civilian population with sanctions that only tangentially
punish the real culprit(s), i.e. Saddam Hussein and his immediate entourage. When
Pres. Clinton in his speech announcing Operation
Desert Fox claimed that “Sanctions have cost Saddam more than $120 billion”, it may
have appeared fair and just. However, the more
dictatorial Iraq is portrayed as being, the more glaring the injustice inherent in the
seemingly fair punishment scheme. The estimated one
million malnourished Iraqi children were certainly innocent of the invasion of Kuwait,
if only because they were not born at the time! 50
The personification of the conflict as implied by the frequent use of “Saddam” as a
short-hand for Iraq—as in the above quote or the
frequently heard phrase to “Get Saddam”). This facilitates the use of enemy images, as
it is inherently more credible than a person is “evil”
than that an entire nation should be so.
The exact opposite happens for the other side, where terms such as the “World
Community” or at least “the West” are often used for what
is really merely a couple of countries (the United States and the UK) acting on their
own behalf.
Sometimes completely abstract expressions are used which obscure who did what and
the obvious follow-on questions “with what right?”
or “one whose authority?”. This has, for instance, been the case of the no-fly zones in
northern and southern Iraq. While they were, in
reality, established by the US, UK and France without any UN mandate, the favourite
terms seem to have become that they “have been
established”, with the even more absurd corollary that they “were expanded” in
1996—as if they could grow organically. 51
To the extent that it has to be acknowledged that the “world community” is not
unanimous, opposition to the action as often dismissed with
reference to (presumably sordid) “special interests”. While it is probably true that
neither Russia nor France have been completely
unselfish, the same is undoubtedly true of the US and Britain. It would be more fair to
either compare what the two sides actually do or
say, or to compare their “hidden agendas”. To take merely one of the opposing sides’
words or actions at face value is obviously biased.
Opposition (by Russia, France or others) is often labelled “obstruction”, while a better
explanation might be that they simply disagree with
the US and/or Britain on the right course of action. It becomes even more absurd when
it is a minority of two who dismiss the dissent of
the majority as “obstruction”.
The very term (dual) “containment” with the implied analogy with the East-West
conflict is profoundly misleading ( vide infra ).
The depiction of the US (and British) armed forces as “heroic” is undoubtedly
welcomed by the American public, but profoundly untrue.
The risks involved with launching cruise missiles against another country in order to
neutralize its air defence and subsequently conducting
air raids against it are minimal—and to do so is thus hardly “heroic” in any
meaningful sense. This lack of any need for heroism might also,
according to some analysis, make the label “war” inappropriate, which may
presuppose as least some duel features, while “slaughter” may
be a more suitable term for what has been happening. 52
A particularly perverse feature of this discourse is the complete inversion of the
distinction between offence and defence. “Defence” is usually (on
the grand strategic level) synonymous with defending one’s own territory, territorial
waters and airspace against invaders or intruders, or (on the
lower levels) with “parrying and awaiting a blow” (Clausewitz), while “offence” is
tantamount to striking a blow against the defender or even
invading. 53 With regard to Iraq, the roles have been inverted, so that Iraq is depicted as
“offensive” or even “provocative” when it seeks to
defend its airspace against enemy aircraft, while it is portrayed as “defensive” for the US
Air Force to strike against ground-based Iraqi air
defences—and to do so pre-emptively, i.e. as soon as they turn on their radars, or even
just because of their being there. According to the
military commander of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), Marine General
Anthony Zinni, “Iraq’s entire air defense system is a threat
to us”, referring mainly to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Indeed, on the same occasion,
the general complained about early-warning systems as
well as optical guidance systems being used “obviously to prevent turning on radars
which would make targeting for us much easier”. By
implications, for the Iraqi to even receive early warning of US strikes would be
“offensive” and “threatening” “We responded within our rules of
engagement by defending ourselves and attacking Iraq’s air defense system, including its
radars, communications facilities and surface-to-air
missile (SAM) batteries”. 54
What has been created by means of practice as well as by the above discourse (and aided
and abetted by subservient news media) is an almost
“normal situation”, characterized by nearly daily small-scale air attacks against Iraqi
military targets, with the inevitable occasional accidental hits
on civilian targets (such as Basra, 25 January 1999) which are “regretted”, but trivialized.
55 In this way, both the media and possible opponents
gradually lose interest. Even though it would be justified, it is obviously impossible to
bring the matter up in the UN Security Council each
time—and especially not considering the fact that any motion to condemn would meet
with a US veto. The United States may even hope to
thereby create some perverted kind of “customary international law”: If something goes
virtually unopposed and uncontested for long enough, it
may be possible (especially if one is a superpower) to claim that a new set of rules have
emerged that justify it ex post facto. This was how the
no-fly zones achieved the status they possess, in the eyes of many observers, at least. And
certainly, both the media and most politicians have
long ago forgotten their actual origins and some have even come to believe that they were
mandated by a Security Council resolution in the first
place.
5. Rogueness and Dual Containment
A central part of the above discourse has been played by the notion of “rogue states”
which has been combined with that of “containment” in the
sense that the US strategy is allegedly about “containing the rogues”, in casu Iraq as well
as Iran. Closer inspection, however, reveals this strategy
as deeply flawed and the discourse about it to be deceptive, as both “rogueness” and
“containment” are used in a highly questionable manner.
The containment strategy proposed by George Kennan and others vis-à-vis the Soviet
Union and its allies was basically a defensive political
strategy. It was based on the assumption (right or wrong) that the USSR was
fundamentally expansionist, but rational. Hence, not only did the
USSR require containment, it was also basically containable. The means to do so were
(nuclear and other forms of) deterrence, defensive
alliances and other forms of support to friendly states (or states hostile to the USSR). The
more sophisticated versions of the strategy, including
that of Kennan himself, placed the main emphasis on political and economic means. The
rationale for this was that communist expansion was
more likely to be political than military,
hence that political and social stabilization would work in the West’s favour, as it would
deprive communism of popular support. 56
During the Cold War, containment was surely taken too far on occasions, for instance
when excessive emphasis was placed on factors such a
“reputation”, which entailed a need for exhibiting “toughness”, even in non-vital
questions; 57 or when the emphasis was erroneously placed on
weakening the East rather than strengthening the West, as was the case of the some
interpretations of the COCOM regime; 58 or when the
political aspects of containment came close to jeopardizing, rather than securing, freedom
and democracy. 59
Table 2: Comparative “Rogueness” 60
IRAQ
IRAN
UNITED STATES
1997 Military Expenditures (1997 US$) 61
Total (mil.)
per capita
Total (mil.)
per capita
Total (mil.)
per capita
1,250
56
4,695
68
272,955
1,018
Nuclear Weapons 62
Possession
Use
Possession
Use
Possession
Use
No 63
No
No 64
No
Yes 65(about
8,200)
Yes
66(August
1945)
Chemical Weapons
Probable
Yes
67(Iran-Iraq
War, Kurdish
insurgents)
? 68
No (?)
Yes 69
Yes(?)
(Vietnam 70)
Biological Weapons
Likely
(anthrax,
botulinum
toxin,
aflatoxin)
No
? 71
No
No (?) 72
No (?) 73
Missiles (Ballistic or Cruise)
Yes
(SCUD 74)
Yes 75
(Iran-Iraq
War, Kuwait
War)
Yes 76
(SCUD-B)
Yes 77
(Iran-Iraq
War)
Yes
(ALCMs,
SLCMs,
ICBMs,
SLBMs)
Yes
(Desert
Storm 1991,
Iraq
1991-99,
Afghanistan
1998, Sudan
1998, Desert
Fox 1998)
Aggression or Intervention 78 (1958-99) 79
Yes 80
(Iran 1980, Kuwait 1990)
Yes 81
(Abu Musa, Greater and
Lesser Tumbs)
Yes 82
(Lebanon 1958 and 1992,
Dominican Republic 1964,
Cambodia and Laos
1969-73, Iran 1980,
Grenada 1983, Nicaragua
1984, Libya 1986, Panama
1989, Iraq 1991-99, FRY
1995-99
Support for terrorists, armed insurgents or military putchists (1958-99)
Yes 83
(Iranian Kurds,
“International Terrorism”)
Yes 84
(Oman 1971, South Yemen
1962-70, Iraq 1967 and
1971, Iraqi Kurds
1972-75, Hizbollah,
“International Terrorism”)
Yes 85
(inter alia Cuba
1959-today, Laos 1961-2,
Chile 1970-73, Angola
1975, Nicaragua 1981-84
and 1986-88, Iraq
1998-99)
Surely there were also occasional problems with drawing the line between the
containment and a “roll back” of communism, for instance during
the Korean War or under the Reagan Administration. 86 On balance, however,
containment was largely defensive. The Cold War, furthermore,
saw plenty of “cooperation among adversaries”, including persistent (and successful)
efforts to avoid any direct armed confrontation, an extensive
use of arms control, confidence-building measures and summit meetings. 87
Not so in the Persian Gulf region, where the US policy of “dual containment” of the two
alleged rogues, Iran and Iraq, has exhibited virtually no
cooperative features, has shown very little appreciation of the other side’s legitimate
security interests, and where nearly no actual dialogue or
negotiations have been attempted. In both cases, US policy has had clear, if not
persistent, elements of “roll back” ambitions, 88 as is quite are
unconcealed in the US “Iraq Liberation Act of 1998” referred to above.
Moreover, the very notion of “rogueness” appares flawed, as illustrated by the
comparison in Table 2 of US with Iranian and Iraqi behaviour
along several dimensions. While this shows the United States to be “roguer” than both
Iran and Iraq, it even underestimates the “rogueness” of
the United States according to her own definition, as it does not take quantitative factors
into account for most of the indicators. For instance, not
only does the US have more types of missiles than Iraq, her holdings of each type are
also, by several orders of magnitude larger.
The surprising conclusion is that the United States scores significantly higher than the
two “rogue states” along every single dimension of a
“rogueness scale” that it has itself defined. It has defence expenditures vastly in excess of
its defence needs; it possesses huge quantities of
weapons of mass destruction, and has shown the willingness to also use them; it has on
several occasions launched illegal attacks against other
states, and it has supported a wide range of (what others would call) terrorists. And it is
all documented in open sources.
Another surprising conclusion is that the alleged rogues have behaved most “roguely”
precisely when they enjoyed US support, i.e. that the US
appears to have (inadvertently, one must assume) invited rogueness rather than deterring
or even containing it. All of the Iranian instances of
aggression and intervention thus occurred under the auspices of the “Nixon Doctrine”
that assigned Iran of the Shah the role of “maintaining
order” in the region.
6. Alternatives to Dual Containment
Fortunately, there may be some movement towards a revision of the dual containment
strategy. 89 For instance, Pres. Clinton vetoed the Iran
Missile Proliferation Act of 1998 with the remarks that
Such indiscriminate sanctioning would undermine the credibility of U.S. nonproliferation policy without furthering U.S.
non-proliferation objectives. Indeed, the sweeping application of sanctions likely
would cause serious friction with many
governments, diminishing vital international cooperation across the range of policy
areas—military, political, and economic—on
which U.S. security and global leadership depend.
In his accompanying statement, he wrote that
From my conversations with members of Congress, I sense a growing awareness that
the vast machinery of U.S. sanctions law has
not served our interests well and is in serious need of an overhaul. 90
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, in a 17 June speech, 91 also struck a conciliatory
cord with regard to Iran
We are ready to explore further ways to build mutual confidence and avoid
misunderstandings. The Islamic Republic should
consider parallel steps. If such a process can be initiated and sustained in a way that
addresses the concerns of both sides, then we
in the United States can see the prospect of a very different relationship. As the wall of
mistrust comes down, we can develop with
the Islamic Republic, when it is ready, a road map leading to normal relations.
Obviously, two decades of mistrust cannot be erased
overnight. The gap between us remains wide. But it is time to test the possibilities for
bridging this gap.
If it true that the United States is contemplating a revision of its dual containment
strategy, the question of alternative strategies becomes
important. In order to conclude this rather depressing paper on an optimistic note, I shall
suggest a four-stage process pointing towards a regional
security community in an enlarged GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) with no need for
any active involvement on the part of the US. Its main
stages are outlined in Table 3.
Table 3: Alternatives to Dual Containment
IRAQ
IRAN
GCC
Dual
Containment
Roll Back
(Militarily,
economically)
Contain
(Economically,
militarily)
Support
(Militarily)
Alternative
Phase 1
Contain
(Militarily)
Normalize
(Integrate)
Support
(Militarily,
defensively)
Phase 2
Normalize
(Integrate)
Support
(Security
guarantee)
Support
(Security
guarantees)
Phase 3
Support
(Security
guarantee)
Support
(Security
guarantee)
Support
(Security
guarantees)
Phase 4
Disregard
(Security community, collective security, general
security guarantees)
The rationale is that the present roll-back strategy with regard to Iraq is both counterproductive, superfluous and a humanitarian disaster. It
could safely be abandoned in favour of “military containment”, manifested in security
guarantees and some military support for the GCC countries
and a regulation of arms transfers to Iraq—for which the available arms control regimes
(MTCR, NPT, BWC, CWC) should suffice. If need be
they might be supplemented with regional (“zone”) arrangements, such as a “WMD-free
zone”. 92
Iran simply no longer needs containing, if ever it did. 93 While one cannot entirely
discount the hypothesis of Iranian expansionist designs, the facts
about its military also lend themselves to a more “innocent” interpretation. First of all,
Iran has not yet made up for its wartime losses, and its
military strength thus remains inferior to what it was at a time when it was regarded (by
the United States at least) as a stabilizing factor. Secondly,
the arms acquisitions of the Islamic Republic as well as its military expenditures remain
well below those of the GCC. Thirdly, most of Iran’s arms
acquisitions have been entirely consistent with defensive intentions. In such an
evaluation, one must, in all fairness, take into account that the
country must remain fearful of an eventually resurgent Iraq; that it has long borders
facing unstable countries such as Afghanistan and some former
Soviet republics; and that it must be worried about the new American assertiveness that
might even lead to intervention (say, in the name of
“counter-proliferation”). 94
With the possible partial exception of the alleged nuclear weapons programme and the
ballistic missiles, the “Iranian threat” is thus not so much a
military threat 95 as something sui generis, namely a threat of terrorism (to which all
countries are vulnerable) and one of “ideological contagion”.
Also, there are many indications that Iranian foreign and defence policy has entered,
since around 1988 or 1989, a more pragmatic phase, that
the terrorist element has been down-played considerably, and that further liberalization is
underway after the election of President Khatami. 96 As
argued by Jamal S. al-Suwaidi of the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies,
The potential consequences of isolating Iran may adversely affect the security and
stability of the region (...) the outlines of a
comprehensive regional security regime cannot take shape until tensions between Iran
and its Arab neighbours give way to a
progressive rapprochement that builds upon mutual interests 97
The more sensible course of action would thus be to integrate Iran into the GCC, under
the auspices of which the remaining problems would be
easier to solve that with the GCC countries forming a united front against Tehran.
Support for the GCC countries may still be needed, but should
be limited to strengthening their defensive military capabilities, underpinned by a security
guarantee.
In due course, the region could proceed to Phase 2, where relations with Iraq will be
normalized. Perhaps this will require a change of regime in
Bagdhad, but it should not be assumed that this is a sine qua non. History has seen
several dictatorial regimes whose international behaviour has
been tempered by a skilful application of deterrence and containment strategies. In order
to stabilize the region, outside powers (and especially
the United States) might extend security guarantees to Iran of the same sort as those
provided to (the rest of) the GCC, which would, at this
stage, probably need no further direct military assistance.
Gradually, Phase 2 might evolve into Phase 3 where even Iraq is integrated into the GCC,
and where all might be the beneficiaries of security
guarantees on the part of the United States and other external powers. At this stage,
stability would be ensured, but it may not yet be sufficiently
reliable (or believed to be so by the regional states) that the rest of the world, and the
United States in particular could completely disengage. The
required involvement would, however, be much less extensive and demanding that
previously.
In the fullness of time, the region may reach stage 4, where it comes to constitute a
security community, implying that the risk of, and preparations
for, war have receded into the background. 98 The GCC may thus establish a selfcontained regional collective security arrangement that might
benefit from, but would not be dependent on, outside support. External powers could thus
safely disengage, leaving behind merely a general
security guarantee that would most likely never be needed. Contrary to the militarized
“New World Order” that was proclaimed by George Bush
and which is being created by means of the roll-back strategy of Bill Clinton with the
misleading label “dual containment”, the above scenario
would fit in well with a more peaceful and progressively demilitarized New World Order
for the third millennium.
Endnotes
Note 1: These parts are an expanded and updated version of the appendix to Møller,
Bjørn: “Resolving the Security Dilemma in the Persian
Gulf. With a postscript on the 1997/98 Iraqi Crisis”, Working Papers, no. 8/1998
(Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1998).
Back.
Note 2: Molander, Johan: “The United Nations and the Elimination of Iraq’s Weapons of
Mass Destruction: The Implementation of a
Cease-Fire Condition”, in Fred Tanner (ed.): From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War
Armament Control of Defeated States (New York:
United Nations/Geneva: UNIDIR, 1992), pp. 137-158; Sur, Serge: “Security Council
Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 in the Gulf Affair:
Problems of Restoring and Safeguarding Peace”, Research Papers, no. 12 (New York:
UNIDIR); idem (ed.): Disarmament and Arms
Limitation Obligations. Problems of Compliance and Enforcement (Aldershot:
Dartmouth, 1994), pp. 63-80; Weller, M. (ed.): Iraq and
Kuwait: The Hostilities and their Aftermath. Cambridge International Documents, vol. 3
(Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1993), pp. 8-12,
494-536. Back.
Note 3: “Russia Wants New Inspection Regime for Iraq”, CNN Interactive, 15 January
1999; “Text of New French Proposal on Iraqi Policy”,
ibid., 13. January 1999. Back.
Note 4: Lippman, Thomas W. & Barton Gellman: “U.S. Says It Collected Iraq
Intelligence Via UNSCOM”, Washington Post, 8 January
1999, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/iraq/iraq2.htm.
Back.
Note 5: For an otherwise quite “permissive” (Israeli) interpretation of the Charter to the
same effect see Dinstein, Yoram: War, Aggression and
Self-Defence. Second Edition (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, Cambridge University
Press, 1994), pp. 83-97. Back.
Note 6: For an elaborate analysis of all the resolutions see White, Nigel: “The Legality of
the Threat of Force against Iraq”, Security Dialogue,
vol. 30, no. 1 (forthcoming March 1999). Back.
Note 7: CNN: World News, 8 March 1998, reporting from ABC’s broadcast This Week.
Back.
Note 8: Sohn, Louis B.: “The UN System as Authoritative Interpreter of Its Law”, in
Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner (eds.): United
Nations Legal Order, Vols. 1-2 (American Society for International Law and Cambridge:
Grotius Publications/Cambridge University Press,
1995), vol. 1, pp. 169-230. Back.
Note 9: CNN, 17 December 1998. Back.
Note 10: Public Law 105-338, 105th Congress, sections 3 and 4.a.2. Back.
Note 11: Murphy, John F.: “Force and Arms”, in Schachter & Joyner: op. cit. (note 8),
pp. 247-317, especially pp. 251-265, 277-292
(quotation from p. 248). Back.
Note 12: Referring to article 50 of the UN Charter: “If preventive or enforcement
measures against any state are taken by the Security Council,
any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself
confronted with special economic problems arising from the
carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with
regard to a solution of those problems”. Back.
Note 13: See, e.g., the chapter on “Supreme Emergency” in Walzer, Michael: Just and
Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical
Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pp. 251-268. Back.
Note 14: See, for instance, Dando, Malcolm: Biological Warfare in the 21st Century
(London: Brassey’s, 1994). See also Bailey, Kathleen:
“Responding to the Threat of Biological Weapons”, Security Dialogue, vol. 26, no. 4
(December 1995), pp. 383-397; Thränert, Oliver:
“Responding to the Threat of Biological Weapons”, ibid., pp. 399-403; Nixdorff,
Kathryn: “Gefährdungen durch biologische Agenzien”, S+F.
Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden, vol. 15, no. 4 (1997), pp. 233-240. Back.
Note 15: Geissler, Erhard & John P. Woodall (eds.): Control of Dual-Threat Agents: The
Vaccines for Peace Programme. SIPRI Chemical
and Biological Warfare Studies, no. 15 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Back.
Note 16: Geissler, Erhard: “Implications of Genetic Engineering for Chemical and
Biological Warfare”, SIPRI Yearbook 1984, pp. 421-454.
Back.
Note 17: On compellence, see Schelling, Thomas C.: The Strategy of Conflict
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp.
195-199; idem: Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 6991. On blackmail see Betts, Richard K.: Nuclear
Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987).
Back.
Note 18: Mazarr, Michael J.: North Korea and the Bomb. A Case Study in
Nonproliferation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994); Reiss,
Mitchell: Bridled Ambitions. Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995),
pp. 231-319; Kihl, Young Whan: “Confrontation or Compromise? Lessons from the 1994
Crisis”, in idem & Peter Hayes (eds.): Peace and
Security in Northeast Asia. The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula (Armonk, NY:
M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 181-204. Back.
Note 19: See, for instance, Prawitz, Jan & Jim Leonard: A Zone Free of Weapons of
Mass Destruction in the Middle East, publication no.
UNIDIR/96/24 (Geneva: UNIDIR and New York: UN, 1996). Back.
Note 20: Press briefing by Army Gen. Hugh Shelton, American Forces Press Service, 6
January 1999. Back.
Note 21: Both quotations are from the CNN’s homepage. Back.
Note 22: “Turkey Reportedly Criticizes some U.S. Strikes in Iraq”, CNN Interactive, 29
January 1999; “US Warns Iraq against Attacks”,
BBC Online Network, 16 February 1999. Back.
Note 23: The most systematic analysis of this is the herostratically famous 44-rung
“escalation ladder”, developed by Kahn, Herman: On
Escalation. Metaphors and Scenarios (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 50-51, 194195. Similar ideas influenced air power doctrines in
the interwar years. See, e.g. Douhet, Giulio: The Command of the Air (New York:
Coward-McCann, 1942); Warner, Edward: “Douhet,
Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare”, in Edward Mead Earle (ed.): Makers of
Modern Strategy. Military Thought from Machiavelli
to Hitler (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 485-503; MacIsaac, David: “Voices From the
Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists”, in Peter
Paret (ed.): Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp.
624-647; Brodie, Bernard: Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1959), pp. 71-106. Back.
Note 24: Gibson, James William: The Perfect War. The War We Couldn’t Lose and How
We Did. (New York: Vintage Books, 1988);
Clodfelter, Mark: The Limits of Air Power. The American Bombing of North Vietnam
(New York: The Free Press, 1989). On the impact of
defoliants such as Agent Orange see Westing, Arthur: “The Environmental Aftermath of
Warfare in Viet Nam”, SIPRI Yearbook 1982, pp.
363-392. Back.
Note 25: On this debate see Dowdy, William L. & Barry R. Schneider: “On to Baghdad?
Or Stop at Kuwait? A Gulf War Question Revisited”,
Defense Analysis, vol. 13, no. 3 (December 1997), pp. 319-327. Back.
Note 26: It would, for instance, constitute a breach of the above-mentioned Declaration
of the Inadmissibility of Intervention. See Murphy:
loc. cit. (note 11), pp. 248. Back.
Note 27: Baratta, Joseph Preston: “The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Outlawry of War”,
in Richard Dean Burns (ed.): Encyclopedia of Arms
Control and Disarmament, vols. I-III (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), vol. II,
pp. 695-705. Back.
Note 28: Huntington, Samuel: “The Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no.
3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49; idem: The Clash of
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996),
especially pp. 328-321. On Middle Eastern
perceptions of the West see Fuller, Graham E. & Ian O. Lessler: A Sense of Siege. The
Geopolitics of Islam and the West (Boulder:
Westview, 1995), pp. 27-46. Back.
Note 29: “Arab Deputies Condemn Air Strikes”, BBC Online Network, 27 December
1998; “Arab League, Egypt Stress Iraq’s Territorial
Unity”, CNN Interactive, 26 January 1999. Back.
Note 30: On the fragility of the “social contract” in the GCC countries see Gary G. Sick:
“The Coming Crisis in the Persian Gulf”, in idem &
Lawrence Potter (eds.): The Persian Gulf at the Millennium. Essays in Politics, Economy,
Security, and Religion (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1997), pp. 11-30; Mottahedeh, Roy P. & Mamoun Fandy: “The Islamic
Movement: The Case for Democratic Inclusion”, ibid., 297-318;
Long, David: “Revolutionary Islamism and Gulf Security in the Twenty-first Century”, in
idem & Christian Koch (eds.): Gulf Security in the
Twenty-First Century (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research,
1997), pp. 121-132. Back.
Note 31: A good analysis of the rise and fall of pan-Arabism is Sela, Avraham: The
Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East
Ppolitics and the Quest for Regional Order (Albany, NY: State University of New York
Press, 1997). Back.
Note 32: See, for instance, Entessar, Nader: Kurdish Ethnonationalism (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1992). Back.
Note 33: For an elaboration see Møller: loc. cit. (note 1). Back.
Note 34: On unipolarity see Layne, Christopher: “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great
Powers Will Rise”, International Security, vol. 17,
no. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; Mastanduno, Michael: “Preserving the Unipolar Moment.
Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the
Cold War”, ibid., vol. 21, no. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88; Kupchan, Charles A.: “After
Pax Americana. Benign Power, Regional Integration,
and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity”, ibid., vol. 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79.
Back.
Note 35: Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 402.
Back.
Note 36: Quoted from Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, vol. 36, art. 37694A. Back.
Note 37: Quoted from Weller: op. cit. (note 2), pp. 281-283. Back.
Note 38: http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssr.pdf. Back.
Note 39: Campbell, David: Politics Without Principle. Sovereignty, Ethics, and the
Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
1994). Comparable analyses of the war against Iraq include Baudrillard, Jean: The Gulf
War Did Not Take Place (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1995); Norris, Christopher: Uncritical Theory. Postmodernism,
Intellectuals, and the Gulf War (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1992); Der Derian, James: Antidiplomacy. Spies, Terror, Speed and
War (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 173-202.
On discourse analysis see also Campbell, David: Writing Security. United States Foreign
Policy and the Politics of Identity. Revised Edition
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), passim; George, Jim: Discourses of
Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to
International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 29-34; Krause, Keith &
Michael C. Williams (ed.): Critical Security Studies.
Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press, 1997), passim; Jabri, Vivienne: Discourses on
Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996); Wæver, Ole: Concepts of Security
(Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, University of
Copenhagen, 1997), pp. 1-25 & passim; Hansen, Lene: Western Villains or Balkan
Barbarism. Representations and Responsibility in the
Debate over Bosnia (Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, University of
Copenhagen, 1998); Klein, Bradley S.: Strategic Studies and
World Order. The Global Politics of Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994); idem: “Politics by Design: Remapping
Security Landscapes”, European Journal of International Affairs, vol. 4, no. 3 (September
1998), pp. 327-345; Fierke, K.M.: Changing
Games, Changing Strategies. Critical Investigations in Security (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1998). An interesting application
of discourse analysis to Iraq is Bengio, Ofra: Saddam’s Word. The Political Discourse in
Iraq (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
Back.
Note 40: Festinger, Leon: A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1957); Jervis, Robert: Perception and
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,
1976), pp. 117-202, 382-406; Lebow, Richard Ned:
Between Peace and War. The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1981), pp. 101-147. Back.
Note 41: Fiebig-von-Hase, Ragnhild: “Introduction”, in ida & Ursula Lehmkuhl (eds.):
Enemy Images in American History (Oxford: Berghahn
Books, 1997), pp. 1-40; Spillmann, Kurt R. & Kati Spillmann: “Some Sociobiological
and Psychological Aspects of “Images of the Enemy””,
ibid., pp. 43-64; Beck, Ulrich: “The Sociological Anatomy of Enemy Images: The
Military and Democracy After the End of the Cold War”, ibid.
65-87; Shimko, Keith L.: Images and Arms Control. Perceptions of the Soviet Union in
the Reagan Administration (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1991), pp. 11-41; Fischer, Ronald J.: The Social Psychology of
Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution (New
York: Springer Verlag, 1990), pp. 39-57. See also Hermann, Richard K. & Michael P.
Fischerkeller: “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spriral
Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research after the Cold War”, International Organization,
vol. 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 415-450. See also
Rojo, Luisa Martin: “Division and Rejection: From the Personification of the Gulf
Conflict to the Demonization of Saddam Hussein”, Discourse
and Society, vol. 6, no. 1 (January 1995), pp. 49-80. Back.
Note 42: See, for instance, Makiya, Kanan: Republic of Fear. The Politics of Modern Iraq
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
1998). Back.
Note 43: Janis, Irving: Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Fischer:
op. cit. (note 41), pp. 68-74. Back.
Note 44: Jervis: op. cit. (note 40), pp. 32-57, 343-355. Back.
Note 45: Glad, Betty & Charles S. Taber: “Images, Learning, and the Decision to Use
Force: The Domino Theory of the United States”, in
Betty, Glad (ed.): Psychological Dimensions of War, (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 56-81.
Back.
Note 46: Heuser, Beatrice & Cyril Buffet: “Conclusions. Historical Myths and the Denial
of Change”, in Cyril Buffet & Beatrice Heuser (eds.):
Haunted by History. Myths in International Relations (Oxford: Berghan Books, 1998),
pp. 259-274, quotations from 265-266, 272. Back.
Note 47: Klare, Michael: Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America’s Search for a
New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang,
1995). See also Goldman, Emily O.: “Thinking About Strategy Absent the Enemy”,
Security Studies, vol. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1994), pp. 40-85.
For an attempt at planning without a stipulated enemy see Davis, Paul: “Planning Under
Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and
Paradigms Emerging”, in idem (ed.): New Challenges for Defense Planning. Rethinking
How Much is Enough (Santa Monica: RAND,
1994), pp. 15-58; Kent, Glenn A. & William E. Simons: “Objective-Based Planning”,
ibid., pp. 59-72; Khalilzad, Zalmay M. & David A.
Ochmanek (eds.): Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century (Santa Monica:
Rand, 1997). On the MIC see Pursell, Carroll W. Jr.
(ed.): The Military Industrial Complex (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Barnett,
Richard: The Economy of Death. A Hard Look at the
Defense Budget, the Military Industrial Complex, and What You Can Do About Them,
New York: Atheneum, 1970); Senghaas, Dieter:
Rüstung und Militarismus (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972). For a critique see
Sarkesian, Sam C. (ed.): The Military-Industrial Complex.
A Reassessment (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972). Back.
Note 48: Taylor, Philip M.: War and the Media. Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf
War. 2nd edition (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1998); Hayward, Malcolm: “The Making of the New World Order: The
Role of the Media”, in Tareq Y. Ismael & Jacqueline
S. Ismael (eds.): The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations in the
Middle East (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 1994), pp. 224-242; Parasitil, Andrew T.: “Defeating the Vietnam Syndrome:
The Military, the Media, and the Gulf War”, ibid., pp.
242-262; Manheim, Jarol B.: “The War of Images: Strategic Communication in the Gulf
Conflict”, in Stanley A. Renshon (ed.): The Political
Psychology of the Gulf War. Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), pp. 155-171;
Mueller, John: “American Public Opinion and the Gulf War”, ibid., pp. 199-226. Back.
Note 49: Chuter, David: “Munich, or the Blood of Others”, in Buffett & Heuser (eds.):
op. cit. (note 46), pp. 65-79. Back.
Note 50: “Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Iraq”, UNICEF Report, 30 April
1998, extracts available at
http://leb.net/iac/UNICEF1998.html. On sanctions in general see Hufbauer, Gary Clyde,
Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott: Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered. History and Current Policy, 2nd edition, vols. 1-2 (Washington,
D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990);
Cortright, David (ed.): The Price of Peace. Incentives and International Conflict
Prevention (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield,
1997); idem & George A. Lopez (eds.): Economic Sanctions. Panacea or Peacebuilding
in a Post-Cold War World? (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1995); Mansfield, Edward D.: “International Institutions and Economic
Sanctions”, World Politics, vol. 47, no. 4 (July 1995), pp.
575-605; Boudreau, Donald G.: “Economic Sanctions and Military Force in the TwentyFirst Century”, European Security, vol. 6, no. 2
(Summer 1997), pp. 28-46; Pape, Robert A.: “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work”,
International Security, vol. 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997),
pp. 90-136; idem: “Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work”, ibid., vol. 23, no. 1
(Summer 1998), pp. 66-77; Elliott, Kimberly Ann: “The
Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty”, ibid., pp. 50-65; Kirshner, Jonathan:
“The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions”,
Security Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 32-64; Lavin, Franklin L.:
“Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma”, Foreign
Policy, vol 104 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-153; Rogers, Elizabeth S.: “Using Economic
Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts”, Security Studies,
vol. 5, no. 4 (Summer 1996), pp. 43-72. On one of the few instances of successful
sanctions see Thomas, Scott: “The Diplomacy of Liberation:
The ANC in Defence of Sanctions”, in Greg Mills (ed.): From Pariah to Participant.
South Africa’s Evolving Foreign Relations,
1990-1994 (Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs, 1994),
pp. 169-192. Back.
Note 51: An example is the testimony of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter B.
Slocombe, speaking before the Senate Armed
Services Committee January 29. He used the expression “the sanctions, the no-fly zones
in the north and south, and the no-reinforcement zone in
the south—which were placed upon Iraq pursuant to resolutions of the Security Council”,
when in fact only the sanctions were mandated by the
UN. Back.
Note 52: Baudrillard: op. cit. (note 39), p. 26. See also Gelven, Michael: War and
Existence. A Philosophical Inquiry (University Park,
Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 1994), pp. 116-124. On the lack of heroism and a
possible demographic explanation see Luttwak, Edward N.:
“A Post-Heroic Military Policy”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 4 (July-August 1996), pp.
33-44. Back.
Note 53: Clausewitz, Carl von: On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1984), p. 357 (Book VI.1.1.). See also Gat, Azar: “Clausewitz on Defence and Attack”,
Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (1988),
pp. 20-26. Back.
Note 54: USIA Security Affairs, 25 January 1999. Back.
Note 55: American Forces Press Service, 26 January 1999 confirmed that A U.S. missile
fired at an Iraqi radar site Jan. 25 went astray and
exploded in a residential neighbourhood near the city of Basra in southern Iraq, justifying
it with the explanation that “At the time, U.S. forces
were responding to provocative attacks against coalition aircraft by targeting elements of
Saddam Hussein’s air defense system”. Pentagon
spokesman Ken Bacon added that “Coalition forces take every step possible to avoid
targeting civilians or creating collateral damage.... We are
not attacking the people of Iraq. We have no animus against them whatsoever. In fact, we
have a lot of sympathy for the people of Iraq. But we
are attacking a large air defense system being used in an attempt to defeat the policing of
the no-fly zones.” Back.
Note 56: Gaddis, John Lewis: Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of Postwar
American National Security Policy (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1982), passim; Kennan, George F.: “Reflexions on
Containment”, in Terry L. Deibel & John Lewis Gaddis
(eds.): Containing the Soviet Union. A Critique of US Policy (London: PergamonBrassey’s, 1987), pp. 15-19; idem: “Containment Then
and Now”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 66, no. 2 (Spring 1987), pp. 885-890. See also Kennan’s
“Long Telegram” of 22 February, 1946, reprinted
in Thomas H. Etzold & John Lewis Gaddis (eds.): Containment. Documents on American
Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 50-63; Mayers, David: “Containment and the
Primacy of Diplomacy: George Kennan’s Views,
1947-1948”, International Security, vol. 11, no. 1 (Summer 1986), pp. 124-162. Back.
Note 57: On the general logic see George, Alexander L.: “Superpower Interests in Third
Areas”, in Roy Allison & Phil Williams (eds.):
Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 107-120. For a
critique see Hopf, Ted: Peripheral Visions. Deterrence Theory and American Foreign
Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1994). See also MacDonald, Douglas J.: “The Truman
Administration and Global Responsibilities: The Birth of the
Falling Domino Principle”, in Robert Jervis & Jack Snyder (eds.): Dominoes and
Bandwagons. Strategic Beliefs and Great Power
Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.
112-144; Jervis, Robert: “Domino Beliefs and
Strategic Behaviour”, ibid., pp. 20-50. Back.
Note 58: Stent, Angela: “Economic Containment”, in Deibel & Gaddis (eds.): op. cit.
(note 56), pp. 59-77; Becker, Abraham S.: “U.S.-Soviet
Trade and East-West Trade Policy”, in Arnold L. Horelick (ed.): U.S.-Soviet Relations.
The Next Phase (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1986), pp. 175-197. For a broader perspective see Lebow, Richard Ned & Janice Gross
Stein: We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1994). Back.
Note 59: Corke, Sarah-Jane: “Bridging the Gap: Containment, Covert Action and the
Search for the Missing Link in American Cold War
Policy, 1948-1953”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 20, no. 4 (December 1997), pp.
45-65. Back.
Note 60: The indicators in this table correspond to the definition of rogueness given in
Tanter, Raymond: Rogue Regimes. Terrorism and
Proliferation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. ix-x; and Klare: op. cit. (note 47),
pp. 24-28. Synonyms include “outlaw states” are
“backlash states”, e.g. used by then National Security Advisor Anthony Lake:
“Confronting Backlash States”, Foreign Affairs, vol, 73, no. 2
(March-April 1994), pp. 45-55. Back.
Note 61: International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 1998/99
(Oxford: Oxford University Press/IISS, 1998), pp.
295-296. Both SIPRI and ACDA have refrained from estimating Iraqi military
expenditures. SIPRI’s estimate of Iranian MILEX in 1997 was
2,715 (1995) US dollars, while its figure for the US was 258,963. See SIPRI Yearbook
1998, pp. 223 and 226. ACDA’s figures for 1995
were (in constant 1995 dollars) 4,191 for Iran and 277,800 for the United States. See U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1996 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing
Office, 1997). Back.
Note 62: “Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs”, U.S. Government White Paper,
February 13, 1998. Available at
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/. Back.
Note 63: Samore, Gary: “Iraq”, in Mitchell Reiss & Robert S. Litwak: Nuclear
Proliferation After the Cold War (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1994), pp. 15-32; Barnaby, Frank: How Nuclear Weapons Spread.
Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s (London:
Routledge, 1993), pp. 86-93; Fischer, David: Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.
The Past of the Prospects (London: Routledge,
1992), pp. 66-67; idem, Wolfgang Köttner & Harald Müller: Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Global Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994), pp. 132-136; Bailey, Kathleen C.: Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation
(Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 28-35; Klare: op. cit.
(note 47), pp. 41-51; Kokoski, Richard: Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.
97-146; Kelley, Robert E.: “The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs. The
Importance of Management”, Security Dialogue, vol.
27, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 27-38. Back.
Note 64: Albright, David: “An Iranian Bomb?”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.
51, no. 4 (July-August 1995), pp. 21-26; Spector,
Leonard S., Mark G. McDonough (with Evan S. Medeiros): Tracking Nuclear
Proliferation. A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), pp. 119-124;
Leeuwen, Marianne van: “Nuclear Proliferation in the
Middle East”, in idem (ed.): The Future of the International Non-Proliferation Regime
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995), pp.
125-154, especially pp. 136-141; Barnaby: op. cit. (note 65), pp. 114-117; Vaziri, Haleh:
“Iran’s Nuclear Quest: Motivations and
Consequences”, in Raju G.C. Thomas (ed.): The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.
Prospects for the 21st Century (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. 310-329. Back.
Note 65: The total includes around 7,200 strategic and 1,000 non-strategic warheads. See
“U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, July 1998”, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, vol. 54, no. 4 (July-Aug. 1998), pp. 69-71; “U.S. Strategic Nuclear
Forces, End of 1998”, ibid., vol. 55, no. 1 (Jan-Feb.
1999), pp. 78-79. Back.
Note 66: Alperovitz, Gar: Atomic Diplomacy. Hiroshima and Potsdam. The Use of the
Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation
with Soviet Power (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985); idem: “Hiroshima:
Historians Reassess”, Foreign Policy, no. 99 (Summer 1995),
pp. 15-34; Walker, J. Samuel: Prompt and Utter Destruction. Truman and the Use of
Atomic Bombs Against Japan (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1997). On the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons
see Burroughs, John: The (Il)legatity of Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons (Münster: Lit Verlag, 1997). On nuclear first-use see Gompert,
David, Kenneth Watman & Dean Wilkening:
“Nuclear First Use Revisited”, Survival, vol. 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 27-44. Back.
Note 67: McNaugher, Thomas L.: “Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The
Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War”, International Security, vol.
15, no. 1 (Fall 1990), pp. 5-34. For a curious (almost indecent) description of Iraq’s use
of chemical weapons see Mushtak, Hazim T.: “Arms
Control and the Proliferation of High-Technology Weapons in the Middle East and South
Asia: An Iraqi View”, in Shelley A. Stahl & Geoffrey
Kemp (eds.): Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia
(New York: St. Martin’s Press & the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 113-119, especially p. 16, where the
author argues that “they were used in a purely defensive
stance and posture”. Back.
Note 68: According to Cordesman, Anthony H.: After the Storm. The Changing Military
Balance in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview,
1993), pp. 419-421, Iran has both a chemical and a biological weapons programme.
Back.
Note 69: The US has ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and destruction of
existing stocks is proceeding, but may not be completed by
the CWC deadline of 2007. See Zanders, Jean Pascal & John Hart: “Chemical and
Biological Arms Control”, SIPRI Yearbook 1998, pp.
457-489, especially pp. 461-463. As recently as around 1986 the United States made a
major effort to develop a new generation of (binary)
chemical weapons and to deploy them in Europe. See Robinson, Julian Perry: “The
Changing Status of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Recent
Technical, Military and Political Developments”, SIPRI Yearbook 1982, pp. 317-362;
idem: “NATO Chemical Weapons Policy and Posture”,
ADIU Occasional Papers, no. 4 (Brighton: ADIU, University of Sussex, 1986). Back.
Note 70: The herbicide “Agent Orange” contained dioxin, and could thus be regarded as
a chemical weapon. Even though it was used as a
defoliant, it had long-lasting effects against humans. See Gibson: op. cit. (note 24), pp.
123-124, 289; Harris, Robert & Jeremy Paxman: A
Higher Form of Killing. The Secret Story of Chemical and Biological Warfare (New
York: Hill & Wang, 1982), pp. 191-196. See also
SIPRI: “Delayed Toxic Effects of Chemical Warfare Agents”, SIPRI Monograph
(Stockholm: SIPRI, 1975), pp. 19-22; idem: CBW and the
Law of War (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksell: The Problem of Chemical and Biological
Warfare. A Study of the Historical, Technical,
Military, Legal and Political Aspects of CBW, and Possible Disarmament Measures, vol.
3, 1973), pp. 55-57. Back.
Note 71: According to ACDA, Iran has produced BW agents and weaponized a small
quantity of these. See Adherence to and Compliance
with Arms Control Agreements, 1997, available at
http://www.acda.gov/reports/annual/comp97.htm. Back.
Note 72: There have been some suspicion about certain US research programmes, inter
alia as far as genetic engineering and defensive
programmes are concerned. See Dando: op. cit. (note 14), pp. 184-190. Also, the
verification regime for the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention is still non-existent—and the US private firms and the Association of
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America are
opposing elements of such a regime. See Zanders & Hart: loc. cit. (note 71), p. 472.
Back.
Note 73: Cuba has alleged that the US launched a biological weapons attack in October
1996. See Zanders & Hart: loc. cit. (note 71), pp.
479-480. The evidence does not, however, appear convincing. Back.
Note 74: The US White Paper ( op. cit., note 64) mentions aspossible “a small force of
Scud-type missiles and an undetermined number of
warheads and launchers”. See also Cordesman: op. cit. (note 70), pp. 484-494. Back.
Note 75: Nolan, Janne E.: Trappings of Power. Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991), pp. 81-86.
Back.
Note 76: Navias, Martin: Going Ballistic. The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East
(London: Brassey’s, UK, 1993), pp. 51-56; Nolan,
Janne E.: Trappings of Power. Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings, 1991), pp. 52-60; Bermudez, Joseph S.
Jr.: “Iran’s Missile Development”, in William C. Potter & Harlan W. Jencks (eds.): The
International Missile Bazaar. The New Suppliers
Network (Boulder: Westview, 1994), pp. 47-74. Back.
Note 77: Cordesman: op. cit. (note 70), pp. 416-419. Back.
Note 78: The UN General Assembly in 1974 (Resolution no. 3314) defined aggression as
“the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United
Nations, as set out in this definition”. See Dinstein: op. cit. (note 5), p. 127. Back.
Note 79: The starting point has been selected as it marks the Iraqi “revolution” that
brought effective independence from British rule. Back.
Note 80: On the attack against Iran see Rajaee Farhang (ed.): Iranian Perspectives on the
Iran-Iraq War (Gainsville: University Press of
Florida, 1997), passim. According to some accounts, the US aided and abetted in Saddam
Hussein’s attack against Iran. See, for instance,
Tousi, Reza Ra’iss: “Containment and Animosity: The United States and the War”, ibid.,
pp. 49-61, especially p. 50. On the resons for the Iraqi
invasion and the unsuccesful (or never attempted) deterrence see Stein, Janice Gross:
“Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-1991: A
Failed or Impossible Task?”, International Security, vol. 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 147179; Karsh, Efraim: “Reflections on the 1990-91 Gulf
Conflict”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 19., no. 3 (September 1996), pp. 303320; idem: “Rethinking the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict”,
Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 7, no. 3 (November 1996), pp. 729-769; Freedman,
Lawrence & idem: The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991.
Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1993), pp. 19-63; Tripp, Charles: “Iraq and the
War for Kuwait”, in James Gow (ed.): Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community
(London: Brassey’s/Centre for Defence Studies,
1993), pp. 16-33; Record, Jeffrey: Hollow Victory. A Contrary View of the Gulf War
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, US, 1993), pp. 15-42.
See also Chatelus, Michael: “Iraq and Its Oil: Sixty-five Years of Ambition and
Frustration”, in Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow & Thomas
Koszinowski (eds.): Iraq. Power and Society (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993), pp. 141-169;
Ishow, Habib: “Relations between Iraq and
Kuwait”, ibid., pp. 303-318. Back.
Note 81: Rubin, Barry: Paved With Good Intentions. The American Experience and Iran
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), pp.
132-134; Chubin, Shahram: Security in the Persian Gulf, vol. 4: The Role of Outside
Powers (London: IISS and Aldershot: Gower, 1982), pp.
9-36; Halliday, Fred: Iran. Dictatorship and Development, 2nd edition (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1979), pp. 266-277; Hooglund,
Eric: “Iran”, in Peter J. Schraeder (ed.): Intervention into the 1990s. U.S. Foreign Policy
in the Third World. 2nd Edition (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1992), pp. 303-320; idem: “The Persian Gulf”, ibid. pp. 321-342. Back.
Note 82: Even though Vietnam might have been included, the fact that the US waged its
war at the request of a South Vietnamese governement
mandated its exclusion. For a historical account see Blechman, Barry M. & Steven S.
Kaplan: Force Without War. U.S. Armed Forces as a
Political Instrument (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978), passim; Haas,
Richard N.: Intervention. The Use of American
Military Force in the Post-Cold War Period (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 1994), passim; Carpenter,
Ted Galen: “Direct Military Intervention”, in Schraeder (ed.): op. cit. (note 83), pp. 153172. On the US air campaigns and invasions of
Cambodia and Laos (both of which were neutral countries) see Prados, John: Presidents’
Secret Wars. CIA and Pentagon Covert
Operations Since World War II (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1986), pp. 298-303;
Kissinger, Henry A.: The White House Years
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), pp. 239-254; idem: Years
of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and
Michael Joseph, 1982), pp. 335-361; Gibson: op. cit. (note 24), pp. 399-418; MacLear,
Michael: Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War
(London: Thames Methuen, 1981), pp. 241-243, 392-406; Record, Jeffrey: The Wrong
War. Why We Lost in Vietnam (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1998), pp. 75-76. On the intervention in the Dominican Republic see
Ranelagh, John: The Agency. The Rise and Decline of the
CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp. 482-485. On the bombing of Libya see
Kaldor, Mary & Paul Anderson (eds.): Mad Dogs.
The US Raids on Libya (London: Pluto Press, 1986). On Panama see Scranton, Margaret
E.: “Panama”, in Schraeder (ed.): op. cit., pp.
343-360. On the mining of Nicaraguan harbours see Kornbluh, Peter: “Nicaragua”, ibid.,
pp. 285-301, especially p. 293; LeoGrande, William
M.: Our Own Backyard. The United States in Central America, 1977-1992 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1998), pp.
330-32. On the invasion of Grenada see Griffith, Ivelaw L.: “Security Perceptions of
English Caribbean Elites”, in idem (ed.): Strategy and
Security in the Caribbean (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 3-26; and Clifford E. Griffin:
“Postinvasion Political Security in the Eastern
Caribbean”, ibid., pp. 76-97; Leogrande: op. cit., pp. 348-9, 357-8. On the 1980 rescue
attempt in Iran (which would qualify as intervention,
regardless of its defensive intentions) see Ronzitti, Natalino: Rescuing Nationals Abroad
Through Military Coercion and Intervention on
Grounds of Humanity (Dordrecht; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), pp. 41-49. On the
FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) see, for
instance, Cohen, Lenard J.: Broken Bonds. Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan
Politics in Transition. 2nd Edition (Boulder: Westview,
1995), pp. 317-318; Anderson, Stephanie: “EU, NATO and CSCE Responses to the
Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe’s New Security
Architecture”, European Security, vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 328-353; Greco,
Ettore: “UN-NATO Interaction: Lessons from the
Yugoslav Experience”, The International Spectator, vol. 32, no. 3/4 (July-Dec 1997), pp.
121-136; Crawford, Timothy Wallace: “Why
Minimum Force Won’t Work: Doctrine and Deterrence in Bosnia and Beyond”, Global
Governance, vol. 4, no. 2 (April-June 1998), pp.
235-256; Glitman, Maynard: “US Policy in Bosnia: Rethinking a Flawed Approach”,
Survival, vol. 38, no. 4 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 66-83.
Back.
Note 83: According to the FBI, Iraq was not actively involved in the sponsorship of
international terrorism in 1997, but it had been so in the
past. Iran, however, allegedly “remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism”. See
FBI: Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997, available on
the internet at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/sponsored.html.
Back.
Note 84: See notes 83 and 85. Back.
Note 85: Ransom, Harry Howe: “Covert Intervention”, in Schraeder (ed.): op. cit. (note
83), pp. 113-129; Schraeder, Peter J.: “Paramilitary
Intervention”, ibid., pp. 131-151; Prados: op. cit. (note 84), pp. 183-187, 195-196 (on
Cuba), 338-347 (on Angola), 385-401 (on
Nicaragua), 315-322 (on Chile); Ranelagh: op. cit. (note 84), pp. 260-269, 358-376, 516520, 678-681, 710-727; Woodward, Bob: Veil:
The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), passim.
On Laos see George, Alexander L.: Forceful
Persuasion. Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), pp. 25-30. On
Iraq see the “Iraq Liberation Act of 1998”, in Congressional Record, vol. 144, no. 137
(October 5, 1998), pp. H9486-9492. Back.
Note 86: On the Korean War (where the 38th parallel and the Yalu River signified the
border between containment and roll-back, in the strict
and more “liberal” sense, respectively) see Whelan, Richard: Drawing the Line. The
Korean War, 1950-1953 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1990), pp. 217-240; Gaddis: op. cit. (note 56), pp. 89-126. On the Reagan Administration
see Posen, Barry R. & Stephen Van Evera:
“Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment”,
International Security, vol. 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 3-45;
LeoGrande, William M., “Rollback or Containment? The United States, Nicaragua, and
the Search for Peace in Central America”, ibid., vol. 11,
no. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 89-120. Back.
Note 87: See, for instance, Lynch, Allen: The Cold War is Over —Again (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1992); George, Alexander L., Philip J.
Farley & Alexander Dallin (eds.): U.S.—Soviet Security Cooperation. Achievements,
Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988), passim; Kanet, Roger E. & Edward A. Kolodziej (eds.): The Cold War as
Competition. Superpower Cooperation in Regional
Conflict Management (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991), passim;
Garthoff, Raymond L.: The Great Transition.
American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1994), passim. For a theoretical
perspective see Milner, Helen: “Review Article: International Theories of Cooperation
Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses”, World
Politics, vol. 44, no. 3 (April 1992), pp. 466-496; Axelrod, Robert: The Evolution of
Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Stein,
Arthur A.: Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); idem &
Robert A. Keohane: “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and
Institutions”, in David A. Baldwin (ed.): Neorealism and
Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993),
pp. 85-115; Glaser, Charles L.: “Realists as
Optimists: Cooperaion as Self-Help”, International Security, vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter
1994/95), pp. 50-90; Miller, Benjamin: When Opponents
Cooperate. Great Power Conflicts and Collaboration in World Politics (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1995). Back.
Note 88: Byman, Daniel, Kenneth Pollack & Gideon Rose: “The Rollback Fantasy”,
Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 1 (Jan-Feb. 1999), pp.
24-41. Back.
Note 89: Milward, William: “Containing Iran”, Commentary. A Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Publication, no. 63 (November
1995), pp. 1-14; Sicherman, Harvey: “America’s Alliance Anxieties. The Strange Death
of Dual Containment”, Orbis. A Journal of World
Affairs, vol. 41, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 223-240; Sick, Gary: “Rethinking Dual
Containment”, Survival, vol. 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp.
5-32; Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Brent Scowcroft & Richard Murphy: “Differentiated
Containment”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 3 (May-June
1997), pp. 20-30; Wright, Robin & Shaul Bakhash: “The U.S. and Iran: An Offer They
Can’t Refuse?”, Foreign Policy, vol. 108 (Fall 1997),
pp. 124-137; Baghat, Gawdat: “Beyond Containment: US-Iranian Relations at a
Crossroads”, Security Dialogue, vol. 28, no. 4 (December
1997), pp. 453-464. Back.
Note 90: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/980623_hr2709.html; and
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/980623_wh_iran.html.
Back.
Note 91: http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980617a.html. Back.
Note 92: Prawitz & Leonard: op. cit. (note 19). Back.
Note 93: Gerges, Fawaz A.: “Washington’s Misguided Iran Policy”, Survival, vol. 38, no.
4 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 5-15; Chubin, Sharam:
“US Policy Towards Iran Should Change—But It Probably Won’t”, ibid., pp. 16-19; alSuwaidi, Jamal S.: “Gulf Security and the Iranian
Challenge”, Security Dialogue, vol. 27, no. 3 (September 1996), pp. 277-294. Back.
Note 94: Arnett, Eric: “Beyond Threat Perception: Assessing Military Capability and
Recucing the Risk of War in Southern Asia”, in idem (ed.):
Military Capacity and the Risk of War. China, India, Pakistan and Iran (Oxford: Oxford
University Press/SIPRI, 1997), pp. 1-24,
especially pp. 5-6 and 16-20; Loftian, Saideh: “Threat Perception and Military Planning
in Iran: Credible Scenarios of Conflict and Opportunities
for Confidence Building”, ibid., pp. 195-222; Chubin, Sharam: Iran’s National Security
Policy. Capabilities, Intentions and Impact
(Washington, D.C: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994). Back.
Note 95: For a much more alarmist analysis, based partly on questionable sources (which
the author does not question) see also Ritcheson,
Philip L.: “Iranian Military Resurgence: Scope, Motivations, and Implications for
Regional Security”, Armed Forces and Society, vol. 21, no. 4
(Summer 1995), pp. 573-592. See also Katzman, Kenneth: “The Politico-Military Threat
from Iran”, in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (ed.): Iran and the
Gulf. A Search for Stability (Abu Dhabi, UAE: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and
Research and London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp.
195-210; Cordesman, Anthony H.: “Threats and Non-Threats from Iran”, ibid., pp. 211286; Arnett, Eric: “Iran is not Iraq”, Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, vol. 64, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 12-14. Back.
Note 96: Hunter, Shireen T.: “Iran after Khomeini”, The Washington Papers, no. 156
(Washington, DC: CSIS, 1992); Clawson, Patrick: “Iran
after Khomeini: Weakened and Weary”, in Daniel Pipes (ed.): Sandstorm. Middle East
Conflicts and America (Lanham: University Press of
America, 1993), pp. 269-276; Kupchan, Charles A.: “Iran after Khomeini: Ready to
Talk”, ibid., pp. 277-284; Rundle, Christopher: “Iran:
Continuity and Change since the Revolution—Carrying Water in a Sieve?”, in M. Jane
Davis (ed.): Politics and International Relations in the
Middle East. Continuity and Change (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 105-117;
Mahtasham, Elahe: “An Iranian Perspective”, in Gow
(ed.): op. cit. (note 82), pp. 107-120. See also Kazemi, Farhad: “Review Article: Models
of Iranian Politics, the Road to the Islamic Revolution,
and the Challenge of Civil Society”, World Politics, vol. 47, no. 4 (July 1995), pp. 555574. For an excellent analysis of Iran’s evolution from a
revolutionary to a “normal” state, see Walt, Stephen M.: Revolution and War (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 210-268. Back.
Note 97: Al-Suwaidi, Jamal S.: “Gulf Security and the Iranian Challenge”, Security
Dialogue, vol. 27, no. 3 (September 1996), pp. 277-294,
quotes from pp. 278 and 287. Back.
Note 98: Deutsch, Karl W. et al.: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.
International Organization in the Light of
Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957); Adler,
Emmanuel & Michael Barnett: “Security Communities in
Theoretical Perspective”, in idem & idem (eds.): Security Communities (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 3-28; idem &
idem: “A Framework for the Study of Security Communities”, ibid., pp. 29-65. For a
rather pessimistic view, see Barnett, Michael & F. Gregory
Gause III: “Caravans in Opposite Directions: Society, State and the Development of a
Community in the Gulf Cooperation Council”, ibid., pp.
161-197. Back.