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Paul Carls
Nietzsche Report 9
19 June 2009
Nietzsche, Evolution, and the Sovereign Individual
Introduction/Summary
Florian Häubi’s paper, “Nietzsche Entwicklungstheorie und das ‘souveraine
Individuum’ in GM II: 2,” discusses questions of Nietzsche’s Entwicklungstheorie as it
applies not only as a critique of Herbert Spencer, a social Darwinist, but also as it applies
to Nietzsche’s discussion of the sovereign individual in GM II: 2. It is divided into four
sections, an introduction, a chapter on Nietzsche and evolution theory, a chapter on
Nietzsche’s idea of individuality, and a conclusion. Häubi describes Nietzsche’s concept
of Entwicklungtheorie in terms of a development within a human group to produce the
highest possible type of human possible, yet it cannot be considered a teleological
development. Within this development of the higher individual, the higher individual in
question must necessarily break free from the herd from which it came and acquire a new
independence. The sovereign individual, according to Häubi, demonstrates aspects of this
independence due to its ability to stand apart from society. Some interpreters have
claimed that the sovereign individual is an ideal type for Nietzsche, while others have
claimed that it represents a negative account of human development. Häubi’s thesis is
that while the sovereign individual is not Nietzsche’s ideal type, if Nietzsche’s
Entwicklungstheorie is applied to the sovereign individual, a positive account of the
sovereign individual can be maintained.
In the introduction, Häubi introduces the above thesis. He also mentions that the
majority of his sources from Nietzsche come from the Nachlass notes from between the
years of 1880 to 1882 and 1885 to 1887. It is during these periods that Nietzsche writes
the most about his ideas concerning evolution, Darwin, and Spencer, and the relationship
between the will to power and Nietzsche’s Entwicklungstheorie. Häubi then outlays the
structure of his paper.
In the first part of the second chapter, Häubi notes that many interpretations of
Nietzsche’s work understand him as a Darwinian thinker. He notes however that this
comes as a result of a misunderstanding of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Häubi also notes that
within the very early Darwinian interpretations much also was misunderstood of
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Darwin’s theory. The fact that Darwin does not apply evolution to humans and also the
fact that Darwin is also a non-teleological thinker was lost. This is what allowed a thinker
like Spencer to pick up Darwin’s theories and apply them to humans in a teleological
way. In the first section of the section chapter (2.1) Häubit sketches some of Spencer’s
most important ideas. According to Spencer, humanity started with individuals dominated
by egoism and then formed societies, which dictated a form of altruism. Over time
evolution worked in that humans became more moral as a reconciliation between this
egoism/altruism split. They adapted to each other in order to exist in society peacefully.
The end result of this evolution is the “ideally moral man,” which would be a prototype
of an individual living in a society. (4)
In the third chapter, Häubi begins discussing Nietzsche’s views on the
development of the individual within society. In the first part, Häubi notes that as early as
1870/71 Nietzsche has a conception of a “Genius,” which is an elite individual who
stands at the end of a long process of development. (5) Häubi also notes that Nietzsche is
critical of Spencer because his account leads to an “allergrösste Ähnlichkeit aller
Menschen.” (6) Nietzsche also believes that humanity formed first within societies, and
not as individuals, like Spencer says. Humans are naturally, then, “sozialer Organismus.”
(7)
In the first section of chapter three (3.1) Häubi discusses Nietzsche’s emphasis
upon the inherent egoism of humanity. Even the altruism of Spencer is considered by
Nietzsche as a form of egoism. This primacy of egoism is support for Häubi’s argument
that Nietzsche’s Entwicklungstheorie leads to the sovereign individual. Häubi also finds
support for this claim in the fact that Nietzsche believes the individual ego is a late
development in human history, since at the beginning humans were essentially a social
being. Nietzsche furthermore conceives the human ego as consisting of multiple drives
and that the ego is not a stable entity, as Spencer claims. Based upon these facts, Häubi
formulates two kinds of egoism. There is a “nicht-individueller Egoismus,” which
constitutes actions that seek to pleasure the ego. (10) But since the drives of the ego are
socially determined, these drives ultimately serve society as well. There is also a “höherer
Egoismus,” which aims at satisfying purely individual desires. (2 of the outline) The
drives of this individual are no longer socially bound, which implies a re-organization of
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the individual’s drives.
In the second section of chapter three (3.2) Häubi discusses the idea of the
individual as it applies to the will to power. Häubi reiterates the fact that Nietzsche does
not see the ego as a stable entity, but rather as “eine Vielheit” made up of many
competing drives. (11) These drives are always in competition with each other for
dominance and recognition, which leads to an “Aristokratie im Leibe.” (12) This
description of conflict and striving for dominance is also to be found within societies.
Within these societies individuals strive for domination over and against the others,
indicating a hierarchy whereby the herd is used as a support for higher types of people.
As Nietzsche describes the process in a Nachlass note, it involves “das ebenso beständige
Vergehen der Individuen auf den Gewinn von wenig Individuen.” (13) This conception
implies a critique of Darwin and his theory of survival of the fittest.
In the third section of chapter three (3.3) Häubi discusses Nietzsche’s concept of
‘Vervollkommnung.’ According to Häubi, this individual who rises to the top is more
developed and more perfected than those who remain in the herd. Nevertheless, this
stress on perfection does not imply a sort of teleology on the part of Nietzsche. While
there is progress and development within humanity, it is not going towards any sort of
fixed goal. It is more so going towards a higher complexity and more power, and not
towards the highest happiness for the greatest number as in Spencer’s theory.
In the fourth section of chapter three (3.4) Häubi links the idea of ‘höhere[m]
Egoismus’ with the sovereign individual. Both types of people have a re-organization of
their social drives towards purely egoistic drives over and against the ‘nicht-individuellen
Egoismus.’ Both types also exercise a measure of independence from society. They no
longer feel themselves like an organ within an organism, but as an organism on their
own. Häubi presents six steps in which the individual would be able to liberate
themselves from the feelings of being attached to society, which can be connected to the
development of the sovereign individual described by Nietzsche in GM II:2. Häubi ends
by making two points. First he mentions the idea that the majority of society exists in
order to bring about these higher types of individuals and is a tool for these individuals.
The second point is that Nietzsche is not arguing for any sort of Darwinian or Spencerian
evolution of species. For Nietzsche the group exists only for the purpose of producing
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higher types of individuals.
In the conclusion, Häubi rejects the idea that the sovereign individual is to be seen
as an ideal type for Nietzsche because this would be far too teleological. Nietzsche’s
critiques of Darwin and Spencer along teleological grounds would not permit this to be
the case. Häubi also rejects the idea that the sovereign individual is the result of a
negative process that Nietzsche describes in GM II: 1 and 2. Häubi claims that by taking
Nietzsche’s Entwicklungtheorie into account it is possible to see a positive element to the
sovereign individual, who by the virtue of breaking free of society resembles the
‘höhere[n] Egoismus.’ Häubi thereby is able to carve out a nuanced interpretation of the
sovereign individual.
Discussion
Our discussion began with Häubi briefly re-stating the goals of his paper. Häubi
first wanted to present the individual as it appears in Nietzsche’s Entwicklungstheorie. He
then wanted to show that while Nietzsche dismisses teleological thinking, he does not
dismiss completely the idea of a certain progression within the human species. Lastly
Häubi wanted to show that Nietzsche thinks of the individual in the Entwicklungstheorie
in a positive way, and that this positive outlook could be transferred to the sovereign
individual of GM II: 2. Our discussion then revolved around three main points
concerning Häubi’s paper.
1) The first point of discussion in the seminar was the question of Nietzsche’s
teleology. It was noted that Nietzsche rejects a traditional Aristotelian concept of
teleology, which is a progression towards a certain fixed goal. Nevertheless, there is some
form of teleology within Nietzsche’s Entwicklungstheorie, since it poses at the end of the
progression some form of higher ideal type of individual. We wondered if Nietzsche’s
account of this development was more descriptive or more prescriptive and normative. If
the latter is the case, then what are Nietzsche’s recommendations for how to help the
creation of this ‘höhere[m] Egoismus?’ Under what conditions is it possible to get a
higher individual? Is it possible to control the elements that go into the formation of these
individuals? I raised the question of whether or not such talk is tantamount to eugenics,
due to its rhetoric. Prof. Siemens confirmed that at points Nietzsche does toy around with
the idea. It was also noted that this kind of talk from Nietzsche is contrary to some sort of
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Spencerian automatism, whereby evolution does its work free of active human
interference. We also asked what exactly, then, Nietzsche’s ideal is. Häubi refuted this
idea, however, saying that Nietzsche rejects any form of idealism.
2) The second topic of our discussion was whether or not Häubi’s correlation of
the sovereign individual with the ‘höhere[m] Egoismus’ is justified. We wondered
whether or not it was possible to connect the sovereign individual to whatever kind of
idea higher type that Nietzsche speaks about. Prof. Siemens noted that you would need to
truly analyze the conceptions of sovereign that Nietzsche uses when he mentions the
sovereign individual and his Entwicklungstheorie. For example, Siemens pointed out that
the sovereign individual does not exhibit the traits of higher complexity and greater
strength as Nietzsche mentions in his Entwicklungstheorie. Nietzsche’s
Entwicklungtheorie must also account for the moral properties that the sovereign
individual exhibits as well. According to Siemens, Nietzsche’s Entwicklungstheorie does
not do this. Häubi would furthermore have to show that the Entwicklung would lead to
something like the sovereign individual. Häubi’s comparison runs into more problems
when it is noted that Nietzsche’s Entwicklungstheorie values one individual above all
others, which does not seem to be the case with the sovereign individual. It was reiterated
that Häubi must adequately discuss what Nietzsche means by sovereignty in both
accounts before he is able to make a legitimate comparison between the two.
3) The third point of discussion concerned a point that prof. van Tongeren made.
He noted that Nietzsche has a fundamental disagreement with a Darwinistic or
Spencerian versions of evolution on two grounds. First is that Nietzsche disagrees with
the notion of self –preservation that is prominent within Darwinian models of evolution.
For Nietzsche a species or individual does not necessarily strive for self-preservation, but
actually for more power and more perfection, or higher complexity. Secondly, Nietzsche
has problems concerning the idea of self that is used in the idea of self-preservation. For
Nietzsche the self is not a unified entity found within consciousness, as Spencer believes,
but rather a many-souled unconsciously driven entity.
Critical Points
In his paper, Häubi presents an interesting and creative interpretation of the
sovereign individual, which seems to side-step several of the problems concerning
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previous interpretations. Nevertheless, several questions remain concerning his
methodology and the way he presents his argument.
The first area of concern is the fact that Häubi uses almost exclusively Nachlass
notes as his source for Nietzsche’s thought. As he explains, “Bei der Ausarbeitung von
Nietzsches Entwicklungtheorie stütze ich mich hauptsächlich-wenn auch nicht
ausschliesslich-auf die Nachlassaufzeichnungen aus den Jahren 1880 bis 1882 und 1885
bis 1887.” (1) As Häubi explains, this is where Nietzsche works out his ideas on
evolution, social evolution, Darwin, and Spencer the most. Nevertheless, there are many
methodological questions surrounding the decision to focus almost exclusively on
Nachlass notes. For example, why not focus on what Nietzsche published, or at least
incorporate into the paper aphorisms that Nietzsche did publish? If Nietzsche had not
decided to publish these notes perhaps he felt that they were not suitable for publication,
perhaps he did not feel the ideas important enough for his philosophy, or perhaps he
changed his thoughts about what he wrote in his notebook before publication. To focus
solely on Nachlass notes is thus a risky endeavor.
A second point of critique, and one that is much more important, is that Häubi
never goes into an in-depth discussion of what the sovereign individual is. He mentions
the idea of the sovereign individual briefly in the introduction, and then again in the
conclusion, quoting from GM II: 2, describing the sovereign individual as, “das von der
Sittlichkeit der Sitte wieder losgekommene, das autonome übersittliche Individuum.”
(19) With such a limited exposition of the sovereign individual it is difficult for the
reader to see how Häubi understands this figure. It is even more difficult for the reader to
see if Häubi’s comparing of the sovereign individual with the ‘höhere[m] Egoismus’ is
anything more than a superficial comparison. In sum the reader does not have a good
grasp of exactly to what degree the connection between the two figures is being made.
Häubi may be correct in making the comparison, but unfortunately he does not provide
very much support for his linking of the two other than the fact that both figures are free
from the societally induced drives and act independently of society. As such, his
interpretation can be called into question, for it seems as if Häubi may be understanding
the sovereign individual in a very narrow and limited sense.
For example, if we put GM II: 2 into context, we see that the process that
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produces the sovereign individual is a process that applies not just to one individual, but
to society as a whole. For example, Nietzsche says, “with the aid of the morality of mores
and the social straitjacket, man was actually made calculable.” It is obvious that the
process that produces the sovereign individual, the ‘morality of mores,’ is a sociological
phenomenon that is being applied not to one man, but to the collective man. As such, the
whole of society is beginning to resemble more and more the ideal of the sovereign
individual. This fact is confirmed in The Gay Science 356. In this aphorism Nietzsche is
warning of a change happening in Western society as a result of the fact that individuals
increasingly grow independent of societal constraints and feel themselves able to perform
almost any function in society. This accompanies a greater freedom felt by the individual
as well, which correlates to the freedom the sovereign individual feels. Yet, there is a
danger, as Nietzsche warns. He says that as a result of this phenomenon, “What will not
be built any more henceforth, and cannot be built anymore, is—a society in the old sense
of that word; to build that, everything is lacking, above all the material. All of us are no
longer material for a society.” Hence, the effects of this ‘morality of mores’ are being
seen throughout society, and not just in one individual. Thus, it appears as if there is a
fundamental difference between the two processes that lead to two different kinds of
individuals. One process leads to a ‘höheren Egoismus’ who stands alone and above the
herd. Another process leads to a collection of individuals who come to resemble more
and more the sovereign individual, which in the end leads to the dissolution of society.
Thus, it seems as if the two individuals who stand at the end of these processes are very
different from one another and it is not clear how a relationship between the two could be
established.
Another complication with Häubi’s interpretation comes with the relationship the
individual holds with society. As Häubi says, “Für Nietzsche geht es innerhalb des
Entwcklungsprozesses nicht, wie Darwin und Spencer glauben, um die Erhaltung der
Spezies, sondern um die Hervorbringung einzelner, starker Individuen.” (18) In this sense
the group exists only for the production and support of great individuals. Yet, with the
‘morality of mores’ the ability of this relationship is threatened. In GM II: 2 it is not clear
exactly what relationship the sovereign individual holds with the rest of society, other
than his condemnation of those who do not keep their promises. And In GS 356
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Nietzsche says that as a result of this process, “those with a genius for organization
become scarce,” and these “great ‘architects’” become disadvantaged due to society’s
continual fragmentation into individuals. No individual will be willing to sacrifice
themselves to the construction of a great work due to their independence. Society no
longer exists either to support or even to produce the great individual. Thus, the effect of
the ‘morality of mores’ would seem to work against the ‘höheren Egoismus,’ since the
‘höhere[r] Egoismus’ would seem to resemble the genius architect discussed in GS 356.
The connection between this figure and the sovereign individual again becomes
problematized, since the differences between the processes that produce the ‘höheren
Egoismus’ and the sovereign individual seem to be very different and lead to different
types of sovereignty.
Echoing critical points made in the discussion, the two processes of development
that lead to the ‘höheren Egoismus’ and the sovereign individual seem to be radically
different and to lead to completely different types of individuals who hold different
relationships with the world around them. If Häubi would like to claim that the
sovereignty of the sovereign individual can be compared favorably to that of the
‘höhere[m] Egoismus,’ he would need to show that the two processes of development
lead to the same, or at the very least a similar, kind of sovereignty, something that he
does not do in his paper. Judging from the discussion above, it will be difficult to see how
a concrete connection between the individual at the end of Nietzsche’s Entwicklung
process and the sovereign individual would be possible.
Conclusion
Häubi’s paper is an interesting take on Nietzsche’s Entwicklungstheorie and how
it can be related to the sovereign individual. It provides a good examination of the
particulars of Nietzsche’s theory of evolution. It also does a good job demonstrating
Nietzsche’s relationship with Darwin’s theory of evolution and other thinkers who used
major components of Darwin’s evolutionary thinking. Nevertheless, there are several
problems with Häubi’s thesis and attempt to reconcile the ‘höheren Egoismus’ with the
sovereign individual. An in-depth discussion of what Nietzsche means by sovereignty,
especially as it applies to the sovereign individual, is needed, because as it stands the
connection between the two is tenuous at best. There are simply too many differences
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between the two types of individuals and too many divergences between the two
processes that create them.