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A. Interpretation and violation - forces engaged in combat or one-time noncombat missions are not part
of U.S. presence – presence requires routine and non-combat activities.
Thomason et al 2002 [James S. Thomason, (Project Leader) - with Institute for Defense Analyses, "Transforming US Overseas
Military
Presence:
Evidence
and
Options
for
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954 | VP]
DoD,"
July,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
WHAT IS OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE? Our working definition of US overseas military presence is that it
consists of all the US military assets in overseas areas that are engaged in relatively routine, regular, non-combat activities
or functions.1 By this definition, forces that are located overseas may or may not be engaging in presence activities. If they
are engaging in combat (such as Operation Enduring Freedom), or are involved in a one-time non-combat action (such as
an unscheduled carrier battle group deployment from the United States aimed at calming or stabilizing an emerging crisis
situation), then they are not engaging in presence activities. Thus, an asset that is located (or present) overseas may or may
not be “engaged in presence activities,” may or may not be “doing presence.”
We have thus far defined presence activities chiefly in “negative” terms—what they are not. In more positive terms, what
exactly are presence activities, i.e., what do presence activities actually entail doing?
Overseas military presence activities are generally viewed as a subset of the overall class of activities that the US
government uses in its efforts to promote important military/security objectives [Dismukes, 1994]. A variety of recurrent,
overseas military activities are normally placed under the “umbrella” concept of military presence. These include but are
not limited to US military efforts overseas to train foreign militaries; to improve inter-operability of US and friendly forces;
to peacefully and visibly demonstrate US commitment and/or ability to defend US interests; to gain intelligence and
familiarity with a locale; to conduct peacekeeping activities; and to position relevant, capable US military assets such that
they are likely to be available sooner rather than later in case an evolving security operation or contingency should call for
them.2
B. Voting issue –
1. Limits - there are an infinite number of potential combat activities because conditions on the ground
are constantly changing – magnifies neg research burden. And, allowing combat missions allows affs to
change specific strategies in topic countries.
Second, precision – narrow definitions are only way to determine effectiveness of presence activities.
Thomason et al 2002 [James S. Thomason, (Project Leader) - with Institute for Defense Analyses, "Transforming US Overseas
Military
Presence:
Evidence
and
Options
for
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA415954 | VP]
DoD,"
July,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
DoD’s overseas military presence posture and activities have been crucial elements of the military strategy of the United
States for many years. Are the substantial resources that DoD now employs to sustain and conduct presence activities
generating effective returns for the nation in the promotion of key security objectives? How do we know? Are there more
cost-effective ways for DoD to promote these security objectives than through the current mix of presence activities, other
military and, indeed, nonmilitary instruments of influence? Are there any promising methodologies for improving the
evidence of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of US presence assets and activities?
To address such questions systematically, we must first define what we are discussing more precisely. What is US
presence? What are the key security objectives? What would constitute credible evidence regarding the effectiveness of US
presence
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A. Funding For the Airborne Laser Has Been Cut – It Can Be Revived
Stephen Trimble, @ Flight International, 2/17/10 [Airborne Laser faces uncertain future despite historic intercept test,
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/02/17/338475/airborne-laser-faces-uncertain-future-despite-historic-intercept.html]
The Airborne Laser Testbed (ALTB) faces an uncertain future as both a research project and an operational system even
after its 1MW-class chemical laser successfully - and historically - destroyed a ballistic missile off the California coast on
11 February. The long-awaited intercept test proved that the modified Boeing 747-400F's key technology - a chemical
oxygen iodine laser (Coil) invented by US Air Force researchers in 1977 - is a lethal weapon against ballistic missiles. A
week before the ballistic intercept, the ALTB shot down a Terrier Black Brant, a two-stage sounding rocket that presents
faster and smaller target to the Lockheed Martin-supplied beam and fire control system. Moving the ALTB out of the
research environment, however, remains an open question. Despite passing a historic milestone for a directed energy
weapons syst/em, the intercept was completed in a sterile test environment. Moreover, the Missile Defense Agency
classified the range of the test and obscured the length of time required to defeat the target, making it unclear how well the
Coil technology really performed. Mike Rinn, Boeing vice-president and general manager for missile defence programmes,
believes the lethal demonstration opens the door for high energy lasers to become operational weapons. "As we show
things like we did last night, decisions can be made about whether this platform or some future platform or some
incarnation of the current technology can be an operational system," Rinn says. But Rinn's top customer - Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates - remains opposed to making the $6 billion programme operational. In 2009 Gates cancelled the
second Airborne Laser aircraft and downgraded the programme from operational prototype to testbed status. The
programme now remains in limbo, awaiting the results of future budget decisions. The Department of Defense has
requested slightly less than $100 million for the ALTB in fiscal year 2011, which Rinn says is insufficient to preserve the
industrial base for such high-energy lasers. But the programme's future will be decided in the next round of budget
planning. The MDA is working on a study computing the lifecycle acquisition cost of an operational system, which
requires buying up to seven aircraft. Meanwhile, the office of DoD's director for research and engineering is analysing
options for missile defences in the boost and ascent phase, Rinn says. That ALTB is a candidate in the director's ongoing
analysis, which will inform the Pentagon's FY2012 budget request, he says.
B. Withdrawal would shift budget toward future weapons, and industry lobbyist are compensated with
contracts.
New York Times 9( Christopher Drew, Covers military contracting and Pentagon spending for The New York Times. He is also
the co-author of “Blind Man’s Bluff,” a best-selling book about submarine spying during the Cold War. 2/27/09“Military Contractors
Await Details of Obama’s Budget”. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/28/business/28defense.html)
The good news for big military contractors from President Obama’s budget this week was his proposal to increase the basic
Pentagon budget by 4 percent, to $534 billion. But now the companies are contending with a new question: what will the
priorities of the new administration — which has made clear it wants to shift spending from futuristic weapons systems to
simpler arms that troops can use now — mean for the industry?The big contractors “are sitting on the edge of their seats,”
said Gordon Adams, a professor at American University in Washington and an expert on the defense budget. The defense
secretary, Robert M. Gates, said this week that he would probably not decide the fate of some marquee weapons systems —
including the Air Force’s supersonic F-22 jet fighter and the Navy’s plans for a new high-tech destroyer — until April. In
an effort to blunt some of the inevitable lobbying, he has taken the extraordinary step of requiring members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to sign documents promising not to leak any details of the deliberations. In addition to the basic budget, the
Obama administration expects to spend at least $130 billion to cover the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, bringing
the total defense budget to $664 billion in fiscal 2010, which begins Oct. 1. That is slightly higher than the $654 billion the
government has set aside in the current fiscal year — the most it has spent, in inflation-adjusted terms, since World War II.
Some military executives acknowledge that the spending proposal for next year remains generous given the government’s
spiraling budget deficits. “It’s a good number in this economic climate,” said Kendell Pease, a spokesman for General
Dynamics, the giant military contractor. But, he said, “There are so many contentious issues to decide, and nobody is going
to do anything in Congress until they see the line-item decisions.” Investors also seem unnerved by the uncertainty; the
stocks of the leading military companies fell even harder than the general market averages Friday. Investors were also
concerned that with the plans to gradually withdraw forces from Iraq, the level of supplemental war funding will drop
sharply in the future. Ronald Epstein, an analyst at Merrill Lynch, said in a research note that this could end up “marking
the end of the defense spending boom.” But other analysts said some of the savings in Iraq could be offset by greater
spending in Afghanistan. James McAleese, whose company, McAleese & Associates, advises military firms on legal and
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business issues, said Mr. Obama’s proposed budget could also increase next year’s spending on weapons acquisitions and
research by $6 billion. But the military contracting industry is consumed now with the parlor game of guessing which
prominent programs Mr. Gates will cut back or scrap as either “gold-plated” or troubled — and whether industry lobbyists
will be able to persuade Congress to overturn some of those decisions.
C. Congress and Contractors Will Demand ABL
Riki Ellison, Chairman and Founder of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, 2/15/10
[http://www.defpro.com/news/details/13147/]
"President Obama and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had cut the ABL program from the FY2010 Missile Defense
Budget. The FY2011 budget request released on Monday, February 1st adds $99 million into an ABL legacy program
called Directed Energy Research (DER). This program calls for continued development and testing of airborne laser
technologies in experiments and test bed formats taking the system out of weapon development. The United States has
invested around 5 billion tax dollars since the early 1990s on the ABL to make it a defensive weapon system. The ABL is
similar in some ways to the development of the Joint Stars 707 aircraft that was thrust into the Iraq war with a test bed
version and has become a tremendously useful military asset that is deployed in numbers today providing sophisticated
surveillance and tracking on the ground from the air." "The ABL is initially proven and should continue to be developed,
tested and even deployed if necessary. The successful test on February 12th gives weight to the release last week of the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review endorsement of Missile Defense development by the President and the Secretary of
Defense who have recognized the quantitative and qualitative threat to our nation, allies and deployed forces from ballistic
missiles. Furthermore, in lieu of Iran's recent and continued nuclear developments, the ability of our Military to use the
ABL with U.S. air superiority to engage and destroy multiple Iranian missiles in seconds over Iran could be a critical asset
if in the future a situation arose between Iran and the United States. This capability would have similar relevancy for the
United States in the Korean peninsula in regards to North Korean's ballistic missile threats and nuclear capability in the
region." "The ABL should be given priority, further developed and be funded to be kept a fully viable defensive weapon
system as a credible hedge against ballistic missile threats. The U.S. Congress will inevitably challenge the Department
of Defense and the administration to fully fund and further develop this system to have an ability to deploy this system in
crisis regions providing our armed forces and allies' necessary protection."
D. ABL Ensures a Directed Energy Weapon Arms Race
Paul Rogers, Professor of Government at Bradford University, ‘2 [Directed energy: a new kind of weapon,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict/article_153.jsp]
The United States development of directed-energy weapons – designed to advance protection of its forces, control of space,
and the capacity to strike foreign targets at will – appears to be a seductive and effective route to guaranteeing US security
in the 21st century. But, in the absence of any arms-control regime, the result could instead be a higher level of threat.
Some time in 2003, a unique new weapon will be tested by the United States air force in an attempt to destroy a Scud
missile. It is a high-energy laser known as the airborne laser (ABL), the first element of an innovative system that could end
up arming a series of powerful satellites able to target anywhere on the Earth’s surface with near impunity. The
impact of directed energy weapons over the next quarter of a century could be huge, and some analysts argue that they are
as potentially revolutionary as was the development of nuclear weapons sixty years ago. For now, directed energy
weapons are being seen as an answer to ballistic missile defence but, in the longer term, military planners are already
viewing them as serving many other functions. The United States has a pronounced lead over all other countries, but its
potential success may encourage others to follow suit, setting up a new kind of arms race; it may also lead to opponents
developing new ways of retaliating. In the light of the attacks of 11 September 2001, this is not to be discounted.
E. Extinction Ensures – Accidents and Pre-emption
Jeff Hech, M.Ed. Higher Education –MA in Electronic Engineering - Editor @ Laser Focus World, ’84 [Beam Weapons: The Next
Arms Race, p. 10-11]
It’s only appropriate that the obstacles to developing beam weapons are high because the stakes involved are very high.
The science-fictional scenario of orbiting antimissile battle stations would cause nothing short of a revolution in defense
strategy. For some two decades we have been living with an uneasy balance of nuclear terror called “mutual assured
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destruction” or “MAD.” That balance is based on the knowledge that there is no effective defense against nuclear attack. It
one side attacked, the other could launch a devastating counterattack – guaranteeing a nuclear holocaust. Under these
ground rules a nuclear war cannot be won. Opponents of beam weaponry warn that their most insidious danger is that they
might make a nuclear war appear “winnable.” That is, the side with a beam weapon system able to defense against
nuclear attack might decide it could launch its own attack with impunity. Critics also warn of other dangerous scenarios
in which beam weaponry could dangerously destabilize the balance of power even if the actual weapon system was
ineffective. For example, one side might attack a weapon system under construction in space to make sure it never became
operational, thereby triggering an ultimate escalation to World War III.
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Coming Insurrection
THE RETERRITORIALIZATION OF WAR THROUGH LEGITIMACY, ECONOMIC
MOBILIZATION AND RESOURCE EXPLOITATION CHANGES WAR FROM VISIBLE TO
INVISIBLE. RESISTANCE IS SIMPLE AGAINST U.S. SOLDIERS, BUT HOW CAN A COUNTRY
FIGHT THE BIOPOLITICAL REGIME FURTHERED THROUGH ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP,
PRIVATIZED WARRIORS, THAT DICTATES THOSE NOT CONDUCIVE TO THE SMOOTH
FUNCTIONING OF THE ECONOMY CAN BE EXTERMINATED.
Mbembe ’03 [Achille, senior researcher at the Institute of Social and Economic Research at the University of the Witwatersrand,
Public Culture 15.1 (2003) 11-40,]
Second, the controlled inflow and the fixing of movements of money around zones in which specific resources are
extracted has made possible the formation of enclave economies and has shifted the old calculus between people and
things. The concentration of activities connected with the extraction of valuable resources around these enclaves has,
in return, turned the enclaves into privileged spaces of war and death. War itself is fed by increased sales of the
products extracted. 68 New linkages have therefore emerged between war making, war machines, and resource
extraction. 69 War machines are implicated in the constitution of highly [End Page 33] transnational local or regional
economies. In most places, the collapse of formal political institutions under the strain of violence tends to lead to the
formation of militia economies. War machines (in this case militias or rebel movements) rapidly become highly
organized mechanisms of predation, taxing the territories and the population they occupy and drawing on a range of
transnational networks and diasporas that provide both material and financial support. Correlated to the new
geography of resource extraction is the emergence of an unprecedented form of governmentality that consists in the
management of the multitudes. The extraction and looting of natural resources by war machines goes hand in hand with
brutal attempts to immobilize and spatially fix whole categories of people or, paradoxically, to unleash them, to
force them to scatter over broad areas no longer contained by the boundaries of a territorial state. As a political
category, populations are then disaggregated into rebels, child soldiers, victims or refugees, or civilians
incapacitated by mutilation or simply massacred on the model of ancient sacrifices, while the "survivors," after a
horrific exodus, are confined in camps and zones of exception. 70 This form of governmentality is different from the
colonial commandement. 71 The techniques of policing and discipline and the choice between obedience and simulation
that characterized the colonial and postcolonial potentate are gradually being replaced by an alternative that is
more tragic because more extreme. Technologies of destruction have become more tactile, more anatomical and
sensorial, in a context in which the choice is between life and death. 72 If power still depends on tight control over
bodies (or on concentrating them in camps), the new technologies of destruction are less concerned with inscribing
bodies within disciplinary apparatuses as inscribing them, when the time comes, within the order of the maximal
economy now represented by the "massacre." In turn, the generalization of insecurity has deepened the societal distinction between those
who bear weapons and those who do not (loi de repartition des armes). Increasingly, [End Page 34] war is no longer waged between armies of two
sovereign states. It is waged by armed groups acting behind the mask of the state against armed groups that have no state but control very distinct
territories; both sides having as their main targets civilian populations that are unarmed or organized into militias. In cases where armed
dissidents have not completely taken over state power, they have provoked territorial partitions and succeeded in
controlling entire regions that they administer on the model of fiefdoms, especially where there are mineral deposits .
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THIS IS DEMONSTRATED IN IRAQ; OUR MILITARY PRESENCE IS JUST ONE FACET. WE
WILL NEVER DISENGAGE FROM THE REGION FOR ECONOMIC REASONS.
Cordesman 08/06/07 (Anthony H., holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS and also acts as a national security
analyst for ABC News “The Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq”, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080607_iraqstrategicpatience.pdf,. MX)
These are unpleasant realities for a nation that prefers all of its solutions to be simple and short. The reality is, however, that
even if the US does withdraw from Iraq, it cannot disengage from it. The US will have to be deeply involved in trying to
influence events in Iraq indefinitely into the future, regardless of whether it does so from the inside or the outside. It will
face major risks and military problems regardless of the approach it takes, and it will face continuing strategic, political,
and moral challenges. Iraq has at least 11% of the world’s oil reserves, and its ability to not only continue to export, but
also to increase its exports, is a major factor affecting the global economy. Iraq is a critical aspect of stability in a region
with more than 60% of the world's proven conventional oil reserves and some 40% if its gas reserves. It plays a major role
in the struggle for the future of the Islamic and Arab world, and against Islamist extremism and terrorism. Iraq is also a
major player in the stability of the Gulf region at the political and military level. It is a major potential counterbalance to
Iranian influence and opportunism, if Iraq succeeds in reemerging as a major regional state. It would be a sharply
destabilizing factor in the region if its Shi’ite population or the entire country came under Iranian influence or dominance,
and the resulting Iranian pressure on Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon would pose a serious additional threat to the Arab-Israeli
peace process. One way or another, the Arab Sunni states would also back Arab Sunnis in Iraq, and Iran would back the
Shi’ites. No one can predict how violent this would make things in Iraq, or how much it would increase tensions in the Gulf
and around it
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The aff’s focus on human rights and withdrawal makes us all more comfortable and complacent in our
continual participation in the socio-economic processes that guarantee the third world’s emiseration.
Zizek 06 Slavoj, Zizek, Prof. of Sociology at Univ. Ljubljana, 2006 “Nobody Has to be Vile,” London Review of Books, Vol. 28
No. 7]
Liberal communists are pragmatic; they hate a doctrinaire approach. There is no exploited working class today, only
concrete problems to be solved: starvation in Africa, the plight of Muslim women, religious fundamentalist violence. When there
is a humanitarian crisis in Africa (liberal communists love a humanitarian crisis; it brings out the best in them), instead of
engaging in anti-imperialist rhetoric, we should get together and work out the best way of solving the problem, engage
people, governments and business in a common enterprise, start moving things instead of relying on centralised state help,
approach the crisis in a creative and unconventional way. Liberal communists like to point out that the decision of some large international
corporations to ignore apartheid rules within their companies was as important as the direct political struggle against apartheid in South Africa. Abolishing
segregation within the company, paying blacks and whites the same salary for the same job etc: this was a perfect instance of the overlap between the struggle for political
freedom and business interests, since the same companies can now thrive in post-apartheid South Africa. Liberal communists love May 1968. What an explosion of youthful
energy and creativity! How it shattered the bureaucratic order! What an impetus it gave to economic and social life after the political illusions dropped away! Those who were
old enough were themselves protesting and fighting on the streets: now they have changed in order to change the world, to revolutionise our lives for real.
Didn’t Marx say that all political upheavals were unimportant compared to the invention of the steam engine? And would Marx not have said today: what
are all the protests against global capitalism in comparison with the internet? Above all, liberal communists are true citizens of the world –
good people who worry. They worry about populist fundamentalism and irresponsible greedy capitalist corporations. They see the ‘deeper causes’
of today’s problems: mass poverty and hopelessness breed fundamentalist terror. Their goal is not to earn money, but to change the world (and, as a by-product, make even more
money). Bill Gates is already the single greatest benefactor in the history of humanity, displaying his love for his neighbours by giving hundreds of millions of dollars for
education, the fight against hunger and malaria etc.
The catch is that before you can give all this away you have to take it (or, as the liberal
communists would put it, create it). In order to help people, the justification goes, you must have the means to do so, and
experience – that is, recognition of the dismal failure of all centralised statist and collectivist approaches – teaches us that private
enterprise is by far the most effective way. By regulating their business, taxing them excessively, the state is undermining the
official goal of its own activity (to make life better for the majority, to help those in need). Liberal communists do not want to be mere profitmachines: they want their lives to have deeper meaning. They are against old-fashioned religion and for spirituality, for non-confessional meditation
(everybody knows that Buddhism foreshadows brain science, that the power of meditation can be measured scientifically). Their motto is social responsibility and gratitude:
they are the first to admit that society has been incredibly good to them, allowing them to deploy their talents and amass wealth, so they feel that it is their duty to give
something back to society and help people. This beneficence is what makes business success worthwhile. This isn’t an entirely new phenomenon. Remember Andrew Carnegie,
who employed a private army to suppress organised labour in his steelworks and then distributed large parts of his wealth for educational, cultural and
humanitarian causes, proving that, although a man of steel, he had a heart of gold? In the same way, today’s liberal communists give away with one hand
what they grabbed with the other. There is a chocolate-flavoured laxative available on the shelves of US stores which is publicised
with the paradoxical injunction: Do you have constipation? Eat more of this chocolate! – i.e. eat more of something that itself
causes constipation. The structure of the chocolate laxative can be discerned throughout today’s ideological landscape; it is
what makes a figure like Soros so objectionable. He stands for ruthless financial exploitation combined with its counteragent, humanitarian worry about the catastrophic social consequences of the unbridled market economy. Soros’s daily
routine is a lie embodied: half of his working time is devoted to financial speculation, the other half to ‘humanitarian’
activities (financing cultural and democratic activities in post-Communist countries, writing essays and books) which work against
the effects of his own speculations. The two faces of Bill Gates are exactly like the two faces of Soros: on the one hand, a cruel businessman, destroying or
buying out competitors, aiming at a virtual monopoly; on the other, the great philanthropist who makes a point of saying: ‘What does it serve to have computers if people do not
have enough to eat?’
According to liberal communist ethics, the ruthless pursuit of profit is counteracted by charity: charity is
part of the game, a humanitarian mask hiding the underlying economic exploitation. Developed countries are constantly
‘helping’ undeveloped ones (with aid, credits etc), and so avoiding the key issue: their complicity in and responsibility for
the miserable situation of the Third World. As for the opposition between ‘smart’ and ‘non-smart’, outsourcing is the key notion. You export
the (necessary) dark side of production – disciplined, hierarchical labour, ecological pollution – to ‘non-smart’ Third World locations (or invisible ones in
the First World). The ultimate liberal communist dream is to export the entire working class to invisible Third World sweat shops
THE CHOICE IS REVOLUTION OR NUCLEAR ARMAGEDDON. VOTING NEGATIVE IS THE
ONLY WAY TO PUT AN END TO THE SOCIAL ANTAGONISM THAT DRIVES INTERSTATE
COMPETITION AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON THE POOR. 800 MILLION PEOPLE ARE
STARVING THE “3RD WORLD” RIGHT NOW AND 30 MILLION ARE ROTTING ON WELFARE
FUNDED WITH THE BLOOD MONEY OF LABOR EXPLOITATION AND PRIMITIVE
ACCUMULATION.
Callinicos, Director of the Centre for European Studies at King’s College, in ’04
[Alex, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx, 2004 pg. 196-197]
Capitalism has not changed its spots. It is still based on the exploitation of the working class, and liable to constant crises.
The conclusion that Marx drew from this analysis, that the working class must overthrow the system and replace it with a
classless society, is even more urgent now than in his day. For the military rivalries which are the form increasingly
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assumed by competition between capitals now threaten the very survival of the planet. As Marx’s centenary approached, the
fires of war flickered across the globe—in Lebanon, Iran and Iraq, Kampuchea, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa,
Afghanistan and the South Atlantic. The accumulation of vast armouries of nuclear destruction by the superpowers,
missilerattling in the Kremlin, talk of ‘limited’ and ‘protracted’ nuclear war in Washington—these cast a shadow over the
whole of humanity. Socialist revolution is an imperative if we are to change a world in the grip of economic depression and
war fever, a world where 30 million rot on Western dole queues and 800 million go hungry in the Third World. To that
extent, Marx’s ideas are more relevant today than they were 100 years ago. Capitalism has tightened its grip of iron on
every portion of the planet since 1883, and is rotten-ripe for destruction, whether at its own hands through nuclear war, or
at the hands of the working class. The choice is between workers’ power or the ‘common ruination of the contending
classes’—between socialism or barbarism . Many people who genuinely wish to do something to remedy the present state of the
world believe that this stress on the working class is much too narrow. The existence of nuclear weapons threatens everyone,
whether workers or capitalists or whatever. Should not all classes be involved in remedying a problem which affects them
all? What this ignores is that what Edward Thompson has called ‘exterminism’— the vast and competing military
apparatuses which control the arms race—is an essential part of the working of capitalism today. No sane capitalist
desires a nuclear war (although some insane ones who believe that such a war would be the prelude to the Second
Coming now hold positions of influence in Washington). But sane or insane, every capitalist is part of an economic system
which is bound up with military competition between nation-states. Only a class with the interest and power to do away
with capitalism can halt the march to Armageddon. Marx always conceived of the working class as the class whose own
selfemancipation would also be the liberation of the rest of humanity. The socialist revolution to whose cause he devoted his
life can only be, at one and the same time, the emancipation of the working class and the liberation of all the oppressed and
exploited sections of society. Those who accept the truth of Marx’s views cannot rest content with a mere intellectual commitment.
There are all too many of this sort around, Marxists content to live off the intellectual credit of Capital, as Trotsky described them. We
cannot simply observe the world but must throw ourselves, as Marx did, into the practical task of building a revolutionary
party amid the life and struggles of the working class . ‘The philosophers have interpreted the world,’ wrote Marx, ‘the point,
however, is to change it.’ If Marxism is correct, then we must act on it.
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THUS THE ALTERNATIVE IS TO SAY NO TO CAPITALISM. IT RELIES ON THE INDIVIDUAL
TO REPRODUCE THE COMPETITIVE FRAMEWORK IT EXPORTS TO OTHER COUNTRIES. BY
RENOUNCING CAPITALISM IN THE NAME OF THE WAR IN IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN AND
OTHER IMPERIAL EXPLOITS, WE CAN HOLLOW OUT THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT
IT RELIES UPON.
Holloway, has a Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Edinburgh, a professor in the Instituto de Ciencias Sociales y
Humanidades, member of the Conference of Socialist Economists, 05 (John Holloway, 8/16/05, “Can We Change The World Without
Taking Power?”, http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/5616 Cassettari)
But it is unlikely that world revolution can be achieved in one single blow. This means that the only way in which we can
conceive of revolution is as interstitial revolution, as a revolution that takes place in the interstices of capitalism, a
revolution that occupies spaces in the world while capitalism still exists. The question is how we conceive of these
interstices, whether we think of them as states or in other ways. In thinking about this, we have to start from where we are,
from the many rebellions and insubordinations that have brought us to Porto Alegre. The world is full of such rebellions, of
people saying NO to capitalism: NO, we shall not live our lives according to the dictates of capitalism, we shall do what we
consider necessary or desirable and not what capital tells us to do. Sometimes we just see capitalism as an all-encompassing
system of domination and forget that such rebellions exist everywhere. At times they are so small that even those involved
do not perceive them as refusals, but often they are collective projects searching for an alternative way forward and
sometimes they are as big as the Lacandon Jungle or the Argentinazo of three years ago or the revolt in Bolivia just over a
year ago. All of these insubordinations are characterised by a drive towards self-determination, an impulse that says,
‘ No, you will not tell us what to do, we shall decide for ourselves what we must do.' These refusals can be seen as
fissures, as cracks in the system of capitalist domination. Capitalism is not (in the first place) an economic system, but a
system of command. Capitalists, through money, command us, telling us what to do. To refuse to obey is to break the
command of capital. The question for us, then, i how do we multiply and expand these refusals, these cracks in the texture
of domination?
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Case
1. We must evaluate all real threat scenarios like our DA – we cannot wish away other actors perceptions
and threatening postures
Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing
Securitization,” p. 360]
During the Cold War, peace research was struggling to gain the status of so- cial and intellectual respectability then only
accorded strategic studies. The concept of securitization has helped to change that. A key aspect of the securitization idea is
to create awareness of the (allegedly) arbitrary nature of ‘threats’, to stimulate the thought that the foundation of any
national security policy is not given by ‘nature’ but chosen by politicians and decisionmakers who have an interest in
defining it in just that way. That interest (according to this line of reasoning) is heavily embodied not just in each country’s
military establishment, but also in the power and influence flowing from the military’s privileged position with respect to
the network of decisionmakers and politi- cians serving that establishment. Hence, ‘securitization’ gave a name to the
process, hitherto vaguely perceived, of raising security issues above politics and making them something one would never
question. This argument is convincing as far as its description of the military estab- lishment and decisionmakers goes, but
its heyday is gone. It was a Cold War phenomenon, and things just aren’t so anymore. In the post-Cold War period, agendasetting has been much easier to influence than the securitization approach assumes. That change cannot be credited to the
concept; the change in security politics was already taking place in defense ministries and parlia- ments before the concept
was first launched. Indeed, securitization in my view is more appropriate to the security politics of the Cold War years than
to the post-Cold War period. Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unim- portant whether
states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from
the actors’ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view,
this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for whatever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts,
or mirages, but such phenom-ena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time.
During the Cold War, threats – in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger – referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they
refer to ‘real’ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to
be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point
of Wæver’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political
elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ‘One can view “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech
act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real – it is the utterance itself that is the act.’ The deliberate
disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Wæver’s joint article of the same year. As a
consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics. It seems to me that the security
dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its founda- tion. Yet I see that Wæver himself has no
compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article. This discounting of the objective aspect of threats
shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made ‘threats’ and ‘threat perceptions’ important
phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Wæver
first began his argu- ment in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the
chief culprit behind the abuse of ‘security’ and the consequent ‘politics of panic’, as Wæver aptly calls it. Now, here – in
the case of urgency – another baby is thrown out with the Wæverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those
situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making
security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Wæver’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the
claim of urgency is just an- other argument. I hold that instead of ‘abolishing’ threatening phenomena ‘out there’ by
reconceptualizing them, as Wæver does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible
claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of
groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.
2. No spillover – the Everest evidence doesn’t indicate that stopping one instance stops colonialism and No solvency - The Brydon
evidence indicates every instance of colonialism must be rejected for true political change, the plan only ensures one rejection and no
impact - You can’t claim colonialism impacts based off of removing one instance – colonialism will still exist in other instances,
means the impacts are inevitable
3. Withdrawal doesn’t change mindsets or larger US policy – alternative causalities like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait prove no there is no
change – Their authors would indicate that the withdrawal isn’t a change
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4. US withdrawal will cause an increase in use of PMC’s by the state department to fill in for lost troops
Jeremy Scahill, February 27, 2008, a Puffin Foundation Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute, is the author of the bestselling
Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army, published by Nation Books. He is an award-winning
investigative journalist and correspondent for the national radio, http://www.thenation.com/article/obamas-mercenary-position
What is unfolding is the face of President Obama's scaled-down, rebranded mini-occupation of Iraq. Under the terms of the
Status of Forces agreement, all US forces are supposed to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. Using private forces is a
backdoor way of continuing a substantial US presence under the cover of "diplomatic security." The kind of paramilitary
force that Obama and Clinton are trying to build in Iraq is, in large part, a byproduct of the monstrous colonial fortress the
United States calls its embassy in Baghdad and other facilities the US will maintain throughout Iraq after the "withdrawal."
The State Department plans to operate five "Enduring Presence Posts" at current US military bases in Basrah, Diyala, Erbil,
Kirkuk and Ninewa. The State Department has indicated that more sites may be created in the future, which would increase
the demand for private forces. The US embassy in Baghdad is the size of Vatican City, comprised of twenty-one buildings
on a 104-acres of land on the Tigris River.
5. Our Turn SWAMPS The Case – Shifting From US Troops to PMC’s Ensure global neo-imperial war,
internal conflict, and mass genocide
Xavier Renou, Prof. @ Université Patheon-Assas, ‘5 [Oxford Development Studies 33.1, “Private Military Compaies Against
Development,” 108-110]
Globalization is a process of deepening of world markets through the internationaliza- tion, interdependence and
concentration of international capital. It derives both from a natural trend in capitalism and from a set of political and
economic choices aimed at solving the world crisis of investment profitability in the early 1970s (Dume ́ nil & Le ́ vy,
2003). Such choices include the “extension of spaces where capital can organise its property rights” and the dismantling of
welfare states throughout the world (Serfati, 2003). They set the frame for the domination of financial capital, which
imposes upon industries the requirement of high levels of profitability in the short term. In the area of international affairs,
globalization results in the emergence of a more violent world and the gradual privatization of warfare. This increase in
violence can be related to the collapse of weak states, which lost their status of protected proxies after the end of the cold
war. On the contrary, they found themselves the main target of a renewal of the traditional competition for the world
resources: the need to restore profitability makes competition for scarce and cheap resources tougher. There are old
resources that were redistributed after soviet domination ceased and new resources (biotechnology, coltan, etc.) for which
demand is on the increase. Competition for resources revolves around neo- imperialist competition between Europe
(notably France) and the USA, which, in some respects, is comparable with the former cold war.1 Together with the
demand by financial capital for high returns on investments in the short run, these phenomena have produced a new form
of imperialism,2 clearly dominated by the USA.3 A result of this renewed scramble for natural resources is the eruption of
more violence. This has taken the form of an increase in the number of low-intensity wars and also inter- state ones, and
a high degree of violence within and between societies, including the recurrent use of extermination strategies, or
genocide and mass rape. Moreover, more violence may also be necessary to impose neo-liberal policies on to weak
states and hostile populations;4 and warfare, a traditional way of increasing economic and political benefits, has fallen
under the principles of financial management: it has to become cheaper and more profitable, to generate high profits.
Hence the growing privatization of warfare. The same process is taking place in the warfare sector. Over the past 10
years, mercenarism has turned into a 100-billion-dollar industry with approximately 100 PMCs playing an essential role in
the provision of security, strategy, training and even direct military action in more than 100 different countries.5 The
downsizing of national armies such as those of the USA, UK or Russia, due to the end of the cold war and the neo-liberal
commandment to reduce public spending, provided the cheap and/or qualified labour required for the industry to grow.
Analysis What are the benefits of the partial privatization of violence and warfare for financial capital and the
governments who tolerate, authorize, use or promote it? One of the New Areas Identified to Restore the Profitability of
Investments The state’s monopoly of coercion was dedicated to the creation and defence of a market- friendly
environment protecting goods, investments and people. It has now turned into a market itself. According to Singer (2003),
from 1994 to 2002 the US Defence Department entered into over 3000 contracts with US-based military firms, estimated at
a value of more than US$300 billion; and the war in Iraq, with a massive appeal to PMCs, must have increased these
figures tremendously. Each time, the return on investment is huge. The investor’s initial cost is limited to that of the
provision of casual labour, an address, a list of names immediately available and already trained, and some advertising.
Profits are potentially enormous: a PMC is in a position to demand a huge payment to endangered states which have no
choice but to pay, occasionally in mining concessions or shares in local businesses that amount to life annuities. In the
process, the PMCs extend and diversify their activities, getting involved in arms sales (Sandline), privatizations, financial
investments, mining or the selling of raw materials (Executive Outcomes (EO) in Sierra Leone and Angola), oil extraction
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(Israeli PMC Lev’dan in the Republic of Congo), or the provision of services from medical assistance to transport,
telecommunications (Geolink), assistance to rebuild industrial and agricultural sectors (EO) or to develop tourism
(Denard’s SOGECOM), etc. PMCs are likely to give priority to countries and factions who can guarantee that economic
gains will be maximized. To Increase the Profitability of Wars As war and violence become not only more likely but also
more necessary, they have to be made less expensive and, as far as possible, more profitable, by the following measures.
In the post-cold war area, the cost of war can be externalized if a client state is footing the bill for the foreign intervention
necessary to rescue it, as in the case of Kuwait during the first Gulf War. It is also possible to rent its military capacity, as
in the case of states willing to provide the UN with troops in exchange for quick money or bribes. War can be waged in a
way compatible with post-war economic goals: in the recent war against Yugoslavia, NATO’s aircraft seemed to target
sites liable to be rebuilt by US industries after the war. Such a scenario seems to have materialized when the private
rebuilding of Afghanistan and Iraq, both also invaded by US troops, appeared to have been distributed— at a price—to US
TNCs a long time
before the beginning of the military campaigns themselves, making the latter much less expensive. The privatization of
war-making is one of many ways to enrich decision-makers with stakes in the companies,6 willing to be hired by the same
companies after a term in office7, or ready to take bribes:8 costs are socialized, while profits remain private. At the same
time, TNCs, which possess the abundant money and influence generally needed for successful political careers, play a
determining role in the selection of candidates for the highest levels.9 Obviously, it is much less expensive to hire a
private company temporarily than to mobilize and train a standing army that may never operate in its entire capacity and
that needs to be maintained in between two conflicts. The efficiency of the South African PMC EO in Angola, at a
minimal cost of US$60 million, must be compared with the years of unsuccessful battles led by a larger and much more
expensive Angolan army. In the process, war is made more likely and more affordable to smaller states. A Convenient
Tool to Pursue (Neo-)imperialist Objectives In the second half of the 20th Century, mercenaries have been repeatedly used
as auxiliaries to neo-imperialist objectives. They were employed in order to take back the newly won independence in the
case of Comoros, to maintain control over strategic regions (Katanga, Biaffra) and to destabilize countries regarded as
belonging to the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union (Benin, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Cuba . . .), etc. Today, they
serve neo-imperialist objectives, with an extra dimension that is decisive in the case of neo-imperialism: short-term
profitability. PMCs allow governments to provide military assistance or run military operations with no official
acknowledgement; no possibility for parliamentary or judicial control or oversight; and no political cost if the action is
illegitimate or turns nasty. In case of scandal, none of the parties have to disclose information regarding contracted
operations as it relates to “proprietary information”. Thus, “plausible deniability” and commercial secrecy make military
intervention and influence, and support to client states in low- intensity conflicts, easier, faster and less risky politically
speaking, something very important at times when statesmen and their armies can be prosecuted before the international
criminal court in cases of human right violations. Corporate mercenaries enable legitimate governments to behave in
illegitimate ways, to break international laws, violate human rights or resort to unconventional ways of waging wars.
Examples of such ways include illegal US involvement in the Great Lakes war in 1995 through the PMC Ronco, the
breaking of UN arms embargoes in Sierra Leone (1995) and Kosovo (1994 – 95 and 1999 – 2001) through PMCs Sandline
and MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporated), the waging of coups in the Republic of Congo (1997) by the
French PMC “Groupe Onze” and others, the weakening or destabilization of countries like Croatia and Bosnia (1991 – 92)
with MPRI, the use of torture and ethnic cleansing as strategies of war (in 1996 Zaire, in 1991 Croatia), etc.
6. Only utilitarianism takes into account the inevitability of sacrifices and compromise – any other
framework is utopian and inevitably fails.
Nye, prof. of IR at Harvard University, 1986 (Joseph, “Nuclear Ethics”, p. 24)
Whether one accepts the broad consequentialist approach or chooses some other, more eclectic way to include and
reconcile the three dimensions of complex moral issues, there will often be a sense of uneasiness about the answers, not just
because of the complexity of the problems “but simply that there is no satisfactory solution to these issues – at least none
that appears to avoid in practice what most men would still regard as an intolerable sacrifice of value.” When value is
sacrificed, there is often the problem of “dirty hands.” Not all ethical decisions are pure ones. The absolutist may avoid the
problem of dirty hands, but often at the cost of having no hands at all. Moral theory cannot be “rounded off and made
complete and tidy.” That is part of the modern human condition. But that does not exempt us from making difficult moral
choices.
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7. Turn: The plan is a narcissistic criticism which prevents real productivity. The obsession with
representations to end foreign interference legitimizes imperialism
Morten Valbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus, ‘4 [Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and
Regional Conflict, “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. 65-6]
The reason why the problems concerning Blindness to the Self is also relevant in this connection is not due to any lack of
awareness of the representer's place in representations of Otherness. Rather, the problem is to be found in the manner in
which this issue is addressed. The thorough self-consciousness associated with the relational conception of culture is thus
brought about by means of a radical constructivism, which, at least in its most outspoken versions, seems to replace a
possibly naïve subject/object separation by an almost solipsistic subjectivism equivalent to Wight's "subject = fi" formula in
the above. This radical constructivism is quite evident among IR's "dissident thoughts" and can also be recognized in
statements by Said such as: "Orientalism responded more to the culture that produced it than to its putative object, which
was also produced by the West" (1995: 22). However, first does it make sense to perceive representation as part of either a
construction of identities or of some kind of subtle performance of power, and, second, is it really possible to represent the
Other at one's own discretion? With regard to the first question, the almost unambiguously negative and rather monolithic
depiction of "Western" representations of the Middle East that can to be found among proponents of the relational
conception of culture seems to some extent to be based on a rather problematic stereotyping, far from the more balanced
accounts by, for instance, Rodinson (1974, 1987). By presenting the orientalist scholarship in a very stereotyped and
caricatured way, Said, for instance, almost ends up doing to the orientalists what he accuses orientalist scholarship of
having done to Middle Eastern societies (Brimnes, 2000). Furthermore, it is anything but obvious that representations
produced as part of the performance of power must necessarily be regarded as unreliable and without value as such.
Halliday, among others, criticized this understanding and argued that the relationship between the origin and the validity of
a discovery is more ambiguous than one might think: "the very fact of trying to subjugate a country would to some degree
involve producing an accurate picture of it" (1995: 213). Regarding the second question, advocates of the relational
conception of culture easily leave the impression that the way the Other is represented almost exclusively depends on the
representer while the represented appears more or less as an empty and passive object onto which all kinds of conceivable
fantasies and ideas can be projected. However, Bhabha, for instance, suggested that instead of regarding the representation
of Otherness as a "hegemonic monologue" where the Other is a passive object on which all thinkable fantasies and
conceptions can be projected-such as it sometimes seems to he the case in the works of, for example, Said and Campbellwe might rather think of it as a hybrid dialogue, though seldom equal nor without power plays (Bhabha, 1997; Keyman,
1997; Brimnes, 2000). Furthermore, the representation of Otherness has often had far more ambiguous effects than what
this approach's advocates usually would acknowledge. Sadiq al-Azm, for example, coined therefore the notion of
"Orientalism in reverse." Here, the classic essentialist and problematic Orient/Occident discourse allegedly used to
legitimize imperialism is reversed and applied to the struggle for an end of foreign interference. In the Middle Eastern
context, this is visible in Arab Nationalism, as well as among radical Islamist movements, in which the criticism of foreign
(in)direct influence is often based on the argument of an allegedly unique Islamic or Arab culture (Azm, 2000).
When advocates of the relational conception of culture seek to counter the prevailing lack of selfconsciousness within the
universalist IR mainstream, as well as among proponents of the essentialist conception, it thus seems that they
unintentionally have turned into what most of all appears as a narcissist self-centeredness. Apparently they lack enough
concern for how the representation of Otherness is not only about the representer's projections, desires, fantasies, and so on.
This kind of (over)reaction also seems to influence their ability to relate to Otherness in a more substantial way.
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8. Withdrawal causes the US to redeploy forces in the Middle East to protect its oil interests.
Monthly Review, Marxist Journal, Jan 05 (The Failure of Empire, https://www.monthlyreview.org/0105editors.htm)ZDM
In order to meet this demand for additional production, the EIA estimated that a further $1.5 trillion would have
to be invested in the Middle East between 2003 and 2030. The long-term potential for investment in the expansion of
production in Iraq is greater than elsewhere since many oil analysts and institutes (for instance the Baker Institute, Center for
Global Energy Studies, the Federation of American Scientists) believe that, in addition to its proven reserves of
115 billion barrels of oil, Iraq may have, in the 90 percent of its territory that remains unexplored, 100 billion
barrels or more of additional oil reserves. (Estimates coming from some agencies, like the U.S. Geological
Survey, are less optimistic, witmedian estimates of additional Iraqi reserves at 45 billion barrels.) According to
Cordesman it is the enormous level of investment necessary for the expansion of Middle East oil production,
which must occur in order to ensure adequate supplies for future consumption, that is the most pressing “practical
problem” presented by the Persian Gulf from the standpoint of the global economy. Not only must such investments be made but they
must then be protected. In this regard it would not be easy for the United States to pull out completely from Iraq or to refrain from
stepping up its involvement elsewhere in the Middle East if compelled to leave that country.
9) Withdrawal from Iraq is reciprocal to increasing troops in Afghanistan
Farmer 5-25, Writer for the UK Telegraph (Ben, 2010 “US troops in Afghanistan surpass number in Iraq”
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7762893/US-troops-in-Afghanistan-surpass-number-in-Iraq.html |JC
Troops are continuing to flood into Afghanistan as part of Barack Obama's surge, while the United States is rapidly
withdrawing from Iraq. The most recent Pentagon figures show 94,000 US personnel are now in Afghanistan compared
with 92,000 in Iraq. Mr Obama was elected on a pledge to pull US troops from their unpopular involvement in Iraq as soon
as possible and instead focus on the "necessary war" to prop up Hamid Karzai's regime. He said at the weekend: "As we
end the war in Iraq ... we are pressing forward in Afghanistan." "There will be difficult days ahead. We will adapt, we will
persist, and I have no doubt that together with our Afghan and international partners, we will succeed in Afghanistan." US
numbers in Afghanistan are scheduled to peak later this year at about 98,000 as the final detachments of 30,000
reinforcements ordered by Mr Obama in December arrive. Britain currently has 9,500 troops in the international coalition.
Mr Obama has given his senior commander, Gen Stanley McChrystal, until July 2011 to turn the tide of the insurgency and
bolster the Afghan forces. He has vowed to begin withdrawing US troops next summer. This summer is expected to see
continued heavy fighting in southern Afghanistan, particularly around Kandahar, as Gen McChrystal pushes into Taliban
strongholds. A total of 4,400 US troops have died in Iraq since the 2003 invasion compared with just over a thousand in
Afghanistan since 2001. All US combat forces are scheduled to leave Iraq by September and the Iraq government has
agreed the US military should leave completely by 2012.
10) And, we have an external net benefit – redeployment to Afghanistan is uniquely worse
Neil Cooper Peace Studies @ Bradford ‘5 “Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representations of Conflict Economies
and the Implications for Policy” Security Dialogue 36 (4) p. 471Afghanistan, may become the object of heightened discourses of threat, producing highly militarized intervention
strategies that prioritize order and security issues while failing to address other factors such as the nature of shadow
economies and their relationship to occupation and regulation. Indeed, at their extreme, as in Iraq, rather than
witnessing the modification of discredited neoliberal models, such objects of intervention may experience even more
virulent versions (Klein, 2005). Others, such as Sudan, may find themselves subject to a post-9/11 variant of the new barbarism thesis, in which the anarchy and
extremes of violence they are deemed to exhibit are simultaneously presented not only as a rationale for intervention but also as a reason for severely delimiting
intervention in the absence of acute imperatives for action provided by the logic of the war on terror. In between, there may be a broad swathe of states, from Sierra
Leone to Angola to Liberia, where specific intervention policies may be less strongly influenced by the logic of war on terror and the more general securitization of
underdevelopment, but where broader policies that influence such interventions are mediated via the dictates of both solidarism and the security and economic
interests of the developed world. Thus, it is perhaps more appropriate to refer not to the imposition of the liberal peace on post-conflict societies but to the imposition of
a variety of liberal peaces (Richmond, 2005), albeit ones still imposed within the broad constraints of neoliberalism and within the context of profoundly unequal global
trading structures that contribute to underdevelopment.
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11) Declaring victory turn
a) Withdrawal now allows the US to declare victory – maintaining troops causes a withdrawal under less
favorable conditions.
Colonel Timothy R. Reese, Chief, Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, 7-31-09, new York times,
http://washingtonindependent.com/53224/col-timothy-reese-its-time-for-the-us-to-declare-victory-and-go-home)ZDM
As the old saying goes, “guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days.” Since the signing of the 2009 Security
Agreement, we are guests in Iraq, and after six years in Iraq, we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose. Today the Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) are good enough to keep the Government of Iraq (GOI) from being overthrown by the actions of Al Qaeda in
Iraq (AQI), the Baathists, and the Shia violent extremists that might have toppled it a year or two ago. Iraq may well
collapse into chaos of other causes, but we have made the ISF strong enough for the internal security mission. Perhaps it is
one of those infamous paradoxes of counterinsurgency that while the ISF is not good in any objective sense, it is good
enough for Iraq in 2009. Despite this foreboding disclaimer about an unstable future for Iraq, the United States has achieved
our objectives in Iraq. Prime Minister (PM) Maliki hailed June 30th as a “great victory,” implying the victory was over the
US. Leaving aside his childish chest pounding, he was more right than he knew. We too ought to declare victory and bring
our combat forces home. Due to our tendency to look after the tactical details and miss the proverbial forest for the trees,
this critically important strategic realization is in danger of being missed. Equally important to realize is that we aren’t
making the GOI and the ISF better in any significant ways with our current approach. Remaining in Iraq through the end of
December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore,
in light of the GOI’s current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security
Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk. Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests
well. This is not to say we can be defeated, only that the danger of a violent incident that will rupture the current partnership
has greatly increased since 30 June. Such a rupture would force an unplanned early departure that would harm our long
term interests in Iraq and potentially unraveling the great good that has been done since 2003. The use of the military
instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected. In the next section I will present
and admittedly one sided view of the evidence in support of this view. This information is drawn solely from the MND-B
area of operations in Baghdad Province. My reading of reports from the other provinces suggests the same situation exists
there. The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that
we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment: 1.
The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend. 2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a
campaign tool for Maliki 3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve
their oil exploration, production and exports. 4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation. 5. Sunni
Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards. 6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and
GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind. 7. The Kurdish situation
continues to fester. 8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal
institutions. 9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal
affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business. The rate of improvement of the ISF is far slower than it should be given the
amount of effort and resources being provided by the US. The US has made tremendous progress in building the ISF. Our
initial efforts in 2003 to mid-2004 were only marginally successful. From 2004 to 2006 the US built the ISF into a fighting
force. Since the start of the surge in 2007 we have again expanded and improved the ISF. They are now at the point where
they have defeated the organized insurgency against the GOI and are marginally self-sustaining. This is a remarkable tale
for which many can be justifiably proud. We have reached the point of diminishing returns, however, and need to find a
new set of tools. The massive partnering efforts of US combat forces with ISF isn’t yielding benefits commensurate with
the effort and is now generating its own opposition. Again, some touch points for this assessment are: 1. If there ever was a
window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces
will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it. 2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model
under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in
the current environment. a) Corruption among officers is widespread b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the
norm c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the
assignment and promotion system e) Laziness is endemic f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the normg) Lack of initiative is
legion h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and
National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining j) For every positive
story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action
review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding
despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams. 3. For all the
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fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for
their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples: a) They
are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions b) They are unable to stand up to Shiite
political parties c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are
afraid of the ignorant masses as a result d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic
military standards e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage
the force development process g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone
does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed
it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on
military operations is evident: 1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the
most basic aspects of the SA 2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA 3. International
Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points
(ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July 4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to
meetings, 5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city
of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq. 6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations
with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc. 7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad
has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US. Yet despite
all their grievous shortcomings noted above, ISF military capability is sufficient to handle the current level of threats from
Sunni and Shiite violent groups. Our combat forces’ presence here on the streets and in the rural areas adds only marginally
to their capability while exposing us to attacks to which we cannot effectively respond. The GOI and the ISF will not be
toppled by the violence as they might have been between 2006 and 2008. Though two weeks does not make a trend, the
near cessation of attacks since 30 June speaks volumes about how easily Shiite violence can be controlled and speaks to the
utter weakness of AQI. The extent of AQ influence in Iraq is so limited as to be insignificant, only when they get lucky
with a mass casualty attack are they relevant. Shiite groups are working with the PM and his political allies, or plotting to
work against him in the upcoming elections. We are merely convenient targets for delivering a message against Maliki by
certain groups, and perhaps by Maliki when he wants us to be targeted. Extremist violence from all groups is directed
towards affecting their political standing within the existing power structures of Iraq. There is no longer any coherent
insurgency or serious threat to the stability of the GOI posed by violent groups. Our combat operations are currently the
victim of circular logic. We conduct operations to kill or capture violent extremists of all types to protect the Iraqi people
and support the GOI. The violent extremists attack us because we are still here conducting military operations.
Furthermore, their attacks on us are no longer an organized campaign to defeat our will to stay; the attacks which kill and
maim US combat troops are signals or messages sent by various groups as part of the political struggle for power in Iraq.
The exception to this is AQI which continues is globalist terror campaign. Our operations are in support of an Iraqi
government that no longer relishes our help while at the same time our operations generate the extremist opposition to us as
various groups jockey for power in post-occupation Iraq. The GOI and ISF will continue to squeeze the US for all the
“goodies” that we can provide between now and December 2011, while eliminating our role in providing security and
resisting our efforts to change the institutional problems prevent the ISF from getting better. They will tolerate us as long as
they can suckle at Uncle Sam’s bounteous mammary glands. Meanwhile the level of resistance to US freedom of
movement and operations will grow. The potential for Iraqi on US violence is high now and will grow by the day.
Resentment on both sides will build and reinforce itself until a violent incident break outs into the open. If that were to
happen the violence will remain tactically isolated, but it will wreck our strategic relationships and force our withdrawal
under very unfavorable circumstances. For a long time the preferred US approach has been to “work it at the lowest level of
partnership” as a means to stay out of the political fray and with the hope that good work at the tactical level will
compensate for and slowly improve the strategic picture. From platoon to brigade, US Soldiers and Marines continue to
work incredibly hard and in almost all cases they achieve positive results. This approach has achieved impressive results in
the past, but today it is failing. The strategic dysfunctions of the GOI and ISF have now reached down to the tactical level
degrading good work there and sundering hitherto strong partnerships. As one astute political observer has stated “We have
lost all strategic influence with the GoI and trying to influence events and people from the tactical/operational level is
courting disaster, wasting lives, and merely postponing the inevitable.”
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b) Perceptions of victory allow the expansion of colonialism
Monthly Review, Marxist Journal, Jan 05 (The Failure of Empire, https://www.monthlyreview.org/0105editors.htm)ZDM
The United States, Cordesman advises, should narrow its objectives to the creation of a stable government backed up by an adequate
Iraqi military force—even if the new political regime is only moderately better than that of Sadaam Hussein and even if openly
antagonistic to the United States. If Washington can “succeed” even to this extent, he says, it can declare “victory” and get out within
two years with a minimum amount of damage to its credibility as an imperial power. However, in case it should fail to create a stable
political solution or to c eate an adequate Iraqi army within that period—as now appears most likely—the United States needs to start
making plans immediately for what it will do in the case of a clear defeat. “Even ‘victory’ in Iraq,” we are told, “will be highly
relative, and defeat,” which can occur in any number of ways as Iraq spins out of control, “will force the US to reinforce its position in
the entire region.” Even more important than the formation of a stable regime, from Cordesman’s standpoint, is the replacement of
U.S. with Iraqi forces. “‘Iraqiazation,’” he writes, “either has to be made to work, or Iraq will become a mirror image of the failure of
‘Vietnamization’ in Vietnam: Coalition military victories will become increasingly irrelevant.” After a detailed assessment of Iraqi
forces and training he concludes: “the Iraq military and security forces are now far too weak to take over the security mission and will
almost certainly remain so well into 2005....The US can only ‘play the course’ effectively if it works out goals and plans with the Iraqi
Interim Government that go far beyond the 28,000 man [Iraqi] armed forces—and the roughly 40–55,000 man total of military,
paramilitary, and National Guard—the US currently says are ‘required.’” The truth is that the presence of 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq,
which has stretched available U.S. forces to the limit, has not been enough, even when supplemented by troops from Britain, to bring
the country to heel. “The US has already learned that it can win virtually any direct military battle or clash, but it cannot secure the
country....As in Vietnam, if the interim Iraqi government cannot win the political battle, U.S. victories in the military battles become
irrelevant.” Given the political turmoil in Iraq and the difficulty of creating any political solution, or even avoiding the outbreak of
civil war, Cordesman believes that the United States needs to concentrate on how to shore up its position in the remainder of the
Middle East in the event of a defeat: Fighting a counterinsurgency campaign is one thing; the US must not stay if Iraq devolves into
civil war....No one can guarantee success in Iraq; or that Iraq will not descend into civil war, come under a strongman, or split along
ethnic or confessional lines....[I]t is one thing to play the game and quite another to try to deal with defeat by reinforcing failure or
“doubling the bet.” If it is clear by 2006 that the US cannot win with its current level of effort, and/or the situation serious[ly]
deteriorates to the point where it is clear there is no new Iraq government and security force to aid, the game is over. There no longer
is time to fold; it is time to run. If forced “to run,” he says, the United States will have to offer reassurances to the rulers of the
“friendly Gulf states and other Arab allies.” It will have to prevent any expansion of Islamic jihad in Afghanistan resulting from
Islamic declarations of “victory” in Iraq. At the same time the United States will have to keep Iran from intervening in Iraq. More
pressure than ever will be placed on the United States to solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Finally, the threat to U.S. strategic
position with respect to Middle Eastern oil will have to be planned for, requiring that the United States not withdraw from the Middle
East but if anything step up its involvement. No doubt is left in Playing the Course that the major issue for the United States in Iraq as
in the Middle East as a whole is oil. Continual attacks on the oil pipelines by the Iraqi resistance have limited the flow of oil from Iraq,
undermining one of the principal U.S. objectives, and highlighting the overall U.S. failure. In the event of a clear defeat and a U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq, the oil situation will become even more critical. “The US,” Cordesman writes “can and must find substitutes for
petroleum, but this will take decades. In the interim, the US and the global economy will actually become steadily more dependent on
energy imports, and particularly on energy imports from the Gulf.” By the end of 2025 the industrialized countries alone, according to
estimates by the U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) in its International Energy Outlook, 2004, are expected to increase their
petroleum imports from OPEC by an additional 11.5 million barrels a day beyond the 16.1 million barrels a day in 2001, with the
Persian Gulf supplying more than half of the increase. North American imports from the Persian Gulf are expected to double over the
period. Meanwhile, demand for oil from China and other developing countries is expected to increase dramatically. The strategic
importance of oil for the world economy will accelerate accordingly. In order to meet this demand for additional production, the EIA
estimated that a further $1.5 trillion would have to be invested in the Middle East between 2003 and 2030. The long-term potential for
investment in the expansion of production in Iraq is greater than elsewhere since many oil analysts and institutes (for instance the
Baker Institute, Center for Global Energy Studies, the Federation of American Scientists) believe that, in addition to its proven
reserves of 115 billion barrels of oil, Iraq may have, in the 90 percent of its territory that remains unexplored, 100 billion barrels or
more of additional oil reserves. (Estimates coming from some agencies, like the U.S. Geological Survey, are less optimistic, with
median estimates of additional Iraqi reserves at 45 billion barrels.) According to Cordesman it is the enormous level of investment
necessary for the expansion of Middle East oil production, which must occur in order to ensure adequate supplies for future
consumption, that is the most pressing “practical problem” presented by the Persian Gulf from the standpoint of the global economy.
Not only must such investments be made but they must then be protected. In this regard it would not be easy for the United States to
pull out completely from Iraq or to refrain from stepping up its involvement elsewhere in the Middle East if compelled to leave that
country. Relative to most analyses emanating from national security circles in the United States, Cordesman’s Playing the Course has
the advantage, we think, of being strong on realism. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the powers that be in the United States
can be expected to follow his prescription, beginning by renouncing all imperial objectives in Iraq. We think this is unlikely to happen.
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The operational phrase remains to “stay the course.” On March 30, 2004, former secretary of defense under Nixon and Ford, James
Schlesinger, and former U.S. ambassador to Russia and under secretary for political affairs under Clinton, Thomas Pickering (the two
co-chaired the Council on Foreign Relations task force that produced the report Iraq: One Year Later), editorialized in the Los Angeles
Times that Iraq should remain “above politics” and that the United States should “stay the course.” The reasons they offered included
preventing Iran from influencing Iraq; guaranteeing “long-term stability in the production and supply of oil” blocking the rise of a new
power in Iraq opposed to the United States; and avoiding a perception of American defeat that would serve to destabilize American
power and its interests both in the Middle East and globally. In short, the imperial objectives for which the United States intervened in
the region must be maintained at all costs. Nothing coming out of Washington these days suggests that this dominant view has altered
in any way. Although it is well understood among those at the top of the social hierarchy that a series of disasters may well await the
United States in Iraq if it simply sticks to its guns, to not do so is seen as guaranteeing a still bigger disaster—a confession of defeat
that will diminish the future U.S. capacity to make war at will on third world societies and thus to employ force directly as a means to
promote its imperial designs. Moreover, there is still the question of Iraqi oil and who will control it. Thus in the ruling class view,
even an absolute failure in establishing a stable political regime and the requisite military force to defend it in Iraq does not necessarily
mean that the United States should get out. Thomas Friedman, the Op-Ed columnist on foreign affairs at the New York Times, whose
views can usually be taken as a good barometer of establishment opinion, concludes a November 18, 2004, report from Iraq with the
statement that “Without a secure environment in which its new leadership can be elected and comfortably operate, Iraq will never be
able to breathe on its own, and U.S. troops will have to be here forever.” The attitude here is that the U.S. occupation would need to
continue endlessly in the case of a failure to realize the goal of a stable political situation in Iraq acceptable to the United States. Given
the enormous Iraqi oil reserves Washington could decide that whatever costs it had to pay in Iraq would be amply rewarded in the end.
If the foregoing reading of the U.S. leadership’s current determination to stay the course is right, then the failures to be
experienced by U.S. imperialism in Iraq are likely to persist and be all the greater. The continuing presence of U.S. troops will
mean that the U.S. military will continue to take its bloody toll (which has already descended to systematic torture and the
reintroduction of napalm, outlawed by the United Nations in 1980), and Iraqi opposition to the American “liberators” will only grow.
Meanwhile any Iraqi government that is elected under these circumstances will either have to be opposed to the U.S. occupation or
lose any claims of legitimacy within Iraqi society. The entire U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq may be creating the conditions for a
civil war, lighting a powder keg under the entire Middle East. To get an idea of just how serious this can be one has only to look at
present Israeli arming and training of the Kurdish militias, with the object of then setting them—if the need should arise—against the
Shiite or Sunni forces in Iraq. Israel’s possession of hundreds of nuclear weapons poses the continual threat of the “Samson option”
should that government perceive itself or its occupation of Palestine as seriously threatened.*Wider speculation at this point would be
foolhardy. But there is no doubt that in invading Iraq the United States opened the doors of hell not only for the Iraqis and the
Middle East as a whole but also for its own global imperialist order. The full repercussions of the failure of the U.S. empire in
Iraq have yet to be seen and will only become evident in the months and years ahead
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