Analysis: Ideological Diversity in Somalia's Islamic Courts Movement

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EDITORIAL
Recognizing Somaliland Is Essential For Security In The Horn
The news of Somali pirates seizing a Ukrainian ship carrying 33 tanks, artillery
shells,
grenade launchers and other ammunition does not come as a surprise to those who have been following
the deteriorating situation in Somalia. Events like this only reinforce the tendency to
dismiss the situation in Somalia as too chaotic to understand. But underneath
Somalia’s raging chaos and humanitarian catastrophe, two ugly and dangerous facts
stand out.
The first one is the descent of Puntland’s regional administration of northeast Somalia
into a well-organized criminal enterprise based on sea piracy, hostage-taking of
foreign nationals, ransom collecting, fraudulent money printing and other illicit
activities. Puntland pirates have hijacked ships with such increasing frequency they
now pose a serious threat to international maritime traffic along the Gulf of Aden.
The second ominous development in Somalia is the takeover by the Islamic Courts
and al-Shabab terrorists of large swaths of southern Somalia, including the city of
Kismayo. Ethiopian and African Union troops in Somalia have clearly lost the
initiative and are constantly under attack.
These two developments have serious implications for security in the Horn of Africa
region as well as international security. One example, is that as a result of incursions
into Kenya by Somali militias and Somali religious extremists, Kenya had to close its
border with Somalia. Another example is that European countries are so alarmed by
Somali pirates attacking European ships and taking European citizens hostage, the
European Union is now considering what steps to take against Somali pirates.
There is a lesson here which is that the worsening situation in Somalia’s northeast
(Puntland) and south (Mogadishu) makes it only more imperative that the
international community star taking the necessary steps to prevent peaceful and
democratic Somaliland from becoming another Somalia. Foremost among these steps
is that the international community should recognize Somaliland’s independence.
Continuing the present approach of keeping Somaliland in limbo only enhances the
possibility that Somalia’s chaos and terrorism would spread to Somaliland, and that
would be a disaster for both Somaliland, its neighbors, as well as the international
community.
How Pirates In Puntland Use Ransom
Money For Acquiring High Social Status
And Protection
Bosaaso, September 27, 2008 (SL Times) – Piracy has become the most lucrative
business in Puntland, Somalia’s north eastern region and safe haven for numerous
armed gangs that hijack private and commercial vessels traveling in the waters
between Yemen and Somalia for ransom.
In this year, pirates have already collected at least $80 million in ransom payments
from ship owners.
It was only yesterday when Puntland pirates announced the release of a Japanese ship
after the payment of a $2 million ransom.
Although sources close to the pirates estimate the number of vessels seized this year
in the Gulf of Aden and off Puntland to be over 100, however only about a dozen of
them had been reported.
Shipping companies are often reluctant to report piracy attacks out of concern for the
increase in insurance premium that it would trigger.
But piracy in Puntland is not going to disappear. It has become the easiest way not
only become rich but also to climb the social ladder fast.
Punland’s piracy industry now employs over 2000 people. But the daring raids on
ships are usually carried out by about 500 hardcore pirates who are often organized
into groups of 10-15.
Pirates share their spoils with the local community and governing authorities for
protection.
The rule is that 20% of the ransom money is invested in purchase of any equipment,
weapons and communication devices that may deem necessary improving the
efficiency of piracy operations, while 20% is allocated to each of the hosting
community and the Puntland authorities. The remaining 40% is divided up among the
Hawl-galeyaasha or the people who do the actual piracy attacks in the sea.
The piracy code also requires allocation of generous compensation funds to the
families of pirates who are killed or wounded in piracy attacks.
Pirates tend to pay extravagantly for services or for goods to buy loyalty.
A Bosaaso businessman who deals with them said “A pirate buying a cup of teas in a
remote coastal village would normally pay 10 times the actual price. If they need an
extra AK 47 they would rent it from a villager for $100 for a couple of weeks instead
of paying the whole $300 it costs.”
There is no doubt that the adventurous and lavish lifestyle led by the pirates in
Puntland has already won admiration and allegiance from local communities.
Somali Pirates Seize Ship Carrying T-72 Tanks
And RPG Rocket Launchers
Nairobi, September 27, 2008 – The pirates who seized a Ukrainian freighter on Friday
may have netted one of their biggest prizes in more than 15 years of terrorizing the
Somali coastline — the vessel was carrying 33 T-72 battle tanks to Kenya.
It appears almost certain that the pirates had no idea of the cargo aboard the Belizeflagged Faina, which Ukrainian Defense Minister Yuri Yekhanurov told the Interfax
news agency was being sold to Kenya. He said the cargo included grenade launchers
and ammunition. Hours after the hijacking, Russia announced it was sending a
warship from its Baltic Fleet to patrol the Somali coast.
Attacks on cargo vessels along the Somali coast have spiked recently, with at least 14
ships and 300 crew members currently held by pirates in lawless Somalia, according
to the London-based International Maritime Bureau (IMB). But the seizure of the
tanks also raises questions about their ultimate destination and purpose: The Kenya
office of the Seafarers Assistance Programme said the ship had picked up its cargo of
military equipment in the Baltic Sea and was sailing to Mombasa. Kenyan
government spokesman Alfred Mutua said his government had purchased the
hardware. "The cargo in the ship includes military hardware such as tanks and an
assortment of spare parts for use by different branches of the Kenyan military," he
said in a statement.
A French intelligence official tells TIME that the hijackers probably had no clue
about the Faina's cargo, and might find they "might get more than they'd bargained
for" — and would probably try to ransom the shipment back to the freighter's owners.
"They see a ship out there alone, consider the surrounding conditions favorable, and
they move," the official explained. France has been closely involved in trying to beef
up patrols in the Gulf, even introducing a resolution to the U.N. Security Council.
Experts believe that the pirates may not have the capacity to offload the cargo — and
there may not be much local interest in tanks, anyway. They'd be quickly noticed in
Somalia, and their destination would reveal the identity of anyone financing the
hijackers.
It wouldn't be the first time that pirates in Somalia may have stumbled upon a cargo
that was bigger than they could imagine. Last August, pirates seized the MV Iran
Deyanat, a ship owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines. Somali
officials contend that the ship had been carrying weapons destined for Islamic
insurgents, a claim denied by Tehran. Ironically, the activities of the pirates may be
lifting the lid on the illicit trade in weapons around the Horn of Africa.
But for the pirates of Somalia, it was just another working day — the Faina was the
third ship taken in the course of a week in an area about 200 miles off Mogadishu,
suggesting an advanced detection capability on the part of the pirates. The Faina is a
huge, well-protected vessel, underscoring both the audacity and capability of the
buccaneers.
"It is an astonishing ship to take, and it defeats a number of the previously held
conceptions that they'd go for slow-moving ships," James Wilkes, managing director
of the London-based Gray Page Limited, a maritime consulting group in London, told
TIME. "This ship is built like a castle; how they managed to make it stop, I don't
know. I can imagine that they possibly laid quite a bit of weapon fire on the ship."
Some reports have tied the pirates to the Islamic insurgents battling the Ethiopian- and
U.S.-backed Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, but experts say no concrete
evidence has emerged to back this claim. Wilkes and others say the hijackers are more
likely simply in the increasingly lucrative business of demanding — and receiving —
ransom payments from shipowners.
"If there was another alternative, the owners would not pay, but right now there is no
alternative," says Cyrus Mody, a manager at the IMB. "Once the pirates are on board
they are pretty much in control. The fact that the pirates are going to be paid a ransom
obviously makes it that much more attractive and lucrative, especially in a country
where there is no government, no law enforcement and no policing to address the
situation."
The brazen attack was a reminder of the limits of the protection offered by the U.S.led coalition of warships patrolling the Somali coast. In a statement issued Friday
from Bahrain, Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, commander of the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet,
explained that the patrols don't "have the resources to provide 24-hour protection" in
waters between Somalia and Yemen. He urged private shipping companies to "take
measures to defend their vessels and crews," which could include hiring security for
their vessels.
Source: The Time
Oiling Wheels Of African Deal
Dublin, Sep 26, 2008 – HAVING STEPPED down last week from the board of Circle Oil,
Irish businessman John McKeon has turned his attention to oil exploration in Somaliland, a
self-governing African region that is seeking international recognition and independence from
Somalia.
McKeon is one of the promoters of Enex Energy Resources, which has a joint venture with
the government of Somaliland to prospect licenses to the southeast of the de facto state.
Somaliland's foreign minister, Abdillahi Mohamed Duale, was in Dublin this week. Enex was
registered in Ireland.
Director Len Tiahlo says it expects to be shooting seismic in Somaliland by Christmas and
hopes to drill two test wells.
He described the prospect as "world class", meaning it could have hundreds of millions of
barrels of oil. That remains to be seen. This is a risky venture and the area in question is under
claim by a Canadian company.
Somaliland's government says the claim is spurious. This might be true but if Tiahlo is right
about his prospect's potential, he will surely have to fight to establish a legal right to extract
oil.
That's to say nothing of the terrorists and pirates operating in the region or the fact that
Somaliland has yet to gain UN recognition.
McKeon is no stranger to doing business in Africa.
Earlier this month, he persuaded a Libyan fund set up by Col Muammar Gadafy to invest £19
million in Circle, which he co-founded, for its drilling activities in Africa.
Pulling off a similar trick with Enex would surely top it.
Source: The Irish Times
KULMIYE Statement On The Horn Of Africa
Dr. Mohamed A. Omar
September 26, 2008
Drawing on a reputation for neutrality and commitment to peace, Somaliland’s KULMIYE
PARTY is in favor of a peaceful means for resolving all the disputes in the Horn of Africa.
Our vision for the region’s stabilization reflects on this principle and is anchored around the
following five key priorities.
First, we support an inclusive political dialogue and integrated peace approach aiming to
achieve a broader consensus among the parties in conflict in bringing an end to the prolonged
regional confrontations.
Second, we call on the international community to provide effective development and
humanitarian assistance to the civilian population that are caught up in these conflicts.
Third, we encourage efforts aimed at creating conditions that are conducive for building
democratically representative institutions that would facilitate greater participation in the
decision-making process.
Fourth, we advocate for a regional economic integration and freedom of trade.
Fifth, we deny extremist groups the opportunity to find a safe haven in the region.
In achieving the above policy priorities, we believe that an internationally- supported and
regionally- coordinated diplomatic strategy is the best way forward, with an integrated peace
building and post-conflict planning.
We strongly believe that promoting democracy and freedom is essential for the broader
regional peace programme, including supporting peaceful and effective administrations in the
region, acknowledging democratic initiatives and defending free media. We recognize these
are the only ideas that can lead to a lasting stability in the region.
We are also of the opinion that a free trade and market economy with investment
opportunities will facilitate a peaceful co-existence and a desire for cooperation among the
people in the Horn. Therefore, we call for a regional economic policy reform that could create
incentives for peace and tolerance.
We believe these are important steps towards the goal of a peaceful, comprehensive and
sustainable solution to the conflicts in the Horn, as well as rebuilding the communities
devastated by these conflicts. For this purpose, we work with our partners in the region with
whom we share these values and, together, we work on achieving well-governed, law-abiding
democratic states.
Contrary to fabricated reports by Somaliland government officials, KULMIYE supports
neither Eritrea nor any other groups that are engaged in the regional disputes. Instead, we call
on all the parties involved to choose for a peaceful and democratic path to advance their
interests and to redress injustices.
Promoting democratic development and fighting against extremism have made Somaliland
peaceful and stable. KULMIYE is determined to promote this process. We respect civil
rights, freedom of expression and individual freedom. We believe that applying these values
and focusing on the above policy priorities will give Somaliland an opportunity to build a
better relationship with the region and to enhance its national security.
KULMIYE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN
Source: The American Chronicle
LOCAL & REGIONAL AFFAIRS
Hundreds Affected By Diarrhea In Burcoa
Contaminated water is blamed for the outbreak of AWD in Buroa
NAIROBI, September 22, 2008 – Authorities in Burao in the republic of Somaliland
are struggling to contain an outbreak of watery diarrhea, medical sources said on 22
September.
"The outbreak began on 13 September and so far we have registered 261 cases and
no fatalities," Adan Ilmi Diriye, the regional medical officer, told IRIN.
The biggest one-day caseload was on 13 September, with 92 cases, he said, adding,
"so far today we have registered 16 cases".
Diriye blamed the outbreak on contaminated water drawn from wells in the area. "We
had rains and we suspect the problem is the water people are drinking has been
contaminated."
A task-force consisting of local authorities and aid agencies based in Burao, chaired
by the regional medical officer, has been set up to deal with the outbreak. An
awareness campaign was also under way.
"We are using every avenue to reach people," Diriye added. "Even the mosques
have been involved in passing information to avoid contracting the disease."
Two wards in Burao general hospital were being used as a treatment centre. "If we
feel we need to use a bigger place we will set it up, "he said.
As part of the efforts to contain the outbreak, Diriye said: "We have started
chlorination of water wells and we are distributing water purification tablets directly to
families in affected areas."
The worst-affected parts of the city were the October and Jarmalka neighborhoods.
Diriye said the Somaliland government had sent enough drugs to deal with the
problem and "we are changing our plans day to day to stay on top of it and be
prepared if the situation gets worse".
He said there was no sign of a slowdown. "I am, however, confident that with our
awareness campaigns and the work of the task-force, we will be able to contain it."
IRIN
'Terror 2' Seized On Plane
Grounded ... passengers flee plane after two suspects were arrested
From Allan Hall in Berlin
Berlin, September 27, 2008 – ARMED commandos stormed a passenger plane in
Germany yesterday to seize two suspected Islamic terrorists.
The SAS-trained German police heroes swooped as the Fokker 50 prepared for takeoff at Cologne-Bonn airport.
Cops said the two men had left suicide notes in a flat telling of their “honour” at being
able to die in a “Holy War”.
The Somalian-born pair — identified last night only as Omar D, 24, and Abdirazak B,
23 — offered no resistance and no shots were fired.
It was unclear if explosives had been smuggled aboard the KLM flight taking 48
passengers to Amsterdam.
Officials said the suspects were members of the Islamic Jihad Union and had tickets
to travel on from the Dutch capital to Pakistan.
Last night speculation grew that German police believed the men were going to
Pakistan to receive terrorist training.
There were also fears they were set to receive orders for attacks on US bases in the
country.
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Germany’s Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigations said the pair had been under
surveillance “for many months”.
The Special Action Commandos (SEK) are the most highly trained police units in
Germany.
Those who stormed the plane at 6.55am wore all-black and face masks. They carried
Heckler and Koch sub-machine guns, gas and stun grenades and Walther sidearms.
It is understood some boarded through the main door while others entered through
hatchways at the back opened by flight attendants.
Before being led away, the suspects were made to identify their checked luggage
which was also seized.
All other passengers had to disembark and identify their cases before re-boarding
Flight KL1804 — which took off 70 minutes late and landed safely.
Source: The Sun
Somali Pirates Release Japanese Ship
BOSSASO, Somalia, Sept 26 2008 - Somali pirates released a Japanese ship and its
21-member crew on Friday after a $2 million ransom was paid three months after it
was captured off the coast of the lawless country, a regional official said.
"We understand that the Japanese ship, MV Stella Maris which had been hijacked on
July 20, was released today after $2 million was paid," Abdulqadir Muse Yusuf,
assistant minister for fisheries in Somalia's semi-autonomous northern region of
Puntland, told Reuters.
Hijackings are common in Somalia's unpatrolled waters, where pirates normally treat
their hostages well in anticipation of hefty ransoms.
Piracy has made the Gulf of Aden, a sea route used by about 20,000 vessels a year,
one of the world's most dangerous waterways.
In the latest attack, pirates hijacked a Ukrainian vessel carrying more than 30 tanks
and other military equipment bound for the Kenyan port of Mombasa, a significant
haul for the pirates. The ship had 21 crew.
Yusuf said the pirates were expected to leave the Panamanian flagged Stella Maris on
Friday but were still on board.
"The pirates are still on board because they do not want to be bombed or captured," he
said, adding that several vehicles had been seen driving towards Garad, where the
ship was held, to transport the pirates.
Andrew Mwangura of the Seafarers Assistance Programme told Reuters that another
ship was due to be released over the weekend. He did not give further details.
Pirates are currently holding about a dozen vessels and more then 200 crew members.
An Islamist insurgence in the south of Somalia, which has not had a functioning
government for 17 years, has made it difficult for the struggling interim government
to police the waters. Russia said on Friday it was sending a warship to the region to
protect Russian ships and citizens.
Source: Reuters
US 'Concerned' About Pirate Capture Of
Ukrainian Ship
WASHINGTON, September 27, 2008 — The Pentagon on Friday said it was
considering its options after news that pirates off the coast of Somalia captured a
Ukrainian cargo ship carrying grenade-launchers, ammunition, and 33 T-72 combat
tanks.
"The United States is monitoring this situation as it develops and looking at possible
options," said Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman.
"Obviously a ship carrying cargo of that nature being hijacked off the coast of
Somalia is something that should concern us," said Whitman.
"We very much care about piracy, we are also concerned about that type of a cargo
and what it might be able to be used for and the origin of the hijackers," he said.
He added: "I am not going to speculate on the options we might pursue."
The vessel, whose whereabouts were unknown Friday, had been heading for the
Kenyan port of Mombasa with a crew of 17 Ukrainian nationals, three Russians and
one Latvian when it was boarded on Thursday.
Dozens of ships, mainly merchant vessels, have been seized by gangs off Somalia's
3,700-kilometer (2,300-mile) coastline in recent years, despite the presence of
Western navies deployed in the region to fight terrorism.
In recent months, a multinational task force based in Djibouti has been patrolling parts
of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, where a pirate mothership is believed to be
operating.
A Russian frigate, the Neustrashimy (Fearless), was ordered to the region following
the hijacking, said Russian navy spokesman Igor Dygalo said.
Source: AFP
Kgalema Motlanthe Sworn In as South Africa's President
Kgalema Motlanthe takes the oath of office at Tuynhuis in Cape Town, 25 Sep 2008
By Delia Robertson
Johannesburg, September 25, 2008 – South Africa's parliament has elected African
National Congress deputy president Kgalema Motlanthe as the third post-apartheid
president of the country. VOA's Delia Robertson reports from our Johannesburg
bureau, the new president made it clear he did not intend to deviate from the former
president's policies.
Despite the ANC ousting former President Thabo Mbeki because, in the words of a
senior party official, "have have lost confidence in him", Mr. Motlanthe served notice
on the country he intended to continue in the footsteps of his predecessor.
"The policies of this government are clear," he said. "Mine is not the desire to deviate
from what is working. It is not for me to reinvent policy. Nor do I intend to reshape
either Cabinet or the public service. We will not allow that the work of government be
interrupted."
Earlier in the day Chief Justice Pius Langa presided over the election of the new
president, who got 269 votes, 28 less than the number of ANC members of
parliament. Justice Langa's announcement of the winner was brief.
"I accordingly declare the honorable Kgalema Petros Motlanthe duly elected
president of the Republic of South Africa," he said.
Later Mr. Motlanthe took the oath of office at his official residence, Tuynhuis.
"I, Kgalema Petros Motlanthe, swear that I will be faithful to the Republic of South
Africa, and will obey, observe, uphold and maintain the constitution, and all other
law[s] of the Republic, and I solemnly and sincerely promise that I will always
promote all that will advance the Republic, and oppose all that may harm it," he said.
President Motlanthe is a somewhat opaque figure to South Africans. A poll was
published early in the day in which respondents were asked to indicate if they
supported his pending election as president, and what they knew about him. Overall
he received a score of just more than four out of 10. Ironically even ANC supporters
scored him less than five with most saying they did not know enough to have an
opinion.
It was just Thursday that South Africans learned for the first time that Mr. Motlanthe
was born on July 19, 1949 in Alexandra township, now a suburb of Johannesburg. It
is believed that he is married with three children. A resume released by the ANC did
not mention his educational qualifications.
In 1976 he was detained without trial for 10 months and the following year sentenced
to 10 years in jail for offenses against the apartheid state.
On his release in 1987, Mr. Motlanthe joined the labor movement and in 1997 was
elected secretary general of the ANC, a post he held until he was elected deputy
president of the party in December last year.
Before he addressed the house, President Motlanthe had to listen to a string of
opposition party members who, while welcoming his appointment, warned him it is
now time to put the country ahead of his divided party. The feisty Independent
Democrats leader Patricia de Lille told Mr. Motlanthe his duty is clear.
"During times like these when there is political and economic upheaval, we urgently
need leadership that will give all South Africans hope that the enormous challenges
we face like corruption, crime, poverty, unemployment and HIV/AIDS will be
addressed," said de Lille.
The new president wasted no time in appointing a new cabinet. He replaced
ministers who resigned but made only minor changes in the remaining departments.
The speaker of parliament, Baleka Mbete, will be the new deputy president. He has
moved the controversial and unpopular health minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang
to the presidency and replaced her with the widely respected Barbara Hogan.
Source: VOA
Somali Leaders Use National Funds To ‘Buy Mps’: Sources
TFG President Yusuf, Speaker Madobe and PM Nur Adde
BAIDOA, Somalia Sep 24, 2008 – Somali leaders locked in endless political disputes
use public funds to pay members of parliament (MPs) for votes, legislative sources
tell Somali news agency Garowe Online.
In July, a political rift arose between Abdillahi Yusuf and Nur “Adde” Hassan Hussein,
the President and Prime Minister of the country’s UN-endorsed Transitional Federal
Government (TFG), respectively.
Somali MPs in the south-central city of Baidoa were deeply embroiled in the conflict,
with Yusuf and Nur Adde supporters introducing rival motions.
When the President’s supporters in Parliament brought a vote-of-confidence motion
against the Prime Minister, Nur Adde’s supporters introduced a similar motion
against the President.
Somali lawmakers’ vote was “on sale” for other critical votes, the sources added,
including an accountability motion with Prime Minister Nur Adde’s government and a
vote on whether or not pro-Yusuf Cabinet ministers could return to their posts.
MPs who did not wish to be named for security-related reasons tell Garowe Online
that President Yusuf and Prime Minister Nur Adde invested as much as US$700,000
to buy lawmakers’ votes during the recent dispute.
The money is handed directly to Sheikh Adan “Madobe” Mohamed, a former warlord
who is now the parliament Speaker, according to our sources.
“Every motion brought into parliament is being secretly supported by TFG leaders,
who invest a lot of money to buy MPs,” said a lawmaker.
Meanwhile, President Yusuf referred Speaker Madobe’s September 23 letter
rejecting the return of 10 Cabinet ministers to the High Court, government sources
said.
There are now concerns that a High Court ruling could bring up a confidence vote
against the Speaker, who was an ally of President Yusuf until recently.
The East Africa country of Somalia has not had a functioning national government in
nearly 18 years, but the Ethiopian-backed TFG has been in power since 2004.
The government collects taxes from key economic resources and is bankrolled by
donor nations, mostly in the West.
But there is no reliable management of government funds, since the money is
controlled by individuals and not institutions.
Source: Garowe Online
High Oil Prices Are A Threat To International Peace, Kenya President Warns
New York, Sep 24, 2008 – President Mwai Kibaki Tuesday evening sent a passionate appeal
to Oil Producing countries to consider the plight of non oil-producing countries particularly in
the developing world.
President Kibaki noted that the sharp increase in oil prices is fast eroding gains made
by economies of developing countries and hence threatening international peace.
President Kibaki made the remarks during his address to the 63rd session of the
United Nations General Assembly in New York City.
The President noted that as a global community, no individual country is completely
insulated from instability caused by inflationary pressures that result from the high oil
prices.
President Kibaki said, “Indeed, the rapid increase in oil prices is hurting developing
countries the most, and does not augur well for international peace and stability. We
should all be conscious of the fact that we are one global community, and none of us
is completely insulated from instability caused by inflationary pressures that result
from the high oil prices.”
The Head of State said that there was need to address the problem of speculative
trading in the oil futures market that has led to the doubling of prices in the last one
year.
With regard to the high world food prices, President Kibaki expressed concern that
the worst affected are the poorest people living in developing countries adding that
the situation could have serious implications to individual countries’ national security.
He advocated that the international community finds immediate mechanisms to
deliver sufficient quantities of affordable food to poor people in Africa and other parts
of the developing world as a short term measure to mitigate the situation.
However, President Kibaki called for improved agricultural productivity particularly by
making available better yielding seed varieties, modern farming techniques, and
cheaper fertilizer to smallholder farmers in Africa.
Said the President, “This will require more effective global partnerships between
developed nations, international institutions, and developing nations. In particular,
these partnerships should place food security, agricultural technology development
and transfer, trade and agricultural credit at the centre of the development agenda.”
The Head of State noted that the most sustainable way of lifting Africa’s people out of
poverty and underdevelopment is through widespread commercialization of
agriculture.
The President said, “We must focus on manufacture and trade in value-added
agricultural products, supported by efficient financial services and markets.”
He further called on the international community to hasten consensus on contentious
agricultural issues to allow conclusion of the Doha Round of World Trade
Organization negotiations.
On issues of governance in Africa, President Kibaki noted that the achievement of
democratic and inclusive governments were core realistic challenges at the heart of
conflict and insecurity in the continent.
“As Africa grapples with the challenges of competitive elections in fragile
democracies divided by regional, racial, religious and ethnic differences, time has
come for us to reflect on the role of competitive electoral processes in the building of
our nascent democratic institutions,” said President Kibaki.
He noted that Kenya had overcome the December general elections challenges and
that the Grand Coalition Government had included all major political parties and
interests in the country following the signing of the National Accord.
“The government is making use of this historic window of opportunity to build
consensus that will enable us address the major challenges facing our country,”
noted President Kibaki.
The President said that the government was in the process of implementing far
reaching legal, constitutional and policy reforms aimed at securing national cohesion
and achieve the political, social and economic aspirations of the people of Kenya.
Thanking the panel of Eminent African Personalities led by former United Nations
Secretary General, Kofi Annan for their lead role during the political negotiation,
President Kibaki expressed his confidence that Kenya had reclaimed its glory and
had retained its position as a peaceful and safe tourist and investment destination.
During the occasion, President Kibaki called for a greater responsibility of the
international community in the Somalia situation to make the country a stable and
democratic nation.
The Head of State thanked the governments of Uganda and Burundi for sending
Peace Keeping troops in Somalia as part of the African Mission in Somalia and called
for deployment of the remaining troops to strengthen the mission.
He further urged the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan to
intensify their efforts in overcoming all outstanding issues in the implementation of
the Accord.
Source: KBC (Kenya)
UK Announces £42 Million For Horn Of Africa
London, Sept. 23, 2008 -- United Kingdom has announced £42 million emergency
assistance to curb hunger crisis in the horn of Africa region.
According to department for international development, package would help feed
over 17 million people facing severe hunger and malnutrition.
“The additional funding will include £22 million to be split between all of the countries
in Horn of Africa and a further £20m that will go to Ethiopia to help the country cope
with its worsening humanitarian crisis,” said department statement.
UK Secretary of State for International Development, Douglas Alexander said
millions of people in Horn of Africa are facing critical food shortages, indicating that
without urgent action their lives will be at risk.
"That is why the Department for International Development is releasing with
immediate effect £42 million from emergency reserves,” he said.
He emphasised that department’s assistance would not be enough to meet needs of
hungry in the region, appealing to other nations including donors to urgently respond
to crisis.
Department said UK's support will go towards meeting most pressing needs on the
ground and will include direct food distribution, medical support, special nutritional
support for mothers and children and clean water supply.
UK has already announced US$1.4 billion over five years to improve global food
security and US$178 million to address current crisis in the Horn.
This announcement comes ahead of a major meeting of global, business, faith and
civil society at UN in New York on Thursday. At this meeting on Millennium
Development Goals, food security will be a central theme.
On Friday UN called on donors to help address growing humanitarian need of as
many as 17 million people in the Horn of Africa. Drought and food shortages in the
region have led to growing number of people in need of emergency assistance and
there is a US $716 million funding shortfall for next three months, according to
reports.
UN said the situation was critical in parts of Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, and was
seriously deteriorating in Eritrea, northern Kenya and north eastern Uganda.
Source: Afrol News
Navy Pursues Pirates Who Grab Arms Shipment
William Pentland 09.26.08, 4:25 PM ET
Somalian pirates may have gotten more than they bargained for when they hijacked a
Ukrainian boat filled with arms, sparking pursuit from both the U.S. and Russian navies.
The ship, bound for Kenya, was taken in the Indian Ocean, a hotbed of pirate infestation. On
board: some 30 T-72 battle tanks, which experts say the pirates will probably not be able to
unload.
Now, U.S. and Russian ships are steaming toward the captured vessel. Lt. Commander Bill
Speaks, a spokesman for the U.S. military, told The New York Times Friday afternoon, "We
are aware of the situation and actively tracking it."
But while this assault is particularly brazen, it isn't anything new. The last 10 years have seen
a worldwide renaissance of sea piracy. The growth of global commerce in the past two
decades crowded the oceans with cargo vessels, dry-bulk carriers and supertankers loaded
with every good imaginable. The world currently transports 80% of all international freight
by sea. More than 10 million cargo containers are moving across the world's oceans at any
given time.
The heavy ocean traffic (and its valuable cargo) spawned a surge in sea piracy and a new
breed of pirates, the bloodiest the world has seen. More than 2,400 acts of piracy were
reported around the world between 2000 and 2006, roughly twice the number reported for the
preceding six-year period. Although pirate attacks have at least tripled during that time
period, the actual number of attacks remains unclear. Shipping companies frequently do not
report attacks out of concern that it could increase insurance premiums.
And nearly every group or government monitoring sea piracy believes that number is
seriously undercounted. The Australian government estimates the actual number of piracy
attacks is 2,000% higher. Piracy is estimated to cost between $13 and $16 billion every year
and could cost substantially more in coming years.
"Piracy is not going away," says Peter Chalk, an international security analyst at the RAND
Institute. "In fact, it's getting more serious and more violent, and its only a matter of time
before you need to take it more seriously."
That's starting to happen. The potential of a disastrous environmental spill resulting from an
attack finally forced the international community to clamp down on sea piracy. International
law allows any government vessel to repress an act of piracy in international waters. On Oct.
30, 2007, two American destroyers, the USS Porter and the USS Arleigh Burke, attacked and
sank two Somali pirate vessels after the pirates captured the Japanese tanker Golden Mori.
In June, the U.N. Security Council voted in favor of a new measure that would allow the U.S.
military to engage Somalian sea pirates.
Somalia is not the only place with piracy outfits this organized; in fact, the country is a
relative latecomer to contemporary sea piracy. Since 2000, southeast Asia has had the most
dangerous waters in the world. Malaysia and the islands of the Indonesian archipelago have
seen the lion's share of sea piracy since 2000. Also troubling: the waters off Nigeria and Iraq.
Unlike the pirates of yesteryear, contemporary sea piracy is frequently carried out by highly
sophisticated criminal organizations made up of seasoned fighters and equipped with
speedboats, satellite phones and global positioning systems. Recently captured Somali pirates
claim they belonged to an organized militia that engaged in piracy to raise funds.
Organizations have started attacking from more than one ship simultaneously using a number
of quasi-military tactics.
Violence has become an endemic feature of privacy, particularly over the last five to 10 years.
The birth of the illicit global arms trade that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union in
1991 made it easier for many (who might feel less inclined to pursue piracy if they lacked
guns) to become pirates, according to Chalk. The arms trade has made cheap and powerful
weapons available in many parts of the world.
Five to six years ago, when pirates attacked, they used machetes, knives and pistols. "Today,"
says Noel Choong, the current director of the International Maritime Bureau's anti-piracy
office in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. "They come equipped with AK-47s, M-16s, rifle grenades
and [rocket-propelled grenades]."
This not only poses an enormous risk in terms of human security, but also endangers maritime
security. Attacked ships can be left unmanned, turning into rogue vessels. "In many maritime
chokepoints where attacks often occur, this creates a serious risk of a collision," says Chalk.
"The truth is that modern piracy ... is a violent, bloody, ruthless practice," said Captain Jayant
Abhyankar, Deputy Director of the International Maritime Bureau at a conference in
Singapore, "made the more fearsome by the knowledge on the part of the victims that they are
on their own and absolutely defenseless and that no help is waiting just round the corner."
Somali Pirates' Unexpected Booty: Russian Tanks
By Nick Wadhams / Nairobi Friday, Sep. 26, 2008
Nairobi, September 27, 2008 – The pirates who seized a Ukrainian freighter on Friday may
have netted one of their biggest prizes in more than 15 years of terrorizing the Somali
coastline — the vessel was carrying 33 T-72 battle tanks to Kenya.
It appears almost certain that the pirates had no idea of the cargo aboard the Belize-flagged
Faina, which Ukrainian Defense Minister Yuri Yekhanurov told the Interfax news agency was
being sold to Kenya. He said the cargo included grenade launchers and ammunition. Hours
after the hijacking, Russia announced it was sending a warship from its Baltic Fleet to patrol
the Somali coast.
Attacks on cargo vessels along the Somali coast have spiked recently, with at least 14 ships
and 300 crew members currently held by pirates in lawless Somalia, according to the Londonbased International Maritime Bureau (IMB). But the seizure of the tanks also raises questions
about their ultimate destination and purpose: The Kenya office of the Seafarers Assistance
Programme said the ship had picked up its cargo of military equipment in the Baltic Sea and
was sailing to Mombasa. Kenyan government spokesman Alfred Mutua said his government
had purchased the hardware. "The cargo in the ship includes military hardware such as tanks
and an assortment of spare parts for use by different branches of the Kenyan military," he said
in a statement.
A French intelligence official tells TIME that the hijackers probably had no clue about the
Faina's cargo, and might find they "might get more than they'd bargained for" — and would
probably try to ransom the shipment back to the freighter's owners. "They see a ship out there
alone, consider the surrounding conditions favorable, and they move," the official explained.
France has been closely involved in trying to beef up patrols in the Gulf, even introducing a
resolution to the U.N. Security Council.
Experts believe that the pirates may not have the capacity to offload the cargo — and there
may not be much local interest in tanks, anyway. They'd be quickly noticed in Somalia, and
their destination would reveal the identity of anyone financing the hijackers.
It wouldn't be the first time that pirates in Somalia may have stumbled upon a cargo that was
bigger than they could imagine. Last August, pirates seized the MV Iran Deyanat, a ship
owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines. Somali officials contend that the ship
had been carrying weapons destined for Islamic insurgents, a claim denied by Tehran.
Ironically, the activities of the pirates may be lifting the lid on the illicit trade in weapons
around the Horn of Africa.
But for the pirates of Somalia, it was just another working day — the Faina was the third ship
taken in the course of a week in an area about 200 miles off Mogadishu, suggesting an
advanced detection capability on the part of the pirates. The Faina is a huge, well-protected
vessel, underscoring both the audacity and capability of the buccaneers.
"It is an astonishing ship to take, and it defeats a number of the previously held conceptions
that they'd go for slow-moving ships," James Wilkes, managing director of the London-based
Gray Page Limited, a maritime consulting group in London, told TIME. "This ship is built
like a castle; how they managed to make it stop, I don't know. I can imagine that they possibly
laid quite a bit of weapon fire on the ship."
Some reports have tied the pirates to the Islamic insurgents battling the Ethiopian- and U.S.backed Transitional Federal Government in Somalia, but experts say no concrete evidence has
emerged to back this claim. Wilkes and others say the hijackers are more likely simply in the
increasingly lucrative business of demanding — and receiving — ransom payments from
shipowners.
"If there was another alternative, the owners would not pay, but right now there is no
alternative," says Cyrus Mody, a manager at the IMB. "Once the pirates are on board they are
pretty much in control. The fact that the pirates are going to be paid a ransom obviously
makes it that much more attractive and lucrative, especially in a country where there is no
government, no law enforcement and no policing to address the situation."
The brazen attack was a reminder of the limits of the protection offered by the U.S.-led
coalition of warships patrolling the Somali coast. In a statement issued Friday from Bahrain,
Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, commander of the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet, explained that the
patrols don't "have the resources to provide 24-hour protection" in waters between Somalia
and Yemen. He urged private shipping companies to "take measures to defend their vessels
and crews," which could include hiring security for their vessels.
Source: The Time
U Of C Helps Settle Land Disputes
Software will use multi-media database to offer alternative
information
Barry recently received a $500,000 grant for his research.
Credit: courtesy Dr. Michael Barry
Caeli Hann
Gauntlet News
September 25, 2008
In many developed countries, it is hard for citizens to prove they own the land they live and
work on. University of Calgary geomatics professor Dr. Michael Barry received a $500,000
personal gift from Focus Corporation Chairman John Holmlund for his ongoing research in
settling property disputes in developing countries and conflict zones.
Fraud and land theft are major issues in developing countries. According to Barry, most land
theft is caused by the state.
"Educated elites often hijack systems which are designed to supposedly improve tenure
security," explained Barry.
Official land records are often destroyed in civil wars and years of misrule have left many
countries without the capacity to control land registration, claimed Barry. The process of
registering land is often extremely tedious and can cost up to 50 per cent of the actual value of
the land. Transactions are often informal and not recorded. In Somaliland, land dispute is the
main cause of homicide, he added.
Barry has been developing a software system called Talking Titler to help solve the property
disputes. It's a database combining multi-media items, such as sound clips, videos and still
photographs with paper-based records and documents, relevant to land tenure information.
The idea for the system existed 10 years ago, but only with recent technology like YouTube
has the idea become feasible. Barry described the software as a document management
system. He explained that it provides a way of integrating information about land in a flexible
way. The program also has an evolutionary system design, meaning it can be adapted for a
variety of situations.
Talking Titler is licensed freeware and is available for use as long as Barry is informed of
what it is being used for. He hopes to gain feedback on the system for it to be improved. It is
currently licensed to the Surveyor General of Canada and Directorate of Land Regularization
in Lagos, Nigeria and will not be commercialized.
Barry explained that many of the societies in developing countries function in very different
ways and that it is important not to hastily intervene, but to simply provide alternatives.
"I'm not out to save the world," Barry said. "One does not go in as an outsider and parachute a
solution in to them. You go in and you listen. You ask, 'What are the alter- natives to what
you do now?' "
John Holmlund's contribution will undoubtedly have a positive impact on Barry's research
and on the Schulich School of Engineering, which claims the only geomatics department in
western Canada.
"Donations like this make a huge difference," said Barry, who will soon be traveling to
Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa to further his understanding of why information transactions
that complicate land ownership are taking place.
FEATURES & COMMENTARY
Analysis: Ideological Diversity In Somalia's
Islamic Courts Movement
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
Sep 25, 2008 After Somalia's war of liberation against the increasingly brutal
dictatorship of Siyad Barre eighteen years ago, the fractured country's politics was
marked by an absence of ideological differences until the emergence of the Islamic
Courts movement in 2006. During its revolutionary phase in that year, the Courts
were guided by the vision of transforming Somalia into a state based on the practice
of Shari'a law. Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia, supported by the United States, in
December 2006 knocked the Courts back, but did not destroy the movement, which
regrouped and through 2008 has once again become the dominant political force in
the country. As it mounted its resistance against the Ethiopian occupation, the
movement was initially united by the simple aim of removing Ethiopian forces from
Somalia, but as it has gained success on the ground, it has begun to look forward to
a possible victory and its components have begun to articulate their contrasting
visions of political Islam, propelling the movement into an ideological phase centered
on a debate over the form of a future state.
All genuine revolutionary movements include diverse perspectives gathered under a
general political formula that is specific enough to provide focus, but that leaves
ample room for differing interpretations of how that formula should be applied in
practice. Those relatively latent interpretations become manifest and crystallize into
ideologies under the pressure of events, as factions in the movement reach the point
at which they are compelled to show their programmatic hands. At that juncture, the
ideological dimension becomes a relatively independent factor in determining the
course of the movement, providing orientations towards the future that mobilize
adherents and appeal to sympathizers and potential supporters. When the
ideological phase kicks in, the movement will either gain enhanced vitality through
efforts to mediate differences while preserving distinctions, or it will begin to collapse
through internecine conflict.
The Courts movement entered an ideological phase in September 2008, following
the capture of the strategic southern port city of Kismayo by one of its components,
al-Shabaab, and that group's subsequent decision to attempt to block aircraft from
using the international airport in Somalia's official capital Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab's
initiatives triggered a response from the militant wing of the Islamic Courts Union
(I.C.U.), which has gained control of several regions of Somalia and is affiliated with
the faction of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia based in Asmara, Eritrea
(A.R.S.-A), which opposes the country's Ethiopian backed and internationally
recognized Transitional Federal Government. Meanwhile, the conciliatory faction of
the Alliance that is based in Djibouti (A.R.S.-D) refused to sign a cease-fire
agreement with the T.F.G. due to differences over a timetable for Ethiopian
withdrawal from Somalia. Taken together, those developments precipitated overt
ideological positioning among the groups.
Forms of Political Islam in Somalia
Contemporary political Islam, wherever it appears is defined ideologically by its
challenge to the modern secular nation state and its aspiration to modify or supplant
that form by introducing Islamic law and practices into the juridical and/or political
orders. Through its development over eighty years, political Islam has crystallized
into three major ideological tendencies: Islamic transnationalism, Islamic nationalism
and Islamic pluralism, each of which is reflected in a component of the Courts
movement.
The sharpest challenge to the modern secular nation state is presented by Islamic
transnationalism, which proposes to supplant the nation state with regional
caliphates, modeled on pre-modern Muslim empires and composed of local emirates
that are governed by clerics according to Shari'a law. Islamic transnationalism is
represented in Somalia by al-Shabab, which announced in mid-September the
formation of the "Islamic Emirate of Somalia" and claimed that the resistance fighters
(mujahideen) in Somalia were "close to uniting" and "will all come under the
Emirate's authority." A self defined "Salafist-jihadist" organization, al-Shabab
welcomes foreign fighters to join its struggle and has expressed affinity with al-Qaeda
after the U.S. placed it on its list of "terrorist" groups.
Similar to Islamic transnationalism, Islamic nationalism, which is represented in
Somalia by the I.C.U. and A.R.S.-A, embraces a political order founded on Shari'a
law, but breaks with the former by affirming the nation state and, as a consequence,
adds particular perceived national interests to its political formula. Unlike Islamic
transnationalism, which remains purely aspirational, there are extant examples of
Islamic nationalism, most notably a Sunni version in Saudi Arabia and a Shi'a variant
that developed in Iran after its early post-revolutionary internationalism was thwarted.
Islamic pluralism, which is found throughout the Muslim world and is represented in
Somalia by A.R.S.-D, is nationalist, but does not insist -at least provisionally - on a
Shari'a state and is willing to coexist with non-Islamic political tendencies in a state
that is influenced to a greater or lesser degree by Islamic law and practices.
Prominent examples of Islamic pluralism are Turkey, in which an Islamic party
governs uneasily in an officially secular state, and Pakistan, in which secular parties
are dominant in an officially Islamic state. A.R.S.-D, which carried non-Islamic
tendencies in the original A.R.S with it when that organization ruptured, embodies
Islamic pluralism within itself as well as toward external actors.
The major tendencies in contemporary political Islam are particularly clear-cut in
Somalia, because none of them has achieved unrivalled dominance in the broader
Courts movement and all of them are active players in the country's manifold
conflicts. All of the tendencies were present during the Courts movement's
revolutionary phase and its phase of regrouping; only now in the movement's "reliberation" push have they become sharply configured.
Kismayo, Adan Adde and Djibouti
The most serious and revealing ideological difference that appeared in September
was between the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A and al-Shabaab, when the latter led a force that
captured Kismayo and then set up an administration of its own choosing headed by a
mayor from Somaliland who was not a member of any of the clans that had
supported al-Shabaab in its action. On September 9, the I.C.U.'s secretary of social
and political affairs, Sheikh Ibrahim Shukri, declared that the new Kismayo
administration was "illegitimate" and had been created "behind closed doors" without
consultation with al-Shabaab's I.C.U. and local allies. Shukri demanded that the
administration be reformed to include local clerics, intellectuals and other "important
social components." Shukri's demand was met by the new administration's
communications secretary, Sheikh Hassan Yakoub Ali, with the blunt statement:
"There is no point of others sharing the decision making with the combatants who
chased the clan militias out of the district." Al-Shabaab's self-proclaimed "elder,"
Sheikh Hassan al-Turki, added that the appointment of a mayor from Somaliland
showed
that
the
new
administration
was
founded on Islam rather than clan representation, commenting that deference to clan
would have caused local clans "to fight among each other."
Apart from considerations of power, the I.C.U.'s criticism of al-Shabaab's move
showed a difference between the former's conception that wider interests be included
in an Islamic political formula and the latter's insistence on purism. Further evidence
of al-Shabaab's authoritarian tendencies was revealed when their administration
called journalists to a meeting and laid down press rules requiring that no reports be
disseminated of which the administration was unaware, that only "factual" news be
presented, that nothing detrimental to the practice of Shari'a be reported, and that no
music be played on the radio that encouraged "sin." The reporters, in turn, appealed
to the administration to take action against the frequent telephone threats they were
receiving.
The ideological split between al-Shabaab and the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A widened when, on
September 13, the former announced that it would shell Mogadishu's Adan Adde
airport if it was not shut down, citing the uses of the airport as a conduit for Israeli
and U.S. intelligence operatives, a supply line for the African Union's small
peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) in Mogadishu and for Ethiopian occupying forces,
a source of funds for the Ethiopians, and a transit point for "extraordinary renditions"
of suspected "terrorists" by the U.S. and the Ugandan component of AMISOM.
On September 15, the I.C.U.'s spokesman, Sheikh Abdirahin Isse Addow,
announced that his group opposed the closure of Adan Adde, offering a counter-list
of concerns, including the use of the airport to bring in medical supplies, ferry the sick
and wounded for treatment outside Mogadishu, allow members of the diaspora to
conduct business and visit friends and relatives, and permit residents of Mogadishu
to conduct their affairs outside the city and participate in the Hajj. Addow concluded
that the I.C.U. knows that the airport is "dominated by our enemies," but is also
aware that it "serves the interests of everybody." The I.C.U., he said, would "give
priority to the will of the Somali people."
The contrast between the ideological purism and armed jihadism of al-Shabab's
program and the nationalist accomodationism of the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A could not be
presented more starkly than in the debate over the airport closure. Leaving aside any
judgment of the moral, strategic and tactical merits of each side's case, it is clear that
al-Shabaab is focused solely on defeating the enemy and that the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A
emphasizes its perception of broader national interests, despite its own commitment
to jihad and the establishment of a Shari'a state. This clash of perspectives reveals a
fault line in the armed opposition that runs much deeper than divergence in tactics
and is only imperfectly designated by abstract terms such as "extremism" and
"moderation."
In order to understand the differences among the components of the Courts
movement and the course that it will take, it is necessary to factor in ideology.
As al-Shabaab and the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A sparred over representation in Kismayo and
the attempted closure of Adan Adde, A.R.S.-D encountered the limits of its pluralist
program at a fresh round of negotiations with the T.F.G. in Djibouti aimed by its
United Nations brokers and Western and regional backers at the signing of a ceasefire agreement.
Facing denunciation from al-Shabaab and the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A that it had capitulated
to Ethiopia and the U.S., A.R.S.-D remained committed to its publicly stated belief
that an Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia would satisfy the goals of the resistance
and that power-sharing with the T.F.G. would give the Courts movement an essential
role in the country's political future.
On arriving at the talks in mid-September, A.R.S.-D soon learned that the cards had
been stacked against it. Rather than facing a balanced negotiating environment,
A.R.S.-D found itself confronted by a TFG supported by the revived Washingtoninspired International Contact Group (I.C.G.), which had expanded from its original
base of Western powers to include the African Union, Arab League, Organization of
the Islamic Conference and a smattering of Arab and African states, including
Ethiopia. When A.R.S.-D became aware of the Ethiopian presence, it walked out of
the talks; local media reported that the T.F.G. had prepared to meet A.R.S.-D
"flanked" by observers from the I.C.G.
It stretches the political imagination to reason out why the ICG. adopted an
intimidation strategy against A.R.S.-D, which was fast losing its credibility and
needed to be seen to be taken seriously; perhaps Washington believed that having
made concessions in the past, A.R.S.-D would stand for anything. Nonetheless,
despite its resistance, the Italian ambassador to Djibouti succeeded in bringing
A.R.S.-D back into the talks, but, as it turned out, to no avail.
When it became clear that the T.F.G. had not brought a timetable for Ethiopian
withdrawal to the talks, as A.R.S.-D had expected it would, but instead floated a
proposal to defer the timetable and offer an Ethiopian pull back from densely
populated civilian areas, A.R.S.-D for the first time put its back up and refused to sign
a cease-fire that al-Shabaab and the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A would not have honored in any
case, and would have left A.R.S.-D void of credibility and a captive of foreign powers.
A.R.S.-D's security committee chair and secretary-general, Umar Hashi Adan,
explained that a solution to Somalia's conflicts "can easily be found if Ethiopia
withdraws, and that there could be no cease-fire without a timetable.
By finally resisting external pressure, A.R.S.-D has pumped a little life into its pluralist
program and has a chance, albeit slim, to become a subordinate player in the Courts
movement, rather than the isolated outlier that it had become. Had A.R.S.-D signed
on to even a meaningless and merely symbolic cease-fire, Islamic pluralism would
have become a dead issue in Somalia.
Ideological Diversity and the Courts Movement's Future
As the current protagonist in Somalia's political conflicts - a status that is only due to
the gains on the ground of al-Shabaab and the I.C.U. - the Courts movement is faced
with containing the outbreak of overt ideological diversity within it. On an ideological
plane, the movement has the advantage of confronting an adversary in the T.F.G.
that has no ideology at all - no vision - but only the prospect of continued clan-based
politics and attendant corrupt warlordism. Despite that advantage, however, there is
a higher likelihood of a breakdown into discord than of healthy competitive
collaboration, given Somalia's and the movement's recent past.
Were the Courts movement to infuse itself with political vitality, its three ideological
tendencies would cultivate mutual forbearance while retaining their relative
independence, which could be achieved without their subsumption into a common
organization. In such a process, A.R.S.-D would mediate the movement to external
actors, the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A would mediate A.R.S.-D to al-Shabaab, and al-Shabaab
would defer its maximal revolutionary aims. This scenario would require A.R.S.-D to
continue to stiffen its bargaining position, drawing it closer to the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A; and
al-Shabaab to moderate its purism, again drawing it closer to the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A. In
turn, the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A would seize its mediating role and act accordingly.
Of the ideological components of the Courts movement, the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A holds the
vital center. All of the ideological tendencies in the movement would have to
acknowledge and accept that if the Courts movement is to remain intact.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue
University
weinstem@purdue.edu
ANALYSIS - Insurgents Take Upper Hand In
Somalia
By Andrew Cawthorne
NAIROBI, Sept 25, 2008 – Nearly two years after being driven from Mogadishu,
Islamists have re-taken swathes of south Somalia and may have their sights again on
the capital.
The insurgents' push is being led by Al Shabaab, or "Youth" in Arabic, the most
militant in a wide array of groups opposed to the Somali government and military
backers from Ethiopia, an ally in Washington's "War on Terror".
"Shabaab are winning. They have pursued a startlingly successful two-pronged
strategy -- chase all the internationals from the scene, and shift tactics from
provocation to conquest," said a veteran Somali analyst in the region.
"Before it was 'hit-and-run' guerrilla warfare. Now it's a case of 'we're here to stay',"
he added, noting Shabaab was "flooded with money" from foreign backers.
The Islamist insurgency since early 2007, the latest installment in Somalia's 17-year
civil conflict, has worsened one of Africa's worst humanitarian crises and fomented
instability around the already chronically volatile Horn region.
Shabaab's advances are galling to Washington, which says the group is linked to al
Qaeda and has put it on its terrorism list. Western security services have long
worried about Somalia becoming a haven for extremists, though critics -- and the
Islamists -- say that threat has been fabricated to disguise U.S. aims to keep control,
via Ethiopia, in the region.
Some compare the Somali quagmire to Iraq in character, if not scale, given its appeal
to jihadists, the involvement of foreign troops and the tactics used by the rebels.
In August, in its most significant grab of a gradual territorial encroachment, Shabaab
spearheaded the takeover of Kismayu, a strategic port and south Somalia's second
city.
This month, its threats to shoot down planes have largely paralyzed Mogadishu
airport. And in recent days, its fighters have been targeting African peacekeepers.
"The only question is 'what next?" said a diplomat, predicting Shabaab would next
seek to close Mogadishu port and take control of Baidoa town, the seat of parliament.
Analysts say Islamists or Islamist-allied groups now control most of south Somalia,
with the exception of Mogadishu, Baidoa where parliament is protected by Ethiopian
troops, and Baladwayne near the border where Addis Ababa garrisons soldiers.
That is a remarkable turnaround from the end of 2006, when allied Somali-Ethiopian
troops chased the Islamists out of Mogadishu after a six-month rule of south Somalia,
scattering them to sea, remote hills and the Kenyan border.
The Islamists regrouped to begin an insurgency that has killed nearly 10,000
civilians. Military discipline, grassroots political work, youth recruitment and an antiEthiopian rallying cry have underpinned their return, analysts say.
With the Islamists split into many rival factions, it is impossible to tell if an offensive
against Mogadishu is imminent. Analysts say Shabaab and other Islamist militants
may not want an all-out confrontation with Ethiopian troops, preferring to wait until
Addis Ababa withdraws forces.
WORLD "NUMB" TO SOMALIA
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is fed up with the human, political and
financial cost of his Somalia intervention, but knows withdrawal could hasten the fall
of Mogadishu.
The insurgents may also resist the temptation to launch an offensive on Mogadishu
until their own ranks are united.
"Opposition forces at the moment are internally debating whether or not it's time for a
major push," the diplomat said.
Meanwhile, the rebels attack government and Ethiopian targets in the city seemingly
at will. Of late, they have also been hitting African Union (AU) peacekeepers, who
number just 2,200, possibly to warn the world against more intervention.
Estimates vary but experts think Ethiopia has about 10,000 soldiers in Somalia, the
government about 10,000 police and soldiers. Islamist fighter numbers are fluid but
may match that.
The Islamists' growth in power has gone largely unnoticed outside Somalia by all but
experts. For the wider world, Somalia's daily news of bombs, assassinations, piracy
and kidnappings has blurred into an impression of violence-as-usual.
Even this week's horrors, including shells slicing up 30 civilians in a market,
registered barely a blip outside.
"The world has grown numb to Somalia's seemingly endless crises," said analyst Ken
Menkhaus.
But "much is new this time, and it would be a dangerous error of judgment to brush
off Somalia's current crisis as more of the same," he said. "Seismic political, social
and security changes are occurring in the country."
The United Nations has been pushing a peace agreement in neighboring Djibouti that
would see a ceasefire, a pull-back of Ethiopian troops -- the insurgents' main bone of
contention -- then some sort of power-sharing arrangement.
Diplomats see that as the main hope for stability, and moderates on both sides
support it in principle. But Islamist fighters on the ground have rejected the process,
and negotiators failed to agree on details last week.
A U.S. expert on Somalia, John Prendergast, said the world had taken its eyes off
the conflict at its peril.
"Somalia truly is the one place in Africa where you have a potential cauldron of
recruitment and extremism that, left to its own devices, will only increase in terms of
the danger it presents to the region, and to American and Western interests."
One effect of the conflict impinging on the outside world is rampant piracy off
Somalia. Gangs have captured some 30 boats this year, and still hold a dozen ships
with 200 or so hostages.
The violence is also impeding relief groups from helping Somalia's several million
hungry. Foreign investors, interested in principle in Somalia's hydrocarbon and
fishing resources, barely give the place a second thought in the current climate.
Source: Reuters
Somali Pirates Turn Route to Suez Into
`Most Dangerous' Waters
By Gregory Viscusi
Sept. 25 (Bloomberg) -- Fishing for tuna in the Indian Ocean 420 miles from the Somali
coast, Captain Patrick Helies figured his trawler was far enough out to be safe from pirates.
It wasn't. On the night of Sept. 13, Somali brigands attacked, hitting his French-flagged ship
with two rocket- propelled grenades. Helies and his crew of 25 outran the smaller pirate boat
in choppy seas without injury or significant damage.
Helies' 279-foot trawler, Le Drennec, is one of 54 boats attacked so far this year in the Gulf of
Aden and off Somalia, the latest hot spot for piracy. Somali pirates are pursuing ever- larger
prey en route to the Suez Canal ever-farther from shore. They are currently holding 12 vessels
and 240 crewmembers hostage.
``Every ship going through the Gulf of Aden faces a serious chance it will be attacked,'' said
Giles Noakes, head of security for Bimco, a shipping association. ``It's beyond the crisis
stage, and the world has to ask if it considers this acceptable.''
Ships using the Suez Canal to travel between Europe and Asia must pass through the gulf. In
the first half of this year, 21,080 vessels used the Egyptian canal, one-tenth of the world's
seaborne trade.
The attacks have led shipping companies to ask for military intervention by the United
Nations and to warn that they may start routing ships around the Horn of Africa, increasing
costs and risking rougher seas. French President Nicolas Sarkozy also has called for an
international response.
The attacks already have cut gulf fishing. Helies and the operators of more than 40 other
French and Spanish tuna vessels have dropped anchor off the Seychelles, temporarily
abandoning their livelihoods.
Foreign Navies
``We had followed every bit of advice and we were still attacked,'' said Jean-Yves Labbe,
chief executive of CMB, the French owner of Helies' boat. ``We are in a situation that has
spun out of our control.''
The pirates haven't been cowed by foreign navies. Bandits seized a Hong Kong freighter and
a Greek-owned carrier in the two days after French commandos freed a yacht and its crew
Sept. 15, killing one pirate and capturing six.
Worldwide, the number of pirate attacks is in decline, to 263 in 2007 from 329 in 2004 and
445 in 2003, according to the International Maritime Bureau.
That progress followed increased patrols in the Straits of Malacca by the Malaysian,
Indonesian and Singapore navies. Those waters had 38 attacks in 2004, falling to seven in
2007 and two in the first half of this year, the IMB said.
Beefed Up Patrols
``Once the Indonesians beefed up their naval patrols and cooperated with Malaysia and
Singapore, the problem was basically over,'' said Noel Choong, who runs the IMB's piracy
reporting center. ``That's not going to be possible in Somalia, which has no government''
because it has been split into loosely run breakaway regions since 1991.
The number of attacks off Somalia rose from 10 in 2004 to 44 in 2007 before hitting 54 so far
this year, the IMB said.
``Somalia is by far the most dangerous area in the world,'' said Klaus Kjaerulff, chief
executive of Danish shipping company D/S Torm A/S. A 115,000-ton Torm tanker was saved
from pirates two months ago by the fortuitous arrival of a U.S. warship.
About 1,200 Somalis, mostly former fishermen or soldiers, are actively involved in piracy, the
IMB said. They use secondhand Russian trawlers to launch radar-evading speedboats for the
attacks.
``It's a lucrative business,'' said Fred Burton, a vice president at Stratfor, a risk management
company. ``They seem to use their proceeds to buy better ships and weapons.''
Rogue Fishermen
The pirates are helped by rogue Somali fishermen who act as lookouts and issue warnings via
satellite phones, according to a book by Patrick Marchesseau, the captain of a French yacht,
Le Ponant, that was held for a week in April.
Like most seized ships, Le Ponant was taken to the port of Eyl in Somalia's Puntland region.
Its owners, Marseille-based CMA-CGM, reclaimed the boat after paying a $2.15 million
ransom, delivered at sea in three bags, Marchesseau said. French commandos recovered some
of the money when they took six pirates prisoner in a helicopter-borne raid in Somalia, the
French defense ministry said.
President Sarkozy's Sept. 16 request for a global anti- piracy effort has elicited a response so
far only from Spain, which plans to dispatch a P-3 Orion surveillance plane to France's base
in Djibouti, on the Gulf of Aden.
Pirate Ship Seized
Other countries have acted independently. Denmark sent the frigate Absalon to the area in
August and seized a pirate ship. On Sept. 18, Kuala Lumpur-based MISC Bhd, the world's
largest owner of liquefied natural gas tankers, lifted a two-week ban on its ships using the
Suez Canal after Malaysia sent three naval escorts.
A June 2 Security Council resolution allows warships to enter Somali waters to combat
pirates. The U.S., France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, Germany, and the U.K. all have
ships in the Indian Ocean supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's military in
Afghanistan. Some forces have rules against firing first.
"The French and the Danes have taken action, but other countries have rules of engagement
that prevent them from being effective against piracy,'' Noakes said.
SOURCE: Bloomberg, Thursday, September 25, 2008
The Fall Of Mbeki
By Greg Mills and Terence McNamee
Thursday, September 25, 2008
It is hard to think of a more ignominious end for Thabo Mbeki. As deputy to Nelson
Mandela and then as president, he has run South Africa since the end of apartheid.
Last Saturday he was "recalled" from the presidency by the National Executive
Council of the governing African National Congress and forced to resign. The move
followed a series of blunders that have shattered the image of the man once revered
as an African Machiavelli, coolly puffing his pipe while outsmarting all before him.
Mbeki's rise through the ranks of the ANC, the party his father Govan Mbeki once
led, was meteoric. He often boasted that he was "born into the struggle" for liberation
from white oppression. But his ousting was inevitable after he arrogantly
overestimated his base within the ANC and failed to be re-elected as party leader last
December.
In totting up his domestic legacy, South Africa's impressive growth rates, political
stability and widening black economic empowerment will have to be balanced against
his failure to tackle the twin epidemics that continue to grip the country - crime and
AIDS. Many regard his crackpot views on the disease as contributing to the needless
deaths of thousands of South Africans who were unable to gain access to effective
treatment.
Throughout his tenure, Mbeki's passion for diplomacy was palpable. He loved the
international stage and believed that he alone possessed the skills and vision to
recast his beleaguered continent in the eyes of the world. This idea became manifest
in his "African renaissance." That one rarely, if ever, hears this term today is
emblematic of his dismal record in foreign affairs. The recent deal he brokered in
Zimbabwe, which looks increasingly tenuous, should fool no one: Mbeki's legacy as
an international statesman is disappointing.
His predecessor's vision that human rights would be the light that guided South
Africa's foreign policy, making the country a beacon of hope for the world and for
African development, may have been utopian, given the harsh realities of African
politics.
Nevertheless, Mbeki inherited an enormous reserve of political capital built up by
Nelson Mandela. The country's diversity, its status as the only nuclear power to
voluntarily give up its weapons, the lessons of its transformation process, the muscle
of its economy - one-third of sub-Saharan Africa's total - all this was an extraordinary
foundation on which to build a uniquely African development model.
Mbeki never demonstrated that he possessed a clear understanding of South Africa's
national interest or how to balance ideological considerations and the country's
priorities in trade, investment and international politics.
At the United Nations, for example, short-term tactical politicization routinely
overshadowed strategic considerations. Instead of leading the African voting bloc,
the UN's biggest, on trade access and help to the continent, South Africa blocked UN
managerial reform, obstructed the interests of Western powers and maneuvered
around tougher action on Burma, Zimbabwe and Iran. None of this did one bit for
Africa or Africans.
The anti-imperialistic tenor of Mbeki's foreign policy was understandable, given his
background. Less explicable was his failure to apply to Russia and China the same
opprobrium he reserved for the West, especially the United States. Whatever the
issue, under Mbeki South African opposition to U.S. policies often appeared more
reflexive than considered.
For several years, Mbeki tried to encourage President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe
down the path of electoral politics. Against all evidence that this was possible in a
state disintegrating under hyper-inflation and violent repression, Mbeki doggedly
stuck to his plan. His unwillingness to act against Mugabe - to simply even state that
what was happening there was wrong - gave succor to Harare's regime and amplified
the crisis.
Did Mbeki misjudge Mugabe? Or did he believe the tyrant's liberation credentials
excused all else?
Clearly, Mbeki sought to project himself as a liberator. But it is hard to escape the
conclusion that, in seeking to ameliorate the crisis in Zimbabwe, Mbeki was greatly
inhibited by his own determination to safeguard the ANC's liberation narrative. His
shameful response to criticism of Zimbabwe by outside powers, and their calls for
South Africa and other African governments to do more to resolve the crisis, exposed
his deep personal sensitivity on questions of race.
If the new administration in Pretoria can unshackle itself from the ANC's inhibitive
liberation ethos, Mbeki's departure from office could revitalize South Africa's standing
in world affairs.
Greg Mills heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation and Terence
McNamee is with the London-based Royal United Services Institute.
Awdalnews Editorial: Kulmiye Leadership
Should Quit Or Face History’s Cruel Verdict
September 24, 2008
No doubt that Somaliland’s main opposition party, Kulmiye, has been viewed since a
short time ago as the most formidable political party in Somaliland. Partly this was
due to Kulmiye’s vigorous and courageous stances vis-à-vis the inept leadership of
President Rayale and his co. and partly due to the charisma and history of its
leaders, many of them drawing their popularity from being former fighters of the
Somali National Movement.
Just because it was the party of heavyweight politicians and war hardened veterans
such Ahmed Sillanyo, Abdirahman Aw Ali, Hassan Isse Jama, Mohamed Kahin,
Muse Bihi, Ibrahim Dhegaweyne and others, people of Somaliland thought these
gentlemen would be their salvation brigade in times of crisis. They placed a lot of
hope in them; a hope that was reinforced by Sillanyo’s commendable decision to
concede defeat in a grossly erroneous election in 2003. In retrospect Somalilanders
now realize that statesmanship of Sillanyo after they have seen the newly found road
to power sharing taken by opposition groups in Kenya and Zimbabwe. It was by
looking back at the torturous and protracted war the SNM waged against the military
dictatorship of Siyad Barre and the ensuing clan civil wars that followed it in the first
years of the country’s restoration of peace that Sillanyo had set an impressive act of
statesmanship that is engraved in stone.
Likewise Abdirahman Aw Ali has besides his famous history of deviating from the
herd mentality and chartering his own course had fought gallantly for a Somaliland
that doesn’t belong to a sole clan; a Somaliland that every man and women,
regardless of their clan and region, can aspire to the highest office of the country.
Just like he fought against the injustice inflicted on the Issaq people by Siyad Barre
regime, he heroically fought for the right of non-Issaq clans of Somaliland to have
their share of the country’s highest offices. Therefore, his selection as Vice President
of the first government of late President Egal didn’t come by accident. It is due to his
struggle that Rayale today enjoys the Presidency of Somaliland and the loyalty of the
otherwise skeptic people of Awdal for Somaliland had been sealed in indelible ink. It
was in the same spirit and for the same principle of making Somaliland a home for all
that Abdirahman had put up a fierce battle in the Kulmiye Congress held in Hargeysa
in March 2008 against the idea of giving the ticket of the Presidency and Vice
Presidency to only one clan. Again it is a matter of principle and his tenacious sense
of justice and respect for party rules that he rejected the dubious election outcome of
the Kulmiye Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates in Buroa in August 2008.
But it is a fact of life that every courageous fighter should one day face his waterloo
and it seems the Buroa convention had signaled the high water mark for both
Sillanyo and Abdirahman’s political careers. Sillanyo has violated party rules by
campaigning for one of the vice presidential candidates instead of remaining neutral.
Both his election in Hargeysa by the fabled dictatorial figure of 99%, his attendance
of a clan meeting in Gar Adag to rally his clan behind him and his unfair endorsement
of one candidate against the other three Vice Presidential candidates all reeked of
devious tactics of a power hungry sly politician. By the same token, Abdirahman has
also shown his Machiavellian style of using the right cause for achieving the wrong
objective by agitating and dividing the people of Awdal on tribal lines. Since the
creation of Somaliland, Abdirahman has held some of the country’s highest posts
such as vice president and defense minister. He also made two previous
unsuccessful attempts for the vice presidency. Where does the greed for power stop
one may ask. Is Somaliland so impotent that it cannot produce new generation of
leaders instead of recycling the same faces for nearly two decades?
With the country now heading towards a decisive election and with Kulmiye
embroiled in internecine infighting, the field seems to be clear for a resounding
victory for Rayale. And it will be a victory given to him on a golden platter by Kulmiye.
Not simply because Kulmiye seems to be irreversibly split, but also the party seems
to be built on a personality cult and appears to be devoid of vision and a political
agenda. Through its long his history as a major party Kulmiye failed to rally the
people behind common goals and objectives. Kulmiye leaders thought their history
would guarantee them people’s loyalty and buy them votes. They were only good at
rabble rousing and agitating people against the government without showing tangible
policies and development plans of their own as a shadow government. Many people
therefore saw the Buroa fiasco as the mighty fall of an aging dinosaur. Kulmiye was
already dead before its Buroa convention has even started.
The only way that Kulmiye can save its legacy, win the trust of the people and pose a
challenge in the coming elections is to change the entire leadership of the party.
Leadership sometimes demands you to take the backseat and lead from behind
when your presence at the front becomes untenable. One good example to follow is
that of Ismail Aare, the vice presidential candidate, who quit his quest when he found
that it was time to step down. “Yesterday, it was I who needed the party but today it is
the party that needs me,” he said, putting the party’s interest before his own wishes;
wise words that Sillanyo, Abdirahman and the entire tired leadership of Kulmiye
should heed.
Gentlemen, we respect your history but you are a spent force. We need leaders with
a vision who can take us to the future; not tired politicians who dwell on past deeds.
We lived through the past and we know it. What we need now is a road map of hope
for the future. And that you cannot deliver. This is why both the future of the country
and the future of the party belong to the younger generation. It is time for you to
move over before you are swept away unceremoniously by the power of the people
and you face history’s cruel verdict.
Awdalnews Network
OPINION
Kulmiye’s Crisis And The Democracy In Somaliland
By: Dr. Mohamed Rashid Sheikh Hassan
If Kulmiye does not put his house in order and come up with an agreed Vice President for
the forthcoming presidential election, democratic process in Somaliland will suffer a huge
damage.
The current crisis of Kulmiye has mainly originated from the leadership contest in Burao
party conference, but not entirely from the conference. The election of the Presidential
candidate was finally agreed to be Sillanyo after a rough ride.
The problem of electing the Vice Presidential candidate plunged the party into
unprecedented crisis, resulting that the party has split in the middle. There were three
candidates for the Vice Presidential candidacy, Abdirahman Sayli’i, Abdirahman Aw Ali
Farah, both from Awdal Region and Ahmed H. Ali Adami from Sanaag Region.
It was clear from the beginning whom was Sillanyo’s favorite among the three contesters
and it was Abdirahman Sayli’i. Why Sillanyo preferred Abdirahman Sayli’i seemed based on
analysis touching different aspects, but the main one was that Sillanyo clearly and honestly
stated that it is Abdirahman Sayli’i that he can work comfortably with, and this is correct in
the ethical and leadership rules in any organizational.
The other two candidates did not accept that and immediately organized their own group
within the party to challenge this outcome. Their main argument was that the Burao
conference was undemocratic particularly the way in which the Vice Presidential candidate
was elected.
After these events, the situation within Kulmiye became an open Pandora Box where
“political marketers” trade in and made their political playground. There were several
mediations from different walks of life of the community, including the other two political
parties, UCID and UDUB.
I am a concerned Somalilander who feels uncomfortable how recent events in Kulmiye‘s
party have been developing, because I feel this is damaging the national interest. There is
no profit or benefit for anyone for Kulmiye party’s crisis. It is in the interest of the country that
the dispute in Kulmiye has to be settled sooner.
Having said this, I would like to contribute this debate with the following observations:
Democracy in Somaliland and its process
Those who are well familiar with the Somaliland democratic process perfectly know that we
are not still democrats, but we are trying to build a democratic society. The way we go about
this has been, and still is, by using mixture of clan, Islamic and limited democratic
methodologies to choose our leaders and to settle our conflicts, and we call these
democratic actions, though it is far from democracy.
In connection to this, the argument that Abdirahman Aw Ali and his supporters saying that
Burao Kulmiye conference were not democratic loses its validity and credibility in Somaliland
political context.
I can quote one main event, during the election of the parliamentary speakers. The Guurti
realized the political system of the country tilts decisively to the ruling party, UDUB if the
speakers of the parliament also went to the ruling party. The Guurti settled with the wellknown formula, by allowing the opposition parties to have had the speaker and its two
deputies (Shir-gudoonka).
That day I remember by asking the wise man of the Guurti, H. Abdirkarin (Abdi Warabe)
what legal basis of this compromise was based. He said to me, “We did not refer too much
on legal basis, but we refer to the political wisdom “xikma” of Somaliland. Because we
thought if “shir-gudoonka” also goes to the ruling party, the government will have too much
power.” (Xisbu xaakimku haday taa ku darsadaan waxay helayaan doobi buuxa, qolada
mucaaridka ahina doobi madhan, markaa taasi nalama aha wax wanaagsan.)
History of Kulmiye Party
If I may go back for a moment to the history of Kulmiye Party, during the Presidential election
in 2003, Abdirahman Aw Ali was a member of the Asad Political Organization headed by
Suleiman Mohamoud Adem, the current chairman of the Guurti. In Kulmiye at that time,
there were four candidates, all from Awdal Region who were competing for the candidacy of
the Vice President., including my self For instance, in my case; I was well-prepared for the
post. I had just finished my PhD in Political Science from London University (SOAS and
LSC) with a professional working experience and political background and being an active
supporter of the SNM struggle.
I met Sillanyo as soon as he left form Siad Barre’s regime and before he joined the SNM
leadership in Addis Ababa. I was Student at London University and a coordinator of a
lobbing Group consisting of students and Somali Diaspora in London against the military
regime of Siad Barre. We welcomed Sillanyo to our group and we gave him a full support in
his opposition activities in London. I personally organized for him several lectures in London
University (SOAS) where he spoke and explained the atrocities of the regime of Siad Barre. I
went with him to Sheffield, Manchester and Liverpool for lobbying and support.
After almost a decade, I met Sillanyo again for a lunch in London before he established the
Kulmiye Party and we had one-to-one lively discussion about the political situation in our
country. The Somaliland Diaspora particularly those living in London encouraged me to join
Kulmiye Party and give Sillanyo the political and media support and experience that he and
the party needed. I came to Hargeysa and joined the party.
Abdi Mohamoud (Gaagaale), now an MP was also among the other three Awdal candidates.
Abdi Mohamoud played an important role in the peace making processes in Somaliland
particularly in the Awdal region. At that time he was living in the United States, but he came
back because of assurance from Kulmiye leadership that he will be selected to be the Vice
Presidential candidate. The two others were Abdi Hassan Buni, an elderly statesman and Dr
Mohamed Hadi, a professional medical doctor.
To our surprise and maybe to the surprise of the Somaliland political history, Abdirahman Aw
Ali mysteriously entered the party from the back door in the last few days before the election
date and before our eyes open, Abdirahman Aw Ali was hastily declared the winner as the
Vice Presidential candidate of the party.
In my analysis abandoning of the other contesters and the sudden switch of bringing
Abdirahman Aw Ali from the back door caused Kulmiye and its leader Sillanyo not to win the
2003 Presidential election. This episode left with Sillanyo and the Kulmiye party with
uncomfortable historical memorial reflections.
In my case, I swallowed my pride, walked out from the party and hoped a good luck for
Sillanyo and the party, but I still I respect Sillanyo as a Somaliland statesman.
Who engineered this plot by bringing Abdirahman Aw Ali from the back door? It was
engineered by the three Mujahiddin Musketeers, Mouse Bihi, Mohamed Kahin and
Dhagaweyne. They even convinced the good-hearted Islamic politicians in the party, such as
Abdiaziz Mohamed Samaale, whom I had a good relationship with, to their point of view.
I give great respect to Muse Bihi, who frankly told me at that time that he was no longer
supporting me and that he switched his support to Abdirahman Aw Ali, because he was his
colleague in the trench during the SNM struggle.
Now we have another face of the political history of the Kulmiye Party. The four Mujahiddin
musketeers (by the way, the four mujahidins Musketeers have an honorable place in the
history of Somaliland because of their contributions to the liberation struggle) are no longer
in the same trench. Abdirahman Aw Ali and Dhagaweyne are in the same camp and Mouse
Bihi and Mohamed Kahin are supporting Sillanyo.
Conclusion
To Ahmed H. Ali Adami & Abdirahman Aw Ali
I consider Mr. Adami a good and productive Somaliland statesman because of his record in
Somaliland National Electoral Commission. He ran the commission in a difficult times and he
kept his head above all these difficulties sometimes using his humorous potentialities. I
advise him to be a good mediator between the two factions of the party and convince
Abdirahman Aw Ali group and himself as well to drop their objections and join the rest of the
party for the national interest. The country can’t afford at this time of historical junction that
none of the three political parties, UCID, Kulmiye and UDUB, have an internal strife.
If the way in which Abdirahman Aw Ali was elected in 2003 Kulmiye’s election was
acceptable and ok, logically the way that Abdirahman Sayli’i was elected should also be ok.
Moreover, Abdirahman Sayli’i did not enter the party from the back door but he came from
the front door and without “plotters” to put him in.
I would like advise Abdirahman Aw Ali the following:
 To swallow his pride and give a chance to Abdirahman Sayli’i to pursue his political
career. This will also save Awdal region and Awdal community from further divisions and
ramifications.
 To give a chance to Kulmiye party as well as his previous close colleague, Mujahid Muse
Bihi, who is now positioned as the second person to Sillanyo.
Dr. Mohamed-Rashid Sh. Hassan e-mail: rashid108@hotmail.com
Time To Hunt Somali Pirates
J.Peter Pham, PhD
September 25, 2008
Late last Monday evening, for the second time this year, France’s President Nicolas
Sarkozy dispatched special operations forces into the territory of the defunct Somali
Democratic Republic to free French citizens who had been hijacked by pirates off the
dangerous waters off the Horn of Africa. The next morning, in a pre-dawn operation
lasting just ten minutes, a team from the Commando Hubert of the berets verts, the
elite naval commandos, freed a French couple, Jean-Yves and Bernadette Delanne,
who had been kidnapped two weeks earlier when their yacht, the Carré d’As IV, was
seized by pirates as it was passing through the Gulf of Aden en route to France from
Australia. The pirates holding the Delannes had been demanding a $1.4 million
ransom. Instead one pirate ended up dead and another half dozen received a free
trip to one of holding cells belonging to the France’s special counterterrorism court
where they will join six other Somalis captured by French commandos in April after
they hijacked the luxury sailboat Le Ponant and held its thirty crew members
hostage. The berets verts suffered no casualties.
Several hours after the commando raid, in a speech from the Élysée Palace in Paris,
President Sarkozy noted that he ordered the rescue when it became clear the pirates
planned to take the hostages to Eyl, a pirate base in the semi-autonomous
northeastern Somali region of Puntland, where “their captivity could have lasted
months.” According to the French chief of state, “The world cannot accept this.
Today, these are no longer isolated cases but a genuine industry of crime. This
industry threatens a fundamental freedom, that of movement and of international
commerce.” Citing the fact that piracy in the Gulf of Aden had “literally exploded” this
year with more than fifty attacks so far this year and Somali pirates still holding an
estimated 150 hostages and more than a dozen ships, mainly around Eyl, the
president called the international community to action against “this plague.”
Yet barely 24 hours later, a Hong Kong-registered ship, the 25,000-ton Stolt Valor,
which had been chartered by the Norwegian-Luxembourgish Stolt-Nielsen
Transportation Group and bound for Mumbai, India, with a chemical cargo, was
seized with its crew of twenty-two, including 18 Indians, two Filipinos, one
Bangladeshi, and one Russian. The next day, Somali pirates hijacked the Greekowned, Maltese registered bulk carrier Centauri, which was carrying 26 Filipino
seamen and a load of 17,000 tons of salt to the Kenyan port of Mombassa; the
vessel was taken to southern Somalia which, as I reported late last month, had come
under the control of Islamist forces with al Qaeda links. In a separate attack that
same day, the Hong Kong-registered Great Creation, which was traveling to India
from Tunisia, was also seized with its crew of 24 Chinese and one Sri Lankan. On
Sunday, another Greek-owned freighter, the Bahamian-registered Captain
Stephanos, was hijacked 250 nautical miles off the Somali coast. As of the time this
column is being filed, there is no word on the fate of ship’s crew of seventeen
Filipinos, one Chinese, and one Ukrainian.
That the attacks are increasing should come as little surprise. In an interview with
Der Spiegel last week, Germany ship owner Niels Stolberg admitted that his Bremenbased firm, Beluga Shipping GmbH, paid $1.1 million earlier this month to recover its
$23 million freighter, the Antigua and Barbuda-registered BBC Trinidad, which had
been hijacked while carrying pipes and other oil equipment from Houston, Texas, to
Muscat, Oman. With ship owners willing to pay ransoms of more than $1 million for
the release of their hijacked vessels, Somali piracy in increasing in both frequency
and sophistication. Not only are the attacks the most lucrative economic activity in
Somalia these days, but the pirates are using at least part of the ransoms they have
collecting to upgrade their arsenals in the hopes of landing even larger maritime
prizes. The authoritative shipping paper of record, Lloyd’s List, warned last week that
“ransom paid to pirate raiders off Somalia could spiral to $50 million this year, fueling
copy cat attacks.”
From being the occasional nuisance whose deadly potential I warned about more
than two years ago in the inaugural column of this series when I reported on an
incident of some pirates foolishly taking Ticonderoga-class cruiser USS Cape St.
George and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Gonzalez 25 nautical miles off
the Somali coast, Somali piracy has, alas, burgeoned into an international problem
affecting literally dozens of countries around the globe. Hijacked vessels currently
being held in Somali ports include ships flying the flags of China, Egypt, Iran, Japan,
Malaysia, Nigeria, Panama, South Korea, and Thailand. Captured seamen presently
being held for ransom by the pirates come from fifteen countries, including Croatia,
India, Italy, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Russia. Insurance premiums for
commercial shipping which must pass through the Gulf of Aden have soared tenfold
over the course of the past year, adding yet another drag to the sluggish global
economy. Yet shippers have few options: the adverse impact on international
commerce of having to navigate all around the Cape of Good Hope, which adds at
least 4,500 miles to a voyage, could be even more severe than the increased
insurance costs.
Late last week the Round Table of International Shipping Associations – an umbrella
group that brings together the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the
International Association of Dry Cargo Ship-owners (Intercargo), the International
Chamber of Shipping/International Shipping Federation, and the International
Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) – jointed the International
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) in a joint appeal calling on the United Nations’
International Maritime Organization (IMO) to use its influence with the world body to
secure “real and immediate action against brazen acts of piracy, kidnapping and
armed robbery, carried out with increasing frequency against ships in the Gulf of
Aden, by pirates based in Somalia,” a challenge which the statement described as “in
danger of spiraling completely and irretrievably out of control.” It should be recalled
that the shipping industry and union were hardly exaggerating the potential risks: in
addition to other commerce, some 11 percent of world’s seaborne petroleum – some
3.3 million barrels – must pass through the very waters currently infested with the
Somali pirates.
From the international security perspective, even more grave than the danger to
global maritime commerce, there is increasing evidence that at least part of the
proceeds from the piracy has gone to fund the Islamist insurgency against the
internationally-recognized, but otherwise utterly ineffective, “Transitional Federal
Government” (TFG) of Somalia. The insurgent “Alliance for the Re-Liberation of
Somalia” (ARS) is spearheaded by al-Shabaab (“the Youth”), a group with ties to alQaeda which was formally designated a “foreign terrorist organization” by Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice earlier this year (see my March 27th report). The latest
confirmation of what is at the very least tacit cooperation between the Somali pirates
and their terrorist counterparts were the reports over the weekend that the Centauri
was headed toward the Islamist-controlled southern Somali coast, rather than to one
of the usual pirate havens in Puntland. Moreover, should the link between Somali
piracy and Somali Islamist terrorism ever mature beyond the current marriage of
convenience to achieve operational and strategic synergies, then the real
consequences of the maritime economic warfare which I sketched out in concept two
years ago will be truly catastrophic.
And while the pirate gangs and, however indirectly, the ARS insurgents have
benefited from the attacks on shipping, the already marginal existence of ordinary
Somalis has deteriorated. The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)
currently feeds some 2.4 million of the approximately 6 million inhabitants of Somalia
proper; by the end of the year, the number of those totally dependent upon food
assistance is expected to grow by about 50 percent to more than 3.6 million as the
region faces what WFP Executive Director Josette Sheeran characterized Monday as
“the worst humanitarian crisis since 1984,” when over one million died in the
Ethiopian famine. With approximately 90% of that food aid moved by sea, the pirate
attacks threaten to cut off that vital lifeline. While the pirates have not targeted WFP
food shipments recently because of escort protection provided by the Canadian
Halifax-class frigate HMCS Ville de Québec, the vessel is scheduled to end its threemonth deployment and sail home this coming weekend. As yet, no country has
stepped forward to take over the mission. The dire humanitarian situation is further
aggravated by al-Shabaab’s warning last week against any aircraft landing at
Mogadishu’s Aden Adde Airport, a threat backed by intelligence that the terrorist
group had taken delivery of a new consignment surface-to-air missiles. As a result of
the Islamists’ ban on flights, the only plane to come in all week was a Ugandan
military flight that slipped in last Friday to deliver supplies to the Ugandan People’s
Defense Force contingent which makes up the bulk of the woefully undermanned
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force. In response, ARS
forces pounded Mogadishu over the weekend, shelling two AMISOM bases, the
airport, and the city’s Bakara market; at least two dozen civilians were killed on
Monday alone.
What then, might be done to deal with the growing challenge of Somali piracy?
First, commercial vessels need to be better prepared to protect themselves. For now,
commercial shipping should limit their risk by navigating within the limits of Maritime
Security Patrol Area (MSPA) proclaimed late last month by the Commander, United
States Naval Central Command, and entrusted to the Combined Task Force 150
multinational effort originally set up to stop suspect shipping in support of the war on
terrorism. In the event they come under pirate attack, vessels transiting through the
Gulf of Aden via the MSPA corridor stand a greater chance of receiving assistance
from coalition ships maintaining a continual presence in the vicinity. Some ship
owners have also invested in alarm systems, close-circuit television, electric fences,
and even armed guards as measures to counter the threat of being boarded, many
have not. Nonetheless, even if all ships deployed countermeasures, the merchant
marine cannot be turned into an armed fleet. Furthermore, with some attacks being
mounted more than 200 nautical miles from the Somali coast by heavily armed
pirates in ocean going vessels equipped with satellite technology, there is a limit to
the effectiveness of the standard advice given to commercial shipping to avoid the
coastline, keep alert, and maintain speed. (See point six below.)
Second, given the large area within which the pirates now apparently operate as well
as their improved armaments and tactics necessitates a strong naval response to
sweep the international sea lanes clear of the pirates. Since early this month the
Royal Danish Navy has had a combat support ship, HDMS Absalon in the Gulf of
Aden as part of the Combined Task Force 150 (the rotating command of the task
force handed over to a Danish officer, Commodore Per Bigum Christensen, last
Monday). The Absalon, however, has been spending more of its deployment chasing
pirates away from commercial shipping in the MSPA than interdicting terrorist
movements of men and materiel: this past week, the frigate-type vessel was
answering at least one distress call a day. European Union (EU) foreign ministers
meeting in Brussels last Monday expressed their “serious concern about the acts of
piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast” and decided to establish a
coordination unit tasked with supporting surveillance and protection activities
undertaken by individual member states. The ministers also approved “a strategic
military option for a possible European Union naval operation.” On Saturday, a press
release from the Spanish Defense Ministry announced that, in support of the EU
coordination unit, Madrid had dispatched a P-3 Orion maritime reconnaissance plane
and a Hercules helicopter, as well as a Boeing 727 carrying support personnel, on a
three-month deployment to Djibouti, from where the aircraft will patrol the Somali
coast. Also over the weekend, the French Permanent Mission to the United Nations
was circulating a draft Security Council resolution calling on “all states interested in
the safety of maritime activities” to “actively take part in the fight against piracy
against vessels off the coast of Somalia, in particular by deploying naval vessels and
military aircraft.”
Third, while an international anti-piracy coalition as advocated by the French is well
and fine, it is effective; and it can only be as effective as its components. While the
unanimously passed UN Security Council Resolution 1816 authorizes for a period of
six months beginning in June the naval forces of other countries to enter Somali
waters in pursuit of the pirates, that document predicated the legal authority to do so
on cooperation with the TFG. The problem is that not only is the TFG no government,
but it is part and parcel of the problem. Last Friday, the Special Representative of the
UN Secretary-General for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, accused the rulers of
Puntland of complicity in the piracy, telling a press conference in Djibouti that “the
Puntland leadership has made it easy for pirates to establish a base there” and
alleging that some of ransom money collected would “be used to fund the 2009
presidential elections in Puntland.” What the Mauritanian diplomat discretely omitted
was that Puntland is the stronghold of TFG “President” Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmad’s
Darod clan and the Majeerteen subclansmen who are his most loyal supporters enjoy
a disproportionately high representation in the ranks of the pirates. One can only
guess how many of the consumer purchases which TFG chieftain is wont to make
during frequent sojourns abroad are paid for with misappropriated international funds
that are supposed to aid Somali civilians and how many are funded by the tribute
payments received by the old warlord from his pirate kinsmen (see this photo posted
on a Somali website – the very week it was taken in London earlier this year, dozens
of Somalis died in attacks in Mogadishu). The TFG is likelier to be a hindrance than a
help in taking the type of strong action, both on land as well as in the water, which
will be needed if the pirate havens are to be destroyed once and for all – statements
like last week’s declaration of support by the International Contact Group on Somalia
for the TFG’s constantly proliferating array of do-nothing committees to dialogue with
the toothless rump of the ARS that, having lost the internal power struggle to more
extremist elements, signed the so-called Djibouti Agreement last month are little
more than wishful thinking.
Fourth, in addition to eschewing entanglements with obstacles like the TFG, it is
imperative that ties be forged with effective authorities capable of helping in the fight
against piracy. While pirates operate openly along most of the 2,285 kilometers of the
coastline in Somalia proper, none ply the 740 kilometers of Gulf of Aden coastline
belonging to the as-yet unrecognized Republic of Somaliland. According to
information first disclosed last Wednesday by my friend Professor Iqbal Jhazbhay of
the University of South Africa in an interview with Nairobi, Kenya-based Voice of
America (VOA) correspondent Alisha Ryu, despite having a base in neighboring
Djibouti, France obtained permission from Somaliland authorities to use the
abandoned U.S. base at Berbera in the northwestern region of the republic as the
staging area for last week’s successful rescue. According to other sources, the
operation also involved the La Fayette-class light stealth frigate Courbet and two
ATL-2 maritime patrol aircraft. After the raid, the base was used again to transfer the
six captured pirates to an airplane bound for France. The French appear to have
decided to avail themselves of Somaliland President Dahir Riyale Kahin’s
coincidental presence in their capital for consultations to secure the use of a staging
ground that was less likely to jeopardize operational secrecy than Djibouti, where the
one runway at Ambouli International Airport is shared by commercial traffic, the
French military mission, and Camp Lemonier, home of the America’s Combined Joint
Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). As I have previously advocated and must
repeat again:
The international community needs to formally acknowledge de jure what is already
de facto: the desuetude of “Somalia” as a sovereign subject of international law.
Unitary Somalia is not only dead, but the carcass of that state has been putrefied;
reanimation is no longer in the realm of possible. To apply Max Weber’s thesis, a
government like the TFG that does not even enjoy the monopoly on the legitimate
use of force in its own capital –much less elsewhere in the territory it claims as its
own – is no government at all. Instead of constantly trying to put the best face on a
bad situation,…the emphasis should be shifted to local Somali entities which have
taken responsibility for governance in their respective regions.
Fifth, while naval operations can be undertaken to clear the sea lanes of the pirate
menace and commando raids launched to rescue hostages, the long term security of
the waters around the Horn of Africa requires the development of maritime capacity
on the part of states neighboring the anarchic regions of Somalia. As I suggested in
last week’s column, there is a need to for engagement initiatives like the United
States Navy-led Africa Partnership Station (APS), which strengthens the capacity of
partner countries to deal with a variety of challenges, including piracy, criminal
enterprises, and poaching. However, for most African nations, the scope of their
maritime ambitions and interests is far more modest than those of the blue-water
navies of middle-tier powers, much less those of the U.S. Navy. In America, functions
like maritime safety and law enforcement, littoral escort, and port security have
traditionally been the primary responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard. Given that, in
terms of mission as well as vessel size, this service is a much closer match to almost
all of Africa’s naval forces than most of the assets of Naval Forces Central Command
or the Pacific Fleet which operate nearby, it would behoove military strategists to
consider how to incorporate the Coast Guard more into their planning for security in
East Africa.
Sixth, even with short-term kinetic operations and long-term capacity enhancement
initiatives, one has to acknowledge that in the waters off the Horn, there would still
remain a not insignificant gap in maritime security between what assistance the
international community can or will provide and such capacities as African states
(and Yemen) might possess. Might it not be the case that, as I argued in The
National Interest Online last year with respect to lack of deployable peacekeeping,
the international community as a whole, interested states, or even those with stakes
in maritime transportation ought to at least consider leveraging non-traditional
security resources available within the private sector to fill, at least provisionally, the
security vacuum?
It is bad enough that, Somaliland aside, the lack of an effective, much less legitimate,
government in the territory of the former Somalia since 1991 has occasioned virtually
endless conflict among the Somali. It is intolerable that the lawlessness should spill
over and threaten the security of neighboring states like Ethiopia, Kenya, and
Yemen, as well as global commerce as a whole, much less that it should augment
the already considerable terrorist challenge. The time has come for responsible
powers in the international community to develop an integrated strategy to cope with
the worsening piracy, one that begins with declaring open season on the seaborne
marauders whom admiralty law has long branded hostes humani generis, enemies of
mankind.
In addition to serving on the boards of several international and national think tanks
and journals, FamilySecurityMatters.orgContributing Editor Dr. J. Peter Pham has
testified
before
the
U.S.Congress.
Feedback:editorialdirector@familysecuritymatters.org.
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