MINUTES
Human Project reading seminar – 1 February 2012
Sorabji, R. - Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life, and
Death
Part II: Personal identity over time
Ch. 5. Memory: Locke’s return to Epicureans and Stoics
Participants:
Georgia Tsouni
Attila Németh
Ákos Brunner
Diana Vonnák
Gábor Betegh
Máté Veres
Zsuzsanna Balogh
Attila introduced the chapter. He explained
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Locke’s focus on psychological links (such as memory) as a criterion of
personal identity.
His ideas are connected to ancient ideas of appropriation (Stoics) and
concern (Epicureans/Stoics ).
Epicureans: memory, concern, and personal identity
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Lucretian palingenesis (De Rerum Natura [henceforth DRN] III. 843-64)
Q1: What fears are addressed by the argument?
A1: The fear of a future painful life, and according to some, even the
preceding death are concerned by the argument.
Q2: Even if we endorse, as Lucretius seems to, that our atoms can be
reassembled in such a way that it would be us (nobis) „to whom the light
of life would again be given”, what does the interruption of memory
between two lives imply?
A2: Our memories, though accurately fitting our past lives, would not be genuine
memories, because
(i) They would not have been caused by our past experiences.
(ii) They would not have been retained as after e.g. sleep, so that our
memories in fact would be new, and not the originals.
(iii) These memories would not be recognized by us as being of the
previous life.
(iv) We would not have a momeroy of the intervening gap.
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But none of the above removes concern for the fears of A1. Can Lucretius argue
against the concerns of A1 satisfactorily by turning to the possibility of past
assemblies of our atoms (at DRN III. 672-3; 859)?
We discussed the importance of causation in creating genuine memories. We
also discussed whether Q-memories could count as phenomenomolgically
genuine memories.
Lucretian symmetry
Since we have no memories of past assemblies of our atoms because of the lack
of retention or causation in the interim – DRN III. 860-1 -, Lucretius is assuming
that the interruption of memory makes it unlikely that our current memories will
appear in the future reassemblies as well.
Sorabji: But why should the future case be the same?
Why should it not concern us – if the foreseen is typically an object of concern in
a way that the forgotten is not?
Lucretius’ solution (DRN III. 861-3) is that with memory interrupted and,
indeed, missing, it will not be the very same person (ipse) after all. (Earlier (DRN III
677-8) he takes the same view, where he infers from our not remembering an earlier life that any
past soul has perished and our present soul only now been created.)
Sorabji finds it plausible that the reassembly of the atoms will not produce the
same person, but not because of the interruption of memory, but because of the
extreme interruption in bodily continuity.
We discussed the relationship between concern (for the future) and memories
and used different interpretations of this link to see if it can provide a criterial
combination for personal identity through time.
We responded critically to Sorabji’s own view and his lack of providing a fullblown argument for/exegesis of his own theory.
We also discussed whether the exact same atomic constitution could result in
different mental states and how one could refrain from reductionism in this case.
We agreed that Lucretius is unclear about the role of memory in the preservation
of presonal identity.
We shared our views on thought experiments and how intuitions are used to
draw metaphysical conclusions in many theories of personal identity. (e.g. shall I
be concerned? → if so → it will be the same person in the future (after death) ).
We also briefly mentioned Parfit’s theory, whose idea was to abandon talk of
’personal identity’ and introduced ’survival’ to depict the continuation of certain
psychological links. These would be sufficient for surival in his view.
Plutarch’s conception of the narrated self: through our genuine memories we can weave
our lives into a unity.
Augustine on the connection between the self and personal memory
In the Confessions there are two views offered:
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(i) infancy is not a part of his life
(ii) the community of the heaven of heavens do not remember their earthly lives because of
the continuous conceplation of God.
Plato and memory
Although Plato’s Socrates in the Phaedo cites recollections from before birth as evidence that the
true self is the soul that existed before the present body, and Plato’s Phaedrus suggests that the
type of person you are depends on the god you followed last time your soul was given a chance to
view the Forms, Plato does not think that remembering includes remembering the
experience itself. As the Meno shows as well, such Platonic memories are based
on inference, so Sorabji deos not think the Platonic self is connected with
memory of one’s own experience.
Plotinus
Our highest self would rise to the intelligible world, where it will not remember that it engaged in
philosophy or that it is Socrates, since in the timeless intelligible world memory makes no sense.
It is in the intermediate realm of the heavens below the intelligible world where memory plas a
role: souls there can remember either the intelligible world or the earthly world.
Themistius
In his commentary on Aristotle’s De An. Themistius thinks that for Aristotle the true self is the
intellect and that Aristotle denies memory to the imperishable part of our intellect (cf. De An.
430a23).
Stoic attachment to one’s body
Locke’s discussion of personal identity is not only about memory, but also about concern and
appropriation, which already surfaces in the Stoics:
„They [the Stoics] say that an animal has self-preservation as the object of its first impulse, since
nature from the beginning appropriates it (οἰκειούσης αὐτὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀπ' ἀρχῆς), as
Chrysippus says in his On ends book I. The first thing appropriate to every animal, he says, is its
own constitution and the consciusness of this (πρῶτον οἰκεῖον λέγων εἶναι παντὶ ζῴῳ τὴν αὑτοῦ
σύστασιν καὶ τὴν ταύτης συνείδησιν). So it remains to say that in constituting the animal, nature
appropriated it. This is why the animal rejects what is harmful and accepts what is appropriate.”
Diogenes Laertius VII. 85, transl. from Long/Sedley)
We discussed the different meanings of oikeiosis (οἰκειούσης) in Stoic philosophy and
compared
and
contrasted
it
with
modern
day
interpretations
of
appropriation/ownership. We saw that it was very difficult to decide what it actually
refers to, a state or a process?
Locke on personal identity
It does not turn on the same soul, but on ownership of various psychological
links, on owning consciousness.
„...as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far
reaches the identity of that person: it is the same self now as it was then.” Essay, 2.27.9
We discussed Locke’s theory on ’same consciousness’ and decided that it did not
have too many parallels with the Stoic thought. We also discussed ’consciousness
of the body’ / ownership in Locke’s relevant sections.
If you had the soul of Nestor or Thersites, you would not be the same person if
you had no consciousness of their actions, but you would be the same person as
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them if you had consciousness of their actions whether or not you had the same
soul.
- Certainly strange thought for the Christians, but not for Lucretius (the
reassamly of the identical soul atoms does not guarantee the same
person).
- In the Stoic theory of eternal recurrence personal identity is not
guaranteed by the return of the same soul, but by the person’s unique
quality.
Unimportance of the same body: the same consciousness might be found in a
new body. It would result a different man, but the sameness of consciousness
would make one the same person.
(1) Self has concern for itself including concern for the body and its parts.
(2) Concern extends only as far as consciousness can be extended.
(3) Therefore there is an essential connection between consciousness and
selfhood (little finger example).
P1 is reminiscent for Sorabji of the Stoic theory of attachment to our bodies.
Locke discusses not only concern for the body, but concern in past actions – the
Stoics were only interested in the former. The acknowledgement of past actions
is said to be brought about by consciousness, in which talk Locke uses Stoic
vocabulary of reconciling and appropriating – cf. the terms οἰκείωσις, εως, ἡ, =
appropriation; concĭlĭātĭo, ōnis, f. = connection, union.
The consequence of Locke’s theory → „one has a hand in creating one’s self”.
It is not merely deliberate self-creation: it is more like an involuntary
appropriation depending on how far our consciousness can extend.
Objection to the theory: it does not seem to exclude the possibility of a selective
memory by directing consciousness only to creditable actions.
Leibniz
Memory is necessary for personal identity – it would not benefit you to be made king of China if it
was on condition of losing your memory. Leibniz, however, was defending the need for a
continuing substance or soul.
Kant
Kant supported Locke against Leibniz on the dispensability of a continuing soul, since he thought
that the first-person experience might be a necessary condition of thought, but it does not
postulate a substance. It is only a condition.
→ This conclusion raises a worry to Sorabji’s conception of self.
For discussion: do we find Sorabji’s answer satisfactory?
Our overall conclusion was that Sorabji’s versatile choices from Ancient literature are
although very interesting, are not analysed in-depth and a clear presentation of his
theory is missing.
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