Cold War- China
Mrs. Schoch
April 19, 2010
Objective:
 Students will learn about the Tiananmen Square event in China, 1989.
 Students will learn proper footnoting and citation skills in research.
 Students will practice source analysis skills through the 5 W’s and OPVL. Assignment
Directions:
1. Read the document analysis provided from The George Washington University, National Security
Archives and the Articles from the NY Times.
o National Security Archives, excerpts (p 4-8)
o Article 1 p 8-9
o Article 2 p 9-14
o Article 3- Interview p 14 and Photo of “Tank Man” p 15
2. Create a bibliography citation for each selection (4). Adhere to Turabian formatting
requirements.
3. Analyze each article as a resource document (OPVL). Your final response should be a paragraph.
You do not need to submit your outline, only the paragraph.
4. ID the article for content value (5 W’s). Your final response should be a paragraph. You do not
need to submit your outline, only the paragraph.
5. Read the summary below and insert superscripts for the placement of footnotes.
6. Create footnotes for each superscript referring to the included articles. Adhere to proper footnote
formatting per Turabian guidelines. You may find the information in more than one source.
Choose the one you wish to include in your footnotes.
1
Ms. Schoch
April 23, 2010
World History 3-4
Summary: (Word Count: 638)
To Massacre or Not to Massacre:
The Tiananmen Square Protest of 1989
June 4, 1989 marks the last of a series of protests by university students and the Chinese press in
Beijing, China. This movement is one of the largest and longest movements in the world, lasting over
seven weeks. The movement began on April 27, 1989 in Beijing as a response to the death of Hu
Yaobang, a party leader and promoter of Chinese democracy, and the growing corruption of the Chinese
government. Hu Yaobang stood in direct opposition to Deng Xiaoping, Paramount Leader of China. Hu
Yaobang often pushed for new government reforms and the retirement of Deng Xiaoping, to be replaced
with a more liberal and democratic government. Hu Yaobang’s death triggered a political confrontation
between Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang. Ziyang was Yaobang’s successor as General Secretary and
expected to be the next Paramount Leader of China.
On April 27th, University students left classes and marched through the streets heading to
Tiananmen Square, the largest city square in the world, to hold a protest rally. The students refused to
leave the square until the government met demands for a democratic form of government and freedom of
press censorship. Lack of response from the government led to a hunger strike in the square on May 13,
1989. As the protest increased and political in-fighting became worse, the Chinese government declared
martial law on May 20th. “But when the bulk of the troops arrive at the outskirts of the capital, citizens…
block[ed] their way. Hundreds of thousands of protesters…” joined the movement. By June 3, over
10,000 protestors lived in Tiananmen Square.
On June 3rd and 4th, the government ordered the military to break up the protest and restore order
to the city; military force was applied within the streets of Beijing. Eyewitness accounts of this massacre
recall atrocious acts against the protesters, including one eyewitness who recalls a military tank running
over eleven people in the street. One of the most famous moments of the entire protest occurred when an
unidentified man stood in front of a military tank and refused to move. He continually blocked the tank
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until a group of people around him forcibly removed him. Consequently, no one knows who the man was
or what happened to him after the protest. However, order was eventually restored in Beijing; although
smaller protests continued throughout China for a few more weeks.
“There is no massacre in Tiananmen Square—although there is plenty of killing elsewhere,” as
troops attack Beijing civilians. The government and eyewitnesses report that the protest within the
Square did not result in bloodshed. However, reports indicated that most protestors, including students
leaving the square, were killed in streets around or near the square. The total estimated number of deaths
varies depending on the source; these numbers range from five hundred to over two thousand. Some
news agencies reported as high as 3,000 deaths. In addition, recent reports from the Department of State
in Washington D.C. estimate nearly 10,000 individuals were injured in the protest.
This event, televised and documented for the world to see, brought China under close scrutiny
from around the world and created tensions between China and the United States as well as other leading
countries in the world. President George Bush, Sr. called for a package of sanctions against China during
the subsequent investigation. Russia also sent emissaries to China to discuss the events of June, 1989.
With sanctions and agreements in place by most of the world’s leading countries, China replaced most of
their government with a government more willing to respond to international opinion and create a more
responsive government body. More importantly, this event became symbolic of the decline of
Communist support in the world. Later the same year, Gorbachev would tear down the Berlin Wall and
unite Germany for the first time in nearly 40 years.
3
Tiananmen Square, 1989
The Declassified History
A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book
Prepared by Jeffrey T. Richelson and Michael L. Evans
June 1, 1999
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB16/documents/index.html#d1
The Chinese army crackdown in and around Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 had an enormous effect on the course of
U.S.-China relations. The deaths of democracy protesters resulted in U.S. sanctions, suspensions of high-level contacts,
and a halt in the transfer of military technology. The controversy continues to this day, as demonstrated by the reaction of
many concerning President Clinton's decision to appear in the square with Chinese leaders during his June 1998 trip to
China.
Documents 1-6: Student Demonstrations in 1985 and 1986
The student demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989 were not the first time in the 1980s that Chinese authorities
were faced with organized demonstrations expressing dissatisfaction with their rule. In late 1985, and again in late 1986,
Beijing and Shanghai was the site of student protests. Students carried banners with slogans such as "Law, Not
Authoritarianism" and "Long Live Democracy."
In China, a state with significant curbs on free expression, demonstrators have often seized upon politically tolerable
causes--such as anti-Japanese sentiment or the commemoration of a popular Chinese leader--as vehicles to gather together
and express their dissatisfaction with the policies of the Chinese government. The following December a new round of
demonstrations, this time explicitly calling for political reforms, sprang up in China’s cities.
Documents 7-11: On the Brink
On May 20, the Chinese leadership imposed martial law on the Beijing Municipality and appeared to be moving toward
the use of force to clear the square.2 Nevertheless, U.S. officials were still hoping to see the standoff between the
government and the student demonstrators resolved peacefully. While the documentary record is far from complete,
Document 7, a heavily excised summary transcript of a May 23 meeting in Washington between President George Bush
and Wan Li, Chairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People’s Congress, indicates that the subject of the
student demonstrations did come up at their meeting. Shortly thereafter, Wan cut short his U.S. visit and, on May 27,
publicly endorsed the government’s martial law order.3
Document 7: Memorandum of Conversation, [George Bush] Meeting with Wan Li, Chairman of the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress and Member of the Politburo, People’s Republic of China (May 23, 1989)
By May 20, 1989, with no peaceful resolution of the crisis in sight, the Chinese government declared martial law in
Beijing, hoping to intimidate the protesters to clear the square. Nevertheless, U.S. officials were still hoping to see the
standoff between the government and the student demonstrators resolved peacefully. Three days after the declaration, U.S.
President George Bush met with the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Wan Li, in
Washington. While the documentary record is far from complete, this document, a heavily excised summary transcript of
their conversation, indicates that the subject of the student demonstrations did come up at their meeting. "The President,"
the transcript shows, "asked how the Chairman sees the present situation playing itself out." Wan’s reply has not yet been
declassified, but he apparently commented on some aspect of the demonstrations, prompting Bush to ask "if this was just
a handful of all those demonstrators." Shortly thereafter, Wan cut short his U.S. visit and, on May 27, publicly endorsed
the government’s martial law order.
4
As the crowds continued to gather in Tiananmen Square in the days following the death of Hu Yaobang, hard-liners in the
party leadership prepared to move against both the students and the more conciliatory leaders within the party itself.4
Documents 12-29: The Crackdown
It would not be long after the U.S. Embassy in Beijing warned that the use of force was an option that it began reporting
the PLA's attacks on demonstrators. That reporting, as well as information obtained by other means, is summarized in
Document 12, a cable from the U.S. embassy in Beijing. The cable notes that troops, using automatic weapons, had
advanced in tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and trucks from several directions toward Tiananmen Square. The
cable also reports that the American Embassy believed that the 50-70 deaths reported in the foreign media were probably
much too low. It also notes that several American reporters "were severely beaten by Chinese troops on Tiananmen
Square." As events in Beijing unfolded, the American Embassy provided a near-continuous flow of reporting, based on
the accounts of newsmen, residents, and the observations of embassy officials.
Document 12: Cable, From: Department of State, Wash DC, To: U.S. Embassy Beijing, and All Diplomatic and Consular
Posts, TFCHO1: SITREP 1, 1700 EDT (June 3, 1989)
By the evening of June 3 the crackdown had begun in Beijing, and the State Department created a special task force in
Washington, designated by the heading "TFCH01," to coordinate information on the situation in China. This document,
the first in this series of SITREPs, updates U.S. embassy and consular personnel around the world on the first violent
clashes with demonstrators as PLA troops "using automatic weapons advanced in tanks, APC’s [Armored Personnel
Carriers], and trucks from several directions toward the city center." Casualties, according to the estimates of U.S.
Embassy personnel, appear high. The cable also notes that Under Secretary of State Robert Kimmitt had called on PRC
Ambassador Han Xu to express "deep regret at the use of force."
The Secretary of State’s intelligence summary for the following morning (Document 13) reports that "deaths from the
military assault on Tiananmen Square range from 180 to 500; thousands more have been injured." It also describes how
"thousands of civilians stood their ground or swarmed around military vehicles. APCs were set on fire, and demonstrators
besieged troops with rocks, bottles, and Molotov cocktails."
Document 13: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 4, 1989, China: Troops Open Fire
The violence that occurred on the night of June 3-4 is summarized in this State Department morning intelligence summary
for June 4. "Two weeks after martial law was declared," the report observes, "the government again controls the symbolic
center of the country." The document describes how civilians turned out in massive numbers and fought for seven hours to
prevent the troops from advancing on the square. In the face of overwhelming numbers of heavily armed troops, the
summary notes, "thousands of civilians stood their ground or swarmed around military vehicles. APCs were set on fire,
and demonstrators besieged troops with rocks, bottles, and Molotov cocktails."
In addition to providing information on the events of June 4, the cables provide dramatic examples of the kinds of
intelligence provided by diplomatic reporting. Document 14, an embassy cable from June 4, reports on confrontations
between soldiers and protesters, some of which ended in deaths, and vandalism by military personnel, who one source
claimed were breaking the windows of shops, banks, and other buildings. On the same day, another cable from the U.S.
Embassy (Document 15) reports, among other things, the statement of a Chinese-American who had witnessed the
crackdown who claimed that, "The beating to death of a PLA soldier, who was in the first APC to enter Tiananmen
Square, in full view of the other waiting PLA troops, appeared to have sparked the shooting that followed." In addition to
these eyewitness accounts of the crackdown, other cables (Document 16) also provide information on PLA troop positions
and casualty estimates.
Document 14: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 32: The Morning of
June 4 (June 4, 1989)
The crackdown continued through the night, and by early morning June 4, as this cable reports, the PLA was in control
Tiananmen Square. Based on eyewitness accounts of the violence, this SITREP is the Embassy's initial effort to provide
5
some detail on the final PLA assault on the approximately 3,000 demonstrators who had not yet left the square. "Some
10,000 troops," the document says, formed a ring around the square, and "a column of about 50 APC, tanks, and trucks
entered Tiananmen from the east." Demonstrators shouted angrily, the cable states, and "PLA troops in Tiananmen
opened a barrage of rifle and machine gun fire." Another column of military vehicles entered soon thereafter, and more
gunfire ensued, "causing a large number of casualties." The document also describes violent PLA clashes with
demonstrators on Changan Boulevard, the main thoroughfare in the Tiananmen area, and in other parts of Beijing.
Embassy officials also report conversations with angry citizens, some "claiming that more than 10,000 people had been
killed at Tiananmen." One woman claimed to have witnessed a tank running over 11 people. She also told Embassy
officers that she had seen PLA troops "breaking the windows of shops, banks, and other buildings."
Document 16: Cable, From: Department of State, Wash DC, To: U.S. Embassy Beijing, China Task Force Situation
Report No. 3 - Situation as of 1700 EDT, 6/4/89 (June 4, 1989)
As reports flowed in from the embassy in Beijing, the State Department's China task force was busy updating other
diplomatic and consular posts around the world on the situation in Beijing. This SITREP reports the current situation in
Beijing where, "The PLA is mopping up isolated resistance," and notes that "casualty estimates vary from 500 to 2600
deaths, with injuries up to 10,000." The cable also discusses the foreign reaction to the recent events, noting especially
that, "Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui called in AIT [American Institute in Taiwan] chief David Dean in Taipei to hear
his appeal for the US to join in condemnation and consideration of sanctions."
After the square had been cleared Chinese Army troops continued to occupy the city5, with continuing reports of sporadic
gunfire and interfactional fighting among PLA units. The possibility that units of the PLA would turn on each other was
raised in the June 6th edition of the Secretary of State's Morning Summary as well as embassy cables from June 5-6.
Document 22: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, TFCH01--SITREP No. 38: June
7, 1900 Hours (June 7, 1989)
This intriguing cable describes a sequence of events that occurred as a large convoy of troops from the 27th Army passed
near the Jianguomenwai diplomatic compound and U.S. embassy residences on their way out of the city as part of a major
troop rotation. In what was later explained as a search for a sniper, the troops sprayed the compound with automatic
weapons fire. One witness, the document notes, "said the unit was from Shenyang and that they had been on the square on
the night of June 3-4." The soldiers appeared to be aiming "at or above rooftops, but soldiers lowered their sights (but did
not fire) at any spectators who did not cower immediately behind nearby protective cover." The cable explains that the
military had apparently chosen to replace "the much-hated 27th Group Army unit" with the 20th in a move "apparently
intended to improve relations between the military and the residents of the city." The incident has provoked speculation
that the shootings may have been staged as a response to the package of sanctions against China announced by President
Bush in June 5, or the decision to grant refuge to dissident Fang Lizhi, an outspoken critic of the Chinese regime, in the
U.S. Embassy in Beijing.
An "Uneasy Calm" returned to being by June 8, according to the Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 9
(Document 23). It reports on missing dissidents, police actions at universities, martial law directives, and the first public
appearance of Premier Li Peng since the massacre. Shortly thereafter, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research published an Intelligence Brief titled "Current Situation in China: Background and Prospects" (Document 24).
The document observes that "at the heart of the crisis in China is the power struggle for the succession to Deng Xiaoping,"
and goes on to analyze the various elements of that struggle.
Document 23: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 9, 1989, China: Uneasy Calm
Five days after the violence, this intelligence summary indicates that, "Numerous arrests can be expected," and that the
military appears poised to take over the university campuses. The document suggests that Chinese leaders have initiated a
defensive campaign combining mass arrests and detentions with vehement denials that there were heavy civilian
casualties during the military crackdown, "focusing instead on attacks and atrocities against the police and soldiers." With
regard to the brewing leadership crisis, the report cites a "reliable source" who says that "Zhao [Ziyang] is still in Beijing
and in the custody of the hard-liners."
6
Document 27: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 14, 1989, China: Back to Business, But Crackdown
Continues
Ten days after the crackdown Chinese leaders appeared to be trying to portray a return to business as usual in Beijing,
despite the continuing widespread arrests of students and political activists suspected as instigators of the Tiananmen
demonstrations. This document describes the sudden public emergence of many top Chinese officials—including some
associated with ousted party chief Zhao Ziyang—in an apparent show of support for the military crackdown. The report
also comments that "Beijing’s efforts to sell the official version of recent events and win bureaucratic compliance with the
new hardline regime conflict with US attempts to limit repression and honor Fang Lizhi’s request for protection."
Document 28: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 15, 1989, China: Accusation over Fang Lizhi
Policy makers in Washington were clearly concerned as the Fang Lizhi episode threatened to further disrupt SinoAmerican relationship beyond its current strains. This morning intelligence summary leads of with a discussion of
Chinese media reports about the affair, noting that "the article takes care to limit blame to 'certain US personages,' 'a
handful of people in the United States,' 'some US media, particularly the Voice of America,' and the 'US Embassy in
Beijing.'" The document also reports on fears in Hong Kong over how the colony will be governed after returning to
mainland Chinese rule in 1997. "Locals are worried that Beijing could in the future limit civil rights in Hong Kong by
declaring martial law or a state of emergency."
Documents 30-35: The Aftermath
Document 30: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, Eyewitness Account of June 4
PLA Tank Crushing 11 Students and Related Early Morning Events in Tiananmen Square (June 22, 1989)
This extraordinary document provides the detailed account of a source who witnessed firsthand the violence at Tiananmen
Square on the night of June 3-4. The source indicated that the students had believed that the soldiers would be firing
rubber bullets and that "he had a sickening feeling when he noticed the bullets striking sparks off the pavement near his
feet." His and other eyewitness descriptions represent an effort by diplomatic reporters to gather evidence about the
crackdown and get the story straight. Most impressive in the account is the source’s graphic description of a PLA tank
crushing 11 students under its wheels on the morning of June 4. Comments at the end of the document indicate that the
source’s version dovetails with the comments of other sources, concluding that, "We find his account of that episode
credible. His accounts of other incidents are worth recording as other evidence becomes available."
Document 31: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, What Happened on the Night of
June 3/4? (June 22, 1989)
This document, as its authors state in the outset, "attempts to set the record straight" about the events of the night of June
3-4. Contrary to earlier reports in the western media, the cable asserts that many if not most of the deaths associated with
the crackdown occurred on Changan Avenue and other streets surrounding the square, rather than on Tiananmen Square
itself. The document calls the notion that the military could have suffered more casualties than civilians "inconceivable,"
but holds that "civilian deaths probably did not reach the figure of 3,000 used in some press reports," but believes that the
figure put forward by the Chinese Red Cross of 2,600 military and civilian deaths with 7,000 wounded to be "not an
unreasonable estimate." The cable concludes with a detailed, hour-by-hour chronology of the events of the night of June
3-4.
In the days immediately following the crackdown, U.S. and Chinese officials were already sensitive to how recent events
would impact the bilateral relationship. On June 5, President Bush had announced the imposition of a package of
sanctions on China, to include "suspension of all government-to-government sales and commercial exports of weapons,"
and the "suspension of visits between U.S. and Chinese military leaders." Document 32, an embassy cable sent three
weeks later, notes that a military official had lodged a formal complaint that "strongly protested recent U.S. military
sanctions," and had canceled the planned visits of U.S. military officials. Embassy officials felt this to be a "measured
response to U.S. sanctions," indicating that the official "did not adopt a confrontational attitude and emphasized that both
sides should take a long-term view of the military relationship." Two days later, on June 29, the State Department
prepared "Themes," (Document 33), in support of Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and national security
7
adviser Brent Scowcroft, who were to leave the next day on a secret trip to China to meet with Deng Xiaoping. "Themes"
provided the framework for the discussions the two emissaries would have with Deng. It focused on the global strategic
benefits of the U.S.-PRC relationship for both sides, the impact Chinese "internal affairs" could have on the relationship
(characterizing the American people as being "shocked and repelled by much of what they have seen and read about
recent events in China"), Bush's view of the importance of the long-term relationship between the US and PRC, and the
impact that further repression could have on US relations with China. As Scowcroft later remembered, "The purpose of
my trip ... was not negotiations--there was nothing yet to negotiate--but an effort to keep open the lines of
communication."6
Document 32: Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, TFCH01: SITREP No. 65, June
27, 1700 Local (June 27, 1989)
This Embassy cable sent three weeks after President Bush announced a package of sanctions against the PRC, informs
that a Chinese military official had lodged a formal complaint with the U.S. defense attaché that "strongly protested recent
U.S. military sanctions." The document notes that, in response to the military sanctions, the official had canceled the
planned visits of U.S. military officials and the discontinuation of exchanges of military personnel and the suspension of
visits with the U.S. defense attaché. Embassy officials felt this to be a "measured response to U.S. sanctions," indicating
that the official "did not adopt a confrontational attitude and emphasized that both sides should take a long-term view of
the military relationship."
Document 33: State Department document entitled "Themes" (June 29, 1989)
On June 30, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger
embarked on a secret mission to Beijing that, according to Scowcroft, was meant to "keep open the lines of
communication" between the U.S. and China. This extraordinary document is a list of themes prepared for their meetings
with Chinese leaders. The document shows that the administration stressed his personal interest in the maintenance of
good relations, and the interest of both countries in continuing strategic cooperation. The Bush administration wanted to
make clear that a harsh crackdown a dissidents would make the broader relationship more difficult to manage in the U.S.
Although the way in which the PRC deals with those of its citizens involved in the recent demonstrations is "an internal
affair," the document stresses that how American people view and react to that behavior is also "an internal affair."
Emphasizing the importance of the long-term relationship, the document notes that the president "wants to manage shortterm events in a way that will best assure a healthy relationship over time."
The Chinese had watched anxiously as communist regimes fell in Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989 but were apparently
unmoved until the bloody end of the Ceausescu regime in Romania. "When Ceausescu was toppled," Scowcroft recalled,
"I believe the Chinese leaders panicked. It had appeared to me that they had taken great comfort from his apparent
impregnability."10 China, Premier Li Peng told his American emissaries at the December meeting, had witnessed similar
eruptions during the Cultural Revolution. "Had we not adopted the resolute measures on June 4," he added, "the present
situation in China would be even more turbulent today."11
Article One: “There was no Tiananmen Square Massacre”
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-5061672-503543.html
This story was filed by CBS News correspondent Richard Roth, who was detained by Chinese authorities for 20 hours on
June 4, 1989, while covering the Tiananmen Square "crackdown".
For years now (certainly by the time of the 10th anniversary of Tiananmen) scholars — and many journalists — have
been describing it as a weekend massacre, a massacre in Beijing, the "Beijing massacre" or the "crackdown" in
Tiananmen, but not a "Tiananmen Square massacre."
8
"Tiananmen massacre" is a phrase that still has currency, but it does tend to be used a lot less now in careful accounts of
what happened there.
Behind this is the weight of eyewitness accounts, de-classified Western government reports, and historians' work that
supports the story of a brief period of negotiation between the army and some student hold-outs (there weren't all that
many left in the square by then) when troops began entering the square in force just before dawn -- silencing the public
address system loudspeakers with a volley of gunfire. The last group of protestors filed out of the square to the south soon
after.
I was being held captive by Chinese army troops on the south portico of the Great Hall of the People (which forms one of
the borders of the Square) when that round of gunfire occurred.
I could hear it but I could not see into the Square. Around forty minutes later, Derek Williams and I were driven in a pair
of army jeeps right through the square, almost along its full length, and into the Forbidden City.
Dawn was just breaking. There were hundreds of troops in the square, many sitting cross-legged on the pavement in long
curving ranks, some cleaning up debris. There were some tanks and armored personnel carriers. But we saw no bodies,
injured people, ambulances or medical personnel — in short, nothing to even suggest, let alone prove, that a "massacre"
had recently occurred in that place.
Later, being debriefed on-air by Dan Rather, I recall making an effort to avoid using the word "massacre." I referred to an
"assault" and an "attack."
I reported what I saw; I said I hadn't seen any bodies. Admittedly, I've never made a point of trying to contradict a
colleague on the air; I've simply stuck to my own story, because I've believed it's true.
Some have found it uncomfortable that all this conforms with what the Chinese government has always claimed, perhaps
with a bit of sophistry: that there was no "massacre in Tiananmen Square."
But there's no question many people were killed by the army that night around Tiananmen Square, and on the way to it —
mostly in the western part of Beijing. Maybe, for some, comfort can be taken in the fact that the government denies that,
too.
Tiananmen Square
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/international/countriesandterritories/china/tiananmen-square/index.html
Updated: May 22, 2009
By Nicholas D. Kristof
In the spring of 1989, Tiananmen Square, set in the center of Beijing, became the site of largest pro-democracy movement
in China in the 20th century.
It began with the death of Hu Yaobang, a party leader who had always tried to do things his own way. In 1986, Hu had
suggested that it might be time for Deng Xiaoping to retire as paramount leader. In April 1989, recuperating from a heart
attack, he suffered a seizure and died.
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Hu's seizure was a prelude to China's. His death triggered weeks of massive protests, giddy days in April and May 1989
when throngs of more than a million filled the streets of Beijing, criticizing the growing corruption, and in general
demanding more of the democracy that Hu had come to symbolize. And then, after seven exhilarating weeks, it all came
to a sudden end. In the early hours of June 4, as the world watched in horror, the tanks of the People's Liberation Army
rolled toward Tiananmen Square and troops fired on the crowds, killing hundreds and wounding thousands.
Behind this highly public drama lay another one, less visual and far less understood, yet just as significant. It was enacted
not on the streets but in Zhongnanhai -- the park-like compound a few hundred yards from Tiananmen where most of
China's top leaders have their villas -- and in Deng Xiaoping's own large estate a mile north of there. This was the battle
within the leadership, a struggle among ambitious men and their competing visions of China.
The following account is pieced together from conversations with dozens of people, including many party officials, as
well as a reading of various documents -- reports and speeches -- some released to the public, others ''internal'' and closely
held.
ZHAO ZIYANG
The central figure in the tragedy is Zhao Ziyang, who in 1987 succeeded Hu Yaobang as General Secretary of the
Communist Party. A wily and sometimes ebullient politician with a razor-sharp mind, Zhao was expected to become
Deng's successor as paramount leader. More than any other official, Zhao was identified with Deng's economic ''opening''
of the country; he surrounded himself with some of the best and brightest of the country's young scholars who, based in an
archipelago of think tanks around Beijing, submitted revolutionary proposals for economic and political change. For many
young intellectuals, this was China's Camelot.
By the summer of 1988, however, their patron's job was in jeopardy. Inflation and corruption were on the rise, and the
people were grumbling. Many older party officials regarded Zhao as too impatient; they were appalled when he flirted
with heretical notions such as freeing prices and selling off state-owned companies to private shareholders. They began to
criticize Zhao, in what they viewed as an attempt to save the revolution and the economy. Early this year, some of Deng's
most influential associates, most notably Chen Yun, the 84-year-old genius of central planning, formally advised that
Zhao, 69 at the time, be dismissed.
With the news of Hu Yaobang's death, university students -- for whom Hu was a symbol of change -- begin hanging
posters mourning him and criticizing the party leadership. In the predawn hours, several thousand students march to
Tiananmen; within a few days, thousands of them are effectively occupying the square and threatening to force their way
inside Zhongnanhai.
Meanwhile, just to the east of Tiananmen Square, officials of the Beijing People's Government are appalled at the
students' conduct.
On April 23, Zhao Ziyang embarks on a previously scheduled visit to Pyongyang, North Korea, leaving hardline officials
in charge of policy. A couple of days later, Deng, in a grim mood, outraged by the ongoing protests and deeply alarmed at
the prospect of further unrest, orders what will eventually become a crackdown on the demonstrators. ''We do not fear
spilling blood,'' declares Deng to his colleagues, ''and we do not fear the international reaction.''
Three days later, the students plan a major demonstration for the following day. Though Deng has issued his orders,
senior leaders spend much of the day negotiating frantically on how to carry them out while avoiding violence.
Meanwhile, troops are brought into Beijing and given orders to use tear gas and force if necessary to suppress the
demonstration.
10
The next day, as word spreads on the campuses that troops are in the area, students emerge from the main gate of Beijing
University just before 9 A.M., chanting democratic slogans and waving banners condemning an editorial in The People's
Daily that declares the official hardline response. Few students expect to reach Tiananmen Square. Some have written
their wills, expecting to be clubbed to death in the streets.
And yet a miracle comes to pass: When the students reach the first line of policemen and troops, the men do not use their
clubs. The delighted crowd easily pushes through the lines, and soon the streets are full of hundreds of thousands of
workers and students cheering for democracy.
It is a turning point: April 27 will come to be regarded by many intellectuals as perhaps the most triumphant day of protest
in China in the 20th century.
But inside Zhongnanhai, the power struggles have grown more intense. Upon his return from North Korea on May 1,
Zhao huddles with his closest aide, Bao Tong, to discuss the situation. Bao, 57, a lean man who doubles as a Central
Committee member and secretary to the Politburo, points out that the published version of The People's Daily editorial
differs slightly from the one transmitted to Zhao in Korea. This lets Zhao disavow the increasingly hated editorial. In a
roundabout challenge to Deng, Zhao suggests to a number of officials that the party retract the editorial.
By May 4, Zhao has begun to align himself more and more with the students. In part, it is a genuine reflection of his
views, but also a tactical move. Slipping within the party, he sees a chance to shore up his position by turning himself into
a populist. That day, he carries this line a step further in a conciliatory speech on national television.
During the week, the demonstrations subside, but Chinese journalists begin to be more aggressive in demanding freedom
of the press. Zhao sees the demands as a chance to position himself as the man of the future.
But by May 8, the bosses of Beijing are outraged at the prospect of a more open press and tolerance of the demonstrations.
The more the party opens up, the worse they look; in the streets they are increasingly portrayed as villains. A meeting with
Zhao is a stormy and inconclusive. The Beijing party faction bitterly criticizes the party leader's May 4 speech, accusing
Zhao of betraying the party.
A RUSSIAN VISIT AMID UNREST
By May 11, the paralysis in the leadership, and the public groundswell for change, are combining to help Zhao. According
to some sources, Zhao is at his finest when the Politburo gathers in an expanded meeting in Zhongnanhai.
It is a tense time; Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev is due to arrive in a few days for the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30
years, and yet the student movement threatens further unrest.
Zhao seeks a mandate for his conciliatory approach, urging that the leadership move toward some of the principles of the
democracy movement -- particularly an end to corruption and a more open government. He submits a letter welcoming an
investigation of his two eldest sons, who are known to be using their connections to make immense sums of money. This
is one of Zhao's key efforts to turn himself from party boss to populist, and at first it seems to work. The meeting ends
with a half-hearted endorsement of Zhao's approach.
Openness is in the air, and Zhao rushes to make clear how much has changed. Zhao's aide Bao Tong drafts an article
praising human rights and calling for a system of balance of powers, and he rushes it to The People's Daily. It appears as
the lead story on May 12.
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Yan Jiaqi, a prominent political scientist who will later lead the exiled democracy movement, says the key is that Zhao's
conciliatory approach has to be proven effective: The students will have to respond by ending their occupation of
Tiananmen and returning to campus.
But this is not what happens. Instead, the protests escalate, and the students thereby doom their protector.
On May 13, the students begin a hunger strike on Tiananmen Square, and sympathetic citizens surge onto the streets to
show support, literally taking over the center of the capital.
During Gorbachev's visit, there is chaos. The embarrassed Chinese Government finds itself constantly rearranging its
plans to avoid interruption by the students.
Yan Mingfu, the party's chief negotiator, pleads with the students to go home, warning in a private meeting that, if they
press too far, they could well destroy those leaders who sympathize with them. The students listen politely but refuse to
compromise.
In the struggle within the leadership, the turmoil creates new uncertainties. Zhao, no doubt realizing that hardliners will
try to seize on the growing chaos to force his retirement, takes the offensive. On May 16, during his televised meeting
with Gorbachev, Zhao Ziyang lunges for power, telling Gorbachev and the Chinese public that Deng Xiaoping is essential
as "the helmsman."
To outsiders, this seems a defense of the senior leader, but it is the opposite. Many Chinese immediately understand that
Zhao is blaming his long-time patron for the stalemate over the students. Zhao is saying that he would like to meet the
student demands, but that Deng will not allow it.
ZHAO'S RESIGNATION REJECTED
On May 17, as the streets overflow with protesters and the Government loses control of the capital, the Politburo Standing
Committee is summoned to the home of a furious Deng Xiaoping.
It is there, according to many Chinese officials, at a stormy meeting in the home of his former patron, that Zhao pleads for
a program of conciliation with the students. It is the moment of confrontation, but Deng and his prestige prevail. Zhao is a
minority of one. Although no formal decision is taken, it is at this meeting that China is set firmly on the course toward
June 4.
To put further pressure on the party, Zhao submits his resignation, but Deng refuses it. Zhao goes on sick leave,
announcing that because of some unspecified ailment he will henceforth not participate in party business. Meanwhile, he
tries to take his case to the people, leaking word of the May 17 Politburo session (reportedly, through Bao Tong). A new
wave of public anger and indignation at the leadership follows -- and with it, for the first time, a certain amount of
sympathy for Zhao.
After the epochal May 17 meeting, Deng and his elderly colleagues, together with the conservative faction in the
Politburo, decide to call troops into the capital and declare martial law. One aim, of course, is to re-establish order and win
the streets back from the demonstrators. But there is another reason, perhaps a more important one: Deng and his
colleagues, believing they have been betrayed by Zhao, fear the party leader might somehow mount a coup d'etat. They
intend the troops to guard key government installations and ministries from a possible attack.
On May 19 in Tiananmen Square, the hunger strikers have been fasting for nearly a week, and many of them have begun
to drift in and out of consciousness. The almost constant sound of sirens from ambulances racing through the crowd
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exacerbate the sense of crisis. Zhao, repeatedly refused permission to see the hunger strikers in a show of sympathy, goes
to the square anyway. Accompanied by Li Peng in a show of party solidarity, Zhao tells the students, as tears well in his
eyes, ''We have come too late.''
Deeply disturbed by what he sees as growing chaos, Li convenes the Politburo Standing Committee later in the day to
endorse the declaration of martial law. Li also arranges for a televised mass meeting that evening, but Zhao refuses to
attend, insisting that he cannot go along with the crackdown, and that in any case he is ill.
Martial law is formally imposed on May 20. But when the bulk of the troops arrive at the outskirts of the capital, citizens
rush from their homes to block their way, some people lying down in the street in front of the military trucks. Hundreds of
thousands of protesters, organized in groups representing factories and offices and even the Foreign Ministry, parade
through the center of the city.
By June 3, after a roundelay of meetings and foiled intents among the politicians, thousands of troops have infiltrated into
the capital, and people are growing accustomed to them -- even in the Tiananmen Square area. The demonstration itself
has lost much of its impetus, with many students from outside the capital returning to their homes. Fewer than 10,000 -probably considerably fewer -- are still living in the square.
During the early hours of this Saturday morning, thousands of soldiers are sent into Beijing from the east, probably to
bolster the show of force in the capital and gradually restore order. At this hour, the streets are empty of civilians, and it
seems likely the plan was for the troops to enter the city quietly, without attracting attention.
But shortly before midnight, three miles west of Tiananmen, a speeding police van had swerved out of control, killing
three bicyclists. An angry crowd quickly gathered, and many of the suspicious people insisted the incident was
intentional. Some also declared that since the van was racing toward Tiananmen Square, the police must be preparing to
evict the demonstrators.
The news has raced around Beijing, and, for the first time in a week, people swarm out of their houses to occupy the
streets. The angry, defiant crowds soon encounter the exhausted soldiers, who are just finishing their forced march into the
city, confirming the public impression that the authorities are scheming to attack the students. The indignant citizens
search all vehicles passing by on the roads, and beat up some of the soldiers.
On June 4, news that troops have been beaten, and guns stolen, alarms the conservative officials now holding the reins of
power. Though the capital has been growing steadily calmer during the last week, the leaders decide they have to act
decisively. And so Deng and his colleagues order the Army to take control of the city, using whatever force is required.
There is no massacre in Tiananmen Square -- although there is plenty of killing elsewhere. Troops frequently fire at
crowds who are no threat to them, and at times aim directly at medical personnel and ambulances. Some of those who are
shot have been threatening the troops -- for while the students have generally urged nonviolence, many young workers
carry firebombs or pipes, and they manage to kill more than a dozen soldiers or policemen. But many other civilians are
casually slaughtered for no apparent reason.
Armed force enabled Deng and his colleagues to regain control over the capital, and during the months since, the
leadership slowly consolidated its authority and purged those who are judged to have failed the test.
Zhao was stripped of power for supporting the students during their 1989 pro-democracy Tiananmen Square protests.
From 1989 until his death in January 2005, he lived under house arrest not far from the government offices where he once
led China.
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Deng pressed ahead with the economic reform policies begun in 1978. "The Four Modernizations" would form the basis
for China's emergence as a global economic powerhouse. He died in 1997.
In June 2009, 20 years later after the crackdown, students seem to accept the restrictions to free speech and democracy
imposed after the events in Tiananmen Square. They describe 1989 as almost a historical blip -- too extreme and traumatic
ever to repeat.
In 2009, students, teachers and many of their countrymen lack the economic and political grievances that helped ignite
protests. They are proud of their country's achievements and flock to the Communist Party, though not driven by ideology.
Yet, like those who protested 20 years before, they are disturbed by government corruption and censorship. They are
eager to study in the West, especially the United States. And despite the government's attempts to wipe the 1989 protests
from Chinese history, many have learned what transpired.
“Tank Man” stops advancement of Chinese troops
Jan Wong
Author and former Toronto Globe and Mail Beijing correspondent.
… [You saw the Tank Man confront the tanks that day] … What exactly did you see?
I was watching it from the Beijing Hotel, where we had rented a room that looked onto the north side of the
square. That morning, I remember, my husband said to me, "You'd better get out here." I rushed out onto the
balcony, and I saw this lone person standing in front of this long column of tanks. … The young man -- … I
couldn't see his face but I think he was young because of the way he moved, he was very fluid, he didn't move
like an older person. … He tried to step in front of the tank. … The tank turned to go around him; the tank did
not try to just run him over. I thought, "Wow!" So the tank is turning and then the young man jumps in front of
the tank, and then the tank turns the other way, and the young man jumps down this side. And I thought,
"What's going on?"
They did this a couple of times, and then the tank turned off its motor. … And then it seemed to me that all the
tanks turned off their motors. It was really quiet; there was just no noise. And then the young man climbed up
onto the tank and seemed to be talking to the person inside the tank. … After a while the young man jumps
down and the tank turns on the motor and the young man blocks him again. … I started to cry because I had
seen so much shooting and so many people dying that I was sure this man would get crushed. [And] I remember
thinking, "I can't cry because I can't see; I want to watch this, but I'm getting really upset because I think he's
going to die."
But he didn't. … I think it was two people from the sidelines ran to him and grabbed him -- not in a harsh way,
almost in a protective way. … Then he seemed to melt into the crowd. Then the tanks, after a moment, just
started up the engines again, and then they kept going down the Boulevard of Eternal Peace. That was the end.
It was amazing. …
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“We know what he stood for. … [H]e didn't need to have a name. He spoke for the masses, the many who'd
been silenced on June Fourth. He was all of them, you know. He didn't need a name because the point he made,
everyone got it. It will endure long after this regime has become history. …”
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