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Federalism 1NC
Uniqueness: The balance of federalism is constantly shifting – currently transportation
infrastructure is redeveloping as a state managed responsibility
Robert Jay Dilger, Senior Specialist in American National Government, “Federalism Issues in Surface
Transportation Policy: Past and Present,” Congressional Research Service, January 5th, 20 11
(http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40431.pdf)
American federalism, which shapes the roles, responsibilities, and interactions among and between the federal
government, the states, and local governments, is continuously evolving, adapting to changes in American
society and American political institutions. The nature of federalism relationships in surface
transportation policy has also evolved over time, with the federal government’s role becoming
increasingly influential, especially since the Federal-Aid to Highway Act of 1956 which authorized the interstate
highway system. In recent years, state and local government officials, through their public interest groups
(especially the National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, National Association of
Counties, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials) have lobbied for increased federal assistance for surface transportation
grants and increased flexibility in the use of those funds. They contend that they are better able
to identify surface transportation needs in their states than federal officials and are capable of
administering federal grant funds with relatively minimal federal oversight. They also argue that
states have a long history of learning from one another. In their view, providing states flexibility in
the use of federal funds results in better surface transportation policy because it enables states
to experiment with innovative solutions to surface transportation problems and then share their
experiences with other states. Others argue that the federal government has a responsibility to
ensure that federal funds are used in the most efficient and effective manner possible to promote
the national interest in expanding national economic growth and protecting the environment. In
their view, providing states increased flexibility in the use of federal funds diminishes the federal
government’s ability to ensure that national needs are met. Still others have argued for a
fundamental restructuring of federal and state government responsibilities in surface
transportation policy, with some responsibilities devolved to states and others remaining with
the federal government. Congressional attention to federalism issues in surface transportation policy tends to
increase during reauthorizations of the federal highway and mass transit program. The current highway and mass transit
program, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA;
P.L. 109-59), after being extended several times, is set to expire on March 4, 2011. Its reauthorization generated
considerable legislative activity during the 111th Congress. Issues addressed by Congress include SAFETEA’s funding
level and financing, especially proposals addressing the Highway Trust Fund’s fiscal sustainability, state funding
guarantees, and congressional earmarks.
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Federalism 1NC
Link: Arbitrarily shifting control to the federal government over transportation issues would
damage state power and encroach on specific jurisdiction
Horowitz 12 (Daniel Horowitz, writer for Red State, 1-19-12, “Devolve Transportation Spending to States,”
http://www.redstate.com/dhorowitz3/2012/01/19/devolve-transportation-spending-to-states/) GZ
One of the numerous legislative deadlines that Congress will be forced to confront this session is the expiration of the 8th short-term extension of the 2005 surface
transportation authorization law (SAFETEA-LU). With
federal transportation spending growing beyond its revenue
source, an imbalance between donor and recipient states, inefficient and superfluous construction projects popping up all over the country, and burdensome
mass transit mandates on states, it is time to inject some federalism into transportation spending. Throughout
the presidential campaign, many of the candidates have expressed broad views of state’s rights,
while decrying the expansion of the federal government. In doing so, some of the candidates have expressed the conviction
that states have the right to implement tyranny or pick winners and losers, as long as the federal government stays out of it. Romneycare and state subsidies for
green energy are good examples. The reality is that states don’t have rights; they certainly don’t have the power to impose tyranny on citizens by forcing them to buy
health insurance or regulating the water in their toilet bowels – to name a few. They
do, however, reserve powers under our
federalist system of governance to implement legitimate functions of government. A
quintessential example of such a legitimate power is control over transportation and
infrastructure spending. The Highway Trust Fund was established in 1956 to fund the Interstate Highway System (IHS). The fund, which is
administered by the DOT’s Federal Highway Administration, has been purveyed by the federal gasoline tax, which now stands at 18.4 cents per gallon (24.4 for
diesel fuel). Beginning in 1983, Congress began siphoning off some of the gas tax revenue for the great liberal sacred cow; the urban mass transit system. Today,
mass transit receives $10.2 billion in annual appropriations, accounting for a whopping 20% of transportation spending. Additionally, the DOT mandates that states
use as much as 10% of their funding for all sorts of local pork projects, such as bike paths and roadside flowers. As a result of the inefficiencies and wasteful
mandates of our top-down approach to transportation spending, trust fund outlays have exceeded its revenue source by an average of $12 billion per year, even
though the IHS – the catalyst for the gasoline tax – has been completed for 20 years. In 2008, the phantom trust fund was bailed out with $35 billion in general
revenue, and has been running a deficit for the past few years. Congress has not passed a 6-year reauthorization bill since 2005, relying on a slew of short-term
extensions, the last of which is scheduled to expire on March 31. Short-term funding is no way to plan for long-term infrastructure projects. In their alacrity to gobble
up the short-term money before it runs out, state and local governments tend to use the funds on small time and indivisible projects, such as incessant road repaving,
instead of better planned long-term projects. It’s
time for a long-term solution, one which will inject much-needed
federalism and free-market solutions into our inefficient and expensive transportation policy. It is
time to abolish the Highway Trust Fund and its accompanying federal gasoline tax. Twenty years after the completion of the IHS, we must devolve all
transportation authority to the states, with the exception of projects that are national in scope.
Each state should be responsible for its own projects, including maintenance for its share of the IHS. Free of the burden of shouldering special interest pork projects
of other states, each state would levy its own state gas tax to purvey its own transportation needs. If a state wants a robust mass transit system or pervasive bike
lanes, let the residents of that state decide whether they want to pay for it. That is true federalism in action. The most prudent legislation that would transition
responsibility for transportation spending back to the states is Rep. Scott Garrett’s STATE Act (HR 1737). Under this legislation, all states would have the option to
opt out of the federal transportation system and keep 16.4 cents of their federal gasoline tax contribution. States would have the ability to use that money to raise
their state gasoline tax and direct those funds more efficiently for their own needs. States would be free to use the funds for vital needs, instead of incessant repaving
projects that are engendered by short-term federal stimulus grants, and which cause unnecessary traffic juggernauts. States could then experiment with new
innovations and free-market solutions that open up infrastructure projects to the private sector. The Tenth Amendment is not just a flag-waving principle; it works in
the real world. It takes a lot of impudence on the part of the President to blame Republicans for crumbling infrastructure. It is his support for a failed central
government system that is stifling the requisite innovations that are needed to deal with state and local problems .
There is no issue that is more
appropriate for state solutions than transportation spending. Every Republican member should co-sponsor the STATE
ACT so we can put an end to three decades of flushing transportation down the toilet. Also, with the news that Rick Perry will head up Newt Gingrich’s Tenth
Amendment initiatives, this might be a good time to advocate for federalist solutions in transportation and infrastructure. When Obama starts ascribing blame for our
“crumbling infrastructure” during his State of the Union Address, Perry and Gingrich should use their megaphone to pin the blame on the donkey’s stranglehold over
the transportation needs of states. With only two months until the authorization for the federal gas tax expires, most other proposals will only further entrench the
power of the federal government. Call your members of Congress and ask them to co-sponsor Scott Garrett’s HR 1737 and stand for bold conservative solutions.
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Federalism 1NC
The Impact: Maintaining the balance of power between state and federal governments is
crucial to preventing violence, secessions, and rebellions
Lawoti 2009 [Mahendra, - Professor of Political Science at Western Michigan University, “Federalism for
Nepal”, Telegraph Nepal, 3/18,
http://www.telegraphnepal.com/backup/telegraph/news_det.php?news_id=5041]
studies covering over 100 countries have shown that federalism minimizes violent conflicts
whereas unitary structures are more apt to exacerbate ethnic conflicts. Frank S. Cohen (1997) analyzed ethnic
Cross-national
conflicts and inter-governmental organizations over nine 5-year –periods (1945-1948 and 1985-1989) among 223 ethnic groups in 100 countries. He found that
federalism generates increases in the incidence of protests (low-level ethnic conflicts) but stifles the
development of rebellions (high-level conflicts). Increased access to institutional power provided by federalism leads to more low-level conflicts
because local groups mobilize at the regional level to make demands on the regional governments. The perceptions that conflicts occur in federal structure is not
entirely incorrect. But the conflicts are low-level and manageable ones. Often, these are desirable conflicts because they are
expressions of disadvantaged groups and people for equality and justice, and part of a process that consolidates democracy. In addition, they also let off steam so
that the protests do not turn into rebellions. As the demands at the regional levels are addressed, frustrations do not build up. It checks abrupt and severe outburst.
That is why high levels of conflicts are found less in federal countries. On the other hand, Cohen found high levels of conflicts in unitary structures and centralized
politics. According to Cohen (1997:624): Federalism moderates politics by expanding the opportunity for victory. The increase in opportunities for political gain comes
from the fragmentation/dispersion of policy-making power… the compartmentalizing character of federalism also assures cultural distinctiveness by offering
dissatisfied ethnic minorities proximity to public affairs. Such close contact provides a feeling of both control and security that an ethnic group gains regarding its own
affairs. In general, such institutional proximity expands the opportunities for political participation, socialization, and consequently, democratic consolidation.
Saidmeman, Lanoue, Campenini, and Stanton’s (2002: 118) findings also support Cohen’s analysis that federalism influences peace and violent dissent differently.
They used Minority at Risk Phase III dataset and investigated 1264 ethnic groups. According to Saideman et al. (2002:118-120): Federalism
reduces
the level of ethnic violence. In a federal structure, groups at the local level can influence many of
the issues that matter dearly to them- education, law enforcement, and the like. Moreover, federal
arrangements reduce the chances that any group will realize its greatest nightmare: having its
culture, political and educational institutions destroyed by a hostile national majority. These
broad empirical studies support the earlier claims of Lijphart, Gurr, and Horowitz that power sharing and autonomy granting
institutions can foster peaceful accommodation and prevent violent conflicts among different groups in
culturally plural societies. Lijphart (1977:88), in his award winning book Democracy in Plural Societies, argues that "Clear boundaries between the segments of a
plural society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into actual
hostility". This is not to argue for isolated or closed polities, which is almost impossible in a progressively globalizing world. The case is that when quite distinct and
self-differentiating cultures come into contact, antagonism between them may increase. Compared to federal structure, unitary structure may bring distinct cultural
groups into intense contact more rapidly because more group members may stay within their regions of traditional settlements under federal arrangements whereas
unitary structure may foster population movement. Federalism reduces conflicts because it provides autonomy to groups. Disputants within federal structures or any
mechanisms that provide autonomy are better able to work out agreements on more specific issues that surface repeatedly in the programs of communal movement
(Gurr 1993:298-299). Autonomy agreements have helped dampen rebellions by Basques in Spain, the Moros in the Philippines, the Miskitos in Nicaragua, the people
of Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts and the affairs of Ethiopia, among others (Gurr 1993:3190) The Indian experiences are also illustrative. Ghosh (1998) argues
that India state manged many its violent ethnic conflicts by creating new states (Such as Andhra Pradesh, Gujurat, Punjab, Harayana, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa,
Himachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland) and autonomous councils (Such as Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council, Bodoland Autonomous Council, and
Jharkhand Area autonomous Council, Leh Autonomous Hill Development Council). The basic idea, according to Ghosh (1998:61), was to devolve powers to make
the ethnic/linguistic groups feel that their identity was being respected by the state. By providing autonomy ,
federalism also undermines
militant appeals. Because effective autonomy provides resources and institutions through which groups can make significant progress toward their
objectives, many ethnic activities and supporters of ethnic movements are engaged through such arrangements. Thus it builds long-term support for peaceful
solutions and undermines appeals to militant action (Gurr 1993:303). Policies of regional devolution in France, Spain and Italy, on the other hand, demonstrate that
establishing self-managing autonomous regions can be politically and economically less burdensome for central states than keeping resistant peoples in line by
force: autonomy arrangements have transformed destructive conflicts in these societies into positive interregional competition". Federalism for Nepal Federalism is
By allowing ethnic groups
to govern themselves in cultural and developmental matters, it lessens their conflicts with the
central state. Many of the conflicts of the identity movements are in cultural issues like religion, language, education and so on. Once regional governments
essential in plural countries like Nepal because it provides cultural autonomy to different cultural groups within a country.
are established, either the contesting parties from their own governments at the regional level, and decides in those matters, and/or influence the outcome because
their proportional presence at the regional level is more than in the national level. Thus, many ethnic and linguistic groups can effectively put more pressure to the
regional governments. Under unitary system, numerous regionally concentrated groups have not been able to put pressure on the central government because their
population and voice are small at the central context. Even if they are not, their nature will become different. Some of the conflicts will be regionally focussed. Hence,
many of the conflicts will decrease in intensity and strength at the central level. The bureaucracy will also increasingly reflect the regional composition because the
regional governments would hire local people in the administration. Bureaucrats with knowledge of local languages and specific local problems will be able to provide
relatively more efficient administration. This will also reduce conflicts. Inclusion of more ethnic members into regional politics and administration will ensure more
public politics directed toward regional needs, instead of irrelevant policies directed by the center. This will contribute to reducing conflicts arising out of maldistribution of resources.
If minorities want some form of autonomy to protect and promote their culture,
develop their people and regions, and self-determine their future, they are likely to struggle for it
unless some autonomy is provided. The struggle might take different form in different periods due to varying circumstances. Even if
unfavorable circumstances may lead to non-actions during some periods, favorable conditions for mobilizations in other periods may lead to more activities, perhaps
Thus, to address the conflicts arising out of
issues of identity and cultural rights that are inherent human aspirations, autonomy is essential.
Granting of federalism would in all likelihood bring an end to ethnic insurgencies like the Khambuwan Mukti
in violent ways. The growth of ethnic movements in Nepal after 1990 is an example.
Morcha because it meets their major demand. It will also prevent the possibilities of other ethnic insurgencies with demand for federalism. Territorial federalism can
work for the benefit of large ethnic groups concentrated regionally but may not be able to address problems of the numerous low populated ethnic groups or groups
that are not concentrated because they may not form majorities anywhere. For these groups, non-territorial federalism, as in Belgium, Austria etc. may address their
needs. In non-territorial federalism, members of ethnic groups have rights to decide about their culture, education, language and so on by electing councils who have
jurisdiction over cultural, social and developmental realms. The problems of the dalit and small ethnic groups can be addressed through non-territorial federalism.
Federalism and its critics in Nepal The dominant group in Nepal often argues against federalism by raising the fear of secession. I have argued elsewhere that this
fear is misplaced. In demanding only a few of the rights that mainly deal with cultural and social issues, the minority groups acknowledge that advantages of staying
within the existing nation-state. On the other hand, devolution helps to avert separatism because granting of devolution meets substantial demand of the minorities.
However, power has to be devolved in ways that make the state and minorities perceive benefit form it. Large numbers of ethnic groups with small population further
minimize the secessionist possibilities in Nepal, if any. The lack of resources and difficult topography of settlement in may cases make the creation and sustenance of
smaller independent nations difficult, more so when the groups are in a state of under development. On the other hand, experience elsewhere demonstrates that
absence of autonomy may lead to secessionist movements. Federalism was considered "slippery" in the 60s in Sri Lanka when the Tamils demanded autonomy.
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Today, autonomy does not satisfy the demands of the movement that arouse out of its denial (Stepan 1999). Hence federalism, in fact, may contribute in keeping a
country together by satisfying communities have power over themselves, there is less need to secede; hence, a federal structure can keep different communities
united within a nation-state framework. Where cultural autonomy has not been provided, many countries have seceded or are undergoing civil war or violent ethnic
conflicts. Many in Nepal ignorantly argue that a small country like Nepal does not need a federal structure. However, federal countries like Belgium, Switzerland,
Israel, Papua New Guinea, Holland and Austria have less population than Nepal. This belies the widespread fallacy that ‘small’ country like Nepal does not require
federalism. The difficult geographic terrain and the problems of transportation and communication, on the other hand, make Nepal effectively larger than its area and
population indicates. The perception that Nepal is a small country is due to its sandwiched position between the world’s two most populous countries. In terms of real
and effective population, geography and cultural diversity, Nepal is not a small country. In fact, it is the 40th populous country among 227 countries in the world as of
2002 (US Census Bureau 2002).
Federalism in not only in the interests if the marginalized groups, however. It
is also in the interests of the dominant community because it lessens the underlying reasons for
conflicts. Conflicts are more costly to the privilege sections of the society; hence as a toll for
lessening the conflicts, federalism can serve the interests of the dominant community as well.
Excerpts from the book "Nepal Tomorrow: Voices and visions" edited by D.B. Gurung.
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Uniqueness
Federal funding is the only status quo involvement in transportation, states dictate policies
and infrastructure changes
Hou 2010 [Yilin, University of Georgia - Department of Public Administration and Policy, “Substantiation of
Transportation Infrastructure – Patterns of Governance and Public Finance in Development: An Analytical Comparison
of the United States and China”, Social Science Research Network, 12/23, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1744123]
While federal transportation aid is important, state governments have the primary responsibility
for selecting, funding, and implementing most transportation projects in the United States. State
departments of transportation (DOT) are the major administrative organization managing
government surface transportation programs.18 State DOT in many states carry out multi-year transportation
plans19 and will work closely with the state governor to develop a list of capital projects to be included in the state
government CIP. State legislatures are often very actively involved in decisions related to
transportation capital projects because of the potential benefits to their constituency. The result
of political compromise is typically a spreading of transportation funding across the whole state,
rather than concentrating funds in high traffic areas. In summary, the federal DOT and state DOT
play an important planning and implementation role but transportation decision making in the
United States is ultimately in the hands of legislative bodies. The political reality of passing infrastructure
development in a representative democracy often lead to wide dispersal of transportation projects.
The Obama administration is open to more state power and restoring the balance of federalism
New York Times 2009 [Obama Seems to Be Open to a Broader Role for States,” New York Times,
1/29/2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30federal.html?_r=1]
The Obama administration seems to be open to a movement known as “progressive federalism,”
in which governors and activist state attorneys general have been trying to lead the way on
environmental initiatives, consumer protection and other issues, several constitutional experts
say. A recent decision by President Obama that could open the way for California and other states to
set their own limits on greenhouse gases from cars and trucks represents a shift in the delicate and often
acrimonious relationship between the federal government and the states, legal experts say, possibly
signaling a new view of federalism. “I think it’s quite significant,” said Samuel Issacharoff, a professor of constitutional law at
New York University law school. “It shows the Obama administration’s more benign view of government
intervention,” Professor Issacharoff said, and “may indicate a spirit of cooperative federalism” in which
Washington will look to the states for new ideas and even a measure of guidance. Tom Miller, the
attorney general of Iowa, who met with the transition team in December to discuss federalism and other issues, said he
believed the Obama administration would “usher in a new era in federal-state relations.” Members of
the new administration, Mr. Miller said, “are open to what we’re talking about, what we’re thinking.” They also appreciate, he
said, the fact that state attorneys general often achieve a level of bipartisan cooperation when they band together to pursue
lawsuits.
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Uniqueness
Health care reform indicates shift in federalism back to state run policies
Conlan and Posner 2011 [Timothy and Paul Professor of Government and Politics at George Mason University and Director of Centers on the Public Service at
George Mason University, “Inflection Point? Federalism and the Obama Administration”, The State of American Federalism 2010–2011, 6/7/11,
http://publius.oxfordjournals.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/41/3/421.full]
Over the past fifty years, mandates and preemptions have become major tools relied on by
Congress and the president to project national priorities and objectives throughout the
intergovernmental system. During the Obama administration, continued use of prescriptive federal strategies was
highlighted in such major areas as health care reform and climate change proposals. As in the case of fiscal federalism,
however, the Obama administration’s record in regulatory federalism has been more nuanced than
simple mandates and prescriptions. Health care reform entailed major federal subsidies and
allowed states to opt out of certain provisions. Moreover, the administration made a noticeable
shift in providing for greater state authority under federal preemption programs. This complex
record is examined in the following section.
State governments have final say in transportation infrastructure decisions
Hou 10 [Yilin, University of Georgia - Department of Public Administration and Policy “Substantiation of
Transportation Infrastructure – Patterns of Governance and Public Finance in Development: An Analytical
Comparison of the United States and China”, Social Science Research Network, 12/23,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1744123]
While federal transportation aid is important, state governments have the primary responsibility
for selecting, funding, and implementing most transportation projects in the United States. State
departments of transportation (DOT) are the major administrative organization managing government surface transportation
programs.18 State DOT in many states carry out multi-year transportation plans19 and will work closely with the state
governor to develop a list of capital projects to be included in the state government CIP. State legislatures are often
very actively involved in decisions related to transportation capital projects because of the
potential benefits to their constituency. The result of political compromise is typically a spreading of
transportation funding across the whole state, rather than concentrating funds in high traffic areas. In summary, the
federal DOT and state DOT play an important planning and implementation role but
transportation decision making in the United States is ultimately in the hands of legislative
bodies. The political reality of passing infrastructure development in a representative democracy
often lead to wide dispersal of transportation projects.
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Link – Mass Transit
State transit action key to federalism, national action impedes it
Daniel Horowitz, jan 19, 2012, “Devolve Transportation Spending to States,” RS REDSTATE
(http://garrett.house.gov/devolve-transportation-spending-states)
It’s time for a long-term solution, one which will inject much-needed federalism and free-market
solutions into our inefficient and expensive transportation policy. It is time to abolish the Highway Trust
Fund and its accompanying federal gasoline tax. Twenty years after the completion of the IHS, we must devolve all
transportation authority to the states, with the exception of projects that are national in scope . Each state should be
responsible for its own projects, including maintenance for its share of the IHS. Free of the burden of shouldering
special interest pork projects of other states, each state would levy its own state gas tax to purvey its own transportation
needs. If a state wants a robust mass transit system or pervasive bike lanes, let the residents of that
state decide whether they want to pay for it. That is true federalism in action. The most prudent
legislation that would transition responsibility for transportation spending back to the states is Rep. Scott Garrett’s STATE
Act (HR 1737). Under this legislation, all states would have the option to opt out of the federal transportation system and
keep 16.4 cents of their federal gasoline tax contribution. States would have the ability to use that money to raise their state
gasoline tax and direct those funds more efficiently for their own needs. States would be free to use the funds for vital
needs, instead of incessant repaving projects that are engendered by short-term federal stimulus grants, and which cause
unnecessary traffic juggernauts. States could then experiment with new innovations and free-market solutions that open up
infrastructure projects to the private sector. The Tenth Amendment is not just a flag-waving principle; it works in the real
world. It takes a lot of impudence on the part of the President to blame Republicans for crumbling infrastructure. It is his
support for a failed central government system that is stifling the requisite innovations that are
needed to deal with state and local problems. There is no issue that is more appropriate for state
solutions than transportation spending. Every Republican member should co-sponsor the STATE ACT so we
can put an end to three decades of flushing transportation down the toilet. Also, with the news that Rick Perry will head up
Newt Gingrich’s Tenth Amendment initiatives, this might be a good time to advocate for federalist solutions
in transportation and infrastructure. When Obama starts ascribing blame for our “crumbling infrastructure” during
his State of the Union Address, Perry and Gingrich should use their megaphone to pin the blame on the donkey’s
stranglehold over the transportation needs of states.
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Link – PEVs
Federal involvement with PEV’s will limit states necessary influence
Nigro 2011 [”Plug-in electric vehicles, literature review” by Monica Ralston, Center for Climate and Energy
Solutions Nick Nigro, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. July 2011]
Another important factor in determining the demand for PEVs is the involvement and support of
local governments and utilities. A study by Roland Berger Strategy Consultants says cities can
play an important role in the deployment of PEVs. This includes encouraging an infrastructure
network, creating hospitable regulatory and operational environments, forming partnerships with stakeholders, Center for
14 Climate and Energy Solutions and educating consumers. Local governments can also provide monetary and
non-monetary incentives, including grants, rebates, tax credits, registration fee exemption,
reduced electricity rates, parking benefits, vehicle inspection exemptions, and HOV lane access
(Benecchi, et al. 2010).Within separate geographic markets, the demand for different types of
PEVs, mainly BEVs and PHEVs, will vary depending on the needs and priorities of consumers.
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Link – NIB
SIBs are in control now
The Council of State Government, 2011, “State Infrastructure Banks”,
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/state-infrastructure-banks
More than 30 states and Puerto Rico have created a state infrastructure bank, a type of revolving
infrastructure investment fund that can offer loans and credit assistance to public and private sponsors of certain highway
construction, transit or rail projects. Five states--Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Ohio and Virginia--have
established banks or accounts within their banks that are capitalized solely with state funds.
These banks were designed with the unique needs of each state in mind and their experiences
have varied. The future of state infrastructure banks may depend on the next federal surface
transportation authorization and what kinds of federal funding and financing resources may be available to states in
the future.
A federal infrastructure bank is an expansion of federal powers – exactly what we don’t need
American Thinker, September 4, 2011, “Infrastructure bank a bad idea”,
http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2011/09/infrastructure_bank_a_bad_idea.html
AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka wants it. The rent-seeking and increasingly statist U.S. Chamber of Commerce wants it. So does RINO Senator Lindsey Graham.
Senator John Kerry really wants it. Former SEIU boss Andy Stern envisions it being a mechanism to tax the overseas profits of multinational corporations. President
an infrastructure bank. The idea, under different
government-owned entity would provide funding for, primarily,
transportation projects through federally funded loans, guarantees, and grants and "leverage"
those funds to "attract significant private-sector investment." Tax payers would initially capitalize and ultimately
underwrite the "bank" (a misnomer, as banks do not award grants). In theory, the concept has certain merits, but the reality,
especially in the grips of big government ideologues, would be something different. To call for such an
entity is to admit governments' past failures and improvidence in this critical area, highlighting the untold amounts squandered on
non-critical if not wasteful, even unconstitutional, expenditures. Recall that the massive, $800 billion "stimulus" bill in
2009 was sold largely on the premise of funding much-needed infrastructure improvements and repairs. For centuries, this country has
financed most of its local, state and federal infrastructure through our existing governmental
bodies and taxing authorities--without an infrastructure bank--via regular appropriations,
municipal bond markets, and other means. Ronald Utt, Ph.D, of the Heritage Foundation thinks the idea of an
infrastructure bank is "a dangerous distraction and a waste of [Obama's] time." Paul Roderick Gregory of
Obama is supposedly obsessed with it and is considering making it part of his latest "jobs plan." It is
names, has been around for several years. The
Forbes believes such an institution "would simply be a political slush fund and encourage wasteful spending by political cronies." Conn Carroll of the Washington
Examiner describes the proposed bureaucracy as "just another stimulus boondoggle." House Republicans are suspicious that such a bank "is nothing more than a
Big, federally
directed and funded infrastructure projects are currently viewed by many on the American left as
a panacea to the ailing economy and to their guy's re-election chances. That belief, writes Chris
Edwards of Cato Institute, is a "liberal fairy tale, detached from the actual experience of most
federal agencies over the last century." As Carroll put it, "When [infrastructure spending] decisions are
made at the federal level, politics, not cost-benefit analysis, dictates what gets funded." The track
vehicle for more stimulus spending, disguised as "capital investment."" Picture a kind of TARP/stimulus/Fannie Mae Frankenstein.
records of our country's existing governmental "banks," like the Federal Reserve, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, don't bode well for a national infrastructure bank.
Like most "public-private partnerships," the associated risks would be borne solely or disproportionately by the public. Further, granting decision-making authority to
A national infrastructure bank would be an
embodiment of statism, central authority, deficit spending, and social engineering (think "green jobs" and
union favoritism) in the form of a new, eternal and ever-expanding federal bureaucracy. It is exactly what
we don't need.
unelected bureaucrats rather than elected officials is a bad idea (though neither is perfect).
A national infrastructure bank is just another example of federal overreach
The Tech, September 20, 2011, “Opinion: No national infrastructure investment bank”,
http://tech.mit.edu/V131/N38/yost.html
At first glance, a national campaign to invest in infrastructure isn’t a bad proposition. The returns to investment on infrastructure aren’t very impressive, but with the
government able to borrow money at two percent interest, and with labor and materials costs at extreme lows, it doesn’t take a very high return to justify infrastructure
spending.
On deeper inspection however, a national infrastructure bank is a fatally flawed idea, for
one simple reason: forcing the citizens of Texas to pay for a high speed rail line from San Diego
to Sacramento is bad government. It invites corruption, pork barrel politics, and misallocation of
our society’s resources. The citizens of, say, Ohio are and will always be in a better position to
decide whether it is worth the money to repair a bridge or school in their state. Offering to let
them pay for their projects with someone else’s money is not going to lead to better decisionmaking— instead, it will lead states to cut their own infrastructure spending and turn their
beggars cup to the federal government. It will incentivize states to represent their infrastructure as worse than it actually is, and pretend
that solutions are cheaper than they actually are. And because it isn’t their money at stake, states will have even less inclination than usual to make sure that the
projects are managed correctly. The real key to a state’s economic success won’t be the wise decision-making of its leaders, it will be its ability to lobby the federal
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government for special treatment and trade favors with the party in power. Perhaps in a few instances, investment in infrastructure at the national level makes sense.
Air traffic control, or an interstate network make sense as matters for the national government to manage . But bridges,
schools, high speed
rail lines, and the vast majority of the projects Obama touts as within the purview of his national
infrastructure campaign are best managed at the state or local level. It’s a conclusion so obvious that the idea of
national control raises immediate suspicion. Does Obama plan to use the bank to bestow patronage on his
supporters (particularly labor unions)? Or did he really manage to forget that state governments
already have the power to levy taxes and make repairs? Democratic activists are thrilled with Obama’s supposedly new
“toughness.” But getting tough is only a good strategy if you’ve got an idea that’s actually worth fighting for. Two weeks from now, every leading Republican is going
to have worked out the obvious counter-argument to a
bank into their stump speeches as yet
national infrastructure bank, and two weeks after that they’re going to have integrated the
another example of intellectually bankrupt federal overreach.
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Impacts – Modeling
American federalism is modeled now, maintaining the balance of power is crucial to the
creation of productive global federalist governments
Schapiro 2007 [Robert A. Schapiro, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law, “2007 RANDOLF W. THROWER SYMPOSIUM: THE NEW FEDERALISM:
PLURAL GOVERNANCE IN A DECENTERED WORLD: ARTICLE & ESSAY: FEDERALISM AS INTERSYSTEMIC GOVERNANCE: LEGITIMACY IN A POST-WESTPHALIAN
WORLD,” Emory Law Journal, 2007, p. Lexis]
Federalism is a widespread form of government throughout the world. Depending on the definition one employs,
somewhere between forty percent and eighty percent of the world's population lives in a federal system. n1 Federal systems involve layerings of legal regimes: Laws
promulgated by the national government and by subnational units apply concurrently .
The growth of transnational governance
provides an additional layer of regulation. Transnational regimes may take the form of bilateral trade agreements or of comprehensive
multilateral conventions with complex implementing bureaucratic structures, such as the European Union. The existence of multiple,
overlapping legal regimes is a pervasive feature of contemporary society. A transaction in Mississippi may well
fall within the regulatory domains of Mississippi, the United States, and the North American Free Trade Agreement. n2 Understanding the place of American
federalism within this global realm of layered governance presents complicated questions. From one perspective, constitutional federalism in the United States
provides an obstacle to [*116] transnational governing regimes. International agreements, and their resulting obligations, tend to result from the actions of the
national government. To the extent that these international conventions impose restrictions on conduct within the United States, the agreements may interfere with
the prerogative of the states. Globalization
may be the enemy of federalism. A functional understanding of
federalism in the United States, on the other hand, can connect federalism within the United
States to these larger global trends. Common issues may arise in all systems of layered
governance, whether federalism in one country or multilateral trade agreements. Overlapping regulations
may provide certain general benefits, while also threatening to undermine other important values. A global perspective fosters learning
about the systemic features of layers of governance. Utilizing a functional understanding of
federalism within the United States, this Essay seeks to draw lessons from the international context. I focus in particular on
issues of democratic legitimacy. Popular sovereignty provides the primary source of legitimacy
for contemporary liberal democracies, such as the United States. n3 Ultimately, government
must be of the people, as well as by the people and for the people. If the nation meets the
prerequisites for democratic rule, then the laws that it promulgates enjoy a democratic imprimatur:
taxation (and other regulation) only with representation. Laws that states or other subnational units impose on their own citizens enjoy a similarly strong democratic
pedigree.
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Impacts - General
Federalism prevents interventionalism and regional aggression
Silverstone 2000 [Scott A. Silverstone, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Williams College, Federal Democratic Peace: Domestic Institutions, International Conflict,
and American Foreign Policy, 1807-1860, September 1, 2000, www.isanet.org/archive/silverstone.html]
Jay and Madison clearly
describe the logic of institutional constraints on military force in terms of
federal asymmetry.[44] The key to reigning in the aggressive potential of republican government
was the territorially-distributed diversity of political perspectives and interests within the Union
that could be counted on to oppose one another at the center of decision-making in the federal
government. In Federalist No. 37, Madison observes asymmetry in the "circumstances" of different territorial
communities at all levels of the compound republic. "As every State may be divided into different
districts...which give birth to contending interests and local jealousies, so the different parts of
the United States are distinguished from each other by a variety of circumstances, which
produce a like effect on a larger scale."[45] Territorial representatives are expected to carry the "local spirit" of federal asymmetry into the
national legislature.[46] Jay notes that the contending interests and local jealousies that emerge from this
asymmetry will have a direct effect on how the different parts of the Union perceive the outside
world and act on their particular external interests through national policy. For example, he asserts that “the
temptations to violate treaties and commit international injustices may result from circumstances
peculiar to the State[s]...such violences are more frequently occasioned by the passions and
interests of a part than of the whole, of one or two States than of the Union.”[47] Federal asymmetry also meant
that different regions in the Union were expected to have different perspectives on the Union's relations with European powers that held colonial possessions in North
America. The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more
immediately to the borderers. The bordering States...will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be
authors of the Federalist recognized the potential
for external aggression that federal asymmetry may produce, they also argue that the diversity
among territorial communities would tend to constrain regional aggression. Jay argues forcefully,
"nothing can so effectually obviate that danger [of regional aggression] as a national
government, whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate
the parties immediately interested."[49] In other words, "the national government, not being affected by
these local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want
power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others."[50] This explanation for why constraints on war
most likely, by direct violence, to execute war with those nations.[48] While the
might emerge from the legislature goes beyond the simple assumption that legislatures are more deliberative bodies by nature, and therefore more likely to decide
against war as an irrational or imprudent act. Diversity among members of Congress increases the likelihood of divergent views and intense competition over
questions related to the use of military force.
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