Success of Democratic Consolidation
Social Influences and Elements of Democratic Transitions
Giovanni Amy Guerra
12/4/2009
The University of Texas at El Paso
POLS 5300- Boehmer
Fall 2009 Semester Research Project
The study of the success of democratic consolidation directly implies the necessity to determine
democratic and autocratic transitions in order to decrease the number of weak and failing states as a
method of securing our national security. Previous research usually takes a realist (economic) or liberalist
(institutional) perspective in identifying influential factors. However, the influence of religious
fragmentation, societal structures, and social equality elements of societies play a crucial role in the
successful rate of states. These societal and cultural indicators of development are analyzed and
examined in their effects on the stability of a nation. Many of these indicators do have a moderate effect
on the success of state consolidation, and as a result they must be addressed by the U.S. in order to
increase the efficacy of democratic consolidation in developing nations.
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Introduction
Since the September 11th attacks many Western democracies have reassessed the
threats of weak and failing states to their national security. According to the 2002 National
Security Strategy, the United States faces a greater threat from weak and failing states than
from conquering ones. 1 Because when development and governance fail in a country, “the
consequences engulf entire regions and leap across the world. Terrorism, political violence, civil
wars, organized crime, drug trafficking, infectious diseases, environmental crises, refugee flows
and mass migration cascade across the borders of weak states more destructively than ever
before.”2 The amount of damage failing and weak states have can clearly be detrimental to the
continued success to stable nations. It is this necessity for stability that leads nations to
promote their specific regime type and has consequently led to a renewed interest in the
success of democratic consolidation that has been seen in literature. The study of the success of
democratic consolidation directly implies the necessity to determine democratic and autocratic
transitions in order to decrease the number of weak and failing states as a method of securing
our national security. Previous research usually takes either an economic or institutional
perspective in identifying influential factors. However, each approach tends to simplify the
phenomenon of development theory by not measuring social and cultural indicators alongside
other identifying indicators for transitioning governments. It is these social indicators that
must be addressed in order to increase the efficacy of democratic consolidation because not
only are these indicators common to both economic and institutional based studies ialso play
1
2
White House,2002
USAID 2002
Guerra- 2
an even more important role in democratic consolidation by positively increasing the chances
of the success of democratization. For this reason, the focus of this research looks at social
indicators of education, life expectancy, and human development to see if they have a positive
effect on democratic stabilization in newly democratic nations.
Background
Previous research in this field can be grouped into two political schools of thought:
liberalism and realism. The liberalist perspective approaches the issue and focuses on the effect
of institutions on the state, while the realist perspective tends to focus on the influence
economics plays in the situation. Understanding both schools of thought helps us understand
the full scope of research and attention that political scientists have given to democratic
consolidation and the reason for continual study of the issue.
“More than any other single factor, the literature on the causes of democratic reversals
has long emphasized that democracies are put under stress by poor economic performance.” 3
Literature that takes such a realist perspective is driven by the arguments and findings of
Seymour Martin Lipset. Lipset argues that there is overwhelming amount of evidence that
economic development has a strong positive effect on democratization. Lipset argues that new
democracies have low levels of legitimacy and therefore there is a need for considerable
caution about the long-term prospects for their stability. According to him, what new
democracies need above all is efficacy, particularly in the economic arena, but also in the polity.
If they can take the high road to economic development, they can keep their political houses in
3
Kapstein and Converse, pg 62.
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order. If not, states will fail to develop and will not institutionalize genuinely democratic
systems.4
This belief in economic influence is a central tenet of realism that is shared and
promoted by other realists. For instance, in their article, “The Challenges of Consolidation”,
Haggard and Kaufman argue economic growth is key for democratic consolidation. Their
research argues that historically, “wherever democratic governments followed neo-liberal
tenets, the outcome has been stagnation, increased poverty, political discontent, and the
debilitation of democracy,” implying that economics are more influential than liberal
institutions in democratic consolidation.5 Haggard and Kaufman’s however do not limit their
scope to overall government economies as the trigger factor for democratic backsliding and
state failure, they note that public opinion also have an important role. They argue that an
“erosion of faith” in weak democratic governments not only by the public but by leaders of the
state to manage economic conditions of their state also lead to instability and the transitioning
of government regimes.6
The literature that approaches democratic consolidation in a liberalist perspective is
promoted by the ideas of two main theorists: Samuel P. Huntington and Larry Diamond. Samuel
Huntington describes democratization phenomenon as a sort of perpetuating cycle of waves of
democratization and reverse democratization. In his article, Democracy’s Third Wave,
Huntington tracks the waves of democratization and identifies three waves (and counter
waves) of democracy. According to Huntington, the first wave began in 1820s and ended in
4
Lipset, 1.
Haggard and Kaufman, 8.
6
Ibid, 7.
5
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1920s after the First World War. The second wave began in 1945 and ended in 1960s. Finally
the third wave began in the 1970s and is continuing today.7 Noting the waves of
democratization, Huntington compared the similar elements in trends in democratic waves and
their reversals. He concludes that key elements such as initial conditions, political institutions,
economic performance, and various internal and external elements were all factors of
democratic waves while obstacles to democratization were always political, cultural, and
economic in nature. However, Huntington still contended that the presence or lack thereof
these elements did not always cause democratic waves and reversal. He states that among the
factors that could produce democratic reversals include: weakness and belief in democratic
values, economic setbacks, social and political polarization, breakdown of law increasing
terrorist and insurgency violence, intervention of nondemocratic foreign powers, and snowball
effect of democratic reversal in neighboring countries. 8
Testing out his theory, in After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave, Huntington
studies the effect that economics and different cultures have on democracies.9 Using indicators
of economic development such as GDP, high levels of urbanization, and literacy Huntington
tests the correlation between levels of democracy and levels of economic development. In
order to see the effect of culture on democracy, Huntington looks at democracy in terms of
elections. Huntington argues that the difference in free and partial electoral democracies
results from the cultural differences of nations. For Huntington, the future of the third wave of
7
Huntington, Democracy’s Third Wave, 93.
Ibid, 95
9
Huntington, After Twenty Years: The Future of the Third Wave
8
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democracy lies in the expansion of democracy in non-western societies.10 It is at this point that
Huntington leaves room for future research discerning the expansion and consolidation to
democracy.
Huntington’s key elements have been the foundation for many researchers studying
the phenomenon of democratization. One clear example of the impact of Huntington’s work is
the work of Keith Jaggers and Ted Robert Gurr, which focuses of tracking Democracy’s Third
Wave using Polity III data. Throughout their study, Jaggers and Gurr make clear their position
on the importance of using three “essential” elements in order to operationalized democracy,
which include presence of institutions, constraints on executive power and finally the
guarantee of civil liberties.11 Using these variables to test and track democratization Jaggers
and Gurr conclude that the use of Polity III data helps establish a systematic mix of domestic
and international, socio-economic and political conditions associated with successful and failed
transitions to democracy during the last half-century.12
Another researcher inspired by Huntington is that of researcher Larry Diamond.
Diamond, wrote extensively on the subject of democracy. One of his works titled “Is the Third
Wave Over?” clearly shows an influence by Huntington’s ideas of democratic waves and
reversals. In this article, Diamond distinguishes between liberal and electoral democracies
arguing that this distinction is important in assessing the success rate of a young democracy. In
further research, Diamond argues that the key to understanding democratic changes lies with
10
Ibid, 6.
Jaggers and Gurr, 1995
12
Ibid, 481.
11
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civil society because it places limits on power by acting as a check against power abuse.
13
Diamond states that a “vigorous civil society enhances not only the accountability, but also the
representativeness and vitality of democracy.” 14
These key elements in liberalist approaches to the phenomenon of democratic waves
have continually been studied and expanded by further researcher. Richard Rose and Don C.
Shin, for instance focus their attention specifically on the phenomenon of democratic reversals.
They argue that countries in the third wave of democratization have been developing
backwards and thus the major reason for failure. 15 For Rose and Shin, the introduction of
competitive elections before establishing basic institutions of a modern state such as the rule of
law, institutions of civil society and the accountability of governors have created incomplete
democracies. In their study they use in depth public opinion survey data such as the New
Democracies Barometer to identify the different ways incomplete democracies can develop. To
make their point, Rose and Shin look at the democratic states of Russia, the Czech Republic, and
the Republic of Korea as case studies to argue that there are three alternative ways to creating
backwards democracies. These three ways include: completing democratization; repudiating
free elections and turning to an undemocratic alternative; or falling into a low-level equilibrium
trap in which the inadequacies of elites are matched by low popular demands and
expectation.16
13
Diamond, Toward Democratic Consolidation,5.
Diamond, Three Paradoxes of Democracy,54.
15
Rose and Shin 2001.
16
Ibid,1.
14
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Monty Marshall, in his report “Fragility, Instability, and the Failure of States,” also builds
on the liberalist theories that view structures and other liberal institutions as necessary in
democratization.17 Marshall discusses a three-tiered societal system of governance, conflict,
and development using various models. When looking at conditional and causal factor models,
Marshall uses a civil war model, greed and grievance model, and ethnic and revolutionary war
models to test indicators of the onset of problem events such as political violence and regime
instability. To gauge regional risk for such problematic events, Marshall uses various predictive
models, using Political Instability Task Force’s data to establish various regional country models.
Concluding his report, Marshall uses general risk and capacity models to comparatively
measure states in strength, social problems, political conflict, and poor state performance.18
Finally, Ethan Kapstein and Nathan Converse have promoted the idea that liberal
institutions affect democracy by studying the division of power and the limits placed on the
executive. Simply studying per capita income Kapstein and Converse argue has the possibility to
conceal severe inequities within a given society.19 In order to understand causal factors behind
democratic reversal, Kapstein and Converse stress the necessity of looking beyond simple
economic variables and focus on liberal democratic institutions. In their book, The Fate of
Young Democracies, Kapstein and Converse’s focus their study on the impact of strong leaders,
arguing that the greatest threat to democracy is “found in the temptation of the leaders of
young democracies to concentrate political and economic power in the executive office” and as
17
Marshall, 2008.
Ibid.
19
Kapstein and Converse, Young Democracies in the Balance: Lessons for the International Community, 4.
18
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a result these are the actors that are most responsible for democratic reversals. 20 Kapstein and
Converse take the ideas of Huntington and previous liberalist researchers and analyze
indicators known to create democratic reversals in young democracies.
Theory
Although there has clearly been extensive research in the area of democratic reversals,
there continues to be a clear answer as to why these events occur. Previous literature does,
however seems to allude to the importance of social and cultural elements, but it is not
accounted for in their research. For instance, in his article The Social Requisites of Democracy,
Lipset examines not only economic, but also some cultural and social variables in regards to
their effect on civil society and their influence on economic variables in maintaining democratic
stability.21 The importance of social influences is also noted by Samuel Huntington and Ethan
Kapstein and Nathan Converse. Kapstein and Converse even cite these non institutional
changes as “crucial to long run development in democratic nations.”22 In Democracy’s Third
Wave, Huntington even argues that religious affiliations can sometimes present an obstacle to
democratic governments. He speculates that eastern religions such as Islam and Confucianism
as religions not compatible with democratic governments.
This disregard of social indicators in creating a stable democracy was first addressed by
Socrates and Aristotle. These political philosophers understood the importance of societal
conventions in sustaining democracies. For Aristotle, “the greatest, of all the means […] for
ensuring the stability of constitutions- but one which is nowadays generally neglected- is the
20
Ibid, 1.
Lipset, 1.
22
Kapstein & Converse, The Fate of Young Democracies, 2008.
21
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education of citizens in the spirit of their constitution.” 23 Education of populous as a measure
of the development of a society has been a long time indicator of development; however the
importance of its effect has not been highly emphasized.
The issue with previous literature however, is that although they acknowledge in
influence of non-institutional and non-economic changes in increasing stability of democratic
regimes, there has been little to no study of these social and cultural elements in democratic
consolidation research. As a result, social indicators are very necessary elements in analyzing
social phenomenon such as democracy and it is important to include such indicators in our
model, not just focus on economic and liberal institutions effect on democratic stability. The
study of democratic reversals and other political phenomenon are by nature social conventions
created by humans. For this reason, the focus of this research looks at social indicators of
education, life expectancy and human development to see if they have a positive effect on
democratic stabilization in newly democratic nations.
Research Design
Development of current nation-states has been attributed to globalization, economic
growth and the presence of internal and external institutions. Such indicators as regime type,
religious and cultural fragmentation, armed conflict in neighboring countries, and state-led
political discrimination all affect democratic consolidation within a country. In order to study
successful democratic consolidation, however it is important to define certain concepts
imperative to this study. The first and by far the most important is democracy, which is defined
23
Aristotle, 1998.
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as one in which political participation is unrestricted, open, and fully competitive; executive
recruitment is elective, and constraints on the chief executive are substantial.24
Polity IV data is a compiled dataset of international state statistics since 1800 – present.
The democracy indicator derived from the Polity IV data is based on an additive eleven-point
scale (0-10) based on the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and
competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive using the
following weights:
Authority Coding Scale Weight
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP):
(3) Election +2
(2) Transitional +1
Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN):
only if XRCOMP is Election (3) or Transitional (2)
(3) Dual/election +1
(4) Election +1
Constraint on Chief Executive (XCONST):
(7) Executive parity or subordination +4
(6) Intermediate category +3
(5) Substantial limitations +2
(4) Intermediate category +1
Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP):
(5) Competitive +3
(4) Transitional +2
(3) Factional +1
Source: POLITY IV Dataset Users’ Manual, Monty G Marshall and Keith Jaggers, 2008.
24
Definition as determined by the Polity IV Project.
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The next important concept needed to be operationalized is education. In order to test
for the effect of education, the level of a country’s adult literacy rate and general enrollment
rates will be used. This data compiled as part of the U.N. Human Development Reports (19802008) and were subsequently added to the Polity IV data. Adult literacy rate and general
enrollment rates however were not the only social indicators used to test the effect whether or
not social indicators have a significant positive effect on democratic stability.
Democratic stability is the final concept needed to be defined. This seemingly more
complex concept is easily characterized by the durability of a regimes authority pattern. Polity
IV data is a comprehensive dataset for studying regime change and the effects of regime
authority. Polity IV data provides this measure, DURABLE, on a three-point change in the polity
index. These concepts and data are all combined and tested in a panel corrected error model in
order to determine the relationship between gross enrollment rates, adult literacy rates, life
expectancy, and human development index trends have on the durability of state regimes.
Results
Observing the effect of these social development indicators on the durability of a regime
has interesting trends. Adult literacy in this dataset is represented as a proportion of those ages 15
and older that are literate as compared to the rest of the country’s population. However, the effect of
adult literacy does not seem to have a strong effect on durability of a state because there is
only a 0.33 correlation between the two variables.
durable adultl~y
durable
adultliter~y
lifeex
GER
HDITrend
1.0000
0.3302
0.4420
0.4090
0.4681
Figure 1 Source: Polity IV, Authors’ Calculations
1.0000
0.7696
0.8187
0.8867
lifeex
1.0000
0.7905
0.9325
GER HDITrend
1.0000
0.8884
1.0000
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The effects of life expectancy at birth and general enrollment rate on the other hand
seem to have some sort of correlation to durability. With a 0.44, life expectancy rate at birth
seems to have a more moderate relationship with the durability of a state. This moderate
relationship can also be seen in that of the general enrollment rate (0.40). Regardless, both are
clearly factors to look at in assessing the durability of a state. Even though, the effect of these
social indicators seems to be very little; when they are combined the effect doubles, increasing
the impact that the indicators have on the durability of a state. This increased correlation
between variables could however be due to an unexamined variable, so looking at the Human
Development Index’s (HDITrend) effect, which is a composite measure of these measures, the
correlation between these variables and durability of regime are returned to a figure similar to
their previous correlations. At 47 percent this correlation between HDITrend and Durability
seems to be quite significant. So as to discern the level of importance, a panel-corrected
standard error (PCSE) model is conducted.
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors
Group variable:
Time variable:
Panels:
Autocorrelation:
ccode
cyear
heteroskedastic (unbalanced)
panel-specific AR(1)
Estimated covariances
=
Estimated autocorrelations =
Estimated coefficients
=
durable
Coef.
lifeex
adultliter~y
GER
HDITrend
_cons
-1.181606
-.4646128
-.2632595
153.0901
43.24249
rhos =
1
Figure 2 Polity IV, Authors’ Calculations
156
156
5
Het-corrected
Std. Err.
.5023551
.1647973
.2622821
48.95572
18.94041
1
z
-2.35
-2.82
-1.00
3.13
2.28
.9151085
Number of obs
Number of groups
Obs per group: min
avg
max
R-squared
Wald chi2(4)
Prob > chi2
P>|z|
0.019
0.005
0.316
0.002
0.022
.9148961
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
952
156
1
6.102564
10
0.4557
11.24
0.0240
[95% Conf. Interval]
-2.166204
-.7876096
-.777323
57.13865
6.119971
.9850007 ...
-.1970084
-.141616
.2508039
249.0416
80.36501
1
Guerra- 13
This model is chosen, in order to take into consideration the effect of time on our
variables, specifically the durability of a regime. Glancing at the data, it becomes obvious that
the correlation between general enrollment rates (GER) and durability was a flawed
observation. The PCSE model controlled for this error and looking at the 95% Confidence
Interval, which ranges from -0.78 to 0.25, the rest of the data for GER can be thrown out
because of there is clearly no significant effect between GER and durability. Another way to
ensure that this data is insignificant is to look at the p-values. With a p-value of .315 for GER,
which is greater than the 0.05 threshold, we can accept that there is no relationship between
GER and durability. Taking this basic approach in examining the rest of the factors, it is clear
that life expectancy and education through testing of adult literacy rates do have effects on the
durability of a state’s regime power.
The next approach to analyzing the data from our model is to look at the point
estimates of the variables. Life expectancy it seems has a -1.18 slope coefficient, meaning that
there is a 95% confidence the chances of a durable regime are decreased 1.18 of a point for
every decrease in the expected life of an individual beginning at birth holding the other
variables constant. Signifying that the importance of ensuring a long life expectancy in order to
increase the stability of a nation. Looking at the slope coefficient for adult literacy, it can be
conclude that for every 0.46 percentage point decrease of literate adults in a nation, durability
is also decreased. This decrease in durability by a measure of education does indicate that
there is a probable chance that education does affect the stability of a nation however at a -.46
point slope estimate, the likely hood of this greatly impacting a democracy’s stability is slim.
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Conclusion
The important of ensuring constitutional stability is an important goal for all legislators
especially in the current state of affairs, in which threats posed against nations are ever
present. The amount of damage failing and weak states have can clearly be detrimental to the
continued success of nations, but the numerous other factors including institutional, economic
or social factors must all be evaluated equally. The focus of this research was to spotlight the
importance social indicators such as education, life expectancy, and human development to see
if they have on democratic stabilization in newly democratic nations. With adult literacy rates
indicating that education does have an effect on the stability of a nation, it is clear that Aristotle
was not fully correct when he said education was the most important factor that influenced a
states’ stability. This decrease in durability by a measure of education does indicate that there
is a probable chance that education does affect the stability of a nation, however the effect is
moderate. These overall findings of the analysis make it possible to reject the hypothesis that
social indicators have a strong positive effect on democratic stability of new nations since many
of the social indicators do not have strong influences on democratic stability. Nevertheless, it is
clear that social factors must be addressed in order to get a better idea of how to preserve
nations in hope to create a stabile and productive society.
.
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