Lecture Notes
November 2: Taking the Reins: Presidential Transitions
I
Defining Transitions
A. Period between Election and Inauguration- 20th amendment- move
inaugural from March 4 to January 20; instead of 4 months they have
11 weeks before inauguration
B. The initial Months of a new administration
II
The Setting
A. Expectations- expectations are enormously high; huge transition teammost are looking for jobs
B. Scrutiny- immense scrutiny from the press
C. Pressures- under pressure to announce your cabinet (Clinton was
systematic approach to closing…talk about position first)
III
Central Tasks
A. Recruiting Personnel- think of it as a team rather than a collection of
superstar individuals
B. Policy: Continuity and Initiatives-has to make a lot of policy decisions- which policies to continue
-institutional memory? (GWB decided to retain CIA director, NSC
people
-decide #1 priorities, #2 etc and pursue #1 right away
C. Organization- how are we going to reorganize
-reorganization is best at the beginning
-no way to reorganize w/o people feeling like they’re worse off or
better off, so there’s always a cost
IV
Hazards- Neustadt’s “hazards of transition” is useful chapter that reminds us that
with every new adventure there are hazards. There are 3 potential types of
hazards with transitions. Porter adds a 4th
A. Ignorance [of nuances]
-there are things you don’t know when you come in and your have to
make decisions (ie bay of pigs)
-NOT UNDERSTANDING THE NUANCES OF POLICY (Carter ex
with president now knowing about communication from foreign
government 1776 in Moscow)
B. Hubris: identifies this with the staff more than with president
-1st hubris: you don’t draw on people who are leaving (tend to ignore)
-2nd hubris: how you treat people who stay (career civil servants)
C. Haste: you’re often pressed to do things quickly (ie Reagan tax plans)
D. Overreaching (Porter)- you want to do a lot of things right at the outset
V
Transitions as Opportunities
November 7 – “The President and the National Agenda”
The President is unlikely to ever feel fully in control. The President must manage the six
streams below. In doing so, he must act as an economizer.
I.
Six Key Streams of Regular Activities
II.
III.
a. Budgets (must hear appeals)
b. Bills (legislative proposals – the State of the Union has 40-60 embedded)
c. News (responding to)
d. Cables (international affairs briefing every 8 hours)
e. Jobs (about 8000 political appointments per term)
f. Callers (meeting with Congress, groups, etc.)
Three Generic Types of Issues – President must use his legislative,
administrative, and rhetorical presidential powers to structure his agenda
around these three reservoirs of issues.
a. Electoral mandate issues – easier to assert when national mood is
consistent with electoral mandate
b. Maturing issues – constantly inclined to tinker (e.g. tax reform, clean air,
education)
c. Crisis issues – when President can persuade others that failing to act now
will result in a significant deterioration of the underlying situation (e.g.
homeland security)
Shaping the National Agenda: Omnibus Approaches – omnibus budget
reconciliation bill
November 9: The President and Congress: Who Leads?
Overview
 Original concepts of the President’s legislative role
o Framers didn’t think the President would do much in terms of legislation
o He had few staff
o Only give one State of the Union address, a legislative program not included
 TR and FDR
o We began viewing the President as someone who would give Congress a legislative
program
 All Congressmen basically thought of as equal, so difficult to produce comprehensive program or
unified budget
o President introduces these, and Congress acts on it
 Incentives
o President’s incentives
 Presidents thought to represent the common, general, national interests
 Do not represent special interests (or special geographic areas)
o Congressional incentives
 Particular interests based on geographical location
 Their main offices are in their own districts
 They believe they represent “particular interests”
 After going through the election process, Congressmen feel like they deserve two things:
o Power, a voice, taken seriously
o Respect from both parties and the President and his staff
Trends in Congress
 Power in Congress has been decentralized
o Less power in party leaders
o People working for you are working for you, and not the political party
o Power is less hierarchical
o Watergate Class started the move toward decentralized power
 52 new democratic members of Congress elected and they decided to get rid of
seniority




 Committee leaders chosen by secret ballot
 All chairmen had been Southern Democrats when JFK took office
 More subcommittee power – less control by Chairman
o 1994 – Republicans introduced term limits for Committee chairmen (6 years)
 Chairmen who are term-limited run for something else
Specialization and Independence
o Everyone wants to do a good job, and you need information to do this
o Congress used to be very dependent on executive branch for information
o Early 1960’s – Congressional Budget Office will produce estimates and information
o Congressional staff increased (legitimized because of the rise in US population)
o Today, Congress has much greater institutional independency
More democratization
o 1974 – Many fewer closed committee hearings
o Began televising house and senate sessions
Workload has increased
o Because federal G spending almost 20% of a larger GDP
Working with Congress is now much more complicated than it was 30+ years ago
o Speaker/majority leader will have less control over other democrats
o More Congressional time spent on specialized issues
o Negotiations much more difficult
Three Successes (FDR, LBJ, Reagan)
 Came into office in a time of crises (Depression, Assassination of Kennedy, stagflation and
Iranian hostages)
o People set aside their differences
 Achieving a governing majority in Congress
o LBJ had many southern democrats
o Reagan put together a group of conservative democrats
 Persuasive personality
o Paid attention to members of Congress
o Reagan – after hospital he lifted a lot, thought about challenging Mondale for an arm
wrestling match
o Reagan would call Congressmen on his birthday – got a list at the beginning of the
day
 His first call after his assassination attempt was to say happy birthday to
Congressman on a talk radio station
Who Leads?
 President puts together a legislative plan
 Congress:
o Defines parameters and makes sure that everyone gets their fair share
 Examples:
o Reagan’s Tax Reform Bill of 1986
 Democrats in control
 Majority leader realized that Reagan’s proposal would not pass, had a
meeting with Reagan, told him that he could get a bill out of ways and
means committee and passed by House, but Reagan might not love it
 Told Reagan to get a bill out of the Senate
 Reagan did not let anyone criticize Majority Leader
 What eventually came out of Congress looked nothing like Ways and Means
bill or President’s initial bill, but it was something everyone could agree
with
o
Clean Air in 1990
 Bush advanced proposal, but told it would not get through the House
 Bush asked that if he could get a bill through the Senate, then Energy
committee chairman would get a bill out of the House – they made a deal
 Negotiate a bill that would be different than Administration’s bill and
different than what came out of Senate
 Hours of negotiation in Senate with Democratic leaders, Republican leaders,
and administration (99 Senators sat in at one point)
 If produce agreement, Senators have to vote in favor of agreement and not
amend it on the floor
 George Mitchell and Minority leader Bob Dole kept their words
 Legislation took a full month, eventually passed 89-11
 Had been gridlocked for 13 years
 Put a lot of pressure on the House, and the House passed it
o Budget Summits of 1982, 87, 92, 97
 Deficit reduction agreements
 1982 – involved leaders in House, Senate, and administration
 Negotiated total size of deficit reduction act and what would be the
particular components
 1992 – Negotiated a deal with 25 people (10 rep leaders from senate and
house, 10 dem…, and 5 from administration)
 One republican (Gingrich) came back and changed his view,
couldn’t get majority of Republicans in house, dems pulled out b/c
they didn’t want to be thought of as tax raisers
 Signal that individual members wouldn’t just sign off on something
that the leaders agreed to
o NAFTA (1993) – negotiated with labor, environment, etc.
 Bipartisan
o No Child Left Behind
 Bush used a democrat from Texas to help pull democrats to the bill
Three Perspectives
 Some believe that President leads the legislation system
o Initiator, and Congress will just respond
o Presidents get most of what they want
 Congressionally-driven
o They actually write legislation, and President signs most of it
 Examples
o Minimum wage increase when Bush entered (Kennedy proposed it)
o Debate on whether to propose right where they would agree or a little lower so there
was negotiation room; would have to veto if raised above the higher proposal
o Proposed higher, it was raised and passed, so Bush vetoed it
Lecture Notes from November 14
The President and the Congress: Mutual Oversight
I. The President and the Congress
 particularized, local interests for Congress
 President’s role is focuser, initiator, and agenda setting
 Congress modifies, wants to make sure particular constituency interests are
observed
 Presidency a personalized office
 Meetings
o Carter mechanically brilliant but lacked a personal touch
o Nixon tried to get around congressional leadership to rank-and-file
o 2 types of meetings
 bipartisan leadership meetings—leaders on both sides of aisle,
appointees sit on side and don’t speak until spoken to
 partisan leadership meetings
II. The White House Office of Legislative Affairs
 Roosevelt used an undersecretary of the interior
 Eisenhower first to use legislative affairs
 Between 20-25 people, professional and support staff, split evenly between House
and Senate personnel
 People who know Congress well, keep egos under control
 Keys to Success
o Limit number of issues they get involved in
o Tell congressmen you don’t like bill early and might veto before
congressmen promise to district will vote for it
o Good working relationship with Congress
III. Presidential-Congressional Relations: Foreign Policy
 Constitutional provisions—formal powers clear; 7 of 18 congressional powers
deal with FP
 The expansion of presidential powers-Washington
o Jefferson sent troops to check piracy
o Madison called to Congress to declare war
 The War Powers Act—established in 1973 when presidential credibility at a low;
Congress has failed to lay down a marker, Pres thinks unconstitutional for him
being commander-in-chief, never tested
 Increased congressional activism—tariff levels a fight—Smoot-Harley tariff
raised tariff to 50-60% and stopped world trade; Pres allowed to negotiate tariff
reduction
IV. Presidential-Congressional Relations: Domestic Policy
 The Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974—imposed by Congress on
weak president
 State of the Union—the President’s legislative program
 Budget Resolutions (Spring)
 Appropriations Bill (Fall)
 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts—congressmen load up bill with pork,
knowing hard for Presidents to veto entire bill
V. Mutual Oversight—issue of time management at forefront; time-consuming, often
partisan
 Formal Oversight
o Fire alarms vs. police patrols—more often fire alarm (reacting to crisis)
rather than police patrols (preventive)
o Investigations—Harry Truman’s Senate hearings about military likely
saved country $15 billion in 1940’s
o When Democratic Congress and Republican Pres in 1983 a lot of
oversight, but when Rep Congress and Dem Pres in 1997 less oversight
o Democratic Party-led committees more oversight conscious
o Another explanation: Congressmen spend less time in Wash D.C.
 Informal Oversight (consultation understandings)
 The appointments process
o Congress must approve of Pres’ appointees
o Every Pres since JFK has had more difficulty (takes longer) getting his
appointees confirmed than the Pres before him
o Why is confirmation process longer? Gov’t has grown, more appointees;
Senate exercising more oversight
 The President’s Veto
o Frequency of Use and Success Rates (less than 5% of vetoes overridden)
o Rationales and Strategies—Reasons given to Congress for veto
 Unwise on policy grounds
 Lack of fiscal soundness
 Unconstitutional
 Administratively unworkable
 Protect executive against legislative encroachment
VI. Generic Lessons
 If Pres can pick time and place, pick his spots effectively, he has the most troops
and will often win
 Less if more—cannot fight on every front—Economizing President
 The Rewards of Persistence—system has high potential for stalemate
November 16, 2006
The Courts and the Presidency
I.
John Roberts – Supreme Court not driven by political views
a. Repeating arguments of Hamilton – Federalist 78
b. Q: how do you square this with
i. 2000 hand re-count intervened by Supreme Court, ensured that
Bush wins ( v. partisan political matter)
ii. (If recount finished Bush still would have won)
c. Argument: Courts have always been political actors – their influence has
grown significantly with the expansion of the modern presidency and they
are increasingly willing to interject into overtly political issues
II.
Watergate v. political reflects courts more deferential to President
a. Nixon elected 1969 – campaign promise to end Vietnam War – trapped
between extrication and maintaining existence of S. Vietnamese regime
b. Pressure increases with Pentagon Paper lead (US involvement in Vietnam
shown to have gone as far back as Truman)
c. Complained to aides about leaks – to Halderman, who hires “plumbers”
whose sole jobs is to stop leaks
i. Operation expands – Gordon Libby and Howard Hunt start using
dubious tactics, like burglarizing office of man who leaked
d. Nixon runs 1972 for re-election
i. Plumbers new job is to support Nixon with “dirty tricks”
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
ii. They plant a bug in Dem HQ in Watergate to check on McGovern
(Nixon didn’t know specifics but knew about plumbers) bug
wasn’t working so they break back into the office to fix the bug
iii. Watergate – plumbers caught – Nixon finds out! – John Dean and
Mitchell (Attorney General) big figures in WH had known about
this
iv. Hush money given to pumbers, who want to plead guilty but judge
refuses plea to get to the truth
e. Woodward, helped by undercover person “Deep Throat” investigates,
Congress starts own investigation
f. Mitchell resigns, many other people resign, Dean goes to the Committee
and spills everything
g. Reveals Nixon had taping system – was voice activated – everything got
taped
h. Archie Cox subpoenaed Nixon for tapes – President exercises executive
privilege – people who work for P. need to have confidentiality
i. Nixon gets independent third party to listen to tapes
i. Court case goes to Supreme court 8-0 Nixon relinquishes tapes “Smoking
gun tape” Nixon heard orchestrating cover-up – impeachable for
obstruction of justice
j. Nixon resigns
Even in ruling against Nixon – Supreme court based decision on overriding
right for criminal defender to have a fair trail (all evidence) which is a legal
principle
a. Contrasted with Gore v Bush – totally different no overriding legal
principle for decision
Courts power rests on a fragile basis – willingness of President and Congress
to depend on the courts for the ultimate interpretation of the Constitution
a. To maintain this power the Court must remain non-partisan
Marbury v Madison 1983 Judicial Review
a. John Adams defeated by Jefferson
b. Adams tries to pack office of Supreme Court with commissions - Not all
commissions delivered, Marbury wants his commission sues Madison to
get commission
c. Marshall is in charge of Court – Court hasn’t established independent
authority would be bad if opinion ignored
d. Unconstitutional case – Marshall avoids getting involved in political
decision by using judicial review – doesn’t appear partisan
Rise of Court activism
a. FDR sees 8 legislation statues ruled invalid by SC – these delegated
legislative power to appointed officials
b. FDR introduces legislations to pack courts – try to expand the size of the
court with people he appoints
c. Judicial Review (Judicial review is the power of a court to review a
statute, or an official action or inaction, for constitutionality. In many
jurisdictions, the court has power to strike down a statute, overturn an
VII.
VIII.
IX.
official action, or compel an official action, if the court believes the
constitution so requires. Wikipedia) is limited by four factors
i. Need support by public
ii. No enforcement arm
iii. Limits on implication for legal precedent
iv. Judicial process reactive – body of cases from which they choose
based on appeal
Primary means by which President can influence SC is his power of
appointment (congress confirms) – nominations are increasingly politicized
a. 1990 Geroge Bush – nominates Clarence Thomas – Anita Hill accuses
him of sexual harassment, heated rhetoric symbolic – v. controversial
race/gender Rep pushing black nominee – normal alliances thrown out, he
is confirmed narrowly – significant signal of politicization
How do P. choose who to nominate? Based on partisanship limit on
appointment power – life tenure of judges
Conclusions
a. Scope of influence of SC has grown – so has politicization
b. Danger – historical deference from Congress/ Prez in danger – why 2000
decision problematic b/c Courts slipped into a v. political process – power
is very fragile
c. Life tenure – cannot claim political support based on elections
d. Power based on basis of Law –
e. And for systems of separate institutions sharing power – you need
deference
November 21: Presidents, Parties, and Interest Groups
I.
The Iron Triangle Theory of American Government
A.
The Elements of the Triangle:
a. Executive branch, head of bureaus and agencies
b. Legislative: senior committee and subcommitee staff in House &
Senate, ppl organizing hearings and drafting legislation
c. Leaders of majority interest groups – affected by various policies
B.
The Sources of Influence
a. Information and position of influence
C.
The Nature of Relationships within the Triangle
a. Tightly structured, consist of mutually rewarding relationships, tend to
exhibit autonomy
II.
The Case for the Iron Triangle Theory
A.
Lack of strong political parties
- Neither Dems nor Reps strong: need for and opportunity for change
B.
Size, diversity and resistance to central control
- Fragmentation of power and authority
C.
The power of pervasive incrementalism
- Charles Linblom: constantly working away
III.
Difficulties with the Iron Triangle Theory
A.
A lack of explanatory power
IV.
a. Not great at explaining large chunks of foreign policy initiatives 
Civil Rts, Reapportionment, can claim only to a partial explanation
B.
The distribution of costs and benefits (IT= Iron Triangle)
Benefits↓
Costs
Concentrated
Distributed
Concentrated
I
III
Distributed
II
IV
- IT can account for I: Small group of ppl who can agitate for legislation—
costs and benefits concentrated
- IT can account for II: Benefits concentrated, costs distributed—ex: sugar
price: 3 Billion dollars to 13,000 sugar producers
-DOES NOT Account for III or IV, no dominance of IT theory
- III: Social Security, Medicare
- IV Existence of which defeats theory – concentrated cost should
organize to break this
C.
Counter triangles
a. There exist group of ppl in all components: (Exec, Legis, Leaders) that
are not enthusiastic and mobilize to block the IT Acts
D.
An expanding world of interests
a. IT does not account for expanding public interests: world of ideas,
research and think tanks, larger pop of ppl educated; power of
individuals rising
E.
The role of elected and appointed leaders
a. IT theory attacks subtly the notion that elected leaders have influence
and power  if IT, it wouldn’t matter who is elected to power as they
don’t have influence
F.
The thrust of government programs
a. 60s – 80s Dems and Reps agreed to policiesredistributive programs
and entitlement programs: ¼ of federal budget before, now ¾ of
federal budget
b. Adopted large # of social value regulations – Not product of Its,
product of much larger groups
G.
The growth of complexity
a. Growth of Congress and Exec office, increase in size and complexity
of institutions undermine this theory (# of political employees grew
under Reps and Dems)
The Evolving World of Interest Groups
A.
The nature of interest groups in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s
a. Associated with organized labor, business, agriculture  industry
groupings, sector groupings, some umbrella organizations like
business council, national federation of small businesses
B.
Changing patterns in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s
a. Compact world changed 60-90s growth in # of interest groups, growth
of intergovernmental offices in DC, services now disseminated by
state and local, paid for by federal govt.
C.
The growth of public interest lobbies
V.
VI.
VII.
a. Growth of public interests lobbies—behave differently than trade
association: financed by foundations and wealthy individual: cause
oriented, rejected traditional means: attract large amts of attn
D.
Implications for the President
a. Implications: more challenging and unpredictable environments,
coalition building is more difficult, more latitude for P to act
The Presidential Response: The Office of Public Liaison
A.
Origins and Evolution
a. Office of Public Liaison: FDR: informal, Nixon: set up office
b. Obj: rep interest of WH to int groups
c. Door to outside world
The Presidency and the Role of Interest Groups
A.
The rise of roles of issue networks
d. might look like an IT, but an IT is static and stable: IN is larger, more
ppl: includes Congress ppl and knowledgeable political appointees
E.
What interest group representatives contribute
1. The conventional wisdom about lobbyists: tend to seek access
through contributions
2. Reality and the quest for credibility: access is easy through
persistence: officials eager to appear approachable, connected etc.
The Roles of Interest Groups: Seven Case Examples
A.
Umbrella organizations at work – The Economic Recovery Tax Act
a. Large orgs came together to reduce the rate of growth of govt taxes
B.
The capacity to block action – Small business and the Health Security Act
a. Came together to block act, put out ads to suggest that there must be
another choice
C.
The power of inertia – The youth differential minimum wage
a. Initially thought that businesses would be interests, but they did not
want to support any change
D.
The leveling of special interests – Fundamental tax reform
a. 1986: host of business interests opposed fundamental reform, but
Reagan kept campaigning for it, one group broke, avalanche of support
E.
Interest groups as bargainers – Steel imports
a. System of filing complaints that you are being hurt in anything unfair;
companies file these reports during presidential election years
F.
Unity in a crisis – Assisting the airlines after September 11, 2001
a. Within 11 days, airline industry and cargo companies came up with a
package and moved through to President to sign. Ex of group of
interests that are usually v. competitive that came together to advance
interests.
November 28:
- The advancement of policies in election years is designed to please certain
constituent groups.
- Polling
1. Presidential Approval Ratings show wide variation
-
-
2. Presidents tend to start high and then decline slowly over time. Beginning
with Ronald Reagan, Presidents start out lower, but have wider shifts.
Initial disapproval ratings used to be very low, but have been on the rise.
Presidents now are somewhat less likely to have high initial approval
ratings. The last three Presidents, however, left office higher than where
they started.
3. How susceptible are ratings to single events? People who disapprove are a
coalition of minorities. People who don’t like you are generally more
passionate about it than people who do. Gradually, the President alienates
more and more groups over time. The public also tends to rally around
the flag, and support the President in times of intense international events.
Going Public consists of popular leadership by the President. In Going Public, the
President overwhelms Congress using the force of public opinion. In recent
decades, the Washington community is more complicated and fragmented, and is
less dependent on political parties. Since the President now has superior access to
the media, he can now use public appeals to get his way instead of bargaining.
But Presidents still have to bargain. Going Public successfully is rare, and the
power of Going Public decreases with use. It is only effective when the issue is
highly salient.
Heclo – The Permanent Campaign – Presidents now are fascinated by public
opinion polls. As such, they tell the public what they want to hear, which
contracts the leeway for bargaining, because they often tell the public how terrible
the other side is. Hence, it is harder to bargain effectively. Problems today are
more complex than problems 50 years ago, so rather than come up with solutions
to these problems, people often just blame the other side for the bad things that
are happening.
November 30: The President and the Press
I.
Historical Evolution and Trends
A. ??(arrived late to class)
B. The Beginning of the Formal Relationship: 1896-1932
 Teddy Roosevelt had press room built in 1902 and regular meetings
 Wilson 1st for regular press conferences
 Hoover first with “Press Secretary”
 regular meetings, location, and expectation to see reporters were the 3 big
developments
C. Developing the Formal Relationship
 1968-Nixon admin…marked expansion in the info. And amount reporters
would see, reporters met w press secretary twice (a day or week)
 govt, press relationship grew out of mutual need
 Roosevelt –86 times, Truman 44, ike 24, jfk 22, lbj 26 (press meetings
with prez per year
 at end of WWII, the relationship was still cooperative, and press was still
of modest size.
 Ike was first to hold first tv press conference but it was not live

Transition for Ike to Kennedy, and Kennedy allowed press conferences to
be live by Salinger’s recommendation but this was opposed by other
members of administration and members of the press
 but Kennedy regarded tv as his ally (esp. after Nixon debates). He cared
little for the print presses advantage
 90% had a favorable impression of the prez from watching these press
conferences
D. Transforming White House-Press Corps Contact: 1969-2006
 due to 1. Rise in media and 2. The growth of the White HousePress-communications Complex
 1. Enhanced role of the media
o due to access for the people
o the D.C press core has quadrupled
o press far more intrusive (vs. not reporting on FDR’s
disability
 2. White house Press-communications complex
o huge expansion as well: Office Of Comm. And the Office of
Press Secretary
o physical proximity makes it easy to keep in contact
 reduction in the number of formal press conferences and only one
daily press conferences
 gaggle: meeting after the senior staff meeting, 24-36 reporters invited
over to the press secretary’s office. Very cramped. It is for utility
guidance and it alerts the press secretary a little more than just
guessing of what the press wants to bring up. It is in everyone’s best
interest (PS and Press) for them to know what is coming, so PS can
prepare and get some answers. Opportunity for press to signal what
they are interested in learning about. Now press conferences re live,
so now no heading back. So in everybody’s best interest to anticipate
this.
II.
Forms of Interaction: The Search for Information and the Quest for Control
 Rankings in press seating and who questions—important for them and
for press secretary. Stories go to first ranking and then on down
 Set of Christmas parties—1. Staff and cabinet 2. Congress 3. Then 2
held for media and the press. The only non-govt. officials are the
press and they get 2—partly b/c there are so many and also bc of
importance
 White House Correspondences, Gridiron Dinner, TV/radio dinner, etc.
 These are all examples of when P is in social situation with press
 Media serves as a intermediary for the people to the P. Political
Parties are no longer the mediators. Now we have tv and print.
III. Media Democracy
1. change in Technology and more visual
 From Film to Tape: speed of transmission. These developments have
accentuated the influence of press/media. The visuals are very important and
what sticks in our mind most, are the visuals
2. Change in Trust
 Skepticism replaced trust by Vietnam and then Watergate and then Iran-Contra
affair, and then the claim of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Distrust instead of
trust
IV.
Incentives and the Nature of the Relationship
 Adversary culture—press and P are in this kind of relationship
 Press is a highly competitive biz, and it looks more glamorous than it is…rather it
is cramped and difficult. A lot of competition between networks and getting
readership or viewer-ship. Across media and within your medium.
Competition!!! Competition in every aspect of the job.
 The Press wants to know as much as possible, as early as possible.
 The Press is skeptical and scared of being used…legacy of Vietnam and
Watergate. Shift in the press away from news and towards entertainment. Still
some news, but there is a greater and greater shift. A drive towards personality
pieces.
 Incentives and imperatives for P and his people: They don’t like to see or hear
this in the press that are under-development bc they don’t want their options
prematurely eliminated. They want to keep their options open.
 Also, they have the incentive to have the announcement on any development or
change on their own schedule. They was to have events to be built around it and
want as much positive press around it.
 They want to be able to explain the policy and the rationale behind it
 So very different incentives
V.
How the Press Affects the Presidency
A. Selecting the Prez
 Affects the perceptions among voters and public about viability of candidates
 Affects name identification—profile pieces can affect it.
B. Shaping prez policies
 By highlighting an issue, it forces the P and staff to respond. They actually shape
the attention of prez.
C. Influencing Prez’s relationships
 If anxious about leaks, can affect who you include. Affects negotiations.
D. Shape expectations
 What is going to happen
E. The fourth person in the room=watchdog
 Always know that someone is watching. Never put something in memo, then be
prepared to see on the cover of the NYTimes. So the existence of the press, has a
very salutary affect that benefits how people think about these things. (Porter is
wary of the oral tradition, so he doesn’t encourage less paper just for this reason.
December 5 Lecture Notes: Presidential Style and Character
This Lecture was on the last theory of the Presidency: Psychological Presidency
Objectives
 Review and asses the different perspective on the study of the
presidency that we have previously studied
 Introduce and examine a new perspective: the “psychological
presidency”
Perspectives on the Study of the Presidency: An Overview
 Richard Neustadt and the bargaining presidency
 Stephen Skowronek and the presidency in political time
o Suggest that he might be right because the great presidents are
the “Politics of Reconstruction” presidents…smash old regime and
start something new
 FDR, Lincoln
 William Howell and the unilateral presidency
 Samuel Kernell and the “Going Public” presidency
James David Barber and the Psychological Presidency
 Background the Founding Fathers and human nature
 Objective to classify presidential character and predict presidential
performance
o by taking a hard look at men before they reach the WH, the voters
can predict what the president will do
o president’s personality is very important to his effectiveness
o understanding presidential success from a psychological
perspective
 Context: the impact of Barber’s work
 Role of personality in shaping presidential behavior
Personality Matters
o Character (the way the president orients himself towards
life)
 Developed in childhood
o World View (belief structure, conceptions of social causality,
human nature, central moral conflicts)
 Developed in adolescence
o Style (habitual ways of performing three political roles –
rhetoric, personal relations, and homework) developed in
early childhood
 Criteria for categorizing presidential character
o How active a President is (active or passive)
 Pushing policies
o Whether or not a President gives the impression that he
enjoys his political life (positive-negative)
 How much they enjoy being President
 Places Presidents into 4 quadrants
Wants to provide people a useful rubric for voting
o Active positive
 Active positive – high self esteem oriented toward the
achievement of results. The active positive character
is adaptive.
 Examples – JFK, Clinton, T. Jefferson, FDR, Carter,
George HW Bush
o
o
o
Active negative
 Intense effort with low emotional reward motivated
by personal ambition. The active-negative character
is compulsive.
 Examples – Nixon (made argument famous),
Johnson, John Adams, Woodrow Wilson
 Don’t like the job but they are active in pushing their
policies – most dangerous
Passive positive
 Other-directed. The passive positive character is
compliant
 Enjoy the office, they are sort of passive about it…not go
getters
 Examples – Ronald Reagan, Harding
Passive negative
 Minimal performance of duty low self esteem;
motivated by civic virtue. The passive-negative
character is withdrawn.
 Examples – Eisenhower, George Washington,
Coolidge
Problems with Barber’s Theory
 A lot of recent presidents who are active positives
o Scowroneck does the same things – politics of pre-emptions
o Both claim to predict greatness but suggest that as we go
into the future, the current and future presidents fall into
same box
 Getting accurate data beforehand
o Can you really tell beforehand or just with hindsight – enough data
before hand?
 Doesn’t account for switching boxes from campaign for office to getting in
office; or for switching because of big events in the presidency
 In the modern presidency, it is hard to imagine people who don’t want to
be president – 2 year process, must want to be there to go through the
process
 Limited predictive value: What box a president in is not predictive of
his success
o Carter and FDR are in the same box – by most accounts considered
vastly different in their success but they fall into the same category
 Influence of other factors
o Might be other things
 Policy, skills, context
Summary and Conclusions
 Brings psychology in
 The person does matter – the person who becomes president has a big
impact on the policy
 Psychological makeup doesn’t matter the extent to which Barber claims it,
but the personality does matter
 The biggest debate: to what extent to individuals matter and make a
difference. To what extent do individual actions matter? To what extent
do actions matter?
o How much is it the individual and how much is the context?

Draws attention to the fact that the psychological characteristics
of the individual matter  do not determine success but it is useful
to know how the president feels
Porter on Barber and Psychological Leadership: Operational Code
 It is hard to predict how Presidents will act in future
 Tool that is helpful = Operational Code
o Every individual who assumes a political office has a set of ideas
about what the powers of that office and the role of that office.
This forms their operational code.
o For example, a president’s operational code would include what
roles they see for the President relative to the congress
(cooperative, adversarial) to public (is his view to shape public
opinion and define it or to follow the public opinion) to organized
interest groups to the press, etc.
o Their view of the political system and the role of the particular
office that they occupy at the time
o Knowing this does not give you the capacity to predict their
decisions but it does give you the capacity to understand the
pressures to which they will be most susceptible
o Example
 Watershed event in diplomatic efforts of US to go to war
over Cuba – not in national interest but idealistic (to free
cuba from the oppression)
 In 20th century – tension in the US between the
realist and idealist approaches in foreign policy
 What caused McKinley to change his mind and move 180
degrees
 Operational Code
 William McKinley was very responsive to public
opinion
 Viewed political parties as the vehicle for action in
the political system
 Viewed himself submissive to public opinion
 Determined that the republican party under his
leadership would be unified and not experience a
split
 Wanted to leave the office of the presidency as
stronger rather than weaker
 Why
 Democrats in the congress were determined to go to
war – held majority in the senate
 40 republicans in the house called themselves the
insurgents and said they would vote for the
Democrats for War
 they threatened to split the Republican Party
 Did not want to become the President in US history
to have to fight a war that he did not ask the
Congress to declare
 Operational Code — tells us not about the
decisions that the Presidents make but the
pressures to which they are susceptible
December 7 Lecture Notes: Evaluating Presidents and the Presidency
Class’ Rating – exactly the same ordinal rankings
 Highest – Roosevelt
o Schlesinger poll – 4.97
o WSJ – 4.41
o Last year – 4.84
o This year – 4.86
 Second – Reagan
o Identical score to the 100th of a percentage point – 4.07
o WSJ – 2nd
o Schlesinger poll – 7th
 Third – JFK
o Same as last year
o 3.79
o WSJ – 3.25 (5th)
o Schlesinger (4th) 3.26
th
 4 – Truman
o 3rd in WSJ
o 2nd in Schlesiger
th
 5 – Bill Clinton
o same position as last year
o 3.62
o 6th in Schlesiger poll
o 9th in WSK
th
 6 Eisenhower – 3.22
o 3rd in sclesigner and 4th in WSJ
th
 7 – Johnson
o 3.16
o WSJ – 3.05, Schlesinger – 3.25?
 8th – George HW Bush
o 8th on every list
o 2.96
 9th – Ford
o same as last year
o 2.87
o 10th in all of them
 10th -- Carter
o Carter – 2.24
o 9th on Sclesinger
o 12th on WSJ
th
 11 – G.W. Bush
o 2.16
o 7th in WSJ (in 2005)
th
 12 – Nixon
o last in every poll
o last year – 2.07
o this year – 1.84
o Sclesinger – 1.48
Porter’s Criteria
 Invites us to think about what we have learned this semester and how we
would go about evaluating
 1. Vision
o great nations require a vision
 “where there is no vision people perish”
A set of goals and principals that embrace not only wehre we need
to go but also the path we are going to take to get there
o In a democracy , this vision must be a shared vision – Presidents
must not only articulate their vision but convince citizens that it is
worth their commitment and usually their sacrifice
Capacity to build a team
o it is the “American Presidency” not “the American President”
o Success rests on the people he attracts and appoint and their
ability to work together
o Winning coaches produce a result that is superior to the talent of
the individual players
Wise Judgement
o presidents decide on issues that they are not expert
o when there are differences within the administration decisions get
elevated and important decisions are made to the top
o must cut to the bottom line and evaluate and decide
Capacity to deal with congress
o share and compete for power
o presidents must establish a relationship of trust and respect…keep
together a working coalition – either a partner or adversary
Rhetorical Presidency
o no longer a Washington insider
o a measure of any president is his ability to shape public behavior
and thinking through his rhetoric
 the way in which they influence the course of national life
through speeches and announcements
Administrative Presidency
o just like the rhetorical presidency, the administrative agenda has
assumed a larger role
o must move and transform that executive branch and this takes skill
Ability to Transform the situation they inherit
o Fairest and most important criteria
o We have seen through the semester the different situations
inherited by the presidents
 Ford – disruption in democratic institutions and economic
inflation
o Ford and Clinton (got Democrats to the middle of the political
spectrum and is resurrected)
The President as a Role Model
o because he is the most visible figure, he has an opportunity to be
an inspiring role model
o JFK
o FDR
o Reagan
Stamina and Resistance
o Presidency is a job that requires a great deal of stamina and
resistance – many bumps in the road that must be overcome
o

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.
December 12 Lecture Notes: Presidential Leadership and the Vice
Presidency
Origins and Early Evolution
 Original conception of the office and early experience
 The Twelfth Amendment and 19th century vice presidents
o Once the President was now just a tool of the President...not even
a prominent person who opposed the president
 Sometimes of the opposite political party
o In years 50-90 of the nation, more than 15 years are president
 the VP were not national figures of any kind beforehand
 The Twentieth Century experience
o Of the 5 VPs who became president, all 5 ran for president and 4 of
the 5 were elected in their own right (Ford only one to lose)
o Many VPs who have run and won, 4 VPs who sought to run for
President – ran and lost
 Nixon, Humphrey, Mondale, Gore
o Started with an insignificant office, but it has been
transformed – now commonly seen as a potential
steppingstone to the presidency
II. The Evolving Section Process
 Phase I – The Elevation of the Vice Presidency
o Franklin D. Roosevelt – John Nance Garner (1932), Henry
Wallace (1940), and Harry Truman (1944)
 If he were elected for a 4th term, he would not live to
survive. Democratic Leaders informed Roosevelt that they
would not support Henry Wallace. They settled on Jimmy
Burns (already was running the economy but he had
angered organized labor to Protestant). Only question
about Truman was JFK
o Dwight D. Eisenhower – Richard Nixon (1952)
 Eisenhower – didn’t declare himself a republican until 1952
 California swung on the third ticket and assumption was the
California would be rewarded...second highest person was
Richard Nixon (jr senator)
o JFK – Lyndon B Johnson
 JFK was challenged by the nomination by Johnson and other
senators
 Highly contested ballot, went right down to Wyoming before
JFK won. Johnson number 2.
 JFK needed TX to win and put Johnson on the ticket for age
and experience and to secure the texas vote.
 Electoral considerations
o Johnson – Humphrey (1964)
 Much friction between Johnson and Robert Kennedy,
Johnson was getting a lot of pressure to put RFK on the
ticket.
 Unprecedented choice – would not select any of the cabinet
members were too valuable so they had to remain in their
current post, announces it a day early before the JFK movie
introduced by RFK
o Nixon – Agnew (1968)
 Agnew was his running mate – Mitchell knew agnew
Strom Thurman and Mitchell persuaded Nixon
that Agnew would help him in the South
 Agnew was receiving cash from the governors...Elliot
Richardson (attorney general) worked out a deal to
plead no contest and resign.
o Nixon – Ford (1973)
 Richard Nixon wanted to appoint a democrat turned
republican, John Connelly but he had been involved in the
Milk Funds scandal, quitted but still tainted.
 Congress wouldn’t confirm Mitchell
 Ford was VP for eight months – didn’t plan on running for
anything else before nominated
o Ford – Rockefeller (1974)
 Polled Congressional Republican leaders
 Top 3: Rockefeller, George HW Bush (head of
Republican National Committee), Donald Rumsfeld
(Congressman from Chicago, us ambassador to
NATO)
 Chose Rockefeller because he was good on
domestic policy
 Phase II – The Accelerated Selection of the Vice President
o Previously, Presidents had waited until they had gotten the
nomination at the convention to pick. But Carter had the
nomination months before the convention. He decided to
have interviews...ended up with Mondale
o Jimmy Carter – Walter Mondale (1976)
 Mondale was a good match for Carter because he was
experienced in Washington and had ties to organized labor
o Ronald Reagan – George HW Bush (1980)
 Reagan edges out George HW Bush for the nomination.
Lots of discussion at the time as to whether Reagan was up
to the job of President – California was a little different and
no foreign policy experience.
 Regan offered the VP to Ford. Ford thought about it and
negotiated – didn’t want to be an ordinary VP.
 Ford said it can’t work
o George HW Bush – Dan Quayle (1988)
o Bill Clinton – Al Gore (1922)
 Similar process to Jimmy Carter – interviewed people.
Fellow governors were high on Al Gore – foreign policy
experience and Washington experience
o Bush – Cheney (2000)
 Bush had time and decided to have a very deliberate
process. Did not know Cheney well beforehand but offer
him a place on the ticket. Cheney turned down the spot on
the ticket but he would head up the search for the VP.
 Cheney had foreign policy and Washington
experience
Conclusions
 The Two Great Watersheds – 1944 and 1972
o 1944
 VP hadn’t been that important heretofore.

Franklin Roosevelt served for 82 days and Harry Truman
only saw each other twice
 no previous VP had ever had an office in the West Wing
 his job was to preside over the Senate and meet with house
leaders
 had not been involved in any of the planning of the War
 rarely had we had anyone cast into such a difficult situation
without any organization
 VP was made the statutory member of the security
council because we didn’t want a VP who was so
unprepared
Johnson was the first VP to get an office other than up at the
capitol. He was in charge of the space program but they weren’t
necessarily close.
Nixon provided an office for the VP for the President in the West
Wing – Agnew wasn’t a hard worker so they wanted him out.

o
o

1972
o Jimmy Carter was the First president to offer a long standing office
in the West Wing
o Carter tells Mondale during the interviews that he wants him to be
a partner
o Within a few feet of the President now – all national security people
are there too.
o Proximity and Power
 VP is there and listens.
December 14 Lecture Notes: Summary and Conclusions
Where have we been?
3 large themes
 The Personalized Nature of the Presidency
o This office is very personalized
 Hugh Siding – “Remains the most sought after, analyzed,
and scrutinized political office…star of a giant soap opera…”
 We have focused great attention on the individual
 Decided early on to adopt a single executive
 An electoral process would elevate the
individual through a complicated set of
arrangements that we call
 Organize campaign that revolve around
themselves their ideas and what they would do
as President
 Both head of state and head of government 
our desire for a democratic king (we want
majesty and someone who can lead in the
arena as the head of our government)
 Enamored with majesty and a common
touch in the oval office
 Washington was the forerunner yet different than all the
rest – “father of his country”
 Universal of respect and veneration
 Won’t return to that level of veneration
 In our political system, we look to the President for the initiative
and the vision
o Most true in the modern presidency since FDR with more strength
and power
o Ways that the president can provide vision and guidance to the
country
o The need for great leaders to concentrate on the issues of greatest
national importance
 National greatness owes as much to wisdom as it does to
power  Thomas Hudson “Size is not grandor and territory
does not make a nation. What are you going to do with all
these things?”
o We look to the President as the individual who can and will
articulate a shared vision for who we are and where we
should go as a country
 Theme 3: How the president must work with the other elements of
government in shaping political outcomes.
o The president operates and exists in separate institutions
competing for power
o The President must be able to work the various levers of
power in our political system
o We have looked at the particular levers of power: 5 takes
Reading Summaries
November 2:
Neustadt Chapter 11 “Hazards of Transition”
Ch. 11 continues with that latter task, comparing, among others, Kennedy and Carter as
they went about learning by doing. This is an inescapable aspect of the office and one
that Carter’s difficulties cast into sharp relief; it seems to be harder and more critical than
formerly. “Transition,” taken as inclusive of the learning time, was hazardous for
Kennedy but still more so for Carter. Personal style aside, this reflects changes in our
system. These, while cumulative since the fifties, accelerated in the seventies so that they
rendered Carter’s institutional surroundings different even from Johnson’s. Chapter 11
suggests how and why. It also spells out, with two new case studies, what the hazards of
transition are. The Bay of Pigs of 1961 and the Lance affair of 1977 are the illustrators in
this chapter, and Neustadt notes a further aspect taught us by David Stockman in 1981.
Chapter 11 thus adds fresh illustrative material (preface)
Hazards:
E. Ignorance [of nuances]
-there are things you don’t know when you come in and your have to
make decisions (ie bay of pigs)
-NOT UNDERSTANDING THE NUANCES OF POLICY (Carter ex
with president now knowing about communication from foreign
government 1776 in Moscow)
F. Hubris: identifies this with the staff more than with president
-1st hubris: you don’t draw on people who are leaving (tend to ignore)
-2nd hubris: how you treat people who stay (career civil servants)
C. Haste: you’re often pressed to do things quickly (ie Reagan tax plans)
Hazards are also discussed in the following terms: “pig” and “rosy scenario.” A “pig” is
embarrassing, has immediate effect on professional reputation, and can be a check to
policy. Pig was named after the Bay of Pigs under Kennedy. Carter’s pig was the Lance
affair (his appointee to head the OMB). The “rosy scenario” has potential to be ruinous.
This was Stockman’s tag for the flawed economic forecast Reagan used (produced under
transition pressure) to justify the income tax reductions in 1981. It led to huge budget
deficits.
Porter “Of Hazards and Opportunities, Transitions and the Modern Presidency”
Transition Period
 Neudstadt contrasts the relatively short pre-inaugural transition period with a
much longer post-inaugural transition
o Underscores conviction that Presidency involves experiential learning
o Pre-inaugural period (Simpler often better-take time, care & attention)
 Keep transition period informal and anonymous before election
 Spend more time with staff before inaugural
 Organize staff soon after election and insulate it thereafter
o Post-inaugural period: mob scene (Greater hazards in early months)
 Cabinet appointees overburdened and undersupported
 Press more critical and intrusive



Face citizens with growing mistrust of politicians
“Atomization” dispersion of power in Washington- fragmented
staffs, interest groups, Congress, executive departments
Expectations
o Legislative program, unified federal budget, economic & domestic agenda
o Campaign promises- raised expectations & focuses early evaluations
Hazards of Transitions (Neustadt)
1. Ignorance
 Bay of Pigs- Kennedy unaware of nuances of intelligence community
 New president- no job that can train you for being president
 Especially hazardous for Washington outsiders- Carter & Clinton as
governors unfamiliar with putting together bipartisan coalitions
 Nuances of foreign policy and executive branch
2. Hubris
 Excited about winning the election, feel smarter than everyone
i. Failure to learn from those who are leaving & those who remain
ii. Feeling of superiority leads to two types of assertions:
a. Previous administration ignored problems
b. New administration must respond to urgent need to
raise ethical standards
3. Haste (in development of initiatives and proposals during the early weeks)
 Campaign promises, pressure from the media
 Misleading “honeymoon effect” (at the start of the job, assumed
competent and given the benefit of the doubt)
i. Expected to get the agenda done in the first 100 days (best time to
get Congress to agree)- yet need bargaining & negotiating time
4. Overreaching (Porter)
 Don’t overload agenda, set agenda strategically & identify priorities
i. Eg. Carter administration- couldn’t tell priorities
Opportunities of Transition Period (may be crucial in building reputation & prestige)
1. Symbolic Action
 May convey prudence or carelessness, energy or complacency, openness
or reserve- wisely managed, they create an environment for transforming a
narrow election victory into a capacity to govern
 Eg. Reagan- met (& partied) with Democrats & Republicans in Congress
 Eg. Clinton- economic summit covered as evidence of his interest in ideas,
willingness to listen & commitment to inclusive decision making process
2. Organizational arrangements
 Management styles- notion that they ought to reflect personal style, habits
& decision making preferences of the president
 Opportunity to develop good working relationships within exec branch
3. Legislative Initiatives
 Most leverage with Congress at outset of the term- members of president’s
party anxious to see him succeed, best time to advance legislative agenda
 May build momentum for new president
Presidents need to avoid hazards and seize opportunities to strengthen their
professional reputation & enhance their public prestige
Possible Term:
Honeymoon period- presidents start with somewhat of a clean slate (perhaps the term
honeymoon is too strong and somewhat misleading), ground is rarely more fertile for new
ideas and fresh approaches than transition period
Kumar, Edwards, Pfiffner & Sullivan “Meeting the Freight Train Head On:
Planning for the Transition to Power”
1. Presidential candidates need to plan early for governing
a. Seizing early opportunities eases confirmations, furthers the president’s
agenda, & affords a new team a valuable reputation for competence
b. Need to put together a good team during transition
2. Challenge to take advantage of early opportunities in cooperation period
a. Washington community, including the media, more interesting in learning
about the new leader, his people & programs
b. Cooperation soon gives way to the hostile relationship between the
administration on the one hand and the opposition party, interest groups &
the press on the other
3. Avoid Constraining Commitments
a. Candidate may ease path to power by establishing a clear agenda or
b. Candidate can burden himself by making commitments that haunt him
after the inauguration
4. Make key designations early- highest priority to six White House positions
a. Chief of Staff
i. Necessary for new operation to get off the ground, otherwise
continual jockeying for position and power
ii. Personnel selection, political strategy & operational matters all
flow from chief of staff
iii. Determines who the president sees & what papers are presented,
also how decisions will be implemented
iv. Need respect & confidence of president (someone he will listen to)
b. Personnel Director
i. Recruitment, Job Descriptions, and Appointment Priorities
ii. Needs strong relationship with the president & full support
c. Legislative Affairs
i. Prepare the way for confirmations, the policy agenda, and the
presidential-congressional relationship
ii. Usually from previous administration & capable of a rapid start
d. Counsel to the President
i. Vetting procedures, ethics and record-keeping guidelines, and
executive orders
ii. Required to anticipate & defend against outside legal actions that
affect president
e. Press Secretary
i. Calibrates press expectations & establishes presidential-media
relations
ii. Need sound knowledge of the federal government: statements of a
president resonate around the world, no room for error
f. Office of Management and Administration
i. White House personnel slots, salaries, and office space
5. Learn from Predecessors
a. Outgoing Team
i. Source of valuable info on personnel positions & can be used to
take some actions that smooth way for incoming administration
ii. Avoid attitude that advice of outgoing administration is inferior,
they want to help
b. Bring in Team with White House Experience
i. Experience buys better shot at successful start, avoid previous error
ii. Need campaign people also to remind a team why they are there,
understand the fundamentals- institutional memory of campaign
c. Retain & Make Use of White House Institutional Memory
i. Eg. Clinton administration pulled out a lot of people in White
House with experience & it took them time to get catch up to speed
& it invited distrust
6. Develop a Strategic Plan for Policy Proposals
a. Establish priorities & choose battles wisely
b. Refine agenda well before president-elect takes office
c. Need comfortable working relationship with Congress from earliest point
i. Length of honeymoon depends on relationship with Congress
7. Conclusion
a. Early planning is associated with an effective first year in office
b. Planning must be completed and decision-making processes well in place
before coming in to office
c. White House is no place for on-the-job training
November 5:
Debating the Presidency: Resolved, psychological character is a powerful predictor of
presidential performance by Renshon/Skorownek
-Barber: character matters; tried to characterize personality types to predict presidential
performance
Pro: Renshon
-acknowledges that no president fully controls his or the country’s destiny, but
psychology does matter a great deal
-2 core elements of presidential performance: judgment (capacity to understand the
essential nature of the problem at hand and devise solutions) and leadership (ability to
mobilize followers and resources in pursuit of those solutions)
-3 distinct elements of character: ambition, integrity, relatedness
-skills develop in 3 primary areas: cognitive, interpersonal, characterological
-example: response to 9/11 shaped largely by Bush’s character
Con: Skowronek
-suggests holding personality and skill constant and examining the typical political
effects of presidential action in the differently structured political contexts
-2 systemic relationships especially significant for an analysis of the politics of
leadership: president’s affiliation with the political complex of interests, institutions, and
ideas that dominated state/society relations before he came to office; current standing of
these governmental arrangements in the nation at large
-see table on pg 170
-gives many examples and characteristics of the politics of reconstruction, disjunction,
preemption, and articulation from the above table – possible IDs
-presidential success determined at least as much by systemic factors as by presidential
character
-lot of characterizations we give to presidents and political types, not personality types
November 7:
James Pfiffner: The Managerial Presidency Ch. 18, “The president and the National
Agenda,” by Roger Porter
Porter outlines his essay as follows:
1) Expectations on POTUS in shaping the national agenda
2) Outline of 3 types of issues that can empower presidents to push agendas
3) How the presidents use the 3 types of issues to pass legislation
I. Expectations on President:
 As scope of gov’t expanded during 20th century, so did expectations on president
 Growing gov’t has placed expectation on POTUS to develop a coherent policy
agenda
 Shift of presidential elections from party controlled to individual campaigns has
placed the expectation of developing an agenda on the President more than the
party
 The skillful use of the veto has given presidents more power, but more is expected
of them as a result – a burden brought upon themselves.
 The media revolution makes the pres. And his agenda more visible ->
expectations rise
II. 3 types of issues
1) Electoral issues:
 Primary competition has forced candidates to articulate positions on issues
 More campaign promises are made now than ever, and subjected to high scrutiny
 Campaign promises are legitimately checked by
1. More urgent policy decisions which intervene
2. Difficulty claiming a mandate – mandate depends both on emphasis
placed on an issue during the campaign and the margin of victory,
especially in individual congressional districts, to gain congressional
support
3. Mandates & memory of electoral promises fade or are surpassed as the
term ages
2) Maturing Issues:

Some issues widely discussed, considered, and researched over years, normally
undergo incremental change, and often develop into stalemate
 Occasionally these issues are ripe for a major breakthrough
 Success marked by skill & timing… 3 skills (surprise?)
1. Skill shaping legislation proposal within the executive branch – executive
branch must be united behind president’s aims as well as minor details of
legislation put forth.
2. Skill building congressional consensus (coalition)
3. Skill developing extra-governmental support (in key constituencies)
 Timing – gestation period is required for change to be, by consensus, necessary.
Skill is required to sense the “right time” for an issue to be reformed or tackled.
 3 examples of maturing issues
1. Reagan’s tax reform – discussed, but stagnant/ineffective in the 70’s and
early 80’s. Reagan skillfully pushed and negotiated the reform through
84-86.
2. Health Care – debates of the 50’s & 60’s and the skill of LBJ led to
medicare and Medicaid in 1965. Since then, there have been incremental
changes in most presidencies, but Clinton pushed for major change in 94
and failed. He didn’t time it right – it wasn’t mature.
3. Welfare reform – proposals failed w/ Nixon, carter, Reagan, bush. Clinton
timed the ’96 Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act well – it had matured.
 3 Characteristics of Maturing Issues:
1. Always in discussion – subject to some degree of presidential attention in
every term
2. Timing is always crucial to success
3. Flexibility is essential – the final reform which passes will not look much
like the president’s initial proposal, but hopefully close enough, and Pres.
Must accept this. This was the case w/ Reagan’s tax reform.
3) Crisis Issues:
 Term “crisis” often abused to draw attention to issues
 To legitimate the use of the term, porter says it should only be used when a
president can convince congress & the public that “failure to act immediately will
result in a significant deterioration in the underlying situation.”
 2 examples of crisis issues
1. Health Care – Clinton tried to create a “Health Care Crisis” in 94, but it
didn’t fly. The issue failed.
2. S&L – situation gingerly avoided by Bush and Mondale during campaign,
but Bush acted immediately once in office, convincing congress that
“failure to act immediately would lead to rapid escalation of the cost of the
problem.” Crisis state was accepted, legislation promptly passed to bail
out S&L’s.
 The hurdle of “crisis” definition is rarely accomplished even though presidents
push for this categorization of issues.
III. Conclusions
 Pres. does not so much revolutionize policy as he focuses on definition, timing,
and coalitions to pass policy which can be passed.

Electoral issues dominate the young term (mandate must be acted on promptly,
and only election issues can be pushed by claiming mandate). Also, distinctly
different or fresh election issues can claim mandate more than stale solutions (if
they were mandated, they’d have passed already).
 Maturing issues require coalitions & flexibility building support from many
sources & experts to show that the proposal is thorough and ready to be passed.
Above all else, SKILL AND TIMING are required to pass legislation on these.
 Crisis issues depend on timing, but most heavily on articulation of the crisis at
hand, and the necessity of immediate action.
 There is overlap between these three types of issues, and one can become another;
this is just a frame of thinking and organizing.
 Presidents can capitalize on crisis by pushing a solution well beyond what is
necessary to push policy in time of necessary action and confusion.
“Expectations greatly outstrip formal powers.” Success of presidents in pushing
legislative agendas depends on “wisdom, patience, skill, and discipline.”
Possible ID’s
Electoral Issues – issues which a president campaigns on. President should act on
mandate to push these issues through early in presidency before support wanes.
Maturing Issues – issues which have received attention and minor adjustment for long
periods of time, and are ripe for a major overhaul. President’s success in pushing
legislation on these issues depends heavily on timing - sensing when the issue is “ripe” –
as well as on his skill.
Crisis Issues – issues which president tries to push by portraying a situation as a crisis in
need of immediate action. Often unsuccessful because president fails to convince public
& congress that the situation is a crisis.
James Pfiffner: The Strategic Presidency pp 111-127 (Ch 6)
This chapter compares Carter & Reagan as case studies for how presidents can influence
congress to pass the White House policy agenda, naming 4 key techniques:
1) Getting a quick start
2) Having an effective legislative liaison while in transition and while term is young
3) Successfully “courting” congress
4) Rifle vs shotgun strategy
Quick Start:
 Stresses the importance of early legislative action repeatedly
 Early success sets the tone of relations with congress for the whole presidency, so
it is make or break.
 The post-election mandate, if any, is short lived – it must be acted on quickly or it
will be gone forever.
 A president can expect his approval rating to fall during his first year, as well as
to lose congressional seats at the midterm election. Best off acting while he has
the support and public popularity.
 Legislation pushed early is much more likely to pass (two to three times more
likely) at some point during the presidency than legislation proposed after the first
few months.
Legislative Liaison:



President should immediately designate a liaison chief once elected
The liaison’s workload during transition is immense, needs immediate attention
The liaison must be in contact with and believed to influence the president, or he
will lose credibility and will no longer satisfy congress
 Carter’s liaison was understaffed early and neglected congress at first, which
started him off on the wrong foot -> lasting effects.
 Physical proximity and direct access to president important to liaison’s credibility.
If he does not have access to the president, people will not take him seriously.
 Carter’s liaison specialized by experience in policy issues rather than political
experience, so they were not adept at liaison-ing. Also, he let cabinet choose their
own liaison officers, which made them not carter people, less cooperative.
 Reagan, Bush, Clinton chose instead experienced staff based on political
backgrounds, chose cabinet liaisons themselves – more effective than Carter’s
strategy.
“Courting” Congress:
 General favors granted to congressmen continually foster cooperation; these are
used more than specific “quid pro quo” favors targeted at cooperation on specific
issues.
 Handling small favors and idiosyncratic preferences of congress members is a
must, keeps them satisfied w/ White House.
 Carter did not “play politics,” acted “morally superior” to congress. He wouldn’t
play games because he was above that, a sentiment which congress resented.
 Carter threatened congress by saying he would appeal to the people if they did not
cooperate. They did not appreciate the threat.
Rifle vs. Shotgun strategy:
 Carter took on far too much legislation early on (shotgun strategy)
 Carter sent things to congress in clumps, rather than individually and carefully
timed. This allowed resistance to organize, and congress generally resented the
glut of legislation on its plate.
 Carter refused to prioritize – everything was equally important to him, so nothing
got done
 Eventually Carter became more focused, but he’d already established strained
relations w/ Congress that would last through his presidency.
Water Projects
 Carter cut many water projects (pork) without consulting the affected
congressmen. Part of his fiscal responsibility campaign against gratuitous
spending.
 Facing incredible hostility from congress, Carter backed down when they tossed
the pork back into a bill he wanted passed. He alienated congress and lost his
moral high ground by not following through.
 Lessons:
o Pick fights carefully
o Be sure you can win the fights you take on
o Stick to your guns – win the fights you pick.
Carters Mistakes:
o Circumstances:
o Carter was a fiscal conservative with a liberal party majority
o Democratic congress was gung-ho to pass its own legislation upon 8 years
of GOP presidency coming to an end.
o Failures
o Failure to consult with and communicate with, and to listen to and lobby
congressmen
o Attitude that principle overridden individual congressional priorities (like
the water projects), stubborn even to consider reversal – acted “holierthan-thou”
o Blunders were early, thus magnified throughout his presidency, set the
stage for strained congressional relations.
Reagan’s Victories:
o Circumstances were economic crisis and landslide victory
o Techniques:
o Reagan’s PAC (Citizens for the Republic) supported many congressman
to victories, entreating their support
o He took a narrow focus (economy only) and pushed aside other GOP
priorities
o Included 160 congressmen in various advisory committees – they felt they
had access/influence
o Listened to and entertained many important congressmen, especially
democrats
o His liaison chair was respected on the Hill; he picked an experienced
liaison staff
o He pushed his legislation hard before opposition could organize a coherent
counter plan
o Personally courted swing voters in congress
o Appeared to public for support of his agenda, but unlike Carter he never
threatened congress that he would go public, he just did it, and won
support.
o There was leverage of PAC money to go for supporters, and especially to
go against democrats who opposed his legislation, at midterm elections.
Also, he promised not to campaign against Dems who supported him.
Possible ID’s:
Mandate – in the context of this author, a mandate is political capital which comes from a
sizable election victory, and must be acted upon early, because it will quickly fade.
Legislative Liaison – president’s team which coordinates with congress. During the
transition period, they must be organized responsive to congress to start off with good
relations.
Courting congress – idea that president can encourage cooperation by forming personal
relationships with congress members in a social setting, and making them feel important
as individuals.
Rifle & Shotgun strategies – A president targeting specific legislative issues, as with a
rifle, is likely to be effective, while targeting everything, as with a shotgon, is likely to
accomplish nothing.
Carter’s Water Projects – Carter attacked nineteen water projects, pork barrel legislation,
as part of his push for fiscal responsibility in the FY1978 budget. He alienated congress
by attacking pork, and showed a weak spine by backing down.
Boll Weevils – term for southern democrats who tended to be more conservative.
Reagan courted them personally as key swing voters for his economic package
November 9:
"The President and Congress"- Mathew J. Dickinson – President and the Political
System
Pp.455-480
Dickinson Theory
1. The President cannot accomplish much with out the support of Congress
a. Political Parties developed as a bridge between the constitutionally
separated branches.
b. The president could count on the support of most of his party and a couple
from the other party that shared his views
c. However, in recent decades the parties have become polarized
d. Dickinson argues that the best policy is to speak softly and carry a "big
veto threat"
2. Bush came in, in 2004, with what he, and his advisors felt, was a mandate.
a. However, a mandate from the people does not ensure congress will follow
the president blindly
b. As Nuestadt puts it the president a congress share governing
responsibilities.
c. Also congress has different constituencies, terms of office, and
responsibilities.
d. So, the president's job is to convince them the supporting a policy is in
their best interest.
3. Congress, the president and political parties 1789-1960
a. The constitution set parameters that govern the president's relationship
with congress.
b. They must collaborate actively / work together
c. Articles I and II of the constitution have set a precedent for presidents to
submit a legislative program and Congress has come to expect this service.
d. President's views are centered because he wants to appeal to the whole
nation. While Reps. views are more extreme and Senators on the other
also have a larger political base, but are elected every 6 years and are less
likely to be influenced by public opinion.
e. This means the president, Reps, and Senators all of different political
needs and agendas
4. The Era of Incumbency and Insulation, 1960-1990
a. In the late 1900's the Parties were loose affiliations, therefore the president
and Congress did not share the same political fate.
b. In the 1960's parties sank to their nadir of influence.
c. People began to split their tickets between parties in election
i. Primaries, the election reform of 1968,
campaign finance reforms, and the rise of electronic media all
weakened party control over candidates and as a result the
candidate-centered campaign replaced the party-mediated
campaign
ii. This led to an incumbency increase in
Congress.
iii. The result of these changes led to an
increased occurrence of divided government.
5. Congress in the Post reform Era
a. The changing of campaign finance the influx of special interest money and
the increased participation of issue activists, particularly in congressional
nominating contests, tended to reward ideological extremes.
b. The number of individual party votes defined as the percentage of times
the average Democrat or republican voters, wit his pr her party in roll calls
that split the two parties, steadily have increased since the 1960's. Clearly
partisan politics now dominates the way Congress conducts business. This
development has had a profound consequences for presidential leadership
in congress
"Resolved, the president is a more authentic representative of the American people
than is Congress" Marc Hetherington and Richard Ellis Debating the Presidency pp.
75-91
Who is the people best representative? The President or Congress?
1. Pro- Hetherington
a. The presidential candidates face a different electorate than most members
of congress. House member's districts tend are quite homogenous.
Redistricting only makes it more similar.
b. Members of Congress have little incentive to embrace moderate ideals as
opposed to their more extreme views. In fact it is more beneficial for them
to choose one ideological pole or another.
c. Most senators move toward one pole as well unless their state is truly
moderate. Then, these states are very important to who wins presidential
elections.
d. Thus, presidential candidates must tailor there polices to appeal to the
most moderate voters. Races have been extremely close in recent
elections. There are no longer close races for the presidency in each state.
In gaining electoral votes in each state there have been more blowouts and
less close races in recent years. Even though the electoral vote count is
similar to other races, the margins of victory in each state have changed
dramatically.
2. Con-Richard Ellis
a. It is a common belief that Congress has become parochial and in the
pocket of special interest groups. They are corrupt and out of touch.
b. No one has benefited more from this than the president.
i. Congressman or women cannot speak for
America as a whole.
1.
Minority interest can prevent action from being taken
2.
Incumbency also has hurt Congress's ability to speak for
the people. High name recognition and large fundraising
ensure a victory and helps them lose touch with voters.
ii. Neither can the President
1.
most people cannot identify a presidential candidates
stance on the issues
2.
Also, people choose candidate more on character and
experience than their policy
3.
Also, people may vote for a candidate based on his
stance on one issue, but may not agree with him on
anything else.
iii. Who pushes policy closest to the will of the
people?
1.
Presidents may not represent a moderate view. Instead,
as in 2004, they my try to mobilize the base in swing state
then try to swing the truly undecided.
2.
A president in his second term does not have to worry
about electoral votes and is no longer forced to the center.
The presidents on views and beliefs will come out
a.
But, even second term presidents look at polls
3.
Congressmen are closer to the people and when
campaigning, encounter real voter and real concerns.
a.
When speaking to the public, congressman do
not have formal meeting. Instead people are allowed
to voice their opinions and be heard.
It is rational to conclude that 535 people can represent the diversity of America than one
person. Congress does not represent the voice of the people. Rather, the people do not
have a single voice. There are many different opinions and it is far more likely to be
heard through the whole Congress than just by the President.
Kessel, Chapter 2: “Working With Congress”
Factors affecting a President’s ability to control legislation (“legislative terrain”)
 Public support for the President
o Determined by President’s popular vote, midterm elections, and approval ratings
 Party support in House and Senate
o Kessel concludes that most Presidents get approximately the same Congressional
support from their own party (about 70%) on key votes, so having the majority (by
the biggest possible margin) in Congress is very important
 “Congruence of the Presidential Agenda” – the extent to which the President’s views are
aligned with Congress’
o Large and new legislative items are more difficult to pass than small and old items
 Ability of same party legislative leaders in Congress
“Shepherds of Presidential Proposals”
 Office of Legislative Affairs created by Eisenhower as a liaison with Congress


Individual department have Congressional liaisons
Legislative clearance
o Ensure that bills are in accordance with views from the departments and the
President
o Performed by Office of Legislative Reference within the Office of Management and
Budget
 Coordination between the President and Congressional leaders through meetings
Congressional Liaison Activities
 Congressional liaisons ensure that Congressmen get fair, accurate, and quick responses to
legislative requests or questions
 Congressmen are always pushing for public projects and departmental jobs that they can give
to their home states and supporters, respectively
 Presidential campaigning for Congressmen
 Maintaining goodwill (Presidential visits and gifts)
 Getting information from Congress
o Voting tendencies
o Congressional views on legislation (multiple advocacy-like framework, allowing
Congress to feel like they have input and access to the President’s legislative agenda)
 Congressional liaisons often make decisions for the President (President’s time is limited)
o Example – Reagan had the Legislative Strategy Group headed by Secretary of State
James Baker
 Exercise influence in Congressional relations
o Usually done by staff but occasionally by the President himself
o President can influence Congress through communication with interest groups and
the general public; appeal to their support and tell them where the President could
use their help
 Box 2–2 (p. 46-47) outlines the position of Chief of Staff
o Presenting information to the President (what he needs to hear and not what just
information with which he is likely to agree)
o Communicating President’s wishes
o Making decisions
David E. Price – “House Democrats Under Republican Rule”
The current functioning of the House of Representatives is greatly altered by the growth
of partisanship and the escalation of partisan tactics under Republican rule. Modern
Congressional reform (since the 1970s) has resulted in the strengthening of party organ
leadership and decentralization of authority, resources, and visibility throughout the
chamber (the rise of “subcommittee government.” When the Republicans gained control
of the House in 1994, Speaker Newt Gingrich took the process even further, ignoring
seniority by instituting rule changes that shifted power from committee to party leaders.
This approach has exacted a high price in terms of party polarization, and it has required
a ratcheting up of power-concentrating leadership tactics in order to keep the narrow
Republican majority in line and to safeguard against deviant outcomes. In sum, the
Republican leaders have gone far beyond the Democratic leadership practices they
decried when they were in the minority. There are practical, political, and moral limits to
what pure partisan exertion can accomplish, limitations variously illustrated during the
last decade by budget standoffs, government shutdowns, a partisan impeachment, and the
polarization produced by exclusionary tactics. The practice of partisanship needs to be
tempered so that its abuses and failures do not displace or discredit its legitimate exercise.
November 14:
Louis Fisher, “Congress as Co-Manager of the Executive Branch.” From The
Managerial Presidency.
1. Framers’ intent: likely that they did not want Congress involved in admin details.
This is why Congress set up department executives (Secretaries of war, finance,
foreign affairs, etc) and Court of Appeals. Some duties straddled the legislative
and executive branches (finance: comptroller, treasurer, auditors) which enabled
Congress to check the executive branch. General Accounting Office continued
to hold executive, legislative, and judicial powers – Congress wanted to retain
some control over finances.
2. Discretionary duties were for the President alone, whereas ministerial actions
require that departments act under the authority of the law, not the President.
3. Investigate power of Congress: in cases of corruption or abuse of trust, prelude to
impeachment. Includes subpoenas, clearance procedures.
4. Congress demands “reprogrammings:” agencies and departments get budget
flexibility provided they get approval of appropriate congressional committees for
special and significant programs.
5. Legislative veto: power of Congress to veto executive orders and executive
branch reorganization. It encourages Congress to delegate more discretion and
authority to executive branch because it is a check that can be imposed later on.
But if the veto is not exercised, executives can make law with no additional
approval.
a. Court technically did away with legislative vetoes in Chadha case where it
ruled that the veto was an unconstitutional way to influence the executive
branch, and incompatible with effective government. They still exist to
reconcile the executive’s freedom and the legislature’s control.
6. Why do we have Congressional micromanagement? There is always quid pro quo
between the branches. Congress intervenes to oversee spending of public funds,
to be loyal to constituents who see contradictions in policy, when executive
branch does not execute laws properly (Iran Contra affair led to congressional
investigations). Intelligence agencies were required to keep the corresponding
intelligence committees well-informed thereafter.
7. Limits to congressional intervention: no bribery, conflict of interest statutes.
Court has drawn a line between legislative activities (talking on the floor,
testifying, etc) which are protected and political activities, which are not
protected.
8. SUMMARY: we don’t have full separation of powers. Rather, the branches are
interdependent, autonomous, but engaging in reciprocity. Effective government
requires that Congress is invested in the executive process.
Nancy Kassop and Richard Pious, “Resolved, presidents have usurped the war
power that rightfully belongs to Congress.” From Debating the Presidency.
War centralizes power and the Cold War and War on Terror have created a state of
permanent crisis, which augments executive power.
1. Kassop: Americans have forgotten Framers’ intentions to empower Congress.
a. Congress was to declare war and maintain army and navy. President was
given title of Commander, but this was secondary to Congress’ power
b. Constitution requires that Congress must authorize all military force,
President can only use unilateral power as a defensive move to repel
unexpected attacks, Congress determines how long the president is
Commander in Chief and in what context, President must give legislature
complete information as basis for informed decisions, and that
congressional approval is still needed when international bodies like
NATO or the NSC propose action.
c. Presidents violate these all the time. Truman’s decision to send US troops
to Korea in 1950 is the best example.
d. Justifying presidential expansionism: Presidents explain the rationale for
their increased independence - commander in chief clause was cited in
sending US forces to Vietnam. Attacks far away now have implications
for the US – the “small world theory.” This means that the president
should be able to act autonomously.
e. Congress has tried to reassert its authority: War Powers Resolution of
1973 to impose procedural requirements on presidents (must ask for
declaration of war from Congress within 60 days of sending troops to
fight). However, this has done little to change presidential conduct.
2. Pious: Constitution invites a struggle for control over foreign policy and Congress
has given up this power to the president
a. Framers left constitutional language vague and ambiguous because they
wanted to explore the distribution of powers once in office
b. President can repel attacks, and Congress can declare war. This means the
power to make war is shared.
c. A Living Constitution: Congress has declared war five times, but
Presidents have always used armed forces without congressional
declarations. Congress has agreed to disagree with President concerning
international treaties and how they get executed.
d. War Powers and the Judiciary: After Vietnam War, courts started to
evade decisions that checked the President’s power, and left him with
freedom to take military action on his own. Courts have the “Joint
concord” standard: As long as Congress and President have taken mutual
action in a war, this is permissible even if there is no declaration of war.
e. Failure of War Powers Resolution: President was to report to Congress
within 48 hours of sending armed forces and required withdrawal of
troops if Congress did not declare war within 60 days. No President since
Nixon has abided by this. Courts do not get involved with this statute.
(Clinton in Haiti, W. Bush in Iraq).
f. CONGRESS has not insisted that Presidents follow War Powers
Resolution, and Courts leave President entirely free.
Richard Neustadt—Presidential Power—Chapter 12—“A Matter of Detail”
 Reagan delegated a lot, often had incomplete information as a result, and did not
care about details.









His style worked very well until Iran-Contra.
Reagan wanted uniformity in his staff, distraught when Meese and Baker differed
in his presence. On the other hand, FDR liked to hear disagreements.
Reagan drew confidence from public support and audience approval of his
speeches.
Reagan had a unique combination of incuriosity and conviction. He knew what
he wanted, but did not really care much to learn about how it would be done.
Reagan’s approval rating dropped 15 percent after Iran-Contra; Reagan denied
knowing of a connection between the two, and was probably telling the truth, but
American people didn’t believe him.
Reagan never knew the details of Oliver North’s deficiencies.
Reagan’s management style: choose targets and men—leave the details to
them—but he was careless in his choice of words and men.
If Reagan were better briefed about Iran-Contra, he probably would have refused
to carry out the plan because of the ramifications to his credibility.
No public support for Reagan’s actions in Iran-Contra, or evidence for that, yet
he believed there was.
November 16:
“The Presidency and the Judiciary”
David A. Yalof
Nov. 16 reading from The Presidency and the Political System
Bush v. Gore
-
politically significant because the decision “proclaimed the ascendancy of a
new relationship between” the Court and the presidency
Whenever the Court ruled against a president, they did so carefully and being aware of
the ramifications their decision would have in the greater political context
Robert Dahl – “the Court ultimately goes along with the dominant national political
coalition”
Nixon’s succession to presidency (Jan 1969) marked beginning of new era in
presidential-judicial relations
-
established trend of nominating federal circuit court judges to Supreme Court
instead Republican friends
-
today’s political atmosphere encourages presidents to choose nominees with
well-established legal reputations instead of political records
Even before a president takes office, he must address critical questions re: views on
controversial legal precedents and the way he hopes to shape judiciary
During 20 century, the Court was only infrequently a factor in presidential elections
th
-
high profile policymaker during that time
Truman, Kennedy, Johnson – barely discussed the Court during campaigns
Eisenhower – mentioned Court only to distinguish his preferred method of judicial
selection from that of Democrats’
Nixon’s campaign – first concerted attempt to place Court and rulings before the voters
Reagan – targeted Supreme Court decisions that were politically divisive (Roe v. Wade)
Clinton – lack of emphasis on Court-related issues, still successful in bringing back
Reagan’s swing voters
Lesson from Dukakis and Mondale failures: Court-related rhetoric sways few voters,
although it is considered an essential aspect of every presidential campaign
Selection to Supreme Court – matter of chance, being in right place at right time
Lower federal court appointments – product of well-honed connections with US senators
Patronage plays central role in determining who will land a coveted appt to federal
judiciary
Process for identifying/selecting candidates for Supreme Court
-
process used to be a private affair, handled by president and small group of
aides
Factors that changed how candidates are recruited now:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Growth and bureaucratization of Justice Dept.
Growth and bureaucratization of White House staff
Growth in the size and influence of the federal judiciary
Divided party government
Increased participation by interest groups, including the organized bar, in the
selection process
6. Increased media attention before and during Supreme Court confirmation
hearings
7. Advances in legal research technology
Reagan’s criteria for selection a Supreme Court justice:
1. “awareness of the importance of strict justiciability and procedural requirements”
2. “refusal to create new constitutional rights for the individual”
3. “deference to states in their spheres”
4. “appropriate deference to agencies”
5. “commitment to strict principles of ‘nondiscrimination’”
6. “disposition towards ‘less government rather than more’”
7. “recognition that the fed govt is one of the enumerated powers”
8. “appreciation for the role of free market in our society”
9. “respect for traditional values”
10. “recognition of the importance of separations of power principles of presidential
authority”
11. “legal competence”
12. “strong leadership on the court/young and vigorous”
RESOLVED, the president has too much power in the selection of judges
Pro: David A. Yalof
-
In modern appointment process, presidents choose without consulting senators
-
Initially, appointment by presidents had to be guided with Senate’s
advice/consent
-
Involving senators at early stage invested them in appt process, creating allies
for confirmation stage
-
Senate can continue to exert leverage by withholding consent for president’s
judicial nominees (in practice, senate rarely does this)
-
Marked increase in partisan polarization
Increased use of extreme tactics like filibustering indicate how desperate
senators are to fight president’s judicial nominees
Con: John Anthony Maltese
-
Constitution says president has power to nominate, therefore he alone has that
right
-
Constitutional Convention ultimately rejected the legislative appt of judges
largely because the delegates feared that legislative appts would be subject to
intrigue and corrupted by factions
-
Some scholars suggested that the word “Advice” in appts clause gives Senate
broad power to advise president on nominations
-
Senators shouldn’t use filibusters to block judicial nominees
Aggressive Senate has resulted in wayward confirmation hearings that now
focus on positions on policy issues and embarrassing details of past (not revealing
nominees’ knowledge and understanding of the law)
November 21:
The Presidency and Interest Groups: Allies, Adversaries, and Policy Leadership
By: Daniel Tichenor
Main Idea: Tichenor uses historical evidence to show two key variables that affect
president – interest group relations: whether the group is affitiated or unaffiliated with the
president’s political party and whether historical circumstances allow the president a
large or narrow capacity for policy leadership
Intro:
- relationships that begin in campaigning do not disappear when the campaigner becomes
president
- even though millions of citizens belong to or contribute to specific interests, most
Americans view organized interest in national politics with a level of contempt
- it is hard for lobbiests to gain access to president, the size and secialization of congress
makes it a better target for interst groups
- but today, in candidate-centered campaigns, interest groups provide money,
organizational support, and votes
- many organized interests see the new modern presidency as an opportunity to advance
their agendas
Two Factors of president-interest group politics:
1. relationship of interest groups to president’s party
2. varying opportunities for presidential policy leadership
Tichenor’s model of interactive politics (pg 317)
Relationship of
interests groups to
pres. party
Pres. Capacity to
exercise policy
leadership
Affiliated
(Collaborative
strategies)
Unaffiliated
(adversarial
strategies)
Broad
(Breakthrough
politics)
Collaborative
breakthrough politics
(Rooveselt’s New
Deal for labor;
Reagan and the
Christian right)
Adversarial
breakthrough politics
(Roosevelts and the
Liberty League;
Reagan’s assault on
liberal citizens
group)
Collaborative
Adervarial politicspolitics-as-usual
as-usual (Carter and
(George HW Bush
energy reform;
and competitive
Clinton and health
council; George W
care reform)
Bush and air quality)
- Collaborative breakthrough politics involves White House sponsorship and co-optation
of interest group allies
- Adversarial breakthrough politics makes it difficult for interest group opponents to
challenge presidents with large political capital
- Collaborative politics as usual is bad for interest groups that want large policy changes
but good for those that are satisfied with incremental policy change
- Adversarial politics as usual allows oppositional interest groups numerous chance to
frustrate the policy designs of the president
Examples
FDR and Industrial Unionism: Collaborative Breakthrough Politics I
- FDR worked with labor leaders, especially the United Mine Workers union, in drafting
the National Industrial Recovery Act that recognized the rights of workers to ban
together. The impact that it had on such groups was huge. FDR, however, did not rely
entirely on such groups for support because he was such a popular president and the labor
unions had to follow his lead not the other way around. Presidents with broad
opportuinities to shape domestic policy tend to have a huge impact on the interest group
system
Reagan and the Christian Right: Collaborative breakthrough Politics II
- Reagan openly courted the Christian right leaders in his campaign in 1980. This served
as an important catalyst for unifying and mobilizing the Chritian right and making it an
important electoral force in politics. Once in office, however, Reagan focused heavily on
economic issues and defense buildup. Even though the Chritian right issues were not in
the forefront, conservative religious organizations still backed his policies and reelection.
* presidents that dominate the political system such as FDR and Reagan largely controal
the terms of their sponsorship of interst group allies
Roosevelt and the American Liberty League: Adversarial Breakthrough Politics I
- When presidents dominate the national policy makings process, opposition groups have
little choice but to challenge it. Business leaders mobilized against the New Deal. The
American Liberty League’s failed effort, however, illustrates the difficulties oppositional
groups face when trying to compete with breakthrough presidents, especially if they don’t
have a large membership.
Reagan’s Assault on Liberal Citizens Groups: Adversarial Breakthrough Politics II
- Reagan was openly against liberal advocacy groups concerned with the environment,
consumer protection, civil rights, poverty, ect. Basically it encourgared the formation of
liberal interest groups that wanted to chanllenge the president’s agenda. Adversarial
breakthrough politics can give oppositional groups the chance to expand and exert
influence if they have strong, broad based constituencies and alternatie bases of support
within the gov.
Narrow
(politics-as-usual)
HW Bush, Centrist Reform, and the Competitiveness Council: Collaborative Politics-asusual
- While the clean air act proved to be Bush’s most significant policy achievement, he was
required to marginalize traditional Republican interests group allies in business and
industry along the way. The American’s with Disabilities Act was also criticized by
conservative organizations. So Bush created the Council on Competitivness within the
Exec Branch that was to review regulations issued by federal agencies and make them
less burdensome for the relevant industry. Small successes for some busniness groups
happened by winning regulatory reform from the administration . All in all, however, the
relationship between presidents with limited power and their party’s intests groups are
often unproductive.
Clinton Health Care Reform: Adversatial Politics-as-Usual
- Clinton was constrained by limited policy-making capacity. Strong group opposition to
Clinton’s Health Care Reform, the Health Insurance Association of America and the
National Federation of Independent Business, were able to help block his agenda. This
illustrates the enormous oppostunities for interest group adversaries to block the agenda
when the president does not have much political capital.
GW Bush’s First Term: Mastering Collaborative Politics-as-Usual
- Even though Bush did not have a lot of political capital coming out of the 2000 election,
he was able to work on regulatory change which allowed him to advance his agenda and
assist allied organized interests incrementally.
The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking Point, Ch 10: The
Interests
By: Haynes Johnson and David S. Brober
Outline: This chapter is about how the stong interst groups, especially the Health
Insurance Association of America (HIAA) and the National Federation of Independent
Business (NFIB), were able to defeat Clinton’s healthcare reform bill. It shows the
capacity that interest groups have to raise large amounts of money and use huge
grassroots strategies and just how powerful special interest have become in politics.
“In this fight, the interests demonstrated their ability to move far beyond
traditional techniques of ‘buying’ political access. They showed – at least on the
oppontents’ side – that for the first time, they had learned to use all the tools of modern
political and political communications for their special-interest objectives.” Pg96
The article then goes on to look at the history of these groups and the president and how
they defeated his bill.
Three major elements of Republican opposition: social conservatives, deficit hawks, and
business groups – all worked together in unity
HIAA
- at first it supported, or at least wanted to work with Clinton, on his bill
- then they got the feeling that the white house wasn’t really listening to them and their
requests and the HIAA knew that many member firms of their organization would go out
of business if the bill became law
- the three points the HIAA disagreed on were major ones:
1. they did not want the government to have a certification process for insurance
companies, the companies wanted to keep operating in the present marketplace and
compete for more customers.
2. the gov. wanted to put cost controls, or premium caps, on insurance
3. “pure community rating” where healthier people pay a bit more so that more
vulnerable people get lower rates
* the HIAA did not want the gov to be able to control and dictate all these aspects of their
business
- in spring 1993, when Clinton originally planned to submit plan, HIAA began 3 and a
half million dollar ad campaign to promot HIAA’s approach to reform. Catch-phrases
such as “they choose, you loose” and “There’s got to be a better way” resonated with the
public.
- “Harry and Louise” ads: portrayed married middle class couple, Harry and Louise,
discussing the problems with Clinton’s plan at their kitchen table. Played on the idea that
the fed gov can’t really be trusted to make this all work out right!
Attitude toward fed gov at the time
- long before the healthcare battle began, public attitudes towards gov became
increasingly negative
- pres of both parties ‘running against government’
- assassinations of JFK and MLK, Nixon and Watergate, Johnson and Vietnam, all bad
for government
- operating in this kind of climate, interest groups opposing change had huge success.
Their ability to exploit and highten negative attitudes towards gov was key to success
- ie. For HIAA, just by saying “government health care” instead of “national health care”
made a difference
- Bill and Hillary’s attempts to get back at HIAA only brought more attention to their ads
and their message
- HIAA also used grassroots: “The insurance industry is in every state and they’re
organized. It’s your agent, you know, it’s the guys down the street. It’s the man and the
woman beside you in church and on civic boards; they’re really into the community. So
they’re very powerful.”
NFIB and John Motley
Motley: NFIB’s chief lobbyist, huge influence
Key problem with bill: “employer mandate” that would require all businesses to provide
health insurance for their employers. Really bad for small businesses!
Fought on two fronts: 1. mounting grassroots campaign in the home district of
members of Congress 2. then send lobbyists in to Congress after the members had been
softened by pressure from constituents
- wanted to build public opposition to reform
- largest grassroots lobbying campaign NFIB ever raised and used virtually every
resource they could (the whole NFIB staff)
- Focus outside of Washington on critical states such as Montana, Louisisana,
Washingotn, Georgia, Oregon, Pennsivania, Florida
- Montana: entire state economy based on small business! Used mailings, TV and
newspaper interviews, NOT subtle and did not want to be
- Attacked Hillary, used quotes that she said about small business against her
- successfully got senators to write letter to Hillary saying they will never agree to bill:
hid the hand that NFIB had in it and got senators to commit early to not singing
*** This example of Health Care Reform shows the power that special interests have
when they have good base and resources. The modern interest group has access to
powerful tools with the media and grassroots lobbying. Also helped that they were
working against government in a time when it was not looked upon favorably by
American people.
Sidney Milkis, “The Presidency and Political Parties
This article traces the evolution of the modern presidency since its inception with FDR and its
relationship with national political parties. Milkis traces this relationship through modern day. The
overall pattern is that as the modern presidency has grown in stature and power, political parties have
been relegated to roles of less and less importance. Only under Reagan and both Bushes can some
efforts at revival and renewal of the party system be seen.
 The Framers envisioned a nonpartisan president who was supposed to play the leading
institutional role in checking and controlling the “violence of faction”
 The tension between the presidency and the party system reached a critical point during the
1930’s
 Milkis argues that the modern presidency was “crafted with the intention of reducing the
influence of the party system on American politics”
FDR
 FDR wanted to pursue an “economic constitutional order” grounded in commitment to guarantee
a decent level of economic well-being for the American people – pursuing this presupposed a
fundamental change in the relationship between the presidency and the party system: Roosevelt
wanted the essentially state and local based party organizations to transform into a national,
executive-oriented system organized around public issues
 FDR’s prescription for party reform was extraordinary presidential leadership, but that posed a
twofold dilemma – on one hand, the decentralized character of politics in the US could be
modified only by strong presidential leadership; on the other, a president determined to
fundamentally alter the connection between the executive and the party eventually would shatter
party unity
 The proposed 1937 executive organization bill, which ultimately passed as the 1939 Executive
Reorganization Act (creating the EXOP, White House Office, etc.) greatly expanded presidential
authority over the executive branch, fostering a government that would help the president to
govern in the absence of a party government
o The reorganization act also represents the birth of the institutional presidency
 As the presidency developed into an elaborate and ubiquitous institution, it preempted party
leaders in many of their limited, but significant, duties: providing a link from government to
interest groups, staffing the executive department, contributing to policy development, organizing
election campaigns, and communicating with the public
Lyndon Johnson
 WWII and the cold war greatly augmented the shift to the president, rather than the party, as the
locus of political responsibility
 Johnson remembered FDR’s interactions with his own party in Congress as the best example of
the ephemeral nature of party government in the US
 Johnson took strong action to deemphasize the role of the traditional party organization – e.g.
ruthlessly attacked the DNC in late 1965
 Trying to build on the New Deal and make his Great Society put Johnson into direct conflict with
established elements of the Democratic Party, such as the national committee and local machines
 Johnson’s administration lacked confidence in the Democratic Party’s ability to act as an
intermediary between the White House and the American people

Johnson created independent task forces made up of academics to develop policy issues and do
ground research, rather than relying on the party apparatus
 Johnson also was committed to appointments by a system of merit rather than political
expediency
 Milkis believes that the tumultuous 1968 elections the McGovern-Fraser reforms should be seen
“as the culmination of long-standing efforts to free the presidency from traditional partisan
influences”
Richard Nixon
 Nixon basically extended on the behavioral pattern of Roosevelt and Johnson – he centralized
authority in the White House and reduced regular Republican organization
 Best example: he created the Committee for the Re-Election of the President (CREEP) from the
RNC in his ’72 campaign
Ronald Reagan
 Erosion of old-style party politics allowed a more national and issue-oriented party system to
develop
 The Republican Party in particular developed a formidable organizational apparatus which
displayed unprecedented strength at the national level
 After 1976, the RNC and two other national Republican bodies (National Republican Senatorial
and National Republican Congressional Committees) greatly expanded their efforts to raise funds
and provide services for the party’s state and local candidates
 Democrats lagged behind but their losses in 1980 spurred them to follow suit
 Reagan identified closely with his party and his presidency showed how the relationship can be
mutually beneficial:
o A strong republican party provided Reagan with the support of a formidable institution,
solidifying his personal popularity and facilitating support for his program in Congress
o Reagan’s popularity served the party by strengthening its fundraising efforts and
promoting a shift in voters’ party loyalties
 Despite this, Reagan’s administration did pursue its program with acts of administrative discretion
that did circumvent the legislative process and the party system
Bill Clinton
 Strong support for independent Ross Perot in 1992 reflected the continuing erosion of partisan
loyalties in the electorate
 Clinton had to pay deference to traditional liberal causes because he and his wing of the
Democratic Party were the minority wing
 Defeat of his health care reform created an impression that Clinton had not lived up to his
campaign promise to transcend the bitter philosophical and partisan battles of the Reagan and
Bush years
 By focusing on his own campaign during reelection, Clinton was the first Democrat since FDR to
be reelected but did little to help his party
George W. Bush
 Both Bush and Gore sought to distance themselves from their parties in 2000, each seeking a
strategic center
 Bush’s compassionate conservatism was a doctrine that he and his close advisors (i.e. Rove)
hoped would strengthen the appeal of the Republican Party – his rhetoric and policy proposal
were a deliberate attempt to play to conservative values w/o being reflexively antigovernment
 At the beginning of his presidency, like Clinton, Bush cooperated with his party’s strong
ideological leaders and preferred to solidify his base in the party before reaching out to
independents
 Rove staffed the Office of Strategic Initiatives which oversaw a nearly complete melding of
presidential and partisan politics – he admitted national parties were imported but said they were
“less important in developing a political and policy strategy for the White House”
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Bush’s compassionate conservatism softened the Republican Party’s harsh antigovernment edge
and gave him a platform to act independently of his party, e.g. on faith-based initiatives and
educational reform
The Bush White House became even more isolated from Congress and the Republican Party as it
planned and fought the war on terror
Bush threw himself into the 2002 midterm elections with more vigor than any other president in
history – he raised a campaign war chest and had numerous appearances for GOP candidates,
strengthening his influence over his party  his party gained seats in both chambers
Since the 1970s the Republican Party had been developing into a formidable national organization
in which the RNC was the principal agent of party-building
The party put together a massive grassroots mobilizing strategy in 2002 and 2004, relying on
volunteers and face-to-face appeals to voters
The White House also took an active role, recruiting candidates, raising money, and attracting
volunteers to bring out the Republican vote
By time of his reelection, Bush had already attracted 1 million new donors to the GOP
Both the 2002 and 2004 elections suggest that modern presidential politics continues to
subordinate partisan to executive responsibility
The war on terror shows that both parties believe the president, rather than Congress or the
parties, should assume principal responsibility
The 2004 election was mostly a referendum on Bush, and so can be seen as more of a personal
rather than a party victory, b/c although the election did energize the national party organizations,
it subordinated partisan to executive responsibility
November 28:
Marc Bodnick, "Going Public Reconsidered: Reagan's 1981 Tax and Budget Cuts,"
Congress and the Presidency, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 1990), pp. 13-28.

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Revisionist scholars, particularly Kernell argue that public appeals or gaining
importance over bargaining. Kernell believes that bargaining is difficult and that
going public is the best alternative. Going public violates bargaining and is
“incompatible” with it. He suggests that public appeals are a form of force that
offers punishment as an incentive and damages the bargaining environment.
This revisionist reasoning directly challenges traditional analyses of the
importance of bargaining. Neustadt argued that if a president wants to
accomplish his goals he must negotiate with other interested parties because force
is of little use.
Bodnick takes another look at Reagan’s budget and tax cuts of 1981, which
represent Reagan’s influence over Congress and are the cases that Kernell uses to
support his going public theory. By examining these cases, Bodnick wants to
show that traditional thinking, based on bargaining, is still viable in explaining
presidential power. Going public is not as important in the passage of tax and
budget cuts as a revisionist view suggests.
For one thing, the House was more ideologically Conservative than it appeared.
Although the House was majority Democratic, but it was full of Boll Weevils,
Southern Democratic Representatives who tended toward ideological
conservatism. A group of 40 Boll Weevils met with Regan and urged him to
propose specific budge cuts, which were above and beyond what Reagan had
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already submitted. Thus Reagan did not need to force anything on the House
because a majority of them were already inclined toward conservative fiscal
policy.
Contrary to the theory of going public, Reagan made many deals and bargained in
order to get the legislation through. He bargained with his cabinet officials in
order to preserve unity in the cabinet. He got Gramm-Latta I passed by telling
Congressman that if they “voted for the general limits mandated by Gramm-Latta
I, Reagan would be willing to compromise and give in on certain programs
whenthe committees themselves want to do the actual cutting”
o This was the largest compromises made with the Gypsy Moths, the
moderate Republicans centered in the Northeast and Midwest.
In Gramm-Latta II, the Boll Weevils received a great number of trades and the
Gypsy Moths each received part of what they lost in the original Gram-Latta I.
Because so many deals were made, going public is not as important as Kernell
wants us to believe.
Public pressure is still important. It provides a resource to protect his bargaining
and to discipline those with whom he has already traded.
Also the going public analysis fails because Reagan did not even attempt to go
public. He did not take his case to the people.
The chief of staff, Baker, gave two enlightening reasons why they didn’t pursue a
public strategy.
o 1. He wanted to save Reagan’s public strength for the contentious tax fight
later in the summer. Public strategies have a weakness, a danger of
overexposure. Public appeals must be conserved and used sparingly.
o 2. They didn’t believe a public strategy would ensure victory. A public
strategy alone cannot turn around a possible defeat; it can only make
success slightly more probable.
Bodnick condludes: Public strategies solidify bargains and may make
compromise easier, but they cannot replace deal-making.
Kernell: Going Public – New Strategies of Presidential Leadership
TERMS
Going public: “It is a strategy whereby a president promotes himself and his policies in Washington
by appealing to the American public for support. Forcing compliance from fellow Washingtonians by
going over their heads to appeal to their constituents is a tactic not unknown during the first half of the
century, but it was seldom attempted” (2).
Institutionalized pluralism: a system of power in Washington based on bargaining, affinity relations
among elites
Individualized pluralism: the system of power that has increasingly replaced institutionalized
pluralism in Washington power relations according to Kernell; based on more independent, self-reliant
politicians who prefer going public to bargaining and reflective of the culture of divided government
and loose coalition in Washington
Major and Minor Public Addresses: “Major addresses are those in which the president speaks
directly to a national audience over radio or television. Minor addresses, by comparison, are those the
president delivers to a special audience either in person or via some broadcast medium” (106)
Chpt 1 – Introduction: Going Public in Theory and Practice
Scene: “in this era of divided government, with the legislative and executive branches controlled by
different parties, and presidents who therefore routinely enlist public support in their dealings with
other Washington politicians”
Presidential appeals for public support had become commonplace by 1992
Carter – 4 television crises about the energy crisis
Nixon – used primetime television to promote policies on Vietnam; prompted FCC to apply a fairness
doctrine to give opponents of war chance to voice opinions
Reagan – excelled in rallying public opinion
Definition of “going public”: “It is a strategy whereby a president promotes himself and his policies
in Washington by appealing to the American public for support. Forcing compliance from fellow
Washingtonians by going over their heads to appeal to their constituents is a tactic not unknown
during the first half of the century, but it was seldom attempted” (2).
Going public is fundamentally incompatible with bargaining, which is Neustadt’s theory on the source
of president bargaining. Going public violates bargaining in several ways
1. Rarely included the kinds of exchanges necessary, in pluralist theory, for the American
political systems to function properly
2. Going public fails to extend benefits for compliance, but freely imposes costs for
noncompliance – more like force than bargaining
3. Going public entails public posturing, which makes compromise with other politicians
difficult
4. Going public undermines the legitimacy of other politicians.
Bargaining and going public in tension in the modern age – weigh carefully which strategy to pursue
Chpt 2 – How Washington and Presidents Have Changed
Why opt for going public when it seems to contradict the purpose of representative, pluralistic
government, in which we elect people who represent public?
1. Bargaining has shown declining efficiency – going public is a more successful strategy
because politicians in Washington aren’t as tractable to bargaining as they once were,
especially in the era of divided government, individualistic politicians
2. Opportunities to go public have increased
A shift from institutionalized pluralism based on bargaining to individualized pluralism (which does
more to encourage going public)
1. Growth of modern welfare state has increased size of constituencies outside Washington
2. Over the shoulder inspection by constituents possible thanks to modern communication
3. Decay of institutionalized pluralism abetted by decline of political parties – erosion of
affinity relations among political elites
Other reasons?
1. Today members of Congress are themselves going public – 29
2. New organizational forms in Congress – caucuses and PACs – indicate that Congress as
an institution is adapting to the Washington community of individualized pluralism
Note that outsider presidents go public because they aren’t as skilled at bargaining, and don’t always
know when the opportunity is presenting itself, desirable
Conclusion – The declining influence of political parties on the electorate has led to numerous
developments that have made going public feasible:
1. Political relations in DC that don’t let a limited set of bargains carry the day
2. Presidential selection reforms that allow ordinary voters to determine nominations rather
than state parties
3. Rise of divided party control of government
Chpt 4 – The Growth of Going Public
Recap – why modern presidents go public: technology makes it possible; outsiders in the White House
find it attractive; the centrifugal forces at work in Washington require it
Examples – when the pres goes on the radio, tv to solicit public support for his legislative program or
to define the nation’s position in an international crisis
Trends in Going Public
1. Public Addresses – major vs. minor public addresses: “Major addresses are those in which the
president speaks directly to a national audience over radio or television. Minor addresses, by
comparison, are those the president delivers to a special audience either in person or via some
broadcast medium” (106)
 Most important kind of major address is the special report he delivers to the nation
on primetime tv – an opportunity cost; can be taxing; people pay more attention to
these when there are fewer of them
2. Public Appearances
3. Political Travel – do it to appear before particular constituency, to find locations suitable for
sounding a particular theme, to find special opportunities to appear presidential (abroad esp.)
 Foreign vs. domestic travel – different political purposes (121)
In sum: “During the past half century, trends in presidents going public – from political travel to
public addresses and appearances – have moved steadily upward. There are some differences among
them, however, in both the overall rate of growth and the timing of the sharpest increases...
Cumulatively, these trend point toward a president today who is far more personally involved in
public relations than were his predecessors thirty and forty years ago” (123)
The Incremental Growth of Going Public
1. Incrementalism as a Function of Technology – continuous tech advances in transportation
(faster planes) and communication (radio, tv, live satellites)
2. Incrementalism as a Function of Politics – changes in political environment have inspired
improvements in technology, specifically the decline of party and institutional leadership and
the rise of divided govt.
Chpt 5 – President Reagan and His First Three Budgets: A Classic Case of Going Public in Action
Reagan’s record of going public was fruitful – demonstrated by his experiences with the first three
budget rounds
Washington press corp. hunted for stories regarding Reagan’s discrete bargaining on the budgets, but
didn’t find any – weren’t used to his style of going public rather than bargaining
Lessons:
1. Popularity Dictates Policy – going public handsomely rewarded Reagan in his dealings with
Congress because he was so popular – few politicians wanted to oppose him
2. Governing as Campaigning – the strategic prescriptions of going public put the office on a
campaign footing by requiring heavy travel, numerous appearances before organized
constituencies, and use of television
3. Policy Serves Rhetoric - rather than the substance of detailed scrutiny and negotiations, policy
questions become overly simplified and stylized to satisfy the cognitive requirements of a
largely inattentive national audience
November 30:
Going Public—Chapter 3
Main Ideas of “The President and the Press”
 “With presidents increasingly going public and with a more assertive press,
contention over control will remain a fixture of the modern system. “
 “Pressure and competition have replaced professional reciprocity as the fabric
of community relations.”
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Early Professionalization—“creed, collegiality, and the recognition of collective
goals” are what defined Washington correspondents early on
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Teddy Roosevelt and Wilson were “transitional figures” in advancing presspresidential relations
Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover proved to be “demonstration cases of the
implications for a president’s options of the developing professionalism of the
press
FDR—“Hard News, Openly Conveyed”. He worked with a “hostile newspaper
industry” and a “friendly press corps” for 12 years. Due to the Depression and the
New Deal , the “president and the press needed each other to accomplish their
respective tasks”. Frequent press conferences
Truman—press conferences became more formal and less frequent and
Eisenhower further eroded the intimacy of press conferences
Kennedy—era of direct communication and a real break from the FDR system.
He took advantage of direct communication via live, nationwide televising of
press conferences. He also used frequently the “private interview”
For Kernell, the Kennedy system is a model for going public and has been
adapted to presidents personal systoles
George Bush adapted Kennedy system because he did not perform well on
television so that there were “brief, impromptu morning sessions in which the
networks were allowed a few minutes to assemble the cameras if they were
interested in covering the conference.”
Kessel – Working with the Media (Ch. 3 of Presidents, the Presidency, and the Political Environment)
The Press Secretary
The Press Secretary must: issue press releases, hold daily press briefings, alert the President to
probable questions before news conferences, deal with crises, and handle logistics for reporters
traveling with the President. In order for the Press Secretary to be successful, he must have copious
experience and have the absolute confidence of the President.
The size of the White House Press Corps has increased dramatically over the years, as has the size of
the White House Press Staff. The modern Press Office is composed of two separate offices working
together. The Upper Press Office in the West Wing has the office of the Press Secretary and his
Deputies. The Lower Press Office, located near the WH Press Corps’ desks, houses several deputies
and assistants as well. The Press Office prepares a news summary for the President every day which
summarizes all the major television newscasts, news wires, and selected articles from papers across
the country. The Press Advance office makes travel arrangements for reporters traveling with the
President. The Photo office supplies photographers to record White House events.
The Office of Communications manages the outflow of positive information about the President.
Within the Office of Communications, the Office of Media Relations deals with the out-of-town press,
and the Television Office manages logistics for television broadcasts. The Chief of Staff generally
coordinates communications activities with press activities. HR Haldeman, Chief of Staff to Richard
Nixon, gave the media a “Line of the Day,” focusing the WH’s message on a specific issue.
Coping with crises can be difficult, because information about them is often initially sparse, but they
have gigantic news consequences, so the Press wants information as quickly as possible. Some crises
may require secrecy because of their sensitive nature, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Information gathering requires reading as widely as possible, listening to questions raised by the
President, as well as his senior aides and journalists themselves, sitting in on morning staff meetings,
and attending as many other White House meetings as they are able. Strong professional reputation
among the White House staff makes this process much easier.
Decision-making revolves around choosing what information to release, when to release it, and under
what circumstances. Such decisions are difficult when they concern national security, sensitive
negotiations, and the health of the president. Since the White House and the Media have different
resources, the process of bargaining between them does not have to do with persuasion but rather the
negotiation of newsworthiness.
Debating the Presidency: The media is too hard on the Presidents
Pro: Matthew Kerbel
Con: Bartholomew Sparrow
The question posed is, are the media-newspaper, magazines, radio, television, and Web
blogs too hard on the presidents?
Pro: Kerbel argues yes. He says media scrutiny compounds this disadvantage by
portraying presidents in a negative light that does little to enhance either position with the
public or their strategic position in Washington. He goes on to say that the need for
television new programs to tell a story has resulted in an effort to emphasized all manner
of competition, form odds making to the presidential approval rating.
Kerbel writes the negative media is a self fulfilling prophecy if the media portrays
the president badly than his approval rating will go down and there for he won’t be able
to get anything done in Washington, which the media said in the first place.
This scrutiny that the president under goes has transformed the presidency, the
communications office has evolved into war rooms devoted to crafting and controlling
administration friendly messages, Governance has morphed into marketing, and
Administration officials spend most of there time competing over content of news
agendas.
Negative process-oriented, horserace-centered, scandal heavy coverage plays to
the media’s needs. But it is bad for governance because the public is focused on the
winners and losers and this detracts from the actual merits of the policy.
Con: Sparrow argues that the media have a love hate relationship that is a
mutually dependent partnership.
He uses Stephen Lukes three dimensional theory 1. Which party is dominating the
determination of issues being openly contested in the media 2. Who is setting the agenda
and 3. Who is controlling the news framing (how information is categorized)
1.
Sparrow argues that that when the Bush entered the white house
Republicans controlled Congress helped to sway media coverage along
with the rise republican news channels and Christian broadcasting
station. This he says is very beneficial to the president
2.
Also as head of state the president can dictate what is and is not news.
Presidents hold much fewer one on one press conferences so they can
avoid tuff questions and release unappealing news at inconvenient times
to cover it. Such as weekends and holidays
3.
The media also frames politics for the president. Sparrow argues that
they framed news coverage favorably to help the president’s agenda in
2001. By calling the 9/11 attacks ”war” and privatization of Social
security as “reform”
He concludes the Bush administration has dominated the media in all three categories and
there for it is not right to say that media is too hard on the president.
The Presidency and the Press: The Paradox of White House Communications War
Jacobs argues that going public is much less likely to succeed and achieve the presidents
objectives than otherwise perceived. He advocates for a less adversarial and more cooperative
strategies of media relations.
Case Studies:
Clinton’s HealthCare Reform and his Social Security Reform
-When Clinton came into office, his strategy called for a communications war, what would “use
the power of the white house to control the message and to drown out critical commentary by
journalists and political opponents”
Presidential media campaigns rest of three expectations
Increase volume of media coverage of specific policy areas.
Increase use of administration allies as sources and to keep opposition from being sources
Expectation that press will steer away from coverage of the political strategizing inherent in a
“communications war” and focus on the substance of their initiatives.
HOWEVER, these do not always occur without costs.
Perversely, the efforts boost press attention to opposition sources and political strategy rather
than to friendly sources. Coverage of issues can be grown in volume, but in ways that usually
contradict presidents goals.
3 Factors govern how reporters cover news:
economic incentive to get readers/viewers
guardians of public welfare
assignment disparity of beats weighs news in favor of more covered beats
Interaction of media routines clash with President’s goals:
Large number of Presidential messages on a contentious issue leads to rise in press coverage of
opposition voices
President’s declaration of communications war leads press to diminish reporting on substantive
policy issues and expand its coverage of the motivations, intentions, and strategies of political
advocates
Bill Clinton’s health care reform communications war was victim of all these interactions and
failed miserably.
For social security reform he took different approach:
-He started by acknowledging and attempting to accommodate the viewpoints of a diverse set of
political actors who had already expressed interest in reforming the program. Declared it was
unwise for him to “offer his own solution to the impending SS crisis on the grounds that this
would politicize the issue and make it harder to reach a compromise” He defined his role as
“coaxing along a bi-partisan dialogue” as the “communicator-in-chief”
As a result, press coverage was more favorable and was less likely to use opposing voices as
sources. Press reports focused overwhelmingly on substance and not strategy.
Conclusion: The implication of the paradox of presidential media campaign- that increased
public appeals generate attention to critics and to political conflict and strategy – is not that
Presidents should abandon these appeals but they should reconsider their leadership style. They
should abandon the communications war approach for the institutionally based cooperative
leadership.
December 5:
December 5 – Barber Reading “Answering the Critics”


1.
This reading is a response from Barber to the critics of his work
He responds to 10 points:
Bias
o
the facts are there in the public record to look at. Barber says that anyone can argue against
him using his facts and more, if they so desire.
2. Personalism
o The criticism is that Presidential Character puts too much stress on the psychology of an
individual and does not consider the institution of the Presidency. The situation should also
shape the President’s action.
o Barber says that it can’t boil it all down to the psyche of the President but you can in a large
part.
o Barber says that the personality of the president undeniably affects the way the office is
carried out.
3. Citizen shrinks?
o Is the book not scholarly because it is written for the public?
o Barber argues that it is necessary for the public to judge the qualities of a president when
electing him so it is better that the public know about his theory so it has an impact
4. Physchoanalytic mumbo jumbo?
o Barber says his book is about evaluating the character not craziness of the presidents
o Uses psychological methods but doesn’t talk about diagnoses
5. The Iron Box
o Says that it is ok to classify into rigid categories. Doesn’t demean differencbut just asserts the
importance of certain factors over others.
6. Fake Active Positives?
o Is it possible that Barber’s book made the Presidents act active positive during the election so
that they would win?
o Barber says that neither Carter or Reagan “needed my book to motivate him to seem to be
what our culture wants him to be: energetic and optimistic.
o Barber agrees that campaigns may show their fake personality, so you have to go back in their
history.
7. The Mechanists
o Some criticize Barber for not presenting a concrete theory with all-encompassing
mechanisms. Barber doesn’t think this is important
8. Change in adulthood
o “My readings of the biographies and psychological studies still leaves me thinking that the
weight of the evidence is for continuity over change. Every character elaborates itself
throughout life, but after thirty or forty years character is rarely transformed. Styles and
worldviews are more malleable, but there too the continuities are more impressive than the
changes. In short, given the present state of knowledge of the subject, I would advise the
citizens choosing a President not to count on major changes in basic personality, basic beliefs,
or basic political skills as that creature of habit moves into the White House.”
9. Downplaying worldview
o Barber says it is ok to downplay worldview because his evidence shows that it is hard for I
president to implement his worldview. I’m not so sure.
10. Inside my head
o Not copied
In the future, America will need strong leaders so they don’t make mistakes.
Michael Nelson: Evaluating the Presidency
190-214:
Michael Nelson examines James David Barber’s theories on the psychological elements of the presidency
and the need for political journalism to consider psychology in its coverage of presidential elections.
Psychological Perspectives on the Presidency:
Constitutional Perspectives—
-framers wanted to limit power of any single man
-framers vested executive power in a single person, in spite of potentially ruinous ambition,
because (1) they knew Washington would be the first president, and “his personal character would ensure
[the presidency’s] republican nature” (2) they provided for the election of a president by his peers (electors,
House members) who would know his character, and (3) they believed the Constitution allowed the
removal of “mad or wicked presidents” before they could do much damage
Scholarly Perspectives—
-now, framers’ defenses against President with defective character are gone
-post-FDR, scholars (i.e. Neustadt) were unconcerned with destructive ambition—they exalted not
only presidential power but ambitious presidents
-scholars recognized people’s attitudes towards presidents were psychological as well as political;
nationalistic emotions were directed toward presidency (not monarchy)
Example: Kennedy’s assassination provoked strong feelings of personal grief
James David Barber and the Psychological Presidency: presidency is an institution shaped by individual
personalities and public feelings about the office
Presidential Psychology—
-psychological constitution based on worldview (adolescence-born politically relevant beliefs),
style (“habitual way of performing 3 political roles: rhetoric, personal relations, and homework”—formed
in adulthood), and character
-character: enduring orientation toward life
-formation of character produces self-esteem: if high, person is “active-positive” = ideal for
presidency (FDR, Carter, Ford, Truman, Jefferson, Clinton)
-insecurity has three forms, each producing a personality type
1) affection seeking: passive positives (Madison, Taft, Harding, Reagan)—enjoy office, but not
hard-working
2) finding usefulness through duty: passive negatives (Washington, Coolidge, Eisenhower)—
duty propels them into politics
3) dominance seeking: active negatives (Adams, Hoover, Johnson, Nixon, Wilson)—throw
themselves into work compulsively, without satisfaction, and pursue disastrous policies
because unwilling to lose control by conceding error
-rarefied, courtlike atmosphere of presidency allows presidents to seal themselves off from harsh
political reality
Criticism:
-psychology may not be everything; healthy political personality is no guarantee of success in office, and
unsuitability does not correspond to failure
-philosophy and skills can explain behavior as well as personality
-subjective criteria—no clear standards against which to measure presidents
212-220:
Nelson dedicates this portion of his essay to three different aspects of James David Barber’s work:
1) Public Psychology; 2) Person, Public Mood, and the Psychological Presidency; 3) Barber’s
Prescriptions.
The first of these segments, Public Psychology, is focussed on Barber’s book, The Pulse of
Politics: Electing Presidents in the Media Age. The novel theory in Barber’s book is that presidential
elections of the twentieth century follow a 12-year cycle, one characterized by three different public
moods: conflict, conscience, and conciliation. According to this schema, an initial conflict-election, in
which the public yearns for a “blood-and-guts political contest”, is followed four years later by a
conscience-election where the public seeks to restore high-minded principles to the country and the
presidency. In the subsequent election, the public seeks to mollify the strains of four years spent devoted to
moral and political stringency. This conciliation-election, in which the public seeks tranquillity above all
else, is then followed by another conflict-election, and the cycle repeats itself.
According to Nelson, Barber sees the “psychological pulse” (conflict-conscience-conciliation)
found in modern elections as an extension of elemental human psychology. The Freudian terminology of
ego, superego, and id are supposed to reflect the three distinct public moods found in modern elections.
Moreover, each mood in the cycle is supposed to cause (in psychological terms) the next one, thus
explaining why the cycle recurs throughout modern elections.
Nelson criticizes Barber’s theory for two reasons. One, Barber does not include any sort of
scholarly citation to back up his weighty psychological claims. And two, the theory itself does not account
for the actual character of elections. (For instance, the acrimonious election of 1988 was supposed to be a
conscience election according to Barber’s theory.)
The second segment, Person, Public Mood, and the Psychological Presidency, examines both sides
of Barber’s model: the character of the president and the mood of the public during the election cycle.
According to Barber, each of the three public moods finds resonance with one of his distinct psychological
characters laid out for the modern presidents. Thus the conflict-election calls for a president with an activenegative psychological character, the conscience-election for a passive-negative, and the conciliationelection for a passive-positive. Barber’s fourth psychological type, the active-positive, finds resonance in
all public moods, and is considered a “president for all seasons”.
However, Nelson points out that there is a very poor correlation between the public mood during a
given election and the psychological type of the president elected, thereby further undermining Barber’s
theory.
The final segment of this essay, Barber’s Prescriptions, finds Nelson approving Barber’s ideas for
reforming the electoral system. Though Nelson rejects much of Barber’s psychological framework for
presidents and the election cycle, he agrees that media coverage of presidential elections should put greater
emphasis on the candidates. According to Barber, if the media focused less on the horse-race aspect of
elections and more on the characters of the candidates involved, the result would be a more informed and
more interested electorate. Barber sees this step as an entirely pragmatic step with respect to the business
of the media, which is to sell stories. More attention on individuals, their attributes of character, and their
views will garner greater readership for media sources, according to Barber. Nelson agrees.
Debating the Presidency: Resolved, psychological character is a powerful predictor of
presidential performance by Renshon/Skorownek
-Barber: character matters; tried to characterize personality types to predict presidential
performance
Pro: Renshon
-acknowledges that no president fully controls his or the country’s destiny, but
psychology does matter a great deal
-2 core elements of presidential performance: judgment (capacity to understand the
essential nature of the problem at hand and devise solutions) and leadership (ability to
mobilize followers and resources in pursuit of those solutions)
-3 distinct elements of character: ambition, integrity, relatedness
-skills develop in 3 primary areas: cognitive, interpersonal, characterological
-example: response to 9/11 shaped largely by Bush’s character
Con: Skowronek
-suggests holding personality and skill constant and examining the typical political
effects of presidential action in the differently structured political contexts
-2 systemic relationships especially significant for an analysis of the politics of
leadership: president’s affiliation with the political complex of interests, institutions, and
ideas that dominated state/society relations before he came to office; current standing of
these governmental arrangements in the nation at large
-see table on pg 170
-gives many examples and characteristics of the politics of reconstruction, disjunction,
preemption, and articulation from the above table – possible IDs
-presidential success determined at least as much by systemic factors as by presidential
character
-lot of characterizations we give to presidents and political types, not personality types
December 7:
Schlesinger Reading “Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton”
o
o
o
o
o
How it works? Asks historians to rate the presidents Great, Near Great, Average, Below Average,
and Failure
Presidents have viewed the polls with some skepticism, but they continue nonetheless.
1996 poll has the same top nine as 1948:
o Lincoln, with a unanimous great vote
o Washington and FDR come next – only one near great vote, the rest great
o Near Great – Jefferson, Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Truman, Polk
o Reagan and Eisenhower are the subject of patrician votes putting them below this
What do the great ones have in common?
o All relatively young
o All have a clear vision and a connect to the “needs, anxieties, and dreams of the people”
o “All great presidents were leaders of thought at times when certain ideas in the life of the
nation had to be clarifies”
o must convince Congress of the rightness of their course
o all of the top ten save Jefferson were involved in War either before or during the
Presidency
o Franklin Roosevelt had the Great Depression
o “crisis helps those who can rise to it.”
o None of the top nine can be described as middle of the road people – “President who seek
to change the nation’s direction know that they are bound to alienate those who profit
from the status quo. Great presidents go ahead anyway.
o “Only boldness and creativity, even if at time foiled and frustrated, will earn [a
President] a place among the immortals.”
See the chart on page 101 of the course-pack for a summary of the poll
Evaluating the Presidency
Michael Nelson
(in The Presidency and the Political System)
- What are the standards by which scholars (such as Schlesinger in the Nov 1 1948
issue of Life magazine) measure the greatness of presidents? Answering this
question gives insight about the evaluators as well as the office itself
Scholars: Strength Amid Confusion
- Schlesinger’s surveys of historians in 1948 and 1962
o Similar results in “greats” and “failures
o 2 important standards: Strength and Desire to be Strong – GREAT
presidents seized opportunity in the presidency and left the office stronger
than when they were inaugurated
o 1968 – Gary Maranell confirmed these results
- Thomas Cronin found that political scientists typically categorize the presidency
as both omnipotent and benevolent
o Strength and goodness go hand in hand – stronger president = stronger
democratic procedures
o Political Scientists (Rossiter and Finer for example) seem to revere the
presidency almost religiously
- “Savior” model of the presidency ties strength, desire to be strong, power, and
virtue together
o President it the chief guardian in foreign policy AND democratic affairs
because of pluralistic nature of society
o Scholars of this thought argued strength and ambition were good for the
presidency through the 1960s, until LBJ and Nixon

These “flawed” presidencies seemed to make it look like strength
was bad for the general welfare
- New Task of scholars – determine why too much power was BAD for the office
(“Satan” model)
o Looked to both the Person and of Office itself for answers
o James Barber – it is bad when presidents have the “active –negative”
personality type – the unhealthy need to dominate others because they
react rigidly and aggressively when encounter problems
o Cronin looked at the Office – office had grown that it was no longer
“checked” by the constitutional system of checks and balances
- Presidencies of Ford and Carter brought in Samson model or
“tethered”/”imperiled” model – examined gap between what presidents are
expected to do and what they actually can do
o 2 sources for presidents incapacity: office’s dependence on other political
institutions for support and recent decline in the ability/willingness for
these institutions to provide it
o Parties, Congress, Bureaucracy, media, and public have become all too
fragmented within themselves to provide adequate support
o Regan came in and this thinking was again overturned
- Alternation between Savior, Satan, and imperiled model reflects confusion among
scholars
o Trying to lump empirical question (is the presidency strong or weak) with
a normative one (is presidential strength good or bad for nation?) – both
are important to answer but should not be lumped together
o All models have shown the underlying desire for presidential strength to
prove beneficial to the nation and political system
Journalists: Strength and Cynicism
- Journalists’ standard evaluation of the presidency can be summed up in one word:
cynicism – they, too, however seem to encourage a powerful executive when all
is said and done
- General cynicism born of the “status frustration” of the White house press corps –
the frustration developed out of the growing imbalance between social and
professional status of the reporters
- Presidential beat is usually key to success in the profession
- “Body watch” – refers to reporters constantly watching and interested on ONE
body: the President’s
o Because reporters have limited access they must rely on secondhand
reports form the press secretary
o Frustration – briefing room comparable to a classroom
- Cynicism can boil over into negative coverage – especially when questioning
morals of president
- Studies do show (1996 Breaking News by James Fallow) that most presidents
receive favorable press coverage
- Grossman and Kumar – when strong action comes from the White House,
journalists tend to applaud it
-
Why are reports generally good despite reporter cynicism? Because with limited
access to the president, the press secretary sets the agenda for what can be
covered by reporters
- The president is the center of journalistic concerns about the government
o Often describe the relations between the president and congress as a
serried of victories and defeats – another example of how the strong
presidency is supported by journalists
Citizens: Strength Amid Contradiction
- American presidency combines the roles of chief of government and chief of
state. Therefore president is both head politically and ceremonially and the public
evaluates president by standards that seem contradictory. Americans are both
philosophical congressionalist and operational presidentialists.
o Philosophical congressionalist – people tend to side with congress when
decision is being battled between the presidency and congress
 This is contradictory because people desire a strong presidency as
well
o Operational presidentialists – people generally love presidents that lead
and congresses that follow
 People can also be emotional presidentialists – thinking of past
presidents as political heroes – evidence of the American public’s
emotional attachment to the presidency
- Like scholars and journalists – the American people tend to favor and desire a
strong presidency.
Members of Congress: Strength Amid Constituency Centeredness
- Members of congress are concerned with being reelected – must please their
constituencies and therefore channel their resources into activities that translate
into votes. In time that is left for legislative activity usually focused on proposing
laws that sound pleasing to their voters or working on the areas of lawmaking that
are of interest to their constituency and campaign contributors
- Evaluate the presidency according to a constituency based criteria – daunting to
the president who needs the legislators to turn their attention to national concerns
and alteration of the status quo
- Congress still enhances presidential strength through the president’s power to
initiate, power of popularity, and power in foreign policy
o Power to Initiate – public places more demands on the federal government
that ever to act mainly through new legislation – congress looks to the
president to take the initiative
 Began in 1932 when members of Congress gave FDR the blank
check to deal with the Great Depression as he saw fit AND
authorized actions that allowed the president to become
institutionalized in the role of policy initiator.
o Power of popularity – when congressional leaders perceive the popularity
of the president among voters, especially in their constituency at home,
they are more likely to follow his lead
o Foreign Policy – unless foreign policy had implications with direct
domestic effects, constituents are not concerned with it, and getting too
involved in Foreign Policy could hurt the chances of a congressman being
reelected, so they routinely leave foreign affairs to the president
Bureaucrats: Strength Amid Careerism
- It is thought that civil servants may have self-interest in their jobs, but often this
stereotype is overdrawn, because careerists feel obliged to serve loyally to who
the people have chosen
- The president also possesses the capacity to redefine the interests of civil servants
- In general they like a strong president because he is easier to follow (and this is
their job) – they follow either because they are loyal and they believe in it OR
simply because if they are hoping to be promoted then following the president is
in their own best interest.
Conclusion: Although on the surface assessments seem different, it seems that all parties
truly appreciate and favor strong presidents. Two things must be noted. First, strength
means different things to different people. Some focus it on leadership, some on
initiative, some on the power to unify, some on the ability to be victorious over congress.
Second, if a president feels he needs to make too much of an impression, his strength can
ultimately disserve the nation. The lesson to presidents is that if they wish to be strong,
they should not see the political system as a threat to their strength.
Resolved, Great Presidents are the Agents of Democratic Change
Landy and Miroff
Pro: Marc Landy – great presidents inspire “conservative revolutions” – they alter
the political landscape in ways that align the political system more closely with the
nation’s guiding constitutional principles
- Democratic change is NOT change preferred by the majority
- Great presidents are agents of democratic change because they are great teachers
– they do not coerce citizens but submit themselves to people’s judgment
- Neustadt saw the essence of presidential power to be manipulation, but great
democratic leadership does not depend on the power to manipulate but the power
to make citizens resistant to manipulation and able to recognize which elements of
the system are worth preserving
- Great presidents utilize the tools of rhetoric and party leadership to accomplish
democratic change by forging conservative revolutions.
- Thomas Jefferson – “Revolution of 1800”
o Rhetoric – inaugural address “we are all republicans, we are al federalists”
o Party leadership – kept republican moderates committed to major reforms
of judiciary, public finance, and administration, and contained party
radicals
- Andrew Jackson
o Party Leadership – united parties that were heavily sectionalist at the time
through the demonstrated success of the democratic party that had unified
causing opposition party to follow
o Rhetoric – used for critical conservative purposes – “the constitution is
still an object of our reverence”
- Abraham Lincoln
o Rhetoric – explained in speeches why a house divided against itself could
not endure
o Party leadership – steered the republican party, which grew out of protest
meetings and political organizations, towards a public scale
- FDR
o Revitalized the democratic party – appealed to Catholics and American
labor groups
o Radio mastery “fireside chats”
Con: Bruce Miroff – great presidents have been the agents of democratic change –
they advance democratic values and practices and engage in battles. They mustered
the support to overcome antidemocratic resistance and institutionalized democratic
change in legal forms as well as establish democratic meaning to the changes of
which they were the agents. Still, they are not the PRIMARY means of change.
- This does not mean that presidents are the principal agents of these changes, they
operate within a larger field of forces and are influenced by the contexts of the
times
- In giving presidents too much credit for democratic change, the efforts of others
may be sometimes overshadowed
- In cases of all the great presidents the American Presidency acts as a force to
break barriers for democratic advancement
- Lesson: while presidents are often agents of democratic change, democratic
change, in the end, depends more on the quality of the nation’s citizens than on
the greatness of its presidents
December 12:
Abe Lincoln and Presidential leadership” William Gienapp
-evaluating presidents is hard b/c no rules to evaluate:
similar actions in different contexts can give different results
looking back in time vs. contemporary opinion
all presidents have some successes and some failures
-5 categories of pres leadership
1. leader of his party
relies on party for support
2. leader of administration
including cabinet
*first 2 are harder now b/c party splits and growth of exec branch
3. head of govt
relations with congress are crucial
4. head of foreign relations/ commander of military
5. leader of the American people
can mold public opinion, rally support
Lincoln is ranked as one of the greatest presidents but his contemporaries didn’t share this opinion.
He had to deal with succession and civil war.
Lincoln assessed in each category:
1. leader of administration
relied on his own judgement, was not afraid to appoint rivals to his cabinet
dominated and controlled his cabinet, only sporadically asked for their advice
put good service to union above personal and political differences and worked with many
people he did not personally like
2. leader of party
was good party leader b/c maintained good personal relationships with individuals and paid
attention to organizational detail
was not intimidated by political criticism and popular opinion
kept policy in his own hands and by doing this didnt allow his party to split
3. relations with congress
not an activist with congress, didn’t submit much legislation.
Only pushed legislation with slavery abolishment
Made decisive decisions when congress was not in session
But was also flexible and didn’t allow relations with congress to completely disintegrate
4. military leader
didn’t know much when came in, but learned quickly
had tact in dealing with generals
gave people positions based on military knowledge, not politics.
Made lots of mistakes, but owned up to them and corrected them
5. leader of American people
used public documents more than speeches
probably should have made more speeches than he did
had a vision, yet let that vision grow and change with the country
overall
had self-reliance through entire presidency- never doubted his ability
historians recognize his greatness b/c read all of his documents (was a great writer)
and see his military victories in their true light.
Cheney and Vice Presidential Power ~ Paul Kengor
Arguably already the most influential VP in history (p161) but with shift of emphasis to
Foreign policy and war (his expertise) he became more influential. Has had lots of input,
been an active VP.
Questions to be answered:
- what are cheney’s duties?
- What does VP power mean in his case?
- How does his Vpresidency compare historically?
Historical Context
- pre WWII role of VP in FP was nonexistent – until Truman as President (because
he succeeded FDR who had told Truman NOTHING about ANYTHING)
- Eisenhower gave more tasks to his VP Nixon like meeting with foreign leaders
- Reagan permitted VP GHWB to chair task forces!
- Each subsequent VP has had more duties and power
Cheney’s background
- experience in defense and FP is unprecedented in VP position. Good match for
Bush who was a Governor before (thus no FP experience)
- was Chief of Staff, Congressman, on House Intelligence Committee, and
secretary of Defense (first VP to have had this position before)
- Cheney’s tenure as secretary of defense was successful – Gulf war went smoothly
and Cheney achieved largest reductions in military budget. Was a popular pick
for VP in 2000 because he had gravitas (possible ID word?) ie he had
respectability, seriousness and experience. (contrary to Bush = good running
mate)
Cheney’s Roll in the Bush administration
- more of a specialist because of his experience
- meets daily with Nat Sec advisor and CIA director. Regular participant in all NSC
meetings
- meets with foreign leaders
- speaks on key issues (sci&tech, human rights, enviro issues, defense and foreign
policy matters etc)
The “September 11 VP”
- Pres Bush was out when attacks happened so he was taking the first action and
responses.
- Was looking to protect the presidency and succession (ie himself as VP, then
speaker of the House)
- Made the first substantive talk to the nation on the situation (on Meet the Press
September 16, 2001)
- From beginning gathered and evaluated info and advised the Pres.
- Recommended that Bush create the Office of Homeland Security, that Tom Ridge
fill the head position, that Bush build coalitions
- Was a diplomat-emissary – met with many foreign officials and began personal
relationships with them. Foreign officials take VP seriously because they know he
“has the president’s ear.”
Main idea: Cheney has continued and even extended the pattern of increasing power in
the VP office.