Thesis Proposal
Arms maintenance as a Rational Decision for
Force Modernization in Indonesia
(20 October 1999 – 20 October 2009)
Wendy Andhika Prajuli
698330338
0
Background
Since 1998, some scholars in Indonesia argue that Indonesia needs to build-up or
increase its relative military capability by purchasing weapons to strengthen Indonesia’s
deterrence effects capability to others. For example, Andi Widjajanto, an Indonesian military
expert, wrote:
“Program pengembangan senjata yang semula diarahkan untuk program arms maintenance
digeser menjadi program arms disposal dan arms build-up… Program arms build-up dilakukan
untuk mengisi kekosongan sistem persenjataan karena program arms disposal dan sekaligus
memperkuat elemen postur pertahanan
(Weapons development programs which were originally directed to the arms maintenance are
shifted into arms disposal and arms build-up programs... The arms build-up programs need to be
conducted to fill the deficiency of weapons systems due to the arms disposal programs and also
strengthen the elements of defense posture).” 1
Indonesian government, however, chose arms maintenance2 as weapons modernization
programs. The Indonesia’s decision on this arms modernization can be seen from some
variables. Firstly, are Indonesian Defense Whitepapers 2003 and 2008. The white paper 2003
states:
“Pembangunan kekuatan pertahanan negara Indonesia bukan untuk memperbesar kekuatan, tapi
mengisi kesenjangan antara kondisi nyata dengan kekuatan sesuai Tabel Organisasi dan Personil
atau Daftar Susunan Personel dan Peralatan.
(Defence force development is not aimed at increasing power, but at filling the gap between the
real situation in accordance with the Organization and Equipment Table (TOP) and the List of
Personnel and Equipment Composition (DSPP).)”.3
Similarly, Defense Whitepaper 2008 words that for some years forward Indonesia’s
orientation to modernize its military weapons is still to replace worn-out weapons.4
1
Andi Widjajanto, “Reformasi Militer, Ekonomi Pertahanan, dan Bisnis Militer di Indonesia” in Jaleswari
Pramodhawardani & Andi Widjajanto (eds.), Bisnis Serdadu: Ekonomi Bayangan, Jakarta: The Indonesian Institute,
2007, p. 12
2
Arms maintenance is a force modernization that taken by a states just to replace its old weapons and/or to
update its force capabilities in line with new technology. This kind of modernization is not based on state’s
response to others because it is a routine modernization done by a state.
3
Indonesia Defense White Paper 2003 (English version), Jakarta: Indonesian Department of Defence, 2003,
http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/IndonesiaWhitePaper.pdf. November 30, 2010.
1
Secondly, Rencana Strategis Pembangunan Pertahanan tahun 2000-2004 (Defense
Development Strategic Planning 2000-2004). On this document, the government wrote during
2000 to 2004 Indonesia does not have a plan to increase its military power, but only change its
expired date military stuffs with the new ones.5
Thirdly, in 2006 Indonesian Navy headquarter published document named Rencana
Pembangunan Kekuatan TNI-AL
Jangka Panjang (The Long-term Planning of Navy
Modernization). In this document the Navy explained that, at least, from 2004 until 2014
Indonesian Navy only does arms maintenance to reach its minimal essential force capability.6
Furthermore, there are two indicators that can be used to examine whether one country
is engaged in an arms maintenance, build-up or race. The first indicator is rooted from the
action-reaction model that is a classical view of arms dynamics. This model has a basic
preposition that states strengthen its armament because of the threat the states perceive from
other states. It explains that arms dynamics, primarily, are caused by external factors. An action
by any potentially enemies to increase its military power will raise the level of threat seen by
other states and cause them to react by increasing their own power. 7 Therefore, this
proposition explains implicitly that the pattern of force modernization that will be chose by a
state is defined by state’s threat perception.
Indonesia classified its perception of threats into three levels, namely global, regional and
domestic level. It was explained that, in global and regional level, Indonesia did not have any
potential hostile state because of security problems would be dominated by non-conventional
issues, such as terrorism, ethnic conflicts, money laundering, human trafficking and drugs
4
Indonesia Defense White Paper 2008 (Indonesian version), Jakarta: Indonesian Department of Defence, 2008,
http://www2.kemhan.go.id/buku_putih/bukuputih.pdf, p. 101. November 30, 2010.
5
Andi Widjajanto & Makmur Keliat, “Penggunaan Fasilitas Kredit Ekspor untuk Pengadaan Alat Utama Sistem
Persenjataan Indonesia (2000-2004)”, Research Report, Jakarta: Pacivis UI, 2005,
http://www.fisip.ui.ac.id/pacivisui/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=37&Itemid=52. December 3,
2010.
6
Andi Widjajanto (et.al), “Indonesia Military Reform: 2009-2014”, Policy Paper I, Jakarta: Pacivis UI, 2009, p. 18.
7
Barry Buzan & Eric Herring, the Arms Dynamics in World Politics, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 83.
2
trafficking. Both in Defense White Paper 2003 and 2008, the government says clearly that any
aggression and invasion by other states to Indonesia have little possibility to be happened.
In contrast, Indonesia believes its security threats will be dominated by non-military
domestic security problems, such as separatism, terrorism, horizontal conflicts, riots, piracy,
illegal fishing, illegal logging and natural disaster.8
Indonesia believes that every interstate conflict can be solved by diplomatic and nonmilitary mechanism. Furthermore, Indonesia does believe United Nations and international
society have ability to avoid any aggression and invasion to Indonesia.9
At last, we can say that Indonesia did not have conventional threat perception, to be
exact, any possibility of aggression by other countries. Second, Indonesia’s defense system did
not develop against threats from other countries.
The second indicator is military expenditure as percentage of GNP. 10 If military
expenditure is constant or is a declining percentage of GNP, then one is probably observing
maintenance or build-down, especially where GNP itself tends to rise at steady but not
spectacular rate. Even though, absolute amounts spent will rise, the increase will mostly reflect
the rising cost of modern weapons compared with the older generations they replace.11
In 1998, Indonesia’s military budget as percentage of GNP was 1.09%. Next, in 1999 the
percentage was increasing to 1.34%. But, in 2000, it was decreasing to 0.93%. Then, in 2001, it
decreased again to 0.58%. In 2002, the percentage increased and reached level 0.70%. Next, in
2003 and 2004, were constant in level 0.93% and 0.98% (table 2). The percentages showed
that, throughout 1998-2004, Indonesia’s military budgets were relatively constant.
8
Indonesia Defense White Paper 2003 & 2008.
Indonesia Defense White Paper 2003.
10
But others also use military expenditure as percentage of GDP to measure this. For example is SIPRI.
11
Barry Buzan & Eric Herring, the Arms Dynamics…, p. 89.
9
3
Same condition also can be found when we measure the budget as percentage of GDP.
SIPRI states that during period from 1998 to 2006 Indonesia’s military expenditures as
percentage of GDP were constant with ranges from 0.9% to 1.4% (see table 3).
Also, by using data from table 1 we can see that the numbers of Indonesia’s military
expenditure are not large. In fact, Indonesia’s military budgets were not enough to fulfill all
military needs. The Indonesian government only had the ability to fulfill 74.12% of the real
budget of military’s needs. Then, only 35% of 74.12% budget that used for maintaining and
buying new weapons. To solve this problem, Indonesia government tried to use an export
credit mechanism to buy some weapons. This was the reason why, from 2000-2004, the use of
an export credit mechanism to buy weapons was increasing. Even, on that period, 50% of the
government’s export credit was used by the military sector.12
12
Andi Widjajanto & Makmur Keliat, “Penggunaan Fasilitas Kredit Ekspor...”, Op.Cit.
4
Table 1
Indonesia’s Military Expenditure 1998-2009
(in US$ and IDR)
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
IDR
11065
9984
11449
16416
19291
27446
32100
34658
41736
48257
(billion)
US$
2755
2265
2970
3136
3294
4397
4840
4731
5037
5478
(million)
Source: SIPRI, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/research/armaments/milex/milex_database
2008
2009
48599
49777
5011
4908
Table 2
Indonesia’s Military Expenditure as Percentage of GNP (IDR* Billion)
1998
1999
2000
2001
GNP1
901,859.8
1,015,967.4 1,172,756.9 1,623,229.3
Military Expenditure2
9,851.42
13,596.20
10,937.66
9,430.04
Military Expenditure as
1.09%
1.34%
0.93%
0.58%
Percentage of GNP
Source:
1) Bank of Indonesia, Indonesian Economic Annual Report, 2003, 2004 and 2005.
2) Departemen of Defense.
2002
1,808,761.7
12,754.95
2003
1,958,938.0
18,310.23
2004
2,183,310.6
21,422.21
0.70%
0.93%
0.98%
*) Indonesian Rupiahs
Table 3
Indonesia’s Military Expenditure as Percentage of GDP
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
1,1
0,9
1
1
1,1
1,4
1,4
1,2
1,2
1,2
Source: SIPRI, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/research/armaments/milex/milex_database
2008
1
5
Finally, based on all these variables we can conclude that during period 1998 to 2009
Indonesia did arms maintenance policy to modernize its weapon equipments.
Force Modernization in Southeast Asia
Force modernization in Southeast Asian countries have started since mid 1980s. From
1985 to 1996, Allan Collins noted that the Southeast Asian countries’ military expenditure
increased significantly as well as their arms transfer. During that period, arms transfer to
Southeast Asian countries increased from 11.9% of world total in 1985 to 23% in 1996.
However, the economic crisis on 1997 had postponed their arms acquisition planning. Then, as
the region recovers from the crisis, the arms procurements were rising again.13
Thailand was the most affected country by the 1997 economic crisis. The crisis seriously
influenced Thailand’s defence budget and procurement. The economic crisis caused Thailand
had to cut its defence spending from US$4.2bn (1995) to US$2bn (1998). This condition forced
Thai government had to postpone or reduce its military modernization plans as well as
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippine. But, Singapore was an exception because from 1998 to
2002 Singapore’s defence budget risen significantly and thus, continued the military
modernization. Tim Huxley says in his article, “though Singapore’s military procurement plans
were apparently stretched over longer timeframes because of the recession, there was no
significant hiatus in the overall ‘SAF2000’ modernization project.”14
Force modernization in Singapore has been planned since the mid 1980s and it stressed
on the importance of maintaining and if possible, enhancing the Singapore Armed Forces’
technological advantages over potential adversaries by developing advanced C4ISR and logistic
capabilities.
To reach RMA capability, Singapore built its new Ministry of Defense Headquarters at
Bukit Gombak with hardened underground operations control center. The headquarters is
13
Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional and Global Issues, Singapore: ISEAS, 2003, p. 94-96.
Tim Huxley, “Defence Procurement in Southeast Asia", paper on 5th workshop of the Inter-Parliamentary Forum
on Security Sector Governance (IPF-SSG) in Southeast Asia, Phnom Penh, 12-13 October 2008, http://ipf-ssgsea.net/5th_WS/defence_procurement_overview_Tim+Huxley.pdf. June 11, 2010.
14
6
linked through microwave and fiber-optic channels to an island-wide command, control,
communication and intelligence network.15 Furthermore, to enhance this capability Singapore
then bought 6 Formidable-class frigates from France. Singapore also bought, at least, 24 F-15SG
combat aircraft from the U.S. This purchasing included:16

200 AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM).

6 AMRAAM Captive Air Training (CAT) Missiles.

50 MK-82 GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) w/BLU-111 warhead.

44 AN/AVS-9(V) Night Vision Goggles.

24 Link 16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System/Low Volume Terminals
(Fighter Data Link Terminals).

30 AGM-154A-1 Joint Standoff Weapons w/BLU-111.

30 AGM-154C Joint Standoff Weapons.

200 AIM-9X SIDEWINDER Missiles.

24 AIM-9X SIDEWINDER CAT and Dummy Missiles.

300,000 20mm Practice Round Cartridges.

100 KMU-556 GBU-31 JDAM Tail Kit Assemblies.

4 MK-82 and MK-84 Bomb Practice trainers.

Electronic warfare systems and support.
15
Desmond Ball, “Trends in Military Acquisitions in the Asia Pacific Region: Implications for Security and Prospects
for Constraints and Controls”, SDSC Working Paper No. 273, July 1993. See also, Andrew Tan, “Force
Modernisation Trends in Southeast Asia”, IDSS Working Paper No. 59, January 2004.
16
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Singapore – Weapons and Logistics/Training Support for F-15 Aircraft”,
News Release, August 22, 2005, http://www.dsca.osd.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2005/Singapore_05-39.pdf. June 11,
2010.
7
Singapore also ordered 4 Gulfstream G550 Conformal Airborne Early Warning Aircraft.
These airplanes were planned being operational in 2010. Besides, Singapore still continues as a
Security Cooperation Participant in the US-led F-35 (Joint Strike Fighter) development program,
but the future involvement of Singapore in this project is not clear yet. Singapore also has an
interest to have RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV for maritime reconnaissance, but the government still
has no decision to procure the system or not.17
Economic crisis had forced Malaysia reducing and extending its procurement, even
though its defense program improved quickly after the crisis. For instance, Malaysia has to cut
its plan to develop 21 New Generation Patrol vessels into 6 ships only. However, 18 Su-30MKK
combat aircraft purchased in 2003 would still be delivered in 2008. 4 A400M heavy transport
aircraft ordered in 2005 will be in service in 2013. Malaysian navy bought 2 Scorpene-class
submarines from France and the first submarine has arrived in Malaysia on September 17,
2009. The second was predicted to arrive in Malaysia on early June 2010.18 In addition, 4 other
locally-built Meko-100 type large patrol vessels would be in service by 2010. Next, in August
2007, 18 Avibras Astros II multiple rocket launch systems were purchased by Malaysia to
increase its army’s capabilities.19 Malaysia will also purchase at least 4 AWACS (airborne
warning and control) aircraft.
Similarly, Malaysia has made an agreement to buy 2 British-built Jebat-class frigates.
These frigates will be in service by 2015. Malaysian government has an interest too to order
new ATGWs (anti-tank guided weapons) and a battlefield management system integrated with
command post AFV (armored fighting vehicle) variants. In the longer-term, Malaysian arms
forces probably plan to acquire 3 LPD-type multi-role support ships, additional combat aircraft,
AEW aircraft, and new armored vehicles.20 Besides, Malaysia has operated MiG-29 and F/A-18D
Hornet.
17
Tim Huxley, “Defence Procurement…”.
"Second Scorpene submarine to arrive in early June", The Star Online, January 13, 2010,
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/1/13/nation/5458256&sec=nation. June 11, 2010.
19
Tim Huxley, “Defence Procurement…”.
20
Ibid.
18
8
Because of lack of budget, Thai military had to satisfy with significant procurements of
second-hand military equipment. Tim Huxley writes that Thailand proposed to barter rice or
frozen chicken for military equipment. 21 Unfortunately, no military companies accepted
Thailand’s proposal. However, thanks to the September 2006 military coup which overthrew
Thaksin from its power. This military coup succeeded to increase military budget up to 34% in
2007 and 28% in 2008. Some portions of this new budget used by the military leaders to buy 12
JAS-39C/D Gripen multi-role combat aircraft, 2 Saab 1000 Erieye AEW aircraft, and new national
air defense system based on the Swedish air force’s Air Force 2000 concept. During this time
Thai government also purchased 50 Chinese C-802 naval cruise missiles, 96 BTR-3E1 amphibious
APCs, and Israeli machine-guns and rifles.22
After the democratic elections on December 2007, Thai military leaders proposed a
budget, at least, THB317 billion or US$9.3 billion for period 2009-2018, to purchase submarine,
additional combat aircraft, and new army equipments. The new government seems to agree
with this proposal because in June 2008 Samak Sundaravej’s government proposed to increase
the defense budget for the 2009 fiscal year up to THB169.1 billion or US$4.9 billion.23
According to Indonesia, Tim Huxley states that “the most militarily significant equipment
being brought into service during 2008 is the Indonesian Armed Forces’ first Kobra integrated
low- to medium-level air defence unit, comprising a 50 km-range search radar, command
vehicles, Poprad mobile anti-aircraft missile systems and ZUR-23 anti-aircraft guns.”24 Under
the agreement of US$1 billion defence equipment package funded by Russian credit, Indonesia
bought 8 Mi-3525 and 20 BMP-3F IFVs for the Marine Corps that will be delivered in 2010.
However, there is apparently still no clear information about Indonesia’s plan to purchase 2
Kilo-class submarines that included in the agreement. Anyway, Indonesia had 4 optional
countries for its new submarines: Germany (U-209), South Korea (Changbogo), Russia (Kilo
21
Ibid.
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
2 Mi-35 arrived on September 2003 and then 6 Mi-35 arrived on July, 2008.
22
9
class) and France (Scorpen), but then, the government narrowed those into 2 options: Russia
and South Korea.26 Indonesia also has decided to buy a squadron of 16 Super Tucano warplanes
to replace the 30 years-old OV-10 Bronco aircraft.27
In addition, IISS noted that during 1998-2004 Indonesia purchased several weapons,
such as Russian helicopter Mi-2, Mi-1728, Mi-35 and Russian airfighter Su-27 and Su-3029, and
Dutch corvette SIGMA-class corvette30. Most of the weapons that bought by indonesia during
this periode will be used to strengthen the Indonesian Air Force and Navy.
The Filipino government attempted to implement an ambitious Capability Upgrade
Program (CUP) for the armed forces. CUP’s priorities for procurement are infantry weapons,
land vehicles, modern communications equipment, and missile-armed fast attack craft.
Unfortunately, the defense budget that increased more than 20% in the 2008 and occasional
extra-budgetary funding allocations are still inadequate to provide the procurement.
Even though both Myanmar and Vietnam suffer by economic problem, military
modernizations in these countries still happen. Both countries bought advanced Russian
combat aircraft since 2003. Vietnam ordered new Russian naval vessels and Polish maritime
patrol aircraft earlier to strengthen the Navy. But, Vietnam’s budget is still insufficient to order
Su-30MK combat aircraft to supplement the 4 similar aircraft delivered in 2004. In addition, in
April 2008, Arianespace launched Vietnam’s first satellite, Vinasat-1, from its base in Korou,
26
"RI may purchase Kilo or Changbogo class submarines", Antara News, September 8, 2009,
http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/1252391638/ri-may-purchase-kilo-or-changbogo-class-submarines. June
12, 2010.
27
"Air Force to purchase 16 Super Tucano fighters", The Jakarta Post, January 24, 2010,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/01/24/air-force-purchase-16-super-tucano-fighters.html. June 12,
2010.
28
6 Mi-17 arrived on August, 2008.
29
2 Su-27 and 2 Su-30 arrived on September 2003.
30
Indonesia’s SIGMA-class corvette was sent gradually to Indonesia from Netherland. First corvette arrived in
Indonesia on September 17, 2007, the second on February 1, 2008, the third on December 3, 2008, and the fourth
on May 25, 2009.
10
French Guiana. Vinasat-1 will play an important military part in boosting the independence and
security of Vietnam’s military as well as civilian satellite communications.31
Carlyle A. Thayer states between 1994 and 2004, Vietnam acquired a total of 12 modern
Sukhoi jet fighters from Russia: 7 Su‐27SK Flanker B single‐seater, 3 Su‐27UBK Flanker C
two‐seat trainers and 2 Su‐30Ks.32 While, the Navy planned to construct up to 20 ‘blue water’
naval vessels and modernize its Hong Ha and Ba Son shipyards. In December 2006, Vietnam
reached agreement with Russia for the purchase of two Gepard‐class (Project 11661) guided
missile frigates. Both frigates will deliver expectedly in March 2010 for the first frigate and 2011
for the second.33
However, the most military purchases done by Vietnam are upgraded, refitted or
second hand equipments. For example, in 1997, Vietnam acquired two refitted Yugo‐class
midget submarines from North Korea and ordered 40 second‐hand Sukhoi Su‐22M4 fighter
bombers from Poland.34
Southeast Asia analysts, such as Desmond Ball, Shannon Selin, Tim Huxley, Susan Willet,
Andrew Tan, and Richard A. Bitzinger, believe these force modernizations are arms build-up3536
because it is followed by quantitative and qualitative changes in their capability, those are:

Developing national command, control and communication systems

Purchasing multi role fighter aircraft
31
Tim Huxley, “Defence Procurement…”.
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Vietnam People’s Army: Development and Modernization”, Research Monograph, August 23,
2009, Sultan Haji Bolkiah Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Arms build-up is a force modernization that increases force capability quantitatively and/or qualitatively to
respond other states, but the action is not enough to be classified as an arms race (Buzan, 1983).
36
See Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence…..”; Shannon Selin, “Asia Pacific Arms Buildups Part One: Scope, Causes
and Problems”, Working Paper No. 6, Institute of International Relations The University of British Columbia,
November 1994, Tim Huxley and Susan Willet, “Arming East Asia”, Adelphi Paper No. 329, International Institute of
Strategic Studies, London, 1999; Andrew Tan, “Force Modernization….”; and Richard A. Bitzinger, “A New Arms
Race? The Political Economy of Maritime Military Modernization in the Asia Pacific”, The Economic of Peace and
Security Journal, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2009.
32
11

Buying modern surface combatant

Purchasing submarines
However, although Southeast Asia countries have trend to modernize their military
capability, none of them has acquired high C4SIR (command, control, computers,
communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capability. Paul Dibb said that
Southeast Asian countries may be able to absorb limited aspects of the C4SIR, but it is still
unlikely they will have high level of C$SIR. He predicted Southeast Asia countries will not
acquire C4SIR at short time.37
The cause of the weakness of the development of the current RMA technology in
Southeast Asia is military sector is not the first priority of national development of Southeast
Asian governments. Economy, education, and health are still the biggest priorities for the
government than the military. For example, Indonesian government reported that the main
priority of Indonesian National Development for 2005‐2025 is to increase and strengthening
economic capability. 38 Furthermore, Indonesian government always allocates its national
budget for defense in fourth priority after budgets for public service, education and economic
sectors. 39 Another example is Malaysia. In this country military sector is not the main
development priority for Malaysia government as well. It can be seen from the fact that the
progress in military procurements is parallel with the progress in economic development. On
the other hand, it can be said that Malaysia lift up its military purchases because there is an
increase in the military budget as result of the progress in economic development, not because
Malaysia shifts its main development priority to military sector.
As explained above, Indonesia has also modernized its military stuffs as well as other
Southeast Asian countries. But, it doesn’t change significantly Indonesia’s relative military
37
Paul Dibb, “Defence Force Modernization in Asia: Towards 2000 and Beyond”, Contemporary Southeast Asia,
Volume 18, Number 4, March 1997.
38
Indonesian National Development Agency, National Development Vision and Mission for 2005‐2025,
http://bappenas.go.id/node/0/2608/rpjmn-book-2010-2014-english-version/. June 16, 2010.
39
See Defense White Paper 2008.
12
capability or power.40 The military modernization that has been done by Indonesia does not
shift its defense posture because air and naval military weapons purchases are just an attempt
to maintain some minimum maritime capability.41 In the other words, Indonesia just did arms
maintenance for its force modernization. Consequently, Indonesia’s deterrence effects are
low.42
At the same time, interstate relations among Southeast Asian countries are not
harmonious. Even though Southeast Asia is relatively a stable region, suspicious and
inharmonious relations among the countries are high. For example, because of some issues,
tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia increased several times. There are 3 latest issues of
conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia: cultural stealing, migrant workers and territorial
disputes.
Also, Indonesia and Singapore relations are not always harmonious. Both countries see
each other suspiciously as well as the relations between Singapore and Malaysia.43
Unfortunately, this region does not have multilateral mechanisms to resolve conflict.44
ASEAN is never being a tool for conflict resolution among its members. Consequently, security
condition in Southeast Asia is always uncertain. Conflict among nations potentially happens to
escalate into war anytime. In this regard, countries in Southeast Asia try to use their own
capability, especially military forces, to secure their existence. Even, scholars argue that those
are the reasons behind arms build-up program in the region.45 The logic is states do arms buildup program to guarantee their military capabilities always get closer to and capable against
their rivals.
40
Andi Widjajanto, “Evolusi Doktrin Pertahanan Indonesia”,
http://www.propatria.or.id/loaddown/Paper%20Diskusi/Evolusi%20Doktrin%20Pertahanan%20Indonesia%20%20Andi%20Widjajanto.pdf. January 26, 2010 at 7.14 am.
41
Leonard C. Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military Force, Singapore: ISEAS, 2006, p. 249
42
Indonesia Defense White Paper 2008.
43
Alan Collins, the Security Dilemma of Southeast Asia, Singapore: ISEAS, 2000, p. 95-96.
44
See Sheldon Simon "ASEAN and Multilateralism: the Long, Bumpy Road to Community", Contemporary
Southeast Asia, August, 2008.
45
For example, see Andrew Tan, “Force Modernization…”
13
These facts gave me questions, why did Indonesian government, during the period
1999-2009, choose arms maintenance as the arms modernization policy? Why the government
didn’t choose arms build-up as the arms modernization policy considering to the arms build-up
in Southeast Asian countries? These questions will be my research questions on my thesis.
Most discourses in Indonesia believe the reason behind the decision is Indonesia’s lack of
military budget to build up its military capability, but I believe the reason is beyond the lack of
money because if the government wants, they can put military budget at the first priority and
allocate more money to it.
Research Objectives
Finding the answer why Indonesian government chose arms maintenance as force
modernization policy during period 1999-2009.46
Literature Review
There are only a few academic resources discussing about Indonesian force
modernization. Security and defense debates in Indonesia are still focusing on problems of
democratizing military force, mostly on how to dislodge military from politics and economy.
There 5 resources talks about force modernization in Indonesia. First, Andrew Tan’s working
paper Force Modernization Trends in Southeast Asia.47 However, Tan’s working paper does not
particularly talks about force modernization in Indonesia. It explains generally the current force
modernization in Southeast Asian countries. Tan explains the trend of force modernization in
every country one by one. He also mentions some causes of force modernization in Southeast
Asia, such as prestige, corruption, supply side factors and economic growth amongst those
countries.
46
I chose time frame from 1999 to 2009 because I want to understand why the government policy toward force
modernization does not change even though since 1998 the government have released a lot of policies, such as
military reform policy to withdraw the military from politics and economy, to develop the military to be
professional soldiers.
47
Andrew Tan, “Force Modernization…”
14
Second, Sheldon W. Simon’s article Southeast Asia’s Defense Needs: Change or
Continuity?. This article observes military capabilities of 6 Southeast Asian (Malaysia, Indonesia,
Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) countries and their relations with outside
nations, such as the U.S., China, Japan, India and Australia. Simon’s main arguments are: 1)
Internal threats are still dominant in Southeast Asia; 2) Even though, those countries are
developing their naval and air capability, they are not acquiring “state-of-the-art weapons
systems”,48 and; 3) Southeast Asian nations are trying to balance Chinese influence in Southeast
Asia by accepting U.S. presence in the region as well as Japan and India.
Third, a policy paper written by Andi Widjajanto (et.al.) Indonesia Military Reform: 20092014. This policy paper only discusses very slightly about force modernization in Indonesia
because the paper focuses on the military reform. Related to force modernization, the paper
describes 2 things: 1) The government’s plan of long term development of military force (20092029). Most of the description explains the 3 phases of Navy force development:
“Phase I 2004-2009 was launched to fill the gap between the current force and Minimal Essential
Objective Force; phase II 2009-2014 will be launched to maintain and modernize Minimal Essential
Force; and phase III 2014-2029 will be initiated to move beyond the Minimal Essential Force
structure to reach a Future Force of 2029.”49
2) Indonesia’s dependency on imported weapons from the U.S. and European Union is high and
still remains for the 2004-2029 armed procurement program.
Third, research report written by Andi Widjajanto and Makmur Keliat, Penggunaan
Fasilitas Kredit Ekspor untuk Pengadaan Alat Utama Sistem Persenjataan (2000-2004) or The
Use of Export Credit Facilities for Weapon Procurements in Indonesia (2000-2004). The main
argument of this research report is lack of budget has driven Indonesian government to use
export credit facilities to procure weapons for armed forces.50
48
Sheldon W. Simon, “Southeast Asia’s Defense Needs: Change or Continuity?” in Ashley J. Tellis & Michel Wills
(eds.), Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, Seattle & Washington D.C.: NBR,
2005, p. 269-301.
49
Andi Widjajanto (et.al), “Indonesia Military Reform…”
50
Andi Widjajanto & Makmur Keliat, “Penggunaan Fasilitas Kredit Ekspor…”
15
Fourth, in a sub-chapter of his book RealPolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military
force,51 Leonard C. Sebastian explains armed procurements and capabilities of Indonesian
armed forces. He says Indonesia has passed 3 phases of military acquisitions (1960s, 1970s and
1980s). 1960s Soviet is the major supplier of weapons procurement. During this period
Indonesia received a lot of Soviet-made weapons, such as MIGs fighters, destroyers, frigates,
submarines and others sophisticated weapons. At that time, Indonesian had the most powerful
armed forces in the region. Second phase was in 1970s. During this period, Indonesia and other
ASEAN members started to buy second-hand weapons because the reduction of military aid.
The last phase was in 1980s. In 1980s Indonesia started to buy new and sophisticated weapons,
such as F-16s, Harpoon and Exocet missiles. However, since mid-1980s the procurements were
becoming slow because of financial reason. After 1983, Sebastian states that Indonesia stopped
its air-fighter procurements until 1986 when the government spent US$ 432 million to buy 8 F16A fighter/strike and 4 F-16B fighter/trainer. At that time the government also spent its
money to buy 4 (second hand) Dutch Van Speijk Class frigates and 2 minehunters. It seems
since early 1980s Indonesia was trying to develop its naval capabilities. However, these military
procurements do not increase military power significantly because of financial problem.52
The government has improved the military budget to increase military capability, but
the improvement will not be effective to increase military capability by buying new weapons.
There are 3 arguments for this. First, military budget are used to correct the military salary that
is below standard. Second, Indonesia military system is diverse in origin. Consequently, the
government has to spend a lot of money to maintain the system. Third, corruption in arms
procurements is high.53
In this sub-chapter, Sebastian also criticize 3 alternative methods of arms procurement
offered by Aaron Karp, namely buying secondhand weapons, buying local products and using
51
Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of…
Additionaly, in general, the condition of Indonesian armed forces’ weapons is 70% of the military weapons are
very old (at least 20 years old) and those weapons are only available for deployment at present is in between 4070% from the ideal requirements. See, "Kondisi Alutsista TNI Memprihatinkan", Era Baru News, February 1, 2010,
http://erabaru.net/nasional/50-jakarta/10169-kondisi-alutsista-tni-memprihatinkan. November 16, 2010
53
Ibid., p. 251-152.
52
16
counter-trade mechanism. Sebastian says the first method is not new idea for Indonesia. The
second method is not effective because the price of local products is not cheaper than the
foreign products. Besides, local products cannot satisfy the military in terms of specifications
and quality. The last method is not effective as well because the method is prone to generate
controversy and corruption.54
In conclusion, even though these academic resources talk about Indonesian force
modernization, most of resources focus on to discuss another topic and just put Indonesian
force modernization as a sub-topic. Hence, my research is trying to fill this space.
Theoretical Framework
I will use rational actor model (RAM) as theoretical framework for my research. RAM
has 2 basic assumptions. First, state is a unitary actor. State is a “single, homogeneous entity,
and presumes that all policy makers go through the same rational thought processes”.55 Second,
state is a value-maximizing actor. It means in deciding which policy it should be taken a state
will choose “the course of action that maximizes their gains/minimizes their losses.” 56
According to Allison, value-maximizing behavior has 2 propositions:57 1) “An increase in the cost
of an alternative reduces the likelihood of that action’s being chosen,” and; 2) “A decrease in
the cost of alternative increase the likelihood of that action’s being chosen.”
Brown explains that to understanding decision made by a state a researcher should do a
process of rational reconstruction.58 The process of rational reconstruction is an armchair
analysis that puts a researcher “into the position of the decision-maker, and attempts to
simulate the process of reasoning which have led the decision maker to act as he or she did.”59
Similar with the process of decision-making, the process of rational reconstruction has 3 steps.
54
Ibid., p. 253-259.
Ibid., p. 450.
56
Chris Brown with Kirsten Ainley, Understanding International Relations, 3rd edition, New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2005, p. 71. See also Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban…, p. 32
57
Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban…, p. 34.
58
Brown, Understanding International Relations…, p. 71.
59
Ibid.
55
17
It is started by 1) Discovering the goals that the state wants to be reached; 2) Identifying “all
available policy options”60 and the consequences or outcomes of each option. Allison says
consequences or outcomes are always related to benefits and cost in line with state’s goals, and;
3) Choosing option that mostly benefit in accordance with state’s goals.61
Implementing RAM
Related to my research problem, the goal of government to modernize the military
forces is to secure the country and its people. There are 2 available options that can be chosen
by the government to modernize the military, namely arms build-up and arms maintenance.
Before continuing with explanation about the consequences or the outcomes of each
available alternative, we have to understand 3 realities in Indonesia. First, Indonesian military
force is lack of military budget because the government cannot cover all military budgets
proposed by the Department of Defence (now known as Ministry of Defence).62 Second,
Indonesia’s external or traditional threats are low. Otherwise, its internal and non-traditional
threats are high.63 Third, the experience of living in military domination for more than 30 years,
Indonesian society still has more or less sensitive feeling about the military.
As mentioned above, Indonesia has 2 options to modernize its military force, in which
each option has its own consequences or outcomes.
1. Arms build-up program.
a. Positive outcome: This is an ideal option because the program would increase
military force power. Thereafter, it would increase deterrent effect as well as
capability to deal with threats.
60
Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern…, p. 450.
See Ibid, Brown, Understanding International Relations…, p. 71, and Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban…, p. 29-30, 33, 34.
62
Ibid., p. 249-252.
63
Ibid., p. 36-38.
61
18
b. Negative outcomes: However, because of lack of money, the government needs
to allocate more money to military budget to do this option. Therefore, the
military budget will overtake the position of other sectors, such as public services,
education and economy. According to the society’s sensitiveness over military,
the sharply increase in military budget would bring suspicious and strong
resistance over the policy from the society. Consequently, this condition can
cause political upheaval and threaten economic development implemented by
government. Economy is a sensitive issue in Indonesia because most of the
insurgencies were caused by economic problems. In other words, arm build-up
could indirectly decrease government’s economic development economic and at
last it would indirectly increase internal threats in Indonesia.
2. Arms maintenance program.
a. Positive outcomes: the government does not need to increase military budget
sharply. Hence there would be no political upheaval and economic decreasing.
At last, internal threats would not increase.
b. Negative outcomes: By doing arms maintenance program Indonesian military
power would not increase significantly. Hence, the impacts on security are 1)
Deterrent effect would still be low, and; 2) The armed forces capability to deal
with external threats, especially from sea and air are low.
Fortunately, the external threats in Indonesia are low. In contrary, the internal
threats are the biggest security problem. However, Indonesia’s capability to deal
with internal threats, such as insurgency, is still satisfactory. It is because 1) to be
up against insurgency the government does not need superior technological
capability, and; 2) To deal with insurgency the government depends on army
that has character its combat capability is not fully dependent on (advanced)
technological mastery. Otherwise, navy and air forces that are more capable to
encounter external threats are fully dependent on technological mastery.
19
So, the cost of arms maintenance program is lower than the arms build-up because the arms
build-up can induce internal threats that have been the biggest problem of security in Indonesia.
Hypothesis
The government chose arms maintenance because it would not increase internal threats
in Indonesia.
Analytical Framework
My research will treat policy consequences as an independent variable that affecting
government’s preference on force modernization program (see picture 1).
Picture 1
Independent Variable
Dependent Variable
Arms build-up would increase
internal threats
The government chose arms
maintenance
I will use quantitative and qualitative approaches on my research. I planned to hold
interviews with 4 persons for my research, namely:
1. Juwono Sudarsono, a former Ministry of Defense
2. Effendi Choirie, member of Indonesia parliamentary
3. Edy Prasetyono, a professor and an expert of security and defence studies
4. Mufti Makaarim A., a director of Institute of Defense, Security and Peace Studies
(IDSPS)64
I will also rely on secondary source data such as books, journals, magazines and
newspaper that discussing about force modernization in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, and
64
IDSPS is a NGO that concern on defense and security policies in Indonesia.
20
primary source data from government institutions such as the Ministry of Defense, Legislative,
Presidential office, and other related institutions.
Organization of Chapters
This thesis will be organized as follow:

Chapter I is an Introduction. In this chapter I will explain my research methodology, such
as background, research objectives, literature review, theoretical framework and
organization of chapters.

In chapter II I will explain about Indonesian force modernization since 1999 to 2009. In
this chapter I will describe documents and variables that explaining that during period
1999 to 2009 Indonesian government chose arms maintenance as a policy for force
modernization.

In Chapter III I will analyze why Indonesian government chose arms maintenance policy.
It will rely on the analysis of the consequences of each available option of force
modernization.

Chapter IV is a conclusion.
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