Animal Rights/ Welfare
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
Some Biblical Material
Animal Welfare – some of the issues
Peter Singer
Speciesism
A matter of history? - Fox-hunting
Use of animals in experimentation
Should we speak of ‘animal rights’ or of ‘human obligations towards animals’? What is the
difference?
What sort of ‘rights’ might animals have and upon what would they be grounded?
A.
SOME BIBLICAL MATERIAL
Issues - killing wasps, eating meat, visiting zoos, which eggs? tuna? veal?, wearing furs, hunting deer
and foxes, culling seals, bull-fighting, use of animals in experimentation for clinical drugs? for
cosmetics?
Does this matter?
Not as much as pure worship, effective evangelism, brotherly love, and faithful prayer, NO. If you
want to be like Christ in all your thinking and conduct - YES
Significance
- Christlikeness
- Reaching the thousands who care deeply about these things
- Wider lessons about stewardship, care of the defenceless, servanthood etc
1) Animals were made for God's glory
- for his praise - Psalm 148.10
- to reveal something of his character & truth - Num 22.27, Job 12.7-9, Is 31.4 Hos 11.10, 13.7
- to help humans understand themselves - Psalm 74.19 Isaiah 41.14 Jer 5.8 John 10
- to instruct humankind in what God requires - Proverbs 30.24-28
2) Animals belong to God and are the objects of his care
Job 41.11 Psalm 24.1 50.10-12, 104.10-30, 145.16, 147.9
3) Animals are to be used by humans to help them glorify God
Gen 1.26, 2.19-20, 9.2-3 (Mark 7.19), Oxen, sheep, Jesus on colt & horse, eating fish/Passover lamb
4) Animals are of lesser value than humans
Matthew 8.32, 10.31 12.12
5) Animals suffer because of human sin and benefit from human redemption and obedience
Hosea 4.3, Romans 8.19-22,
Deut 11.13-15, 28.4, 31
Exodus 9.1-7, 9, 11.5, 23.10f,
Isaiah 11.6-9, 65.17-25 (see also Psalm 8 and Hebrews 2)
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6) God uses animals to execute his judgments
Numbers 21.6, 2 Kings 2.24, 17.25, Revelation 6.8
7) Salvation includes protection from/removal of these animals insofar as are agents of judgment
Exodus 23.28-30, Deut 8.15, Ezekiel 34.25
8) Humans are to treat animals with care and respect
Exodus 20.10, 23.12, Deut 5.14, 25.4, 22.6-7. Proverbs 12.10
Luke 14.5, Luke 15.1-7, John 10.11 (and trees Deut 20.19f)
May animals be eaten?
YES - Genesis 9.2, Mark 7.19, Acts 10.12 - Jesus ate lamb and fish
May animals be killed?
a. for food - see above
b. for clothing - Gen 3.21, Job 31.20, Mark 1.6, 6.9
c. if they kill a human - Genesis 9.5, Exodus 21.28-29
d. for the greater good of humans - in order that humans may enjoy the blessings
of redemption:

the sacrificial system - Leviticus 1, 3-7

safety - Samson and Benaiah - Jdges 14.5-6, I Chron 11.22

Legion - Mark 5.11-13
(dogs sniffing for bombs, testing drugs on rats, killing wasps?)
e. for their own good (culling?, finishing off a badly injured rabbit, 'putting to
sleep' a desperately ill and suffering pet, eg)
f. for entertainment?
May animals be treated casually or cruelly because they are of lesser value than humans
and made, in part, for their use?
NO, NEVER. In using animals we must care for them - Deut 25.4. (space, company, food,
temperature, light ... )
9) The Lord Jesus Christ and Animals
- with the wild beasts in the wilderness - Mark 1.13
- driving sheep and cattle out the temple area with a whip - John 2.14-15
- riding on a colt into Jerusalem - Luke 19.30
- eating Passover Lamb and fish (helping his disciples catch fish)
- caring for animals - Luke 14.5, 15.1-7
- himself the Lion and Lamb - John 1.29, Revelation 5.5-6
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B.
ANIMAL WELFARE - SOME OF THE ISSUES
PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) Factsheets - available at http://www.petaonline.org/mc/facts/index.html
Veterinary Malpractice and Grooming Accidents
Collectors: Kindness Gone Awry
Death or Divorce and Your Companion Animal
Living with Allergies to Animals
Animal Abuse & Human Abuse: Partners in Crime
Animals in Entertainment
Rodeo: Cruelty for a Buck
Greyhound Racing: Death in the Fast Lane
Zoos: Pitiful Prisons
Circuses: Three Rings of Abuse
Horse Racing: A Losing Bet
Bullfighting: A Tradition of Tragedy
Traveling Animal Acts: Shameful Shows
Marine Mammal Parks: Chlorinated Prisons
Carriage Horses: Don't Get Taken for a Ride
Stationary Animals Acts & Exhibits: Anguished
"Entertainers"
Model Injunction Against Animal Acts
Vegetarianism
Veganism and the Issue of Protein
Keeping a Healthy Heart
Factory Farming: Mechanized Madness
Veal: A Cruel Meal
Vegetarianism: Eating for Life
Vegan Children: Healthy and Happy
Poultry and Eggs: Gone Rotten
Milk: A Cruel and Unhealthy Product
The Grief Behind Foie Gras
"Free-Range" Eggs and Meat: Conning Consumers
Clothing
Leather: Beauty Isn't Only Skin Deep
Trapping: Pain for Profit
Ranch-Raised Fur: Captive Cruelty
Wool Manufacturing: Shear Pain
Dumping Down, Silk, and Honey
Animal Experimentation
Animal Experimentation: Sadistic Scandal
AIDS: Contagion and Confusion
Dissection: Lessons in Cruelty
Product Testing: Toxic and Tragic
Chimpanzees: Our Closest Living Relatives
Lethal Dose Tests: Unlimited Lunacy
Eye Irritancy Tests: Blinding for Beauty
Alternatives: Testing Without Torture
Military Testing: The Unseen War
Cancer: Why We're Losing the "War"
Drug Testing: Pain, Not Gain
Endotracheal Intubation: Killing Cats & Kittens
Xenografts: Frankenstein Science
Health Charities: Helping or Hurting
Wildlife
Hunting: Unfair Game
Fishing: Aquatic Agony
Predator "Control": Pain and Persecution
Pigeons: Amiable Urbanites
Living in Harmony with Nature
The Western War on Horses
Companion Animals
Spaying & Neutering: A Solution for Suffering
What To Do If You Spot Animal Abuse
Puppy Mills: Breeding Ills
Exotic Animals: Born Free, Sold Out
Flea Control: Safe Solutions
Declawing Cats: Manicure or Mutilation?
Animal Dealers: Licensed to Kill
Animal Shelters: Hope for the Homeless
Euthanasia: The Compassionate Option
Trapping Feral Cats: The Animal Comes First
If Your Companion Animal is Shot...
Pet Shops: No Bargain for Animals
No Gift for the Animals
Meatless Meals for Cats and Dogs
Pound Seizure: The Shame of Shelters
Captured or Captive-Bred Birds
Traveling with Companion Animals
Fishes in Tanks: No Thanks!
Companion Animals: Doing What's Best for Them
Miscellaneous
The Animal Welfare Act
PETA's History: Compassion in Action
Glue Traps: Pans of Pain
Model Injunction Against Animal Acts
Animal Sacrifices: Cruel Rituals
Yards Go Natural
Animals in the Classroom: Lessons in Disrepect
Lobbying: Laying Down The Law
Premarin: A Prescription for Cruelty
Animal Ingredients and Their Alternatives
Animal Abuse & Human Abuse: Partners in Crime
What To Do If You Spot Animal Abuse
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C.
PETER SINGER
Currently Professor of Bioethics at Princeton
CV - http://www.princeton.edu/~uchv/faculty/singercv.html
Australian – born 1946
Melbourne – 1964-9
Oxford – 1969-73
New York Uni – 1974-5
La Trobe – 1975-6
Monash – 1977-99
Princeton – 1999Publications include:
Democracy and Disobedience (1973, 1994)
Animal Liberation (1975, 1991)
Practical Ethics (1979, 1993)
Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics (1995)
A Darwinian Left (1999)
Writings on an Ethical Life (2001)
Interesting and informative piece by Richard Neuhaus in First Things at
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0202/public.html
The New Yorker declares him to be the world’s “most influential living philosopher.”
The opening line of Rethinking Life and Death sets forth what for him is self–evidently the
case: “After ruling our thoughts and our decisions about life and death for nearly two thousand
years, the traditional Western ethic has collapsed.” …
His system of ethics is an individual preference version of utilitarianism, going back to the
nineteenth century and Jeremy Bentham’s doctrine that each is to count as one and none is to
count as more than one. The ethical goal is to minimize pain and maximize pleasure. …
Utility, equality, universality, and individual choice—these are the dogmatic points of
reference in a scheme presented as the enemy of dogma. … At times he declares that the
lodestar of his thinking is one simple imperative: reduce suffering. …
Prof. Singer defended the proposition that the ethical goal is to reduce suffering and respect
preferences, and that goal may at times permit and even require the killing of the
innocent. At many times, as it turns out. To be sure, his argument has important qualifications.
Not all who are biologically human beings should be counted as human beings. Some
human beings are more human than others. The unborn, the newborn, the anencephalic, and
those in a vegetative state, for instance, do not count, or at least do not count fully, as human
beings. The other qualifying prong of his argument is that it is not rational to draw a hard and
fast line between human beings and other forms of animal life. To do so is an instance of
“speciesism.”
Prof. Singer’s book on animal liberation has sold hundreds of thousands of copies, and in law
schools today there are scholars developing a legal framework for the defense of animal rights
based on his work. The natural result of Singer’s argument is to shrink the circle of those
protected by virtue of human rights, and to expand the circle of beings protected by rights
deemed to be superior to the rights of some human beings. The argumentative strategy
requires, of course, the blurring of the line between human animals and other animals. Many
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commentators expressed shock when, in the past year, Prof. Singer came out in defense of
sexual relations between human beings and animals, a practice traditionally known as
bestiality. (He qualified his argument by emphasizing that it is not permissible to cause the
animal pain.) Clearly, the commentators who were shocked had not been attending to his
argument. It follows. Yet I admit that I am still puzzled about why, in the absence of clear
consent on the animal’s part, such intercourse is not a form of rape. But we had so many things
to discuss, and perhaps on some other occasion Prof. Singer can set me straight on that one. …
There was a spot of unpleasantness in the debate. Singer’s Benthamite principle that each
counts as one and none as more than one has led him to insist again and again that, from an
ethical viewpoint, our duties to friends and family are not different from our duties to
strangers. That is part of what it means when he says his ethical theory is universal. One has
no more ethical duty, for instance, to one’s own daughter than to a girl of the same age ten
thousand miles away in Bangladesh whom one has never seen and whose name one does not
know. My family, my friends, my country—each must give way to the universal. Each person
counts as one and no more than one. But then, in a long and generally sympathetic interview in
the New Yorker, the question came up about Singer’s devoting many thousands of dollars
and elaborate nursing care for his own mother who had Alzheimer’s. In the interview,
Singer is reported to have explained, “Perhaps it’s more difficult than I thought before, because
it is different when it is your mother.”
Singer’s critics understandably seized on this blatant contradiction. Peter Berkowitz, writing in
the New Republic, said: “The ethicist’s innocence, at this late date in his career, of the most
elemental features of his subject matter boggles the mind. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more
stunning rebuke to the well–heeled and well–ensconced academic discipline of practical ethics
[Singer’s much–used text is titled Practical Ethics] than that its most controversial and
influential star, at the peak of his discipline, after an Oxford education, after twenty–five years
as a university professor, and after the publication of thousands of pages laying down clear–cut
rules on life–and–death issues, should reveal, only as the result of a reporter’s prodding, and
only in the battle with his own elderly mother’s suffering, that he has just begun to appreciate
that the moral life is complex.”
In my opening presentation, I suggested that Singer’s claim to “neutrality,” to representing the
rationality of “the disinterested observer,” was a kind of “view from Nowhere,” and I pointed
out that nobody actually lives in Nowhere. In this connection, I referred to the public
discussion of Singer’s very preferential treatment of his mother. I said he was to be
commended for what he did, but that it is a cockeyed ethical theory that is embarrassed by a
son’s caring for his elderly mother. Prof. Singer very sharply, one might say rudely, interrupted
my presentation, protesting that I was invading his privacy, that his mother had recently died,
and that the New Yorker article misrepresented his views. I was quite taken aback and
apologized for any offense given, while noting that I thought he had made the subject a matter
of public discussion, and that it did drive to the heart of his rule that none counts for more than
one. But his appeal to his privacy and bereavement did score him points, as indicated by
applause from much of the audience.
Later, in friendly conversation, I told him that I thought his eruption was more than a little
unfair, and asked how the matter had been misrepresented in the New Yorker interview. He
explained that the extensive care he had provided his mother was not entirely his idea, there
were family pressures, and so forth. The striking thing is that he was clearly more interested in
defending his curious theory than in defending his commendable care for his mother. In any
event, his explanation does not detract from the force of Berkowitz’s criticism. After all, it is
Peter Singer himself who wrote in Practical Ethics, “Ethics is not an ideal system that is noble
in theory but no good in practice. The reverse of this is closer to the truth: an ethical judgment
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that is no good in practice must suffer from a theoretical defect as well, for the whole point of
ethical judgment is to guide practice.” …
The eerie sense of unreality induced by his argument was especially strong when the debate
turned to his long–standing claim that it is sometimes permissible, even ethically required, to
kill children after they have been born. In the past, Prof. Singer has urged a waiting period
of twenty–eight days after birth before deciding whether a baby has rights that we are
bound to respect. If the child is severely defective, and if the parents so decide, he or she
can be killed. Now, after extensive discussion with medical authorities, he is persuaded
that the twenty–eight day limit is arbitrary and too inflexible.
In the question and answer session, an undergraduate sharply challenged Singer, asking why, if
Singer’s argument is right, his parents could not kill him or have him killed. Singer replied that
the rule would not apply to the student because he was a conscious and responsible moral
agent, or at least presumably so. This elicited appreciative chuckles from some in the audience.
I was less than satisfied with his answer and asked Prof. Singer what, then, should be the cut–
off age at which parents would no longer be free to kill their children. One year? “Oh,” he said,
“I should think it would be somewhat short of one year. But my point is that it’s not for me or
anyone else to say. It should be up to the parents.” He added that it is a decision that parents
should make in consultation with their doctor. …
And if someone decides not to be a morally decent person? Well, that, too, is his or her choice.
We are entitled to take measures to prevent their interfering with our choices, but what they do
with themselves or with others—especially if it is determined that the “others” are not really
human beings after all—is none of our business. Of course, if people act in such a way as to
increase, rather than reduce, suffering—if, for instance, they protect and thus prolong painful
and “meaningless” lives—we can let them know in no uncertain terms that we think they are
not morally decent persons, or at least that they are morally misguided. The principle of
equality requires that we respect their right to choose, even if they choose to believe that the
sanctity of life means that all are equally deserving of respect, although they also believe that
we are not able to, and should not, treat all in the same way. We may hope, in Prof. Singer’s
view, that with the advancement of education and enlightened thought, they will come to see
the error in their position. Meanwhile, he is sure, we do have a right to impose upon them the
rule that they must not impose their rule upon us. That is only logical.
Lightweight but amusing piece by Boris Johnson in Electronic Telegraph (23 May 1998) at
http://www.portal.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=%2Farchive%2F1998%2F05%2F23%2Ftl
vegi23.html
“So what is the point at which the utility of some non-human life form outranks that of a
human being? Suppose he could save either a child or the last Bengal tiger. "I'd save the child,"
says Singer swiftly. "The value of preserving a species like the tiger is symbolic and aesthetic."
But suppose the child is disabled, and not capable - according to utilitarianism - of much
human happiness? "Well," says the thinker, "there's a reasonable chance that the child will be
of value to the people who care for him or her, the family and so on."
What if the child is an orphan? "A disabled orphan that people barely care about? I'd leave the
child and keep the tiger." And suppose the tiger was starving, and about to die along with the
species, and could not catch the orphan without assistance, would you shoot the orphan?
In Singer's utilitarian philosophy there is no moral distinction between knowingly allowing
something to happen and actively bringing it about.
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"Your example is extreme, because there would be other ways of feeding the tiger. But
assuming there were not, it's true that I don't make a distinction between an act and an
omission," he says. "So I guess . . . I'd shoot the orphan." ”
Further:
“Pope John Paul II proclaims that the widespread acceptance of abortion is a mortal threat to the
traditional moral order …. I sometimes think that he and I at least share the virture of seeing clearly
what is at stake in the debate.”
Practical Ethics: “The life of a fetus is of no greater value than the life of a nonhuman animal at a
similar level of rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel, etc., and that since no fetus
is a person, no fetus has the same claim to life as a person… Now it must be admitted that these
arguments apply to the newborn baby as much as to the fetus. When the death of a disabled infant will
lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness
will be greater if the disabled infant is killed....Therefore, if killing the hemophiliac infant has no
adverse effects on the others, it would, according to the total view, be right to kill him. The main point
is clear: killing a disabled infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person. Very often it is not
wrong at all.”
D.
SPECIESISM
‘members of different species have a different moral status simply and solely because they are of a
different species’
Singer: “a bare-faced – and morally indefensible – preference for members of our own species …
exactly the kind of arbitrary difference that the most crude and overt kind of racist uses in attempting
to justify racial discrimination.”
What grounds might there be for distinguishing humans from animals or one species of animal from
another?





language
reason
self-consciousness
moral agency/responsibility
sentience
Singer: “if a being can’t suffer or enjoy then there is nothing to take into account.”
What about plants? How do we know what pain a tree might feel – can’t even tell when someone in
PVS/coma registers everything being said?
Distinguish between stinging nettle, earwig, dog, chimp?
Leviticus 11
All beings that feel pain deserve human rights
Equality of the species is the logical conclusion of post-Darwin morality
Richard Ryder - Saturday August 6, 2005 - The Guardian
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The word speciesism came to me while I was lying in a bath in Oxford some 35 years ago. It
was like racism or sexism - a prejudice based upon morally irrelevant physical differences.
Since Darwin we have known we are human animals related to all the other animals through
evolution; how, then, can we justify our almost total oppression of all the other species? All
animal species can suffer pain and distress. Animals scream and writhe like us; their nervous
systems are similar and contain the same biochemicals that we know are associated with the
experience of pain in ourselves.
Our concern for the pain and distress of others should be extended to any "painient" - painfeeling - being regardless of his or her sex, class, race, religion, nationality or species. Indeed,
if aliens from outer space turn out to be painient, or if we ever manufacture machines who are
painient, then we must widen the moral circle to include them. Painience is the only
convincing basis for attributing rights or, indeed, interests to others.
Many other qualities, such as "inherent value", have been suggested. But value cannot exist in
the absence of consciousness or potential consciousness. Thus, rocks and rivers and houses
have no interests and no rights of their own. This does not mean, of course, that they are not of
value to us, and to many other painients, including those who need them as habitats and who
would suffer without them.
Many moral principles and ideals have been proposed over the centuries - justice, freedom,
equality, brotherhood, for example. But these are mere stepping stones to the ultimate good,
which is happiness; and happiness is made easier by freedom from all forms of pain and
suffering (using the words "pain" and "suffering" interchangeably). Indeed, if you think about
it carefully you can see that the reason why these other ideals are considered important is that
people have believed that they are essential to the banishment of suffering. In fact they do
sometimes have this result, but not always.
Why emphasise pain and other forms of suffering rather than pleasure and happiness? One
answer is that pain is much more powerful than pleasure. Would you not rather avoid an hour's
torture than gain an hour's bliss? Pain is the one and only true evil. What, then, about the
masochist? The answer is that pain gives him pleasure that is greater than his pain!
One of the important tenets of painism (the name I give to my moral approach) is that we
should concentrate upon the individual because it is the individual - not the race, the nation or
the species - who does the actual suffering. For this reason, the pains and pleasures of several
individuals cannot meaningfully be aggregated, as occurs in utilitarianism and most moral
theories. One of the problems with the utilitarian view is that, for example, the sufferings of a
gang-rape victim can be justified if the rape gives a greater sum total of pleasure to the rapists.
But consciousness, surely, is bounded by the boundaries of the individual. My pain and the
pain of others are thus in separate categories; you cannot add or subtract them from each other.
They are worlds apart.
Without directly experiencing pains and pleasures they are not really there - we are counting
merely their husks. Thus, for example, inflicting 100 units of pain on one individual is, I would
argue, far worse than inflicting a single unit of pain on a thousand or a million individuals,
even though the total of pain in the latter case is far greater. In any situation we should thus
concern ourselves primarily with the pain of the individual who is the maximum sufferer. It
does not matter, morally speaking, who or what the maximum sufferer is - whether human,
non-human or machine. Pain is pain regardless of its host.
Of course, each species is different in its needs and in its reactions. What is painful for some is
not necessarily so for others. So we can treat different species differently, but we should
always treat equal suffering equally. In the case of non-humans, we see them mercilessly
exploited in factory farms, in laboratories and in the wild. A whale may take 20 minutes to die
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after being harpooned. A lynx may suffer for a week with her broken leg held in a steeltoothed trap. A battery hen lives all her life unable to even stretch her wings. An animal in a
toxicity test, poisoned with a household product, may linger in agony for hours or days before
dying.
These are major abuses causing great suffering. Yet they are still justified on the grounds that
these painients are not of the same species as ourselves. It is almost as if some people had not
heard of Darwin! We treat the other animals not as relatives but as unfeeling things. We would
not dream of treating our babies, or mentally handicapped adults, in these ways - yet these
humans are sometimes less intelligent and less able to communicate with us than are some
exploited nonhumans.
The simple truth is that we exploit the other animals and cause them suffering because we are
more powerful than they are. Does this mean that if those aforementioned aliens landed on
Earth and turned out to be far more powerful than us we would let them - without argument chase and kill us for sport, experiment on us or breed us in factory farms, and turn us into tasty
humanburgers? Would we accept their explanation that it was perfectly moral for them to do
all these things as we were not of their species?
Basically, it boils down to cold logic. If we are going to care about the suffering of other
humans then logically we should care about the suffering of non-humans too. It is the heartless
exploiter of animals, not the animal protectionist, who is being irrational, showing a
sentimental tendency to put his own species on a pedestal. We all, thank goodness, feel a
natural spark of sympathy for the sufferings of others. We need to catch that spark and fan it
into a fire of rational and universal compassion.
All of this has implications, of course. If we gradually bring non-humans into the same moral
and legal circle as ourselves then we will not be able to exploit them as our slaves. Much
progress has been made with sensible new European legislation in recent decades, but there is
still a very long way to go. Some international recognition of the moral status of animals is
long overdue. There are various conservation treaties, but nothing at UN level, for example,
that recognises the rights, interests or welfare of the animals themselves. That must, and I
believe will, change.
· Dr Richard Ryder was Mellon Professor at Tulane University, New Orleans, and has been
chairman of the RSPCA council; he is the author of Painism: A Modern Morality, and his new
book, Putting Morality Back into Politics, will be published by Academic Imprint in 2006
E.
A matter of history? - FOX HUNTING – Some of the issues and questions:
Is it legitimate to kill animals?
On what grounds?
By what means?
Is the derivation of pleasure / satisfaction / entertainment from the performance of moral acts which
are “required though regrettable” (some would call these ‘necessary evils’) itself of moral
significance?
- burying
- inflicting punishment
- performing amputation / tooth extraction ?
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What is pleasure and what, precisely, gives the pleasure?
What concerns over ‘tolerance of minorities’ and the ‘tyranny of the majority’ might there be?
“Suppose, for example, that people suddenly paid attention to the fact that Jews practise
circumcision. How easy it would be to work oneself up into a frenzy of anger at the idea that
Jews take tiny babies and cut off their foreskins. How quickly populist politicians could turn
this into a campaign for a ban. And yet, whatever we think of circumcision, we surely
recognise that it is not a form of child abuse. It is part of something ancient and complicated,
and to ban it is to offend against beliefs and customs which command an allegiance even
deeper than does the law of the land. So it is with hunting.”
(Charles Moore, “ Life, Liberty
and the Pursuit of Charlie” , Spectator, 27th Jan 2001 – online at http://www.spectator.co.uk
under Back Issues)
Some other issues:
- what are the most effective ways of killing foxes / managing deer populations etc?
- how do we measure animal welfare
- intensity x duration? (!)
- the individual and the population / species?
- defining cruelty
Some resources giving the arguments against hunting:

http://www.huntsabs.org.uk/ - go to ‘Online Leaflets’

http://www.league.uk.com/ - go to ‘Cruel Sports’
Countryside Alliance documents relating to the Burns Inquiry:

http://www.countryside-alliance.org/cfh/010215acou.htm

http://www.countryside-alliance.org/cfh/burns/010517burns.htm

http://www.countryside-alliance.org/cfh/burns/howtouse.htm
F.
USE OF ANIMALS IN EXPERIMENTATION
1.
2.
http://www.animalaid.org.uk/home.htm
http://www.huntingdon.com
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