VUFO-NGO RESOURCE CENTRE
“Lessons Learned from a Decade of Experience”
A strategic analysis of INGO methods and activities in Vietnam
1990-1999
Author: Nguyen Kim Ha
Ha Noi, January 2001
This study was commissioned by the Steering Committee of the
VUFO-NGO Resource Centre
La Thanh Hotel, 218 Doi Can, Ha Noi, Viet Nam
Tel.: (84 4) 832 85 70
Fax: (84 4) 832 86 11
E-mail: info@ngocentre.netnam.vn
This study was funded by the following Donors: Australian Agency for International
Development (AusAID) at the Australian Embassy in Vietnam; The Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA) at the Canadian Embassy in Vietnam; the
Good Governance Programme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of New
Zealand via the New Zealand Embassy in Vietnam; and the following International NonGovernmental Organisations in Vietnam: ActionAid; CARE International; Caritas
Switzerland; The Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation / Centre
Canadien d’Etude et de Cooperation Internationale (CECI); Cooperation Internationale
pour le Developpement et la Solidarite (CIDSE); Catholic Relief Services (CRS);
Environmental Development Action in the Third World (ENDA); Marie Stopes
International (MSI); Maryknoll; the NGO Training Project; Oxfam Great Britain; Oxfam
Hong Kong; Oxfam Solidarite Belgique; Plan International; Radda Barnen / Save the
Children Sweden; Save the Children/USA; SNV – Netherlands Development
Organisation; and World Vision International.
The views and opinions expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the
above mentioned organisations nor do they necessarily represent those of individual
member or supporter organisations of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre.
This report was written by Nguyen Kim Ha, who initially worked as a member of the
study team from April to August, 2000 and, in November 2000, took over the task of
writing up the findings of the team.
In addition, the following consultants worked on the study during the time periods listed:
Mr. Tom Scott (April, 2000 to October, 2000)
Mr. Nguyen Tat Canh (May, 2000 to August, 2000)
Ms. Nguyen Thi Ha (May, 2000 to August, 2000)
Mr. Chu Viet Cuong (April, 2000 to May, 2000)
Mr. Dao Quoc Anh (April, 2000 to May, 2000)
In comparison with the copies distributed in 2001, this edition of the report has undergone some minor corrections.
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Table of Contents
i) Foreword ___________________________________________________________ 1
ii) Acknowledgements ___________________________________________________ 2
iii) Executive Summary __________________________________________________ 3
iv) Introduction ________________________________________________________ 7
v) Methodology ________________________________________________________ 9
1. History and Development of INGOs in Vietnam ___________________________ 12
1.1 A Brief Overview of the History… _________________________________________ 12
1.2 Development of INGOs in Vietnam ________________________________________ 14
1.3 Overview of INGO Investment ____________________________________________ 16
1.4 Sectoral Trends ________________________________________________________ 20
2. Some Impacts of INGO Work in Vietnam ________________________________ 21
2.1 Sectoral Achievements ___________________________________________________ 22
2.2 Impact on Direct Target Groups __________________________________________ 30
2.3 Impact on Government Programmes and Policy _____________________________ 41
3. Methods, Approaches and Lessons Learned ______________________________ 47
3.1 Partnership ____________________________________________________________ 47
3.2 Capacity Building_______________________________________________________ 54
3.3 Ideas and Innovations ___________________________________________________ 60
3.4 Sustainability __________________________________________________________ 64
3.5 INGOs Internal Management _____________________________________________ 71
4. Future of INGOs in Vietnam __________________________________________ 75
Appendix A -Figures and Tables _________________________________________ 80
Appendix B -Terms of Reference _________________________________________ 85
Appendix C – List of Funders ____________________________________________ 91
Appendix D - Abbreviations and Acronyms ________________________________ 92
Appendix E - Key dates and Key Regulations ______________________________ 92
Appendix F – List of Acknowledgements ___________________________________ 94
Appendix G - Bibliography ____________________________________________ 101
i) Foreword
The publication of this report on Lessons Learned from a Decade of Experience comes at
an opportune time. Vietnam continues its rapid socio-economic development, continues
to integrate into the global economy, and continues to build closer linkages with the
world community.
Presently, the nation is taking stock of its achievements in the Doi Moi era. Vietnam can
be proud of the progress made over the past decade, perhaps the most remarkable decade
in recent history. One area where this process of reflection is taking place is related to
international cooperation. The Government, Party, and indeed International NGOs
themselves see this last decade of partnership as an important factor in the development
of the Vietnamese nation.
Although several INGOs worked in Vietnam much earlier, most began only in the late
1980s or early 1990s, in parallel with the Doi Moi process. But, the Vietnam of today is
different in many respects from the Vietnam of ten years ago. During this last decade of
partnership for development, what has been achieved? What lessons have been learned?
How can INGOs and the Government of Vietnam improve their partnership to further the
equitable development of the nation?
To begin to answer these questions, the Steering Committee of the VUFO-NGO
Resource Centre, with the generous support of a number of institutions, commissioned
this report.
The members of the Steering Committee of the Resource Centre would like to thank Ms.
Nguyen Kim Ha, the author, and her team for the work that they have done to help our
community understand where we are, and where we might go. The task was a difficult
one – INGOs work in many different sectors, many different geographical areas, and
with many different partners. Their experiences are difficult to compare. Therefore, and
given the volume of data collected and the complex and lengthy process of preparation of
this final report, inevitably many opinions and lessons learned could not be included, nor
could the current approach nor impact of any sector be fully reflected. We look forward
to future complementary studies.
Ms. Ha and her team have accomplished this difficult task, and her report is presented to
the development community in the hope that it will further dialogue, learning, and
reflection.
We are all working to build an equitable and bright future for the people of Vietnam, and
we hope that this report contributes towards this great purpose.
The Steering Committee of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre
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ii) Acknowledgements
A note from the author:
I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of those people and organisations that
have shared information and contributed to the following report. I would like to express
my cordial thanks to the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre who gave us a chance to carry
out this study, to the Steering Committee of the Resource Centre, and to the donors who
supported this study. I am grateful to all INGO local and international staff,
governmental staff and officers, local partners and beneficiaries, who talked with us and
shared information.
This report could not be done without the help and collaboration of many people. I am
exceedingly indebted to my colleagues Ms. Nguyen Yen Huong for her translation and
processing of interview notes, reviewing documents and external data while I was
writing the draft, and to Ms. Michelle Brown for her generous guidance and encouraging
suggestions.
I would like to express my gratitude and sincere thanks to the members of the Steering
Committee for their support and especially to Mr. Mark McPeak, Ms. Lady Borton, and
Mr. Nguyen Van Kien for their guidance and comments.
I would like to extend sincere thanks and gratefulness to my colleagues Mr. Nguyen Tat
Canh, Ms. Nguyen Thi Ha and Mr.Tom Scott for their work to gather information for
this study. I also thank Ms. Do Thi Hong for her administrative work for this study. I
also thank Mr. Joachim Theis and Mr. Matt Desmond for their ideas and input.
Thanks to all INGO staff who trusted us to share their experiences, stories, and to those
who have expanded my understanding about INGOs works in Vietnam.
The numerous organisations and individuals who contributed to the study are listed more
thoroughly in the list of acknowledgements in Appendix F.
Nguyen Kim Ha
January, 2001
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iii) Executive Summary
1. This report aims to present lessons learned from a decade of INGO work in Vietnam
- from the beginning of 1990 to the year 2000. The Terms of Reference for the study
emphasised the need to: a) describe and analyse the work of INGOs in Vietnam over
the past ten years, identifying and drawing out any trends that have emerged; b)
identify areas where INGOs have had an impact on development in Vietnam; and c)
identify methods that have worked well in terms of INGO impact and analyse the
factors critical to success or failure.
2. Nineteen organisations were studied in-depth to gain an understanding of the impact
of INGO activities in Vietnam and the relative effectiveness of the different methods
and approaches that have been used by INGOs. In addition, six sectoral windows
were chosen for focus, and workshops were held in each of these areas, which were:
1. Integrated Rural Development (with an emphasis on remote communities and
upland areas)
2. Urban Community Development
3. Nutrition
4. HIV/AIDS
5. Inclusive Primary Education
6. Micro Finance and Enterprise
3. The main method used in the study was to review available assessment reports of
individual INGOs during the last ten years. This was triangulated with available
literature focusing on sectoral analysis, research, and other relevant documents. It
was also compared with information from interviews with both local and
international staff of INGOs, partner organisations, beneficiaries, sub-contractors,
Government departments and mass organisations, as well as with bi-lateral donors
and other international organisations. The study team made field visits to Thai
Nguyen, Hue, Quang Tri, and Ho Chi Minh City, where they held two of the six
sectoral workshops and a meeting with long-time local staff members. The study
included one questionnaire, which was sent to all member INGOs of the VUFONGO Resource Centre.
4. Based on indicators and data available on INGOs’ work in the last ten years in
health, education, agriculture, and rural development, the study team feels that
INGOs have made considerable contributions to the development of Vietnam. One of
the sectoral areas examined was urban community development. It should be pointed
out that relatively few INGOs work in this area. Obviously, there are some reasons
that hinder INGOs working in urban community development. The study team would
argue that, in the future, INGOs should think about expanding their work in this area,
given the fact that, based on world-wide experience, urbanisation has become an
undeniable trend.
5. During the last ten years, it appears that most INGO work has only reached the
relatively poor and middle-income households, but not the poorest of the poor. Some
reasons are highlighted in the report. Not enough attention is paid by INGOs and
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their partners in addressing the problems of the poorest of the poor. One reason is
due to a limited understanding of successful methods in poverty alleviation.
6. The study team found that, although INGOs have paid great attention to gender
issues when considering a project or programme, in many cases this did not bring
about comprehensive participation by women. So far, most INGOs have not had an
overall, strategic and long-term view on the issue. The importance of women's roles
in INGO projects and programmes needs to be more than just rhetoric.
7. A lack of understanding of the language and culture of different ethnic minorities,
including customs, values and ways of life of the ethnic communities, has limited the
impact and effectiveness of INGO-supported projects targeting these groups.
8. People with disabilities, the aged, the unregistered and the landless appear to have
been almost left out of INGOs project and programme planning, with the notable
exception of INGOs that specifically target these vulnerable groups.
9. The small-scale nature of INGO projects (which tend to have small investments, pilot
initiatives, bottom-up methods and farmer-based approaches) has limited the spread
and application of new technology and hindered project achievement. This has
reduced INGO impact on Government programmes, policies and planning.
10. While partnership is a key concept in Vietnam, a general assessment is that INGOs
and their local partners have not been fully successful in achieving partnership in the
past ten years.
11. Capacity building has been considered as one of the first, foremost and necessary
activities in INGOs’ projects and programmes. Although there appear to be a lot of
activities in the field, the study team discovered that INGO assessment reports on
capacity building are rare, especially in relation to the impact of capacity building in
the last ten years. Moreover, INGO capacity building has focused more on direct
beneficiaries from INGO projects and programmes as opposed to institutional
capacity building.
12. New ideas and innovation require time for testing. However, in the last ten years, it
appears that INGOs have put up many new study models for experiment, rather than
making use of, or building on, successful models from other INGOs. This has led to
financial waste on specialists and in training.
13. Sustainability has been a crucial issue relating to INGO approaches. Many challenges
have affected sustainability, some relating to partner selection, to changes in partner
staff, capacity building, and other factors. Sometimes, dependence on international
donors and unexpected factors involving legal ownership of a project or programme
belonging to international donors or the Government have either encouraged or
prevented sustainability.
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14. The continuous turnover of INGO representatives interrupts partner relationships and
can also contribute to a turnover of local INGO staff, creating organisational
instability.
15. Local staff has noted that they are required to meet programme demands but
sometimes do not have adequate training. It appears that most INGOs have offered
short courses; however, few INGOs have focused strategically on long-term staff
training.
16. Relations between expatriate and local staff working in INGOs remain a problem. In
the early 1990s, when INGOs began to open offices in Vietnam, local staff members
were not experienced and had limited foreign-language skills. Expatriates often
showed local staff how to do every aspect of their work. The situation does not
appear to have improved considerably after ten years. INGO expatriate staff members
have been criticised for sometimes adopting a superior attitude and not listening to
Vietnamese staff or local partners.
Key Lessons Learned Relating to INGO Work:
1. In the future, INGOs should continue to focus on targeting the poor – especially the
poorest groups in remote and mountainous areas where national projects and
programmes on poverty alleviation have not yet been implemented.
2. INGOs should strengthen their staff and partners’ understanding of poverty issues in
Vietnam. They should introduce into project and/or programme planning methods
that identify the changing nature of poverty (including the increasing gap between
rich and poor) as well as methods that focus on vulnerable groups.
3. INGOs should concentrate more on the issue of gender. To improve their work, one
possibility may be to appoint a specialised gender project officer to co-ordinate and
supervise activities relating to gender. The INGOs’ Gender Working Group should
be strengthened through the participation of key staff working on gender issues.
4. INGOs need to improve methodologies to better target and involve women from
vulnerable families, especially women-headed households.
5. INGOs should create opportunities for local staff to learn ethnic-minority languages
and consider recruiting ethnic minority people to work as project officers in the field.
6. INGOs should study the culture and customs of ethnic groups living in project areas
before designing programmes in order to learn how best to serve these communities.
7. INGOs may wish to reconsider their support to ethnic minorities by focusing on
those minorities in remote and mountainous areas (even those in areas most difficult
to reach) rather than focussing assistance on ethnic minorities who are not so
isolated.
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8. INGOs should take time to evaluate and choose the most suitable project partners and
consider carefully the appropriateness of opening projects for tender.
9. INGOs should review management policies regarding the roles of
representatives/directors, project officers and partners, including information sharing
and a process for transferring power to partners to develop and maintain equal
relationships.
10. Since capacity building is based on co-operation with others, the VUFO-NGO
Resource Centre and the various working groups attached to it should have
newsletters and bulletins to introduce and share INGO experiences and successful
models in various sectors. Contents could include project selection, selection of
ethnic groups, ways to organise training courses, choice of lecturers, training
materials, etc.
11. Since capacity building is a major concern, INGOs should pay attention to the quality
of training. In addition to assessment reports, they should study the
effectiveness/impact of capacity building with partners and beneficiaries.
12. INGOs should review training materials and re-design them with suitable
information in language that is easy for participants to understand.
13. INGOs should develop and maintain a strong network to share experiences and new
ideas. The VUFO-NGO Resource Centre and the working groups attached to it
should review activities of the current working groups to find appropriate and
effective mechanisms of future co-operation. Working groups' activities need
commitment from INGO representatives/directors.
14. INGOs should work in accordance with Government programmes and with the
support of Government authorities to maintain the sustainability of INGO projects
and/or programmes.
15. INGOs should move towards, or continue to move towards, turning their role over to
local organisations. This should be seen as an important objective in their work, but
recognised that it is not necessarily achievable over night.
16. INGOs should consider strengthening the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre library by
recognising that it is in their own interest to send their documents and reports to the
library to encourage the overall development of INGO activities.
17. INGO representatives should have flexible contracts that extend beyond a two-year
term for those who can stay longer. INGOs should consider recruiting and training
Vietnamese representatives.
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18. INGOs need clear and long-term policies and systematic approaches for training
local staff. Training criteria based on staff members’ organisational longevity will
create more stability by increasing incentives and reducing staff turnover.
19. INGOs should pay attention to team building to create mutual confidence and an
information-sharing culture so that each team member has an open, sincere and
constructive attitude. This will help create equality and prevent isolation within
organisations.
20. INGOs should improve and maintain a network of local Vietnamese consultants
through a database at the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre.
21. INGOs should define the role and function of expatriate staff to be more in tune with
Vietnamese culture, including time to learn Vietnamese and experience Vietnamese
culture and social customs.
iv) Introduction
The idea to carry out a study, INGO Lessons Learned in Vietnam, first began to take
shape in 1996. However, for various reasons, the study did not materialise at that time.
In 1999, the Steering Committee of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre re-considered such
a study. According to the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations (VUFO),
Vietnam’s Committee for NGO Affairs was planning, once again, to hold a conference
on INGOs as it had in 1992. An independent study commissioned by the Resource
Centre was seen as a potential key input into such a conference. It was hoped that this
study could be a tool not only for INGOs but also for others interested in the roles
INGOs play in Vietnam’s development.
While INGOs’ financial assistance does not represent a large percentage of total ODA to
Vietnam, it had been pointed out that “the primary value of INGO efforts to Vietnam
may now be their ability to innovate, to experiment with new approaches, to do essential
research, to provide high-quality training, and to assist in providing policy makers with
good ideas".1 In a broader context, understanding of the role INGOs play in the
development of a country and as learning organisations has grown. Research has
emerged from various parts of the world on the constraints, opportunities, experiences
and comparative advantages of civil society organisations and their role within a country.
In Vietnam, the experiences and lessons learned from close to a decade of significant
INGO involvement had not been comprehensively explored or documented.
The VUFO-NGO Resource Centre seemed to be in a unique position to take a deeper
look. The Centre was established in 1993, in an effort to collect and disseminate
information, help co-ordinate, and increase awareness of the activities of INGOs. By the
1
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Ford Foundation, 1999.
year 2000, the membership had grown to over 100 INGOs. After entering into a
strengthened partnership with VUFO in 1998, the Steering Committee of the VUFONGO Resource Centre was changed to its present composition of five representatives
from International NGOs and five members from the Government Committee for NGO
Affairs.
The Steering Committee wished this to be an independent study, which would review
and analyse INGOs’ working methods and the impact of their work on development in
Vietnam over the last decade. It turned out to be a tremendous task, which raised many
questions, but the decision was taken to go ahead. Needless to say, working on the study
was a learning process in itself. With this report, the Steering Committee of the VUFONGO Resource Centre and the Study team wish to share the key findings with all those
interested.
Aim2
To strengthen INGO work and create a better understanding of INGOs’ role and
contribution to development by analysing and documenting INGO methods and impact
after a decade of experience in Vietnam.
Objectives
 Describe and analyse the work of INGOs in Vietnam over the past ten years,
identifying and drawing out any trends that have emerged. Analysis should
examine sectors, geographic areas, methods, staff and budget, and other
INGO characteristics.
 Identify areas where INGOs have had an impact on development in Vietnam.
Focus should be on looking at projects and programmes which have been
completed, or where particular stages have been completed, so that impact
can be measured. Particular attention could be given to overall goals, such as
poverty alleviation, and to key areas, such as capacity building.
 Identify methods that have worked well in terms of INGO impact and analyse
the factors critical to success or failure. Critical factors might include levels
of working (micro versus macro), ways of working (more versus less
operational), degree of participation, local contribution, co-operation and
networking, transparency, partnerships etc. Focus should be placed on clearly
outlining what has worked, and why.
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Aim and objectives for the study have been defined in the Terms of Reference, which are attached to this report.
v) Methodology
Method
In May 2000, the INGO Study team documented its plan to address the two tasks of (i)
assessing the impact of INGO activities in Vietnam and (ii) studying the relative
effectiveness of the different methods and approaches that have been employed.
Opinions and evidence were to be sought from both local (Vietnamese) and international
(expatriate) staff in INGOs and compared with evidence and opinions offered by other
key informants directly involved with INGO project work, such as partner organisations,
beneficiaries, sub-contractors, Government departments, and mass organisations. This
was to be triangulated with available literature focusing on sectoral analysis, research,
evaluation and impact-assessment as well as other relevant documents. Additional
information was to be gathered from secondary informants, such as bilateral donors and
other international organisations.
Sample Design
The Terms of Reference had suggested that eight to ten INGOs be studied in depth and
their experiences then compared with a wider range of organisations. The Study team as
first constituted, in conjunction with the Steering Committee, felt that the original
number would not give enough information for the study to draw useful conclusions;
thus, it was decided to expand to twenty organisations. However, only nineteen
organisations were able to participate due to one organisation’s leadership changes.
It proved difficult to arrive at a simple set of criteria for a sample of INGOs that would
represent the wide range of agency activities and characteristics. The Viet Nam INGO
Directory 1999-2000 lists over 220 INGOs working in Vietnam. The Terms of Reference
of this particular study limited the selection of INGOs to those that had been working for
five or more years in Vietnam. By using the INGO Directory of 1994 and comparing it to
the most recent version, the number of relevant organisations was reduced to seventy. As
this number was still too large for the Study team to contemplate, further criteria such as
nationality, geographical areas, sectors, and resources (human and financial) were
applied in order to come up with the sample list of nineteen INGOs below:
INGOs in the Sample:
ActionAid
The Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI)
CARE International
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
Cooperation Internationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite (CIDSE)
Ecoles Sans Frontieres (ESF)
Environmental Development Action in the Third World (ENDA)
Helvetas - Swiss Association for International Cooperation
International Development Enterprises (IDE)
Japan International Volunteer Committee (JVC)
Komitee Twee
Medecins du Monde (MdM)
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Medical Committee Netherlands Vietnam (MCNV)
Nordic Assistance to Vietnam (NAV)
Oxfam Hong Kong
Radda Barnen (Save the Children Sweden)
Save the Children Fund UK (SCF UK)
Vietnam Plus
World Vision International
Early in the study, the team saw the difficulty of drawing any lessons across the board
and proposed the idea of “sectoral windows” to draw out INGO learning. It was, of
course, a difficult decision to choose one sector at the expense of another.
In response to the team’s proposal, the members of the Steering Committee undertook a
process of elimination to determine which subject areas, within the main sectors, would
form the focus of the study. A decision was made to select topics that reflected (i) sectors
where the majority of INGO activities are located, (ii) sectors where significant levels of
investment have been made, (iii) sectors where it was perceived that significant learning
had been gained, and (iv) sectors where questions exist about the nature of future INGO
activity. The six selected areas were:
1. Integrated Rural Development (with an emphasis on isolated/remote
communities and upland areas)
2. Urban Community Development
3. Nutrition
4. HIV/AIDS
5. Inclusive Primary Education
6. Micro Finance and Enterprise
A number of INGOs raised concerns about the choice of sectors. In particular, some
INGOs saw the absence of “reproductive health” as a mistake since many INGOs have
done considerable work and learning in this sector.
The Study team was based in Hanoi and made field visits to Thai Nguyen, Hue, Quang
Tri, and HCMC to gather opinions and information from beneficiaries and local partners.
The team held two of the six sectoral workshops, and a meeting in HCMC with longtime local staff members in HCMC.
Data Collection
The study utilised the following techniques to collect information:
 Literature review – Information on INGO characteristics, approaches,
activities and impact along with general information on trends, geographical
areas, levels of investment etc., was gathered from evaluation and impactassessment reports, country strategy papers, sectoral reviews, and conference
reports available from the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre and PACCOM as
well as from the selected INGO offices.
 Interviews and meetings -- The Study team held one hundred semi-structured
interviews with INGO representatives and local staff, partner organisations,
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
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and other key informants as well as workshops and focus groups. Ten
meetings were held on the six sectoral areas plus two meetings with
experienced staff (one in HCMC and one in Hanoi), one meeting with
PACCOM staff and one meeting with representatives from ministries and
agencies represented on the Committee for NGO Affairs.
Questionnaires – The study included one questionnaire sent to ninety incountry member INGOs of the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre to draw
information about trends in their work over the decade, budgetary and
staffing information, etc. The Study team received thirty-six replies.
1. History and Development of INGOs in Vietnam
1.1 A Brief Overview of the History…
International NGOs have been providing support to Vietnam for many decades. This
involvement falls into four key phases,3 which can be linked to specific historical periods
in Vietnam and broader international involvement and relations.
In the early 1970s, some sixty-three INGOs worked in Vietnam.4 One INGO notes
having been involved in Vietnam since 1948,5 while others came to work in Vietnam
after the end of the war against the French in 1954. Earlier international humanitarian
activities had been supported through missions of the Roman Catholic Church. Most of
these first INGOs to Vietnam had religious (Christian) affiliations.
In the years up until 1975, the number increased, with twenty to thirty INGOs providing
humanitarian support and relief to those in need on either side6 during the American War.
During the war, many INGOs with head offices in Geneva and Paris kept in contact with
the Northern Government through its Solidarity Committees. Previous to 1965, the North
saw support from Socialist countries through various Friendship Associations. After
1965, popular support for Vietnamese people suffering from the war grew in other
Western Countries and some INGOs started to ship goods (medicine and equipment) to
“where the bombs are falling”.7 However, in 1975, most INGOs closed offices and
foreign staff left as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam assumed responsibility for their
activities.
From 1975 to 1979, some INGOs (such as AFSC-Quaker Service, MCC and CWS)
moved their offices to Thailand and/or Laos and continued to provide relief and
humanitarian assistance from abroad with occasional visits. Virtually all Western donors
with the exception of Sweden supported the increased embargo imposed by the US in
1979. This decreased significantly the amount of assistance available for INGOs wishing
to support Vietnam, who developed other strategies in order to raise funds and provide
humanitarian relief during severe food shortages. In 1979, the Ministry of Finance
established AIDRECEP to facilitate assistance from foreign organisations, including
INGOs. Although Vietnam and INGOs share a long history, fewer than ten INGOs had
“intensive contact with Vietnam from the late 1960s through the late 1980s”.8
Up until 1986, INGOs’ support focused on humanitarian relief. The internal situation and
external factors, in particular the US-led embargo, limited the opportunities for INGOs to
McCall, 1998.
Information from PACCOM, 2000.
5 According to MCNV, 1999 report, Secours Populaire Francais may be the
first INGO to have worked in Vietnam.
6 McCall, 1998.
7 MCNV, 1999.
8 As noted by MCNV, 1999.
3
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increase their support for Vietnam. In relation to needs, INGO support was low but the
solidarity shown was important and is well remembered by those who cite the
Vietnamese expression, “we remember best the mouthful of rice given when we were
hungry”.9
During the mid to late 1980s, Vietnam began to broaden its international relations. At the
end of 1986, the Communist Party of Vietnam initiated a policy of Doi Moi or
Renovation. This change coincided with the collapse of the former socialist countries of
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; as a result, these countries substantially reduced
their support for Vietnam’s development. This change created new possibilities for
INGOs wishing to support Vietnam and many renewed efforts to have representatives in
the country. By 1988, the effects of Doi Moi had begun, including increased interest
from foreign investors. In October 1988, CIDSE became the first INGO with a
representative in Hanoi. The 1989 withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia
brought the beginning of re-normalisation with Western donor countries.
In 1989, The People's Aid Co-ordinating Committee (PACCOM) of the Vietnam Union
of Friendship Organisations (VUFO) was established to “work as a focal agency for
international non-governmental organisations”. PACCOM’s main functions are to: work
as a bridge between INGOs and Vietnamese partners and localities; facilitate INGO
activities and assist local partners in their relations with INGOs; gather and share
information concerning INGO activities in Vietnam; and recommend to the Government
proper policies for INGOs in Vietnam. PACCOM is also responsible for processing
permits for INGOs, who are requested to register with the Committee for NGO Affairs
through PACCOM. In the early 1990s, the Vietnamese Government gave AFSC,
ActionAid, CARE, MCC, Oxfam Belgique, and the then name Oxfam UK&I and NARV
permission to open offices in Hanoi and actively encouraged other INGOs to come.
Throughout the 1990s, the number of INGOs working with Vietnam steadily increased.
As the graph below shows, this growth was greatest during the mid 1990s but has
levelled off; some INGOs have left but new ones have replaced them. Today, close to
500 (depicted in grey) INGOs have relations with Vietnam, 350 (depicted in white) of
which are currently active with partners and programmes. The other nearly 150 nonactive INGOs have at some point provided assistance or relief. An estimated 157 of the
350 have offices or work-stations in Vietnam.
Roughly 35% of the organisations listed in the NGO Directory come from North
America (United States and Canada), 35% from Europe, approximately 8% from Asia
(Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand), and 7% from Australia
and New Zealand. In addition there are INGOs from other countries and INGOs who are
described as international.
9
MCNV, 1999.
13
Figure 1: Number of INGOs in Vietnam with relations and active in the country.
Number of INGOs in Vietnam: 'with relations' and 'active'
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1975-1978
1979-1988
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Year
Source: PACCOM, 2000
INGOs working in Vietnam are as diverse as the programmes and projects they
implement. A large number are development organisations, but there are also INGOs
concentrating on the environment, conservation, charity, relief, reconstruction and
reconciliation.
1.2 Development of INGOs in Vietnam
In the early 1990s…
International isolation and Vietnamese regulations meant that, for a long time, INGOs
worked from a distance and with central authorities. A long history of war left a
bureaucratic system not yet adapted to peacetime and a legacy of secrecy that limited
information flow.10
The administrative atmosphere in the early 1990s was significantly tougher than today.
Following Doi Moi, the Government began to develop a legal framework for foreign
organisations wanting to work in Vietnam. The Government’s early legal framework and
legislative environment had not included the new phenomenon of INGOs. This created
challenges that may have led to misunderstandings and occasional mistrust. For INGOs,
difficulties included: obtaining visas, defining administrative procedures, meeting other
INGOs, working at the community level, and visiting remote areas.
In 1992, INGOs in Hanoi sent a proposal to PACCOM, addressing “the need for better
sharing of information about our programmes between ourselves, with other agencies
10
MCNV, 1999.
14
and with our Vietnamese partners”. In 1993, the NGO Resource Centre was established
in the offices of Radda Barnen. By then, Vietnam was a country in transition. As it
became easier to work directly with poor communities, INGOs moved away from
activities now targeted by increasing multilateral and bilateral lending and support.
….through the mid-to-late 90s....
In 1996, the Committee for NGO Affairs was formed and comprised of six members at
ministerial level: The Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations (VUFO) as standing
agency for foreign NGO affairs; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); the Ministry
of Public Security (MOPS); the External Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of
Vietnam; and the Government Committee for Organisation and Personnel (GCOP).
Decision 340/TTG, an underlaw, was issued to regulate INGO activities.
…and onwards…
By 1999, the Committee for NGO Affairs had issued 320 permits:
- 42 for representative offices
- 58 for project offices
- 220 for operations
PACCOM notes that “by issuing permits, a clear legal framework for INGOs to operate
in Vietnam has been established, providing INGOs with official recognition”.11 Indeed,
although permit procedures became clearer after Decision 340/TTG was issued, some
concerns remained, and new ones arose. In 1999, the Vietnamese Government issued
Decision 28 regulating the reception of INGO assistance and procedures for approving
projects involving Vietnamese organisations. During 2000, Decision 28 amendments
were discussed to decentralise decision making and enable local authorities to approve
projects at higher budget levels.
In July 2000, the Committee for NGO Affairs was disbanded in line with public
administrative reform. The role of VUFO and PACCOM did not change; a different
consultative committee will likely soon be formed. GCOP is increasingly becoming the
central agency responsible for emerging local NGOs and is taking the lead in developing
appropriate regulations. Thus, administrative responsibilities for international NGOs and
local NGOs are now separated. This has led some INGOs to question the value of their
previous support to agencies other than GCOP when those INGOs were trying to
increase Vietnamese understanding of INGOs roles in other countries.
Vietnam is changing rapidly. Sometimes foreign organisations cannot tell what
information needs to be provided and when, and who should facilitate their work. INGOs
now wonder about the future structure for permit approvals and programme
administration. Will new INGOs be able to secure permits to work in Vietnam? Will
there be difficulties with issues relating to programme work?
11From
the notes of the meeting of the study team and PACCOM staff
(July, 2000).
15
On-going administration reform may require patience as it brings some short-term
administrative confusion even if it is aimed at making procedures clearer and easier in
the long run. Currently, INGOs apply for permits with PACCOM and submit quarterly
reports to PACCOM. Projects with local partners must be approved by competent local
authorities or the Ministry of Planning and Investment. Implementing partners can be
line ministries such as MOLISA, MOH or MARD; mass organisations; universities; or
local organisations.
1.3 Overview of INGO Investment
During the period from 1975 to 1986, INGO assistance was mostly in kind relief, charity
or emergency assistance. 1990 figures for financial assistance place it at 16 million USD
rising more than 300% to over 80 million USD by the end of the decade12 .
Figure 2: Annual INGO Assistance to Vietnam
1998
1996
1994
1992
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1990
Annual INGO Assistance to Vietnam
(in USD million)
Year
Source: PACCOM, 1999
Based on information provided in reports of 384 NGOs to PACCOM, a total of 1458
projects were implemented in 1999 with a disbursement of approximately 81 million
USD which is slightly higher than the year before. 44 million USD was provided in kind
assistance in 1999.
The trend in growth of INGO investment was reflected in the information collected from
30 INGOs who responded to the study's questionnaire. However, the information from
the sample is flawed in the sense that the organisations working in the country started
work at different times and that it was difficult for many organisations to provide records
of budgets and expenditure for their early years. For 1993, 12 organisations were able to
provide this information and by 1996 this increased to 27. Nonetheless, based on a
sample of INGOs, we can see that on average INGO budgets and expenditure have
grown over the decade (as demonstrated in Figure 3, Appendix A).
12
Information from PACCOM, 1999.
16
It is important to note the significant differences between INGOs of annual budgets and
expenditures13. In total, of the INGOs who responded to the questionnaire, 20
organisations were spending more in 1999 than in their first year of work in Vietnam,
while 5 were spending less and three about the same.
Indeed, the diversity of INGOs is reflected in their budgets. At the start of the decade
respondents to the questionnaire noted budgets starting from USD 30,000 up to USD
1,400,000. In 1995, the lower end of the range was just over USD 13,000 and by 1999
the top end of the range had increased to over USD 4,000,000. Looking at the INGO
directory for the year 2000 we can see an even wider range, with some INGOs having
budgets under USD 6,000 while others are as high as USD 6,000,000 .
The disbursement rate for INGO assistance is relatively high compared with bi-lateral
and multi-lateral donors. In 1998, the Resource Centre carried out a short survey of
INGOs which indicated that the disbursement rate for INGO spending was 89%.
However, we now see that this rate may actually be higher if we look at the sample of
INGOs responding to the Study's questionnaire.14 We see an annual average
disbursement rate between 92% and 123% based on the INGOs that could provide both
budget and expenditure figures.
Breaking down INGO investment
Are INGO Budgets clear?
The team encountered questions from different people outside the INGO community
about the clarity of INGO budgets. How much is expatriate staff really getting paid?
How much goes into administration costs? What percentage of the budget really gets to
the communities? The team wished to address this by asking INGOs questions related to
the breakdown of budgets to which some information was gathered. This information
should be treated cautiously. Not all of the questionnaires respondents provided costs or
estimates of costs of headquarter support for Vietnam programmes. Formats for INGO
budgets are not uniform and it is therefore difficult to draw out trends related to budgets.
Respondents interpreted the questions in different ways and were asked to either quote
actual costs or provide 'guestimates' (guessed estimations). INGOs also commented that
the questionnaire was difficult to understand and extremely lengthy.
Nonetheless, the team gathered information15 to attempt to break down INGO spending
in the 1990s with data focussing on INGO spending in 1995 and 1999.
Some INGOs gave actual costs while others provided estimated percentages. Because of
this all figures were calculated in percentages and the figures represent average
percentages. One set of figures for each year was drawn from the replies of 17
organisations that included head office costs. Another set of figures for each year is the
Figure 4, Appendix A which demonstrates the diversity in INGO
expenditures.
14 See Table 1, Appendix A.
15 See Table 2, Appendix A.
13
17
average for nine INGOs which did not or could not include head office costs of their
Vietnam programmes. The information must be treated cautiously as there were
differences in understanding of the questions and what should fall under the different
categories.
In answer to those who wanted to know what INGOs are spending before the money gets
to the communities - it's difficult to say for sure. However, we can come up with some
averages and in addition point out the wide range in responses which reflects the
diversity of INGOs.
In 1999, according to the information gathered from the respondents:
 INGOs allocated an average of 9.6-11.7% (head office and no head office costs) to
field office expatriate staff costs. However, there are some INGOs with no expatriate
staff.
 INGOs spent an average of 10.6% to 15.64% (head office and no head office costs)
on indirect project support costs. However the range was between 0% to 30%.
 Costs of direct project support is one of the biggest ranges. While the average
expenditure of respondents was from 17%-20% some INGOs had no direct project
support costs while another’s was over 80%.
Has the breakdown of INGO costs changed over time?
The team asked the respondents to give these figures for 1991, 1995 and 1999. Only a
few were able to provide this information for the start of the decade but sixteen
organisations could give information for 1995. According to organisations which
provided information for both 1995 and 1999, some changes appear in the breakdown of
INGO costs over time. Notably, grants to partners for direct project costs decreased over
the five year period as did field office indirect support costs. Field office expatriate costs
increased as did direct costs of INGO managed projects.
As one informant stated: "Some INGOs don’t have clear budgets and many have high
administrative fees of between 40 and 50%."16 However, INGOs note that it is not
simply an issue of high administration fees but that this spending occurs in relation to
capacity building, monitoring and evaluation.
The limited information collected was therefore not able to demonstrate how much
investment was reaching communities. Something much more in depth would need to be
done if the INGOs wished to follow up on this.
Changes in staffing levels in INGOs?
With an increase in the number of INGOs working in Vietnam there are a significant
number of people employed by INGOs. Every organisation responding to the
questionnaire except one, noted an increase in the number of employees since they began
operations. In a majority this was relatively small with an increase of only one or two
From the notes of the meeting of the study team and PACCOM staff
(July, 2000).
16
18
additional members but in a small proportion staffing levels had grown by 900-1400%
with specific organisations noting increases from 1-9 staff, from 5-45 staff, from 6-60
and from 7-100 employees in one of the largest INGOs in Vietnam.
Geographical trends
– expansion, consolidation and moving to more remote areas
INGO programmes are active in all 61 Provinces of Vietnam. Their activities reach to an
estimated 420 out of 600 Districts.17 According to PACCOM “more INGOs are coming
to work in more remote provinces which previously saw little or no INGO assistanceincluding Lai Chau, Ha Giang, Bac Kan, Phu Yen and An Giang. Some Provinces see
more INGO activities than others”.18
Over 80% of INGOs who responded to the Study's questionnaire noted changes in the
geographical focus of their programmes since they first started work in Vietnam. Some
INGOs have been expanding, others have been consolidating. Another trend as noted
above has been away from urban areas to poorer, more remote and mountainous
locations.
Nearly 40% of the organisations responded that changes were linked to a greater
understanding of the economic situation and the nature of poverty in Vietnam. Other
reasons included greater understanding of demographic situation; requests from partners
and donors and PACCOM.
While changes have been made, some concerns have been raised by the authorities
regarding the geographic focus of INGOs and one informant stated: "INGO aid has not
been evenly distributed across the regions. Richer provinces and cities continue to have
more assistance, while poorer province share much less. Big cities like Hanoi and
HCMC received proportionately more than the poorest provinces of the Northern
Upland, North central, central Highland and the Mekong Delta."19
17
18
19
From the INGO Directory, 1999.
PACCOM and NGO Resource Centre.
From the notes of the INGO study/PACCOM meeting (July 2000).
19
1.4 Sectoral Trends
The chart below gives a breakdown of sectoral disbursements in 1999.
Figure 5: INGO Sectoral Disbursements
INGO Sectoral Disbursements - 1999
Sectoral Groupings
Emergency Relief
Environment
Education
Economic Dev't (including micro-credit,
irrgation, rural infrastructure, etc..)
Health Care
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Percentage of INGO Disbursem ents
Source: PACCOM, 2000
Changes in Sectors or Changes in Approach?
The INGOs that responded to the questionnaire confirmed that health and education
continued to be priorities for investment but reflected movement away from specific
sectoral groupings towards more holistic, community or integrated development20.
Spending can never give an adequate picture of true programme significance.
Respondents also gave a percentage weight to various sectors. INGOs pointed out that
the number of activities and the time spent on research, programme and strategy design
and on advocacy also indicate a sector’s relative importance. According to the
information collected in the questionnaire, discrepancies appear in the mid 1990s
between the importance of a particular sector and the investment made. However, these
values grew closer by the end of the decade.21
Why a Change in Sectoral Focus?
More than half of the organisations responded that changes in their sectoral emphasis and
investment were due to a better understanding of the causes of social and economic
problems. Other reasons for change included: requests from partners and beneficiaries
(over 40% of the INGOs noted this) and a decision to move from single sector to multisector approaches. Less but still significant reasons included: changing donor priorities,
20
21
See Figure 6, Appendix A.
See Figure 6 and 7, Appendix A.
20
changing head office priorities, and changing Vietnamese Government priorities and
Government permission to move into other sectors22.
2) Some Impacts of INGO Work in Vietnam
The major question for the study was INGO impact in Vietnam during the last ten years.
However, if impact is defined “not (as) immediate outputs or effects of a project or
programme but lasting and sustained changes”,23 then developing a comprehensive
analysis becomes a nearly impossible challenge.
Doi Moi and its socio-economic and political effects have been the driving force behind
change in Vietnam during the last ten years. Impact cannot be accurately measured by
financial contribution. Changes during the last decade have resulted from efforts by the
people and Government of Vietnam with assistance from international donors, from
domestic and foreign economic investment, and from an array of other factors. In
general, international donors can be effective only when the host country creates a
favourable environment. Thus, the broad picture should emphasise input by the
Government of Vietnam, both in volume and impact. As a result of these factors, it is
difficult to distinguish between the impact of INGOs and other agents of change.
INGOs’ own reports (both internal and external), their reports to PACCOM, various
ministries’ reports and overviews, information submitted for the NGO Directory, and
information contained in reports by the World Bank, UN Agencies, and other donors
were important sources of information for the study. However, most information on
impact in these reports relates only to outputs or only to partial impact.
As noted in Section 1, INGOs work in virtually all sectors in Vietnam. A thorough study
of all these sectors would be too ambitious; therefore, the study team chose six sectoral
windows that have attracted INGO projects and programmes: micro-finance, nutrition,
HIV/AIDS, integrated rural development, urban community development, and inclusive
primary education.
It was a challenge to summarise and analyse concrete INGO achievements. First, it
proved impossible to secure the necessary concrete statistics, including: the total of funds
given for credit-and-savings loans; expenditures for training veterinary surgeons,
agricultural workers and extension workers; the number of clinics and schools built; the
number of teachers and health-care workers trained; etc. Second, statistics in INGO
reports usually reflected only a specific activity of a specific project in a specific
geographic area. Third and most importantly, numbers cannot give an adequate picture.
INGOs often stressed that the quality of their work is more important than the quantity.
Thus, this report highlights only some examples from nutrition and HIV/AIDS in relation
to the health sector; from inclusive primary education in relation to the education sector;
and from micro-credit and integrated rural development in relation to broad agricultural
and rural development sectors.
22
23
See Table 4, Appendix A.
Roche, 1999, p..20.
21
2.1 Sectoral Achievements
Health Sector
INGOs in Vietnam are active in a wide array of health-related fields and at very different
levels. According to the NGO Directory, one hundred INGOs are involved in health plus
an additional one hundred NGOs which have health-related activities in community
development programmes. Some, such as MCNV and AFAP work at the national level
through national research institutes; some, such as CIDSE and BfdW, work with medical
schools; some work at the local level. Respondents to the study questionnaire indicated
that the percentage of INGO spending allocated to health decreased from about 40% at
the start of the decade to closer to 20%. In 1999, INGO spending in health was just over
23 million USD. 24
Other figures exist from the Project Co-ordinating Department of the Ministry of Health
(MoH), which in 1998 estimated that 7 million USD out of 74 million USD ODA
support to the MoH came from INGOs:
Table 5: ODA to the MoH 1992-1999 in USD
Total
ODA
INGOs
1992
31,692,486
3,372,119
1993
1994
60,738,883 61,481,747
5,394,848
2,700,00
1995
63,060,367
1996
48,458,327
1997
67,421,313
1998
74,829,961
3,399,863 (not provided)
4,513,679
7,360,000
Source: Project Co-ordinating Department – MoH, May 1998
HIV/AIDS
Fifteen organisations (6.8% of the INGOs listed in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre
database) note their work on HIV/AIDS. Opinions gathered from interviews and the
HIV/AIDS workshop on July 6, 2000 indicated that an INGO achievement has been
awareness-raising of HIV/AIDS in Vietnam through the introduction of peer
education. The peer education programme was considered a suitable model because
simple language would make HIV/AIDS education more accessible by involving people
in similar circumstances, for example women with women, youth with youth. Along with
many achievements, there have been some difficulties:
 If peer education is not combined with other activities, programme effectiveness
diminishes. Peer educators do not continue with the same commitment when
programmes finish because they have lost the economic support once provided by the
INGO-funded programme. Peer education programmes need extra activities to
support the peer educators’ economically, yet such activities are often beyond the
programme’s capacity.
Health activities are often considered as part of Community
Development and other integrated activities. Thus, it is difficult to
estimate financial input.
24
22
 Peer education activities often cannot be fully implemented because the
programmes lack specialised local staff. Government staff knowledge of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic has been low, thus limiting Government support. Government
staff members do not really support these INGO activities and do not create
favourable programme conditions. This, in turn, limits programme effectiveness.
Lessons Learned
INGOs could have a more positive impact if they implemented some of the following:
 INGOs should use the mass media to change the social environment since peer
education by itself is not enough to change behaviour. It appears that INGOs have
not shown much interest in this expansion of peer education. They could organise
workshops for writers and radio and television directors and work with these forms
of media.
 The many INGOs taking part in HIV/AIDS work should improve their cooperation. The NGO HIV/AIDS working group should strengthen its activities in
information-sharing amongst INGOs to avoid overlap. A monthly newsletter or a
bulletin for INGOs working in the field could be one of the activities in addition to a
daily e-mail bulletin service which is being provided.
 Vietnam should use INGO strengths and experience and consider INGOs part of
the fight against HIV/AIDS through an inter-disciplinary, holistic approach that
does not criminalise HIV/AIDS. INGOs should share their experiences with
Vietnamese partners and assist with the Government’s strategic planning and provide
a chance for INGO activities to fit better with Government directions. Many INGOs
expressed concern about the change in the National AIDS Committee to the
Committee for Social Evils – Drugs, Prostitution and AIDS. Is a change in name a
change in strategy? Will amalgamating HIV/AIDS with other social evils reduce the
prevention and awareness-raising work of INGOs? The fight against HIV/AIDS
should be everyone’s task.
Nutrition
Twenty-one organisations (9.5% of the INGOs in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre
database) note their work in nutrition. Interviews and information from a nutrition
workshop on June 15, 2000 indicated INGOs (especially SCF/US) were in fact the
turning point in work against malnutrition in Vietnam. INGOs set up networks of
volunteer health workers focusing on nutrition and maternal and child health, put
forward models of positive deviance, and supported provincial Committees for the Care
and Protection of Children.25 However, some limitations remain:
 Effectiveness is limited because INGO model nutrition programmes are more
suitable to the delta than to the mountainous regions. Working methods,
approaches, and the use of local resources have solved only the immediate problem
25
Notes from Nutrition Workshop (June, 2000).
23
of nutrition but not malnutrition as a whole. INGO staff members have spent too
much energy experimenting. The programme's small scale and short-term outlooks
have reduced their impact.
 Community commitment and volunteers’ activities that once contributed to
programme sustainability decreased when new local leaders did not fully
understand and follow the programme. Payments for collaborators were reduced,
causing them to leave the programme.
Lessons Learned
 INGOs should continue to integrate nutrition into other programmes from the time
of overall planning to solve root causes and continue the change from nutrition to
mother and child health to address the problem rather than minimise malnutrition.
 INGOs should use statistics shared by GSO and FAO to evaluate their
programmes’ outputs and effectiveness.
 INGOs and GOs (Governmental Organisations) should consult with each other on
appropriate and shared knowledge levels for local volunteers.
 INGOs should share information between organisations by setting up a sectoral
working group.
Education Sector
Seventy-eight organisations (35.5% of the INGOs in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre
database) note their work in education. In 1999, INGOs contributed 17% of their
disbursements or just over 13 million USD to education. INGOs responding to the study
questionnaire reflected a consistent pattern, with investment from 18% to 21% to
education over the decade and with an allocated weight between 17% and 19%.
During the past decade, Vietnam expanded its co-operation with international
organisations to implement EFA (Education For All) programmes. Komitee Twee's
education for children with disabilities and Oxfam GB’s education project in Ha Tinh
Province helped create the confidence that made this co-operation possible.26 INGO
work in this sector includes Oxfam GB and Enfants et Developpement (SCF/France)’s
support for Primary Education (PE) in Lao Cai Province; SCF/Australia’s support in
Binh Thuan Province; and Radda Barnen’s work;27 Plan International, Oxfam GB and
SCF/France support out-of-school education;28 and SCF/UK, Radda Barnen and CRS
support education for children with disabilities.29 Many more organisations have
activities in education.
26
27
28
29
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2000, p.70.
UNICEF, 2000, p. 64.
ibid.
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2000, p.11.
24
Since1991, INGOs have integrated inclusive education programmes into community
development, as the following case study shows:
Radda Barnen supported a project following the International Convention on the Rights
of the Child and a Plan of Action of EFA (Education for All). Educators developed a
curriculum and materials for teaching children with disabilities in public primary
schools. By the 1998-1999 school year, Radda Barnen, CRS, UNICEF, and SCF/UK had
conducted inclusive education programmes in more than fifty districts in forty-five
provinces. More than 30,000 children with disabilities were participating in day-time
classes at 1,000 public schools. Simultaneously, beginning in 1995, Radda Barnen and
CRS targeted children with disabilities in pre-school education through pilot projects on
inclusive education.30
However, there are some limitations to inclusive education programmes :
 This idea comes from abroad and requires experimenting to determine
appropriateness to Vietnam and to define adaptations before extending the idea.
 A present method of inclusive education regarding children with impaired hearing of
sending children from special education or early intervention programmes to regular
schools without changing the new educational environment may only be suitable for
children with mild and moderate hearing loss and with appropriate hearing aids.
This method of inclusive education is not effective for children with severe or
profound hearing loss. Demand for school admittance is much higher than the
number of places, with the result that integration is slow. Many regular schools are
not willing to accept these children.31
Lessons Learned
 INGOs should re-evaluate the effectiveness of programmes by: assessing the
integration level of children with disabilities into regular schools; studying aspects of
child psychology when children with disabilities share classes with other children;
and measuring the classroom understanding of children with disabilities in
comparison with other children.
Agriculture and Rural Development
Many INGOs have been involved in agriculture and rural development during the last
decade. Since it was beyond the scope of this report to examine all the issues in this
sector, the study team chose only two areas: integrated rural development and microfinance.
Integrated Rural Development
30
31
Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
Komitee Twee, 1996.
25
2000, p. 26.
Thirty-one organisations (14% of the INGOs in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre
database) work in integrated rural development. Respondents indicated investment
between 6 and 8% from 1992 to 1999 and weight of work around 5% over the decade.
Various projects (such as credit, health, clean water, education, etc.) within the
programmes strengthen the integrated approach, making INGO programmes more
accessible and easier for local partners to support.
In the beginning, organisations implemented various projects (such as credit, health,
clean water) in one location, calling them an integrated programme. However, such
projects did not necessarily support each other; thus, the integrated approach must be
reviewed when beginning project implementation. An entry point into the community
helps the INGO assess community needs, whether they are in health or irrigation. Then,
based on these needs, the INGO can support other activities linking, step by step, to a full
programme.
Integrated approaches and projects had some of the following difficulties:
 Integrated programmes demand that project officers individually or as a team have
comprehensive knowledge. One person can hardly possess all the needed knowledge
but as a result, project quality may often be reduced, and staff prestige may decline.
 In many cases, INGO ways of working with partners have created difficulties in
implementation, supervision and follow up.
Micro-Finance
Thirty-six organisations (16.4% of the INGOs in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre
database) note their work in micro-finance. Respondents indicated investment of about
5% over the decade in micro-finance, but the average work weight allocated was higher
in 1999, at about 8% (See Section 1). Micro credit in rural areas is among the most active
sectors of INGOs. Most INGOs consider savings and credit a common means to promote
income generation, while a small number see savings and credit as income protection for
the poor.32
Some Observations Related to INGO Credit Projects
 An appropriate INGO approach emphasises loans for the poor. Many INGOs
appear to have targeted average groups rather than the poor and the poorest. If
loans are beyond the reach of the poor, then it could be argued that INGO projects
and programmes lose meaning..
 INGO loan programmes have integrated many other purposes, such as
empowerment, income generation, and reduction of the gap between the rich and
the poor. Larger goals will require time. Small loan and credit programmes do not
achieve ambitious goals.
32
UNDP, 1996.
26
 At present, the Women’s Union is the most common INGO partner in credit
programmes. However, some Women’s Union staff members have not had sufficient
training and interest. Moreover, Women’s Union staff members have rotated,
limiting project sustainability.
 Programme expansion without adequate training has caused many INGO credit
programmes to fail because these INGOs have not become specialised in credit and
no one in the partner organisations had had credit training sufficient to run a viable
programme. This has actually increased debt. In addition, a framework of mutual
understanding was not established in some programmes, with the result that funds
were moved to other programmes.
Lessons Learned
 INGOs should develop relationships with local partners, setting up a temporary
legal framework of mutual understanding. Then, the programme can extend,
creating greater co-operation with managers and policy makers at higher levels.
 INGOs should maintain the commitment between themselves and local partners by
starting with a small model before expanding. Without careful planning, the number
of people who participate and then withdraw is fairly high, creating additional per
capita costs, wasting training resources, and reducing programme impact.
 INGOs using the Women’s Union as a partner should emphasise local training.
Although the Women’s Union has a commitment to credit and savings work from the
national level on down, and a concomitant awareness of the programme, Women’s
Union staff are not financial managers. INGOs working with local Women’s Union
partners in credit and training must make a substantial investment in training to
ensure project success.
 INGOs should be clear as to whether they want to be a financial-service
organisation or a financial-support organisation.
*
*
*
Lessons Learned in relation to the sectors above
 Sustainability was mentioned in all INGOs sectors, especially credit, nutrition, and
HIV/AIDS. To achieve sustainability, INGOs would need to work in accordance with
Government programmes and with the support of Government.
 Networking within programme activities is needed to maintain regular contacts and
for information sharing between and among INGOs and Government agencies.
Working groups should be strengthened towards working more closely with
government agencies/donor community to link with national programmes and to
27
avoid overlap resulting in wasted resources. Although there has been networking in
some sectors, the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre should further support networks
concerning INGO activities.
Information on INGO work during the last ten years in health, education, agriculture and
rural development indicates that INGOs have made considerable contributions to
Vietnam’s development.
Urban Community Development 33
Information on INGOs activities in this sector was limited because only a few INGOs
(mostly in the south) focus on this area. This report will try to analyse some reasons that
might explain a perceived lack of interest in INGO work in this area.
The projects or programmes implemented by INGOs in this sector include:34
- Micro-finance
- Water and sanitation
- Environment
- Scholarships for poor children
- Health insurance for poor children
- Programmes for children with disabilities
- Vocational training
- Infrastructure construction
- Housing
The number of urban community development projects and programmes are far fewer
that in the agriculture and rural development sector. Some difficulties that might affect
this and that the study team found are :

There appears to be a lack of community cohesion in the cities, leading to
programme obstacles. The loose connection between urban residents makes
community-based projects and programmes to help disadvantaged groups
inconvenient or even impossible. For example, a CBR (Community Based
Rehabilitation) project aimed at rehabilitating disabled children through a
community approach to create faster integration into the community. However, in
Vietnam, the urban living of 'just within your own house' ('nhµ ai biÕt
viÖc nhµ Êy') may have prevented other community members from
intervening and assisting disadvantaged children troubled by domestic violence
or harassment. Another example appeared in micro-finance. Regular group
repayment meetings to strengthen group cohesion and improve knowledge faced
difficulties compared with similar rural meetings. This may be because urban
members had different work times and greater distances between them.
The INGO Directory lists this sector together with rural development
under the heading community development.
34Preliminary Note at the Urban Community Development Workshop, Ho Chi Minh City ( July, 2000).
33
28

Officials’ lack of eagerness and support makes it more difficult to implement
urban community development projects/programmes. It is difficult to reconcile
local people's and authorities’ requests with an INGO’s strategy.35 Without
intending to do so, INGO assistance to urban poor in slum areas may have
created magnets contradicting city efforts to curb urban migration. Another
related issue is the different expectations between INGOs and partners. For
example, the study found that one INGO wanted to carry out a project for
disadvantaged children but failed after one year because the INGO wanted to
improve attitudes towards disadvantaged children through training, while their
partner wanted wheelchairs and financial support.36

Security in urban areas is of more concern than in the rural areas. Local
paperwork for an expatriate to visit project areas can be confusing making it seem
as if the Vietnamese side has tried to create difficulties. This may in turn diminish
INGO interest in urban projects and programmes.

Urban community development projects have been risky and can lack
sustainability. For example, group members in micro-credit projects for urban
poor may include unregistered citizens, increasing the risk that loans won’t be
repaid. Additional risk can arise from infrastructure and construction projects.
Even city authorities cannot assure the stability in the project area. For example,
the study team visited a new resettlement area, where an INGO had helped build
roads, sanitation, electricity, a water system, and had provided loans for house
construction in a project to resettle people in Ho Chi Minh City. However, an
official of the project area expressed uncertainty, noting that he himself was not
quite sure of the future of the newly resettled area.
Urbanisation is a universal trend in developing countries, making it likely that urban
areas will become a more important sector for INGOs.
Lessons Learned
 INGOs should consider the needs of local people and authorities, but the first
planning priority should be the needs of the people.
 INGOs should co-ordinate with the city management board regarding the city’s
development plan.
 INGOs should respect Vietnam’s administrative rules and avoid expatriate visits to
project sites without notifying the local authorities.
 INGOs urban community development projects and programmes should support
community groups in the process of urbanisation.
INGO activities in the cities are numerous when compared with rural
areas.
36 Note from Workshop (July, 2000).
35
29
 INGOs should support training for Vietnamese officials in urban management.
2.2 Impact on Direct Target Groups
Changes in INGO Target Beneficiaries - Moving Closer to the Poor and Vulnerable.
Many respondents (47.2%) to the INGO study questionnaire reported a change in either
the kinds or numbers of beneficiaries, noting a change towards focusing more closely on
the poor, the vulnerable and ethnic minorities. A small number of programmes have
moved away from beneficiaries initially indicated by the Government. Thirty per cent of
the INGOs cited as reasons a greater understanding of the economic situation and the
nature of poverty in Vietnam; nineteen per cent cited requests from partners and
beneficiaries.
What has been the impact on the target beneficiaries of INGO programmes in relation
to vulnerable groups?
The Poor
Ten years ago, the poor were neglected in most INGO projects and programmes, with the
main reason being a lack of confidence in the poor. By the early 1990s, INGO focus on
this group helped lift many out of poverty, and the poor themselves contributed to
changing the social perception of others.
Some of the positive INGO impacts on the poor are:








Change and diversification of production activities
Access to appropriate technology
Improvement of living standards and working conditions
Income and property generation, debt reduction
Access to health care and education
Increased self-confidence and self empowerment
Enhanced role in the family and in the community
Confidence of other organisations to create access for the poor to credit.
However, information collected from interviews and reports confirmed that, so far, most
INGO projects and programmes reach only the relatively poor and middle-income
households. As one INGO report notes: “the poorest groups in communities are often left
out" and "most of the project of poverty alleviation mainly seems to attract the better off
strata within the poor communities”.37
A lack of attention paid to addressing the poorest of the poor as illustrated in the case
of micro-credit (below) may be due to limited understanding of INGO staff members in
poverty alleviation methods.
37
NAV, 1996, p. 23.
30
 Local project partners tend to choose only those poor households able to pay
interest and repay loans. Extra conditions for the project participants sometimes
include: no debts to the co-operative, good health, work management skills, freedom
from drugs, a reputation for hard work, and ability to pay interest and repay the loan.
For example, the criteria for selection of participants in one credit and savings
programme has been:



Poor, as indicated by having less than 13kg rice/person/month income equivalent
Ability to repay and, later, ability to deposit savings
Active membership in the Women’s Union.38
Such criteria can appear contradictory, as a hard working person with management
skills may not be among the poorest and will not be continuously in debt. Many poor
households are in debt from emergency expenditures, such as health costs, or from
investing in a venture, which has failed.39
The same situation appears in agricultural projects. Criteria for participant selection in
one extension project for farming on sloping land were:



Households which have suitable land for setting up a SALT model
Households which have enough labour force to implement activities
Those who can contribute local materials, experience and knowledge
Poor farmers who have land, labour and the capacity to contribute not only
experiences but also materials will not be the poorest of the poor.
 There appears to be a contradiction between project sustainability and the
participation of the poorest. Most projects and programmes have set up selective
criteria for the sustainability which leads to the exclusion of some of the poorest.40
For example, a sustainable interest rate of INGO credit programme is usually 1% ,
1.2% or 1.5% while the Vietnam Bank for the Poor and the Vietnam Bank of
Agriculture charge 0.7%. While INGOs debate interest rates, some question whether
high INGO interest rates prevent the poorest from borrowing in INGO credit
programmes. Perhaps INGOs may need to do more to raise awareness as to why they
wish to have higher interest rates. As a local interviewee stated: “We can’t
understand why INGO projects want to help the poor but their interest rate is higher
than the Bank for the Poor”41.
INGOs working in agriculture and micro-credit tended to select partners who were
not the poor or the poorest in order to guarantee success. One staff member noted
38
39
40
41
Porter, 1997, p.14.
Government of Vietnam; Donor; NGO Poverty Working Group, 1999.
Notes from the Workshop on Credit, (June, 2000).
Note from the field trips.
31
that, “it is difficult to identify the poor who are able to carry out micro-enterprise”42
and that selecting poor participants could have a negative impact on programme
results. Another staff member noted that, “poor site choice and poor application of
recommendations, ... reduced the impact of hedgerows for many farmers”.
 INGO participation requirements of local resources have prevented the poor and
the poorest from taking part in projects. The poor can contribute labour to a project
by carrying earth and digging wells, but they cannot contribute cash, especially to a
big project. One INGO said that its policy in the past was for local people to
contribute 30%. Now, that figure is 50%, and in the future, the local contribution will
probably be 75%. If expenditures for a clean water project run in the millions of
VND, the project participants who must contribute will not be the poor and the
poorest.
 INGO project partners such as the Farmer's Union or the Women's Union require
that borrowers be active members, limiting access for the poor, particularly in
remote areas. Although the mass organisations generally have impressive outreach,
they are not active in many remote ethnic minority areas, where poverty is greatest. 43
 Project selection has gone through many steps and levels, thus hindering the
participation of the poor and the poorest. Through the recommendation of
PACCOM, an INGO may then go through a process of contacting a relevant
province, then going from the province to a district, which is supposed to be poor or
not yet having many implemented projects. Then, the INGO moves from the district
to a poor commune and from the commune to poor hamlet. Then poor households are
selected to participate. The long process moving through many different
administrative levels sometimes makes the selection of the poor dependent on the
wishes of individual authorities. Even though criteria for the selection process may
be transparent, local officials may exert inappropriate influence.44
 Difficulty accessing markets in remote areas limits participation in INGOs credit
and savings programmes because the poor cannot sell their goods. According to one
INGO staff member, “some ethnic communities near the Laos border are so isolated
that they do not use the market system at all”.45
In the future, will INGOs support individuals from the better-off social strata, continue to
support the middle poor, or support the poorest of the poor?
Lessons Learned
42
43
44
45
Notes from the
UNICEF, 2000,
World Bank and
Interview with
32
field trips.
p. 43.
DFID, 1999, p.60.
an INGO informant.
 INGOs should target the poor, especially the poorest in the remote and
mountainous areas, where the national projects and programmes on poverty
alleviation have not yet been implemented.
 INGOs should adjust and reschedule their projects to take risks.
 INGOs should work to change people’s perception on participation and consider
potential beneficiaries’ sense of responsibility to the community rather than ability to
make financial contributions.
 INGOs should engage the close co-ordination and commitment of the authorities
to support the poor.
 Administrative steps should be minimised to ensure the poorest can participate.
 INGOs should strengthen the understanding of INGO staff and partners regarding
poverty issues in Vietnam. Methods to identify and cope with the increasing gap
between the rich and poor and especially to address vulnerable groups should be
introduced in programme and project planning.
Women’s Groups
Many INGOs have a goal to improve gender equity and have supported projects
targeting women, including credit and savings projects through the Women's Union. To
encourage women's empowerment, INGOs have strived to have women taking part in
other project activities, particularly training. INGOs have had the following positive
impacts on women:




Empowerment
Enhanced women’s participation in communities
Changed labour division within families
Improved lives of women, their families and children (income generation, access to
the basic services of health care, education)
INGOs noted that the credit and savings programmes helped women to speak their minds
more freely, feel more self-confident, and become more included in community
activities. Participants also learned more about disease prevention, sanitation, and
agricultural extension. However, these comments applied more to average women than
to the poor or the poorest as the following quotes illustrate. One assessment report found
that “women are thus often marginalised, particularly if they come from poor families”
and that "women of poor families are (paid less attention to) in the various.... projects,
and also in the credit schemes for women”.46 Another noted: “The credit scheme... has
had some impact on the livelihoods of some (poor) women but the impact is limited. The
research is not conclusive on the notion that the poorest and most vulnerable families and
women within a hamlet now participate more or less in the affairs of their community46
NAV, 1996.
33
the answer appears to be no change and no impact.”47 Since many INGO micro-credit
projects have mostly been in partnership with the Women’s Union and yet have not
reached the poor and poorest women, INGOs may want to consider whether the
Women’s Union is the best partner.
Some reports indicated that women’s roles have improved in society and in the family as
women’s opinions become more respected. However, this impact is not clear. The
chance for women to extend their influence and access various sources of information
has been very limited because most women have been busy with household work. Thus,
they do not have much chance or time to join meetings, especially those in remote
areas.48
Participation in credit projects may impose more work and responsibility on women.
Some reports indicate that, though the working loads for women have increased with
loans from credit programmes, the participants remain pleased because they feel “their
work is much less difficult than before and the condition of work is better”49. Thus,
increased work loads should not be considered a negative impact of the credit and
savings programme on women.50
The focus on women in INGO projects and programmes has created an opportunity for
men to neglect their duties and responsibilities. Consequently, men have not actively
taken part in many programmes, thereby leading to an increase in women’s work loads
and responsibilities. Many activities in a nutrition programme for children required
women’s time, including: taking the child to be weighed, tracking the child’s growth,
and preparing special meals. One INGO nutrition project concluded women’s
participation and time investment was necessary for project success in order to have any
effect, including advocacy.
Recently, women’s participation in INGO projects has increased. One INGO commented
that 50% of its team and participants were women. Women seem to participate more at
the community level. For instance, some women have been community health workers,
community veterinarians, voluntary nutrition workers, and staff in rural integrated
development projects.51 Women have been very active from cultivation to harvesting in
agricultural and silvicultural activities. In many places, women do even harder work in
the fields than men. Both women and men have participated in cultivation and
silviculture, whereas women have mostly taken part in animal husbandry and IPM
projects.
Women’s participation in INGO training activities has attracted more attention when
women have been invited by name to attend a training course, or a couple has been
invited to a meeting when a project is being implemented. However, most assessment
reports have not yet evaluated women’s participation in training activities. The study
47
48
49
50
51
Oxfam Great Britain, 1998.
Interview notes.
Oxfam United Kingdom and Ireland, 1997, p.37.
ActionAid Vietnam, 1996.
Notes from the field trips.
34
team felt that the impact of training activities on women has been limited for the
following reasons:
 Men were the family's representatives in project meetings and training activities,
thereby limiting women’s participation, particularly in rural areas and particularly in
the early 1990s.52
 Generally speaking, women’s education is lower than men’s, particularly in remote
and mountainous areas. Consequently, even if they are invited, women seldom attend
meetings because they lack self-confidence.
 INGO project times and venues have not considered the different education levels
and different roles between women and men within the household.
 Women’s participation in training activities has often been only symbolic. Although
participation encourages and inspires women, it has yet to be evaluated.
The study team found that, although INGOs have paid great attention to gender issues,
and participation has increased, they have not yet deeply involved women. INGOs have
not yet had an overall, long-term view of the issue. Sometimes women’s roles in INGO
projects seem more rhetorical than actual. As one informant said: “They (INGOs) require
women’s participation just to demonstrate their gender attitude, but they do not carefully
take care of women’s concerns or interests.”53
The study team could not collect information on the number of men and women
participants in project management boards, though did observe that men have taken most
of the functional roles while women have assumed support roles. Men dominated in
agriculture and in agriculture extension. As one report noted: “Men still dominate most
functions and are well represented in most of the projects’ Boards of Management.
Efforts to empower women within the.... programmes are few.” 54
In Vietnam 27% of the heads of households are women; most are poor. This number will
likely increase.55 INGO information regarding programmes and projects for this target
group was not available. Thus, INGO impact on women heads of household is not clear.
At present, most INGOs have a goal to enhance gender equity. However, none of the
studied INGOs have appointed a staff member specialised in gender, although some staff
are responsible for gender among other issues. Addressing gender issues can therefore
becomes extra work, making gender activities secondary. Some INGOs did establish a
Gender Working Group, although it appears symbolic with no responsibility or power.
52
53
54
55
UNICEF, 1994.
Interview notes.
NAVprogramme Review, p.35.
UNICEF, 2000, p.18.
35
Most of the studied INGOs have organised training courses on gender issues for their
staff and some of the partners. However, the knowledge gained in the training courses
has not yet been fully applied. One INGO assessment report indicates that, “staff and
local partners did not articulate a plan to have gender in the ‘project’, and there was a
lack of consistency about how gender policy is translated into programme”.56 In general,
INGO project officers have not been fully trained and do not thoroughly understand the
methods and skills necessary to address gender issues. One INGO project officer
wondered: “Why it is necessary to question the time, activities and different demands
between women and men? Addressing the gender issue will be complicated and a waste
of time. Even worse, in the religious or fishing communities, there could be some strong
protest”.57
Lessons Learned
 INGO staff should promote gender understanding among their own staff. Senior
programme staff should understand gender dimensions in development. Gender
training should be a first priority in internal staff-training programmes.
 INGOs should have a specialised gender project officer to take responsibility for
co-ordinating and supervising project or programme activities on gender issues. A
Gender Working Group should include representatives of various sections within
INGOs so that these staff members have enough power to address gender issues
within project activities. Their participation should have a clear commitment from
the organisation.
 INGOs should have a system to track gender criteria in programmes and projects,
especially within training activities, should keep statistical data on men and women
who participation in these activities, and should assess the impacts of training on
both men and women.
 INGOs should mobilise men and women and urge men to share in housework,
home production activities and childcare.
 INGOs should improve their methodologies for targeting women-headed
households.
Ethnic groups
Working with ethnic groups has been an INGO goal. Respondents confirmed recent
INGO efforts to target ethnic minorities. Indeed, work with ethnic minorities has been
the main focus of some INGO projects and programmes. However, few assessment
reports address the impact of INGO programmes involving ethnic minorities, although
there are sections on ethnic minorities within overall programme evaluations. Moreover,
these reports have not mentioned some sensitive issues, such as inter racial attitudes.
Still, INGOs have contributed to positive changes in ethnic communities, such as:
56
57
Oxfam Hong Kong, 2000, p.45.
Notes from the field trips.
36
 INGO projects and programmes supporting traditional professions, including herb
gardens and traditional treatments, have increased income and restored ethnic
identity. One NGO noted that, “…the project has had a positive result in reviving at
least two craft skills -- silk weaving and dyeing -- and making them a viable
economic livelihood for group members. ... Productive use of traditional ethnic Thai
skills is one of the most valuable aspects of the project as far as the district is
concerned.”58
 Some INGO projects and programmes such as small irrigation systems have
changed old habits of cultivation, thus contributing to economic stabilisation for
ethnic minorities. Highland ethnic groups such as Tay, Nung, Muong and Thai can
now cultivate two crops annually, whereas H’mong communities with new irrigation
systems can now cultivate in terraced fields.
 INGO projects and programmes have increased people’s participation in
community activities, particularly in the case of ethnic minority women. As one
INGO noted: “Several of the projects have been implemented with possible bias
toward the inhabitants of hamlets with poor and more vulnerable ethnic groups,
effectively attempting to involve them much as possible. H’mong and Dao men are
more involved in community affairs than in 1993”.59 Those INGO activities in
remote and mountainous areas where Government programmes have not yet been
visible have reduced the isolation of ethnic minorities. “More interaction between the
most marginalised ethnic minorities and outsiders (occurred) as a result of the
project.”60 Local authorities acknowledge this. One provincial leader said that
“INGO project activities in remote areas created opportunities for contact with
outsiders".61
 Health programmes such as clean water systems and training courses for health
workers have had a positive impact on ethnic communities. “The health of ethnic
minorities has definitely improved... the impact of this water availability has been
huge and has positive results on the health of the women and children.” 62
However, some factors have reduced the impact of INGO activities.
 Language has been a big obstacle to effective INGO work with ethnic
communities. Most project officers do not know ethnic languages. Consequently,
contacts with people who speak only ethnic languages depends on bi-lingual
commune leaders, with the result that local people are left out of decision making,
thereby reducing project impact. One INGO staff member commented: “It is very
difficult to develop a project in ethnic communities. During hamlet meetings, the
villagers just sit in silence, giggling or even speaking their own language. That’s why
58
59
60
61
62
Oxfam
Oxfam
Oxfam
Notes
Oxfam
37
Hong Kong, September 1998, p.47.
Great Britain. 1998.
Great Britain, 1998.
from the field trips.
Hong Kong, 2000.
in the beginning, needs assessments were implemented only in the Kinh-speaking
ethnic communities or with Kinh-speaking leaders.”63 This raises the question
whether project requests from ethnic communities where there are few Kinhspeaking people and little contact with outsiders have come from the communities
themselves or, instead, from the few Kinh-speaking leaders.
 Poor understanding in ethnic languages has led to poor knowledge of ethnic
customs, psychology, values and behaviours, thus limiting project impact. For
instance, an INGO paid a small salary to the trainees in a course in basic knowledge
for commune and hamlet health workers so that workers would also have incomegeneration possibilities in their own communities through treating patients. However,
a hamlet health worker told the study team: “I did not receive payment for medical
treatments or injections because the ethnic minorities do not pay for this kind of
service. They consider these activities as ‘self assistance within the community.’
Besides, most households in the commune or hamlet are my relatives. Some would
bring gifts, (but) other than that I did not receive anything. No one would pay me.”64
Thus, the idea of income generation for commune health workers did not succeed.
Similar results have happened with commune veterinary workers.
 INGOs tend to reach only more accessible ethnic communities with natural
resources. Thai, Tay and Nung communities receive more opportunities than
H’mong and Kho-mu groups, creating considerable contrast between the number of
beneficiaries in the two geographical areas. For instance, in one INGO credit and
savings project in a Thai hamlet, 100% of the women in 34 households took part,
while in another hamlet of a different ethnic minority only 44% (7 out of 16
households) had women taking part.65
 The same INGO project design applied to various ethnic minorities has created
different results between different ethnic groups. The study team could not collect
any data comparing beneficiaries within Tay, Nung, Muong, Thai, H’mong and Dao
in the same project. However, generally speaking, Tay, Nung, Muong and Thai are
more advanced in Kinh language, education, general knowledge and communication
skills. Thus, if the numbers of beneficiaries are the same, then it could be argued that
Tay, Nung, Muong, and Thai beneficiaries will receive more advantages from INGO
projects. An evaluation of a project to train commune health workers indicated: “The
levels of education, language and geography have considerable impact on the
learning skills of participants. Participants with higher levels of education and better
ability in speaking Kinh and who are not so isolated will have a better chance to learn
and understand new information compared with those having lower levels of
education, less fluency in Kinh and homes in more remote areas.”66 These dynamics
create differences among beneficiaries in a project involving different ethnic groups
and expand opportunities for the more advantaged.
63
64
65
66
Notes from the field trips.
Interview with a Halmet Health Workers in Tay Commune.
Author field note.
Action Aid, 1998-1999, p.4.
38
 Members of project management boards tend to be people living in accessible areas
rather than those living in remote or mountainous areas. Consequently, large
ethnic groups have dominated small ones in projects.
Lessons Learned
 INGOs should overcome ethnic language barriers by:



encouraging project officers in charge of ethnic minorities to study the ethnic
language, perhaps facilitated through daily contact with a local staff speaking that
language.
training a local staff person as interpreter
encouraging local people to take part in the project recruitment process.
 INGOs should study and learn the culture and customs of ethnic groups living in
project areas.
 INGOs should separate ethnic groups and apply approaches appropriate to each
during project planning. The length of training activities for Tay, Nung and Thai may
be similar to that for Kinh. However, H’mong, Dao, and Kho-mu may need language
training in Kinh and longer training time for project activities.
 INGOs should reconsider their policy of supporting ethnic minorities and invest in
the most difficult areas rather than let those areas remain isolated.
Other Vulnerable Groups
People with Disabilities
Thirty-four of the INGOs in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre database work with
people who have disabilities. It appears that few INGOs integrate people with disabilities
into their work. Often, people with disabilities have not been allowed to participate in
credit, agriculture or training sessions partly because of a decision that these people
would not be able to work. A project officer in one credit and savings project said that
they “do not let the disabled groups borrow money because they have lost their working
capacity, so it is very difficult for them to repay their loans”.67 In general, people with
disabilities appear to have only been a concern for specialised INGOs such as Komitee
Twee, Radda Barnen, World Vision, Handicap International, HVO, and CRS. The work
depends on the individual organisation’s philosophy. For instance, KTW focused on
hearing-impaired children while Radda Barnen has worked to apply the Convention on
the Rights of the Child in Vietnam. People with disabilities are sometimes involved if
they live in the project areas, as in the case of PSBI, which has an inclusive education
project for hearing impaired and deaf children as one of its activities in Thai Nguyen
Province.68
67
68
Notes from the field trips.
Viet Nam INGO Directory 2000-2001.
39
Although disability has not been a primary focus, the Disability Forum comprised of
about twenty INGOs has aimed to promote co-operation, collaboration and better
communication between INGOs, organisations of people with disabilities, and relevant
Government ministries. Some specialised INGOs make people with disabilities their
primary focus, while other INGOs have developed specific activities as part of broader
programmes. The study team did not find any attempts to explore reasons preventing the
broad inclusion of people with disabilities in INGO programmes. As one INGO staff
member said, “we have no conscious recognition of people with disabilities in any
programme planning”.69
In general, INGOs do not seem to have addressed the issue of recruiting people with
disabilities to be office staff or project officers serving people with disabilities; and it
seems unlikely this question will be on the agenda soon. INGOs may not have
sufficiently emphasised people with disabilities (with the result that many are still left
out) or existing social attitudes may have hindered INGOs efforts to take initiative.
The Aged
Only four INGOs in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre database work with the aged.
They focus mostly on housing and food for the elderly or co-operate with the Research
Institute of Traditional Medicine to develop herbal medicines for harmonious ageing.
Some reasons may explain the limited INGO involvement. First, since most INGO
projects target households, economically independent elderly living in the family are
unlikely beneficiaries. Second, care of the elderly in Vietnamese culture is the duty of the
children. Thus, helping the aged is more a matter for families in particular than for
society in general, making this not as urgent a social issue as in other countries.
Other Vulnerable Groups
These groups include single-headed households and unregistered citizens in project and
programme areas, in particular, big cities. These groups appear to be a fairly new focus
of INGO work.. One INGO staff person said, “our organisation has only begun to
address the issue of the unregistered since last year, when it was raised for the first time
by SCF/UK”.70 Some INGO Vietnamese staff did not even realise that no unregistered
families in their areas took part in their projects or programmes.71
The unregistered are more important in big cities and the Mekong Delta. Those of
working age comprise most of the people who move from one area to another in search
of work, especially to big cities such as Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. However, INGOs
and their partners do not appear to have tried to create opportunities for these people,
particularly in credit and savings projects, where there would be no guarantee of loan
repayment. As an informant in one INGO study stated: “Illegally settled families have no
69
70
71
Interview notes.
Interview notes.
Interview notes.
40
access to either credit or poverty alleviation programmes.”72 It should be noted that this
is not true of all INGO work.
Single-headed households also have not received much INGO attention even though
gender has been an INGO focus.73 One INGO noted that in their projects and
programmes they have aimed to focus to “get technology across” to the extent that “the
project paid no attention to marginalised groups”.74
INGO inclusion of these vulnerable groups in project and programme planning seems to
have been more by chance than purpose. Can these groups become more a part of INGO
projects and programmes?
2.3 Impact on Government Programmes and Policy
To examine INGO influence on Government programmes and policy, the study team
used: information collected from six workshops, in-depth interviews, and published
reports. Interviewees fell into two main groups:


individuals in international organisations,75 as well as policy makers, researchers;
officials of Government agencies; local authorities; members of mass
organisations; and staff of local NGOs
INGO staff.
The study team interviewed fifty people in the first group, with Government staff
comprising the main interviewees (24/50), including one person at the deputy minister
level (see the table below). The second group consisted of local and expatriate INGO
staff, including programme and project officers and representatives. The interviewees
had been working in various sectors, such as education, health, agriculture and rural
development, and urban community development. Some interviewees’ remarks spanned
many sectors.
The interviewees’ opinions were diverse but fell into three main sub-topics:



impact on Government programmes
impact on Government officers and staff
impact on the formulation of Government policies, documents and regulations
below the level of a national law.
From the Report of a Review of the Three Projects in the Mekong Delta
funded by an INGO. November 1998.
73 See previous section.
74 Interview with a member staff from an INGO.
75 Here, the term international organisations includes UNDP,
multilateral organisations, and other bilateral donors but not INGOs.
72
41
Table 6: Interviewees According to Work Positions and Fields
Sectors
Interviewer
Education
Health
Minister/vice
Minister
Gov. officers
Local leader
Mass org.
Local NGO
INGO Rep.
INGO staffs
Others
Total
8
1
4
4
17
7
2
1
1
9
1
21
Agriculture
&Rural
Development
1
Urban
C.D
Others
4
8
3
2
10
18
2
3
3
1
1
2
3
1
46
11
Total
1
1
6
24
12
5
6
17
34
2
101
2.3.1 Impact on the Way to Access Government Programmes
Most interviewees shared the opinion that INGOs’ ways of working have been flexible,
bottom-up and community-based, and, as such, have positively influenced Government.
INGO activities in agriculture and rural development have had major impacts on
MARD programmes, including agricultural extension, credit, IPM, agro-forestry
development, and land and forestry contracting and management. INGOs have
particularly affected sustainable agricultural development.76
PRA methods have influenced Government programme planning and implementation.
INGOs have mobilised local people to solve problems in their own communities. Many
Government projects have applied these methods with flexibility to assess community
needs and priorities. Local authorities have followed INGO methods to mobilise local
forces for road construction, digging wells, sanitation facilities and school construction.
A director of a provincial health department commented, “the PRA method was applied
by health staff when implementing Government projects such as the CBM (Community
Based Monitoring) in five districts in 1998”.77
INGO activities in credit programmes in the early 1990s expanded some models
already in use in Women’s Union pilot projects, including the use of small groups,
instituting savings among the poor, and implementing loans through gradual repayment.
The Government then applied these models to help the poor. One interviewee noted,
“Our credit programme contributed to the city’s hunger-and-poverty-eradication
programme. For example, in the early stage, Government credit programmes always
76
77
Interview notes.
Interview notes.
42
collected interest at the end of the period, and offered no training to borrowers. Thus,
there was not much result. Later, the programme succeeded following my organisation’s
experiences in gradual collection of interest.”78
INGOs demonstrated new ways of working on HIV/AIDS prevention and helped
decrease the epidemic’s impact in Vietnam. Some INGOs such as SCF/UK created a
new model by establishing a network of peer educators, who then contributed to the
primary framework of Government programmes. As an officer of the former National
Committee for HIV/AIDS Prevention commented: “Although INGO projects have only
established small models, the National Committee for HIV/AIDS Prevention has applied
them to large Government programmes. For instance, in the beginning, the model of peer
educators was not accepted by the Government. During the last two years, the
Government provided financial support to twenty provinces for peer education.”79 One
INGO staff member thought INGO activities in HIV/AIDS would fail because the
Government had recently integrated the Committee for AIDS Prevention with the
Committee for the Prevention of Social Evils.80
INGOs in nutrition, in particular SCF/US, contributed significantly to Government
programmes on nutrition.81 By using health volunteers for child-and- women-focused
interventions specific to anti-malnutrition, INGOs brought a new model to Vietnam. This
model included growth monitoring, nutrition-education and rehabilitation, as well as preand-post-natal care. The use of a positive deviance study enabled communities to utilise
their own resources to address malnutrition.82
INGOs in education have offered latest and up-to-date information on training. One
interviewee noted: “This source of information is so precious for us, even better than
money. INGO activities have contributed to changing knowledge at the community and
ministerial levels, thus creating new and effective ways of working."83 Komitee Twee’s
education programme for hearing-impaired children has stimulated contributions from
local schools to upgrade classrooms. MRM (Maternal Reflective Methods), a modern
and effective method for children with severe hearing impairment, use hearing aids and
can be applied in the mother tongue. Many other resources have contributed to the
renovation of methodology in public schools.84
2.3.2 Impact on Government Staff
INGO activities have influenced Vietnamese Government staff members, who have
improved their professional skills when working with INGO experts in agriculture,
health, and education. In addition, INGOs have sent Government staff members abroad
for training, giving them access to advanced technology.
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
Notes from field trips.
Notes from field trips.
HIV/AIDS Workshop, (July, 2000).
Workshop on Nutrition, (June 2000).
Save the Children US, 1995.
Interview notes.
Komitee Twee (Evaluation Report).
43
Co-operation with INGOs has helped local officials learn about planning,
implementation, management and supervision of small projects, knowledge that they
have applied to projects from other sources of funds. An official from a mountainous
district noted: “After having implemented the INGO project, we realised we had learned
a lot and applied the INGO way of project management to various projects in the district.
It is very difficult for us to find other donors, but we have written some project proposals
to send out to donors for financial support. It is obvious that management skills of
commune leaders have improved from implementing the INGO project.”85
Co-operation with INGOs has helped improve the capacity, role and prestige of some
mass organisations, such as the Women’s Union, Farmers’ Union, and VACVINA.
INGO activities in agriculture, education, and health have contributed to a changed
perception of Vietnamese staff, thereby improving the role of peasants, and helping
children with disabilities and people living with HIV/AIDS integrate into communities.
INGOs activities in building capacity for partners have influenced training methods
for Vietnamese staff. In the early stages, INGOs opened training courses for health
workers, commune veterinary surgeons, etc. Then, later on, provincial and district
leaders organised training courses using INGO models but Government funds. One
INGO staff member stated: “At the beginning, our INGO organised a training course for
hamlet health workers. Later on, the district heath department organised training courses
for other hamlets with contents similar to our programme."86 A director of a provincial
health department noted that, “the contents of training courses organised by MCNV for
commune health workers have had a great impact on teaching methods and contents in
the medical schools, in particular the use of student participation”.87
Some interviewees noted that, although INGOs had received credit for training
Vietnamese staff, INGOs have drawn skilled and talented staff away from Government
agencies, creating a negative impact. An official heading a research institute noted: “We
now lack staff with ability to do fundamental research because our good staff have
become consultants for foreign organisations.”88 Some argued that serving as consultants
to foreign organisations, including INGOs, has caused Vietnamese researchers to lose
their creativity and initiative in relation to Government work and that it has become more
difficult for these staff to become specialised in their own field, harming human
development in Vietnam. Others felt co-operation with INGOs has improved the
knowledge and working skills of Government staff. They felt that Vietnamese staff who
had moved from Government work to INGOs also contributed to Vietnam development
and that this trend should not be considered a negative impact.89
85
86
87
88
89
Interview notes.
Author field note.
Author field note.
Author field note.
Author field note.
44
2.3.3 Impact on the Making of Policy, Regulations and Documents
below National Laws (“under-law documents”)
Collecting information for this section was difficult because interviewees either did not
understand this relationship or did not know about INGO work in detail. However, the
study team was able to collect the following information:
One policy maker stated that when drafting under-law documents on the new model of
co-operative, they did review and consult the model of co-operative introduced by one
INGO in Thai Nguyen Province.
INGOs have helped open the possibility of permission for children with disabilities to
attend school. In 1997, provisions which prohibited children with disabilities from
attending kindergartens were abolished. The Ministry of Education and Training
(MOET) confirmed that disabled children learning in special schools should attend
regular schools.90 With Komitee Twee support, MOET began specific activities,
including:




Organising a university division with a training curriculum in the field of hearing
impairment
Providing preparatory education courses for lecturers to establish special
education departments at local teachers training colleges
Providing general training courses for primary and kindergarten teachers
Establishing key pedagogic universities in the north, the centre and the south, and
at the National Institute of Educational Science to improve curricula, develop
training and continue research in education.91
Lessons Learned
Generally speaking, INGOs projects with their small investments, pilot initiatives,
bottom-up methods, and farmer-based approaches have limited the spread and
application of new technologies. These factors may have in turn reduced the impact of
INGOs on Government policy planning and programmes. However, it could be argued
that some of these factors (small scale investments and bottom-up methods), will have
also had positive influences in relation to the use of more participatory approaches.
To extend the impact of their programmes, INGOs should consider some of the
following:
90
Interview note.
91
Komitee Twee (Evaluation Report).
45
 INGOs should understand and consider the policies of the Vietnamese Party and
Government in order for their work to be appropriate. INGOs should co-operate with
and support Government activities. Only through this way will INGO work be
effective. For instance, solving the root causes of malnutrition requires Government
involvement at all levels.
 INGOs in the same sector or sharing the same partners should establish and
maintain a strong network facilitated by the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre. INGOs
might then have a common voice when speaking to the Vietnamese Government.
 INGOs in the same sector should meet with concerned Government staff and
agencies to discuss experiences and share information. Only in this way can INGOs
apply the results of their work to development policies of Vietnam.
 INGOs should co-operate with and support Government offices and local
Vietnamese organisations appropriately to train and strengthen Vietnamese staff.
46
3. Methods, Approaches and Lessons Learned
Changing from service delivery to capacity building
Over 65% of the organisations responding to the study’s questionnaire reported changes
in their activities since starting work in Vietnam. The most apparent shift is from a focus
on service delivery to capacity building of project partners. More than 40% of the
organisations surveyed noted that sectoral investment changed with greater awareness of
social and economic problems and that activities also changed to include more
appropriate responses. Shifts also resulted from partner and beneficiary requests and
awareness of new or innovative activities. Other reasons included requests from
headquarters and donors and changes in the Vietnamese regulatory framework92.
Changing to participatory approaches and active learning
INGOs reflected a lack of consensus about what constitutes approaches and methods.
Nevertheless, over 80% of the organisations surveyed noted changes in approaches and
methods. Trends included increased emphasis on capacity building, participatory
methods, supporting local structures to manage activities at the grass-roots level, and
greater use of active learning methods93.
An understanding of why methods have changed can be gained by examining replies of
specific organisations. One INGO stated “a bottom-up approach has always been
applied” but “more recently PRA processes have been introduced and are completed
before the design of programmes”.94 Based on these findings, the organisation is
beginning participatory planning at the village and commune levels. Staff noted that
these new ways of working will require time before they become normal practise.
Another INGO pointed out that it focused on introducing “innovative ideas and
approaches” in its early years but later favoured applying these approaches.
3.1 Partnership
Partnership is extremely important to INGO work in Vietnam. INGOs most often
collaborate with the Government and mass organisations at local and central levels, as
well as with emerging local NGOs, social development organisations, research and
consultant institutes, and universities.95 In reality, INGOs’ co-operation with Vietnamese
agencies and organisations varies from one INGO to the next. Following are five
common typologies, some of which may overlap:
See Table 7, Appendix A.
See Table 8, Appendix A.
94 Interview notes.
95
VUFO-NGO Resource Centre, 1999, p.4.
92
93
47

INGOs that do not have offices in the country. Approximately 193 INGOs (350
active INGOs minus 157 with offices or workstations in the country) are working
from abroad. These organisations mostly operate through their local partners or even
sometimes through another INGO which has an office in Vietnam. These
organisations were not included in this study.

INGOs that situate international staff and volunteers in country to implement
programmes. These organisations employ no or very few local staff. Volunteersending agencies fit in this type.

INGOs with field project offices that have direct relationship with local people
where project or programme activities are carried out. Some INGOs have a head
office and also establish project offices on site in project areas. For example, CARE
has a representative office in Ha Noi, and project offices in Ngoc Lac, Phu Yen, and
in Ho Chi Minh City. Or, an INGO may have only one office and choose to locate it
in a project area, for example, Save the Children Australia in Binh Thuan Province.

INGOs with centrally based offices in Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hue, or other
provincial capitals, from which field projects and programmes are implemented.
An expatriate usually heads the office, and usually each project or programme has a
Vietnamese officer responsible for supervision and monitoring.

INGOs that serve as donors supporting Vietnamese agencies or NGOs to
implement projects and programmes. Vietnamese counterparts implement the
projects; INGO staff only supervise, monitor, and evaluate.
At present, INGOs have various partners for co-operation; thus, the term partnership has
been used freely. As one INGO notes, “partners are sometime at provincial, district or
commune level and sometime at all three levels. In the village, there is said to be
partnership with the Management Committee of an activity. Partnership with
international and local NGOs is also possible.”96 A careful project assessment and choice
of the right partner can help to guarantee the success of an INGO programme. Some
INGOs with long experience have tried many types of co-operation. They note that it is
often difficult to find partners appropriate for the organisation’s objectives and
philosophy.
None of the nineteen INGOs selected for this study belonged to the first since all were
based in the country. Few fit the second type. As a result, the study focused on the
remaining three types. Their strong points are:

96
Having local project offices helps prompt implementation through the assistance of
local staff at the main office. Many mistakes can be avoided. INGOs partners
acknowledged that this model was suitable. Overall, provincial and district officials’
Oxfam Hong Kong,
48
2000, p. 79.
attitudes towards having a local office were positive. The local office helped ensure
co-operation between the organisation and its partners and minimised delays.97

The recruitment of staff from the locality for project offices helps INGOs have easy
access to local Government and people, thus avoiding mistakes caused by
misunderstanding the local culture and local situation. INGOs can improve local staff
capacity through training courses and daily discussion with consultants and staff
from Hanoi offices.

Recruitment of specialised staff from the field to work at the project area reduces
the costs of a cumbersome management mechanism. Generally speaking, recruited
staff members have met INGOs criteria so that INGOs did not have to lose time in
initial training. Moreover, local Vietnamese project officers served as bridges
between INGOs and Vietnamese partners, thus contributing to project success.

INGOs who have been working as donors and have made use of the existing
Vietnamese structure, to improve staff capacity and have not drawn talented staff
from Vietnamese Government agencies. (See the section on policy impact.)
In spite of the above-mentioned strong points, some weaknesses appeared:

INGOs initially had difficulty recruiting local staff with the capacity to implement
and supervise projects. Main-office staff had to train local staff. However, the
presence and support of main-office staff could make local staff at the project office
dependent, which could cause a loss of initiative and creativity. One INGO staff
member said that “local project officers still depend heavily on Hanoi officers even
after so many years of assistance. Many local officers cannot yet write a report”.98 As
a result, giving support for a short time and then withdrawing seems inappropriate.

The relationship between main-office staff and staff recruited from project areas to
work in the field is a sensitive issue not mentioned in most assessment reports.
Local staff members in project areas have a tendency to form local alliances, while
main-office staff have a tendency to dominate and press to assure the organisation’s
objectives are followed. This can create tension and disputes with the risk of harming
work relationships. One INGO main-office staff member said that “local staff’s
cohesion and their partial attitude have made the staff from main office feel
isolated”.99 Different policies for main-office and locally hired staff in the field add
to these tensions.

Professional project officers running projects through local partners will not be
effective if the INGO officers do not have enough time to manage, supervise and
grasp the whole project because the project partner may change the project design
during implementation. One INGO staff member commented: “When our credit
ActionAid Vietnam (The Son La Programme - 5 years).
from the field trips.
99Notes from the field trips.
97
98Notes
49
project began, the Women’s Union agreed to give loans with 1.2% interest, but when
the project was almost completed, our project officer learned that the Women’s
Union had reduced the rate.”100 Generally speaking, local partners are in charge of
daily work, while INGO project officers must follow the steps of the project
implementation closely; otherwise, the project may become only symbolic. As an
example, one HIV/AIDS project set up a network of local collaborators in an attempt
to attract the participation of health organisations, the Women’s Union and Youth
Union. However, the project was not effective one year after the network was, in
theory, established.

Some issues have emerged between INGOs and the supported organisations such
as Government offices, mass organisations, and local NGOs.
 Mass organisations (particularly the Women’s Union) are not specialised in
finance; thus their lack of management capacity appears during project
implementation. Moreover, partner organisations second personnel to work with
INGOs in addition to regular work, thus reducing the impact of both the INGO
and the partner organisation.
 The many levels from INGOs down to beneficiaries (sometimes as many as
four) may lead to indirect relationships and weak project management.
Government organisations are often expected to ensure a project’s technical
aspects, yet the partner may only supervise the project.
 Partner agencies sometimes take advantage of the situation for their own
benefit. One INGO staff member indicated that some Vietnamese agencies
implementing projects have cheated both the INGO and the beneficiaries.
Training activities are a good example, with the number of budgeted courses,
attendants and actual expenditures unknown to both INGOs and beneficiaries.
The same issues appear vis-à-vis co-operation with local NGOs, as described in
the following section.

INGO assistance may not be mentioned when local partners feel the INGO projects
they implement are theirs, making it hard to assess INGO impact.

Both sides’ aspirations, expectations and ideas should be discussed when
partnership is being discussed . Otherwise, differences may arise during the project
process owing to different expectations.
The relationship between INGOs and local partners is not yet fully successful, as the
following points illustrate:

100
50
Different methods and approaches between partners and INGOs have hindered
good partnership. Some partners complained that INGOs mostly work top down,
while INGOs themselves often stress their bottom-up approach. Partners in one credit
Notes from the field trips.
project complained about high interest rates. District officials working with an
integrated rural development project complained about unwanted visits by INGOs,
local organisations and university students. In another case, discord between district
authorities and project staff over fund management, interest, and administrative
procedures led to the project’s early end in May 2000 instead of 2004. Different
styles have created misunderstandings. For example, INGOs expect to discuss issues
openly with wide community participation, while partners often want to raise issues
privately within their communities. One INGO staff member commented that “the
problem with community development in Vietnam is the fact that the implementing
partner wants to be told what to do and then go off and do it in the community and
then tell you what happened”. 101

The way to work either directly or indirectly with partners of many different levels
of INGOs is one of the causes that hinders good partnership. INGOs tend to reduce
the role of intermediate partners to have more direct relationships with beneficiaries.
Provinces have signed most contracts, but districts or communes have implemented
the projects and programmes. Activities in completed commune projects were
reported to the district; however, the province as indirect partner neither received
comprehensive information nor fully understood project activities. The director of a
provincial health department complained: “The provincial department only knew
them (the INGOs) in the beginning of the process. Then we were told what they had
done and how the project was implemented in the district or commune, even though
we were an indirect partner. We don’t create obstacles for INGOs, but we do want to
know about their activities so we can support and supervise their health work in the
province.”102

Financial transparency remains an issue. Some partners complain that INGOs are
not transparent. INGO staff members have admitted to this. One INGO staff member
stated: “We are trying to be transparent, but there are still some budgetary issues. In
the first year we translated our whole action plan, which shows progress up to a
point. However, we can never be truly equal because of our position as funders.”103
Meanwhile, INGOs have demanded that their partners be financially transparent. One
partner stated that “they (INGOs) force us to submit detailed monthly, quarterly and
even yearly financial reports on every item, even very small items like paper, pens,
and ink. Yet we know they spend money in a very wasteful manner at their main
office.”104 Local partners have accused INGO staff of lacking transparency in credit
and construction projects.

INGO and partner differences in information sharing and participation in
decision-making have damaged partnership. As one INGO staff member stated:
“We are reasonably accountable to our partners and improving. We try to be open, as
it is better to be open. We are sharing all our documents, reports, everything except
101
102
103
104
51
Interview notes.
Notes from the field trips.
Interview with local partner.
Notes from the field trips.
performance appraisals.” Few INGOs so fully share information with partners; rather
partners often do not know anything about assessment team results. One informant
noted “we have met and worked with a lot of assessment and evaluation teams on
technology, on impact, on socio-economy, but we have never heard their results or
their comments so we could learn.” Partners seldom have the chance to participate in
decisions regarding projects. For instance, INGOs (not partners) choose consultants.
Many partners raised concerns about the recruitment and selection of consultants:
“We only know the consultants when they come down to work with us. Only then do
we know how they work and their capacity. Some consultants are good, but the rest
are not qualified.”105

Project officers play an important role in the relationship between INGOs and
partners. A lack of project officers’ decision-making power weakens this
relationship. Several INGOs staff members commented that “some expatriate INGO
directors want to watch every project activity closely and want project officers to
consult with them on every decision, however small”.106 As a result, partners ask the
expatriate to solve work-related issues. This delays project implementation because
good partnerships also depend on the attitude of the directors and representatives. On
the other hand, project officers’ limited capacity can cause partners to lose
confidence, particularly if the project officers’ capacity is weaker than the partners’.
INGOs need an appropriate partner for project and programme success. Vietnam is
different than any other developing countries, where those INGOs may implement
similar programmes more directly with beneficiary communities. Partnership is crucial in
Vietnam. One attendee at the workshop on integrated rural development noted,
“choosing the right partner is important to success. A partner with weak capacity will not
lead to success.”
Lessons Learned
 INGOs should build stronger commitments with their partners. Before signing
contracts, both sides should thoroughly discuss expectations, advantages and
disadvantages. Without this process, either side may singly change the terms during
project implementation. Signed contracts should be considered as both legal
documents and guides for project implementation.
 INGOs should take enough time in advance to evaluate and choose the right
partners based on criteria about where a project or programme should be located.
They should avoid partners with too many other commitments since they may not
take the project seriously or may turn it into a new kind of service.
 INGOs should consider whether their direct partners should be organisations with
technical consultants or mass organisations. Many INGOs have changed partners
105
106
52
All quotes in this paragraph are from interview notes.
Experienced Staff Workshop, (July, 2000).
after learning that Vietnamese mass organisations are neither independent nor
technically specialised, and may have been too busy with their own activities.
 INGOs should review management policies relating to representatives/directors
and project officers. During early programme stages, negotiating with Government
officials can take half a director’s time. This work should then be transferred to
project officers. INGOs should review their systems of information sharing and
power transference to partners. Only by this way can equal relationship be
maintained.
 INGOs should consider whether bidding is an appropriate way to find good
project partners.107 Many INGOs have followed this model, for example in
infrastructure construction where a bidding process is used. However, if using this
process INGOs should give close attention to the issues of quality and supervision.
A Case Study of Partnership 108
One agency’s programme aimed to train teachers for children with impaired hearing. The
agency consulted with the province People’s Committee about education for
disadvantaged children. About 200 children among 4,220 disadvantaged children in the
province joined the agency’s programme. The agency trained teachers at every level in
working with disabled children. Teachers trained in the programme then received local
hearing-impaired children into their classes.
The province had good intentions but no money. Province officials were happy when the
INGO came and agreed to help. The INGO arranged for the training of major teachers in
the districts, and the National Institute for Education Sciences (NIES) provided master
training and experience with hearing-impaired children. The province wanted to have an
independent programme but had to use NIES staff because not enough province staff had
attended the initial courses. Thus, the province was a partner but under direction of
another institution, NIES.
The INGO thought the province would pay NIES for the training, but to save money, the
province wanted to use its own staff. In addition, outsiders sometimes determined the
selection process. Teachers whom the province wanted were not trained, and the salary
for trained teachers was less than 70% of their normal salary. The province wanted to
work directly with the INGO and discuss these problems frankly but had to go through
NIES because NIES was the INGO’s official partner. Thus, the province could not speak
directly with the INGO about its problems with the project.
107
108
53
HIV/AIDS Workshop, (July, 2000).
Interview notes.
Most partners have tried not to complain about INGOs but, rather, have praised them.
One partner stated: “When working with us, they (INGOs) still make some mistakes and
have weaknesses, but it’s good they have helped our people. Although the support is
small, it is better than nothing.” Partners worry that strong criticism will dampen INGO
support. Sustainable co-operation can come only from mutual understanding, mutual
respect and mutual frankness. Vietnamese partners need to express their opinions frankly
about INGO ways of working and co-operation. INGOs should create an atmosphere to
encourage this.
3.2 Capacity Building
Thirty-six organisations in the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre database include activities
in capacity and institution building. The study defined institutional capacity building as
“providing training opportunities for local organisations or partners so that they improve
their skills and take charge”. INGO capacity-building activities included supporting the
development of community development plans, gender awareness, study tours, building
local NGOs, and staff development of partner institutions to strengthen local capacity.109
Capacity building appears to have emerged as a new approach in INGO activities during
the past decade and with more focus on it in recent years. INGOs that responded to the
questionnaire noted a growth in capacity building from under 5% in 1991 to
approximately 12% by the end of the decade. The financial means allocated to capacity
building increased from 7% in 1991 to around 12% over the same time. However, such
figures may not adequately reflect the importance given to capacity building as it may be
an activity built into other sectoral programmes and projects.
Most INGOs agreed on the importance of building capacity for local staff, partners, and
beneficiaries. Some argue that “the role of INGOs is to help the partners develop
professional capacity and commitment.”110 Perhaps this is the reason capacity building
has become one of the foremost activities in INGOs projects and programmes. Although
INGOs have engaged in many activities, assessment reports on capacity building are
rare, especially in relation to the impact of these activities during the last ten years. This
section will concentrate on the institutional capacity building and capacity building for
the direct beneficiaries.
Information collected from interviews with various groups confirmed the following
strong points in INGO capacity-building activities:
 Capacity building has had positive impacts on Vietnamese organisations and staff.
This effect was noted above in attitudinal changes towards the poor and people with
disabilities as well as in improvement in planning and management skills at the
NGO Directory 2000-2001.
Minutes of Terre des hommes INGOs Policy Conference, HCMC, August
1996.
109
110
54
grass-roots level while simultaneously enhancing the prestige of mass
organisations.111
 Some INGO projects and programmes proved their effectiveness in capacity
building in relation to INGO achievements. One INGO noted that, “the results of
capacity-building efforts were clearly shown during the project implementation
process. The technicians, GREWs (grass-root extension workers) and group leaders
fulfilled their work during the project and contributed to its success. Many GREWs
improved their skills in participatory training and technology transfer.112 Komitee
Twee noted, “(local staff) support was effective, contributing to the development of
education for handicapped children in Vietnam. The project was practical for the
development of training for teachers at different levels, especially in the current
situation where there are few such teachers and training facilities are not available for
them. Komitee Twee support was comprehensive in training personnel and providing
necessary facilities and equipment for the children’s development.”113
 Capacity building for local beneficiaries can be considered a primary tool for
working with vulnerable community groups, such as the poor, women, and ethnic
minorities, providing them with knowledge and new skills. Direct project
beneficiaries such as women in the credit projects, children in anti-malnutrition
programmes, participants in IPM projects, and users of clean water systems
participated in training activities. Consequently, INGO beneficiary training went
beyond the programme designers’ first expectations.
Some challenges facing INGOs in capacity building for partners and beneficiaries are:
 INGOs and partners differed in their perception of training needs. One INGO staff
person said: “We do not engage in institutional capacity building and do not have
information.”114 Some INGOs explained that they were small with only a small
training budget, which they concentrated on necessary technical training for
implementing partners rather than on English training, education abroad and overseas
study tours. They felt those activities were more suitable for Government.115 Some
INGOs felt they should focus more widely. As one of INGO staff member said: “We
can be justly criticised for not doing enough in capacity building. We have not
responded to partner expectations for training.”116 Another INGO staff member
noted: “We don’t want the partner to be a small version of our NGO. We don’t want
to create babies with all the attending limits and dependencies. We try to reinforce
existing bodies and their actors."117 Some INGOs felt they should do even more to
improve their capacity-building work.
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
55
For more details, please read Section 2 and 3.
Interview notes.
Komitee Twee, 1998.
Interview notes.
Notes from the field trips.
Interview notes.
Interview notes.
 Some training courses focused only on certain target groups and did not reach all
needy people. In some cases, a few partners with English fluency and high positions
had numerous opportunities to attend courses, while others hardly had any
opportunity. This created an elite among partners. One INGO staff member
commented: “Some partners have improved their professional skills, but the situation
among Government staff remains unbalanced since INGOs invest only in some
personnel.”118
 The intention of partner capacity building often does not lead to subsequent
expected results because the trained staff members are not in decision-making
positions. They cannot apply their new knowledge in their daily work. However, if
capacity building is with elected individuals, then elections may shift responsibility
during the project, thus affecting training results. One INGO staff member
commented: “The effects of training activities had to go in accordance with longterm commitment of the partners, but in fact the project which I have to complete in
five years has seen partners change three times.”119
Some INGOs have supported social and community development institutes. This model
could be very promising, as one INGO staff member said: “We hope in the future to get
universities more involved in our work and assist social work to become an established
profession again. We need good, trained people – social and community development
professionals – to do the work. Community development needs to be introduced as a
form of intervention, and it must be taught at university. We should support Vietnamese
groups teaching people to do community development. We want to establish independent
research to enable Government decisions to be based on the real situation, not on
decrees. Services will only improve when professional people manage them.” 120
A Case Study in Skills Transfer
One INGO wanted to build the capacity of local authorities to implement an urban
community development project involved with resettlement. The INGO had partnership
with other INGOs, the Youth Association and the Women’s Union. The INGO provided
training in management skills to Vietnamese partners. A Management Board was
established, with community members and the local authorities. In a meeting, the INGO
stressed that training and daily work needed to go together. Training should be in the
project context so people in management roles could better understand their work.121
INGO capacity building is not always successful because much training is top-down,
too technical, from the West, and not suitable to local conditions. INGOs do not always
understand the problems of local people and the local culture. They tend to think
technically, try to do a number of projects, and apply a number of models. In one
118
Interview
from
Interview
Interview
119Notes
120
121
56
notes.
the field trips.
notes.
notes.
integrated rural development project, an INGO wanted to provide tam hoang chicken to
peasants as the first grant in a supposedly highly productive income-generation project.
However, this kind of chicken requires special food and living conditions. The particular
province had severe weather, making it hard for the chickens to survive. In addition, the
peasants were too poor to buy the special food necessary for the chicken. As a result, the
project failed within a short period of time.122
 INGO training sometimes does not bring the intended effects because of logistics,
funding, and other obstacles. Some INGOs had to shorten their courses or limit the
number of attendants, meaning partners often were not effectively trained.
 Extension training has had both a positive and negative impact, and is cut or
repeated depending more on finances than on effectiveness. INGOs described
training activities as flexible and casual. Some INGOs allocated funds to training
with no clear plans. In turn, some partners implemented many small activities or a
few very large ones, indicating a lack of clarity and strategy.
Training of trainers (TOT) aims to build capacity in skills transfer within a core group
of people who can then work with target groups. "Although nobody can be 'made' to
learn, a skilful trainer who knows the target group, its background and earlier
experiences, can raise and direct audience interest towards the desired topic, .... creating
optimal conditions for each individual learner to build a personal mental model on which
practical performances are based.”123 The following points became clear:
 TOT sessions run by INGOs did not turn out to be very effective because TOT
quality depends on selection of initial trainers, course content, materials, teaching
plans for on-going training, course length, etc. TOT courses and INGO methods of
extension training revealed weaknesses, as described in the following example:
A Case Study in Training of Trainers
“Some staff of the PHC project were trained in Hanoi ... on the Grameen Bank credit
model. After the training, the Women’s Union staff designed a training programme for
the commune staff, but there remained a big gap in the training contents. The Women’s
Union lacks experience of general economic management, especially in the management
of credit and savings programmes. District and commune staff, who did not have
sufficient experience or methods or materials, then conducted training for borrowers.
That led to a poor quality of training. Borrowers raised many issues that could not be
answered by the managers124.
 The quality of trainers is important to the success of capacity building. At present,
INGOs rely on their own capacity, human resources and network to choose trainers.
122
123
124
57
Notes from the field trips.
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development, 1997, p. 6.
Notes from an interview with an INGO.
Trainers may be university lecturers, staff of specialised agencies, or even INGO
staff. Each type of trainer has strong and weak points. The way of transferring
knowledge is important. University lecturers have in-depth knowledge but may lack
suitable skills for communicating with peasants and may not be appropriate trainers
for courses aimed at farmers. INGO staff may be qualified but lack time. They could
organise beginning TOT courses with subsequent classes taught by specialists.
 Staff members such as district agriculture extensionists and districts health
workers have been suitable trainers for INGO training courses. First, they are the
local people who know the local topography and socio-economy, especially in
ethnic-minority regions. Those who understand ethnic languages are in a better
position to provide training. A commune staff member in charge of agriculture said:
“The three days of training were not enough for peasants to absorb the knowledge;
we have to instruct them at every step. For instance, with the plants having insects,
what should they do? How should they treat pigs that are ill? Thus, agriculture
extension staff must deal with all sorts of problems.”125 Training and capacity
building serve various purposes, for, by training local partners, trainers increase their
own capacity as well.
 Training manuals are important for capacity-building quality. However, few
INGOs have built programme-training manuals for their courses. One evaluation
stated: “Few documents in structured training and technical extension leaflets are
available for extensionists and farmers. No standard training manual is yet available;
most training costs are for new staffs or to transfer courses to other districts.”126
Training materials used came from invited trainers, creating differences among the
INGO programme. University lecturers tended to bring materials that were too
academic; trainers from central agriculture departments often used materials that
were either too general or not suitable to the local environment.
 Training materials and methods are often inappropriate. An assessment of health
training for communes and hamlets noted that some points of the curriculum were
inappropriate for the hamlet level.127 Trainees sometimes received books that were
too complicated or contained nothing new; the new books stayed on the shelves. One
beneficiary of an integrated rural development project stated that “the trainers talked
a lot but I did not remember a single word. Then I took the plants home. The local
technicians gave instruction. Then I understood how to space the plants”.128
Lessons Learned
 INGOs should continue to use a TOT approach for ethnic minorities, but note the
need for serious investment. INGOs should provide training for several months to
the most competent community members to upgrade technical and presentation
125Interview
126
127
128
58
notes.
CIDSE and SNV, February 1999.
ActionAid Vietnam, 1998-1999.
Interview notes.
skills. INGO project staff should provide adequate supervision and follow-up to
trainers in remote areas. People of the same ethnic group should be more closely
involved in project management and activities. It may be necessary for INGOs to
train them in Kinh (Vietnamese) language and in report preparation, or for INGO
staff and project partners to learn to work in minority languages. As one INGO staff
member said: “We have to instruct ethnic minorities directly about the work. If
INGOs could be patient enough to build local capacity, then that would be a big
difference between INGOs and Government organisations.”129
 INGOs should clarify their goals to improve training for women’s capacity
building and improve women’s participation in project design. With the exception
of credit projects, many INGOs could not establish how many women had
participated in training courses, though it was clear that women had participated less
than men. Factors in this dynamic were course design, timing, level of needed
education, and each locality’s culture and customs.
 INGOs should consider limiting staff and partner training abroad because it is
costly and risky for local partners because of electoral turnover. The money spent
on a staff trained abroad could be better used in TOT groups. However, INGOs
should provide close supervision to ensure the quality of TOT training courses.
 INGOs should consider the increasing demand for partner-and-beneficiary
training. Training commitments must depend on each INGO’s strategy and financial
situation. One INGO staff member noted: “this is a life-long investment. The same
contents can be repeated, and attendees can return for retraining. Training can also be
considered as networking together local people sharing mutual concerns.”130
 INGOs should also focus on capacity building gained not only through training
but also by daily work. Sharing experiences between INGO consultants, project
officers, partners and beneficiaries are important. A modest attitude, openness,
eagerness to learn, and mutual respect are crucial. Foreign consultants, especially,
should avoid coming to tutor others rather than to learn.
 INGOs should improve their co-ordination in capacity building. They should use
other organisations’ knowledge and experiences in the same sector when selecting
partners, organising training courses, writing training materials, and working with
ethnic minorities. The VUFO-NGO Resource Centre and its attached working groups
could produce newsletters and bulletins to introduce INGO experiences and good
models in each sector.
 INGOs should study impact of capacity building on their partners and
beneficiaries, and pay attention to the quality of training they bring to Vietnam.
129
130
59
Interview notes.
Interview notes.
 INGOs should review training materials. INGOs should compile materials with
easy-to-understand language and contents suitable to participants’ levels. Materials
should be consistently suitable for various target groups, such as farmers,
extensionists, and policy makers.
3.3 Ideas and Innovations
INGO contributions to Vietnam’s development reach far beyond the transfer of funds to
encompass more important elements, including the introduction of innovation, new
ideas, international linkages, and improving solidarity.131 Interviews confirmed that
stakeholders learned creativity and innovation from co-operating with INGOs. One
example is an INGO training activity using “Theatre for Development.”
Participants who were bored with logic and analysis wanted something both trainers and
trainees could respond to with passion. Topics emerging from a group discussion to be
explored through theatre included dengue fever, waste management, family planning,
agriculture extension, and dental health.132 Such new models have had a positive
influence on different target groups and on Government programmes and policies. (For
more details, see Sections 2.2 and 2.3.) However, several challenges remain:
 New ideas need time for testing, but some testing is needlessly repetitive. In the last
ten years, INGOs have put forward many new models for experiment rather than
make use of other INGOs’ established models, thus creating financial waste on
foreign specialists and in training. A staff member from a bank in Vietnam wondered
“why are INGOs still testing micro-finance models when some INGOs did that in the
early 1990s? Why don’t they evaluate their models, revise them and then enlarge
them? Why don’t the later INGOs follow the models of the former ones or learn from
the former ones and then re-design their programmes. INGOs just keep testing and
testing.”133
 Most new models have been imported, thus requiring that specialised consultants
be foreigners, some of whom would look down on Vietnamese staff. In reality, the
qualities of foreign consultants have not always matched those of Vietnamese
consultants. Several Vietnamese consultants noted that “foreigners always act as if
they are more knowledgeable than Vietnamese. They hardly listen to our suggestions
about how to run a project. They think they are superior. They just give instructions,
and operation manuals, but they do not adjust to local conditions”.134
 Most INGO projects have remained in a testing phase, reducing the possibility of
replication. Some INGOs had no clear strategy when entering Vietnam; still trying to
formulate one, they create new projects annually. One Government officer with long131
132
133
134
60
VUFO-NGO Resource Centre, 1999, p.7.
Interview notes.
Interview notes.
Interview notes.
time experience with INGOs commented: “I have the feeling that some INGOs are
like the blind, just groping their way. They move when their cane shows them there
seems to be a way. Otherwise, they continue to grope.”135
 INGOs’ encouragement of new ideas and initiatives in their working environments
sometimes leads to anarchy and a lack of consensus within the INGO. This has
negative impacts on projects and programmes. Some INGO Vietnamese staff
acknowledged that they felt relaxed in INGO environments because their boss
welcomed most of their new ideas and provided both financial support and time to
test them. If they failed, they could try another new idea the next time. No one was
blamed even when tests created waste and additional costs. Obviously, each INGO
has its own style of project implementation. Another INGO staff member indicated:
“Credit projects have been the most diverse projects in my organisation with various
target groups deciding different ways to give loans and applying different interest
rates. In one project we let the loan group use the interest but in another collect the
money monthly, like bank staff.”136
 Some new INGO ideas have not been suitable to Vietnam’s culture, economic
conditions and legal framework, thus reducing project impact. An INGO education
staff member said: “education projects have been so ambitious in trying to influence
teaching methods and content to improve the quality of education, but in fact, change
depends on many other socio-economic factors. The content of education
programmes is under MOET, with teachers returning to Government programmes.
INGO projects have no legal status; thus, it is impossible to intervene in the training
content and methods without permission.”137
 Sometimes, new project ideas involve an enormous objective requiring macro
solutions, which is not feasible for an INGO. One example follows:
Case Study on New Ideas and Innovation138
A micro-enterprise project aimed to assist development by adapting small-scale rural
enterprises to local conditions so farmers could eventually access formal credit sources.
The INGO helped organise a small tea enterprise for production, processing, and
marketing. The INGO did not pay 100%; farmers contributed part of the project’s costs.
The project was designed to promote bottom-up participatory planning and monitoring to
elevate lessons learned and provide feedback to policy-makers. It aimed to produce
models of successful small-scale rural enterprises, which could demonstrate market
potential, long-term comparative advantages in cost versus profitability, and provide
access for poor people, particularly women. The project design met the local people’s
requests. The INGO supplied each group of six to eight farmers with a hand pump to
135
Interview notes.
notes.
Interview notes.
Note from field trip.
136Interview
137
138
61
encourage farmer unity and mutual assistance. The INGO set up a Community Economic
Organisation (CEO) in the project area to help the farmers work in a co-operative way.
However, commune leaders indicated that sharing hand pumps caused difficulties:
- Everyone needed to pump water at the same time during the dry season; otherwise
tea productivity would be low. Some households had tea hills far from water sources,
making pump use impractical. Conflicts arose; farmers tried to keep these quiet,
fearing the INGO would take the pumps back.
- The limitation of only one pump for seven farmers when need was greatest meant
that most farmers had to buy their own pumps; thus, sharing the pumps failed, and
the INGO’s contribution proved to be, relatively speaking, insignificant.
The programme’s small size was a weakness. The limited number of pumps caused
disputes, and the equipment fell into disrepair. Group cohesiveness slipped. Income from
tea depends on quantity and price, which is decided by quality and market. Irrigation
systems and fuel for drying tea were significant issues. One beneficiary said the project
should have supported an irrigation system through cost sharing instead of supplying
hand pumps,
There were some small-scale opportunities to market in the district, but the quality of
other local teas was better. The province, which already produces many kinds of tea, was
too small to absorb a major increase in another variety of tea that was not widely
exported. Farmers had to buy fertiliser and find larger markets outside the province and
the country. So far, no tea associations except the CEO facilitate the co-operative use of
equipment and marketing; however the CEO is still weak.
Overall, the project design presented objectives that were significantly difficult for
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Activities emanating from the stated
objectives appeared to be designed in a logical, participatory way. However, some
activities were insufficient to meet designated objectives.
One informant said INGOs can help the enterprise and its ways of working but shouldn’t
attempt small-scale forays into marketing. INGOs should learn that in some situations
their ability is limited; they cannot handle complex areas, such as tea marketing. Since
marketing is a difficult problem for the Vietnamese Government, what can a small INGO
expect to do? Tea for export must move through the Government system. Economies of
scale are such that an INGO does not have the capacity to handle the tea marketing.
The INGO based its new model on co-operating farmer groups sharing one pump and
one tea-drying machine. However, it appears that the INGO did not pay attention to the
inconvenience of sharing equipment during high-intensity periods. Farmers soon sold
their share in the equipment to one member of the group; thus the idea of sharing, as in
the time of command-system co-operatives, failed.
Although INGO introduction of PRA (participatory rural appraisal) to access and
work with communities has had an impact on Government methodologies and
62
programmes (For more details, see Section 2.3), the use of PRA has met the following
unexpected challenges:
 PRA as a tool has not been effective in all circumstances. More than the normal
five to six days are necessary to delineate solutions for difficulties besetting a whole
community. PRA can risk becoming another tool for outsiders to come and do
something quickly.
 PRA tools sometimes create conflicts between INGO capacity and community
requests. Some INGO staff members commented that they have a hard time
balancing the people’s requests and the INGO’s reality. An INGO may take a longterm perspective that creates problems for funders and accountants. Organisations
need to stress a long-term perspective but may not have the time to do the necessary
work. As one INGO staff person noted, “staff are available for only three days during
PRAs. They need to hang around rather than focus immediately and try to define the
community’s potential. Much of what we have learned comes from our mistakes, our
unattained claims and dry wells. We are now convinced of the need for going
slowly.”139 In addition, PRAs can raise expectations which NGOs may not be able to
meet. Open communication is needed to avoid later conflicts. As the same INGO
staff member noted, “We don’t have the funds, since our total budget is only 15,000
–20,000 USD.140
 PRAs sometimes go beyond the capacity of PRA beneficiaries such as project
officers, local staff, or partners. PRA tools have been used to create village
development plan addressing issues far beyond the INGO’s capabilities. The inability
to respond has caused frustrations and problems for extensionists.141
 PRAs may not always be appropriate for remote ethnic minority communities.
Difficulties in visiting these areas and using ethnic languages prevent careful use of
PRAs. In reality, PRA information collected in remote areas has reflected the
thoughts of only Kinh-speaking leaders. (See section 2.2.) Moreover, men in remote
and ethnic minority areas, dominate so that PRAs reflect only the aspiration of men.
(See the following sections.)
Lessons Learned
 INGOs should do more research before developing project and programme
activities. Still, some INGOs have so concentrated on research that the money spent
on beneficiaries has been meaningless. INGOs should harmonise the two. The
balance should depend on lessons learned from other compatible INGOs sharing the
same standard for consultants and Vietnamese partners.
139
140
141
63
Interview notes.
Interview notes.
CIDSE and SNV, February 1999.
 INGOs should set up and maintain a strong network to review activities and find
more effective mechanisms. Activities of different working groups have been
uneven; some groups have been very active, attracting a large number of participants,
whereas other groups have tapered off. INGO representatives and directors need to
support these activities by creating time for staff to attend. Information sharing
among INGO staff in working groups is a good opportunity for staff training.
 INGOs should ensure that not only expatriate staff and consultants but also local
consultants participate in design as local people know and understand their own
problems and the environment needed for project success. INGOs should be careful
not to select expatriate consultants with arrogant attitudes who come to Vietnam to
teach rather than to learn.
 INGOs should review the use of PRA as a tool and seek other supportive methods to
carry out baseline surveys when starting projects and programmes.
3.4 Sustainability
“In recent years, 'sustainability' and 'sustainable development' have become common
words used by donors, including bi-laterals, multi-laterals and INGOs. However, it is
generally said that sustainability is a critical issue for all countries, not just for those in
the 'South’.”142 In Whose Reality Counts?, Robert Chambers states: “Sustainability
means that long-term perspectives should apply to all policies and actions, with
sustainable well-being and sustainable livelihoods as objectives for present and future
generations.”143
In 1997, Vietnam’s Open University listed six elements of sustainability:
 continuity
 extended time frame
 activities that are self-supporting
 the development of capacities
 the realisation of capacities through performance
 learning as an integral part of developing capacities and assessing performance.
Different INGOs describe sustainability in different ways. Not all INGO projects keep
sustainability in mind. However, sustainability was an issue of keen interest of all people
interviewed, although it often seemed elusive for reasons such as:


142
143
64
Some projects have been going only two to three years, and some long- term
projects and programmes are still being implemented.
Most evaluations focused on assessing implementation and impact after a certain
period of time in a certain community. Few reports mentioned programme
sustainability with a long-term perspective.
Studio Driya Media & Cuso, 1990, p. 17.
Chambers, 1997, p.10.

Information on sustainability is rare. INGO staff members sometimes provided
guesses or expectations. Completed projects often had no mechanism for
supervision, making it difficult to collect information from the beneficiaries in
projects and programmes finished four or five years ago.
INGO project sustainability was described in various ways. Some interviewees noted
that INGO projects have had a much higher level of sustainability than comparable
Government projects. Others had the opposite opinion and considered sustainability to be
the INGOs’ weakest point. Yet others took a suspicious attitude. One INGO partner
commented that “if (INGO X) stopped, continued project success would depend on
financial support from the province (then) I suspect the project would develop much
more slowly".144
Some INGOs mentioned their approach as proof of sustainability. “Everything is based
with solidarity in mind. We do not know if we are going to last forever since our income
is based on personal donations. So, we focus support on projects that local beneficiaries
can look after themselves.”145 Meanwhile, other INGOs believe that a particular
programme is sustainable only when methods and approaches are permanently altered, as
in the case of new methods for teachers. Others noted that programmes would be
sustainable if the funding stopped but the activities continued, that an INGO’s new ideas,
technical input and financial support simply helped speed up the development process.146
These different ways of assessing sustainability reflected different INGO approaches.
One INGO staff said: “Projects are sustainable if project activities continue after the
project has finished.” Another INGO noted: “A project is sustainable when three factors
are present and addressed: the sustainability of society, the economy and the
environment.”147 Another said: “Sustainability occurs when benefits continue to be
maintained, local people’s participation continues to be strengthened, and the
organisational structures managing project activities are maintained (e.g. BoMs ands Self
Help Groups).”148
The following factors adversely affected INGO project sustainability:
 Stakeholders become frustrated with project implementation when their thinking is
not fully reflected in the project design. Some credit projects are an example. A staff
member from the Bank for the Poor said that “INGOs credit projects are a failure
when the total financial and non-financial factors in training and study tours is
considered. Credit projects have no sustainability”.149 Meanwhile, an INGO credit
project officer indicated that the INGO project was highly sustainability because
144
145
146
147
148
149
65
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview
notes.
notes.
notes.
with an INGO staff member.
with an INGO staff member.
notes.
loans were given to women. Interest rates had been high, but the Women’s Union
had the ability to control the credit.150
 Adverse consequences occur if development managers are not clear about the
objectives of intervention at the start with respect to sustainability. This lack of
clarity may prevent a thorough analysis of the environmental factors within which
projects must operate, reducing sustainability. For example, some INGOs expected
that leguminous hedgerows would prevent upland soil erosion, stabilise soil quality
and increase yields on upland plots. However, 80% of the target farmers in core
communes found that hedgerows were more appropriate to paddy land and not
applicable in areas subject to night frosts, (which occur) where the farmers lived.151
 Sustainability exposes the vulnerability of many INGOs projects and programmes.
One INGO mentioned a project to assist farmers investing in bee keeping. After a
period of time, for whatever reason, the bees flew away. Obviously, the project had
failed.
 Selection of unsuitable partners has led some INGOs to change partners during
implementation, creating waste and reducing effectiveness. An education INGO
staff member said: “It is difficult for me to understand why an INGO selected the
Women’s Union as partner for an education programme. How could the programme
be maintained?”152
 Partners’ level of participation is another factor. Most INGOs have chosen districts
or communes as partners. One interviewee noted: “Counterparts of …projects are
districts because districts have enough professional branches to work with. And,
districts have the power to co-operate.”153 Another INGO staff person added: “If
counterparts are at the district level, management and extension of a model is easier.
Having district-level counterparts should be a strategy for the future.”154 However,
other INGOs had different arguments; they had chosen only provincial and commune
level partners but had not included the district. One INGO project officer
commented: “The partner is on the provincial and commune levels but not the district
because the district level has no money or power. The district level cannot decide
policies and finance by itself. We once chose the district level as a partner, but this
was not successful. We work directly with the provincial level on strategy, but the
commune level is our direct partner.”155
 Changes of partner staff have challenged INGO project sustainability. Partner staff
members may change with elections, requiring that INGOs train the new staff on
project management and implementation even though budget allocations are usually
larger during the project’s first stage. This training can be learning through working,
150
151
152
153
154
155
66
Interview notes.
Action Aid Vietnam: The Son
Interview notes.
Interview with staff member
Interview with staff member
Interview with staff member
La Programme After 5 years, p. 17.
of INGO.
of INGO.
of INGO.
but then new staff members possess incomplete knowledge, adversely affecting their
capacity in project management and implementation. Changes of partners reduce
long-term commitment, which can also adversely affect a project or programme. An
example follows:
Cafe Condom Case Study
A Cafe shop was set up to focus on HIV/AIDS protection by providing information to
young people about various aspects of their lives. This was an innovative programme
and very difficult to start. Information topics and activities soon expanded to include:
Reproductive health,
STDs
Counselling
The name was changed from Thanh nien (Youth) to BCS1, (the Vietnamese abbreviation
for condom). When BCS1 started, the shop did not receive Government attention or
support. Then the increasing number of HIV-positive residents made such programmes
more important. BCS1 received attention and support.
A fee was to be used to pay the manager and some of the volunteers. The remaining
funds would be used for project support. The Cafe Condom project was evaluated as a
successful model after the INGO project finished in December 1999. However, after six
months, activities had decreased to just 10% of those in the past because volunteers did
not receive project financial support as they had in the past. The partner did not follow its
commitment with the INGO to support activities financially after the hand over.
In June2000, a second Cafe Condom opened based on experiences from the first. To
ensure project sustainability, the partner will provide a room and a salary for the
volunteers. The proceeds from Cafe Condom 2 will cover the manager’s salary and some
volunteer allowances. However, the Youth Cultural House took the Cafe shop on as a
commercial venture rather than an HIV/AIDS education project. As a result, a local
NGO social fund appears to be running a business.156
.
 Capacity building for partners and beneficiaries is only one factor contributing to
project and programme sustainability. For partners, knowledge and management
capacity can be a decisive factor affecting INGOs projects. For the beneficiaries,
capacity in daily implementation is also a decisive factor. Training methods and
contents for both groups have affected the quality of training courses (For more
detail, see Section 3.2). Development of capacity alone is insufficient for achieving
sustainability. From a development manager’s perspective, the final element of
156
67
Interview with an INGO staff member.
learning in the action-learning cycle that underpins any process of development
should be a central consideration in any intervention and should be examined
carefully in the research stage.
 INGO staff members are necessary in the beginning of a project, though some
INGOs have no clear vision of their partners and do not plan to reduce the INGO
role in the project. When partners have enough management capacity, in-depth
INGO assistance reduces the partners’ independence and the programme’s
sustainability. One credit project evaluation noted: “The scheme was managed by the
district Women’s Union banking service. However, the management capacity
demonstrated by the district Women’s Union banking service was weak, and many
management functions had to be performed by (Organisation X). This will present a
problem when (Organisation X) withdraws from direct participation.”157
 Payment of salaries or subsidies for programme volunteers and participants
limits sustainability. When such INGO programmes finish, volunteers and
beneficiaries stop participating. A nutrition report indicated: “The stipend was
described as a monthly incentive for volunteers in all programme activities. This
unintentionally created an expectation that beneficiaries would be paid to attend
weighing sessions and that they would obtain a paid position. After nine months,
when INGO collaboration ended, some volunteers would not participate for free.”158
 INGO local programme management structures may contribute to sustainability.
Some INGOs have established local programme management structures, including
Boards of Management, Rural Development Associations, District Management
Boards, Village Voluntary Development Committees, and Water User Groups.
INGOs have encouraged the selection of people not in the local Government
administration for these groups. It is unclear whether these new mechanisms are
capable in project management and implementation. In addition, a new management
mechanism which is not controlled by the local Government will likely create
dissension when the INGO leaves if the local Government administration is not
supportive. One local partner remarked: “The idea of an INGO to set up a local
management mechanism is great. However, if a mechanism (is) not in the
Government administration system (it) will disappear when the project is completed.
Such a board can operate (only) if it is under the local Government administrative
mechanism.”159
 A lack of feasibility studies when introducing new techniques has been a leading
cause of un-sustainability. Following is an example:
UNDP, 1996.
Evaluation of the Child Nutrition Programme in Quang Ngai Province,
TT Lang and DA Tuan, May 1998.
159 Interview notes.
157
158
68
Case study for sustainability160
The total area of the district in question is about 118,000 ha, of which nearly 60% is forest, more
than 30% is fallow and bare hills, and 3% is cultivated and pasture land. Generally speaking, bare
hills and fallow land are common features of the district.
 The overall project goal was to diversify and increase agriculture production with sustainable
resource management to address food security, hunger eradication and poverty alleviation.
 The project covered about one-third of the total number of communes in the district where
Sloping Agriculture Land Technology (SALT) or Sloping Land Farming (SLF) is one of the
main ways for food security and income generating opportunities for the ethnic minority
people who suffer from unsustainable farming practices for a long time which had partly
contributed to destroying the forest and to increase annual soil erosion.
 The beneficiaries of the project include the poorest of the poor in target communes. As
planned, most farmers have maintained the target area of 1,500 m2 of sloping land per
household with canals and leguminous hedgerow.
Documents and interviewees indicated that the projects were sustainable, but some other aspects
should be considered:
 Local conditions were not carefully studied before introducing new varieties and new
farming techniques, thus creating difficulties for the implementation of the project. There are
some models on which farmers planted only coffee trees on the terrace. The farmers
expressed that coffee trees did not grow well on the plot, a lot of leaves turned yellow and
offered few fruit, even many trees died because of stem borer insects. There are certainly
many causes such as inappropriate land, fertiliser shortage, unfavourable weather and
climate, lack of water and the like. Hence, coffee trees will not be suitable to integrate longterm trees with short-term crop in the sloping land farming plot.
 Concerning the demo plots, INGOs did not carefully consider making a sufficient action plan
to carry out the activities. The PMT (Project Management Team) did not have enough time
to think and consider the idea of setting up demo plots and, on the contrary, they themselves
tried to run the activities according to a plan which led to unsuitable households. As a result,
the demo plots failed.
 Legal ownership of a project can affect sustainability. Credit projects are an
example. In many cases, the Women’s Union as partner does not have the legal right
to manage the capital when the project is completed. Funds from some completed
projects were transferred to banks or were put under the management of the local
Government administration.
 Dependence on international or bilateral donors affects sustainability. Many
INGOs have unpredictable sources of project funds. One INGO staff person noted:
Evaluation Report of Participatory Extension Project of Slopping
Land Farming in A Luoi District, Thua Thien Hue Province. JVC, May
2000.
160
69
“When we began to implement a project in an area, we first have to meet the
beneficiaries for a needs assessment; then we carry out a feasibility study. The final
but most important part of the process will be fund raising because sometimes we do
not have any idea about the project in advance. Seeking funds from an external donor
can affect the length of the project.161
Lessons Learned
 INGOs should carry out feasibility studies on the environment, target groups,
partners, etc., before carrying out work in a new community.
 INGOs should establish working groups to support the sharing of information and
experiences between INGOs, policy makers and experts as a crucial factor in
increasing sustainability. Below is an example of the activities of one working group.
Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Working Group
Launched to revive the previous Agro-forestry and Sustainable Development Working
Group. The objectives of this group are: to increase knowledge of member
organisations of successful experiences and approaches in Vietnam and outside
Vietnam; and to contribute to the promotion of and debate on sustainable agriculture
and natural resource management in Vietnam. Participants include INGOs,
Government ministries, local organisations, and bi-lateral and multi-lateral
organisations. The Steering Committee of the group meets once each month to
facilitate, plan and support the wider group, which plans to meet quarterly.162
 INGOs should support information sharing through publications. INGO attention
to the sharing of key documents has not been very strong. Most INGOs do not have a
person in charge of this work, with the result that documents and evaluations have
not been systematically kept. Many recent evaluations have not been sent to the
VUFO- NGO Resource Centre. As a result, the Centre lacks updated reports on
INGOs activities. INGOs should build a strong library at the Resource Centre and
should develop a mechanism whereby they feel that it is in their own interest to
circulate and share their reports.
 INGOs should foresee a clear division of work between themselves and their
partners from the beginning, including a description of work to be accomplished in
each period so that co-operation and power sharing happens appropriately.
 INGOs should work within the Government legal framework to insure INGO
programme sustainability. Through ten years’ experience, it has been clear that: “In
161
162
70
Authors field note.
Viet Nam INGO Directory 2000-2001.
the working process of a project both the Government and the INGO should make a
contribution. This will ensure the project’s sustainability.”163
3.5 INGOs Internal Management
INGO office management (both home office and in Vietnam) is an important factor that
significantly influences programme quality. The study addressed only internal
management of INGOs in Vietnam, including the role of the representatives, expatriate
salaries, and local staff personnel policies.
a) Role of expatriate representatives and some problems
 INGOs programmes have been implemented without any long-term strategy but
based mostly on the representative’s experience and background. When INGOs
began to establish and re-open offices in Vietnam, most expatriates came without any
understanding of Vietnam. The US embargo had not been lifted; only INGO
representatives with good will towards Vietnam came to work. They started the
foundation for INGOs in Vietnam. One INGO expatriate staff member noted: “My
predecessor’s background was education, and that was her main interest. Our first
pilot project with NIES was designed to develop teaching materials for working with
children with disabilities.”164 Later on, programme changes were based more on
organisational philosophies, partner requests and Vietnam’s changing situation.
However, expatriate attitudes toward programme priorities still continue to play a
crucial role. One INGO project officer said: “Our former representative devoted time
to the ethnic minorities, but my new boss spends more time on advocacy. I have to
upgrade my knowledge. Otherwise, I won’t fit in.”165
 The turnover of expatriate representatives and the resultant programme shifts has
negatively impacted offices and project implementation. Many interviewees felt as
one INGO Vietnamese staff member commented: “A two-year contract is rather
short for a manager to have a proper plan for office operation in the long term. We
just follow the representatives’ changing ideas.”166 Sometimes representatives have
left behind programmes reliant solely on their own ideas and energy but having no
staff ownership. Representatives’ short terms have contributed to a feeling of
unsuitability of representatives because representatives do not plan strategically and
learn Vietnamese so they can better understand the culture. Experienced Vietnamese
staff noted that expatriate representative turnover creates additional organisational
163
164
165
166
71
Notes of HIV/AIDS workshop in Ho Chi Minh City, (July, 2000).
Interview with an INGO informant.
Interview with a staff member of INGO.
Interview with a staff member of INGO.
costs to hire successors. In addition, changing representatives has brought two other
disadvantages:
 interruption of established expatriate working relationship with partners
 turnover of Vietnamese within the organisation as staff move to other
organisations, thus contributing to organisational instability.
 The INGO representative’s way of working has been considered one of the
important factors determining office morale. Participants in the experienced staff
workshop were clearly of the opinion, that: “A representative’s way of working is
very important. If a representative encourages local staff to work independently and
local staff members feel appreciated, they will be active and creative. However, if the
representative is not active, the local staff members become passive as well.”167.
 INGO representatives’ transparency creates favourable conditions for a good
working atmosphere. Open discussion and information sharing between
representatives and staff create an open atmosphere. It is inappropriate for the
representatives to consider information as their own property and equally
inappropriate for them to use opportunities for training and salary increases as gifts
for staff. A lack of transparency on the part of representatives creates disputes and
distrust within the INGO, hindering solidarity between staff members.
b) The role of local staff members and some related problems
INGO Vietnamese staff members, from administrators to project officers, have been
crucial in implementing country programmes. Local staff must balance the needs and
demands of the organisation with needs and pressures from the partners. As one local
staff person noted: “Local staff within INGOs are the middle persons between the agency
and their local partners. It is a very sensitive position. They cannot favour anyone.”168
 Representatives of various INGOs indicated their high respect for local staff. One
typical comment was: “There is a high level of competence amongst staff on
development issues, though there are individual differences here as elsewhere. They
have good local knowledge, are mature and have quite good qualifications and
sufficient competence in financial matters and accounting to meet present
requirements.”169
 The background of some local staff members may limit their ability to work
effectively. During the early 1990s, few Vietnamese had both the knowledge relevant
to INGO work and English proficiency. Early staff members working for INGOs
were mainly those with English diplomas. This sometimes led to low programme
quality since Vietnamese staff often could not understand technical context and
meaning.170 Local staff sometimes felt a lack of understanding and knowledge yet
167
168
169
170
72
Note from
Note from
Interview
Interview
the meeting of experienced Vietnamese staff July, 2000.
the meeting of experienced Vietnamese staff (July, 2000).
with an informant of INGO.
with an informant.
found themselves in charge of projects. One informant said: “INGOs should not
conduct integrated projects (if) their staff lacked training and had limited
capacity.”171
 INGO Vietnamese staff qualifications have changed dramatically. Before, INGO
staff mostly had a B.A degree. Currently, many senior staff members/managers have
advanced degrees and have engaged in mid-career training. Much of this change has
been a result of INGO capacity building for local staffs.
 INGO Short-term training courses have contributed to local staff capacity. Staff
members need basic knowledge for the field in which they work. Short training
courses PRA, community development, credit management, TOT, etc., have offered
staff the chance to build skills. One local INGO staff member noted, “INGOs’ local
staff have been trained in a number of skills, such as project management,
community development, project implementation, monitoring, report writing and
English language.”172.
 Capacity building for local staff has become crucial. The local staff feel they are
required to meet programme demands but sometimes they do not have the
opportunity to be trained, when they themselves are spending most of their time and
the INGO’s resources on capacity building for others. Most INGOs have offered
short- term study opportunities, but few have focused on long-term staff training.
Reasons hindering long-term training for local staff are:



small INGO budget with small line-items for training
if staff contracts are for only one year, long-term training courses will affect the work
of the INGO
experience has shown that experienced and qualified staff look for better paying jobs
after having received training.
 Local staff members do not feel they have job stability; staff turnover has been
rather high. Participants at the workshop for experienced INGO staff indicated: “At
present Government staff have become more specialised in their fields and the
number of people with higher education has increased. Vietnamese staff members
working for INGOs have had trouble securing long-term training opportunities. In
the past, with B.A degree, they could become a project manager. Now, applicants
have post graduate education. Many wonder whether INGOs will require higher
levels of education.”173
 Relations between expatriate and local staff remain a problem. In the early 1990s,
when Vietnamese staff members were not yet experienced and had limited English
skills, expatriates showed local staff how to do every aspect of their work. In some
171
172
173
73
Interview with a member staff of local NGO.
Interview with a staff member of INGO.
Hanoi-Workshop with Experienced Staff (July, 2000).
cases, this situation has not improved. Some INGO expatriates do not listen to local
partners or Vietnamese staff but instead act as if they are superior. Few INGOs
representatives respect staff opinions. Generally speaking, decision-making is top
down. For example, local staff members have hardly been involved in representative
recruitment but are informed of decisions after they are made.
 Local INGOs staff are often unwilling to go to distant and remote areas because
they do not want to be away from their family and also because of a perceived lack of
information and day-to-day working skills. INGOs have solved this problem by
recruiting staff from the project area or have made it clear in job advertisements that
time out of the city is required.
Lessons Learned
 INGO representatives should have flexible contracts that extend beyond a two-year
term for those who can stay longer, and INGOs should consider recruiting and
training Vietnamese representatives.

INGOs should have clear and long-term policies and systematic approaches for
training local staff. Training criteria based on staff members’ organisational
longevity will create more stability by increasing incentives and reducing staff
turnover. INGOs should secure a clear commitment from staff members that they
will return to work for the organisation after training. In order to reduce the training
costs and to keep the work of the organisation going, staff should go for postgraduate
education in Vietnam through a flexible time frame of reduced work demands during
the time of study.
 INGOs should pay attention to team building to create mutual confidence and an
information-sharing culture so that each team member has an open, sincere and
constructive attitude. This could help to create equality and prevent isolation within
organisations.
 INGOs should improve and maintain a network of local Vietnamese consultants
through a database at the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre. Vietnamese staff should
take part in the selection of expatriate consultants.
74
4. Future of INGOs in Vietnam
Most people raised questions about the future of INGOs in Vietnam, including:
 Are INGOs going to stay in Vietnam, or will they leave soon?
 Will the work of staff and partner organisations with INGOs be stable?
 Who will take on the work of INGOs if they leave?
Other questions raised were:
 How will the large multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors' apparent shift to sectoral
approaches and partnerships affect the relationship between INGOs and their
partners? What is the future role for INGOs with their relatively moderate funds
compared with other donors?
 What will be the impact of globalisation and regionalisation on INGO work in
Vietnam and in other countries?
 Are INGOs accountable to the donors, to their partners, or to their beneficiaries? If
INGOs are responsible to their donors, what happens when donors make changes in
their policies and approaches? How do INGOs adapt? How can they best contribute to
and support poverty alleviation in Vietnam?
These questions and issues are not unique to Vietnam. After ten years, it is commonly
recognised that INGOs play an important role in Vietnam. As one senior retired
Government official noted: “Through their small projects and programmes, INGOs have
supported and assisted Vietnam."174 This combined with INGO ability to respond
quickly has contributed to hunger eradication and poverty alleviation. INGOs have
emphasised the transfer of experience and training mainly through providing "support
towards self-sufficiency". INGOs try to work through harmonious development or
“harmony between development and environment, between economy and society,
between the human being and nature, between macro and micro".175 Finally, INGOs
have emphasised human resource and capacity building and have supported the
development of local organisations.176
174
175
176
75
Nguyen Van Thanh, 1998.
ibid.
Interview notes.
This raises questions concerning INGO roles in a coming period of development in
Vietnam. Vietnamese informants and INGO local staff raised one concern: the gradual
replacement of expatriates with Vietnamese in development work in Vietnam. The
majority considered it time for Vietnamese to take charge of the work, though some
wondered whether this was a realistic aspiration or simply a dream. Two important
points arise:


whether INGO local staff can be independent in their work when foreign INGO
staff leave the country, and
whether Local NGOs can replace INGOs in the course of Vietnam’s
development.
a. INGOs local staff
Local staff members have gained experience and have made achievements during their
time working with INGOs. However, the short-term training and learning through
working have often left local staff as only the implementers of INGOs ideas. Few local
staff members have been trained in management skills in a long-term manner. As a
result, they may depend on expatriate staff and consultants. Like their partners, they may
have only the capacity to implement programmes but, with few exceptions, do not
independently plan or manage projects. This is particularly true in organisations where
the number of expatriate staff is large and Vietnamese staff act as assistants to the
expatriates. INGOs should question how local INGO staff members can take
responsibility of the work if expatriates are withdrawn.
Training involves participation in training courses and self-training. To date, there are no
standards for INGO staff; thus INGO local staff need not deal with the urgent question of
self-training. One INGO staff member said: “There is no momentum for us to move
forwards to self capacity development. That’s why after ten years of working, I still have
a B.A degree."177 Moreover, annual contracts and few opportunities for promotion have
made INGO local staff feel no need to develop their own capacity.
Some INGOs have hoped that they could train Vietnamese staff members in
management skills so that they could become their organisation’s representative in
Vietnam. During the last ten years, very few Vietnamese have become INGO
representatives because of the following obstacles.

177
76
Most INGOs representatives appear to have no confidence in Vietnamese leadership
and no desire to train Vietnamese to be managers. Indications of this can be seen
during the time of hand-over between a new representative and an old representative
where an interim expatriate representative is appointed. With rare exceptions,
Vietnamese staff members do not act as interim representatives, not even for a few
months and not even when the temporary expatriate replacement creates disorder in
the organisation and when this person cannot work as effectively as a Vietnamese
staff member.
Interview notes

In general, there has been a tendency to compromise in INGOs when selecting
Vietnamese staff members who are relatively suitable to management positions
rather than to invest financially in training for staff development. INGOs prefer to
use available human resources without considering long-term investment. For
example, INGOs with a long-term view might train up ethnic minority managers
when targeting those groups, but few if any INGOs have invested in training ethnicminority managers.

Expatriate managers and local INGO office staff hold very high expectations of
Vietnamese managers, making recruitment of Vietnamese managers difficult178. Both
expatriates and local staff feel Vietnamese managers need to be democratic and
development-oriented and not directive and father-like.
b. Local NGOs
Opinions differ relating to the transfer of INGO work in Vietnam to Local NGOs. Some
argue that Vietnam’s mass organisations with their strength and networks are best for
project and programme implementation, with LNGOs acting as consultants. Others argue
that Local NGOs have already implemented projects and programmes; thus INGOs
should have a concrete, step-by-step plan for LNGOs to take over their work.
The definition of NGO is tied up in definitions of civil society, with the latter being
unique in each country, according to unique social, political and cultural factors. As
Harper notes: “A common understanding of civil society is as a voluntarily formed body
of organisation situated between the state and the household which operates to pursue
commonly identified goals.”179 From an outsider’s perspective, civil society may be more
difficult to define in Vietnam’s socio-political system, where every type of organisation
has been linked to the State through a broader umbrella organisation. LNGOs are very
new in Vietnam. Unclear perceptions about them exist and the situation is different than
in other countries.
While there may not be agreement in Vietnam as to what constitutes a LNGO,
Vietnamese civil society organisations could fall into four main types:
 NGOs defined under professional, scientific and technological associations
 Charity organisations
 Other types of organisations
 Mass organisations of the Fatherland Front.
For the purpose of this report, LNGO refers to organisations other than the mass
organisations of the Fatherland Front. When thinking about handing over, INGOs need
to think about two issues:

178
179
77
whether a LNGO is strong enough and sufficiently qualified to succeed the INGO
Zung Le, Leadership and Management of NGOs in Vietnam.
Harper, Caroline, 1996.

how and by what means the INGO should transfer decision-making power and
the work itself to the LNGO.
LNGOs in Vietnam have emerged in the last ten years. Few LNGOs have a long-term
strategy. Thus, strategic planning and human resources development become major
concerns for INGOs considering handing over. Most LNGO staff members are senior
retired people from State jobs or young students who have just graduated. Most LNGO
managers are retired Government staff who may not have a long-term commitment and
whose family style management makes it difficult to create the equal working
environment of a development agency.
Low salaries and incentives have hindered LNGOs’ ability to attract good staff. English
language skills are weak. As a result, LNGOs have difficulty sharing information,
extending working relationships to the international community inside Vietnam, and
taking part in international exchanges. Most LNGOs rely on project proposals to raise
funds from international donors and depend on consultant fees as trainers to support their
organisations. Limited financial resources prevent LNGOs from spending money on
training their own staff. This creates dependence on outside funds, leading LNGOs to
search for training scholarships abroad or to join INGO training courses.
Some weaknesses relating to LNGOs include:
 No single umbrella for local NGOs currently exists to promote LNGO information
sharing and co-operation. Currently, the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre membership
includes only INGOs. Information sharing between the Centre and local
organisations is ad-hoc and informal, making it difficult to know which local
organisations are doing what. This can inhibit co-operation when international
organisations are looking to set up partnerships.
 Vietnamese NGOs’ unclear legal status adds to “uncertainty that many of these
local groups feel about their role in the Vietnamese development context and thus
their role in and value to the emerging development partnerships”.180
 The lack of legal clarity has contributed to unclear management and financial
structures, making it difficult for LNGOs to operate, for example, to open bank
accounts.
 Heavy INGO and other international financial support to some LNGOs has led
many to question the evolving purpose of LNGOs: whether they are working for
Vietnam’s development or for their own benefit.
 LNGOs may not be sustainable when international funds are withdrawn. One
participant in the workshop on “Co-ordination and Co-operation among Local
NGOs” organised in Hanoi in September 1998 spoke for many: “It is not good to
depend on one source of funding. A local NGO is less vulnerable, if it has funds from
180
78
Poverty Policy Learning Group Paper – Partnerships.
different sources. And, for external reasons, the donor can also decide to change its
policy.”181
 Local NGOs have fewer opportunities for co-operation through institutionalised
forums and processes. For example, there is no broader non-governmental umbrella
only for LNGOs such as the monthly INGO Forum. Co-operation does take place
more informally through task forces or project-specific work but usually at the
initiative of an external actor or donor. Establishing a LNGO network will take time
and paper work.
Nevertheless, the Study team feels that INGOs in Vietnam should prepare to hand over
their work to Vietnamese organisations. The length of this process will depend on INGO
interest and willingness and Vietnamese efforts. Any hand-overs should be done in a
'step-by-step' approach in accordance with the both organisations’ long-term perspectives
to create appropriate awareness and understanding on both sides. But first and foremost,
co-operation between LNGOs and INGOs must be enhanced, and a legal framework
must be established.
The Study team did not attempt an in-depth study or evaluation of any particular INGO,
but instead has tried to draw out the experiences and lessons learned after ten years of
INGO work in Vietnam, so that INGOs (and other organisations) can avoid the repetition
of mistakes and so that INGO work can improve. Of course, the INGOs themselves will
draw their own conclusions on the future of their organisations’ work in Vietnam.
The study team hopes that the results of the study will be useful to the reader.
Coordination and Cooperation among Local NGOs. September, 1998,
p.16.
181
79
Appendix A -Figures and Tables
The following figures and tables have been referred to in the body of the text:
Figure 3: Average INGO Budget and Expenditure in the 1990s from Sample
US Dollars
Average INGO Budget and Expenditure in the 1990s
900000
800000
700000
600000
500000
400000
300000
200000
100000
0
Budget
Expenditure
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Year
SSSS
Source: INGO Study questionnaire, 2000
Figure 4: Expenditure of 7 INGOs 1991-1990
Expenditure of 7 INGOs 1991-1999
2500000
US Dollars
2000000
Organisation a
1500000
Organisation b
Organisation c
1000000
Organisation d
Organisation e
500000
Organisation f
Organisation g
0
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Year
Source: INGO Study Questionnaire, 2000
80
1996
1997
1998
1999
Table 1: Average INGO Disbursement Rates over the decade
Year
Disbursement
Rate
1991
98%
1992
95%
1993
94%
1994
93%
1995
99%
1996
92%
1997
96%
1998
99%
1999
123%
Source: INGO Study Questionnaire, 2000
Table 2: Comparison breakdown of average percentages of INGO budgets in ‘95
and ‘99
Overseas/head office
costs of Vietnam
Programme 182
Field Office expatriate
staff costs 183
Field Office indirect
support costs184
Direct project support
costs185
Expatriate consultants
Local consultants
Project management
and admin fees paid to
partner186
Head Office Costs Provided
1995
1999
Average Range
Average Range
%
%
%
%
8.46 1.5-20.8
12.8 1.5-42
7.14 0-16.7
9.6 0-27.3
No Head Office Costs Provided
1995
1999
Average Range
Average Range
%
%
%
%
9.71 0-19.5
11.7 0-45
9.171 0-30
10.6 0-30
18.02 5- 26.91
15.64 3.4-26.9
21.84 0-80
17.4 0-37
15.01 0-54.56
20.66 0-83.8
0.899 0-5
2.07 0-9.7
2.25 0-12.5
3 0-22.6
2.24 0-10
1.56 0-10
1.7 0-9.7
2.5 0-12.5
0.63 0-3.8
0.96 0-5
0.5 0-3
0.87 0-5
Expenditure incurred elsewhere in the world (usually in head
offices). Includes costs of servicing and supporting an INGO programme
in Vietnam (including desk officer salaries, field trips, equipment,
pre-service training etc).
183
Expatriate staff costs in Vietnam (including salaries and other
expanses paid in the country of origin or in Vietnam).
184 Cost of the field office in Vietnam and which indirectly supports the
work in the field (admin costs, accountancy, staff development etc) but
excludes expatriate costs.
185 Direct costs of supporting projects in the field (field office based
project officers, partner training, transport and allowances for
project officers etc).
186
Amount of project budgets or grants that are diverted to local
partners administrative or management costs.
182
81
Direct costs of INGO
managed projects187
Grants to partners for
direct project costs188
Other
19.97 0-78
28.24 0-79.4
0
19.8 0-78
27.08 0-84
18.04 0-84
24.90.9 0-79
24.44 0-60
27.22 0-78.4
1.83 0-7
3.8 0-13
0.9 0-5.7
Source: INGO Study Questionnaire, 2000
Table 3: Why a change in geographical focus for INGOs?
Reasons for changing geographical focus
Greater understanding of the demographic situation
Greater understanding of the economic situation/nature of poverty in Vietnam
Permission granted to work in other areas
Donor request
Head office request
Request received from partners/beneficiaries
Request from PACCOM
Other reasons including: planned expansion of programme; better official partners; desire to
concentrate work in a few areas; recommendations from evaluations; new opportunities for
experimentation in different locations; lack of funds; response to disasters; etc…
Percent of
Organisations
19
38
19
13
8
27
11
50
Source: INGO Study Questionnaire, 2000
Figure 6: Average INGO Investment in Sectoral Areas 1991-1999
Source: INGO Study Questionnaire, 2000
Project budgets for schemes directly run by INGOs (e.g. project staff
teams, materials, equipment, costs of activities, credit funds etc).
188 Grants paid to local partners for the actual operating costs of
projects (project staff, material costs, cost of activities, credit
funds etc).
187
82
Figure 7 : Sectoral Importance
Source: INGO Study Questionnaire, 2000
Table 4: Reasons for INGO Sectoral Changes
Reasons for Sectoral Changes:
Better understanding of causes of social or economic problems
Request from beneficiaries or partner organisations
Changing from single sector to multi-sector/integrated approach
Changing donor priorities
Changing head office priorities
Changing VN Government priorities
Permission from VN Government to move into other sectors
Other reasons, including increased capacity to deal with more difficult issues; changing
sources of funds; possibilities to work closer to the grassroots; greater openness with
counterparts; etc..
Source: INGO Study Questionnaire, 2000
83
Percent
56
42
39
28
25
14
17
27
Table 7: Reasons for INGOs Changing Activities
Reasons for Changing Activities
Percent of
Organisations
Greater awareness of appropriate responses to the causes of socio-economic problems
44
Requests from beneficiaries/partners
42
Awareness of new or innovative activities
31
Requests from donors
3
Headquarter office requests
8
Changes in Vietnamese regulatory framework
11
Other reasons including greater capacity; long term strategies; evaluation
55
recommendations; greater awareness of the situation; more involvement at commune
level; institutional capacity development; etc.
Source: INGO Study Questionnaire, 2000
Table 8: Reasons for INGO changes in methods used
Reasons for Changing Methods
Growing understanding of the causes of economic/social issues
Awareness of new/innovative methods/techniques
Growing technical capacity
Demands for new, more relevant methods from partners and beneficiaries
Donor requests
Head office requests
Other reasons, including ability to use participatory methods; sharing lessons of
success and failure; growing staff capacity; increased partner transparency; more
sustainable options; and global societal changes
Source: INGO Study Questionnaire, 2000
84
Percent of
Organisations
39
66
47
36
11
8
31
Appendix B -Terms of Reference
“Lessons Learned from a Decade of Experience”
A strategic analysis of INGO methods and impact in Vietnam 1990-1999
(finalised 25-10-99)
Background and Rationale:
International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) have been active in Vietnam for
many years in ever-increasing numbers. Recent years have seen an increase of INGOs
with substantial programmes and offices as well as a broadening in their scope of work.
A large amount of collective experience has been built up and there has been an
increasing desire on the part of donors and other INGOs to learn from NGOs' experience
in the country to date. Aside from a conference on INGO activity organised in 1992 by
the People’s Aid Co-ordinating Committee (PACCOM), there has been no
comprehensive study of the 'lessons learned'. In 1997, a similar conference was planned,
which would have taken place in conjunction with an INGO Study commissioned by the
Resource Centre in Hanoi. This conference was postponed and therefore so was the
research. The Committee for NGO Affairs plans to reschedule the conference for 2000.
A strategic analysis of INGO methods and impact would be an important contribution to
this conference, in addition to being a useful tool for INGOs, policy makers and donors
as well as a valuable learning experience.
While NGO assistance, in dollars and cents, represents a small percentage of total ODA
to Vietnam, it has been pointed out that “the primary value of NGO efforts to Vietnam
may now be their ability to innovate, to experiment with new approaches, to do essential
research, to provide high quality training, and to assist in providing policy makers with
good ideas” 189. In a broader context, understanding of the role that INGOs play in the
development of a country and as learning organisations has grown. Research from
various parts of the world has emerged on the constraints, opportunities, experiences and
comparative advantages of civil society organisations and their role within a country.
The experiences and lessons learned from close to a decade of significant INGO
involvement in Vietnam provides a huge resource, which has not yet been fully explored
or documented.
Co-operation has been a critical aspect of INGO work in Vietnam and the VUFO-NGO
Resource Centre was established in 1993 in an effort to help co-ordinate and disseminate
information about the activities of INGOs. It is managed by a Steering Committee
The Ford Foundation. March, 1999. A Preliminary Note on INGOs as
Learning Organizations.
189
85
representing 5 INGOs, the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations (VUFO),
PACCOM and 3 members from the Vietnamese Government 190.
This Steering Committee wishes to commission this independent study to review and
analyse INGO methods and impact over the last decade. The study will move beyond
pure description of programmes and activities, which already exists in the VUFO-NGO
Resource Centre’s Annual Directory. The study would provide important qualitative
input to the conference planned for next year. It would be a useful learning experience in
terms of analysing, defining and documenting lessons learned. Finally, it would be a
valuable source of information for the audience concerned - the NGO community and
their partners, donors, public officials and policy makers - to better understand INGO
methods and impact in Vietnam.
Project Aims and Objectives
Aim
To strengthen INGO work and create a better understanding of INGOs role and
contribution to development by analysing and documenting INGO methods and impact
after a decade of experience in Vietnam.
Objectives
1. Describe and analyse the work of INGOs in Vietnam over the last 10 years,
identifying and drawing out any trends that have emerged. Analysis should examine
sectors, geographic areas, methods, staff and budget size and other INGO
characteristics.
2. Identify areas where INGOs have had an impact in Vietnam. Focus should be on
looking at programmes and projects that have been completed or where particular
stages have been completed so impact can be measured. Particular attention could be
given to overall goals such as poverty alleviation and to key areas such as capacity
building.
3. Identify methods that have worked well in terms of INGO impact and analyse the
factors critical to success or failure. Critical factors might include: levels of working
(micro vs. macro), ways of working (more vs. less operational), degree of
participation, local contribution, co-operation and networking, transparency and
partnerships, etc. Focus should be placed on clearly outlining what has worked well
and why.
Methodology and Sample
1. Comprehensive literature review
This would be guided by the Resource Centre Steering Committee and include
evaluations; policy documents; proceedings from relevant conferences and sector
reviews.
190
86
Specific representatives have yet to be determined.
2. Identify the sample
Consult with 1) INGOs; 2) relevant government agencies and 3) partners and
beneficiaries to develop sample of INGOs who have worked in Viet Nam for at least 5
years and who have completed programmes and projects with valuable lessons to share
in terms of successes and short-comings in their impact and contribution to Vietnam’s
development. The sample will include 8-10 INGOs which have been working in Vietnam
for at least 5 years.
The study aims to examine INGO work throughout the country. Therefore, the research
will focus on 4-5 geographical areas encompassing urban, rural, coastal and mountainous
locations as well as at the central, provincial, district, commune and village levels to be
determined by focus group discussions. Careful attention will need to be paid to the
selection of geographical and administrative areas191. The study should not only focus on
areas where many INGOs are working but also look at areas with a smaller number of
INGOs. These concerns will, of necessity, shape the sample to be studied.
Questionnaires/interviews/focus group discussions will be used.
3. Study the sample
Through consultation with this sample, their partners, beneficiaries, donors and
government agencies, identify particular methodologies which have had an impact as
well as factors critical for success or failure. A historical perspective should also be taken
analysing what was possible in the early 90s as opposed to now. This will involve a field
trip, questionnaires/interviews/focus group discussions and the documentation of
relevant and illustrative case studies.
4. Extrapolate Results
Results from the sample INGOs will be reviewed with the wider INGO community
which would include newer INGOs to Vietnam to validate and explore similarities and
differences.
This will also involve questionnaires/interviews/focus group discussions with INGO
Representatives; Vietnamese partners and authorities including VUFO and PACCOM;
relevant multilateral agencies (e.g. World Bank, UN organisations, etc…) and bilateral
agencies; as well as participation in monthly Forum meetings, various sector group
meetings, relevant donor meetings and others which are called over the time frame of the
study.
Outputs
A comprehensive study analysing INGO methodologies and impact since 1990 including
case studies of successful work to be used by government in reviewing policy, donors for
their information and NGOs to benefit from lessons learned.
It is a common understanding among many INGOs in Vietnam that some
provinces are easier than others to work in.
191
87
Study Team
The study team will consist of 3 researchers plus one interpreter/administrative assistant.
At least one member of the team will be an expatriate who may play the leading role. At
least two of the team members should be locally based and one (preferably two) of these
must be Vietnamese national(s).
The composition of the team should reflect qualifications and experience in the various
fields listed in the above objectives. Of particular importance is:
-Solid understanding of roles, activities and ways of working of INGOs in a range of
sectors and specifically related to Vietnam;
-Solid understanding of the role of the State and the processes of development in
Vietnam;
-The team leader must have demonstrated experience in leading research, dealing with a
lot of information while drawing out key issues and carrying a process such as this
through to the end;
-Fluency in English and Vietnamese (as a team); additional languages would be an asset.
Management
The team will work in co-operation with the Steering Committee of the VUFO-NGO
Resource Centre in Hanoi, and under the direction of 1-2 people from the Steering
Committee responsible for close follow-up of the study. The VUFO-NGO Resource
Centre in Hanoi will be the administrative base of the study and accommodation and
work space will be provided in the adjoining hotel. Monthly meetings will be held with
the whole Steering Committee for feedback and direction.
Time Frame
Four months, including 3 months for research and preparation of a solid draft and one
month for revision.
Budget
The study will cost around USD 50,000 depending on the fees of the consultants who are
chosen, whether they are based in Vietnam or elsewhere, type of accommodation,
amount of travel, etc... The budget will need to be modified at a later date taking into
account actual costs.
Funding
The Resource Centre can contribute USD 5,000 towards this study and is seeking
additional donor funding of approximately USD 45,000. The VUFO-NGO Resource
Centre will be responsible for the acceptance of the grant and for the administration of
funds for the project.
88
Budget – INGO Study Project : 'Lessons Learned'
(revised 25-2-2000)
Description
Unit
Personnel
(in days)
Unit Cost
Total
Consultant 1 (team leader)
90
200
18000
Consultant 2
90
100
9000
Consultant 3
90
60
5400
Interpreter / Admin. Assistant
90
50
4500
Sub-total Personnel
360
36900
Travel
International (if based abroad)
1 Rt Fare
1500
In-country
air-fare
1 Rt HN-HCMCForeigner
260
2 Rt. HN-HCMCVietnamese
286
1 Rt HN-DNGForeigner
143
2 Rt. HN-DNGForeigner
other travel
143
Car Rent / Taxi / other
2000
Sub-total
4332
Accommodation
Hanoi
120 nights
20
2400
Field
40 nights
10
400
40 nights
10
400
40 nights
10
400
Sub-total accommodation
Per Diems (food and miscellaneous)
Administrative (stationary, phone, fax and
email)
Translation
Sub-total non- personnel
5% Contingency (excluding Personnel costs)
3600
90 working days
15
1350
270 working days
10
2700
500
100 pages
5
500
12982
649
50531
Total
89
INGO Study Project : 'Lessons Learned' (USD)
Revised Budget June 2000 (sent to donors)
Description
Unit
Personnel
Researcher:
Researcher:
Researcher:
Researcher:
Researcher:
Researcher:
Administrator:
Interpreter
(in days)
90
17.5
17.5
85
55
40
75
18
Sub-total Personnel
Travel
International (if based abroad)
In-country
air-fare
USD
Unit Cost
Total
200
80
70
70
70
70
30
50
399
1190
278
278
146
584
Travel to field (20 days)
43
860
Travel in HCMC (9 days)
Travel in Hue (6 days)
Travel in Hanoi (60 days)
20
20
4
180
120
240
3452
20
20
15
15
15
15
2300
660
495
495
495
495
Sub-total travel
Accommodation
Hanoi
Field
(nights)
115
33
33
33
33
33
Sub-total accommodation
Workshops
Space (big meeting room @ La Thanh)
Lunch
4940
50 USD * 6
(25 people * 5 USD * 6 workshops)
300
750
Sub-total workshops
Per Diems (food and miscellaneous)
90
18000
1400
1225
5950
3850
2800
2250
900
36375
1 Rt Fare
1 Rt HN-HCMC-Hue-Hanoi
Foreigner
4 HN-HCMC-Hue-Hanoi
Vietnamese
other travel
USD
1050
146
15
2190
309
10
3090
500
Administrative (stationary, phone, fax and email)
100 pages
Translation
5
Sub-total non- personnel
5% Contingency (excluding Personnel costs)
500
16222
811
53408
Total
Appendix C – List of Funders
The VUFO-NGO Resource Centre would like to thank the following organisations for
their financial support to this project:




















91
AusAID at the Australian Embassy in Vietnam
The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) at the Canadian Embassy
in Vietnam
The Good Governance Programme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of
New Zealand via the New Zealand Embassy in Vietnam
ActionAid
CARE International
Caritas Switzerland
The Canadian Centre for International Studies and Cooperation / Centre Canadien
d’Etude et de Cooperation Internationale (CECI)
Cooperation Internationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite (CIDSE)
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
Environmental Development Action in the Third World (ENDA)
Marie Stopes International (MSI)
Maryknoll;
Oxfam Great Britain and the NGO Training Project
Oxfam Hong Kong
Oxfam Solidarite Belgique
Plan International
Radda Barnen / Save the Children Sweden
Save the Children/USA
SNV – Netherlands Development Organisation
World Vision International
Appendix D - Abbreviations and Acronyms
CEO
EFA
IPE
MOET
MRM
NIES
PPA
PRA
TOR
TOT
Community Economic Organisation
Education for All
Inclusive Primary Education
Ministry of Education and Training
Maternal Reflective Method
National Institute for Education Sciences
Participatory Poverty Assessment
Participatory Rural Assessment
Term of Reference
Training of Trainers
Appendix E - Key dates and Key Regulations Relating to
INGO activities
Some key dates in recent history
 1975 exodus of INGO personnel from Vietnam although many continued to provide
support
 1986 Doi Moi (renovation) in Vietnam and general opening up
 1989 the People’s Aid Co-ordinating Committee (PACCOM) was established
 1990 First NGO Directory was published
 1992 International Symposium on INGOs was held in Hanoi
 1993 Decision 80 was issued on ‘foreign NGO assistance to Vietnam’
 1993 NGO Resource Centre was established in Hanoi to help improve sharing and
exchange among the NGOs.
 1994 end of US embargo
 1994 PACCOM reported that 97 INGOs spent 70 Million USD in country
 1996 Decision 340 was developed as a legal framework for INGOs in Vietnam and
regulated 3 types of permits which can be issued
 1996 The Committee for NGO Affairs was established as an inter-ministerial board
to approve permits. The Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations (to which
PACCOM is the administrative arm) was the standing agency for INGOs. The
Government Committee for Organisation and Personnel was the relevant body for
local organisations. At the central level, the Government of Vietnam promulgated the
Regulations on the Operation of Foreign NGOs, and in parallel, formed a state body
– the Committee for NGO Affairs, designated to oversee INGOs’ activities.
92



1999 Decision 28 issued to replace Decision 80 on Management and Usage of
Foreign Non-Governmental Organisation’s Aid
1999 meetings between child focussed INGOs’ are permitted to take place at the
Union of Friendship Organisations in Ho Chi Minh City
2000 The Committee for NGO Affairs is disbanded. VUFO and PACCOM note that
this is in line with Public Administration Reform and that their role in relation to
INGOs will not change – but a new advisory board/committee will be established
Some key regulations issued in the 1990s for INGOs:
-
-
-
93
Decision of the chairman of the Council of Ministers on the Issuance of the
Regulation on Relations with NGO Assistance – No. 80CT, 28 March, 1991
Decision of the Prime Minister on the Issuance of Regulations on the Establishment
of Representative and/or Liaison Offices of Foreign Non-Governmental
Organisations in Vietnam – No. 581/TTg, 30 September, 1992
Guidance on the Regime of State Financial Management of Aid from NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs) – Circular No. 87 TC/VT, 27 October 1994
Decision 339/TTg on May 1996 by the Prime Minister on the Establishment of the
Committee for NGO Affairs.
Decision of the Prime Minister on the Issuance of the Regulations on the Operation
of Foreign NGOs in Vietnam – No 340/TTg, 24 May, 1996
Regulations on the Operation of Foreign NGOs in Vietnam (Promulgated in
accordance with the Decision - No. 340/TTg, 24 May 1996)
Guidelines for the Implementation of Regulations on the Operation of NGOs in
Vietnam – Nov. 05 UB-PCPNN, 7 August, 1996
Decision of the Government Prime Minister on the Promulgation of Regulations on
Aid Usage and Management of Foreign NGOs – No 28/1999/QD-TTg, 23 February,
1999
Regulation on Management and usage of Foreign Non-Government Organisation’s
Aid (promulgated together with Decision No. 28/1999/QD-TTg) 1999
Joint Circular guiding the Implementation of Regulation on Foreign NGO’s Aid
Management and Use – No. 04/1999/ttlt-bdh-bht, 1 November, 1999
Decree Promulgating the Regulation on Organisation and Operation of the Social
Funds and Charity Funds - No 177/1999/ND-CP, 22 December 1999
Appendix F – List of Acknowledgements
Organisations
ActionAid
AAV Uong Bi Programme
Australian Red Cross
Allianz-Mission
Caritas Switzerland
CARE International in
Vietnam
CECI
CIDSE
CIDSE in HCMC
Catholic Relief Services
CORD
Danish Red Cross
DKT International in
Vietnam
Environmental
94
Full name
Ramesh Singh
Ha Quynh Anh
Pham Van Ngoc
Le Thi Lan
Che Phong Lan
Duong Van Thieu
Ly Bich Huyen
Nguyen Van Dao
Le Minh Hue
Nguyen Van Tuan
Bui Thi Thu Hang
Nguyen Tuan Hung
Trinh Thi Mai
Vu Minh Lan
Pham Nguyen Bang
Jens Rydder
Richard Harman
Nguyen Anh Thuan
Truong Quang Hong
Nguyen Thi Le Hien
Kathleen McLaughlin
Nguyen Minh Thu
John Egan
Than Thi Chung
Nguyen Minh Hien
Nguyen The Thach
Nguyen Thi Phuong Nga
Luu Thanh Tue
Bui Ngoc Hiep
Christopher Gilson
Dang Huong Giang
Nguyen Van Gia
Cynthia Weill
Luu Thi Khuyen
Dang Hoang Hai
Nguyen Thi Thao
Phung Thi Binh
Le Sy Tri
Position
Representative
Project Officer
Policy Research and Advocacy Manager
Microfinance Coordinator
Project Officer - SNC
Project Officer
CD-IT Officer
Senior Project Officer
Nicolas Renard
General Advisor
Programme Officer
Programme Officer
Programme Administrator
Project Manager BAHAP Project
ANR Coordinator
Country Director
Programme Officer
Programme Officer
Office Manager
Representative
Project Assistant
Representative
Bac Thai Reginal Coordinator
Central Regional Coordinator
Senior Project Officer
Project Officer
Project Officer
Project Officer Manager
Representative
Project Officer
Project Officer
SED Project Officer
SED Project Manager
Programme Officer
Administrator
Southern Sales Manager
Development Action in the
Third World (ENDA)
Ecoles Sans Frontieres
Ford Foundation
GRET
Helvetas
Health Ed
HOLT- Vietnam
International Development
Enterprises
IMA
International Federation of
Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies
Japan International
Volunteer Centre
Komitee Twee of the
Netherlands
Bang Anh Tuan
Doan Van Khai
Michele Bergdoll
Oscar Salemink
Luong Quoc Tran
Sylvaine Rieg
Pham Nguyen Khoi
Tran Lan Huong
Tran Ngoc Vy
Vo Chieu Hoang
Ho Dang Hoa
Dan Salter
Nguyen Van Quang
Nguyen Van Chat
Nguyen Thu Hue
Ingela Holmertz
Le Ha Van
Vu Xuan Tuong
Ito Tatsuo
Ito Sachiko
Ho Thi Phuong Dai
Barry Wright
Tran Thi Thiep
MCNV
MCNV office Dong Ha
Quang Tri
MCNV Central Vietnam
VUFO-NGO Resource
Centre / Oxfam Hongkong
Nordic Assistance to
Vietnam (NAV)
95
Programme Director
Programme Officer
Country Representative
Project Officer
Senior Project Advisor
Project Officer
Vu Quang Trung
Dinh Thi Vinh
Country Director
Representative
Hue Regional Coordinator
Deputy Director
Country Coordinator
Social Welfare Advisor
Social Welfare Programme Officer
Programme Officer
Agricultural Specialist
Programme Officer
Project Coordinator
Education Director
Deputy Director Xa Dan school for the
Deaf, Hanoi; Coordinator Early
Intervention Project; Coordinator K2
Education of Hearing Impaired Children
Programme
Director Training and Development Centre
for Special Education, Hanoi Pedagogic
University
Admin Assistant
Programme Officer
Yvan Thebaud
Dang Thi Nhat Vinh
Pamela Wright
Nguyen Thuy Huong
Mardo Hekker
Representative
HIV/AIDS Advisor
Senior Technical Advisor
Accountant
Reproductive Health Advisor
Nguyen Huu Thai
Nguyen Thi Yen
Accountant
Information Officer
Egil Hauge
Thai Quang Thuan
Dang Dieu Tan Trang
Van Thi Minh Chau
Nguyen Minh Tam
Tran Viet Tuan
Pham Thu Huong
Representative
Project Officer
Project Officer
Project Officer
Nguyen Thi Hoang Yen
Maryknoll
Mennonite Central
Committee
Medecins du Monde
Advisor
Administrator
Secretary
Oxfam Solidarity
(Belgium)
Oxfam GB
Oxfam GB
Oxfam Hongkong
Oxfam Quebec
PACT (Vietnam)
Plan International
PDI
Quaker Service- American
Friends Service Committee
Radda Barnen
Save the Children Japan
Save the Children Fund UK
Save the Children Fund UK
HCMC
Save the Children / US
SNV
SNV Ninh Binh
SNV Quang Binh
Terre des hommes
96
Josie Cambel
Pham Thi Phuong Lan
Nicolette Moore
Gillian Frost
Vu Thu Hong
Nguyen Thi Thuy
Nguyen Thanh Em
Nguyen Minh Cong
Van Thi Minh Chau
Nguyen Manh Toan
Susana Hopkins-Leisher
Lisa Fancott
Pham Cong Phin
Nguyen Thu Huong
Melissa Knight
Le Quang Duat
Nghiem Giang Huong
Ruth Bowen
Nguyen Duy Linh
Lady Borton
Le Hoai Phuong
Britta Ostrom
Fanny Gjorup
Ta Thuy Hanh
Nguyen Linh Van
Tran Thi Huong Lien
Joanna Hayter
Le Thi Bich Hang
Trinh Thi Huong
Tran Xuan Canh
Nguyen Kim Phuong
Tran Thi Nhieu
Tran Cong Binh
Le Thi Minh Chau
Krishnamurthy Pushpanath
David Claussennius
Doan Anh Tuan
Tran Thi Lang
Dang Xuan Kha
Dinh Anh Tuyet
Nguyen Thanh Hien
Vu Quynh Anh
Pham Thi Hong
Toon Keijsers
Heino van Houwgelingen
Rene Orij
Evelijn Bruning
Le Thi Thu Thuy
Advisor for RDP
Administrator/Accountant
VSO Teacher, Lao Cai & Ha Tinh
Programme Officer
Programme Officer for Education &
Microfinance
Local Project Officer
Administrator/Accountant
Project Officer
Project Officer
Representative
Project Director
Project Manager
Project Officer
Representative
Programme Support Manager
Health Advisor
ARDC
International Affairs
Director
Representative
Programme Consultant
Programme Officer
Programme Officer
Programme Officer
Deputy Programme Director
Admin. Coordinator
Project Coordinator
Project Officer
Project Coordinator
Senior Project Officer
Senior Project Officer (HIV/AIDS)
Senior Project officer (Child Protection)
Programme Director
Director
MIS/Micro finance Manager
Project Officer
Micro-finance Programme Officer
Deputy Director for Programmes
Project Assistant
Project Assistant
Development Advisor
NAPA Credit Advisor
Banking Advisor
Credit Advisor, NAPA
Project Officer
Fondation Lausanne
Le Quang Nguyen
Hoang Thi Lan Anh
Bui Van Toan
Stephen Price- Thomas
Agneta Dau Valler
Mai Thi Quynh Giao
Bernard Kervyn
Le Thi Yen Hang
Dinh Xuan Hung
Jan Niebudek
To Thi Bay
Pham Van Anh
Michael Hegenauer
Ellen Hegenauer
Dang Nhat Thanh
Than Thi Ha
Bernie Angle
Le Thi Lan
Le Ngoc My
Huynh Nhat Tien
Tran Viet Phu
Nguyen Thi Tuong Van
Nguyen Duc Thien
Le Viet Hoa
Bui Quang Minh
Luong Thi Chung Thuy
Nguyen Thanh Nha
Street Children Programme Officer
Community Development Project Officer
Programme Coordinator
Programme Director
Acting Programme Director
IT Manager
Representative
WWF
Jamie Uhrig
Do Thanh Muoi
Hoang Thanh
HIV/AIDS Consultant
Project Officer
Manager, Vietnam Conservation
Programme
Freelance Consultant
Paula Kelly
VNAH
VSO
VSO
Vietnam Plus
Villes en Transition
World Concern Vietnam
WUSC
World Vision International
in Hanoi
Senior Project Officer
National CFDC Coordinator
National Health Coordinator
Team Leader
Project Officer
Community Development Coordinator
Project Assistant
Project Assistant
Project Assistant
Team Leader
Admin. Assistant
Project Assistant
Project Assistant
Project Monitor
Other International Organisations
CIDA
Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO)
United Nations
Development Programme
(UNDP)
World Bank
USAID
UNICEF HCMC
Louise Buhler
Christine Orema
Nguyen Phong
Cris Shaw
Laura Phan
Le Ngoc Hai
List of people met in Vietnamese Departments and Agencies
HEDO
Trinh Ngoc Trinh
97
Director
Rural Development
Services Centre
Inclusive Education Centre,
MOET
Content and Methods
Centre, National Institute
for Education Sciences,
MOET
Foreign Relations
Department, MOET
Primary Education
Department, MOET
Centre for Mountainous
Education
MOET
National AIDS Committee
Micro finance Resource
Centre, National Economic
University
National Institute of
Nutrition, MOH
Bank for the Poor
National Institute of
Nutrition
National Centre for Social
Sciences and Humanities
Women Studies Faculty,
Ho Chi Minh City Open
University
HCMC Healthcare
Preventive Centre
PGD, Binh Chanh, HCMC
Women Studies
Department-HCMC Open
University
Tuoi Tre Newspaper
HCMC Red Cross
Thao Dan Street Children
Programme
HCMC AIDS Committee
Sai Gon Giao Phong
Newspaper
Voice of HCMC
HCMC Department of
Cadastre, Land and
98
Dang Ngoc Quang
Director
Le Van Tac
Chief of Research Department
Do Dinh Hoan
Director
Nguyen Xuan Dau
Expert
Dang Thi Lanh
Vu Xuan Dinh
Mongky Slay
Deputy Director
Dang Van Khoat
Dao Van Hung
Prof. Tu Giay
Tu Ngu
Nguyen Tri Tam
Nguyen Thi Thin
Nguyen Cong Khan
Deputy Director
Advisor
Deputy Director
Deputy Director
Nguyen Huu Minh
Nguyen Thi Oanh
Advisor
Le Dai Tri
Director
Vo Kim Loan
Le Chi An
Thuy Cuc
Huynh Thi Minh Tam
Ly Vinh Minh
Nguyen Van Hung
Truong Hong Tam
Truong Xuan Lieu
Le Thuy lan Thao
Kieu Oanh
Bich Phuong
Nguyen Hoang Nhan
Tran Thi Thu Nga
Housing
HCMC Architecture
University
ODAP HCMC
HCMC Union of
Friendship Organisations
HCMC Poverty Alleviation
and Hunger Eradication
Programme
HCMC Economic Institute
Tien Giang
Vinh Phuc
Hope Cafe
DOLISA
Health Information and
Education Centre
CEMMA
National Institute for
Agricultural Planning and
Projection (NIAPP)
State Bank of Vietnam
FUFA
DEVAID
VCPCC
VACVINA
Vie 96/029
NIPA
Social Work Centre,
Vietnam Youth Association
Social Science Institute
MDM
Rural and Agricultural
Department of Thai
Nguyen Province
Thai Nguyen Agriculture
and Forestry University
Plant Protection
Department of Thai
Nguyen Province
Thai Nguyen Department
99
Vuong Dinh Hao
Do Phu Hung
Bach Anh Tuan
Pham Tu
Truong Quang Thao
Le Dieu Anh
Nguyen Thi My Tien
Nguyen Van Xe
Nguyen Thi Tuong Vi
Tran Van Dung
Nguyen Thien Hao
Luu Ngoc Thanh
Nguyen Xuan Nghia
Nguyen Thanh Cong
Phan Nguyen Binh
Le Minh Kha
Nguyen Thi Thanh Binh
Do Hong Ngoc
Tran Hue Trinh
Truong Trong Hoang
Pham Manh Hung
Nguyen Huong Tra
Director
Vu Manh Hong
Tran Hong Truong
Trinh Thi Binh
Nguyen Trong An
Nguyen Van Lan
Bui Thi Kim Quy
Tran Trong Duc
Ludovic Dewaele
Nguyen Thi Nhat
Nguyen Van Quang
Le Thi My Hien
Huynh Thi Ngoc Tuyet
Huynh Thi Sang
Ngo Quang Ngo
Deputy Director
Dang Kim Vui
Dean of Forestry faculty
Mr. Vuong Deputy
Director
Nguyen Quang Hien
Deputy Director
of Education and training
Thai Nguyen Centre for
Agriculture Extension
Thai Nguyen Women's
Union
Phu Luong District People
Committee
Quang Tri people’s
Committee
Dalkrong District Women’s
Union
Vinh Linh District
Women‘s Union
Quang Tri provincial
Health Department
Centre for Family &
Women Studies
Centre for Reproductive
and Family Health
Centre for Disadvantaged
Children
Centre for Education
Technology
Ministry of Finance
Aid Reception
Central Commission for
External Relations of the
Vietnam Communist Party
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
International Organisations
Department
Ministry of Public Security
Ministry of Planning and
Investment
Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural Development
Vietnam Union of
Friendship Organisations,
American Department
European Department
Vietnam Committee of
Religious Affairs
People’s Aid Coordinating
Committee (PACCOM)
100
Tai Ngoc Hai
Deputy Director
Ms. Tham Chairwoman
Nong Van Tran
Chaiman
Dang Hoang Mai
Nguyen Thi Ha
Director of the Foreign Relation
Department
Chairlady
Nguyen Thi Thu
Vice Chairlady
Le Van Hao
Director
Le Thi
Former Director
Nguyen Thi Hoai Duc
Pham Thi Lien
Director
Pham Toan
Nguyen Duy Le
Nguyen Thi Nhuong
Do Hoang Long
Deputy Director
Nguyen Van Kha
Deputy Director
Nguyen Thanh Huong
Do Le Hoang
Dao Trinh Bac
Cao Duc Phat
Vice Minister
Bui Ba Binh
Nguyen Van Long
Nguyen Thi Bach Tuyet
Phan Trong Thai
Nguyen Van Kien
Tran Thu Thuy
Le Van Son
Dang Minh Tuyet
Director
Deputy Director
Coordinator
Coordinator
Appendix G - Bibliography
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Commune of Mai Son District, Son La Province. 1998-1999.
2. ActionAid Vietnam. Saving and Loan Use Survey and Gender Impact Assessment of Uong
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3. ActionAid Vietnam. The Son La Programme After 5 years.
4. ActionAid Vietnam. Savings and Loan Use Survey and Gender Impact Assessment of Uong
Bi and Credit program- ActionAid- Credit and Saving. By Natasha Pairaudeau.
October/November 1996.
5. Aminin L. Abubakar and Ngo Tien Dung. Micro Enterprise Promotion Project Evaluation
Report Integrated Pest Management Training Thai Nguyen Province. February 1999.
6. Bergren, Gretchen Glode and Tran Tuan. Evaluation of Save the Children (SC/US), Poverty
Alleviation /Nutrition program. Thanh Hoa province. November 1995
7. Boyd, Charlotte and Le Dinh Chung. Review of the Impact of ACTIONAID-VN's Irrigation
Projects in Son La province. July 1997.
8. CECI. Micro-enterprise promotion. Project (MEPP), Phase 1. Final report ( revised version).
August 1999.
9. Chambers, Robert. Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last. Intermediate Technology
Publication. 1997.
10. CIDSE and SNV. Report of the Evaluation Mission of Agricultural Innovation and
Agricultural Extension in Thai Nguyen province. February 1999.
11. CIDSE. Mid-term Evaluation of Credit Programmes. December 1998.
12. CIDSE. Mid-Term Survey and Evaluation on the Extension Program for Mountainous
Regions in Bac Thai province. May 1993.
13. CIDSE. Evaluation report for Credit and Saving project VO601. By Dao Van Hung.
February 2000.
14. CIDSE. Evalution report on Credit activity in the Primary Health Care (PHC). By Dao
Hung. May 1995.
15. CIDSE. Study the Implementation of SALT Model in Agricultural Extension Programme,
Phase 3 ( VO509). November 1999.
16. Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. Vietnam -Finland Forestry Sector
Cooperation Programme.Tech. Report. No 5. Training Needs and Training of Trainers in
Forestry Extension in Cho Don District. Bac Kan Province. 1997
17. Ford Foundation, ‘A Preliminary Note on INGOs as Learning Organisations’. March 1999.
18. Government of Vietnam - Donor - NGO Poverty Working Group: Attacking Poverty. 1999.
19. Goyder, Hugh and Flli Free. Technical Desk Review of Son La Program 1992-1997.
September 1997.
20. Grady, Heather. Report on the Credit Programme Evaluation of the American Friends
Service Committee (AFSC) –VN. August 1993.
21. Ha Thanh Binh. Report on the Review of Working With Aids Project. January 2000
22. Harper, Caroline. 1996 Paper on: Strengthening Civil Society in Transitional East Asia: The
Role of Foreign Donor Agencies.
101
23. JVC. Evaluation Report of Participatory Extension Project of Sloping Land Farming in A
Luoi district, Thua Thien Hue. May 2000.
24. Komitee Twee. An Evaluation Report on Komitee Twee Education of Hearing Impaired
Children in Vietnam by Le van Tac, Pham Kim and Nguyen Thi Mai Ha. 1998.
25. Komitee Twee. Final Evaluation Report. VN 91003. June 1996.
26. Kristiansson, Bengt and Rita Liljestrom. Report on Evaluation Mission of Community based
Rehabilitation in VN. November 1993.
27. Le Van Tac, Pham Kim and Nguyen Thi Mai Ha. Evaluation Report K2 programmeEducation of Hearing Impaired Children in VN. 1998.
28. M., Janine and Wassana. Border Area HIV/AIDS Project (BAHAP). Care International.
Draft External Review Document. February 2000.
29. MCC. Evaluation of the Impact of the MCC Tam dao Saving and Credit program, 1995Menonite Central Committee (MCC). Final draft. By Dao Hung. Nov 1995.
30. McCall, Dorothy. Partnership with Government: A Realistic Strategy for Poverty Focused
INGOs. 1998.
31. Medical Committee Netherlands Vietnam (MCNV) NGO Experiences in the Health Sector
in Vietnam. 1999.
32. Nguyen Van Thanh. Review the Role of INGOs in Vietnam. The Research and Exchange
Magazine. No 17. September 1998.
33. Nguyen Xuan Nguyen, Nguyen Van Cuong. CIDSE. Assessment of CIDSE SV-607 Project
Linking Bank with Self-help Group: Credit Program to Assist Poor Women in Improving
Household Economy. November 1998.
34. Oxfam GB. Oxfam's Impact on Livelihoods in Lung vai. December 1998
35. Oxfam Great Britain. Oxfam’s Impact on Livelihoods in Lung Vai. 1998.
36. Oxfam Hong Kong. Vietnam Review of the Programme. 2000.
37. Oxfam Hong Kong. Report of An Evaluation of Two Oxfam Hong Kong Assisted Craft
Projects with Ethnic Minority Women, September 1998.
38. Oxfam Hong Kong. Mid-term Evaluation Report. By Koos Neefjes. July 1998.
39. Oxfam United Kingdom and Ireland. Evaluation of the Ky Anh Credit and Saving Program
of Oxfam/United Kingdom and Ireland. March 1997.
40. Oxfam/ United Kingdom and Ireland. Evaluation of the Ky Anh Credit and Saving
Programme of Oxfam/United Kingdom and Ireland. March 1997.
41. Turcot, Paul and Dale Posgate. Monitoring Mission Report CECI: Vietnam-Canada MicroEnterprise Promotion Project- Micro-enterprise. May 1998
42. Porter, Beth. Assessment Report of Credit Programme in Ky Anh, Ha Tinh 3-1997,
43. Poverty Policy Learning Group. Issue Papers in English. Meeting between Donors and
INGOs. June 19th, 2000.
44. RDSC, TEW, RTCCD. Coordination and Cooperation among Local NGOs. September
1998.
45. Report of Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Official report) – National Committee for EFA –
2000 Assessment.
46. Roche, Chris. Impact Assessment for Development Agencies-Leaving to Value Change.
1999.
47. Save the Children UK. Final Report to EC. HIV & AIDS prevention and management
program. May 1999
48. Save the Children US. Evaluation of Save the Children US Poverty Alleviation/Nutrition
Programme. Thanh Hoa Province. 1995
49. Save the Children US. Investment For Nutrition in VN. December 1989.
50. Save the Children Fund UK. Assessment Report of Credit Programme in Ky Anh, Ha Tinh.
March 1997.
102
51. Rawlings, Sharon. Entry Point Activity Assessment-CECI-Micro-Enterprise Promotion
Project ( MEPP). September 1998.
52. Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Official report) – National Committee for EFA – 2000
Assessment.
53. Studio Driya Media & Cuso, 1990, p. 17. Sustainable Development - Voices from Rural
Asia. Volume 1.
54. Provincial Women's Union of Soc Trang and Medecins du Monde. Training of Trainers.
Network of Volunteers in Health Education. Narrative and Financial Report from January to
May 2000.
55. TT Lang and D.A Tuan. Evaluation of the Child Nutrition Program, Quang Ngai province,
Viet Nam. 4-6 May 1998.
56. UNDP. Microfinance in Vietnam: A Collaborative Study Based Upon the Experiences of
NGOs, UN Agencies and Bilateral Donors. 1996.
57. UNICEF. Vietnam Children and Women, a Situation Analysis 2000.
58. Vietnam Plus. Report on the project progress and measurement-Community Development
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59. Vietnam Poverty Attacking. 1999.
60. Vietnam-Finland Forestry Sector Cooperation Programme. Tech. Report. No 5. Training
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61. VUFO-NGO Resource Centre.
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62. World Bank and DFID. Voices of the Poor. November, 1999.
63. World Vision International. District 8, Ho Chi Minh City, Urban Development project an
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65. World Vision Vietnam. STD/HIV/AIDS Evaluation Le Chan District Hai Phong .January
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103