Jim Herran
THE STATE OF NATURE
A Comparison between John Locke and Thomas Hobbes
Hobbes and Locke intended to promote a form of civil society that can foster, as much as
possible, the happiness of men and natural justice in spite of the corrupt element in the nature of
mankind. Their difference in emphasis, which leads to some differences in their doctrines, may
be attributed to a difference in ambition (in advancing happiness and natural justice) or in an
underestimation, by Hobbes, of the misery that can be caused by a tyrant, or overestimation, by
Locke, of the stability of representative government. At any rate, as philosophers of the same
tradition, they have very similar understandings of the natural state of man, and the naturally
right state of man.
In his Second Treatise, John Locke says that in the state of nature, first, men are in a “State
of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they
think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature […],” and secondly, men are in a “State also of
Equality, wherein all Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal […].”i Thus in this ideal state man is
not free to do as he will, but he is free to do as he will where he is not bounded by the Law of
Nature. “And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or
Possessions.”ii In short, the Law of Nature “willeth the Peace and Preservation of all Mankind.”iii
Moreover the execution of this law is placed in every man’s hands (as they are equals), whereby
men will punish the transgressors in view only of “reparation, which belongs only to the injured
party,” and restraint, so as to make the transgression “an ill bargain to the Offender.”iv For the
Law of Nature would be useless if there were no “Power to execute that Law.”v
In the Second Treatise, Locke bases these obligations and this equality simply on the fact
that “Men being all the Workmanship of one […] Maker; All the Servants of one Sovereign
Master […], they are his Property […], made to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure. And
being furnished with like Faculties […], there cannot be supposed any such Subordination
among us […].”vi However, we are presented with a deeper layer, so to speak, in his Essay
concerning Human Understanding. But first, as the obligations to others’ life and health are thus
far accounted for, a closer examination of the Natural Rights of possessions and liberty (and
Locke’s ambiguity about two different connotations for the term state of nature and the need for
civil society) must follow.
Whether by every man’s right to preserve his life by means of the goods of the earth, or by
divine revelation, “’tis very clear, that God, as King David says, Psal. CXV. Xvi. has given the
Earth to the Children of Men, given it to Mankind in common.”vii However, if one had to gain
the consent of every man in the world before he could pick an apple from a tree, he would
certainly starve.viii Though the Earth is common to all men, “every Man has Property in his own
person […]. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his.”
A man mixes something of his own with the common stock of mankind to appropriate for
himself a piece of property.ix There are some limits to what a man may rightly acquire through
his labor. He must leave as much as is enough, and as good as what he took, for the rest of
mankind.x He cannot let any fruit spoil or any carcass rot. If his harvest exceeds his need, he has
ploughed too much land;xi but he may rightly sell that excess for imperishable goods, thus
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increasing the productivity and prosperity of his community.xii Thus in the state of nature private
property is respected, and transgressors are to be punished by anyone.
In the state of nature, every “Man is to be free from any Superior Power on Earth, and not
to be under the Will or Legislative Authority of Man, but to have only the Law of Nature for his
Rule.”xiii There is an exception, however, for children. They are to be ruled by their parents, for
men are not born reasonable. Reason, which is necessary to acquire knowledge of the Law of
Nature, is acquired progressively with one’s age. “The bonds of this Subjection are like the
Swadling Cloths they are wrapt up in, and supported by […]. Age and Reason as they grow up,
loosen them till at length they drop quite off, and leave a Man at his own free Disposal.”xiv But
this begs the question, are all men to be expected to discern the Law of Nature when they come
of age?
The state of nature, in this light, presupposes mankind’s general knowledge of the Law of
Nature. In it, though some may offend it at times, the rest correct them as a mother may spank
her babe. But it seems that this state of nature is presented as an ideal, as a goal. This is the state
of nature as it ought to be. The state of nature as it usually is, is one in which the vast majority of
“Men are biased by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of [the Law of Nature]
[…].”xv Indeed, some men “cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads, […]” and
the greatest part of mankind […] are given up to labor, and enslaved to the
necessity of their mean conditions […]. These men’s opportunities of knowledge
and inquiry are commonly as narrow as their fortunes […]. It is not to be expected
that a man who drudges on all his life in a laborious trade, should be more knowing
in the variety of things done in the world than a packhorse […].xvi
To top it off, “there are another sort of people […] who though they have riches and leisure
enough and want neither parts nor other helps, are yet never the better for them. Their hot pursuit
of pleasure […] engages their thoughts elsewhere.”xvii It is this problem in the real state of
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nature (so to call it), along with every man’s bias and limitation when it comes to judging and
executing their understanding of the Law of Nature, that points to the necessity of civil society,
which is to take the ideal state of nature ( as it is ruled by the Law of Nature) as a model. Indeed
though in civil society men must give up their natural powers of judgment and execution of the
Law of Nature to the Government (which judges and executes according to the civil law, which
in turn mimics the Law of Nature), men are by nature free, and can rightly enter civil society
only by their own consent and on their own terms.xviii Though in civil society positive laws
determine property rights, the “original Law of Nature for the beginning of property, in what was
before common, still takes place;”xix and as God has given mankind Reason, the property laws of
a civil society must strive to adhere to it and “make use of [the land] to the best advantage of
Life, and convenience.”xx And though in civil society all men subject themselves to the laws of
the legislature, “’tis fit that the Laws themselves should in some Cases give way to the Executive
Power, or rather to this Fundamental Law of Nature and Government, viz. That as much as may
be, all the Members of the Society are to be preserved.”xxi Thus, the ideal state of nature or, more
fundamentally, subjection to the Law of Nature (understood in the precise sense described
above) is toward what a civil society must always progress.
It thus becomes clear that Locke believes that the natural, unimproved, condition of men is
quite stark; not unlike Hobbes understanding of it as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”xxii
But in the Second Treatise Locke has submitted a guide, an end, for civil society. But to further
analyze this ideal state of nature, we must question its origin. Reason, Locke says, is the law that
governs this state. We are left with the impression that reason rests when it finds God’s will. But
how do we know, for instance, that God forbids “any Subordination among us […]?” For even if
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“we are furnished with like faculties,” some develop their intellectual capacities very well
indeed, while most are no better than a “packhorse.”
The “deeper layer” is that Locke observes that men are not born with any innate practical
principles, but only that “man [has] a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery.”xxiii “Things
then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain.”xxiv And though men mistake not
what gives them pleasure and what pain, they tend to mistake what course of pleasures pursued
will lead them to happiness.
Were the pleasure of drinking accompanied, the very moment a man takes off his
glass, with that sick stomach and aching head which, in some men, are sure to
follow not many hours after, I think nobody, whatever pleasure he had in his cups,
would on these conditions, ever let wine touch his lips.xxv
Reason then seeks happiness, and “the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires
[…], so that our understanding may be free to examine, and reason unbiased give its judgment,
[is] that whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happiness depends.”xxvi Now reason is
not meant only to find out the way to preserve mankind on the basis of Locke’s understanding of
Scripture, but it is that which seeks one’s happiness on the rock-solid and palpable (or simply
natural) foundation of pleasure and pain. But again, in the real state of nature, most men cannot
depend on their reason only to live happily. Most men are guided only by pleasure and pain that
is immediately in view. Therefore most men, if not all to a certain extent, are guided by laws
with their enforcements, or rewards and punishments. There is “first, the divine law,” which is
promulgated in two ways: “by the light of nature” (which is the truly rational pursuit of
happiness) and “the voice of revelation.” God has the “power to enforce I by rewards and
punishments of infinite weight and duration in another life […]. This is the only true touchstone
of moral rectitude.” Secondly, there is the civil law. And thirdly, the “the law of opinion or
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reputation,” which honors and dishonors.xxvii Both the civil law and the law of opinion must be
directed by the divine law; the purpose of all of them is the happiness of mankind. However,
“though all men’s desires tend to happiness, yet they are not moved by the same object.” xxviii Up
to a certain extent men have different paths to happiness. The civil law is responsible for guiding
the whole community towards what happiness the members share in common; that is, all
members of a community can agree that self preservation and the conditions for family life are
crucial elements to their happiness, so the domain of civil society is dictated by the ideal state of
nature (with its particular definition of Law of Nature). Not everybody can agree, for instance,
that being a Catholic is a fundamental part of one’s happiness; and if it ought to be, one cannot
change a man’s conscience perforce. The law of opinion can certainly punish those who worship
incorrectly; its domain is as broad as the whole of the divine law. Being a philosopher, for
instance, is not a fundamental part of everyone’s happiness anymore than being a farmer is.
Some men will end up being miserable if they think they have to be philosophers, but think of
open fields and sunny skies all day long. This is why Locke wrote his Letter concerning
Toleration, that men may freely pursue the truth about their happiness while not hindering what
is proven to be the common happiness, nor others’ freedom to make the same pursuit.
We thus conclude that Locke wrote about a real state of nature, the human condition, in
which men are born knowing nothing but that in some things they find pleasure and in others
pain; in which they have an intellectual capacity, called reason, that helps them anticipate what
course of pursued pleasures and necessary pains will ensure their happiness; in which most men
cannot or will not develop their reason well enough to avoid getting stuck in such pleasures that
will ensure their misery. The remedy for most of mankind, if not for all, is to live by the civil
laws, the religious laws, and the laws of opinion, whose punishment compels and whose
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pleasures are clear and easy to behold. But these laws are informed by the Law of Nature (which
is mankind’s rational pursuit of happiness) or by divine revelation. The state of nature in the
ideal sense (with its particular definition of Natural Law) is the direct model for the civil laws,
for the domain of the civil laws is the common happiness of mankind.
Thomas Hobbes was a philosopher of the same tradition in the same respect that Locke
was. In his introduction to his Leviathan, Hobbes says that, “wisdom is acquired, not by reading
of books, but of men.”xxix And though these two philosophers differ in their models of a good
civil society, they have similar views on the state of nature (Locke’s “real” state of nature), or the
human condition, and a standard of justice based in nature (the Law of Nature).
Hobbes says that the state of nature is one of equality, but as with Locke, this is not simply
true. There are strong men, and there are weak men; there are wise men, and there are fools. But
“as to strength of body,” says Hobbes, “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest,
either by secret machination, or by confederacy […].”xxx And as to wisdom it
is the nature of men that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more
witty, or more eloquent, or more learned, yet they will hardly believe there be many
so wise as themselves […]. [And] there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal
distribution of anything than that every man is contented with his share.xxxi
Though the first proposition is self-evident, the second is as much as to say that men will pretend
to be as wise as the wisest because they want to. Indeed, as he speaks against Aristotle’s doctrine
that some men are rulers by nature, he says that “if nature have made men unequal, yet because
men that think themselves equal will not enter into conditions of peace but upon equal terms,
such equality must be admitted.”xxxii From this equality, or pseudo-equality, if we consider men
in their nature, “arises hope in the attaining of our ends.” And so, when two men desire the same
thing, whether it be for “their own conservation” or their “delectation,” they will “endeavor to
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destroy or subdue one another.”xxxiii Due to this diffidence, “there is no way for any man to
secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all
men he can […].”xxxiv Moreover, because every man desires “that his companion should value
him at the same rate he sets upon himself […], [he will] extort a greater value from his
contemners, by damage, and from others, by the example.”xxxv Thus, war and conquest come
naturally to mankind. Some creatures, like ants and bees, “live sociably with one another”
because for these creatures “the common good differeth not from the private […], but man,
whose joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men, can relish nothing but what is
eminent.”xxxvi Hobbes observes man and finds that he is continually in competition for honour,
and is constantly involved in envy, hatred, and war. Truly, Locke does not present the natural
state of man as starkly as Hobbes. He never says explicitly that the state of nature is a state of
war. He mostly speaks of the state of nature in the ideal sense, and only sheds light into the truth
of it when explaining mankind’s gross ignorance; though it is quite clear that from that
ignorance, men can be brought to do all sorts of horrible things when attached to a bad law of
opinion. At any rate, Hobbes certainly depicts the state of nature as something to be avoided at
all costs; Locke does the same with tyranny. This does not mean that Hobbes favors tyranny
anymore than Locke favors anarchy, it is simply a difference of emphasis.
But men generally desire a happier state. In the state of nature
there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and
consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that
may be imported by sea, no commodious building, […], no knowledge of the face
of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of
all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short.xxxvii
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Thus, while the preservation of life is certainly men’s first concern, it is not their only concern.
Men desire commodities, knowledge, friendship, and civility. Men desire happiness. And as with
Locke, the Law of Nature for Hobbes directs man’s happiness. For “reason suggesteth
convenient articles of peace […]. These articles are they which otherwise are called the Laws of
Nature […].” xxxviii The Law of Nature, for Hobbes, directs “that every man ought to endeavor
peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and
use all helps and advantages of war.”xxxix The second clause of this law (what Hobbes calls the
right of nature) is exactly what qualifies Hobbes’ widely criticized statement that in the state of
nature, “man has a right to everything, even to one another’s body.”xl For the Right of Nature “is
the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his
own nature, that is to say, of his own life, and consequently of doing anything which, in his own
judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.” xli War is justified for
preservation, not for “delectation.”xlii Here is the difference between what is natural and what is
naturally right.
And it is because of this discrepancy between the state of nature and the state of nature as it
ought to be, that the artificial remedy of civil society is necessary. There must be a magistrate
that can “keep [men] in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their
covenants and observation of those laws of nature […].”xliii Nor is it contradictory, to this
distinction between the two states of nature, when Hobbes says that nothing that the Sovereign
does is unjust.xliv This is part of Hobbes’s exoteric teaching that prefers to err on the side of any
government as opposed to revolution and anarchy, at the expense of being unclear about what he
thinks is a model for civil societies. Indeed, as far as Locke is concerned, his carefulness
becomes excessive when he concludes that absolute monarchy (when the king has the legislative
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power) is the best form of government, and that, while the beginning of a civil society requires
unanimous consent, there is no such thing as coerced consent.xlv But this element of his teaching
does not contradict his belief in natural right, for he also says, that the “obligation and liberty of
the subjects is to be derived either from […] the end of the institution of sovereignty […],”
which is “their own preservation, and a more contented life […].”xlvi Indeed the sovereign is
bound to observe the laws of nature,xlvii which are “immutable and eternal; for injustice,
ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made
lawful.”xlviii
We thus conclude that Hobbes also wrote about the state of nature as the natural condition
of mankind, in which, not only are men ignorant about the way to happiness, but they are
constantly in a state of war. Pseudo-equality leads to competition, which in turn leads to
diffidence, and then war. Wars for glory arise from pseudo-equality directly. But men also have
reason, which allows them to find out the Laws of Nature, which dictate, not only the
preservation of life, but the happiness of men.
i
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988,
14th reprint 2003) 2nd Treatise, paragraph 4, lines 3-8.

Hobbes’s argument is that a monarchy is the most powerful form of government, and also the most likely to be
equitable; for the monarch has a strong personal interest in ruling over a thriving, prosperous, and happy kingdom
(Leviathan 19, 4.). Locke on the other hand, believed that granting authority to a monarch to rule is not sufficient
consent from the people. To best prevent the tyranny that usually comes with unchecked power, they must consent
to the very laws made by the legislative power. This means that the people must have elected representatives that
will legislate the will of the people (2nd Treatise, 136-137).
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ii
2nd Treatise, 6, 7-10.
2nd Treatise, 7,3.
iv nd
2 Treatise, 7,4; 11, 3-4; 12,5.
v nd
2 Treatise, 7,9.
vi nd
2 Treatise, 6, 10-17.
vii nd
2 Treatise, 25, 6-8.
viii nd
2 Treatise, 28, 13-16.
ix nd
2 Treatise, 27.
x nd
2 Treatise, 27, 11-12.
xi nd
2 Treatise, 31, 6-11.
xii nd
2 Treatise, 48.
xiii nd
2 Treatise, 22, 1-4.
xiv nd
2 Treatise, 55, 4-8.
xv nd
2 Treatise, 124, 9-10.
xvi
John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding (the University of Dallas: Packet for Politics 3334, Fall
2004) 24, 25.
xvii
Packet, 26.
xviii nd
2 Treatise, 87.
xix nd
2 Treatise, 30, 6-7.
xx nd
2 Treatise, 26, 1-3.
xxi nd
2 Treatise, 159, 15-19.
xxii
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 1994) Chapter
13, Paragraph 9.
xxiii
Packet, 13.
xxiv
Packet, 16.
xxv
Packet, 21.
xxvi
Packet, 20.
xxvii
Packet, 21, 22.
xxviii
Packet, 20.
xxix
Leviathan, Introduction.
xxx
Leviathan, 13, 1.
xxxi
Leviathan, 13, 2.
xxxii
Leviathan, 15, 21.
xxxiii
Leviathan, 13 3.
xxxiv
Leviathan, 13 4.
xxxv
Leviathan, 13, 5.
xxxvi
Leviathan, 17, 7-9.
xxxvii
Leviathan, 13, 9.
xxxviii
Leviathan, 13, 14.
xxxix
Leviathan, 14, 4.
xl
Leviathan, 14, 4.
xli
Leviathan, 14, 1.
xlii
Leviathan, 13, 3.
xliii
Leviathan, 17, 1.
xliv
Leviathan, 18, 6.
xlv
Leviathan, 14, 27.
xlvi
Leviathan, 21, 10; 17, 1.
xlvii
Leviathan, 21, 7.
xlviii
Leviathan, 15, 38.
iii
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