Alternative Globalisations/Advanced Global Politics
R. James Ferguson © 2007
Lecture 1:
The New Global Politics:
Alternative Outlooks in a Period of Contested Globalisation
Topics: 1. Transition Beyond the Old Inter-National Relations
2. Change: The Expected and Unexpected
3. Global Politics: The Basic Description of Globalisation
4. Incomplete Globalisation as Global-Dialogue
5. Alternative Outlooks and Institutions
6. Bibliography, Resources, and Further Reading
1. Transition Beyond the Old Inter-National Relations
International relations at all levels were rapidly changing in the last quarter of the
20th century and in the early 21st century. Likewise, ‘International Relations’ and
‘International Politics’ as disciplines have been undergoing rapid change during the
last two decades, with a large range of alternative viewpoints being developed by
practitioners, scholars and activists. Ironically, the thinking of academics, foreign
policy advisers, political activists, mainstream economic advisers (see Davies 2004;
Soros 2002) and government policy groups have probably been adapting more
slowly that the real changes they have to face in the world around them.
International Relations, as the term ‘inter-national’ indicates, was a discipline which
concerned itself originally with the relations among states. It was therefore
concerned with issues such as war, diplomacy, power politics and state order. These
issues of ‘high politics’ were viewed as the most important shapers of the world, past,
present, and into the foreseeable future. The state was focused on because it was
viewed as the main international actor, and as religious authority declined, as the main
source of legitimacy. With the disastrous outcomes of World War I and World War II,
the main issue seemed to resolve itself on the theme of power, a trend entrenched in
thinkers such as Hans Morgantheau (1985), policy practitioners such as Henry
Kissinger (1994), and the realist and neo-realistic schools of thought (taken further in
lecture 2). These views were entrenched and developed further during the Cold War
superpower competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union.
Such ‘realist’ thinkers argued that the state was the main international actor, the
only source of genuine legitimacy, and that in a basically anarchical world order of
high competition and regular conflict, the state and its interests had to be preserved at
all cost. The term anarchical here refers to the concept that no true source of
authority or legitimacy existed above the self-interest of states, leading to a lack of
genuine international society, a concept developed by Hedley Bull (Bull 2000). The
idea here was that in spite of some inter-governmental and supra-national actors (the
UN, the EU etc.), there was no higher source of global order than states and
agreements made among them, based on national interest. International Relations,
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therefore, particularly in British and U.S. scholarship, tended to be viewed as an
extension of foreign affairs, foreign relations and foreign policy. International
Relations was therefore studied mainly to allow the proper formulation and
prescription of foreign policy, e.g. how the U.S. could retain hegemonic control in
the Persian Gulf or help chart a road towards a wider Middle Eastern settlement,
remain the dominant power in the Pacific, or how other nations can be coerced on
particular issues (for a sophisticated account of coercive bargaining, see Lebow 1998).
Countries had to either develop their own power resources, or align with those who
had power. On this basis, the main issue for national leaders remained the issue of
developing, maintaining and using power, conceived of primarily in political and
military terms, with a secondary recognition of the role of wealth in support of these
kinds of power.
However, by the late 1980s several trends began to emerge which shifted
international relations, in the factual arena and in its ideas, away from this dominant
theme of the nation and hard-power relations. These revisionist themes, include the
following: 
The Cold War itself, which dominated European and then world affairs from 19491989, was based on the notion of hostile camps armed with nuclear weapons.
Though small, useable weapons (which one might dare use) were conceived of in the
second half of this period, the basic concept of deterrence was dominant. In
classical nuclear deterrence, this assumed that a major conflict between nuclear
powers could lead to atomic war, and in the classical system of deterrence lead to
mutually-assured destruction (MAD). The problem that this scenario was it involved
the development of enormous nuclear arsenals and military power which by
definition could not be used. If the policy of deterrence was working, there should
never be a need to ‘nuke’ anybody. In effect, this moved the whole issue of power
onto the development of a massive military potential, backed by a sophisticated
notion of game-theory in which you assumed that the enemy was just as rational as
you were. In other words, the theory could only work for the Americans (or British
and French) if they correctly understood the thinking and strategies of their Soviet
and Chinese opponents. Strategists were led back to thinking about strategic
culture, leadership styles, and political systems in opposing as well as allied
countries. As a result, hard-headed ‘independent’ policy institutes which helped
provide research that was utilised by Western governments, e.g. the RAND
Corporation, the Brookings Institute, and the International Institute for Strategic
Studies (London) began analysing a wide range cultural, historical, and political
and social factors (see for example Langer 1972; Boylan 1982; Harding 1984;
Harding 1987; Harding 1993; Harding 1994; Dupont 1996). The first move in this
direction was a paper studying ‘strategic culture’ of the Soviets made by Synder in
1977, published by the RAND corporation, and this became a major secondary
theme in even conservative journals in the 1990s (See Synder 1977; Dellios 1997b,
pp202-204). From 2001, we may see a return to a more sophisticated version of
this contest through the debate over the deployment of a Missile Defence system by
the U.S. (as well as possible extended missile defences - TMD, Theatre Missile
Defence Systems, for Japan and possibly even Taiwan). Such a system has serious
implications for China, Russia, and Europe, leading to another round of analysis of
motivation, strategic culture and capability among the nuclear powers (see Lieber &
Press 2006; Wilkening 2000; Evans 2004). Likewise, there is now a major effort to
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understand the motivation of thinking of government actions in states such as India,
Pakistan, Iran and North Korea (especially through 2003-2007). From 2006, debate
has begun to emerge as to whether a new system of nuclear balance is emerging
in Asia, in large measure outside the old nuclear club and outside of effective
regulation by the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), a trend still developing
due even as India and North Korea have engaged in very different types of dialogue
on this issue. If Iran or North Korea's leadership is viewed as inherently
'unpredictable', this might lead to a more robust effort to contain or erode their
ability to project power. Ironically, such defence systems can cause a period severe
instability before they are fully deployed, and do not deal with other threats such as
international terrorism, nor a host of other transnational problems (see further
below; for limitations of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RIM) for the
low intensity conflicts (LICs) that may become more common in the 21st century, see
Jordaan & Vrey 2003). Likewise, strategic culture has also had engage with the
ideas and motivations of non-state actors who have emerged as political and
military opponents over the last seventy years, including revolutionary, guerrilla and
terrorist groups. At the same time, this trend indicates that military and
technological power, in new forms, remain important elements of power for
some states.

The end of the Cold War lead to massive changes in the international system,
as well as greatly surprising most politicians, strategists, and international relations
thinkers. Almost no one predicted the major changes of the 1988-1992 period, at
least not so early. With the slowing and end of the Cold War (though tensions among
Russia, the ‘West’ and China and the U.S. have been somewhat revived through
2005-2007, they are of a totally different order to the 1949-1987 period), several
major changes have occurred. Although security and defence issues remain
important, military power is now viewed as one potential among many sources of
strength and influence. The dominant conception of power which has emerged since
the 1980s has been the priority of economic power, based on national wealth, trade,
technological innovation, and influence in the international financial system. Ralph
Pettman has characterised one version of this system as the ‘balance of
productivity’ (see Pettman 1991). Other approaches try to combine economic and
resources issues as part of a more broadly based notion of power, conceptualised
either as comprehensive national strength, and comprehensive security,
including a wide range of factors: population, resources, economic strength, military
forces, education levels, diplomatic prestige (these concepts have been deployed at
different times by China, Japan, and NATO, Li 1990). Likewise, the international
news of the 1990s is full of discussions of international trade and finance
organisations (the World Trade Organisation – WTO; the International Monetary
Fund – IMF), of economic crises (Mexico, Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia,
Argentina), economic trends (e.g. trade and investment flows), and growing energy
demands of rising powers such as China and India. Wealth is seen as basis for the
power and international influence of modern powers such as the European
Union, Germany, Japan, and ultimately, the US itself. Prospects of future ‘great
powers’ are also assessed in terms of economic growth and future parity purchasing
power (PPP), e.g. the prospect of China becoming the world’s largest economy by
2025 if not earlier (for various estimate, see Dellios 2005; Cheng 2003). In such a
setting, technological, economic and institutional innovation become key
factors in shaping the global system, as well as strongly shaping regional and
bilateral relations (for one such analysis of China and the WTO, see Cheng 2003).
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
Many policies and decisions that influence regional and global now operate through
large corporations or regional and international organisations. They are inherently
transnational, often working beyond the confines of individual states with a speed
and volume that dwarf all but the largest national economies (see Strange 1996).
Thus, even in the early 1990s, 51 of the world's largest economic entities were
corporations (with transnational operations and dispersed production), while 49 were
nations (Davies 2004, p144). As such, many of the organisations created at the
end of World War II (the Bretton Woods Institutions such as the IMF and
World Bank) may no longer be able to regulate the world system as effectively
as had been hoped (see Stevenson 2000). Over the 2001-2007 period this viewpoint
has been partially modified, with the US and its coalition 'partners' showing the
operation of military predominance in the interventions of Afghanistan and Iraq,
in part using strategic power for defensive reasons, in part to shape access to key
resources such as oil (for the revival of 'realist' orientation since 2001, see Haque
2003). However, in the long run economic, energy and resource factors are still
central in shaping power and foreign policy in the 21st century, but now run in
transnational settings (see Leech 2006; Kleveman 2003; Klare 2002). Furthermore,
globalisation also allows transnational illegal networks and trades to flourish,
with issues such as arms, drugs, and people smuggling emerging as major problems
alongside money laundering (estimated at running around 2-5% of global GDP) and
the theft of intellectual property (Naim 2003). These problems cannot be controlled
by the efforts of single nations (see Naim 2003).

A third major trend has been a recognition that a whole range of issues that were
once viewed as of secondary importance, i.e. ‘low politics’, now have a stronger
role in driving change and in structuring crises. These include: -
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environmental concerns have become more prominent, e.g. the
severe air pollution or haze affecting Southeast Asia for parts of 1997-1999,
widespread pollutive damage in Russia, Eastern Europe, India and China.
Since 1992, there have serious efforts to forge an international agenda
aimed at managing global environmental problems (via tools such as the
Kyoto Protocol and Agenda 21).
climate change, impacting on agriculture, fisheries, and patterns of
risk and insurance, e.g affecting Pacific and Indian Ocean Islands, parts of
Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Pakistan and the Arctic. If sustained, climate change
may affect the security of entire nations and regions. Even if part of longer
natural cycles, human activity may be exacerbating the rapidity of these
cycles. This may then be linked to issues of crisis management and the
resilience of human institutions to a range of disasters. However, even with
the formal coming into force of the Kyoto Protocol with Russian
ratification from November 2004, these have had a limited global impact
(taken up later lectures; see further Stavins 2004). Through 2006-2007 the
reality of climate change has been accepted, as has the notion of ongoing
pressures on the use of fossil fuels, leading to a renewed debate on energy
sources and usage in China, the U.S. and Australia.
control and management of ocean and coastal resources, both
through control of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and open ocean areas,
part of a wider 'global commons' debate (see for example Environmental Policy
and Law 2001). Fisheries, undersea gas and oil fields, and rights of passage for
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military vessels are part of a complex debate about management of coast and
deep see resources.
migration, populations movements, refugees and illegal workers.
Movement of human being remains one of the most poorly regulated and
problematic areas of national and transnational governance, and continue to
challenge developed economies in Europe and North America.
poverty and under-development, often as sources of wider
political and military instability (addressed in later lectures).
issues affecting women and children as poor, dis-empowered or
exploited segments of world society (See Pettman 1991). In this setting,
gender issues and challenges to traditional systems of authority and the use of
force have been brought forward by feminist theory (see for example
Tickner 2005; Tickner 1997; Lenz 2003).
uncontrolled urban development and urban crises, leading to a
debate as to whether the growing number of megacities are truly sustainable
(taken up in lecture 10).
health issues which have a global impact, e.g. AIDS, SARS
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), Avian bird flu, malaria (which from
1989 has re-emerged as a major problem, reported in 107 countries up to
2003, World Malaria Report 2005), the re-emergence of tuberculosis, the
global cost of poor health systems, immunisation issues, the cost and
subsidising of generic drugs to make them more widely available, the
evolution of new viruses, and the enforcement of biological warfare
conventions. These trends suggest global vulnerabilities based flows in the
global system that need better detection and management (see Dudley 2006
for one example).
culture and civilisational dialogue verses patterns of political
conflict in international relations. These factors were explicitly recognised as
an important in UN conferences since 1993, but remain controversial in
relation to the causes of modern conflict, e.g. the role of Islam, and varying
degrees of tolerance in political systems (Huntington 1993; Huntington 1996;
Iriye 1997; Hudson 1997; discussed further in week 4).
agendas concerning new communication technologies, e.g. the
possible divide between information-rich and information poor
communities. This has led in part to a 'new diplomacy' and a new way of
waging international political and civil campaigns, as well as providing a
means for e-commerce and accelerated international financial flows. A new
'public diplomacy' driven in part through agencies such as CNN and public
relations firms, has shifted the way politicians and governments relate to
domestic and international audiences (see for example Ross 2003; Maluf
2005). As noted by Christopher Ross: Modern diplomacy, once a largely one-dimensional, nation-to-nation process,
is now a multi-dimensional enterprise in which so-called "non-state" actors
and foreign publics play an increasingly prominent role. The latest Iraq war is
the most dramatic, but hardly the first, example of this phenomenon. The rise
in influence of non-state actors has been paralleled by two other equally
important developments: globalization - the integration of peoples, societies,
and economies - and information technologies that now link nations, cultures,
and societies in complex and unprecedented ways.
This is the transformed international environment in which public diplomacy
now operates. In such a world, the public-diplomacy quotient of virtually every
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foreign policy issue today has risen dramatically, whether regarding a trade
negotiation over genetically modified corn, the reconstruction of Iraq, or the
threat of HTV/AIDS. (Ross 2003)
The effects (negative and positive) of these new technologies often influence
different countries, regions and classes differentially. Likewise, the impact of
these trends on warfare, intelligence gathering, human rights, and diplomacy,
has yet to be fully explored in the public domain.

These changes have taken place alongside two opposing trends that have nonetheless
placed great pressure on traditional models of the nation-state. These are the trends
of localisation alongside globalisation. Localisation is the notion of small regions,
cities or communities becoming more autonomous and pro-active, i.e. engaging
people in local culture and empowering local institutions. The clearest example of
this has been the emphasis on the empowerment of local regions in Europe below
the level of the nation, e.g. Scotland, Wales, Catalonia (officially an autonomous
region of Spain from 1979, with increasing degrees of independence through 2006),
parts of Northern Italy (seeking more economic and cultural independence through
political movements such as the ‘Northern League’), and Corsica. These regions have
either been allocated more regional autonomy (Scotland, Catalonia) or groups in
these regions are demanding more independence, sometimes by violent means, e.g.
until recent agreements, the Basques in Spain. Likewise, the character of states and
local culture groups within India has also made the unity of India one of the key
problems for that state, with tensions in areas such as Assam, the Punjab (Sikh
secessionists), Kashmir (Muslim-Hindu disturbances), and for Tamils in the south.
Localisation is also found in reborn trends towards nationalism and ethnic
nationalism in parts of Europe and Eurasia, where small communities, no longer
submerged in large Federal states such as Yugoslavia and the USSR, now seek to
secede and retain their own national sovereignty. These trends have created small,
reborn states such as Croatia and Latvia, and also strong aspirations towards
statehood or greater autonomy in regions such as Kosovo, Chechnya and Tartarstan
(in Russia). Other examples of localisation include the huge powers that major
trading cities now wield (Singapore, Hong Kong, London, Shanghai, New York)
often operating alongside rather than below national foreign policy. These major
trading and financial hubs are now linked in a network of World Cities, which are
one of the sources of globalisation, international information flows and
transnational decision making (see lecture 10).

The countervailing trend is globalisation, whereby new trade and
communication links have created an international order where individuals,
goods, services and ideas are moved across national boundaries (see further
below). This trend of globalisation, which still remains uneven around the world, is
often linked to the concept of complex interdependence, whereby different
nations are often interlinked economically, financially and politically which means
that they are often restrained by these linkages (see further Wittkopf & Kegley 1995;
Holsti 1995). The exact nature and implications of globalisation are highly
controversial and will be discussed briefly below. The important thing about
localisation and globalisation is that they are often connected. Local groupings
can often gain more significance in the context of supranational organisations, e.g.
Scotland within the context of the EU. Likewise, a range of non-government
organisations often gain importance through connecting the local with the global, e.g.
earlier Red Cross operations in East Timor were effective in linking on the ground
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problems in the then troubled part of Indonesia through a respected and relatively
neutral international organisation. INGOs, International Non-Government
Organisations, often succeed by making a local issues a global affair: sometimes
this process is dubbed as the 'glocal'. Thus aid agencies often flag, monitor or
publicise ongoing or emerging crises, signalling problems that need greater
attention from governments IGOs (see Relief Web at http://www.reliefweb.int/ for
one active example). Taken from a different angle, this has led to the idea of the
nexus of the local and the global, with local and global developments often linked
('glocalization'; see Thornton 2000 for some of the debates over this term).
Likewise, globalisation is sometimes seen as a threat, sometimes leading to a rebound
in local nationalism.

Key players in the nexus among local, national, regional and global affairs include not
just states, IGOs (Inter-governmental Organisations) and corporations, but INGOs
(International Non-governmental Organisations). Thousands of NGOs and
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have been active influencing UN policies, global
environmental agenda, the land-mines ban, and the formation of the International
Criminal Court (as well as influencing flows of national aid and foreign policy). This
has accelerated, especially from 1945 onwards, resulting in a key force in the 'new
diplomacy' with strong interactions between state and non-state actors, with the
new political environment providing a range of opportunities for NGOs to gain
funding and roles, often from governments (see Reimann 2006; Davenport 2002).
In sum, these trends have created a dynamic and complex international landscape,
which has rapidly transformed the global system over the last fifteen years. Yet most
of our large-scale institutions and the everyday concepts used to analyse, moderate or
mould the international system were created in earlier periods. The UN, the Security
Council, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund were all created during or
shortly after the end of World War II. Likewise, notions such as ‘real-politik’ (power
politics), ‘balance of power’, traditional patterns of diplomacy and international law,
were first developed in the 16-19th centuries, and refined for international usage
during two World Wars and the Cold War. One of the major questions facing us is
whether these established organisations and ideas can readily be adapted to find
solutions in the current period, i.e. via the reform in governance that has
occurred through the 1970s-1990s (see Loughlin 2004).
As we shall see, institutional change, redefinition, and goal-reformulation are
possible, but not always successful. Sometimes new and alternative ways of looking at
and dealing with issues are required. Here international relations has to remain
creative and adaptive. We will explore these themes in your seminars, and in the
following lecture series: 1.
Introduction: Alternative Outlooks in a Period of Turbulent
Globalisation
2.
International Relations from Thucydides to World Systems Theory
3.
Transnational Realities: Trade, Diaspora, and Migration
4.
The Contested Role of Culture In International Relations
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5.
Economic Cultures: From Reconstruction to Growth to Instability
6.
The Challenge of Environmental Sustainability: Risks and Prospects
7.
Alternative Global Forces: Islamic International Relations and
Transnational Flows (Case Study)
8.
Soft and Hard Power: Case Study - The Chinese Century 1949-2049
9.
Environment, Resources and Development
10:
The World City: Singapore, Shanghai, Berlin, Dakar and Beyond
11.
Scripts for Cooperation and Protest: People Power, Low-Violence
Strategies, and Cosmopolitan Governance
12.
Conclusion: The New International Relations From Crisis Management to Strategic Adaptation
2. Change: The Expected and Unexpected
The late 20th century was a period of dynamic change and rapid global modernisation
based on an ongoing knowledge explosion, with some suggesting that this trend will
accelerate through the 21st century (see Hobsbawm 1994; Friedman 2005). In the last
decade, certain changes have been predicted, but a wide range of changes have
emerged which have not been expected. Some of these changes were so unexpected
that they were hard to detect and analyse until they were well underway, surprising
policy makers, politicians and academics alike.
Since the end of World War II, a large number of international trends were predicted,
and in many cases actively planned for by both national governments and international
groups. Expected and planned for changes have included: 
The evolution and expansion of the roles of the United Nations and its agencies,
even as the role of the UNSC and UNESCO are disputed.

The emergence of an integrated Europe, which ran a difficult but planned-for
process of deepening and broadening to include more nations and functions from
1951-2004 (this process, formally running from the Treaty of Paris, of course, is far
from problem-free). This was one of the most important supranational experiments
globally, passing up some elements of sovereignty to the level above the state, but in
recent years also allowing greater dialogue with civil society and NGOs. Through
2005-2007 the limits of this process began to emerge, in part via tensions over the
future entry of Europe, and problems in building a single European constitution.

The development of active regional organisations, e.g. ASEAN, ARF, NAFTA,
APEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), OAS, Mercosur, which have
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developed trade, security and political agendas. In part, these organisations have been
either viewed as stepping stones towards global level-agreements, or as buffers
against the effects of accelerated globalisation.

The continued rapid development of science, technology, weapon systems,
computer and communication capabilities. This has revolutionised the nature of
warfare, finance, economic competition and international cooperation through civil
society networks.

Continued but uneven global population growth, combined with uneven
economic development. India in May 2000 passed the one billion level in population,
and in the same month China announced stricter child birth policies to try to stabilise
population at the 1.3 billion mark. High growth rates still are a common feature of
many developing countries, especially in parts of Africa, and have implications for
poverty and environment sustainability (covered in later lectures). Ironically,
Japan, much Europe and now Russia have either zero or slightly negative population
growth, leading to major debates about the implications of these demographic
differentials across regions and religious groupings. (for one controversial
discussion see Ferguson 2006). It has been suggested that world population growth
rates are already slowing and may stabilise around 2050, in part driven by increasing
urbanisation which changes birth rates (Carbon Positive 2007).

Relatively slow but real growth in the global economy, and trends towards the
creation of a truly global marketplace. Though growth was sluggish through 20012002, one estimate suggests '4.4 per cent a year in 2005 and 2006' (National Institute
Economic Review 2005). It also notes that: 'Although the global economy is slowing
from last year's hectic GDP increase of 5.1 per cent, the outlook for the three years
to 2007 is for robust growth averaging nearly 4 1/2 per cent a year. However,
consumer price inflation is generally picking up, partly as a result of higher oil prices
but also because the global economy is operating at roughly full capacity' (National
Institute Economic Review 2005). World GDP grew by 4.3% in 2005 and was
estimated at 4.9% for 2006 (IMF 2006). These trends, however, are highly uneven,
with some countries and regions gaining (globalisation-from-above), and others
finding themselves needing to catch up to global norms and developments (see
Ravenhill 1998).
However, a wide range of dramatic changes have occurred which were not readily
predicted, and were not expected. In many cases these changes, even when basically
positive, were viewed as highly problematic. A small sample of these trends include: 
The dramatic and rapid end of the Cold War, largely triggered off by Gorbachev’s
leadership (1987-1990), was not predicted within its short time-frame.

The collapse of the Soviet Union into 15 different nations at the end of 1991 was
so sudden that it took most Western nations by surprise, leading to fears of massive
destabilisation.

The opening of China and its adoption of aspects of capitalism, leading to a greatly
empowered People’s Republic of China that has sought to play a stronger role in
East Asia and in the global system (1978-2007). This also involves strong PRC
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needs that impact on the global system, e.g. for economic growth, continued
exports, imports of energy, and an effort to shift towards a somewhat greener
economy from 2006.

Continuing patterns of uneven globalisation and underdevelopment, whereby
some countries remain desperately poor, e.g. Sudan, Somalia, Bangladesh, in spite of
movements towards a world-wide neo-liberal capitalism and numerous humanitarian
interventions. This means that the type of development program used by most
agencies and by bilateral aid programs remain highly controversial. Even poverty
reduction and food aid policies remain fiercely debated (for some debates in Kiely
2004; 2001, see Blustein 2001; Struck 2001). Even at the level of basic nutrition and
intake of calories, there are serious inequities in the global system, with ongoing
concerns about basic food security and clean water provision in many poorer
countries.

Trends in some regions through the 1990s moved back towards exclusive forms of
nationalism, ethnic conflict, and the use of war as a state-building tool (e.g. in
former Yugoslavia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Rwanda). For a time, it was feared that
new forms of 'tribalism' and international anarchy would undermine regions of
stability, and create separate zones of relative peace and zones of war

The re-emergence of genocide and ethnic cleansing, e.g. in Bosnia, Kosovo and
Rwanda, despite the lessons of World War II and fifty years of activity by the UN
and various humanitarian conventions and organisations. Some see this as a serious
failure for international law and the international system. Efforts to address this
problem, whether through specially constituted International Criminal Tribunals (e.g.
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), or the developing International Criminal
Court (ICC), have yet to be perfected as strong preventive tools, though the ICC has
begun investigations and initial prosecutions concerning human rights abuses in
North Uganda (with prosecutions against Joseph Kony and leaders of Uganda's
Lord's Resistance Army), Congo and Sudan, including 'Ahmad Muhammad Harun, a
former junior interior minister in the Sudanese government and head of its Darfur
security desk and now, astonishingly, minister for humanitarian affairs; and Ali
Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Rahman, better known by his nom de guerre, Ali Kushayb, a
leader of the janjaweed' (Economist 2007a; for the initial debates on the ICC, see
Tucker 2001; Novogrodsky 2005).

Growing or sustained gaps between rich and poor in many developing countries,
e.g. India, Brazil and most recently Argentina), and continued serious poverty in the
bottom tier (15-40%) of one third of the world (e.g. in much of South Asia and
central Africa), even as there is some reduction of extreme poverty in parts of East
Asia and Latin America. Debates have since emerged as to whether globalisation and
increased trade flows have reduced poverty, or entrenched a poor rural tier in debt
ridden countries (Saul 2005).

In spite of strong trends towards reduction and control of nuclear armaments
(treaties such as the NPT, CTBT, START I, II & III, INF), a number of nations
remain armed with sizeable numbers of nuclear weapons (the nuclear club). There
is at least one ‘undeclared’ nuclear state (Israel); several threshold states who could
develop nuclear weapons in the near future (e.g. North Korea, Iran); states that could
quickly develop nuclear weapons if their security was greatly undermined (Japan,
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Australia); and two states that have recently declared their nuclear capability
(India and Pakistan). This system of ‘nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots’ received
serious shocks in 1997-1978. First, India and then Pakistan refused to sign the CTBT
in its current form (The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), undermining its status as a
globally binding treaty (see Ghoshroy 1999; Hewitt 2000). Second, in early May 1998,
India, under the leadership of the then new BJP coalition government, tested a total
of five nuclear weapons in underground tests, ranging from thermonuclear bombs to
small yield tactical weapons and greatly surprising even the CIA, the Central
Intelligence Agency of the US (Strategic Comments 1998). The problem is not so much
the demonstration of the technology, which India has held since its first ‘peaceful’
nuclear explosion in 1974, but the challenge it represented to the current system
of nuclear powers. The status of nuclear weapons has been under debate between
Pakistan and India through 2003-2007, and India has made it clear that it remains
concerned by China's nuclear capabilities. The point is that the problem of nuclear
weapons has not been solved, regionally or globally, and the current regime for
controlling nuclear weapons is now under serious challenge. There has been some
shift to change the focus of control through mechanisms that would control nuclear
technology and nuclear materials, e.g. in 2005 India ratified the Convention on
Nuclear Safety, emphasising the safety and control of nuclear power production
sites (Xinhua 2005). As a result, the NPT may be seen as a failing regime, or at
least one that needs serious support if its goals are to be sustained. Others
view it as a moderately successful system: Yet, has the NPT failed? Although a bit dated and despite some noncompliance
concerns, it is fair to say that the vast majority of its members continue to believe in
and fully support the treaty's objectives and principles. Contrary to growing
perceptions in Washington, both in governmental and nongovernmental circles, the
treaty has a good track record. Although the only four states that remain outside the
treaty are now armed with nuclear weapons, this problem relates to long-standing
regional and bilateral political issues that the NPT was not necessarily designed to
address. Convincing these countries to renounce nuclear weapons or control their
nuclear-related technologies and material will require tailor-made diplomatic
approaches outside the context of the NPT in which the United States and other NPT
nuclear-weapon states have a leading role.
The "glass-half-empty" protagonists seem to believe that because less than a handful
of NPT members have cheated--Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Iran--the NPT and its
safeguards system have failed to prevent proliferation. Of these "cheaters," Iraq and
Libya are no longer of nuclear proliferation concern, while the verdict is still out on
Iran's intentions. In their analysis of the treaty's well-being, those who foresee a
demise of the NPT seem to forget that several states, such as Argentina, Belarus,
Brazil, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine, gave up their nuclear weapons or
related programs and joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states in good standing.
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of other non-nuclear-weapon states have
laudable compliance records. (du Preez 2006)

Global or regional instabilities in stock markets, currency markets and in the
international financial system 1987-1998 and 2001-2002, in spite of the activities
of the International Monetary Fund and the secondary role of the World Bank. The
question here was whether these markets can find a substantially self-regulating
equilibrium, or would continue to disastrously impact on specific countries and
regions. To date, aside from some reform to the IMF for more speedy action on its
part, no new major system of financial governance has been put in place (see
D'Arista 2000), indicating that there is no guarantee that further instability in this area
11
could not occur again. Although no new major round of major crisis has occurred,
instability through 1997-2002 in Russia, Turkey, Indonesia and Argentina has raised
the spectre of a two-tier world-system based on those countries with strong
currencies (Japan, EU, US), and those with vulnerable ones. In this setting, regional
organisations such as ASEAN and Mercosur have begun to think of long term
options such as shared currencies, which is problematic while economic convergence
is low (see Bunyaratavej & Hahn 2003), or at least ways to avoid regional contagion if
one national currency collapses. Moreover, it has been suggested that East Asia may
have gone in the opposite direct in recent years through undervalued currencies. In
the view of Nouriel Roubini: "First, this new economic and financial model is leading to excessive monetary and
credit growth, asset bubbles in stock markets, housing markets and other financial
markets that will eventually lead to a build up of financial vulnerabilities – like the
capital inflows and bubbles that preceded the Asian crisis of 1997 in a region of semifixed exchange rates – that could trigger a financial crisis different from that of 199798, but that could be potentially as severe."
Secondly, says Roubini, Asia's low reliance on domestic demand and high reliance on
net exports (and production capacity for those exports) means that were the US
economy to even slow down more seriously than it has, or worse – head into
recession, then Asia is left very vulnerable. To exacerbate the matter, the longer
export-led growth continues the more pressure builds up for protectionist measures
from the US and Europe, which, if applied, would have the same effect. (Peel 2007)

The emergence of a global system of communications, based not just on mass
media and telephines, but also on the Internet, e-mail, and digital networks. The
Internet, in particular, based on technology in part developed for military purposes,
originally was extended as an academic research network. It rapidly moved to
embrace a large section of the commercial and private groups who had access to
computers and phone/line connections. As a result, ‘an-almost-global’
information network (highway) is being created, with serious implications for
international relations, diplomacy, transnational business, NGOs, political and
pressure groups, and for the ability of individuals to gain access to information in
order to pressure or influence governments. The revolutionary effects of the Internet
has already begin to transform education and marketing, but has also had a serious
impact of international language and culture policies (e.g. in France), on issues of
censorship and political control (Singapore, the People’s Republic of China, Cuba),
on criminal activity (fraud, pornography, financial transfers, security issues), a serious
impact on print media, and an influence on the labour and trade union movement.
The rapid development of this system as one of the main sources of information may
also inadvertently create information-poor ghettoes. Likewise, individuals, using
these new technologies, can communicate with and influence others around the
globe. This can range from the formation of hobby, interest or lobby groups giving
each other international support, through to the creation of ‘virtual communities’
with new identities. This has linked up with recent rends towards skill-enriched
elites, leadership groups, and publics. In some countries, especially those with
adequate education systems, there has been a trend towards more highly skilled
groups entering into public discussion, political activity, and policy formation (see
Rosenau & Fagen 1998, suggesting a 9-14% improvement in the ability to deal with
complexity in political life, compared to earlier generations). Some thinkers suggest a
‘skills revolution’ is underway which will radically change the accountability and
power of government, greatly complicate international regimes, and even in the end
12
force serious reform in the United Nations (See Rosenau & Fagen 1998). This has
now come forward as part of emerging transnational skills and competencies,
allowing NGOs and civil society to collect the information needed to either help or
criticise national governments, as appropriate to their goals. Such organisations, of
course, also try to prompt major policy debates via the world-wide web (see for
example the OneWorld.net at http://www.oneworld.net/).

Serious changes in the nature of work, and in the range of subcultures and
communities in which people can become involved. The work place is now often
much more competitive (due to international pressures), more volatile (due to
technological change), often conducted on a part-time basis, and in some areas can
be done either at home, on the move, or at any remote location using new
communication technologies (see Friedman 1999). The most extreme examples are
‘technological nomads’, who need no more than an e-mail or web address to do
their creative or technical work and to receive information and payments in return.
Likewise, major projects can be done by groups working in vary diverse locations,
e.g. software design done jointly between India and Switzerland, library systems
developed in offices in Australia and Singapore, or else subcontracted out to labour
sites globally on a cost/delivery basis, e.g. in many areas of low-tech manufacturing.
This greatly ‘internationalises’ the nature of the production, which is also more
intensely subject to international pressures, standards and competition. At the same
time, legal flows of labour tend to remain restricted to highly professional or skilled
jobs, while illegal (non-documented) flows of workers have placed severe on
borders zones in Europe, the Mediterranean, North America, and Southeast Asia.

The degree to which international life at all levels is affected not just by the action of
states, governments and international organisations such as the United Nations
(IGOs, international and inter-governmental organisations), but by the action of nongovernment groups. These include non-government and international nongovernment organisations (NGOs, INGOs and CSOs, civil society organisations),
who are now often recognised as observers and participants in the creation and
implementation of international treaties, especially in the UN governance and
environmental area (see the roles developed since the mid-1980s, outlined in
Raustiala 1997; Reimann 2006). The most effective non-government actors, of
course, have been the Trans-National Corporations (TNCs, also called
Multinational Corporations, MNCs), as well international banks and financiers
who have had a massive impact on the world economic system. Some would argue
that the survival of many groups and most large businesses now depends on their
ability to survive in and profit from this internationalised environment. Even large
states now often rely on access to the international trade and investment markets for
their viability (see Strange 1996). Likewise, some criminal organisations, whether drug
cartels, 'mafia' organisations, have also become truly effective at the international
level (thereby called TNCOs, Transnational Criminal Organisations), presenting
a serious problem for international policing and putting pressure on the adaptability
of national court systems (see Geldenhuys 2002). One argument suggests that
businesses have been the most effective at becoming truly transnational (Saul 2005),
but recent trends in environment groups and even labour organisations suggest that
these groups too can internationalise their activities effectively, e.g. the global
activities of Greenpeace, the operations of international labour alliances in support of
union activities, and other international lobby groups (see Herod et al. 1998; Bell et
al. 2002).
13

One of the most dramatic, and dangerous, surprises of the 21st century has been the
ability of terrorist networks to use transnational and international tools to
attack powerful Western nations and their interests, including the US, Spain, the UK,
and Australian interests via Bali. Although national terrorism has been operational
for decades, the ability of loose 'network of organisations', such as Al Qaeda, to pose
an international threat that could strike targets at will was surprising. In part this
was based on the use of everyday aspects of globalisation: easy air travel, easy
access to information and technology, communication systems, mobile phones, and
the ability to transfer even small sums to active cells in remote countries (see Abuza
2002). The result was a major challenge to the security of many Western states (the
US, Britain, France, Spain and Australia), and a rapid increase in securitisation of the
international system. This included tougher monitoring transport, customs,
migration, and banking systems. Likewise, these tragic events led to a stronger push
towards intervention and pre-emption of threats by the US and some of its allies
(especially Britain and Australia), e.g. in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has also pushed
forward a strong agenda for forcing some kind of comprehensive peace on the
Middle East, though this prospect stalled through 2004-2007. Whether the security
approach has contained international terrorism, or simply pushed it underground for
the time being, remains to be seen. (see Naim 2003).
It can be seen, then, that the international system has undergone rapid and
dramatic change in the last 50 years, and has not been entirely predictable. This
throws up new challenges which nations or even inter-governmental organisations
cannot deal with adequately without a wide basis of support. All these factors have
taken place within the context of trends towards globalisation, but the question we
need to ask is what kind of globalisation is taking place, and what kind of
globalisation is to be preferred.
3. Global Politics: The Basic Description of Globalisation
Globalisation embraces the idea that a wide range of commodities, institutions,
services, commercial activities, legal and treaty processes, as well as ideas and
patterns of organisation are now occurring most effectively and powerfully on worldwide scale, rather than just locally, nationally, or even regionally. ‘Globalisation’ is
really a short-hand term for ideas and theories concerning several international
processes that are developing at the same time. In large part, globalisation is driven
by interdependence and interconnectedness in the world economic system (see
Wittkopf & Kegley 1995). This has become ‘a global architecture of power in which
production, distribution and communication are increasingly structured by
international networks and strategies’ (Camilleri 1997, p7). It is clear that national
economies have to deal with new realities: It is now generally accepted that national economies have become increasingly
interdependent and that the closely related processes of production, circulation, and
exchange have assumed a global character. . . . All states must negotiate with
international and transnational institutions which exercise decisive leverage in shaping
the balance of costs and benefits, or risks and opportunities, within the world economy.
That leverage flows from their command of technology, their ready access to global
14
markets and global sources of capital, and their ability to play off one sovereign
jurisdiction against another. (Camilleri 1997, p8)
This not just an economic, technological and political revolution. It is also a cultural
revolution in which some see a new ‘global culture’ or ‘global civil society’
emerging. One account of these ‘global cultural flows’ outlines five distinct paths: –




ethnoscapes produced by flows of people (tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles,
guest workers, and al those engaged in international science, sport, or entertainment);
technoscapes produced by the flows of technical hardware and software generated by
transnational corporations and government agencies;
finanscapes produced by the rapid flows of money in the stock exchanges and the
currency and futures markets;
mediascapes produced by the flows of ideas and norms associated with statist and
counter-statist movement, many of which have their origins in the Western
Enlightenment worldview and give expression to diverse notions of freedom, national
self-determination, democracy and human rights. (Camilleri 1997, p11, following
Appadurai 1990).
Moreover, it is possible to see globalisation as driven by modernisation and
Westernisation, with Western ideas, culture and institutions becoming globally
dominant. This forms one strong critique of globalisation, resulting in resistance, both
violent and non-violent, to institutions supporting globalisation. This has been driven
both by those opposed to the neo-liberal, market-oriented reform dominant in
globalisation, by those see current patterns as perpetuating the North-South divide
between rich and poor, as well as by those who see it as a form a cultural imperialism
(see further Buttel 2003; Huntington 1996; Saul 2005). As we shall see, much more
than these Western processes are at work. Other forces are also at play trying to
influence the global system, and set up a more inclusive dialogue on these issues.
Several globalisation processes are running alongside each other, allowing the
possibility for their reform or modification (treated in more detail in later lectures).
Thus these parallel globalisation processes, which are incomplete, are highly
contested. Thus, George Kaloudis has suggested that we need to speak of several
global transformations running at the same time: Internationalization refers to the increased interaction among people from different
countries. Liberalization refers to the reduction of regulatory barriers. Universalization
refers to the spread of people and cultural phenomena to all corners of the globe.
Westernization refers to the process of greater homogenization and of the world
becoming more western. Scholte believes that all these definitions are old definitions
and as a consequence do not present any new insights. In turn, he defines
globalization as "deterritorialization--or . . . the growth of 'supraterritorial' relations
between people. In this usage, 'globalization' refers to a far reaching change in the
nature of social space. The proliferation and spread of supraterritorial - or what we cal
alternatively term 'transworld' or 'transborder' - connections brings an end to what
could be called 'territorialism,' that is, a situation where social geography is entirely
territorial. Although . . . territory still matters very much in our globalizing world, it no
longer constitutes the whole of our geography." (Kaloudis 2004, quoting Jan Aart
Scholte, Globalization: A Critical Introduction, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, pp.
44-46)
Alongside this patterns, there has also been an emerging body of thought since the
1970s which suggested that global problems and progress could only be supported by
increasing transnational and global flows of (free market) trade, finance and ideas, i.e.
15
the loose ideology known as globalism. Some of the expectations promoted by
globalism have been listed by John Ralston Saul: The power of the nation-state is waning.
Such states as we know them may even be dying.
In the future, power will lie with global markets.
Thus economics, not politics and armies, will shape human events.
These global markets, freed of narrow national interests and inhibiting regulations, will
gradually establish international economic balances. . . .
Such markets will unleash waves of trade. And these waves will in turn unleash a
broad economic tide of growth.
This tidal wave will in turn lift all ships, including those of the poor, whether in the
West or in the developing world. (Saul 2005, p15)
In turn, it was hoped, that these trends would support certain types of
democracies (moderate and constrained), with a gradual withering away of
nationalism and racism (Saul 2005, p15). Over the last thirty years, these
expectations have at best been only partially met, with rather different patterns
emerging from current globalisation processes that may undermine some of these
hopes (to be addressed through lectures 2-11).
4. Incomplete Globalisation as Global-Dialogue
As we have seen, globalisation (in the sense listed above) is far from complete around
the world and globalism has perhaps made overstated claims: large sections of the
world have yet to benefit from comprehensive modernisation, a modern capitalist
economy based on open trade flows, modern communications, or an adequate
standard of living. The lower tier of least developed countries are still in dire poverty,
while within most developing countries there are sizeable groups of urban and rural
poor, and those vulnerable to violence and uncertainty. This is sometimes called
uneven or incomplete globalisation (Camilleri & Falk 1992).
Furthermore, not just Western institutions, products and culture are being spread
around the world. These are examples where major domains of culture, finance and
regional organisation come from diverse sources, leading to more pluralist value
systems. Pluralism entails the idea that several groups and institutions have political
power in society, with diverse forces shaping decisions and values beyond any single
government. In the modern post-colonial period, the pattern of interaction has been
one of mutual influence and interpenetration, rather than outright domination, in
spite of the strong influence of modernism, Westernisation and the U.S. strategic
hegemony in the current period. In reality, most of the cultural influences have been
'diffused rather than distributed', interacting and modifying each other, allowing
transformation and recreation of values (Minattur 1965, p91). In terms of cultural
products, religious ideas and organisation approaches, countries such as Japan, China,
and India have had some impact on the global system, while regions such as Latin
America and Africa have strong cultural resources that have to some degree begun to
impact on global media. Likewise, value systems developed in Asia and the Islamic
world cannot be ignored if there is to be any global consensus on a core of human
values, and minimal definitions of international conduct (see Dallmayr 2002).
16
Here it is necessary to briefly mention the phenomena of incomplete globalisation.
Globalisation processes can marginalise least developed countries, especially if they
are small, weak in region al terms, and debt-ridden. Countries such as Bangladesh,
compared to India, for example, find it hard to find their way into the international
system and meet all regional and international expectations, e.g. via open trade
proposals or the need to reform the legal system. Sophisticated nation-states in North
America, parts of East Asia, and Europe are most able to benefit from most
globalisation trends in the world economy (Im 1996, p285; Ferguson 1998;
Mahbubani 1995, p111). Countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and
South Africa have also begun to integrate strongly into global processes, though with
strong pressures on social policy and fiscal management. Core countries in the 'global
North' tend to have greater influence in setting norms, building effective
organisations, and running their economies to benefit from the new global financial
system. Hence, they can sometimes direct or shape globalisation processes and rules,
e.g. via the UN and IMF, a process called 'globalisation-from-above'. In contrast,
globalisation 'from-below' seeks to shape these processes by grass-root groups and
international civil society (see Herod at al 1998; Warkentin 2001). Furthermore, it is
possible that several globalisation processes are running at once.
One of the great fears concerning globalisation is that rather than representing positive
opportunities for all nations, it will simply make the 'market system more productive
and improves the standard of living of the civilized who live by material consumption'
(Reuters 1997), i.e. that it is a narrow materialist exercise aiding the wealthy more
than any other group. Fortunately, it is now possible to glimpse several parallel
globalisation processes running together in the current period. In this emerging
pluralist global system the state and transnational corporation will not dominate to the
same decree as they have in the last twenty years. Civilisational influences, virtual
city-states, networks and diasporas (large-scale migrations) working across state
boundaries (Pettman 1996, pp5-8), and consciously developed regionalism will add
to this more complex process of globalisation. Likewise, as Chinese power grows and
the Chinese state entwines itself more deeply in international organisations, we might
expect to see a world system more impacted by Chinese expectations, i.e. ’global
politics with Chinese characteristics’ (Dellios 1997a). In the long term this would be
based not just on the economic power of ‘Greater China’1 nor on the regional
influence of China in Asia, but also on the emerging power of ideas and culture as
defined by an even wider ‘cultural China’ (we will touch on this theme of ‘soft power’
in later lectures).
Here a genuine dialogue is required to sustain the positive aspects of trade and
culture in the global system. Bearing in mind the economic power of East Asia, and
the relative diplomatic effectiveness of its regional organisations including ASEAN
and the ASEAN-Plus-Three (including PRC, Japan and South Korea), the rising
economic and military power of India, and the growing economic linkages between
North and South America, the time is ripe to continue a serious dialogue on trade,
culture and values. Dialogue may will be much more effective in setting shared
standards and interests than trying to impose a ‘rights monopoly’ on the global system
1
The economic and social networks including the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, and
Chinese groups throughout Southeast Asia.
17
(a point of view often launched my middle-level or reformist powers critical of the
current global system, e.g. Turkey, Iran, China). Interactions among regional and
cultural systems will be one of the main features of the twenty-first century global
order. Continued vigorous trade in the world system virtually ensures that an
interaction of values will also occur, whether based on constructive dialogue or
contending claims. We will return to this issue of competing models of globalisation
later in the subject.
Another model of this interaction suggests that the type of dialogue and
communication occurring within global networks is crucial in shaping the use of
power. There is a need for the wide range of agenda and goals of different
international groups to begin to converge on some better future in which there is a mix
of practical outcomes and accountability that goes beyond national politics. One
emerging area has been the slow evolution of cosmo-politics, cosmopolitanism and
theories of cosmopolitan governance, all directed towards a more humanistic and
responsive global system that recognises both human rights and global diversity
(Cartier 1999; Cheah & Robbins 1998). This may be both a new model for
democracy in a globalising world, and a source of universal human values based
on dialogue and tolerance across different classes and social groups (Cartier 1999;
Held 1999). Viewed as 'a set of international societal processes and values,
cosmopolitanism is a humanist counterpart to globalization; and if the cosmopolitan
has a geography, world cities are its primary nodes' (Cartier 1999; see further lectures
10-11). The aim would not be to 'force' democratic institutions on all states, but rather
to enhance open communication and public participation across different
institutions and groups that regulate regional and global institutions, gradually
improving their accountability, legitimacy and capacity (discussed in later
lectures).
5. Alternative Outlooks and Institutions
This subject looks at rapid change in the international, political, cultural and
economic systems, and changing theories about this transformation. It also looks
at alternative institutions and movements which are challenging traditional views of
power, international politics and globalisation. Next week we will briefly look at the
main international relations theories explaining international politics, and current
attempts to reformulate the idea of ‘power’ and the nature of the 'world system'. We
will then turn to a wide range of alternative ways of explaining or influencing change.
We will then look at the role of resources in shaping conflict, and patterns of ‘hard
and soft’ power. The role of culture in international affairs will be addressed,
including economic, political and strategic aspects of culture. Institutions,
international actors, and their reform and accountability will also be addressed. Later
in the series we return to new forms of transnational and cosmopolitan governance,
including versions of ‘people power’. These involve new forms of connectivity
whereby local issues can draw on international support, and in turn where
communications technologies allow people to be directly involved with
geographically removed events (Ackermann & Duval 2005; Rosenau & Fagen 1997).
18
One of the key trends that underline all these themes has been the need to move from
reacting to events after they occur using old modes of thought (reactive), to building
up the ability to be ready for change (pro-active capacity building), and the need to
move beyond crisis management in the international system towards adaptive
change. In this way, the current period of international transformation can be viewed
as a crucial period in which some positive change can be generated, rather than
negatively as a series of reactions ongoing crises as they emerge in the international
system. Although no single 'international architecture' or set of institutions is likely to
provide a complete fix to global problems (see Whitman 2006 for some of these
problems), overlapping competencies at different levels might provide stronger
patterns of governance for the 21st century.
6. Bibliography, Resources, and Further Reading
Resources
The Sustainable Development Department of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the
United Nations has an Internet database of 1200 articles on a wide range
developmental, environmental and political issues. [Web address =
http://www.fao.org/]
A wide range of news, lectures and articles can be found within the International
Relations Portal at: www.international-relations.com
A large database of useful articles will be found in the Infotrac Expanded Academic
Database, located off the Bond University Library webpage.
Relief Web provides a range of useful reports, news items and links concerning
humanitarian crises, aid and development at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/
A useful, NGO-oriented site is the One World network, with searchable articles and
news, located at www.oneworld.net
The IMF's World Economic and Financial Surveys an World Economic Outlook Database
(April 2007 Edition) can be downloaded or searched via
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/index.aspx
The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance has collection of useful information on
peace and development studies (including some useful information on African
issues, published by the Department of Peace Studies, the University of
Bradford. Click on the 'Academic button' for access to articles, via
http://www.jha.ac/
Further Reading
You can extend your knowledge by looking at one or more of the following: BHAGWATI, Jagdish In Defense of Globalization, New York, Oxford University Press,
2004
19
BRYSK, Alison (ed.) Globalization and Human Rights, Berkeley, University of California
Press, 2002
CARLSNAES, Walter et al. (eds.) Handbook of International Relations, London, Sage, 2002
DAVIES, Geoff Economica: New Economic Systems to Empower People and Support the Living
World, Sydney, ABC Books, 2004
HENDERSON, Conway International Relations: Conflict and Cooperation at the Turn of the 21st
Century, Boston, McGrawHill, 1998
HEROD, Andrew, TUATHAIL, Gearóid & ROBERTS, Susan M. (eds.) An Unruly
World?: Globalization, Governance and Geography, London, Routledge, 1998
KALOUDIS, George "Why Global Transformation and Not Globalization", World and
I, 19 no.12, December 2004 [Access via Infotrac Database]
KLARE, Michael Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, N.Y., Henry Holt
and Company, 2002
KLEINBERG, Remonda & CLARK, Janine (eds.) Economic Liberalization, Democratization
and Civil Society in the Developing World, New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000
LAPID, Yosef & KRATOCHWIL, Friedrich (eds.) The Return of Culture and Identity in IR
Theory, London, Lynne Rienner, 1996
LEECH, Garry Crude Interventions: The US, Oil and the New World (Dis)order, London, Zed
Books, 2006
NAIM, Moises "Five Wars of Globalization", Foreign Policy, January/February 2003
[Internet Access via www.foreignpolicy.com]
SAUL, John Ralston The Collapse of Globalism: And the Reinvention of the World, London,
Atlantic Books, 2005
TORRES, Raymond Towards a Socially Sustainable World Economy, London, ILO, 2001
WARKENTIN, Craig Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet and Global Civil Society,
N.Y., Rowman & Littlefield, 2001
References
ABUZA, Zachary "Tentacles of terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian network", Contemporary Southeast
Asia, 24 no. 3, December 2002, p427-467 [Access via Infotrac Database]
ACKERMANN, Peter & DUVALL, Jack "People Power Primed: Civilian Resistance and
Democratisation", Harvard International Review, 27 no. 2, Summer 2005, pp42-47 [Access
via Infotrac Database]
APPADURAI, Arjun “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy”, in
FEATHERSTONE, Mike (ed.) Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity,
London, Sage, 1990, pp295-310
BELL, Ruth Greenspan et al. " Fostering a culture of environmental compliance through greater public
involvement", Environment, 44 no. 8, October 2002, pp34-44 [Access via Infotrac Database]
BLUSTEIN, Paul "O'Neill Targets World Bank's Poverty Fighting Strategy", Washington Post, 16 May
2001, pE01 [Internet Access]
BULL, Hedley Hedley Bull on International Society, edited by Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell.
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000 [Access via Ebrary Database]
BUNYARATEVJ, Kraiwinee & HAHN, Eugene "Convergence and its implications for a common
currency in ASEAN", ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 20 no. 1, April 2003, pp49-59 [Access via
Infotrac Database]
BUTTEL, Frederick H. "Some observations on the anti-globalisation movement ", Australian Journal
of Social Issues, 38 no. 1, February 2003, pp95-117 [Access via Infotrac Database]
BOYLAN, Edward S. "The Chinese Cultural Style of Warfare", Comparative Strategy, 3 no. 4, 1982,
pp341-364
CAMILLERI, J. “Making Sense of Globalisation”, in WISEMAN, John (ed.) Alternatives to
Globalisation: An Asia-Pacific Perspective, Fitzroy, Community Aid Abroad, 1997, pp6-13
CAMILLERI, J. & FALK, Jim The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting
World, Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1992
Carbon Positive "IPCC report: Making sense of the numbers", 7 May 2007 [Access via
http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=685]
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CARTIER, Carolyn "Cosmopolitics and the Maritime World City", Geographical Review, 89 no. 2,
April 1999, pp278-289
CASPER, Gretchen Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, Pittsburgh, University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1995
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Database]
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