Opposition-In-InterventionRHLAW

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

JAMES M. IMBONG AND LOVELY-

ANN C. IMBONG, ET AL.

-versus-

HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL .

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY

FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES,

INC. (ALFI), ET AL.,

-versus-


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL.

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND

LIFE VISAYAS, INC. AND

VALERIANO S. AVILA

-versus-


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ET AL.

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO

CITY INC. ET AL.

-versus-

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ET

AL.

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR.

-versus-

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF

THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

G.R. No. 204819

G.R. No. 204934

G.R. No. 204957

G.R. No. 204988

G.R. No. 205003

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER AND THE

CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE

APOSTOLATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

-versus-

DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T.

ONA, ET AL.

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF

XSEMINARIANS, INC.

-versus-


EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL.

·

REYNALDO J ECHAVEZ, MD., ET

AL.

-versus-

HON. PAQUITO

N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY, ET AL.

SPS. FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND

MARIA FENNY C. TATAD,

ET AL.

-versus-

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF

THE REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES

FOUNDATION, INC., ET AL.

-versus-

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ET

AL.

Comment-in-Intervention

Page 2 of 36

G.R. No. 205043

G.R. No. 205138

G.R. No. 205478

G.R. No. 205491

G.R. No. 205720


Page 3 of 36

COMMENT-IN-INTERVENTION

Intervenors, Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Dr. Jamie Galvez-Tan, and

Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. (collectively referred to hereinafter as

“Intervenors”), through the undersigned counsel and unto the

Honorable Court respectfully ask for leave to intervene, and allege that:

1. On 19 March 2013, the Supreme Court issued a Resolution which granted the Office of the Solicitor General a period of until 3 April 2013 to file a consolidated comment on the Petition which consolidated G.R. Nos. 205478, 205491 and 205720 with

G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043 and 205138.

2. Intervenors are former Secretaries of the Department of Health

(hereinafter “ DOH ”) who are intervening as such and as medical professionals, citizens and taxpayers.

3. All of the Intervenors may be notified of and served with pertinent processes through the undersigned counsel at 1904

Antel Corporate Center, 121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village

Makati City 1200.

4. Intervenor Jaime Z. Galvez-Tan, in his official capacity as then

Health Secretary, issued AO 1995-6 defining the roles and responsibilities of key DOH management personnel for the

Integrated Family Planning and Maternal Health Project

(hereafter, “ IFPMHP ”);

Intervenor Alberto G. Romualdez Jr. who, as the DOH Secretary of Health, issued AO 2000-19 stipulating the guidelines in the allocation of Family Planning Instruments to health facilities with trained service providers; and Intervenor Esperanza I. Cabral who issued during her term as Secretary of Health, AO 2010-0014 aimed at strengthening the capacity of midwives to adequately respond to pregnancyrelated complications in order to reduce maternal and newborn morbidity and mortalities; are entitled to intervene in the instant case to protect their personal and legal interest in the matter of the validity and implementation of the Administrative Orders issued by the DOH.


Page 4 of 36

Indeed, as medical doctors/physicians, Intervenors have a positive duty to educate the public on the matters relating to the promotion of health, under the Code of Ethics of both the Board of Medicine 1 and the Philippine Medical Association 2 .

Moreover, as ordinary citizens, Intervenors represent and invoke the public’s interest and right to life, health and information which the DOH sought and continues to seek to protect through the issuance of the aforementioned proceeding

Administrative Orders and policies.

5. History bears witness to the DOH’s long-standing advocacy for responsible parenthood and reproductive health services and information, as reflected through the DOH’s numerous family planning policies.

For more than four decades, the DOH has issued orders and laid down policies akin to the principles of RA 10354.

In 1972, AO 1972-169 and AO 1972-180 were issued pertaining to the National Comprehensive Maternal and Child Health

(MCH)-Family Planning Project Office and the DOH Family

Planning Project Funds.

Come 1974, in line with the decentralization plans of the

National Family Planning Office (hereafter, “ NFPO ”), the DOH, through AO 1974-209, prescribed the procedures in the signing

1 Article III, Section 1 of the Code of Ethics of the Board of Medicine provides the “Duties of

Physicians to the Community,” to wit:

Physicians should cooperate with the proper authorities in the enforcement of sanitary laws and regulations and in the education of the people on matters relating to the promotion of the health of the individual as well as to the community. They should enlighten the public on the dangers of communicable diseases and other preventable diseases, and on all the measures for their prevention and cure, particularly in times of epidemic or public calamity. On such occasions, it is their duty to attend to the needs of the sufferers, even at the risk of their own lives and without regard to financial returns. At all times, it is the duty of the physician to notify the properly constituted public health authorities of every case of communicable disease under his case in accordance with the laws, rules and regulations of the health authorities of the Philippines.

2 Article III, Section 1 of the Code of Ethics of the Philippine Medical Association (2008) provides the Duties of Physicians to the Community,” to wit:

A physician should cooperate with the duly constituted health authorities in the education and enforcement of laws and regulations for the promotion of heath. Furthermore, in times of epidemic and public calamity, except when his or her personal safety is at stake, the physician must attend to the victims, alert the public and duly constituted health authorities on the dangers of communicable diseases and enforce measures for prevention and cure in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations.


Page 5 of 36 of Family Planning checks, and approval of payment of incentives of Lay Motivators and other expenses chargeable from the Family Planning project Funds.

The very next year through then Minister of Health J.C. Azurin, the DOH issued AO 1981-1-E providing the guidelines and procedures for the construction of Barangay Health Stations in order to strengthen the Primary Health Care, Family Planning, and Nutrition Services of the government.

In August 31, 1990, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon issued AO 95 creating an office to handle the financial operations of the aids granted by various foreign financing institutions to the Family Planning Project of the DOH.

Early 1995, the DOH, through Intervenor Jaime Z. Galvez-Tan, issued the aforementioned administrative order applicable to management personnel for the IFPMHP.

On February 17, 2000 the DOH, through Intervenor Alberto G.

Romualdez Jr. issued AO 2000-19 on improving accessibility and availability of Family Planning methods by distributing IUD

Kits to government health facilities with trained service providers.

Furthermore, from the year 2001 to 2004, the DOH, through

Secretary of Health Manuel M. Dayrit, issued various orders recognizing Family Planning as a critical element of the

Reproductive Health Program including AO 2001-50-A in 2001, which acknowledged the Philippine Family Planning Program, not only as a demographically driven program, but as one that promotes Family Planning as health intervention to promote the health of all Filipinos but with special attention to women and children.

In mid-2006, the DOH, through Secretary of Health Francisco T.

Duque III, issued AO 2006-0008 to provide policy direction for the public-private collaboration in the health sector within the context of increasing share of private sector provisions in total population-wide coverage of essential health services for women of reproductive age.

6. In 2010, in furtherance of DOH policies, then Secretary of

Health, Intervenor Esperanza I. Cabral, in addition to the


Page 6 of 36 aforementioned AO 2010-0014 aimed at strengthening the capacity of midwives to reduce maternal and newborn morbidity and mortality, issued AO 20100027 amending the “Guidelines on the Management of Donated Commodities under the

Contraceptive SelfReliance Strategy” (AO 2004-158), with the goal of ensuring the availability and accessibility of all family planning methods including modern family planning and RH commodities.

Lastly, as recent as June 27, 2012 the DOH through Secretary of Health Enrique T. Ona issued AO 2012-0009 providing for an updated and comprehensive approach to reduce the unmet need for Modern Family Planning services in support of the strategic thrust to attain health-related Millennium Development

Goals (MDGs) for the year 2015, and to achieve Universal

Health Care as described in the Kalusugan Pangkalahatan

Execution Plan.

7. As the abovementioned policies and programs demonstrate, the DOH has continually taken its role as the State’s principal health agency seriously by including Family Planning as an element of Reproductive Health in its priority health policies.

With the passing of RA 10354, the principles which served as the DOH’s foundation, as well as the rights the DOH sought to safeguard, through the issuance of the aforementioned orders were maintained. Unfortunately, with the issuance of the status quo ante order, temporarily stopping the government from implementing the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive

Health Act of 2012, herein Intervenors ’ interest, as former

Secretaries of the DOH, as medical doctors/physicians, and as ordinary citizens; in the protection of the health of all Filipinos, has been jeopardized.

8. The requisites for an intervention 3 are present in this case.

Section 1 of Rule 19 provides:

Section 1. Who may intervene. -A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties , or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a

3 The case of Nordic Asia Limited v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 111159, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA

390,398-399 [2003]) reiterates the following requisites:

(a) It must be shown that the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and

(b)

Consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether or not the intervenor's rights may be protected in separate proceeding.


Page 7 of 36 distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. [Emphasis supplied]

11. The issues surrounding this case are interwoven with the State's interest in and obligation to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill the public's inherent and constitutional right to life and to health. When the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that one is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest . The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the legal standing of ordinary citizens invoking constitutional rights in cases where public interest is involved.

11.1 In 1989, the Supreme Court recognized the legal standing of Rodolfo Albano as a citizen and a Member of Congress to question the

Philippine Ports Authority's awarding of a contract to the International Container Terminal Services,

Inc. for the development, management and operation of the Manila International Container

Terminal. The Court held that "public interest is definitely involved" considering the "important role of the [Terminal] in the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved." 4

11.2 In 1998, the Supreme Court recognized the right of Francisco Chavez, as a Filipino citizen and former solicitor general, to file a petition to compel the Presidential Commission on Good

Government to disclose its transactions related to the recovery of ill- gotten Marcos wealth. Chavez invoked his constitutional right to information and access to official records and documents. The

Court allowed the petition on the ground that "the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the

4 Rodolfo Albano v. Rainerio Reyes, G.R. No. 83551, July 11, 1939.


Page 8 of 36 enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a

Filipino citizen ," were satisfied.

5

11.3 Where matters of public right and interest are concerned, it is the people who are the real parties, and it is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to vindicate such public right and interest, as explained by the Supreme Court in the 2010 case of De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council and

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo : 6

Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the issue may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue . In

David v. Macapagai-Arroyo, the Court aptly explains why:

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both

"citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions.

The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York

Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:

" In matter of mere: public right, however… the people are the real parties… It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a

public grievance be remedied." [Emphases supplied]

12. Intervenors invoke the public interest and state that they have a clear legal interest in the matter in litigation.

5 Francisco Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716,

December 9, 1998.

6 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, et seq., May 3, 2006.


Page 9 of 36

13. Allowing herein Intervenors to intervene in the instant case will not unduly delay the adjudication of the case. On the contrary, it will prevent multiplicity of suits.

14. Moreover, the rights of the Intervenors will not be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. The Petitions should be dismissed as the conditions for the exercise of the power of judicial review have not been met.

1. The is no actual case or controversy.

2. The question is not ripe for adjudication.

3. The Petitions are pleas for declaratory relief outside of the jurisdiction of the Honorable Supreme Court.

4. The Petitioners have no “standing” to challenge the law.

II. Republic Act No. 10354 is constitutional.

1. It is consistent with the constitutional right to privacy.

2. It is in furtherance of the Philippines's state obligations under international law.

3. It does not violate the freedom of religion.

4. It does not violate the right to life.

DISCUSSION

The Petitions should be dismissed as the conditions for the exercise of the power of judicial review have not been met.


Page 10 of 36

15. Petitioners call on the Honorable Supreme Court to exercise its power of judicial review and declare Republic Act No. 10354 entitled

“An Act Providing for a National Policy on Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health” as unconstitutional.

16. In assailing the RA 10354 as unconstitutional, Petitioners are invoking the “judicial supremacy” of the Supreme Court for it to assert the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution.

7

17. However, it is well-settled that like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:

“Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the following:

(1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) the question must be ripe for adjudication;

and

(3) the person challenging must have

“standing”; that is, he has personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury.” 8

7 Angara vs. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936

8 Guingona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532. July 10, 1998 citing Philippine Association of

Colleges and Universities vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806, 810 (1955); and

Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 678, 680-682, February 29, 1972 and People vs. Vera, 65

Phil. 58, 89 (1937).


Page 11 of 36

There is no actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of the judicial power

18. The requirement that there must exist a case or controversy is inferred from a reading of constitutional provisions on the grant of judicial power upon the Supreme Court.

19. Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution provides-

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one

Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

Government.

20. Under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Philippine Constitution, the

Supreme Court shall have the power, among others, to:

1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality

or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

21. From the above constitutional provisions, the requirement that there must be an actual case or controversy is clearly seen. Should no such case or controversy exist, the Judiciary may not exercise the power of judicial review vested upon it by the Constitution.


Page 12 of 36

22. Passing upon the validity of laws when there is no case or controversy shall be tantamount to the Judiciary playing the role of another chamber of the Philippine Government, i.e., the legislature.

9

23. Moreover, the “insistence on the existence of a case or controversy before the judiciary undertakes a review of legislation gives it the opportunity, denied to the legislature, of seeing the actual operation of the statute as it is applied to actual facts and thus enables it to reach so under judgment.” 10

24. In Guingona vs. Court of Appeals , 11 the Supreme Court discussed when an actual case or controversy exists, to wit:

“An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” 12

25. Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled that-

“The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.” 13

26. No such actual case or controversy exists in the Petitions assailing the constitutionality of RA 10354. The Petitions are based on hypothetical dispute and abstract propositions. Failing such requirement to show that there exists an actual case or controversy, the Petitions should be dismissed.

9 Mendoza, Vicente V. Judicial Review of Constitutional Questions. Manila: Rex Printing

Company, Inc., 2004.

10 Ibid., page 86.

11 G.R. No. 125532. July 10, 1998

12 Id. Citing Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., pp. 241-242.

13 Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010 citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305

(1988)


Page 13 of 36

27. Thus, Petitioners ’ attempt at abstraction absent an actual case or controversy “could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.” 14

28. Judicial prudence should therefore be observed and the power of judicial review be not exercised.

29. The fact that the Petitions are abstract propositions and hypothetical disputes may be gleaned from the arguments contained therein. Undoubtedly, the manner by which the Petitioners framed their arguments is such that there really is no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.

15

29. In G.R. No. 204819, Petitioners offer an abstract proposition that the Republic Act No. 10354 “introduces policies that negate and frustrate the foundational ideals and aspirations of the sovereign

Filipino people as enshrined in the Constitution.” 16

30. In G.R. No. 205003, Petitioner Bugarin, raises the argument that the “passage of Republic Act No. 10354 which is the first anti-family and anti-law in this country, will pave the way for the passage of other anti-life and anti-family laws such as: (a) same sex marriage law; (b) divorce law; (c) laws punishing criticisms of gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transgenders; and, (d) abortion law.” 17

31. Petitioner Bugarin then posits that the Supreme Court should exercise its power of judicial review because, adopting the statement of Mother Theresa, “the fruit of abortion is nuclear war.” Petitioner

Bugarin, thus, stated that-

“For the sake of our children and our children's children, petitioner implores the Honorable Supeme Court and its sense of right and wrong as well as its highest and absolute fidelity to

God's laws, to shield our beloved country from a possible nuclear annihilation by declaring as unconstitutional Republic

Act No. 10354.” 18

14 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552,

October 5, 2010

15 Apormento vs. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010 citing Cruz, Isagani, Philippine

Political Law, 2002 Edition, p. 259.

16 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Imbong et al., page 4

17 Bugarin, Jr. vs. Offices of the Hon. President of the Republic of the Philippines, et al., page 7

18 Id., page 8


Page 14 of 36

32. The same is true with respect to the other Petitions. Petitioners in

G.R. No. 204988 argue against the constitutionality of Section 9 of

Republic Act No. 10354 on making available any product or supply included or to be included in the Essential Drug List on the condition that it is not be used as an abortifacient. They argue that it is “like giving a child cyanide laced candy then giving the appearance of responsibility by saying don't eat it but nevertheless hoping the child will eat the candy inasmuch as that would be one mouth less to feed and drain the resources.” 19

33. In G.R. No. 205043, Petitioners therein also offer an abstract proposition that “when the FO (fertilized ovum) or later on when the implanted live fetus, now a PERSON under the law, fails to survive due to the lingering lethal effects of either abortifacients or abortives,

JUSTICE for such victims of serious physical injuries, homicide or even MURDER, will be practically impossible!”

34. Petitioners therein also argue that the fertilized ovum will be unconstitutionally discriminated against together with “the present husbands/fathers of existing FAMILIES legitimately married and faithful to their wives, where the latter independently and unilaterally a) refuse to have children sired by their husbands; or, b) merely

AVOIDING to get PREGNANT by other men with whom wives are having pleasurable sexual “experiences” but unknown to their husbands; and c) are being tempted or PLANNING to have such adulterous relationships. Thus, the assailed law particularly under

Sections 3 and 4 thereof... is veritably a state supported program for

FACILITATING CUCKOLDRY or ADULTERY among married couples, and/or being the source of serious conflicts between spouses where either one of them refuses to have a child yet or even NEVER, but the other spouse wants to have a child as part of their mutual commitment in their marriage vows .” 20

35. As the threshold requirement that there be an actual case or controversy existing is not met, the Honorable Supreme Court is called on to dismiss the Petitions and to not exercise its constitutionally-vested power of judicial review.

19 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City Inc., et al., page

11.

20 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, pages 9 and 10.


Page 15 of 36

The question is not ripe for adjudication

36. Apart from the fact that there exists no actual case or controversy, the issue at hand is not ripe for adjudication as there is no actual injury sustained by the Petitioners as caused by the passing of the law being assailed.

37. In Lozano vs. Nograles , 21 the Supreme Court reiterated the principle of ripeness, to wit:

“An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual

challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.” 22

38. Petitioners have not sufficiently shown that the law as it was passed has brought about direct adverse effect on them individually.

This was because the case was brought too early. The controversy, if one may exist at all has not become concrete and focused. Thus, the court would find it difficult to evaluate the practical merits of each party.

39. Since the issue is brought too early, it is not ripe for judicial adjudication. The fact that it was brought too early is bolstered by the issuance by the Supreme Court has already issued the status quo ante order on 19 March 2013 before the law was even implemented.

21 G.R. No. 187883, June 16, 2009

22 Id. citing Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 3d ed. 2000, p. 335; Abbott Laboratories v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 427-428

(1998); Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 901-902 (2003); and G.R.

No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677, 682.


Page 16 of 36

The Petitions are Pleas for declaratory relief outside of the jurisdiction of the Honorable

Court

40. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network vs. Anti-Terrorism

Council , the Supreme Court ruled that

“it has been established that “(w)ithout any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by “double contingency,” where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.” 23 ”

41. As argued above, there exists no actual case or controversy such as to meet the condition for the Supreme Court to exercise its power of judicial review. There is no doubt that the Petitions herein have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the law

42. Another limitation to the exercise of judicial review is that the person challenging must have “standing”; that is, he has personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury.

43. The Supreme Court, in many cases, has discussed this principle of locus standi. In Bayan Muna vs. Romulo 24 , it explained that-

“Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." Specifically, it is "a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act

23 Id. citing LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Vol. I, p.332 (3 rd ed.

2000), citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) and Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426

(1975).

24 G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011


Page 17 of 36 being challenged, and "calls for more than just a generalized grievance." 25

44. Moreover, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network vs. Anti-Terrorism Council , the Court reiterated that “(l)ocus standi or legal standing is a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions .” 26

45. Petitioners herein failed to meet the requirement that they show personal and substantial interest in the case where they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the passing of the RA 10354. What they allege is but a “generalized grievance” which was not sufficient to grant them standing to challenge the validity of the law.

46. At this point, it bears stressing what the Supreme Court has reiterated in David vs. Arroyo 27 , to wit:

“Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and

misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse

in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case .” 28

25 Id. citing David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160 and Jumamil v. Café, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 475; citing Integrated

Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81.

26 Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 633 (2000), citing Baker v.

Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

27 G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

28 Id. Citing Uren v Bagley, 118 Or 77, 245 P 1074, 46 ALR 1173 and Gutierrez v. Middle Rio

Grande Conservancy Dist., 34 NM 346, 282 P 1, 70 ALR 1261, cert den 280 US 610, 74 L ed 653, 50 S Ct 158.


Page 18 of 36

Republic Act No. 10354 is constitutional

The Law is consistent with the

Constitutional Right to Privacy

47. The law in its entirety is constitutional. It is consistent with the right to privacy which has been recognized in our jurisdiction. It is so because the law opens up the choices of individuals in the realm of reproductive health.

48. This freedom of choice in marriage, family, and other forms of relationships lies at the very core of the right of privacy.

49. In Ople vs. Torres , 29 the Supreme Court emphasized that “(t)he essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." 30

50. The state policy enunciated in the law is consistent with this right of privacy, to wit-

“The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.” 31 (Emphasis supplied)

51. Moreover, the guiding principles of the law dovetail with this very essence of the right to be let alone, to wit:

“(a) The right to make free and informed decisions, which is central to the exercise of any right, shall not be

29 G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998

30 Id. citing Cooley on Torts, Sec. 135, vol. 1, 4th ed., [1932]; see also Warren and Brandeis "The

Right to Privacy," 4 Harvard Law Review 193-220 [1890] — this article greatly influenced the enactment of privacy statutes in the United States (Cortes, I., The Constitutional Foundations of Privacy, p. 15 [1970]).

31 Section 2, Republic Act No. 10354


Page 19 of 36 subjected to any form of coercion and must be fully guaranteed by the State, like the right itself;

(b) Respect for protection and fulfillment of reproductive health and rights which seek to promote the rights and welfare of every person particularly couples, adult individuals, women and adolescents; xxx

(e) The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidencebased medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization:

Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions;

(f) The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions: Provided,

That no one shall be deprived, for economic reasons, of the rights to have children; (2) achieve equitable allocation and utilization of resources; (3) ensure effective partnership among national government, local government units (LGUs) and the private sector in the design, implementation, coordination, integration, monitoring and evaluation of people-centered programs to enhance the quality of life and environmental protection;

(4) conduct studies to analyze demographic trends including demographic dividends from sound population policies towards sustainable human development in keeping with the principles of gender equality, protection of mothers and children, born and unborn and the promotion and protection of women’s reproductive rights and health; and (5) conduct scientific studies to determine


Page 20 of 36 the safety and efficacy of alternative medicines and methods for reproductive health care development; xxx

(h) The State shall respect individuals’ preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State’s obligations under various human rights instruments; xxx

(k) Each family shall have the right to determine its ideal family size: Provided, however, That the State shall equip each parent with the necessary information on all aspects of family life, including reproductive health and responsible parenthood, in order to make that determination;” 32

52. In Morfe vs. Mutuc , 33 where our Supreme Court first adopted

Griswold v. Connecticut , 34 the constitutional foundation of the right of privacy was traced.

53. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional right to privacy is recognized as an independent right that is fully deserving of constitutional protection.

54. The Supreme Court decided that-

“The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has


33 G.R. No. L-20387,January 31, 1968

34 381 U. S. 479, 484 (1965)


Page 21 of 36 always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.

All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 35

56. With the passage of the law, the right of individuals to make fundamental decisions and choices with respect to their reproductive health is actualized. The law recognizes that the “vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness of free men (and women) 36 wi th the declaration that “the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood” 37 is recognized and guaranteed.

The law is consistent with the legal obligations of the

Philippines under international law

57. The Philippines has legal obligations under the following international treaties, and the law is in pursuance of this legal obligations-



The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR) (ratified by the Philippines without reservations on 23

October 1986) protects the “equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the

35 Morfe v. Mutuc, citing Grisworld v. Connecticut at p. 485.

36 Loving vs. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967)



Page 22 of 36 present Covenant,” including the “inherent right to life,” right to liberty and security of persons,” the “right to found a family,” among others.

38 With the Philippines's ratification of the First

Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (22 August 1989), without reservations), it recognizes the jurisdiction of the Human Rights

Committee to hear individual complaints. Significantly, the

Human Rights Committee has already interpreted the ICCPR to declare that “women should be given access to family planning and methods,” and a corollary government duty to provide family planning services and information.

39



The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights (ICESCR) (ratified by the Philippines on 7 June 1974, without reservations) provides for the individual's right to the highest attainable standard of healt h,” and the duty of the State

Parties to “provide for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the child.” 40

The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights has noted that the right to health inc ludes “access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and reproductive health.

41



The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (ratified by the

Philippines on 21 h 1990) specifically obligates State-Parties to:

1) “recognize the right of the child to the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health... strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health care services,” 2) “take appropriate measures to develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family planning education and services.” 42 The Child Rights Committee has interpreted the CRC to mean that “States Parties are encouraged to ensure that health services employ trained personnel who fully respect the rights of children to privacy (Art. 16) and non-discrimination in offering them access to HIV-related information, voluntary counseling and testing, knowledge of their HIV status, confidential sexual and reproductive health services, and free

38 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, 21 st Session, U.N.

Doc. A/6316 (entered into force on March 23, 1976), Art. 3, 6(1), 9(1), 23(2), and 26.

39 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Argentina, 17 th Session Para. 14,

U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/70/ARG (2000).

40 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.

GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on

January 3, 1976), Art. 12.1 and 12.2.

41 General Comment 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12) (22 nd

Sess., 2000), in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by Human

Rights Treaty Bodies, at 90, para. 11, U. N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5 (2001)

42 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 November 1989, 44 th Sess., U.N. Doc.

A/44/49, reprinted in LL.M. 1448 (entered into force on 2 September 1990), Art. 24.1 and 24.2.


Page 23 of 36 or low-cost contraceptive methods and services, as well as HIVrelated care and treat if and when needed.” 43



The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (ratified by the

Philippines on 5 August 1981 without reservations) specifically obligates the StateParties to: 1) “(e)nsure access to specific educational information to help to ensure the health and wellbeing of families, including information and advice on family planning”; 2) “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those related to family planning”;

3) “ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and post natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation; 4) “take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in rural areas (and) ensure to such women the right:.... (b) to have access to adequate health care facilities, including information, counseling and services in family planning:; and 5) “ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women... (e) the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education, and means to enable them to exercise these rights.” 44

Indeed, there is a positive duty on the part of the Philippines to enact RA No. 10354. The CEDAW “requires States to eliminate discrimination against women in their access to health-care services throughout the life cycle, particularly in the areas of family planning , pregnancy and confinement and during the post-natal perio d.” 45 (Emphasis supplied)

Further, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women requires that “States parties should state what measures that they have taken to ensure timely access to the range of services that are related to family planning, in particular, and to sexual and reproductive health in general and

“(p)articular attention should be paid to the health education of

43 General Comment No. 3, HIV/AIDS and the right of the child (32nd Sess., 2003) in

Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations by Human Rights Treaty

Bodies, at para. 20, U.N. Doc CRC/GC/2003/3(2003).

44 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 18

December 1979, 34 th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/34//36 (entered into force on 3 September 1981), Art.

10(h), 12.1, 12.2, 14.2(b), and 16.1.

45 Paragraph 2, Document A/54/38/Rev.1 chap. I


Page 24 of 36 adolescents, including information and counseling on all methods of family planning.” 46

As a matter of fact, during the Thirty-sixth Session of the

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against

Women, 47 the Committee made the following concluding comments with respect to the Philippines-

“ 27. The Committee expresses its concern about the inadequate recognition and protection of the reproductive health and rights of women in the

Philippines. The Committee is concerned at the high maternal mortality rates, particularly the number of deaths resulting from induced abortions, high fertility rates, inadequate family planning services, the low rates of contraceptive use and the difficulty of obtaining contraceptives. It is also concerned about the lack of sex, education, especially in rural areas.

It is concerned at the high rate of teenage pregnancies, which present a significant obstacle to girls’ education opportunities and economic empowerment.

28. The Committee urges the State party to take concrete measures to enhance women’s access to health care, in particular, to sexual and reproductive health services, in accordance with article 12 of the

Convention and the Committee’s general recommendation 24 on women and health. It requests the State party to strengthen measures aimed at the prevention of unwanted pregnancies, including making a comprehensive range of contraceptives more widely available and without any restriction and by increasing knowledge and awareness about family planning. The Committee recommends that the State party give priority attention to the situation of adolescents and that it provide sex education, targeted at girls and boys, with special attention to the prevention of early pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases. The

Committee recommends that the State party consider reviewing the laws relating to abortion with a view to removing punitive provisions imposed on women who have abortions and provide them with

46 Paragraph 23, Document A/54/38/Rev.1 chap. I

47 7-25 August 2006


Page 25 of 36 access to quality services for the management of complications arising from unsafe abortions and to reduce women’s maternal mortality rates in accordance with the Committee’s general recommendation 24 on women and health and the

Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action.” 48

58. Significantly, consistent with the above legal obligations, the law declares that “(t)he State likewise guarantees universal access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, supplies which do not prevent the implantation of a fertilized ovum as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and relevant information and education thereon according to the priority needs of women, children and other underprivileged sectors, giving preferential access to those identified through the National Household Targeting

System for Poverty Reduction (NHTS-PR) and other government measures of identifying marginalization, who shall be voluntary beneficiaries of reproductive health care, services and supplies for free.”

59. Moreover, the law instructs that “(n)o person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial.” 49 The law also mandates the DOH to “implement programs prioritizing full access of poor and marginalized women as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization to reproductive health care, services, products and programs.” 50

The law does not violate the

Freedom of Religion

60. The theme prevailing under the law is the grant of freedom of choice when it comes to reproductive health. The State does not impose upon the citizens the mode of family planning or type of contraceptives which they should use. Neither does it impose acceptance of any belief. It only prohibits those acts and practices, whether based on belief or whim, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.

48 United Nations Doc. No. CEDAW/C/PHI/CO/6

49 Section 7, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 10354



Page 26 of 36

61. More importantly, the law widens the spectrum of effective options for individuals and couples by providing them information and subsidizing access to contraceptives.

62. Adults are free to reject information relating to reproductive health provided by the State, for whatever personal reason which may or may not be related to their religious beliefs.

63. Insofar as children are concerned, it is the responsibility of

State to provide information about the current state of knowledge which necessarily includes information about human beings themselves, how their bodies work, and what their bodies can and cannot do.

64. The inclusion of Age- and Development-Appropriate

Reproductive Health Education in schools as directed under Section

14 of the law is justified as part of the State’s constitutional obligation to create an environment conducive to the formation of healthy and informed citizens.

65. Moreover, there is more than enough leeway given in the law so that religiously-inclined parents and institutions are not compelled to accept what the State considers to be age-and-developmentappropriate instruction on reproductive health.

66. Thus, the relevant provision of the law states:

Section 14. Age- and Development-Appropriate

Reproductive Health Education. – The State shall provide age- and development-appropriate reproductive health education to adolescents which shall be taught by adequately trained teachers informal and nonformal educational system and integrated in relevant subjects such as, but not limited to, values formation; knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women’s rights and children’s rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood: Provided, That flexibility in the formulation and adoption of appropriate course content, scope and methodology in each educational level or group shall be allowed only after


Page 27 of 36 consultations with parents-teachers-community associations, school officials and other interest groups. The Department of Education (DepED) shall formulate a curriculum which shall be used by public

schools and may be adopted by private schools

[emphasis supplied].

67. Religious schools are not being compelled to accept what state schools will teach to their own students. Moreover, the law requires consultations with parents and other interest groups before reproductive health education may be implemented in state schools.

In other words, the law recognizes the place of religious and other sensibilities in the process to craft such a reproductive health education program and does not deny them their right to develop their education program for the same purpose.

68. As for Roman Catholic doctors and healthcare providers, the law does not in any way violate their religious convictions about contraceptives, as it neither requires them to dispense nor prescribe contraceptives disapproved by church teaching.

69. All that they are asked to do, when confronted with a situation where a patient inquires them about reproductive methods other than natural family planning ones, is to refer the patient to the nearest appropriate clinic or institution.

70. If at all, this indicates the law’s recognition of their right to freely exercise their religious beliefs and convictions. This “requirement to refer” does not constitute any substantial burden imposed by the state as to compel them to modify or violate their beliefs.

51

71. The relevant provision of the law states thus:

Section 7. Access to Family Planning. – All accredited public health facilities shall provide a full range of modern family planning methods, which shall also include medical consultations, supplies and necessary and reasonable procedures for poor and marginalized couples having infertility issues who desire to have children: Provided,

That family planning services shall likewise be extended by private health facilities to paying patients with the option to grant free care and services to indigents, except in the case of non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group, but

51 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)


Page 28 of 36 they have the option to provide such full range of modern family planning methods: Provided, further, That these hospitals shall immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health facility which is conveniently accessible: Provided, finally, That the person is not in an emergency condition or serious case as defined in Republic Act No. 8344.

72. As it were, the law provides an exception to the exception, in which a religiously-minded medical institution may not refuse access to a full range of family planning methods to a patient who is in an emergency condition or a serious case as defined under RA 8344.

73. How does RA 8344 define an “emergency condition” or a

“serious case?”The law states:

"(a) 'Emergency' - a condition or state of a patient wherein based on the objective findings of a prudent medical officer on duty for the day there is immediate danger and where delay in initial support and treatment may cause loss of life or cause permanent disability to the patient.

"(b) 'Serious case' - refers to a condition of a patient characterized by gravity or danger wherein based on the objective findings of a prudent medical officer on duty for the day when left unattended to, may cause loss of life or cause permanent disability to the patient.

74. This law was originally passed in 1997 to penalize medical institutions who refuse patients treatment for the latter’s failure to pay for the medical service solicited.

75. At best, this provision in the 1997 law, now included by reference in the law in question, merely restates a duty all medical institutions, whether religiously-minded or otherwise, already bear, simply because of the very nature of their work as medical institutions.

76. At worst, this portion of the law in question is an unfortunate surplusage and/or infelicity in wording, for the reason stated above and also for the fact that the assailed law, RA 10354, does not and could not have contemplated any situation at all where a religiouslyminded medical institution or medical professional may be compelled to perform a medical procedure related to family planning in a


Page 29 of 36 serious case or emergency situation in such a manner that violates its or her religious beliefs and convictions.

77. The law recognizes the Free Speech Clause, giving churches, religious universities, religious social services institutions, and other similar organizations which are important actors of civil society, their right to freely oppose government programs that do not cohere with their beliefs. The law does not coerce them to follow its terms under threat of sanctions if they fail to do so.

78. In other words, the assailed law in fact provides a permanent

“safe harbor” 52 for religious institutions and individuals to practice their religious beliefs and convictions in relation to reproductive health without fear of punishment or coercion.

79. What the Petitioners would have this Honorable Court do is to unduly interfere with the State’s Constitutional duty to defend spouses’ right to found a family because what they all want to do is to ultimately favor only natural family planning methods.

80. Contrary to what is envisaged under the Constitutional duty of the State, spouses are divested of any ‘real’ or ‘informed’ choice in founding their families, since Petitioners ostensibly favor only the

Roman Catholic-sanctioned natural family planning methods.

81. If Petitioners were to have their way, the State ought to impose only a single or unitary view on family planning upon all Filipinos.

This imposition is anat hema to the State’s Constitutional duty to defend “the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood”.

82. The State’s defense of spouses’ rights to found a family demands nothing less than embracing a pluralist approach to spouses’ decision to build a family. Whether the decision is to use natural family planning methods or artificial methods of contraception, spouses must be free to choose solely in accordance with their religious convictions, if any, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

83. If at all, a single view of family planning violates the freedom of religion protected under the Constitution because it imposes only one view – the Roman Catholic one – and eschews the reality that the

52 to borrow a term from an unfortunately more restrictive American version of a reproductive health program


Page 30 of 36

Philippines is a pluralist society of citizens who belong to different faiths, some of which may not necessarily share the same convictions on family planning as the dominant faith in the

Philippines.

84. In a situation of competing visions of the good, the State does not exist simply to protect majoritarian interests. That is not what a

State founded on democratic principles is about. Rather, the State’s primary duty is to ensure public justice – the task of giving what is due to each differentiated sphere in society.

85. Thus, a political community such as ours should not be shaped as a religious community of whatever faith – Christian, Muslim, secularist, or a general civil religion. Instead, our Republic must be built as a community of citizens that finds no room for discrimination against anyone solely because of his/her faith.

86. Flowing from this, that every citizen must be given equal access and equal rights in the political community, regardless of faith, in the same way that they should be treated regardless of their skin color, gender, ethnicity, and social status.

The Law is consistent with the

Constitutional Right to Life

87. The Petitioners harp on the alleged violation by the law of the constitutional protection of life.

88. In the very first place, it should be emphasized that the law clearly states that it does not legalize abortion. In fact, the law emphatically “recognizes that abortion is illegal and punishable by law.

” 53

89. Indeed, the questioned law assumes utmost fidelity to the constitutional protection for the unborn.

90. Secondly, it in fact, assures the right to life by providing a broad and comprehensive approach to maternal health care anchored on a generous view of the right to health of the people.

53 Section 3 (j), Republic Act No. 10354


Page 31 of 36

91. The Constitution mandates the State to “protect and promote the right to health of the people”.

92. In giving force to this right, the State is also obligated to “adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.”

93. This exactly is what the questioned law intends to do: providing for the most liberal conditions to support the flourishing of life, not just for mothers but for families as well.

94. If Petitioners will have their way however, they will ensure that women will bear the brunt of their avowed policy of enforced ignorance.

95. Such regime as Petitioners want to implement is what Margaret

Sanger referred to as “compulsory motherhood”—

The man and the woman have as much natural right to say how many children they will bring into the world and when, and to say when and whom and why they will marry….Barbarous peoples coerce their women into matrimony; civilized people coerce them into maternity under [anti-contraception laws].

54

96. It is women who primarily bear the risk and consequences of pregnancy, unintended or not, with all its impact on their health, career, and other life choices.

97. The policy choices Petitioners want forces women into choosing between pregnancy and abstinence and, in effect, traps them in a system that compels women to suffer for engaging in acts of sexual intimacy.

98. Apart from severely limiting the fundamental right of women to decide whether or not to get pregnant, the disparate impact of prohibiting the implementation of the questioned law amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws as it places women (most

54 Brief on behalf of the Plaintiff in Error, at 40-41, Sanger v. People, 251 U.S. 537 (1919).


Page 32 of 36 especially those who are poor) at a severe disadvantage in relation to men in deciding on matters that affect the former more than the latter.

99. The fundamental right of the individual to associate entails the right to determine the details of intimate conduct or to control the terms by which that individual engages another in a purely personal manner.

100. Petitioners’ desired outcome ultimately denies women the flourishing of their right to life by also violating their right to equal protection in significant ways: (a) it disproportionately places in men the right to decide whether women should get pregnant, and (b) it unfairly compels women to submit to that decision because the anticontraception stance Petitioners want this Court to enforce will substantially impair women’s ability to nullify their partners’ decision

(or ignorance).

101. Women are thus inevitably subordinated to male choices, and are denied appropriate public health care treatment and information that allow them to make the same reproductive choices as their male counterparts.

102. This denial of the ability to make informed consent which prevents women from deciding fundamental questions affecting their lives under conditions of parity is a clear violation of the Equal

Protection Clause.

103. The Petitioners have no right to disempower the women

Petitioners in relation to men under the guise of “moral regeneration.”

104. Further to this, the CEDAW Committee has recognized that child bearing imposes “inequitable burdens” on women in relation to

“their right of access to education, employment and other activities”.

105. Therefore, states parties under CEDAW are mandated to “take all appropriate measures” to eliminate discrimination against women and to ensure, on a basis of equality between men and women, access to “information and advice on family planning” and to “health care services, including those related to family planning”.


Page 33 of 36

PRAYER

WHEREFORE , premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the

Petitions be DISMISSED for lack of merit and the STATUS QUO

ANTE ORDER be lifted IMMEDIATELY .

Other reliefs as are just and equitable under the premises are also prayed for.

Makati City for Manila; 9 May 2013.

ELIZABETH AGUILING-PANGALANGAN

ROLL NO. 33032

IBP LIFETIME MEMBER 3506

PTR 8278651B (5/6/13)

MCLE EXEMPTION NO III-000940. (4/7/2012)

ROQUE & BUTUYAN LAW OFFICES

1904 Antel 2000 Corporate Center

121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village

Makati City 1200

Email: mail@roquebutuyan.com

Tel. Nos. 887-4445/887-3894;

Fax No: 887-3893

By:

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE

ROLL NO. 36976

IBP LIFETIME MEMBER

PTR NO. 369262 (1/18/13)-MAKATI CITY

MCLE COMPLIANCE NO. IV-000513 (2/15/13)

ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES

ROLL NO. 49518

IBP NO. 924439 (1/10/13)-SOCSARGEN




Page 34 of 36

GEEPEE ACERON GONZALES

ROLL NO. 59686

IBP NO. 924436(1/10/13)-ORIENTAL MINDORO



ETHEL C. AVISADO

ROLL NO. 56254

IBP NO. 9033690(9/17/2012)- DAVAO CITY


MCLE COMPLIANCE NO. III-0002218 (10/25/12)

(MCLE IV Compliance Certificate In Process)


Page 35 of 36

Copy Furnished:

Atty. James M. Imbong and Jo Aurea M.

Imbong

Imbong and Castro Law Offices

Counsel for the Petitioners/ G.R. 204819

Unit 304 Senor Ivan de Palacio Building

139 Malakas St., Diliman, Quezon City

Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche

Counsel for Petitioners/G.R. 204934

MCS NOCHE LAW OFFICE

91 Melchor Street, Loyola Heights

Quezon City

Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay (reg)

Counsel for Petitioners/G.R. 204957

Diamond St., cor Jade St., Francisca Village

6 th St., Happy Valley, Cebu City

Atty. Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr., (reg)

Petitioner in G.R. No. 205003

No. 19 Country Club Village,Banilad

Cebu City

Atty. Noel A. Clemente

Counsel for Petitioners in G.R. 205043

Penthouse, Aurora Milestone Tower

1045 Aurora Blvd., Quezon City

Attys. Earl Anthony C. Gambe and Marion I.

Yap (reg)

Counsel for Petitioner in G.R. 204988

Gambe and Yap Law Offices

Mandumol, Upper Macasandig Cagayan de

Oro City

Atty. Ricardo M. Ribo

Counsel for Petitioners PAX in G.R. 205138

Rm. 206 Reza Building, 1318 Quezon Ave.

Quezon City

Attys. Howard M. Calleja and Ramon Andre

F. Cedro


Unit 1903-A. West Tower, PSE Centre

Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, 1605 Pasig

City

Atty. Allan F. Paguia

Counsel for Petitioners in G.R. No. 205491

Unit 412 Corporate 101 Building

101 Mother IGnacia St., Brgy. South Triangle

1103 Quezon City

Atty. Rufino Policarpio III, Cristina A. Montes and Jeremy I. Gatdula


Policarpio and Acorda Law Office

903 Richmonde Plaza, San Miguel Ave.

Cor. Lourdes Drive, ortigas Center, 1605

Pasig City

Atty. Samson A. Alcantara

Petitioner-in-Intervention

Suite 1402, 14 th Flr., Manila Astral Tower

Taft Ave., cor P Faura St., Ermita Manila

Attys. Ibarra M. Guiterrez III & Juan Alfonso

P. Torrevillas

Counsel for Intervenors Ana Theresia “Risa”

Hontiveros et al.

No. 36-B Madasalin St., Brgy. Sikatuna

Diliman, Quezon City

Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeliza

Office of the Solicitor General

134 amorsolo St., Legaspi village

1229 Makati City

Copies of the following to be provided to the

Office of the Solicitor General:

His Excellency Benigno Simeon c. Aquino III

Office of the President

Malacanang Palace, Manila

Senate of the Philippines c/o senate President Juan Ponce Enrile

GSIS Bldg, Financial Center

Roxas Blvd, Pasay City

House of Representatives c/o Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.

Batasan Bldg, Batasan Hills

Diliman, Quezon City

Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa Jr.

Executive Secretary

Premiere Guest House

Malacanang, J.P. Laurel Sr. St, Manila

Secretary Florencio B. Abad

Department of Budget and Management

Gen. Solano St., San Miguel, Manila

Secretary Enrique T. Ona, M.D.

Department of Health

San Lazaro compound, Sta. Cruz, Manila

Secreatry Armin A. Luistro, FSC

Department of Education

DepED Complex, Meralco Ave., Pasig City

Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II

Department of Interior and Local

Government (DILG)

EDSA cor. Mapagmahal St., Diliman,

Quezon City

Hon. Arsenio M. Balisacan

Socio-economic Panning Secretary and

NEDA

Director-General, 12 saint Josemaria

Escriva Drive,

Ortigas Center, Pasig City

Philippine Commission on Women c/o Chairperson Remedios Ignacio-Rikken

1145 J.P. Laurel St., San Miguel, Manila


Page 36 of 36

Philippine Health Insurance Corporation c/o President Eduardo Biazon

Citystate Centre, 709 Shaw Blvd., 1603

Pasig City

League of Cities of the Philippines c/o President Oscar Rodriguez

7 th Flr., Unit J & K. CyberOne Bldg

Eastwood Barangay Bagumbayan, quezon

City

League of Municipalities of the Philippines c/o President Donato Marcos

2 nd Flr., LMP Building, 265 Ermin Garcia St.,

Cubao, Quezon City

Hon. Suzette H. Lazo

Food and Drugs Administration

Civic Drive, filinvest Corporate City

Alabang, 1781 Muntinlupa city

League of Provinces of the Philippines c/o President Alfonso Umali

Unit 1510 west Tower, Philippine Stock

Exchange Center

Exchange road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City

Public Information Office

Supreme Court

Atty. Corazon D. Delos Reyes

Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief

Judicial Records Office

Supreme Court

EXPLANATION

Due to the shortage of messengerial services and lack of time copies of the foregoing are being served to the other parties by registered mail in accordance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised

Rules of Court.

ETHEL C. AVISADO

Opposition-In-InterventionRHLAW

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