Comparative perspectives on the Repatriation and Resettlement of
Palestinian Refugees:
the cases of Guatemala, Bosnia and Afghanistan
Michael Dumper1
This paper argues that the study of the Palestinian refugee issue has been characterised by a degree of
exceptionalism that has constrained debate on policy initiatives. There is orthodoxy that the Palestinian
refugee situation is unique. Because of its genesis through the creation of the state of Israel, because of
its very longevity and because of the evolution of relief structures outside the main UN agency dealing
with refugees, the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), it is seen as a category sui generis.2
(Consequently, it is argued that the resolution of the issue should also be formulated from within its
own context. One important result of this view is that the experience of UNHCR and other international
NGOs has not been utilised which, in turn, has led to a restricted range of policy options. While there
has been considerable success in demonstrating the applicability of international law on refugees to the
Palestinian situation, operational and programmatic studies in the field of forced migration have not
encompassed the Palestinian refugees to any significant extent. This paper intends to link discussion
over the resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue to the broader debate concerning repatriation and
resettlement within the UN agencies and other NGOs through an exploratory comparative study.
I. Introduction
To some extent the lacuna can be explained by the lack of a comparative framework in forced
migration studies. Despite the publication of numerous single case studies, 3 the study of refugee
repatriation as apart of forced migration studies is methodologically underdeveloped. It lacks the body
1
Research for this paper was carried out during a British Academy and Leverhulme Trust Senior
ResearchFellowship year. The author would like to thank them for their generous support.
2
Masrieh-Hazboun, N. (2001) “Refugee Resettlement in the Gaza Strip: Israeli Policy Revisited”, in
Ginat J, Perkins, E., (eds.) The Palestinian Refugees: Old Problems –New Solutions, (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2001).
3
Crisp, J. (1996) Rebuilding a War-torn Society: A review of UNHCR’s Reintegration Programme for
Mozambican Returnees, (Geneva:UNHCR); Kibreab, G., (1996) Ready and Willing but Still Waiting: Eritrean
Refugees in Sudan and the Dilemmas of Return, (Uppsala: Life and Peace Institute); Koser, K. (1997) “Information
and Repatriation: the case of Mozambican Refugees in Malawi”, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol 10, No 1.
of comparative research such as we have in other fields, such as with the literature on transitions to
democracy.4 On both the analytical level and on the programme planning and policy level, there has
been a failure to build upon the existing body of literature and research and, consequently, a frequent
re-inventing of the wheel. This paper, therefore, will also suggest a research methodology that can be
adopted in order to erect a framework for comparative studies which may provide the vehicle for the
transfer of best practice to the Palestinian context.
A comparative approach has many benefits in the study of the Palestinian refugee issue. First, it can
identify elements from the experience of other repatriation and resettlement programs elsewhere in the
world and evaluate their relevance and utility to the Palestinian context. For example, in the Guatemala
case, seen as a relatively successful repatriation program, trilateral coordination established in 1986
between the Guatemalan and Mexican governments and UNHCR provided much of the framework for
planning and refugee participation. Second, in planning what preparatory work should be undertaken
for a repatriation programme in terms of training, identification of gender and age requirements, an
examination of other situations reveals many guidelines to be adopted and pitfalls to be avoided. In the
Bosnian case, for example, duplication and varying levels of assistance from different NGOs and
governments during the mid-1990s led to competition and feelings of dissatisfaction among the refugee
population. Or, similarly, in the Guatemalan case, the focus on involving women in the early stages of
preparation led to many positive results. Because the role of women in maintaining family networks is
well documented in the Palestinian case, an examination of the gender elements in repatriation and
resettlement programs elsewhere could be utilised in drawing up a similar program for Palestinian
refugees.
There are three further discrete and crucial aspects to the future of the Palestinian refugees that can be
examined using the comparative approach. The first aspect concerns the kind of compensation to
which the refugees are entitled and the mechanism for its distribution.
4
An examination of
Exceptions to this generalisation include Zeager, L. and Bascom, J. (1996) “Strategic Behaviour in
Refugee Repatriation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 40, No 3, pp 460-485;
Takahashi, S., (1997) “The UNHCR Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: The Emphasis of Return over
Protection”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol 9, No 4, pp.593-612; Vedsted-Hansen, 1997
compensation regimes from South Africa after the dissolution of apartheid, in Central and Eastern
Europe after regime changes there, and after the Gulf War of 1991 can provide many indications of the
kind of compensation regime that is workable and appropriate. The second aspect is the question of
the lead agency to oversee the resettlement or repatriation of refugees. Much of the current debate
centres on the future role of UNRWA, the UN agency that has had responsibility for most Palestinian
refugees since 1950. Many external donor agencies prefer a new institution with a new mandate.
Others point to the expertise residing in UNRWA and its legitimacy in the eyes of the refugee
community as being over-riding factors in favour of its retention, albeit with additional tasks conferred
upon it. A comparative approach would assist a thorough evaluation of this issue. The final aspect is
over the question of future housing provision. There is a lively debate currently taking place among
officials from the Palestinian Authority, the World Bank, the EU, donor agencies, and Israel as to how
best to direct Palestinian refugee inflows to the West Bank. One school of thought argues that such
inflows should be incremental and directed to the margins of existing urban areas. Another school
contends they should be one-off and directed to newly-created cities. A comparative study of
resettlement programs would draw in the experience of other communities and societies that have had
to deal with the integration of large numbers of refugees.
Finally, it should be noted that in the Palestinian-Israel context, the insights provided by comparative
studies are double-edged. They provide comfort and concern in equal measure to both sides. It may be
disconcerting to many Israeli citizens to learn that repatriation programmes have taken place which do
not have cataclysmic effects upon the society that is expected to absorb the returnees, and indeed may
offer many advantages to it. By the same token, many Palestinians will be alarmed to hear of the
degree to which, despite the full backing of international law and the presence of external military
forces, many repatriation programmes do not succeed in meeting the aspirations of the refugees and
indeed fall considerably short of them.
The paper will be divided into four parts. The first section will suggest a research methodology that
can be used to provide an analytical framework for studying refugee repatriation programmes in a
comparative perspective. The comparison as such will then be made on two distinct levels – the macro
and the micro. The second section will examine the macro-level of the regional political architecture
and multilateral arrangements that are in place, drawing on examples from the three case studies:
Guatemala, Bosnia and Afghanistan. The third section will look at the micro-level of programme
planning and logistics taking examples again from the case studies. The final section will identify the
lessons that can be learnt form these experiences and examine their relevance to the Palestinian
context. The paper is exploratory and marks the initial phase of a broader comparative project where
more a greater depth in analysis will be used to substantiate some of the observations this paper raises.
The intention is that the project will culminate in a workshop in 2004 that will pool more detailed case
studies with the view of identifying relevant best practice for the Palestinian context.
II. Towards a comparative methodology of repatriation programmes
As already mentioned the comparative study of forced migrations and post-conflict repatriation and
resettlement is underdeveloped methodologically. Unlike the transitions to democracy literatures which
has built up a corpus of material and developed a rich set of data bases and analytical frameworks since
the 1970s,5 the research methodologies available to scholars of forced migration studies are in their
infancy. In addition, the field it is also driven by the quest for policy relevant research. One aspect of
this quest is the search for “pre-requisites” for a “successful” and “effective” programme.
Clearly
there are problems associated with the definition of a successful programme. To some extent the
numbers of returned or resettled refugees is one important element in a definition, but other elements
such as consistency with human rights law and refugee conventions or durability of the programme are
also crucial elements. Researchers have to make it clear from the outset what their definition is.
Another problem is one that is associated with the comparative method itself. How does one compare
situations with such disparate features or such an attenuated process or with such a large number of
variables? Post-conflict repatriation programmes come in many different forms and have different rates
of completion, target groups, political, economic and environmental conditions that comparisons can be
5
Lipset, S. M., (1959) “Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy”, The American Political Science Review, 53, 69-105; O’Donnell, G., and Schmitter P. C., (1986)
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore and
London: John Hopkins University Press); Rustow, D.A., (1970) “Transitions to Democracy: towards a Dynamic
Model”, Comparative Politics, 2, 337-363.
contrived and artificial. Indeed, there is a strong case for exceptionalism in virtually every example
used. Indeed, scholars using the comparative method have also identified other shortcomings that need
to be taken into account. These include amongst others: a) the inference from a restricted number of
cases, b) establishing cross-cultural equivalence in the use of terms and values, c) the danger of
intentionality or bias in the choice of case studies in order to strengthen one’s argument and, finally, the
possibility of drift in the levels of analysis whereby elements from different levels are incorporated into
the level of analysis under consideration without differentiation.
Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, the comparative method still offers up opportunities for
analytical insights that should not be overlooked. Before continuing we should briefly re-state the case
for the comparative method. There are four main benefits to be derived from comparison. First, it
contextualises the description of political phenomena in a given country or case study. Scholars can
both avoid an ethnocentric bias and place events and patterns within a broader perspective. Second,
comparison allows a degree of classification in which separate cases can be grouped together and
characterised. This process both simplifies discussion and encourages a focus on distinctive features
that can be held in common. Third, once cases have been contextualised and classified, comparativists
are able to look for explanatory factors by a process of hypothesis-testing. Relationships between
variables (key actors, environmental conditions, socio-economic groupings etc) can be posited and
illustrated. Finally, an important objective in comparative studies is the ability to make predictions
based upon the generalisations constructed and observed. Correlations can be extrapolated from
certain proven patterns and sequences.
When comparing a number of different cases, researchers have adapted John Stuart Mill’s methods of
difference and agreement and devised two types of systems design: the Most Similar Systems Design
(MSSD) and Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). The MSSD methodology takes cases with many
similar features but which do not all have the same outcome. The cases are compared in order to
identify those explanatory factors that are different and which, therefore, may account for the range of
outcomes. Thus in forced migration situations, post-conflict repatriation programmes with many
similar features such as external intervention or demographic profile of the refugees may have led to
different outcomes. The explanatory factor may be the nature of the political settlement or the role of
the international community. Most Different System Design (MDSD), on the other hand, compares
cases that do not share many common features but have a common outcome. The challenge is to
identify the explanatory factors that may account for the similar outcome. 6
This paper will adopt the MSSD approach and examine three forced migration situations where similar
features of a repatriation programme are correlated to the results of the programmes. Two levels of
analysis will be selected to identify independent variables so that a range of pre-requisites (dependent
variables) can be isolated as essential components in any repatriation programme. The two levels are
the political architecture or regional and multilateral frameworks (eg UNHCR-government or host
country agreements) that are in place before repatriation commences and, secondly, the options
available to refugees, be it compensation, return to country of origin, or host or third country
resettlement.
The case studies of Guatemala, Bosnia, and Afghanistan have been selected in the light of the
following similarities: a political settlement involving the international community, a desire on the part
of refugees to return to their places of origin, the close involvement of host countries, the role of
external lead agencies and, finally, a similarity in demographic profile (predominantly peasant and
rural based forced migration) rather than absolute numbers. (It is important to note that the
accessibility of primary data either in the form of documentation or through interviews of key
personnel can also be a critical factor in making selections.) Clearly the cases of Guatemala, Bosnia
and Afghanistan taken in their totality exhibit enormous differences in genesis, in historical and
political trajectory and in their role in the international system. The focus of this methodology and
analysis, however, is on the repatriation and resettlement process which exhibit much closer similarities
in both the independent variables and the outcomes, as will be shown. In this way it will be possible to
identify explanatory factors which can used to construct a set of prerequisites for programme planning.
1. Level 1: The macro-level of the regional political architecture
6
Landman, T., Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction. 2nd edition.(London:
Routledge, 2003)p. 29; Collier, D. “New Perspectives on the Comparative Method”, in Rustow, D. and Erikson,
K., (eds.) Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives. (New York: Harper Collins, 1991)
p.112.
This section will examine the three case studies at the level of the regional political architecture and
multilateral arrangements between countries of origin, host countries, international organisations such
as UNHCR and other international NGOs. By focussing on similar features in each case - forced
migration leading to political settlement leading to repatriation - which have had, similar outcomes the partial repatriation of refugees - it is hoped to identify the key explanatory factors involved, be it
external intervention, refugee participation or political reconciliation.
a. Guatemala
In the 1970s, Guatemala, along with its Central American neighbours El Salvador and Nicaragua, was
immersed in social and political upheaval, with state forces reacting oppressively to any attempts at
political participation. The internal conflict in Guatemala stemmed from inequalities in the landownership system and access to political power. 72 per cent of the arable land was owned by 2.1 per
cent of landowners, mostly from a non-indigenous minority. Power was consolidated in the hands of
the conservative military and private sector interests leading to widespread armed resistance in the
1970s. As a consequence the military regimes between 1978 and 1985 conducted a series of counterinsurgency campaigns which drove the guerrillas into the mountains and the rural population were
subjected to scorched earth tactics and indiscriminate killings. Over 1 million, or some 20 per cent of
the country’s total population, was estimated to have been displaced, including between 150,000 and
200,000 people forced into exile. By 1981, 46,000 had entered Mexico, mostly to the impoverished
provincial state of Chiapas, where they were registered and in 1982 the UNHCR opened offices there.
The Mexican government adopted a policy of dispersal and at least 17,000 were resettled in the states
of Campeche and Quintana Roo, some distance from the border with Guatemala.
The process of return for the Guatemalan refugees started in 1985, when elections for the first civilian
President since 1969 took place and the constitution was revised. International support was contingent
upon an improvement in the human rights situation and one of the important measures for this was
deemed to be the issue of refugee return. In 1987 a Tripartite Agreement was signed between UNHCR
and the governments of Guatemala and Mexico which established structures and operating guidelines
for UNHCR to organise assistance to the voluntary repatriation of refugees and displaced Guatemalans
who had fled across the borders into Mexico. However, the agreement did not lead to the desired mass
return of refugees. While political conditions in Guatemala had changed, the refugees showed a deep
mistrust of the government and its governance of the areas to which they were returning. 7
The refugees created a group of representatives, the Permanent Commissions (or CCPP – Comisiones
Permantes de Representantes de los Refugiados Guatemaltecos en Mexico) to negotiate the terms of
their repatriation directly with their own government and became a representative body for a majority
of refugees. In 1989, UNHCR gave them logistical and other support and although the Guatemalan
government initially tried to ignore them, it eventually agreed to direct dialogue. In October 1992 an
agreement was signed between the different interest groups making it possible for a formal return
programme to take place. In January 1993, the first large-scale organised return took place. By 1996,
22,000 refugees had returned and following a peace agreement with the rebel movement there were
further returns in 1997. Some 27,000 refugees remained in Mexico, most of whom were offered the
option of integration and a secure legal status. 8
It is important to note the extensive involvement of the international community in this whole process
and the establishment of a number of consultation fora and monitoring groups that ensured the early
airing of grievances by all parties and that the process retained the confidence of the refugees
themselves. One such forum was Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA). This was a
conference initiated by the UN General Assembly in 1989 and which led to a standing follow-up
committee representing regional governments and international organisations. Later regional and
international NGOs as well as representatives from the displaced population were given the opportunity
to have a voice. Supported jointly by UNHCR and UNDP, it was designed to be an evolving
mechanism for co-ordination. It was seen, however, as successful in opening the door to initial
solutions, but less successful in implementation and funding.
7
Riess, S. “’Return is struggle, not resignation’: lessons from the repatriation of Guatemalan refugees
from Mexico”. New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 21. (Geneva: UNHCR Evaluation and
Policy Analysis Unit, 2000), p. 13.
8
UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), p. 95.
Another forum was the Mediation Group set up by the CCPP in 1990, which invited the participation
of UNHCR, the Catholic Church through its standing Bishop’s Conference, the newly created Human
Rights Ombudsman and a human rights organisation set up by Guatemalans in exile. In addition, an
international support group known as GRICAR was set up to assist with the negotiating process
between returnees and the Guatemalan government. It was made up of embassy representatives from
Sweden, Canada, Mexico and France as well as the International Council for Voluntary Agencies
(ICVA) and the World Council of Churches. It was deemed unique because of the combination of
national and international entities involved. The undisputed credibility of some of the members
(especially a particular Catholic Bishop) and the respect engendered by the presence of members of the
diplomatic corps were regarded as key to getting certain actors to sit down at the negotiating table. In
addition, it provided an indirect form of capacity building in terms of developing the negotiating skills
of those involved.
A final body with a clearer monitoring role was CTEAR (Spanish acronym for the Technical
Commission for the Implementation of the Accord for the Resettlement of Population Displaced by the
Armed Conflict.) Set up in 1994 as part of the implementation of the peace accords, CTEAR comprised
a six-person body with four voting members and two observers from the international community. The
voting members were two representatives from the government and two from the newly created
organisation of several grassroots groups representing displaced persons, refugees and returnees. The
international community was represented by a consultative group of donor countries and UN agencies,
elected UNDP officials (stipulated by the accord to administer CTEAR’s trust fund) and the European
Commission as formal representatives. It provided an opportunity for inter-institutional co-ordination,
holding sub-committees on health, education and regeneration and allowed UNHCR to plan
strategically and ensure sustainability of its intervention.
The return of Guatemalan displaced persons took place during a time of continued conflict and a heavy
military presence. UNHCR has a responsibility to ensure that a repatriation process is conducted in a
‘safe’ environment and a ‘dignified’ manner by establishing minimal norms for returning refugees that
parties in conflict will agree to respect. In the case of Guatemala, by the time the final peace agreement
was signed, 78% of total returnees had already returned. It is generally felt that with the majority
having returned to conflict areas, this stimulated the demilitarisation of these areas and preceded the
formal cease-fire that followed.
b. Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a population of 4.3 million, was one of six republics of the former Federal
State of Yugoslavia. Following the collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia
disintegrated and war broke out between the ethnically mixed populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Serbian support for minority Serbs Bosnia-Herzegovina led to the expulsion of Muslim and Croat
Bosnians from those areas. There was also conflict between Muslim and Croat forces. By 1992, 95 per
cent of Muslim and Croats in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina had fled their homes and over 1 million
were displaced.9 In 1994, despite the signing of the Washington Agreement in which a Bosnian
Muslim-Croat Federation was created, fighting between Serb and Bosnian forces continued. During the
conflict the economy collapsed, most of the post-war housing was destroyed or damaged and the
country became divided along ethnic lines, creating the biggest movement of refugees in Europe since
the Second World War. By 1995, 4.4 million people were displaced of which over 1.2 million fled to
Western Europe and neighbouring countries.
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (also known as the Dayton
Peace Agreement) was signed in December 1995 between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(comprising two entities - Republika Srpska and the Muslim –Croat Federation) the Republic of
Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was witnessed by the ‘Contact Group’ comprising,
the US, the Russian Federation , Germany, UK and France. The agreement stipulated the cessation of
hostilities, withdrawal of foreign forces, redeployment of forces, the replacement of the UN peacekeeping forces (UNPROFOR) with a Nato-led Implementation Forces (IFOR) and prisoner exchanges.
It also created the Office of the High Representative to coordinate the activities of organisations
involved in the civilian aspects of the agreement and to monitor its implementation. The OHR received
political guidance from the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) comprising 55 countries and
international organisations that support the peace process and fund the OHR. (53 percent by the EU and
9
UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: Fifty hears of Humanitarian Action, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), p. 218.
22 per cent by the US) A Steering Board meets regularly and issues communiqués concerned with the
implementation of the Framework Agreement with regard to civilian aspects. By May 1996, significant
progress had been made on the military provisions of the agreement.10 Aware that civil harmony and
the repatriation of refugees would only take place under safe conditions, the Annex 6 of the Framework
Agreement laid down stringent ‘benchmarks’ for human rights and set up mechanisms such as the
Commission on Human Rights and the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees. These
benchmarks were slow to be met and which had a direct bearing upon the implementation of the
provisions relating to the repatriation of refugees contained in Annex 7.
Annex 7 institutionalised the role of UNCHR in the return and repatriation process by calling on it to
develop a repatriation plan that will allow for an “early, peaceful, orderly and phased return of refugees
and displaced persons”. However, while the peace agreement specified that all refugees had a right to
return to their homes of origin, no provision was made to ensure that such returns could take place.
Instead it relied upon the signatories to cooperate in creating the conditions for safe returns. As a result,
by 2000 only 10 per cent of the Serbs from Croatia, 5 per cent of Muslims and Croats from western
Bosnia and Herzegovina and only 1 per cent of those expelled by Serbs from eastern Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Republika Srpska) returned to their homes.11 The Bosnia and Herzegovina crisis has been
characterised by a high degree of external involvement. UNHCR was involved from the outset of the
crisis in emergency humanitarian assistance and post-1995 has been given the role of lead agency in
the return of refugees and displaced persons. The Office of High Representative, the Peace
Implementation Council, IFOR, and the UN International Peace Task Force have created a virtual
international protectorate of the state with increasing interventions in legislation concerning property
and the appointment of officials and jurists. The EU has also attempted to create a regional framework
for reconciliation, multi-ethnic democratic processes and reconstruction through the promotion in 1999
of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, despite, or even perhaps, because of this
external involvement, the repatriation of refugees has not gone smoothly. Recent figures suggest that
9
11
Bagshaw, S., (1997) “Benchmarks or Deutschmarks? Determining the Criteria for the Repatriation of
Refugees to Bosnia and Herzegovina”, International Journal of Refugee Law, Vol. 9, No. 4, 566-592.
Ibid, p. 231.
out of a total of 4.4 million, approximately only .425 million refugees and .5 million displaced persons
have returned to their pre-war homes.12
c. Afghanistan
Including Afghanistan in this series of case studies causes some problems as the repatriation
programme is in its very early stages and the authority of the central government is limited.
Nevertheless, due to the large number of refugees involved and the close involvement of host countries,
it is hoped that logistical similarities to the Palestinian case will reveal some useful insights.
The Afghanistan refugee issue began during the Soviet invasion in 1980 when 2 million refugees fled
the country to neighbouring Pakistan and Iran. This number increased to approximately 6 million as
fighting broke out between the Soviet-backed regime and a coalition of mujahidin and tribal leaders.
The Geneva Agreements in 1988 led to the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the creation of an interim
government that was eventually taken over by the mujahidin. Between 1992-94, approximately 3
million refugees returned but the outbreak of civil war that erupted between the former coalition
partners allowed the Taliban to exert control over the country. As a result, the return of refugees slowed
considerably. Following the attack by al-Qa’ida, on the US on September 11th, 2001, the United States
invaded Afghanistan in order to root out al-Qa’ida bases in the country and install a pro-US
government. As a result of US military actions between October 2001 and January 2002 a further
200,000 Afghanis arrived in Pakistan and over 1.2 million were internally displaced.
The Bonn Agreement in December 2002 led to the formation of the Afghanistan Interim
Administration (AIA) which was to facilitate the calling of a loya jirga to appoint members of the
Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA). The ATA was mandated to run the country until elections
could be held in 2004. Security in the country was put into the hand of the International Security
Assistance Force based in and around Kabul with the intention to extend its jurisdiction to the 32
provincial capitals. International aid was to be coordinated by a new UN body, the UN Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).
12
Prettitore, P. “The Right to Housing and Property Restitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Case
Study”. Unpublished paper presented to the BADIL Expert Forum Seminar on the Role of International Law in
peacemaking and Crafting durable Solutions for Refugees, University of Ghent, May 2003, p. 5.
In terms of refugee assistance, the AIA included representatives of representatives of refugee
communities in Iran and Pakistan to ensure that their needs were incorporated into the planning of the
new administration. The ATA comprised a cabinet advisor on refugees. At the signing of the Bonn
agreements in December 2002, it was estimated that 5 million Afghanis remained internally displaced
or in exile. UNHCR began an assisted repatriation programme in March 2002 with a target of 800,000
but by the end of September, already twice that number had returned, the largest and most rapid
assisted return movement to have been organised by the UNHCR since 1972. This caused huge strains
on not only UNHCR’s budget but also on the capacity of the ATA to absorb returnees with resultant
disappointment and unplanned urban migration. The ATA has established a Ministry of Repatriation
and hopes to reform the management of repatriation by establishing offices in host countries to
coordinate and regulate refugee flows.
2. Level 2: The Micro-level of logistic and programmatic strategies
This section will compare the implementation of repatriation programmes in each of the case studies.
The features that they have in common encompass the activities of a lead agency, (in this case
UNHCR), logistical aspects such as transportation, housing and cash assistance, and, overall
programmatic elements such as preparation, training and consultation.
a. Guatemala
Following the progress in 1992 of discussions between the CCPP and the Guatemalan and Mexican
governments, UNHCR established four field offices in Guatemala in order to prepare for the return of
30,000 refugees over a 2 year period. In January 1993, the first large-scale organised return took place
and by 1996, 22,000 refugees had returned. For this programme, UNHCR adopted a two-track
approach. The first was to ensure the safe repatriation of those displaced persons and refugees from
Guatemala who wanted to return to their homes. The second was to facilitate the integration of those
not returning. Assistance with the repatriation process comprised the following four main components:
First, assistance with immediate humanitarian relief including one-off cash assistance packages.
Second, the introduction of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) contracted out to organisations with greater
experience of project design and implementation. This was a recognition that UNHCR was too large an
organisation to provide the quick response required in this kind of work, and also contributed towards
ensuring that reintegration projects were conceived in a longer term context. Third, UNHCR developed
a strategy of linkage with local NGOs and planning for eventual handover. Finally, UNHCR
recognised that it had a key role to play in mediating between refugee groups and the government. This
took place on two levels: the formal level, such as in the Mediation Group mentioned in the previous
section and on a community level centred around specific activities.
In accordance with standard practice in UNHCR repatriation programmes, the packages of assistance
given to returnees consisted of cash grants, food aid, agricultural tools and housing materials. In
addition, all returnees were provided with the same identity documents as nationals. Whilst timeconsuming, bureaucratic and complex, addressing the issue of documentation enabled returnees to
rapidly exercise their civil and political rights. Due to the long distances and the remoteness of most of
the returnee homes, transportation was a major operation. UNHCR, therefore, set up reception centres
to receive new arrivals and where their various documentations, health and other needs could be
assessed. Cash grants for those under 14 years were handed over to the mother while other entitlements
went to both the man and the woman of each couple. In this way, women returnees increasingly played
an active part in the decision-making regarding the use of these funds.
The Guatemala case is characterised by a high degree of involvement of returnees in the peace process.
This process was started in the camps and programmes to train leaders who would be able to help and
represent the community in this process were established. In the same way, teachers and other
professionals were trained to provide the education and leadership that would be needed after return.
The creation of women’s networks were particularly encouraged and UNHCR staff were provided with
training on gender awareness and how to incorporate gender issues into the planning of the repatriation
programme. The networks also helped to increase the confidence of women refugees and they
developed skills to publicly articulate what their needs and aspiration. While it is clear that refugees
were closely involved in the preparation and planning elements of the repatriation process, there is also
some research which show that the concept of voluntary repatriation was applied too broadly and
loosely. In many cases, the lack of suitable alternatives obliged the refugees to cooperate in their
repatriation.13
b. Bosnia
The Bosnian repatriation programme took place mainly from the mid- to late 90s and was one element
in a set of durable solutions available. The largest was integration into the host country and the smallest
was re-settlement in a third country. Repatriation was the middle option. From the outset the Bosnian
repatriation process was characterised by duplication and the lack of coordination.
This was despite
the mandate given to UNHCR to coordinate such repatriation efforts. 14 In part this was due to the lack
of legal harmonisation amongst EU member states on asylum policy in general. In addition, each state
had a different set of policies towards repatriation, often offering different assistance packages, and
over the issue of refoulement, or its voluntary nature. This is partly explained by the difference in
numbers accepted by each state. Those with large Bosnian populations tended to establish distinct
return programmes, whereas those with smaller numbers included the Bosnians in their existing
migration policies. For example, Germany, where there was a large Bosnian presence, set itself
ambitious targets of return that included a large programme of involuntary return. In contrast, countries
like the Netherlands and Austria resisted the forcible return of any Bosnian refugee.
Exacerbating this disparity was the presence of a wide variety of NGOs representing a number of
different interests. Although their presence was legitimate, their specific individual remits became
confusing both for recipients of assistance as well as non-refugee populations. The range of
programmes provided for returnees offered different types of assistance. Some focussed mainly on
physical return, others provided in addition reintegration assistance to returnees, while others sought to
promote the reconstruction of areas to which people were returning. However, despite this disparity in
implementation a common overall aim can be discerned in that all assistance programmes contained
short term, immediate assistance in the form of cash and travel grants, housing assistance and
employment.
13
Riess, S. Return is struggle, not resignation, p.9
Travel cost were met by the host country, with arrangements made directly through existing return
programmes or by contracting out the operation to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
which was, however, more expensive. ‘Look and see’ schemes were also set up whereby refugees
could visit their homes for a few weeks to ascertain how safe or realistic it was for them to return.
These schemes were generally appreciated by the returnees and regarded as a successful component of
the return programme. Cash benefits were provided to cover returnees' immediate subsistence needs till
they were settled. For example, under a Dutch government scheme, all those under 50 received
assistance for three months while those over 50 were given it for the rest of their lifetime. However,
these varied from state to state within the EU, and even within states. The inconsistency of the
approach of member states in the EU led to confusion and resentment amongst the returnees and
became an important issue.
Addressing the provision of accommodation was complex. First, there was a shortage of housing for
the population as a whole. The size of the existing housing stock bore no relation to existing needs and
the influx of returnees. Some programmes linked their aid to reconstruction, developing building skills
and the regeneration of the construction industry. However these seem to have been of limited success.
Second, the internal displacement of large numbers of people that had occurred over several years and
led to secondary occupations which if reversed would cause further displacement. Finally, continuing
ethnic divisions created a difficult environment in which to settle returnees from a minority group. It
was not until the adoption of the Property Law Implementation Plan by the OHR, UNHCR and the
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe that progress on property restitution and
compensation issues commenced.15
There were a number of approaches to employment generation in the repatriation process. Schemes to
attract professionals were designed to find appropriate employment for individuals and to top up
salaries by a percentage of the level they had obtained in the host country for up to two years. A
scheme known as the Return of Qualified nationals (RQN) scheme and implemented by IOM, offered
14
UNHCR, Operational Plan for Durable Solutions within the Framework of Annex 7 of the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Related Regional Return and Repatriation
Movements, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
15
Prettitore, The Right to Housing and Property Restitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Case Study”,
p. 14.
assistance over a 36 month period. Travel costs, an instalment grant of 380 ECU, a guaranteed salary at
local wages and a 3560 ECU grant for equipment for the employing institution were included in these
schemes. In addition, considerable emphasis was placed upon providing opportunities to develop new
and more appropriate skills or upgrade existing skills. A third type of scheme focused upon micro
enterprise. There were a number of schemes that assisted returnees develop small enterprises, largely
through systems of loans, training and support in running their own business. However, this scheme
encountered criticism in that they were seen to lack cost effectiveness deficient in tackling community
based problems. Their small-scale nature resulted in them benefiting a minority of returnees and not
the community at large while and the focus on returnees alone engendered hostility against them from
the community.
c. Afghanistan
As mentioned in the previous section, at the signing of the Bonn agreements in December 2002, it was
estimated that 5 million Afghanis remained internally displaced or in exile. By September 2002, it has
been estimated that approximately 1.7 million refugees returned to Afghanistan in one of the largest
examples of spontaneous refugee returns recorded. This caught UNHCR and the ATA unprepared.
UNHCR provided cash grants to cover immediate needs and travel costs but the budget for these were
soon depleted. In addition, the very large numbers of returnees requiring such grants ate into its budget
for longer-term re-integration and reconstruction schemes. At the same time, the ATA was not in a
position to provide any nationally based assistance for re-integration and reconstruction of damaged
property. Its area of jurisdiction barely exceeded the perimeter of Kabul and plans for its Ministry for
Repatriation to set up reception and needs assessment centres in host countries were barely underway.
The lack of coordination among the various agencies concerned with the reconstruction of Afghanistan
and the absence of central administration with effective control over its provinces and the ongoing
military operations against the Taliban and al-Qa’ida supporters has rendered impossible a coherent
repatriation process.16
16
Stockton, N. “Strategic Coordination in Afghanistan”, (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit,
2002); Turton, D. and Marsden, P. “Taking Refugees for a Ride? The Politics of refugee return to Afghanistan”,
(Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2002).
As a result, there have been two significant developments. First, is growing evidence that many
returnees either returned back to their camps or drifted to the nearest urban settlement, usually Kabul.
This supported by an earlier UNHCR survey that suggested that 52 per cent of returnees intended to
settle in Kabul. Already over 500,000 returnees have arrived in the capital where almost 50 per cent of
the housing infrastructure has been destroyed. 17 Second, because of the conditions of unresolved
conflict and inadequate reconstruction activity, UNHCR has begun to distinguish between ‘facilitating’
and ‘promoting’ repatriation. Due to its legal responsibility to ensure a safe and dignified return for
refugees, it recognises its inability to guarantee such conditions. The distinction allows it to retain a
role without obvious contravention of its responsibilities.
III. Lessons to be learnt
Clearly every refugee situation is comprised of both a number of unique features and a number of
features held in common. Even the features held in common require a certain amount of abstraction to
draw out their similarities. However, from the case studies even in an exploratory examination such as
this paper, it is clear that there are number of elements or prerequisites that are essential for an effective
and durable repatriation programme.
From Level 1 we can see how a centralised state administration operating within firm and defined
borders are a minimal requirement for a durable repatriation process. The lack of effective governance
and reconstruction activity is a major contribution to the slow pace of repatriation in both Bosnia and in
Afghanistan. In Afghanistan in particular, the weakness of central government, the insecure political
environment and the inadequate progress on reconstruction presents severe obstacles to a repatriation
programme to the extent to oblige UNCHR to redefine the nature of its activities as facilitating rather
than promoting return. A planned repatriation process does not exist in the accepted sense.
In addition, it is clear that there is a need for external intervention in the coordinating elements in a
repatriation process. The lack of a co-ordinated and harmonised approach by EU states led to a variety
19
Petrin, S., (2002) “Refugee Return and State Reconstruction: a comparative analysis”, New Issues in
Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 66. (Geneva: UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit), p. 14.
of different assistance programmes being implemented for returnees in Bosnia, offering varying levels
of assistance. This caused resentment and confusion both amongst Bosnian returnees as well as those
who remained. In addition, a chaotic NGO sector emerged, in which numerous international NGOs
were present, often implementing host government schemes with little local accountability. Coordination at an operational level can ensure more efficient dissemination of information and avoid
duplication of services. The Guatemalan programme on the other hand was characterised by extensive
inter-institutional co-ordination. There were a variety of forums set up to improve communication,
ensure co-operation and joint planning. Much of this coordination prompted informal and mutually
beneficial capacity building, particularly around negotiation and organisational skills. In Afghanistan,
on the other hand, the multiplicity of mandates has caused paralysis and competition.
Furthermore, it is clear that external intervention in enforcement and monitoring is also essential.
Repatriation does not take place at the end of a process of reconciliation and the healing of wounds,
but, usually, at the beginning. Indeed, it is part of the process or reconciliation and healing. At the
beginning emotions are running high and enmities are still very fresh. The Bosnian experience has
shown that international intervention to safeguard human rights had an important political effect,
especially in the form of the PIC, in ensuring that the civilian aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement
were implemented. The involvement of the international community in the Guatemala process was
also vital.
The host countries and the country of origin also play a crucially important part in an effective and
durable repatriation programme. The level of state co-operation can determine how effective the
programme can be implemented. This can be seen in the legislation needed to facilitate return
programmes, the issue of documentation as well in providing logistical assistance. A repatriation
programme without host and country of origin participation and cooperation would be very hard to
achieve.
Finally, from the evidence of Level 1 we see that the role of the lead agency and its mandate must be
clear. The duplication and competition between NGOs can be very wasteful of resources and
destructive in the sense that in a fragile and divided society suffering from conflict, a level of parity and
consistency needs to be demonstrated. In the case studies examined UNHCR played a clear role with a
mandate determined by international law and conventions. Further comparative studies will need to
look into other refugee situations where another agency operates to examine the impact this may have
on the repatriation process.
From Level 2 there are a number of useful lessons that can be used in the planning of a Palestinian
repatriation programme. The first is the importance of planning and preparation. Ensuring that
demographic information on returnees is acted upon in order to plan for particular needs such as single
women, young single men, elderly, disabled, unaccompanied minors makes a significant contribution.
Building in this preparation time ensures that the systems to co-ordinate the contribution of all
stakeholders can be identified and put in place; that joint standards of best practice can be discussed
and agreed, and a common understanding of aims, objectives and ways of working can be developed. It
took two years of preparation before the Guatemalan programme finally started. In contrast the
Bosnian and especially the Afghanistan cases were marked by a high degree of spontaneous returns and
fast-track repatriations precipitated by the host country governments before the country of origin was in
a position to receive them, both in terms of infrastructure but also in terms of legislation.
As important is the availability of objective advice and information for the prospective returnees. This
will greatly assist in the returnees’ ability to settle. Information offered in a range of forms, from ‘Look
and See’ schemes, to the activity of local displaced persons associations (DPAs), to printed materials,
to advice centres located in the main areas of settlement proved to be successful in Guatemala and
Bosnia.
The case studies also point to the fact that the involvement of returnees themselves in the design and
implementation of return programmes is an essential component in the successful repatriation
programme. In addition, the programme will only be effective if there is some sense of ownership and
trust. In the Guatemala case the groundwork done at grassroots level with both men and women was
critical in securing a high level of refugee participation and was central to the success of the
repatriation programme. It encouraged refugees to return and their involvement in shaping the nature of
the repatriation process can be said to have ensured the durability of assistance schemes. In contrast,
mechanisms to consult with potential returnees themselves were conspicuously missing from the
process of return in Bosnia. Government and agency programmes were based upon speculation as to
how Bosnians would react to return schemes.
In terms of direct material assistance, the success of assistance packages is dependent on several
factors. First, the degree of consistency in the level of benefit for each returnee is important. Second,
the degree to which the support given to returnees is seen to benefit the community as a whole, thus
counteracting resentment from the existing community not receiving benefits. Third, the provision of
advice, training and ongoing support to individuals in the scheme is essential. Fourth, it is important to
provide appropriate legislation to support the creation of micro enterprise and the avoidance of a
situation where the market for small businesses becomes saturated. Fifth, programmes need to
demonstrate a clear commitment to ensuring both men and women benefit from the programme and
include a coherent and systematic gender component. Enabling systems for women need to be put in
place and to ensure, among other things, that women professionals benefit and are equally attracted to
return.
There can be no question that every refugee situation has its unique trajectory and context that cannot
be replicated. Yet at the same time, it is also clear that in a repatriation process there are some
structural and operational features that are held in common. The evolution of conventions and
UNHCR guidelines and handbooks are a testament to this. Much of this knowledge and experience has
not been utilised in discussing solutions and implementing mechanisms for the Palestinian case. This
paper has sought to demonstrate how this can be done and sought to map out the parameters of a
repatriation process which takes into account both the unique features of the Palestinian case and the
patterns discernible in a broader context.
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