State-business relations, investment climate reform and economic growth in sub
Saharan Africa *
Kunal Sen 1 and Dirk Willem te Velde 2
October 2008
1. Introduction
Researchers have long examined the factors that contribute to economic growth. The new challenge that this research addresses is to examine how state–business relations
(SBR) affect economic performance in sub Saharan Africa. Critics would contend that this is a difficult task because such relations are intangible and immeasurable and it would therefore be difficult to assess the effects. While we do acknowledge that some informal aspects of SBRs will be difficult to measure, our research suggests that it is possible to identify and measure key factors behind effective SBRs conducive to growth in Africa, but more needs to be done.
The context for SBR research in Africa is rich, diverse and dynamic. Some countries have long had official relations separating state and business, while in other countries the relations are difficult, complex and based on mistrust, and in many countries a significant part of business is owned by the state. In some countries there is an
* The research presented in this chapter has been undertaken for for the Research Programme
Consortium on Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth (IPPG) and funded by UK DFID. More details of the research are available on www.ippg.org.uk
. Special thanks goes to Mahvash Qureshi and
Max Cali the co-authors of some of the work summarised in this chapter. We are grateful to the World
Bank for providing access to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Any errors and opinions expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors.
1 IDPM, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, (+)44 161 275 0967; email@ kunal.sen@manchester.ac.uk.
2 Overseas Development Institute; 111 Westminster Bridge Road, London SE1 7JD, (+) 44 (0) 20 7922
0300, fax: (+) 44 (0) 20 7922 0399, e-mails: dw.tevelde@odi.org.uk
1

institutionalised form of state-business relations, e.g. in Mauritius and South Africa, while in other countries, such as Malawi, the state and business were brought together through a facilitated forum. Some countries have a developed entrepreneurial business sector, in others this is largely absent. Nearly all African countries have seen an improvement in the factors associated with good SBRs. And so has growth since the mid 1990s, so it would be instructive to see whether and how SBRs have facilitated economic performance, accounting for other drivers of growth.
Our motivation for focusing on state-business relations as an additional determinant of economic performance is influenced by a long-standing literature in political science and political economy that collaborative SBRs can be growth-enhancing (e.g.,
Amsden 1989, Evans 1995). This literature has argued that sustained economic growth has occurred in contexts where the state has intervened in the economy so as
‘to provide incentives to private capital and to discipline it’ (Harriss 2006) and takes the position that ‘good growth-enhancing relations between business and government elites are possible’ (Maxfield and Schneider 1997). The empirical evidence in support of this view has been mostly from case-studies, predominantly drawn from East Asia
(e.g. Johnson 1987) or Latin America (Doner and Schneider, 2000). In support of this, some recent firm-level studies provide evidence that state support contributes to firm survival and growth ( Fajnzylber et al. 2008, Hansen et al. 2009).
3
There is as yet
3
Fajnzylber et al (2008) address aspects of the impact of forms of government support on Mexican micro firms, using various techniques to identify treatment effects of credit, training and tax payments (as a measure of formality, hence a proxy for potential access to public services) on firm profits, growth and survival likelihood. They find that although access to these forms of support does not appear to significantly influence profits, ‘formality’ and access to credit improve the likelihood of survival. They argue that facilitating access to credit and business development services and promoting formalisation (which is similar to state-business relations) are all likely to increase firm growth. In this way, there is some evidence and SBRs, at the micro level, can support private sector development, hence contribute to growth. A paper in a similar vein is by Hansen et al (2009) which explore the effects of direct government assistance during start-up and other forms of interaction with the state (hence relating to aspects of SBRs) on the long-run performance of
2

limited knowledge of whether effective state-business relations in Sub-Saharan Africa can contribute to economic growth. This is an important omission in the literature, given that in the political science literature on Africa there has been recognition of growth-impeding collusive behaviour among weak and fragmented political and economic elites that has characterised most African countries, along with examples of political elites that formed successful ‘growth coalitions’ with economic elites in countries as disparate in initial conditions and geographical characteristics as
Botswana, Ghana and Mauritius (Herbst 1993, Bräutigam et al.
2002, Robinson and
Parsons 2006).
4
There are several unresolved issues in research on SBR. There is no single definition of SBRs which makes the topic more difficult to navigate. But questions of substance relate to how state-business relations are formed, what different forms they take, whether the essence of SBRs can be measured, whether SBRs can have measurable effects at micro and macro level, and whether different forms or functions of SBRs have different effects on performance. This paper summaries ongoing research on the factors associated with effective SBRs, how SBRs can be measured, what the effects of SBRs are and concludes with some implications. small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam. They find strong effects on firm dynamics (survival and growth) from interaction with state institutions – providing further micro evidence that SBRs matter for firm performance.
4
There is also a wider literature that discusses the possibility of a developmental state a la East Asia in the Sub-Saharan African context; Mkandawire (2001) argues that the institutional relations that governed state-business interactions in East Asia are also possible in Africa.
3

The chapter is structured around 5 sections. Section 2 discusses the factors that are normally thought to be associated with effective state-business relations, such as transparency, reciprocity and credibility and how they are expected to affect growth.
Section 3 attempts to measure state-business relations as both the macro and micro level. Section 4 summarises empirical evidence at both the micro and macro level.
Section 5 concludes and provides policy implications.
2. What factors are associated with effective state business relations?
The literature on state-business relations takes the following elements as essential characteristics of effective state-business relations (see Maxfield and Schneider,
1997).

Transparency: the flow of accurate and reliable information, both ways, between business and government.

Reciprocity: the capacity and autonomy of state actions to secure improved performance in return for subsidies.

Credibility: when capitalists are able to believe what state actors say.
Effective SBRs as characterised above can affect growth through fulfilling a number of economic functions. Firstly, they can help to solve information related market and co-ordination failures in areas such as skill development or infrastructure provision.
For instance, business associations or government departments may co-ordinate and disperse information among stakeholders.
4

Secondly, effective SBRs provide a check and balance function on government policies and tax and expenditure plans. Thus, effective SBRs may help to ensure that the provision of infrastructure is appropriate and of good quality. The design of effective government policies and regulations depends, among other things, on input from and consultation with the private sector. Regular sharing of information between the state and businesses ensures that private sector objectives are met with public action and that local level issues are fed into higher level policy processes. The private sector can identify constraints, opportunities, and possible policy options for creating incentives, lowering investment risks, and reducing the cost of doing business. More efficient institutions and rules and regulations might be achieved through policy advocacy which could reduce the costs and risks faced by firms and enhance productivity.
Finally, effective state-business relations and membership of business association may help to reduce policy uncertainty. Firms operate in an uncertain environment and frequently face risk and resource shortages. They undertake decisions concerning technology, inputs, and production facilities based on anticipated market conditions and profitability. Uncertainty can have significant negative effects on investment, when investment involves large sunk and irreversible costs and there is the option to delay the decision to make the investment until further information becomes available
(Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Businesses that have a better relation with government may be able to anticipate policy decisions.
Hisahiro (2005) argues that various forms of information and resources, which are dispersed among entities in the public and private sector, need to be integrated in a
5

more sophisticated way to jointly coordinate policies and provide better public services. It is this combination of insulation and connectedness that minimises the risks and enhances the effectiveness of economic policies. Hence, appropriate government capacity and policy, which is necessary to support private sector development and promote economic growth, can be enabled by good state–business relations and productive public-private sector dialogue.
Thus, effective state-business relations can enhance economic growth by positively affecting the two proximate determinants of growth – the rate of factor accumulation and the growth of total factor productivity. Greater transparency in the flow of information between state actors and the business sector leads both to a better allocation of investments by the business sector to their most productive uses and, by reducing policy uncertainty in the minds of investors, a higher rate of investment.
Higher credibility of state actions lead to less problems of time and dynamic inconsistency of government policies, providing a more favourable environment for investment to occur. Reciprocity ensures improved performance by private sector actors in return for subsidies and the provision of public goods, contributing to higher productivity growth in the economy.
In summary, effective state-business relations can mitigate both market failures and government failures which are pervasive in most developing countries, and by doing so, bring about an increase in economic growth.
There are visible aspects of state-business relations which could be measured. Some would argue that less visible-informal aspects are equally if not more important.
6

Trust, for instance, is not always dependent on contracts or visible enforcement mechanisms. This we acknowledge. However, we argue that the above visible aspects are important in their own right, and that the informal aspects may influence the links between measurable aspects of SBRs and performance but this does not deny that there could be a systematic link between formal SBRs and growth. Hence, our hypothesis is on understanding the effects of the measurable aspects of SBRs.
3 Measuring state-business relations
Measuring SBRs involves the measurement of the four factors identified above. The measurement of the role of the private sector in state–business relations is based on the presence and length of existence of an umbrella organisation linking businesses and associations together. The measurement of the private sector in state–business relations is based on the presence and length of existence of an investment promotion agency (IPA) to promote business. Effective SBRs requires the cooperation of the public and private sector, and we examine a number of factors. This mechanism can come in a number of different forms: it can be open to all and autonomous of government intervention as is the case with a formal existing body, or it can be an informal ‘suggestive’ body with no entrenched power. The measurement of how the state interacts with business is based on the format, frequency, and existence of state– business relations. Finally, the presence and length of existence and effectiveness of laws protecting business practices and competition measures the mechanisms to avoid collusive behaviour.
7

Measuring at the macro level. Each of the four factors above can be measured for a number of African countries over time. In background research, we focused on 20
African countries for which we have data on each of the four indicators (Te Velde
2006). This leads to four, time-varying indicators per country. In order to obtain a composite measure, we take the average of the above indicators (attaching the same weight to each indicator). Te Velde (2007) shows the raw data for country-specific averages. Chart 1 shows the averages for four groups of countries, ranging from the fastest growing groups over 1970–2005 (group 1) to the slowest growing group
(group 4). As expected country groups with higher SBR scores have grown faster.
Chart 1 Higher SBR scores for groups of faster growing countries
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
1
0.9
0.8
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4
0.2
0.1
0
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988
Year
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Notes : Group 1 = Botswana, Mauritius, Uganda, Mozambique, Mali; Group 2 =
Tanzania, Ghana, Eritrea (part), Senegal, Kenya; Group 3 = Benin, Ethiopia, South
Africa, Nigeria, Rwanda; Group 4 = Malawi, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Zambia, Cote d’Ivoire. Groups based on PPP GDP per capita growth rates over 1980–2004.
8

Box 2 provides two examples of formalised state-business relations. Whilst the
NEDLAC might have less influence than would be suggested on paper, the JEC in
Mauritius is fully operational. As Bräutigam et al.
(2002, p. 526) notes, “over the years, the JEC has become institutionalised as a strong and legitimate ‘peak’ association for businesses in Mauritius, an encompassing group that represents all the major sectors and works out broadly agreeable positions on economic policy”. The
JEC discusses with the Minister of Finance a draft budget and presents proposals which to a varying degree are taken over in the final budget (see also Brautigam et al,
2002).
Box 2 Two African examples of formalised state-business relations
The JEC in Mauritius and NEDLAC (National Economic Development and Labour
Council, since 1994) in South Africa are two examples of the most developed and institutionalised SBRs in sub-Saharan Africa. The primary institution for statebusiness relations in Mauritius is the Joint Economic Council (JEC, 1970). The JEC meets with the prime minister on a regular basis and participates in budget proposals.
The JEC of Mauritius is funded entirely by its members, which include , Mauritius
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mauritius Chamber of Agriculture, Mauritius
Employers’ Federation, Mauritius Sugar Producers’ Association, Mauritius Export
Processing Zone Association, Mauritius Bankers’ Association, Mauritius Insurers’
Association, Association des Hôteliers et Restaurateurs de l’île Maurice, Association of Mauritian Manufacturers. The Joint Economic Council is managed by a Council of 18 members, with a Chairman who rotates every two years and a full-time
Director. As of 1999, the JEC’s top goals are to ensure a stable macro economic environment, foster greater fiscal discipline, restore financial health, and integrate all sectors of the economy in order to reduce distortions and improve efficiency of investment.
NEDLAC has four constituencies that meet to discuss and form consensus on social and economic policy:
1) The Government: Departments of Labour, Finance, Public Works and Trade and
Industry.
2) Organised Business: Under the umbrella of Business South Africa (BSA) and the
National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (Nafcoc).
3) Organised Labour: Under the umbrella of the Congress of South African Trade
Unions (Cosatu), the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) and the Federation of Unions in South Africa (Fedusa).
4) The Community: South African Youth Council, National Women’s Coalition,
South African National Civics Organisation, Disabled People of South Africa, and
9

the National Cooperatives Association of South Africa.
All agreements and findings under NEDLAC are made public and tabled in
Parliament. The NEDLAC Annual Summit brings together delegates representing over 300 constituencies.
Measuring at the micro level. One indicator associated with good SBRs is an organised private sector, which is measurable at micro level as membership. Chart 2 presents the distributions of firms that are members of business associations across 7
African countries.
Chart 2: Private sector organisations membership across African countries
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Member Non-member
Benin Et hiopia M adagascar M alawi M aurit ius S. Af rica Zambia
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys
Business associations provide different services and the World Bank questionnaire asks firms which services are found to be most important. Lobbying government and information on government regulations are on average the two most important services provided by business associations to the firms covered in the sample (Chart
3a-3c). The least important services are resolution of disputes (with officials, workers, or other firms) and accrediting standards or quality of products. The research also shows that business membership varies by sector and firm size; but all sectors and sized are covered.
10

Chart 3a : Value of services by business associations to firms in Zambia
140
120
100
80
Critical value
Major value
Moderate value
Minor value
No value
60
40
20
0
Accreditation Domestic information
International Regulations Lobbying Resolution information
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys: Ethiopia, South Africa and Zambia.
Chart 3b: Value of services by business associations to firms in Ethiopia
200
150
100
50
0
Accreditation Domestic information
International Regulations Lobbying Resolution information
Critical value
Major value
Moderate value
Minor value
No value
Chart 3c: Value of services by business associations to firms in South Africa
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Accreditation Domestic International Regulations Lobbying Resolution
Critical value
Major value
Moderate value
Minor value
No value information information
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys
11

4 What have we learned about the effects of state-business relations in Africa?
This section summarises a number of empirical studies aimed at examining the effects of state-business relations in Africa, at macro level and at the micro level.
Effects of SBRs at the macro level. While the importance of SBRs has been acknowledged in the context of SSA, it has not been detailed in the economic growth literature and its effect has never been quantified. Our research has begun to quantify the effects of effective state-business relations (Sen and Te Velde, 2007). We use the index developed on the basis of measuring SBR (as detailed above) and estimate standard growth regressions in dynamic panel form for 20 African countries over the period 1970-2004 using annual data, controlling for more conventionally used measures of institutional quality in the empirical literature. Previous empirical studies of the role of institutions in growth measure institutional quality by the rule of law index (Keefer and Knack 1994, Sachs and Warner 1997), the risk of expropriation
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001), government repudiation of contracts
(Keefer and Knack 1994, Sachs and Warner 1997), bureaucratic quality (Keefer and
Knack 1994, Sachs and Warner 1997), incidence of corruption (Mauro 1995), and constraints on the executive (Glaeser et al.
, 2004). To see whether SBR can explain economic growth independent of these other institutional variables, we include these variables in our estimated equations along with the SBR measure, and standard control variables used in growth regressions such as inflation, government consumption and openness.
12

The results, based on GMM and fixed effects estimators, show that effective statebusiness relationships contribute significantly to economic growth in Sub-Saharan
Africa – countries which have shown improvements in state-business relationships have witnessed higher economic growth, controlling for other determinants of economic growth. The index of SBRs has advanced significantly and began to improve before the pick up in growth (though different conditions applied in different countries). We also find that effective SBRs seem to matter more for the growth of the manufacturing sector, and that among the components of the SBR measure, what seems to affect economic growth most are the presence of investment promotion agencies and formalised public-private dialogue.
Effects of SBRs at the micro level. The micro-level studies follow a two-stage approach (Qureshi and te Velde, 2007a). In the first stage we estimated a production function for firms in a country, by fitting a production function explaining production value added as a function of capital and labour. The estimation procedure uses the
Levinsohn-Petrin technique to account for endogeneity of the error term and factor inputs labour and capital. In this respect, the data set is rich as we can exploit the fact that there are often three years worth of firm performance data as well as variables such as material input costs that can be used a proxies. In the second stage, we estimate a total factor productivity equation, where productivity is based on the residuals in the first stage, and test whether membership is associated with better performance accounting for other effects.
13

Some suggest that there might be endogeneity issues in that good performance leads to membership: firms with higher productivity more likely to become a member of a business association. However, we suggest there are a number of reasons to suspect the relationship is the other way around. Indeed the literature suggests that it is more likely that firms become a member because they expect higher benefits. Olson (1968) and Doner and Ross Schneider (2000) suggest that the right incentive structure (ie benefits of selected firms) is a key driver for membership. Moreover, evidence from the World Bank enterprise surveys suggest that firms perceive there to be a high value of services provided by business associations, see e.g. Chart 3a-3c.
The micro level regressions for Zambia (Qureshi and Te Velde, 2007s) used the enterprise survey data of the World Bank Group for around 200 firms with data on performance, including data that facilitate the calculation of productivity levels, and on the institutional context facing or perceived by firms. We
It finds that membership of a business association enhances Zambian firm performance in the form of productivity improvements in the range of 37 to 41 percent. This finding is robust to including other variables. Further, joining a business association is particularly useful for small and medium sized firms. Finally, the results supported the view that foreign owned firms lobby the government more effectively than their Zambian counterparts.
Subsequent work used the enterprise survey data of the World Bank Group for seven
African countries (Qureshi and Te Velde, 2007b), independently as well as in a panel of African firms (allowing for country and sector specific effects). The results show
14

that being a member of a business association improves firm performance in the form of total factor productivity improvements on average between 25 to 35 percent. This finding is robust to including other variables that are commonly used to describe the investment climate, and robust to using estimates of productivity that account for endogeneity problems.
Detailed findings in table 1 show that the effectiveness of business association works primarily through solving of information related market and coordination failures and lobbying government. The findings confirm that the perceived value of services provided by the business association is in line with the estimated effects. The more important a services is perceived the more important is its estimated effect. Thus, business associations affect firm performance by reducing policy uncertainty and by lobbying government over regulations
Table 1: Effects of different services of business associations on productivity
Variable
Information on government regulation
Lobbying government
Information on domestic markets
Information on international markets
Accreditation standards
Resolution of disputes
Estimated coefficient in productivity equation
0.10*
0.08*
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.02
Perceived usefulness on scale of
0 (no value) – 4 critical value, mean value
1.85
1.41
1.42
1.34
1.00
0.97
Note: This is the coefficient on the business association variable in an equation explaining productivity (TFP) controlling for other factors: based on data available from Ethiopia, South Africa and Zambia
Membership of business associations can also work though its effect on business climate indicators. For instance, we found that business association membership decreases the size of informal payments by individual firms and improves other investment climate indicators. Finally, membership also increases labour productivity
15

so that positive productivity effects are at least in part captured by labour; most of these benefits are going to the skilled workers providing positive dynamic incentives throughout the economy.
Linking micro and macro. The micro level work for each of the 7 African countries reveals that there are significant differences in the effects of membership across countries, ranging from highly significant and positive in Mauritius and Ethiopia to insignificant in Benin and Madagascar, with effects positive and significant in Malawi and Zambia.
Importantly, when we compare the estimated coefficients for membership with the overall SBR scores computed for these seven countries as detailed above, we estimate the correlation coefficient to be 0.55, see chart 4. This suggests that there is a link between the advancement of visible aspects of SBRs at the macro level (SBR country measure) and the effects on firm performance at the micro level. In general, the effects of SBRs are more pronounced in countries that have strong institutional setups to support and conduct effective SBRs.
16

Chart 4 The effect of business association membership on productivity is greater in countries which are better prepared for state-business relations
South Africa
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.4
Benin
-0.2
y = 0.5491x + 0.433
Madagascar
Malawi
Zambia
0 0.2
0.4
Coefficient on membership
0.6
Mauritius
Ethiopia
0.8
.
5 Conclusions and implications
Our ongoing research effort suggests that improvements in formalised institutional relations between the state and the private sector increase economic growth in the
African context. These institutional relations could be the creation of umbrella business associations, the setting up of Investment Promotion Agencies, formalised public-private dialogues or the implementation of competition law. Umbrella business associations can help resolve collective action problems for the private sector and allow them to push for growth enhancing policies. The development of effective
Investment Promotion Agencies signals the intention of the government to take the private sector and investment activity seriously. Formalised public-private sector dialogue processes allow for transparency in policy formulation and efficient dissemination of information from both the public and the private sectors. Effective competition laws prevent rent-seeking and collusive behaviour on the part of bureaucrats and capitalists. Our research shows that the creation and sustenance of
17

effective state-business relations along these lines may have a stronger impact on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa than the conventional measures of governance reform such as improvements in the rule of law and stronger anticorruption measures that have been stressed in the literature and in the policy debate.
While we have suggested there are certain key principles behind effective SBRs, this does not mean that each country should follow one institutional blue print. Indeed, this study does not indicate whether certain types of SBRs or business associations work better than others (as explained in Doner and Schneider, 2000 for non-African developing countries) and this is likely to be context specific and dependent in part on informal aspects. It does not identify which economic function is most relevant (or binding) in which country, e.g. reduction in policy uncertainty or lobbying government (as suggested in the micro-econometric study for Zambia by Qureshi and
Te Velde, 2007). While this study does show that state-business relations can be good for enhancing growth, which by itself is an important policy finding given the historically sceptical view toward the private sector in Africa as being solely rentseeking, there is much left to research at the country level. Perhaps most importantly, the analysis shows that our SBR measure does have empirical meaning, so the nature of state-business relations in Africa is worthy of further study.
18

Therefore, this new and ongoing research on understanding the key characteristics and effects of SBRs is challenging and is yielding some preliminary insights and implications as well as unfinished business. SBRs can be measured at micro and macro level, we can already sketch out some ways through which SBRs affect economic performance theoretically and empirically, but much more needs to be done.
Conceptually, it is important to test the boundaries of what can be measured in terms of state-business relations. In part this is about what can be measured per se , and in part about whether there are enough data on what can be measured. It is important to test the effects of the measurable aspects of SBRs; we suggested that as a very general conclusion, measurable aspects of SBR have a positive impact on economic performance in sub Saharan Africa at both micro and macro level. This provides support for the hypothesis that more open, visible and therefore a more democratic state-business relations are good.
However, it is too soon to assess and understand the precise effects of SBRs on development and what the exact channels are. So far, the available evidence points to a number of possible routes. The micro-evidence suggested that business associations lobby government (in addition to own firm’s lobbying) and this is both perceived to be important as well as estimated to increase firm performance. We would need to know why this is so. One such possible route is that the business association would be effective in identifying and removing investment barriers by lobbying the government. Such a mechanism would provide for a democratic way of conducting
19

effective state-business relations; in fact, membership is associated with a reduction in informal payments by individual firms.
There is a need to know more about the precise effects on economic performance, but also on different types of growth. And the precise routes through which this is expected to work. A conceptual framework on the effects of SBRs on shared growth is only just emerging. We also need to know more about what leads to the formation of SBRs, what sustains them and what factors are we excluding when we focusing on measurement issues. The focus on measuring SBRs facilitates a debate between economists and political scientists on what matters for state-business relations to improve growth prospects
References:
Acemoglu, D. S. Johnson and J. Robinson (2001) ‘The Colonial Origins of
Comparative Development’.
American Economic Review , 91 (5), pp. 1369–1401.
Amsden, A. (1989), Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation , New
York: Oxford University Press.
Badagawa, G. (2008), ‘Public-Private dialogue. The PSFU Experience.’ Presentation at a PPD workshop in Senegal, 3 April 2008, available at: http://www.publicprivatedialogue.org/workshop%202008/PSFU%20PPD%20process
%20-%20Dakar.ppt..
Bräutigam, D., L. Rakner and S. Taylor (2002), “Business Associations and Growth
Coalitions in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of Modern African Studies , 40, 4, pp. 519-
547.
Dixit, A. and R. Pindyck (1994), Investment under Uncertainty , Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
Doner, R.F and M.R. Schneider (2000), ‘Business Associations and Economic
Development: Why Some Associations Contribute More than Others’
Business and
Politics , 2, pp. 261-288.
20

Evans, P (1995) Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation .
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Fajnzylber, P., W. F. Maloney and G. V. Montes-Rojas (2008), Releasing Constraints to Growth or Pushing on a String? Policies and Performance of Mexican Micro-
Firms, Journal of Development Studies , 44, forthcoming.
Glaeser, Edward; R. La Porta; and F. Lopez-de-Silanes (2004) ‘Do Institutions Cause
Growth?’.
Journal of Economic Growth, 9, pp. 271-303.
Hall, Robert and Charles I. Jones (1999) ‘Why do some Countries Produce so much
More Output Per Worker than Others?’
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, pp. 83–
116.
Hansen, H., J. Rand and F. Tarp (2009) Enterprise Growth and Survival in Vietnam:
Does Government Support Matter?, Journal of Development Studies , 45, forthcoming .
Harriss, John (2006) ‘Institutions and State-Business Relations’, London: Improving
Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth (IPPG) Briefing Note 2, available at www.ippg.org.uk/research.
Herbst, J. (1993), The Politics of Reforms in Ghana, 1982-1991, Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
Hisahiro, K. (2005) ‘Comparative Analysis of Governance: Relationship between
Bureaucracy and Policy Co-ordination Capacity with Particular Reference to
Bangladesh’, Institute for International Cooperation. available at: http://www.jica.go.jp/kokusouken/enterprise/chosakenkyu/kyakuin/200509_gov.html.
Hyden, G. J. Court and K. Maese (2004), Making Sense of Governance: Empirical
Evidence from Sixteen Developing Countries , Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner.
Johnson, C. (1987), ‘Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The
Government-Business Relation in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan’, in The Political
Economy of the New Asian Industrialism , ed. F. Deyo, Ithaca: Cornell University
Press.
Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1995) ‘Institutions and Economic Performance: Crosscountry Tests using Alternative Measures’. Economics and Politics, 7, pp. 207–227.
Maxfield, S. and B.R. Schneider (1997), eds., Business and the State in Developing
Countries , Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
Mauro, P. (1995), ‘Corruption and Growth’,
The Quarterly Journal of Economics , 60, pp. 681-713.
Mkandawire, T. (2001), “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa”,
Cambridge Journal of Economics , 25, pp. 289-313.
21

North, D.C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance ,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Olson, M. (1982), The Rise and Decline of Nations , New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Qureshi, M. and D.W. te Velde (2007a), ‘State-Business Relations and Firm
Performance in Zambia’,
London: IPPG Discussion Paper 5, http://www.ippg.org.uk/publications.html.
Qureshi, M. and D.W. te Velde (2007b), ‘ State-Business Relations, Investment Climate
Reform and Firm productivity in SubSaharan Africa”, London: IPPG Discussion Paper 6, http://www.ippg.org.uk/publications.html.
Rapley, J. (1994), “The Ivorian Bourgeoisie”, in J.B. Berman and C. Leys (eds.),
African Capitalists in African Development , Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Robinson, J. and Q.N. Parsons (2006), “State Formation and Governance in
Botswana”, Journal of African Economies , 15, Supplement, pp. 100-140.
Rodrik, D. (2003) In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth .
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rodrik, D., A. Subramanian and F. Trebbi (2004) ‘Institutions Rule: The Primacy of
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development’. Journal of
Economic Growth, 9, pp. 31–165.
Sachs, J. and Warner, A. M. (1997) ‘Sources of slow growth in African economies’.
Journal of African Economies , 6(3), pp. 335–376.
Sen, K. and Velde, D.W. te (2007), State Business Relations and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, London: IPPG Discussion Paper No. 7, available online at www.ippg.org.uk/research , forthcoming in Journal of Development Studies.
Velde, D.W. te (2006), Measuring State Business Relations in Sub-Saharan Africa,
London: IPPG Discussion Paper No. 4, available online at www.ippg.org.uk/research .
Weiss, L. (1998). The Myth of the Powerless State . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press.
22