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To what extent was the foreign policy of Philip II Consistent?
The majority of Historians are in agreement that during the reign of Philip II, the
foreign policy of Spain did not adhere to a common and consistent cause. There are
however conflicting explanations amongst Historians as to why this was the case.
Some would support the idea that Philip had adopted a ‘grand strategy’ relating to his
foreign ambitions while also maintaining that there existed certain contexts in which
Philip, through logic and reason, was forced to respond and adapt differently to the
circumstances with which he was dealing, abandoning any central ideals, explaining
why inconsistency occurred. On the other hand other Historians would argue that
Philips motivations were divided from the start, and that his actions can be explained
by several differentiating an in some case conflicting aims and ambitions which
resulted in a foreign policy which lacked any single aspiration. The questioning of the
reasons behind this inconsistency would also prove to generate friction between the
conflicting views of Agent and Structuralist historians. The Agent school of thought
would dictate the stance that Philip was directly responsible for a sporadic foreign
policy while Structuralists would enforce the motion that there existed external factors
out with monarchist control which forced an inconsistent foreign policy. As well as
this, one must also investigate the intensity at which this inconsistency existed. Some
Historians would argue the point that the foreign policy of Philip was largely
consistent in terms of its defensive and pragmatic approach up until 1583, when it
adopted a more aggressive nature as a reaction to the increased pressure of imperial
overstretch on the economy of Spain. This can therefore present a distorted
impression of the overall manner of Philips foreign policy in that it does not take into
account the less volatile years of Philips reign.
A large majority of Historians would make the point that Philip possessed a wide
variety of conflicting motives which dictated the style of his foreign policy. However
there is debate amongst Historians as to which of these were of the largest concern to
Philip. Leopold von Ranke states that religion was the key factor of influence and that
Philip believed his personal success was measured by the extent to which he upheld
and defended Catholicism. Parker would reiterate this view but would describe Philip
as a messianic imperialist whose main preoccupation was an ambition to create a
united European Empire of Christianity, which he would defend from the Turkish
infidel. This school of thought would be supported by Philip’s participation in the
Holy League that waged war against the Ottoman Empire in 1571 and his inclusion of
Jesuit missionaries in the crew of the Armada fleet whose unfulfilled aim was to
administer a process of conversion to Catholicism as soon as they landed in Protestant
England. To strengthen further this line of argument, Philips involvement in the
French Wars of Religion can be interpreted as an attempt to curb Calvinist influence
and uphold Catholic orthodoxy in a major European state, despite also being one out
with the perimeters of his control. In contrast to this, Historians such as Woodward
and Stradling make the claim that the principle aim of Philip’s foreign policy was
purely the preservation of his territorial inheritance and reputation. Philips reaction
towards the Dutch Revolt would highlight this, in the form of his consistent refusal to
adopt compromise or negotiation as a means to solving the rift in the Low Countries.
Philip would far sooner employ ambitious military campaigns to oppress the revolt
than to dent his pride and lessen his grip over his monarquia by conceding to the
demands of the rebels. Philip further illustrates this by openly admitting in 1557 that
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his primary reasons for waging war with France were the maintenance of his
reputation and honour which were credentials that he valued above all others. The
argument that Philip was driven first and foremost by religion is further weakened by
the fact that Philip ordered Spanish forces to remain in France, despite Henry of
Navarre’s, the newly named French king, proclamation of his loyalty to Catholicism
and rejection of Calvinism. There no longer existed a religious motive for
involvement in France yet Philip was determined to not to accept a defeat and cut his
losses. These circumstances provide and example of the contradictions within Philips
foreign policy, in that he was now fighting Catholics, explaining the impossibility of
consistency. Black legend Historians such as Motley argue that Philip was a
tyrannical leader whose sole ambition was the aggressive expansion of his already
vast imperial inheritance and that this ambition fuelled his foreign policy. To back up
this claim they draw evidence in the form of his invasion of Catholic Portugal in
1580, and the Armada in 1588 which supposedly symbolised an aggressive and
expansionist attack on England. However it must be remembered that the majority of
these opinions are heavily biased against Philip, being composed largely from
Calvinist Propaganda fuelled by contemporaries such William of Orange, or by
Historians such as Motley who are writing with Protestant objectivity. The varying
opinions adopted by Historians are testament to the fact that Philip’s foreign policy
was not dictated by a single motive alone and was composed of a variety of
ambitions complementary to the context in which they were being carried out,
therefore preventing a consistent foreign policy.
However certain Historians, such as Stradling and Pierson, maintain that until 1583,
Philips foreign policy represented motivations which were consistently conservative
and pragmatic. In support of the notion that Philip’s ambition was the protection of
his inheritance and reputation they state that Philip adopted a largely defensive
foreign policy. Evidence to support this claim can be seen in the earlier stages of
Philips reign, such as his agreement to the treaty of Cateau – Cambresis with France
in 1559, in which Spain, despite being financially unable to continue fighting,
succeeded in the peaceful reclamation of all previously French territory in Italy. To
further support this argument, Philip’s decision to make peace with the Ottoman
Empire in 1581 proves that the foreign policy of Philip was, in this context at least,
not fuelled by an irrational messianic imperial drive nor by an aggressively
expansionist mentality and demonstrates that Philip was aware of his limitations.
However some Historians might contradict this drawing on Philips involvement n the
French Wars of Religion as evidence of Philips monarchia expanding intentions in
that France was in a state of turmoil and presented no threat to Imperial Spain. One
can support this by drawing on the widely appreciated belief that Philip intended to
politically manoeuvre his daughter onto the French throne, achieving direct influence
over France and expanding his ‘universal monarchy’. On the other hand, one can also
justify and understand his involvement when taking into account Philip’s fear of a
highly threatening Anglo-French alliance should France become a Protestant country.
It is widely believed by most Historians that whatever consistency that had existed pre
1583, was lost thereafter.
The idea of a grand strategy, put forward by Parker, suggests that Philips foreign
policy ran parallel to a rigid set of Hapsburg principles which did not change
throughout the course of his reign. Parker states that these were the conservation of
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honour, reputation and his territorial inheritance as well as consistent defence and
support Catholicism throughout western Christendom.
Geoffrey Parker’s idea of a Grand Strategy suggests that Philip followed a set of
Habsburg principles throughout the course of his reign with regard to his foreign
policy. Parker argues that these were the preservation of Philip’s reputation and
honour, the conservation of his inherited monarquia and the upholding of Catholicism
throughout Christendom. Parker argues that despite changing circumstance Philip
attempts to stick to these ideals. He continues to fight against the Dutch Rebels from
1566 until his death in 1598, indeed the Dutch Revolt is the single most damaging
event to the Castilian economy throughout Philip’s reign and yet he perseveres in an
attempt, some historians argue, to preserve his inheritance and his reputation. Parker
also cites Philip’s ‘zero tolerance policy’ in that he refuses to make concessions in
conquest and his refusal to have a back up plan, due to his belief in divine providence,
as evidence that he was very fixed in his foreign policy objectives. However these
policies clashed in many situations, as in the case of Portugal in 1580 and France in
1593 (both mentioned above) and this would suggest that it was almost impossible for
Philip to follow such a rigid set of principles when the state of Europe was so volatile.
Historians such as Pierson and Stradling use this as evidence to back up the idea that
Philip’s foreign policy was in fact reactionary and did not follow any type of grand
design and as a result of this could not be consistent. They see Philip as an ineffective
crisis manger, who reacted to circumstances as they arose and often adopted a ‘wait
and see’ policy which flies in the face of any suggestion of a predetermined foreign
policy. This is supported by the changing circumstances that arose in England after
the Treaty of Nonsuch in 1585 where Elizabeth I pledged military support to the
Dutch Rebels. The French Wars of Religion and the death of the King of Portugal
were also factors completely out of Philip’s control and these historians argue that he
was forced to react to them by adjusting his foreign policy accordingly making it
impossible to follow a rigid structure. Finally Pierson and Stradling emphasise how
the length of Philip’s reign (1556 -1598) illustrates that it would have been extremely
difficult for Philip to consistently uphold Parker’s suggested ideals.
Both Agent and Structuralist historians would argue that Philip’s foreign policy was
inconsistent throughout the course of his reign. The historical debate lies over whether
Philip’s personal mistakes were responsible for the inconsistency in foreign policy or
whether it was factors out with his control which prevented him from maintaining a
consistent approach to Spanish foreign policy. The Agent argument is supported by
the fact that Philip had an inability to delegate properly and this coupled with his
procrastination over decision making resulted, some historians argue, to inefficiency
with regard to foreign policy. Philip also struggles with prioritisation and this leads to
resulting indecisiveness and ultimately inconsistency. On the other hand another
school of historical thought is that Philip did indeed try to follow a consistent policy
of delivering knockout blows to his enemies, in the case of the Netherlands in 1566/7
and England in 1588, as he acknowledged the limitations of his finances and
resources. However he cannot cut his losses if the first attack is ineffective and
although this policy of ‘no surrender’ seems consistent throughout his reign, it is
hugely damaging to both his foreign and fiscal policies. Historians may also point to
his peace with the Turk as undermining the consistency of this argument as well as
contradicting the idea that he refused to give in as he would not cooperate with
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heretics. On the other hand Structuralist historians would argue that the inconsistency
of Philippine foreign policy was due to factors outside Philip’s control. This idea is
upheld by the fragmented, distant nature of Philip’s inheritance. R. A. Stradling states
that it is inevitable that such a far flung empire would be in a permanent condition of
war. This idea is supported by the idea of Philip having to react to constant warring in
his empire which would again emphasise the views of certain historians that Philip
made little attempt to follow a consistent foreign policy. Kamen also states that Philip
was trapped in a Habsburg destiny that was destined to fail and therefore Philip
cannot be held entirely responsible for foreign policy inconsistency as he had to
endure inherited problems such as Imperial overstretch, limiting distribution of his
resources, although he may have exacerbated this problem through the conquest of
Portugal.
Therefore Philip II’s foreign policy was inconsistent to a large extent. Many historians
agree that it was his perusal of many conflicting policies which prevented him from
pursuing a consistent foreign policy whereas others focus on the fact Philip’s policy
was mainly reactive due to the volatile nature of circumstances within Europe at the
time, suggesting that Philip did not completely intend to follow a rigidly consistent
foreign policy. Although historians such as Parker suggest that Philip was attempting
to follow a grand Habsburg strategy and others that his foreign policy was
consistently defensive and pragmatic up until 1583, it would appear that the majority
of historians see Philip’s foreign policy, despite having elements of consistency, as
largely inconsistent over the course of his reign.