Sidney Jones
International Crisis Group
DRAFT, CTITF Conference, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
24 January 2011
COUNTERING EXTREMISM ON INDONESIAN INTERNET SITES:
SUBSTANCE, STYLE AND TIMING
In looking to construct appeals to counter the message of extremist violence, one useful approach, as
Omar Ashour points out, is to look at the arguments of former militants who have renounced violence.
Another is to examine the content of internal critiques that are known to have been widely
disseminated on the Internet and to have had an impact on extremist thought. What made these
appeals particularly persuasive? What elements might be replicated in a broader counter-radicalisation
strategy?
In this paper I look at two tracts that have been the subject of intensive discussion on radical websites
in Indonesia. One is called “Reflections on the Aceh Jihad”; the second is a short section from Abu
Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s criticism of his former pupil, Abu Mus’ab Zarqawi, that was translated into
Indonesian as They are Mujahidin But They Made Mistakes (Mereka Mujahid Tapi Salah Langkah).
There are some common elements to both:
 Timing was critical to their impact. Both were released in the aftermath of incidents that had
dealt major setbacks to the movement.
 Both reinforce the legitimacy of the global jihad.
 Neither renounces violence per se but both question the failure to focus on longer term
objectives that will allow Islam to triumph.
Both arguably had more impact on the jihadi community in Indonesia than arguments against
bombings made by former militants, in part because they were circulated on the Internet by people
still involved in the movement, in part because they went beyond the usual point-counterpoint of
general jihadi arguments. Their impact suggests that an effective Internet counter-strategy requires a
thorough familiarity with ongoing debates, and that the efficacy of the message may last only as long
as that debate stays current. If extremist movements are constantly evolving, presumably strategies
aimed at an Internet audience will need the same flexibility and ability to adapt to changing events.
I.
REFLECTIONS ON THE ACEH JIHAD (REFLEKSI JIHAD ACEH)
This 6,000-word critique is one of the rare examples of Indonesian jihadi revisionism, as opposed to
revisionist texts translated from the Arabic and made available on Indonesian websites. It appeared in
three parts on a salafi jihadi blog, http://elhakimi.wordpress.com , with the first part posted on 22
March 2010. This was exactly one month after Indonesia’s counter-terrorism police, Detachment 88,
had broken up a training camp in Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, run by a group calling itself
Tandzim al-Qaeda Serambi Mekkah (Serambi Mekkah, or Mecca’s Verandah is a local term for
Aceh).
By the time the first installment appeared, dozens of men linked to the camp had been arrested and
seven had been killed. “Refleksi” was quickly picked up by other blogs and featured on several of
Indonesia’s leading radical websites including www.arrahmah.com. It argued that by running off to
the jungle with guns and losing so many of its members, the movement was depleting its own
resources and undermining its prospects for victory.
“Refleksi” has several elements that boost its persuasiveness.
1
1. The anonymous author establishes his radical credentials by siding with the mujahidin against
two groups of detractors: the conspiracy theorists (read Hizb ut-Tahrir), who do not believe that
Muslims are smart enough to pull off a spectacular feat like the World Trade Center attack
themselves and see everything as a plot by the C.I.A. or Mossad; and the “neo-murji'ah” (read
pure salafis), who castigate the mujahidin as heretics or khawarij.
2. He identifies with those he is criticising, saying we all should be proud to be called terrorists in
defence of Islam.
3. The style is conversational, not didactic. The author knows his audience – not just the jihadis
themselves but the broader hardline community that constitutes a potential recruiting base. He
uses a touch of humor here and there to make the criticism more palatable and the content more
appropriate for debate and discussion.1 At one point he says that to blame the police for all the
setbacks for jihad in Indonesia would be like blaming Brazil if there were an Indonesia-Brazil
football match and Indonesia lost. The Indonesian team would become a laughing stock unless it
recognised its own weaknesses, and we jihadis need to do just that.
4. He is careful NOT to reject violence but makes the case for the need for more da’wa and
development of human resources first. He points out that violent jihad in Aceh -- and Indonesia
more broadly-- lacks popular support and cannot succeed without it. He contrasts Indonesia with
Iraq, where Abu Mus’ab Zarqawi, a hero to those he is addressing, was able to build on a hated
occupation by brutal kafir. Ordinary Indonesians do not understand the rationale for attacking
foreigners, he says, and most of the police are Muslim, so we are encouraging Muslim on Muslim
attacks. As far as the public is concerned, the police rationale for attacking terrorists may make
more sense. This underscores the need for da’wa and education to educate the ummah about who
the enemy is.
5. He asks his colleagues to think about benchmarks for success. Is it simply the number of
martyrs? Is it the increasing number of mujahidin in jail? Is it our ability to mimic al-Qaeda
propaganda? Because on all these counts, we’ve succeeded, he says. But if we look at our ability
to continue the jihad and weaken the enemy so that Islam will be victorious, we don’t have much
to show. He cites Abu Mu’sab as-Sury, another iconic jihadi thinker, on the need for continuous
evaluation about shortcomings and weaknesses.
6. He uses gentle mockery, chiding those who just want to see photos of themselves holding AK47s
and who neglect the “machine” behind any victorious jihad – schools and other religious
institutions; individuals with professional skills like doctors, teachers and engineers; farmers and
fisherman who can feed the movement and so on. He also urges his audience to differentiate
between jihad as an end in itself and jihad as a means to a more important end – the “means
mazhab” vis the “end mazhab”. The former, he says, are inclined to see simplify jihad as if they
were advertising a product on television.
7. He goes out of his way not to alienate those responsible for radical websites and says the
jihadis should not be exhorting them to leave their posts and head for the hills because they are
playing a more important public education function. The critique at one level can be understood
as an appeal for more “jihad by the pen” but at another it is an argument to put down the guns and
get back to books.
8. He argues that the best people are not being drawn into jihad and therefore something is
wrong with the way it is being conceived. It is different, he notes, in Iraq, Afghanistan or
Somalia where everyone wants to fight and everyone is needed. In a non-conflict situation like
Indonesia, the cadres need to be chosen more carefully, and not everyone who is eager to fight
makes a suitable mujahid. We need people who are as interested in strengthening Muslim
banking, building Muslim enterprises, encouraging aMuslim lifestyle as they are in taking up
arms. This is a long war, not just a battle or two, but Indonesian mujahidin have lost sight of the
long term goal of taking political power. This, he hastens to add, does not justify taking part in
Indonesia’s filthy party politics but instead is a rationale to put more effort into applying Islamic
law.
Mukhlas, the Bali bomber, used much the same style making the opposite arguments in “Wasiat dan pesanpesan untuk kaum Muslimin”, a piece that appeared on www.anshar.net in 2005 after the second Bali bombings.
1
2
9. He repeatedly cites leading jihadi theoreticians in arguments against al-Qaeda style
violence. One given particular prominence Hazim al-Madani whose book on jihad has been
translated into Indonesia. He quotes al-Madani approvingly that the entire Muslim umat needs to
be seen as a partner for the global jihad, but interprets this to end as he began the critique, that any
jihad can only succeed with community support.
That the criticism hit home was evidenced by how quickly it was picked up by other sites, copied on
Facebook pages, discussed in study groups and printed as a supplement to the monthly magazine run
by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s organisation, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid. It probably had a greater impact
than any single tract published in recent years in the electronic or print media aimed at the jihadi
community.
A weak rebuttal, probably from Abdullah Sunata, one of the key promoters of the Aceh camp,
appeared on an obscure blog, http://sjihad.wordpress.com , on 9 June 2010 shortly before Sunata was
arrested.2 Called “Misperceptions of Refleksi Jihad Aceh” (Salah Kaprah Refleksi Jihad Aceh), it was
not widely picked up at the time remains the only posting on that site. But it was brought to the
attention of “Refleksi”’s author who then posted a rejoinder in which the full text of the rebuttal was
printed with comments inserted. This again was widely reproduced and served to strengthen the
original arguments.
Refleksi’s popularity suggests that at least some of the nine elements cited above should be used by
anyone trying to construct counter-narratives for an Indonesian audience. But it is also worth
examining another tract that had a major influence on Indonesian jihadi thought.
II.
THE AL-MAQDISI TRACT: AVOID MUSLIM DEATHS
Al-Maqdisi, often cited as a leader of jihadi revisionism for his criticism of Zarqawi’s tactics in Iraq,
is one of the most widely read radical authors in Indonesia, thanks to translations of many of his
writings by the influential Indonesian salafi jihadi scholar, Aman Abdurrahman alias Abu Sulaiman.3
His arguments do not have the same immediate appeal that Refleksi’s do, but a few themes have
resonated deeply with Indonesian extremists, which suggests that they should be included in any
counter-narrative. One is how individuals can contribute to the eventual Islamic victory other than
byblowing themselves up; the second is the unacceptability of tactics that produce Muslim casualties.
They Are Mujahidin But They Made Mistakes (Mereka Mujahid Tapi Salah Langkah) was published
in December 2007.4 This was a year that saw major police operations in Poso, Central leading to the
death of 14 mostly armed mujahidin, and the arrest several months later of several top JI leaders
including its acting amir, Zuhroni alias Zarkasih and a top military commander, Abu Dujana. Noordin
Top, leader of a terrorist splinter group that carried out a second Bali bombing in 2005, was still at
large, calling himself the leader of al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago, and serious debates were
underway within the jihadi movement about tactics and strategy.
The book’s arguments are similar in some ways to Refleksi’s, though obviously written from a very
different context and in a less engaging style. Al-Maqdisi criticises the young people “whose only
capital is enthusiasm”, whose only weapons are explosives, and whose indiscriminate attacks alienate
It turns out that “sjihad” is an abbreviation for “Shoutul Jihad”, mimicking the name for the al-Qaeda on-line
magazine.
3
His real name is Oman Rochman. An Arabic linguist from West Java, he was arrested for sponsoring a bombmaking class in Cimanggis, West Java, in March 2004; tried, convicted and sentenced to 7 years in early 2005;
released from prison in July 2008 and arrested for the second time in March 2010 for having recruited personnel
and provided some financing for the Aceh training camp. He was sentenced to 9 years in December 2010.
4
It was published by Jazera Press, a Solo-based company owned by Jemaah Islamiyah member Bambang
.Sukirno. Jazera chose the title. The original had been Mereunung Sejenak Terhadap Hasil-Hasil Jihad
(Thinking about the Results of Jihad).
2
3
ordinary Muslims who otherwise would support a jihad.5 Attacks at the wrong time, in the wrong
place and against the wrong targets, he argues, only give legitimacy to the enemy.
The part of the book that drew the most attention on radical websites, however, was al-Maqdisi’s
distinction between qital nikaya, repeated hits at an oppressor, and qital tamkin, liberation of territory
so that Muslims can better implement their religion. The first is what Refleksi’s author calls jihad for
jihad’s sake, without broader strategic goals. Qital tamkin, by contrast, is aimed at the establishment
of an Islamic polity. If Zarqawi was the embodiment of qital nikaya in the Middle East, Noordin Top
was his counterpart in Indonesia, putting together teams for bombing operations that served no
broader goal than “making Western nations tremble”.
We know from individuals directly involved in the Aceh training camp that the nikaya vs tamkin
debate was a critical element in finding common ground among the disparate groups in the al-Qaeda
Serambi Mekkah alliance. All could agree on the need to avoid Muslim deaths, the need for a secure
base from which to build the Islamic state, and the need for more focus on building bridges with the
surrounding community through da’wa.
One question is how this one part of the al-Maqdisi tract reached the broader jihadi community.
Radical websites in Indonesia fall into two broad categories, those aimed at ideological teaching, and
those aimed at news of the global jihad, which is where Refleksi was circulated. One of the most
important sources for teaching, however, has been al-Maqdisi’s own websites, www.tawhed.ws and
http://almaqdese.net .6 Materials are downloaded by an Arabic-speaking Indonesian, translated, and
posted either in whole or in part on Indonesian blogs or websites such as http://millah-ibrahim.com or
http://lintastanzhim.wordpress.com . From there they are downloaded, photocopied, printed as
pamphlets and circulated, often becoming materials for radical religious discussion groups. The
Internet thus becomes a way station, one node in a broader dissemination through print and word of
mouth, and the nikaya vs tamkin tract probably reached as many people through print and discussion
groups as it did through the Internet itself.
The importance of not killing Muslims was reinforced in a posting on the website of a new JI affiliate,
Majelis Dakwah Umat Islam (MDUI), where the author wrote:
You can learn from the bombings in Jakarta that caused Muslim deaths. Just imagine
a da’i (preacher) having to support jihad in front of ordinary people. What Quranic
verse or hadith can a preacher use to support you? Have we reached conditions here
that are so dire that we don’t even have to take Muslim deaths into consideration? Are
we in a situation where if Islamic forces don’t attack the enemy with the risk of
Muslim casualties, the enemy will defeat the faithful with even worse consequences?
In such conditions, shedding Muslim blood can be justified. But you must answer this
question honestly: is there no way to oppose the US or the West in Indonesia other
than by shedding Muslim blood?
If the answer is yes, then we have reached a state of emergency. But if there are other
means, for example if you become a sniper who can guarantee that your victim will
fall, or use poison or hitting a car or other such methods, then we have not reached
such conditions. This means you are an egotist, you are not taking into consideration
how difficult it is for scholars and preachers to defend you. You are happy living with
your own logic, as if you’re on another planet. You feel resentful when we don’t
come to your defence. When we say this isn’t jihad by law, you become angry.7
5
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Mereka Mujahid Tapi Salah Langkah, December 2007, p.23.
Others are abu-qatadah.com and tawhed.net.
7
MDUI website, http://buletinalhikmah.wordpress.com/m-d-u-i/ cited in International Crisis Group, Indonesia:
Jihadi Surprise in Aceh, Asia Report No.189, 20 April 2010.
6
4
No one wishing to challenge jihadi narratives would be encouraged by the idea that poison or
hit-and-run car attacks are better than suicide bombings, but pointing out the high Muslim
casualties in indiscriminate attacks is a powerful argument against them.
Another argument to consider, not used by al-Maqdisi although he gets close to it in his
comments on suicide bombers, is that those who rush toward martyrdom are essentially
selfish, thinking more of themselves than of the ummah. The point is made in a response by
an influential JI leader to the accusation that JI was just sitting around doing nothing these
days while others risked their lives in jihad. Abu Rusdan’s response was entitled “Not
Cowardice, But Strategy.”8
III.
AUTOBIOGRAPHIES OF EX-MILITANTS
In Indonesia, the two most important militants to reject extremist violence are Nasir Abas, a
former regional commander and strategist, and Ali Imron, a religious scholar, two of whose
brothers were among those executed for the first Bali bombs.9 Both published autobiographies
that rely on religious arguments to make a case against indiscriminate violence, but crucially,
without renouncing violence in principle. The arguments of Ali Imron, considered more of a
scholar than Nasir, are particularly worth examining.
Like Refleksi’s author, Ali Imron underscores the legitmacy of jihad and the individual obligation to
wage it when Muslims are under attack. But he challenges his former colleagues on several fronts. On
the more practical side (but using religious arguments):
 Muslims who are too weak to confront a much stronger enemy should focus on i’dad
(preparation) and building up their strength. This argument is also used repeatedly by JI
leader Abu Rusdan to argue against engaging in attacks in Indonesia.
 Viewed from a cost-benefit analysis (manfaat and madharot), attacks are counterproductive
 Attacks lack community support and have only served to weaken and divide the ummah
He goes on, but less effectively, to question the legitimacy of targets chosen; the assumption by the
attackers that they are among the thaifah manshurah, the group that will be saved on Judgment Day;
their failure to engage in da’wa before using attacks as a last resort; and other shortcomings. These
more general arguments against terrorist attacks are precisely the ones that the extremists themselves
have become past masters at refuting, so it is not clear how much weight they would carry if simply
posted in an Internet message, no matter how credible the source.
Compare, for example, a few arguments posted on the Internet by Bali bomber Mukhlas in 2005 to
respond to possible doubts among his followers:
You don’t want to wage war because you want to do good works, focus on education first,
strengthen your faith etc etc etc. Don’t you realize that the most effective way to educate
yourself in all aspects of the faith is through jihad? The battlefield will teach you more
effectively about the unity of God than any other school. This is where you learn that the
hereafter is more important than the present, and people who have just converted to Islam can
“Bukan Pengecut Tapi Siasat,” An-Najah, May 2010.
Both trained on the Afghan-Pakistan border in JI’s military academy. Nasir Abas went on to head Mantiqi III,
the regional division of JI covering the Philippines, eastern Borneo, and Sulawesi; he opened the training camp
in Mindanao in 1994. Ali Imron took part in most of JI’s bombing operations from 1999 through the first Bali
bombing. Nasir’s book, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah [Exposing Jamaah Islamiyah], was published in July
2005 and became a best-seller. Ali Imron: Sang Pengebom [Ali Imron: The Bomber] was published in
November 2007. The sale of both books was probably dwarfed by the success of the autobiography of the
unrepentant bomber Imam Samudra, whose book Aku Melawan Teroris [I Fight Terrorists] became a runaway
hit when it was released in 2004.
8
9
5
earn the blessings of Allah at once, whereas people who play around with bachelors’ degrees,
and master’s degrees and Phds in Islamic law and religion never reach an understanding of the
love for jihad and the glory of dying as a martyr.
You don’t want to wage jihad because it results in loss of life and property, leads to the sons of
Islam being imprisoned or killed while the ultimate aim, the caliphate, will not necessarily be
achieved. So you go for the peaceful route, choosing democracy and parliaments without any
loss of life or material goods. This is deviant thinking, not in accordance with religion or even
common sense. If you think worldly goods are so important, what then is your goal in life?
What are you struggling for after all? Aren’t you too looking for the blessing of Allah and how
do you think you can find that if you are not willing to sacrifice a little blood?10
Many of the jihadi messages carry responses along these lines to shubhat or doubts; it’s why an
analysis, like Refleksi, to a specific incident that is still fresh in everyone’s memory is so much
more compelling.11
It is also worth noting that the influence of ex-militants may not cross cultural or national lines.
One of the huge influences on the Indonesian jihadi community has been al ‘Umdah fi’ l’daadil
‘Uddah (The Essential Guide to Preparation [for Jihad]) by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader, Dr
Fadl, more commonly known in Indonesia as Abdul Qadir bin Abdul Aziz. His recantation was
translated and published in Indonesia in 2009 but was never widely read or circulated in the jihadi
community – in part because the arguments made smacked too much of what the jihadis call
murji’ah or pure salafi.12 Al ‘Umdah, by contrast, continues to sell like hotcakes.
Conclusion
The readers that Refleksi aims to persuade are not the foot-soldiers. They are the reasonably
well-educated computer literate members -- or leaders -- of religious discussion groups: the
intellectuals who are or might become recruiters and trainers in jihadi circles, or university
students who might be tempted to provide moral, logistical or financial support. They are
being told very clearly, “We need you, but in a different, more important capacity.” If
counter-narratives can build on that appeal, they may have some chance of success as part of
a broader prevention strategy.
“Wasiat dan pesan-pesan untuk kaum Muslimin”, op.cit.
For a good analysis of Indonesian jihadi thinking and justifications for violence more generally, see Greg
Fealy and Ken Ward, “Indonesian Jihadist Thinking” in [to come], forthcoming
12
Ibid, p.6.
10
11
6