Clark, Christopher. Kaiser Wilhelm II: Profiles in Power. Harlow: Longman, 2000.
“History is written by the winner,” the old adage goes, and certainly in the case of
Kaiser Wilhelm II this has been borne out. Much of the historiography since the end of
World War I has painted Germany’s emperor as everything from an incompetent buffoon
to the precursor of the evil of Hitler. Are these perceptions the reality or is there another
level that has gone unexplored? With Kaiser Wilhelm II: Profiles in Power, Christopher
Clark has produced a work that forces the reader to reevaluate the last emperor of
Germany and also take a hard look at the reader’s own biases.
The thesis of the work is clearly outlined by the author in the preface. Clark
focuses on the nature and extent of the Kaiser’s power, how he “projected authority,” and
how much he influenced political policy in his Reich. The author also poses a parallel
question: How much difference did it make that it was Wilhelm sitting on the throne
during the years leading up to the Great War? Clark does not clutter up his narrative with
pedantry- he presents his arguments in a clean and crisp manner that is refreshing to those
readers who simply want the facts so they might form their own opinions. To support his
arguments, Clark uses extensive endnotes that are conveniently located at the end of
every chapter.
The simple image of a monolithic German military state under the absolute rule of
the Kaiser is a convenient one for those who wish to ascribe the start of the First World
War to Germany. Indeed, combined with the emperor’s well-known bombastic utterances
it makes a strong case for guilt. The fact of the matter is that the political situation in
Germany in the years leading up to the war was very complex. It must be remembered
that the German state had only been united for a few decades when Wilhelm ascended to
the throne. The nature of political power was constantly changing and shifting between
the throne, the Chancellor, and the Reichstag. The emperor had few clearly delineated
responsibilities. The power of Bismarck during the early period of German political
growth further muddied the waters for his dominance kept the Kaisers from fully
exploring and marking their natural boundaries of power. The convoluted nature of the
German constitution also confused power issues. For example, responsibility for
maintaining the effective strength of the military was given to the Kaiser in Article 63 yet
the same responsibility was given to the Reichstag in Article 60. Because of this
confusion, there were constant struggles between the emperor and the legislature over
military expenditures.
The most important avenue of power for Wilhelm was through his right to hire
and fire government appointed officials. Yet even this power was often circumvented
through the will of the Chancellor, different ministries, or the Reichstag. Some point out
that it was this power that gave Wilhelm “institutionalized personal rule.” Clark disagrees
and presents convincing evidence that Wilhelm’s chancellors all exercised freedom of
action often at the emperor’s expense. Conversely, any argument that holds that Wilhelm
was without the means to exercise political prerogatives can be shown to be fallacious by
Wilhelm’s appointment of officials “over the head” of his chancellor. These arguments
aside, the Kaiser’s overall ability to influence Germany’s political agenda was severely
limited.
The Kaiser’s near impotence in shaping government policy led him to move
deeper into military affairs. His status as commander-in-chief did allow him a measure of
freedom of action. Wilhelm, however, was not a creature of the military establishment. In
fact, he was often derided as the “Peace Kaiser” by the army’s Prussian hierarchy. Where
he found his home was in naval affairs. It was his desire to make Germany a naval power
that caused the arms race with Great Britain, a move many see as an important leg on the
road to war. Clark sees the arms race as just a manifestation of a more serious issue
dividing Great Britain and Germany- global trade. German naval expansion coupled with
the seizure and long-term leasing of the Chinese port of Kiaochow was deemed as a
major threat to Britain’s dominance in trade.
Much has been made of Wilhelm’s personality and how much it affected
international relations especially in the critical days leading up to August 1914. Although
it is generally accepted that Wilhelm was impetuous, insecure, and given to making
outlandish statements, what the author makes clear is that most of the statements
regarding Wilhelm to be a firebrand and warmonger are the perspectives of his enemies.
In fact, American and Dutch officials found him to be quite “pacific.” It was, and is, easy
to use Wilhelm’s personality flaws to pin the blame for the war on him. Clark clearly
demonstrates that every document, letter, and utterance by Wilhelm was given much
greater importance because of the later events of 1914. A deeper look at the context of
the evidence shows another picture of the Kaiser- a man that did all he could with the
powers at hand and in the confines of his personality to stop the war from occurring.
Concurrently, the reader also comes to see the Entente powers in a new light.
Much of the historiography of World War I has been written in an anglophile vein. Great
Britain, France, and to a lesser extent Russia, have often been portrayed as the aggrieved
parties. Germany’s motives have always been less “pure.” What Clark demonstrates is
that the political motivations of the Entente were just as selfish, imperialistic, and
provocative as any of those of Germany. Christopher Andrew sums up the political
paranoia of the period perfectly: “The diplomacy of imperialism was often based on
suspicion and on myth generated by suspicion. Governments were apt to attribute to
others their own imperial ambitions.” Clark’s book will disturb even the most partisan
anglophiles.
Kaiser Wilhelm II: Profiles in Power is a refreshing look at one of the most
enigmatic rulers of the early twentieth century. Its balance and objectivity are clearly
needed for any thoughtful discussion on why World War I occurred. Clark succeeds in
helping define the German pre-war political picture and he rehabilitates the Kaiser to a
level where the motives of all the belligerents are suspect and game for blame.
Robert Marshall
Hist 5423 World War I and Versailles
Dr. Jones
19 February 2001