Political Consumerism as Chance and Challenge
Andreas Follesdal
Introduction
Globalization affects the opportunity space, informational bases, and coordination
capacities of states, multinational enterprises, NGOs, and citizens. With such
changing resources come changing allocation of power and responsibilities—or so
argue international NGOs and other vocal contributors to public debates. They
challenge existing expectations and institutions and use terms as “corporate
citizenship,” “citizen-consumer,” and “ethical trade” to emphasize their point. The
topic of these reflections is the responsibility of consumers in a global
marketplace, committing acts of “political consumerism.” Traditionally, political
participation has involved the relationship between citizens and their government,
which in turn regulates the market. Political consumerism adds to this conception
in that citizens turn directly to the market with a variety of political concerns. This
phenomenon of political consumerism needs a political theory. We need a
plausible account of consumer activism, which will allow us to identify and
clarify its role within the political and economic global institutional order and
provide criteria for its normative assessment.
The Need for Political Theory: Puzzles of Political Consumerism
Some scholars hail political consumerism as a practice within “civil society,”
indeed within “global civil society.” Civil society steps up to global governance at
a time where globalization threatens traditional structures of authority (Eide 1998,
631-32). The need for systematic reflection arises in part from what appears to be
valid criticisms of political consumerism, especially as committed by individuals.
Political consumer actions often seem counterproductive. Consider cases of
objectionable company practices, that worsen the situation for a local population,
or that exploit and violate workers’ basic rights. Sometimes, when political
consumerism targets such a company, the action “works” in the sense that the
company pulls out. But several unfortunate effects of company exit have been
reported. Other, less sensitive, companies move in and continue abuse.
Sometimes, if no other employer moves in, the workers may be left even worse
off, in unemployment or prostitution. Exploitation such as child labor, while an
evil, may, thus, be the least bad alternative. Other critics denounce political
consumerism as illegitimate, insofar as the loose networks or organizations behind
such protests should be democratic, transparent and accountable, which some of
them patently are not. Yet other criticisms charge that consumer action, on the
basis of Western consumers’ own values, amounts to blatant disregard for the
local culture and values: Political consumerism is cultural imperialism through
market means.
These criticisms fail against several plausible conceptions of political
consumerism. This response does not amount to denying the empirical claims, but
instead draws on what we may think of as the political theory of political
consumerism. At first glance this label may seem inappropriate. Political theory is
typically concerned with questions such as by what authority, and within what
limits, political power may impose laws and practices with threats of sanction.
Acts of political consumerism are not exercises of political power in this strict
sense. It does not appear to be a collectively enforced, social arrangement, and
hence does not restrict the legally regulated opportunity space of others. Yet,
In Politics, products and markets: Exploring political consumerism past and present. Eds. Michele Micheletti,
Andreas Follesdal and Dietlind Stolle. Transaction Press 2003, .
insofar as political consumerism is widely followed, it can effectively restrict the
feasible options of companies, employees, and other consumers for better or
worse. As with a wide range of practices that affect others, we may require that
such practices be normatively justifiable. Moreover, through political
consumerism citizens sometimes seek to build, reform, or improve institutions,
that have influence over our common well-being, regardless of whether these acts
are part of the political order in the strict sense. Therefore, the phenomenon of
political consumerism encourages scholars to rethink the function and meaning of
political participation and authority.
The effectiveness of political consumerism can only be assessed on the basis of a
clear understanding of its ends. In the next section I identify and discuss five
different conceptions of political consumerism. Many of them are not affected by
the criticisms discussed above. However, the criticisms do challenge political
consumerism, regarded as a practice aimed at institutional reform. These worries
merit close attention and assessment, particularly under globalization, which is the
topic of the second section. The third section sketches a normative framework of
the market, that takes its point of departure in Adam Smith’s discourse on the
subject for domestic markets. Then I explain why shifts in capacities among
governments, business, and civil society may be thought to bolster the need for
political consumerism or other non-traditional measures of political action. The
fifth section identifies some of the challenges facing political consumerism as a
mechanism for changing institutions and business practices towards international
human rights standards.
Conceptions of Political Consumerism
At least five different conceptions of the role of political consumerism can be
identified. They may not be exhaustive and are not mutually exclusive. I
distinguish arguments based on consideration of what I call Agency, Expression
of Self, Expression of Mutual Respect, Instruments for reforming Wrong-doers,
and Instruments for reforming Business Practices.
Argument of Agency: Clean Hands. Boycott has long been regarded as a way to
disassociate oneself from what is regarded as evil acts. The element of selfpurification in Gandhian Satyagraha is an example. Boycott avoids complicity by
seeking non-cooperation with evil, reducing the causal chain between one’s own
acts and the immoral outcomes by avoiding personal participation and
responsibility. Of course, bad consequences are important, but what also matters
is whether evil comes about through one’s own agency. Such concerns have been
defended and discussed among moral philosophers including Kant (Kant 1964),
and more recently under the heading of “integrity” or “agent-relative reasons” (cf.
Williams in Smart & Williams 1973, Hill 1979, Sen 1982, Mills 1996). Criticisms
against such views include insistence that this is a case of moral self-indulgence,
that considerations of responsibility matter little or nothing as compared to the
goodness or badness of outcomes in the world, and observations that it is
impossible to extricate oneself completely from patterns of interaction anyway,
which makes participation in evil trade practices unavoidable. Such criticisms
notwithstanding, political consumer actions on this basis avoid some of the
problems. Firstly, whether the suffering abates, while morally relevant, is not
decisive. Secondly, the grounds for action may be part of one’s personal moral
view and not claimed to be properly part of the common normative basis of
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society. Thirdly, such political consumerism need not be considered as an
institutionalized practice, needing organizations, publicly defendable criteria, and
the like.
Arguments of Identity: Expressing Self. Other conceptions of political
consumerism regard it as a more active expression of one’s values. Such selfexpressive conceptions may typically be part of what is often termed postmaterialist values (Inglehart 2000). In societies where economic survival is taken
for granted, younger generations give more priority to non-material values, such
as making autonomous choices, spontaneous participation in political life, and
environmental and gender issues, as discussed by Stolle and Hooghe in this book
(see also Putnam 2000). Consider lifestyle preferences generally or Expressions of
Self, where participants do not claim that all other citizens should so react, or that
businesses should change their policies - except insofar as others happen to share
these morally neutral values. An example may be political consumerism on the
basis of aesthetic considerations, e.g., avoiding chain stores whose storefront ruins
the small-town neighborhood image. For our purposes, we may note that such
reactions need not be institutionalized, especially since they are volatile in several
senses. Individuals’ values may shift rapidly, and post-materialists are also said to
be wary of hierarchy and long-term organizations, preferring fluent networks.
Arguments of Identity: Expression of Mutual Respect. Other self-expressive
actions may best be regarded as Expressions of Mutual Respect. They are
undertaken on the basis of beliefs that certain companies violate fundamental
normative constraints. In these cases, the values are thought to be not just optional
preferences but legitimate standards for company behavior. Such cases may well
arise for post-materialists, for even though their values tend to favor
individualistic responses rather than collective, they are not egoistic or unduly
self-interested. The high value given autonomy for oneself is often combined with
respecting the autonomy of others, prizing individual liberties and social
tolerance, and fostering civic participation—but in new social movements rather
than in established organizations (Welzel, Inglehart, & Klingeman 2002).
Spontaneous political consumerism may thus be a natural response to perceived
abuse of workers or environmental degradation. Kant seems to have held such a
view regarding disentangling oneself from immoral actors (Kant 1964, Hill 1979,
Hill 1991, Mills 1996). Political consumerism may express and foster a shared
public understanding of what it means to be a responsible and fully human person
(cf. Galston 1991).
Some features of these views may be noted. The central aim is not to change a
practice or even to stop a particular case of abuse. “Merely symbolic” action with
no impact on the abuse may still serve the expressive purpose. Coordination
dilemmas of the kind “even if our company stops, the suffering will not stop,” do
not affect expressive arguments. One’s self-image and values are important, but
the general trustworthiness of any coordinating organizations is not an issue, as
long as the protester has trust in them. While detrimental effects by other
companies may play a role in the decision, such effects are not part of the agent’s
responsibility or expressive of identity in the same sense. Still, for Expressions of
Mutual Respect some such considerations of effects on the suffering may matter,
for instance insofar as the values include what John Rawls calls the natural duty of
justice to “support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. It
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also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when
this can be done without too much cost to ourselves” (Rawls 1971: 115).
Instrumental Arguments: Re-Socializing Wrong-doers. Some actions aim to resocialize those who do wrong by shunning them, thus impressing on them the
need to change their values. With such a change of heart, the unacceptable
behavior should cease—for moral, rather than economic reasons, as pointed out in
Friedman’s chapter. While such protests may often work, they can also backfire,
causing hostility and suspicion rather than transformation, as Gandhi was well
aware (Gandhi 1918).
Instrumental Arguments: Changing Business Practices. Other acts of political
consumerism seek to reform business practices. Such social action at the domestic
level has been somewhat successful in the case of labor, civil rights, and women’s
rights. Again, a variety of ends can be distinguished. Political consumerism may
be part of a concern to replace parliaments and national governments as sites of
political power. This may draw on a radical denial of the need for centralized
power for maintaining the political order (cf. Burnheim 1986, cf. Held & McGrew
2000, 412, Goodin 1992). Or actions can be regarded as supplementary to
government action in several ways, as a permanent supplement to government’s
coercive power or using extra-parliamentary means to get stricter government and
inter-governmental regulation of business. Political consumerism can also be a
stopgap measure until global structures are in place with sufficient enforcement
power. The aim would be changes in domestic and global regulation, which
should be restricted to such issues, properly regulated by state power rather than
more contested issues. Among proper aims would then be fair trade, human rights,
and human security. Protests may be directed against governments or against
companies, that may pressure host governments to implement human rights and
monitor compliance to avoid future boycotts (Spar 1998). Several features of
these instrumental arguments are important. Their effect on desired change is
highly relevant, though single cases of success or failure are not decisive when
assessing the practice of political consumerism. The central issue is instead
whether the practice of boycotting secures stable shifts in the values or
expectations of businesses, and hence affects practices—recognizing that mishaps
will still occur. Dilemmas may arise due to the need to reward good behavior by
lifting the boycott, even if the business’ values may remain unchanged (Mills
1996). When political consumerism aims to change governments’ regulations or
the practics of businesses, a number of issues of institutional design and
assessment must be addressed. The most important are accountability of the
organizations involved and their value basis. The remainder of this chapter
addresses these institutional issues.
Of particular concern is political consumerism, interpreted narrowly as a practice
involving consumers as a collective agent participating in the global governance
of markets, supplementing states, intergovernmental bodies as the UN, NGOs, and
multinational enterprises. One central aim of such political consumerism is to
provide added incentives for compliance with, and the creation of, legitimate
conditions on global trade, in circumstances of globalization with weak
enforcement mechanisms. On this view, political consumerism is also a collective
expression of mutual respect, of our individual and collective responsibility to
protect the interests of those whom we can affect, and particularly of those who
are dependent on our actions through international trade. Important issues concern
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“whose standards” to use, when assessing business behavior. For reasons of space
I must here simply suggest that some vital human needs may be regarded as such
common factors, and that they are best secured by domestic legal orders that
respect human rights—including political, civil, social, and economic rights. Such
a normative basis for human rights is compatible with a broad range of religious
and philosophical traditions, and these rights are part of international law,
subscribed by a large majority of states and endorsed in documents as The
European Monitoring Platform, OECD guidelines, and the UN Committee on
Transnational Corporations under the UN Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC). Such norms can be defended across a broad range of normative
theories. While these premises are contested and contestable, I take them for
granted for our purposes. Among the issues targeted are workers’ rights, the
human rights violations of their sub-contractors, the plight of local communities
affected by corporations, and the lax enforcement of human rights by host
governments.
In the absence of global instruments of formal governance, citizens have come to
use political consumerism to demand enforcement of existing international human
rights norms. In this view, appropriate political consumerism must actually
improve the plight of those suffering from the injustice, if not in this particular
case, then at least by improving the practice in general, for instance by securing
agreement among companies or if the host government enforces stricter standards
or better options for workers.
In summary, this account of political consumerism would appear to clearly fall
within the métier of normative political theory. Political consumerism forms part
of governance—arrangements by which agents regulate some issue area by means
of extra-institutional authority, involving non-public actors and without secure
enforcement (Rosenau 1992, Commission on Global Governance 1995, Banchoff
& Smith 1999: 15). We must ask similar questions of such forms of governance as
of governments’ use of power: what are the grounds of such authority, what
should be its institutionally circumscribed limits, and how should it be exercised
within such limits when we seek to treat all affected individuals as moral equals?
A legitimate conception of political consumerism must be consistent with—or
may even be required by—the proper role of individuals in the market in a
globalized world order. We turn first to consider why globalization matters for
these normative arguments.
Globalization of Market Actors: Citizens of no Country, Cosmopolitan
Consumers
The effects of globalization have important normative aspects for any normative
theory insisting that practices should be defensible towards all affected parties.
Insofar as globalization means that actions have global implications, the impact on
foreigners must also be included in the normative justification of practices, such
as global trade regimes. We are often said to be living in the era of globalization.
As with most slogans, such claims are vague, perhaps essentially contested, and
often dubitable as general statements. In a historical vein, global perspectives on
economic affairs are not new. Cosmopolitan perspectives led Diogenes (412-323
BC) to declare that “I am a citizen of the world,” in defense of his refusal to pay
local taxes. Later cross-border mobility rendered such claims more plausible.
Writing more than two hundred years ago, Adam Smith observed that, “A
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merchant, it has been said very properly, is not necessarily the citizen of any
particular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him from what place he
carries on his trade, and a very trifling disgust will make him remove his capital,
and together with it all the industry which it supports, from one country to
another” (Smith 1776: 3, 4).
Both globalization and cosmopolitan ethics have changed since Diogenes and
Adam Smith. For our purposes, globalization is the fact that actions and practices
systematically affect others across territorial borders. Among the results are
increased living standards for many and increased access to goods and services.
Unfortunately globalization also has some highly problematic consequences. The
digital economy is a contributing cause of shifting control from domestic
governments to globally integrated financial markets and multinational enterprises
(Strange 1986), which impacts on governments' perceived policy options. Some of
the traditional instruments of the state acting singly and sovereign—taxation, final
adjudication, and regulation—have withered, leading sometimes to increased
international regulations, e.g. within the European Union. Other times,
governments are led to compete for mobile capital and multinationals leading,
some fear, to a race to the bottom regarding wages, health, and safety standards.
The acceptable limits to such variations must be addressed and enforced, e.g.,
concerning bribery, human rights, and wage levels (Donaldson & Dunfee 1999).
International business ethics has become an important topic, because transnational
enterprises have effects on vulnerable individuals, both inside and outside the
marketplace, who do not have decent protection (e.g., Donaldson 1989). Existing
constraints are insufficiently enforced, due to lack of international regulations and
bodies. There is nothing in the way of a “global government.”
Globalization affects the capacities, roles, and responsibilities of governments,
business, and civil society. The increased territorial impact of international
business, combined with the reduced capacities of governments and civil society,
help explain why international business may stand in need of justification in ways
that domestic business need not. We must rethink the distribution of
responsibilities, that traditionally have justified business and consumer practices
in the domestic setting. To explain how globalization changes the normative
assessment of the responsibilities of businesses and of consumers, we can draw on
Adam Smith’s defense of the market within state borders.
Moral Framework of the Market
Many have been struck by the apparent differences in behavior between citizens
in society in general and the behavior of business people. Among ordinary
individuals equality, sympathy, honesty, and concern for the common good are
maintained as high ideals. In contrast, many business practices appear to distribute
benefits according to the bargaining power and the starting positions of players
acting on the basis of self-interested choice. Behavior, elsewhere condemned,
might well be rewarded in business. So the role and rules of business seems
different than for other parts of society. This raises the fundamental question
whether they can be reconciled.
Business’ reliance on immoral motives was a topic of central concern to Adam
Smith (Muller 1992, Werhane 1991). In Wealth of Nations, the great economist
and moral philosopher most famously argued that, under certain conditions, even
self-motivated market agents will freely exchange goods in such ways that some
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will be better off without rendering anyone else worse off. Thus market behavior
serves the common good in the utilitarian way he defined it, at least when
embedded in an elaborate distribution of social responsibility between what we
may re-label business, government, NGOs, and civil society. Markets can be
morally legitimate, but preferably when the state maintains just rules of the game,
only as long as it ensures a “fair” distribution of the benefits over time. Bargaining
power must not be skewed inappropriately but leave all parties with acceptable
ranges of options. Proponents of free markets have hailed Adam Smith, while
critics say that the preconditions he assumed are seldom found in real life, indeed
that those with nothing to sell may be left worse off. Proponents of market
freedom often forget that Smith argued for severe constraints on the market, and
critics often ignore that Smith himself insisted that governments must not only
regulate the market and correct market failures, but that they must be
supplemented. Markets do not ensure that all individuals develop their talents and
a benevolent moral character required in society. And Smith recognized that the
market does not secure distribution of goods to those without money, thus the
need for private benevolence and re-distributive luxury tax to subsidize basic
goods to the poor.
Elaborating on this defense, we may say that businesses are permitted to focus on
value creation within constraints set by governments and as long as other agents
secure other important societal functions such as redistribution, socialization to
concern for others, and scrutiny of governments and business. Problems arise
when this distribution of responsibilities fails: when third parties are affected;
when re-distributive tasks are not performed, or some firms abuse the rules. In
such cases, business—and consumers—may have to take on responsibilities
beyond value creation or exercise more self-restraint.
The Role of Political Consumers in a Just Global Market
Globalization has caused a mismatch between global economic effects and global
political regulation. States may have their formal sovereignty intact, but they lose
options and face eroding general trust in their ability or willingness to regulate
markets domestically and beyond their borders. In particular, they appear unable
or unwilling to secure a high economic floor and safe working environments for
workers in the global economy. While such claims are often excuses,
globalization does appear to affect governments who have been accustomed to
being policy-makers rather than policy-takers. The changes in options and
capacities of business and domestic governments weaken Adam Smith’s
justification of business' license to pursue profits. There is no global government
in the sense of an institutional body with enforcement and re-distributive
authority, and there is little in the way of a global civil society ensuring
inculcation of mutual respect across borders. So the constraints on business must
be rethought. If global markets are to be normatively justified, the responsibilities
for re-distribution and prevention of harm must be borne by other agents than the
state—namely corporations and consumers. I submit that political consumerism
may be interpreted in this light.
Corporations are not only accountable to shareholders but also subject to domestic
and international law, and they are dependent on consumers. Political
consumerism may bolster shifts in corporate responsibilities by providing
incentives for some firms to engage in more fair business practices. The minimum
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requirements of business under globalization merits careful attention. I here only
lay out some considerations. What may be required of business need not be
charitable work in general. It is not obvious that corporations can be trusted to
plan and act for the common good rather than for the good of their shareholders.
Yet businesses may be required to avoid wage slavery and certain forms of child
labor and—not least—comply with legislation enacted by host governments and
not block proposed human rights legislation. Constraints may include respecting
ILO regulations, refraining from bribing government officials, and the
requirements of the UN’s Global Compact.
Some argue that multinational corporations should abide by further moral
considerations. Thomas Donaldson (1991) proposes ten human rights, said to
protect interests of extreme importance without imposing undue burdens on
business. These rights include freedom of physical movement, ownership of
property, freedom from torture, fair trial, non-discrimination, physical security,
freedom of speech and association, minimal education, political participation, and
subsistence. A fundamental objection to such lists must be addressed. There are
situations where unilateral self-constraint by one company does no good. For
example, consider that many violations of human rights and basic needs are
perpetrated with the express or tacit permission of domestic governments to serve
business interest. Firms may face hard dilemmas where self-constraint on their
part may do no good. One upright corporation cannot prevent others corporations
from abusing workers. Thus oppression may happen regardless of what one single
corporation does. Unless all competing corporations are regulated and all
governments agree to high standards, oppressed workers of the world cannot
avoid being mistreated. While such coordination traps no doubt exist, firms
should not be allowed to excuse themselves from all compliance with such norms
as Donaldson's by such arguments. Instead, work must be done—or at least not
prevented—on three fronts by businesses and others. Realistic rules must be
available that would allow companies to make a profit and secure basic needs. For
this, international standard setting, even without sanctions, plays a crucial role.
Secondly, in certain cases industry-wide agreements are required. Thirdly, partial
compliance by some companies is often better than none, but this can be difficult
to achieve. Political consumerism may contribute to all three tasks.
Political consumerism may contribute to convergence between good ethics and a
healthy bottom line by shifting companies’ payoffs. Organized consumers can
stimulate the creation of norms, foster compliance by industry sectors, and
promote compliance by individual companies, all of which are more difficult
under globalization. Consumer pressure may counteract coordination problems by
creating a market for companies that can credibly claim to honor good standards
in areas such as child labor, sustainable forest harvesting, or animal rights. If
consumers succeed, they create a demand among companies for sufficiently clear
rules. One response by some firms is to develop or subscribe to voluntary,
industry-wide standards such as Social Accountability 8000, the principles of the
Caux Round Table, the UN’s Global Compact, or the work of Amnesty
International’s Business Group. While voluntary standards may not always be
enough, political consumerism can add pressure for compliance, supervision, and
global regulation—sometimes even enticing companies to lobby host
governments into establishing, monitoring, and sanctioning industry-wide
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standards to block less scrupulous competitors and avoid consumer actions (Spar
1998).
Globalization may increase the need for political consumerism but may also
facilitate it for two reasons. Firstly, information gathering is eased by information
technology, for instance between activists in southern NGOs about labor problems
or environmental issues and consumers in other countries. Secondly, globalization
lowers the cost of political consumerism when the market offers alternative,
nearly equivalent products at only slightly higher prices. Then normative
considerations become less costly.
I have explored an institutional role of political consumerism, understood as the
coordinated use of purchasing power that serves the role of promoting certain
changes in global business practices—including business behavior in particular
cases as well as business regulation. As an instrument aimed at stricter
governmental regulation, political consumerism exerts leverage on business and
indirectly on governments. It may boost the formulation of voluntary and legal
codes, pressure companies to sign voluntary codes, and sanction businesses, all of
which take on particular urgency under globalization.
Challenges for Political Consumerism: Earning and Keeping Trust
Political consumerism promises to alleviate some of the problems created by
globalization. With such influence come responsibility and the need for scrutiny
of organizations that coordinate political consumerism. I suggest that at least five
issues must be addressed, if political consumerism is to establish and maintain
legitimacy and trustworthiness.
While identity arguments need not be concerned about effectiveness, it is a central
question for political consumerism regarded as an instrument for reforming
business practices. It is not at all clear that political consumerism always improves
the plight of the worst off, as shown in Friedman’s chapter in this anthology. Nor
is it clear that such protests are more effective than “constructive engagement” by
companies remaining in problem areas (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink 1999. Thus
Unocal claims that by remaining in Burma it has a more positive effect than
isolating the country (Greenhouse 2000). The examples presented in Part II of this
volume suggest that political consumerist actions are more likely to be effective if
they combine credible threats and promises by addressing a target with clear and
achievable demands. Research is needed to render such actions more effective.
For instance, we need to know whether actions against child labor typically
improve their plight or rather force the children into prostitution. Do
environmental boycotts tend to improve the environment or merely scare away
those companies most vulnerable to bad press, leaving the field to less scrupulous
players? As discussed in the chapter by Cashore et al., important issues include
how to set standards that are realistic yet do not “sell out.”
Whose values? What standards? The goals of political consumerist organizations
must be assessed carefully. The Economist asks rhetorically “Are citizens’ groups,
as many of their supporters claim, the first steps towards an ‘international civil
society’ (whatever that might be)? Or do they represent a dangerous shift of power
to unelected and unaccountable special-interest groups?” (Economist 1999). I
think it a mistake to regard these two options as mutually exclusive. There is no
guarantee that civil society is particularly civil. Unfortunately, we have no
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guarantee that “transnational civil society networks—the emerging third force in
global politics—tend to aim for broader goals based on their conceptions of what
constitutes the public good. They are bound together more by shared values than
by self-interest” (Florini 2000: 7). Indeed, the history of political consumerism
includes illegitimate shared values (Halliday 2000): in the 1930s against goods
produced by Jews (Encyclopædia Judaica Jerusalem 1971), by Blacks in New
York against Italian-Americans as shown in Greenberg’s chapter in Part II.
The public should be able to determine whether the organizations want to improve
global business practices or would rather see global business abolished, whether
the anti-globalization movement is against globalization in general or just against
globalization on the present terms. We can also expect more conflict regarding the
content of standards. Even good faith NGOs may lay down incompatible
standards for determining unacceptable business practices (see Cashore et al.,
Jordan et al. in this volume for details). We can also expect a market for lax
standards by businesses eager to avoid criticism, as has been a worry concerning
the UN Global Compact, that allegedly requires little in the way of real action by
the signatories. Much work is done, but more remains concerning how standards
should accommodate the very different powers and roles of governments and
businesses. Within a system of coordinated, yet largely sovereign states, the
international community can hold governments responsible for fulfilling the range
of political, civil, economic, and social rights. However, even if one company
respects all such rights of individuals, other agents may violate them if
enforcement is lax. Thus the satisfaction of individuals’ vital interests seems
clearly beyond the reach of any single company. The relevant standards for
companies must therefore be specially drafted, as indeed is the case.
Whose “Facts”? Political consumers must rely for fact-finding on NGOs such as
Amnesty International, Transparency International, and Consumers International.
Quality control is a perennial challenge even for well-intentioned NGOs. NGO
credibility is obviously even more important, when high ethical standards become
a comparative advantage and competitor companies may criticize “findings” for
less than honorable reasons, (cf. Cahore et al. this volume). Trustworthiness is
even more problematic when organizations are established, or used, to
intentionally slant information, as when multinationals use the international lobby
group “The Coalition for the Right for Truth in Environmental Marketing” to
influence governments and WTO in their favor (Micheletti 1999). The Internet
also creates new pitfalls, since it lacks quality control and hence leaves it to users
to distinguish well-founded cyber activism from unfounded “cyberterrorism.” The
trustworthiness of standard setting and fact-finding must be secured through a
variety of institutionalized means: governmental expertise or, to the contrary,
independence of government (Micheletti 1999), auditors such as Price
Waterhouse Coopers, Ernst & Young, and Deloitte, or by cooperating with
academics.
Who guards these guardians? – is democratic accountability required? A fourth
challenge is to maintain public confidence that the organizations for political
consumerism reliably fulfill their role professionally and effectively. This would
seem to require public scrutiny and accountability, though perhaps not that the
organizations are internally democratic. Neither the Identity nor Instrumental
arguments require that the organizations for political consumerism are internally
democratic. Democratic accountability may not be equally important for such
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agents of civil society. It may suffice that organizations of political consumerism
are subject to media scrutiny within civil society. Individual consumers may then
choose to use these organizations and their information and possibly decide to
exercise “market accountability” against the firms violating standards.
The appropriate roles of governments. On the Instrumental account, political
consumerism must find its role alongside governmental action. In addition to
providing quality control of standards and information and scrutiny, we should
recall the limits to effective political consumerism where government action alone
seems useful. There are several ills that political consumerism is unlikely to
combat due to the limited range of goods under consumer control, lack of
sanctions of voluntary codes, and coordination problems. At best, political
consumerism may prevent human rights violations by particular firms such as
child labor, environmental damage, etc. Consumers cannot affect companies that
do not sell products to individual consumers. Many requirements of social justice
seem to be beyond what can be asked of individual companies—for instance,
massive redistribution, public education, etc. Governments thus have several
important tasks, even when political consumerism is effective. It is an important
task to find and implement the institutional solutions that best divide up or share
these responsibilities.
Conclusion: Consumerism with a Vengeance?
Political philosophers have long lamented the shift in public perception towards
regarding the citizen as a consumer (MacIntyre 1978: 245). Citizens’ concern for
the general good was replaced by concern for satisfying consumption preferences
(cf. Sandel 1996: 224). The point of democracy became to secure “the widest
range of economic satisfaction” more fairly distributed rather than the formation
of republican citizens (Weyl 1912 in Sandel 1996: 225). The practice of political
citizenship transcends this conflict.
Political consumerism is strikingly different from consumerism as an ideological
basis for politics that developed in the U.S. in the 1920s (cf. Strasser, McGovern
& Judt 1998). Indeed it inverts the relationship between means and ends. Political
consumerism does not regard poor consumer quality of goods as cause for
political action but considers the poor political quality of the goods as cause for
consumer action. It insists that a working market does not assume that consumers
only seek self-oriented satisfaction. Consumers are also citizens and can be
strongly committed to distributive justice and the decent and respectful treatment
of those they affect. This commitment can find expression through purchases.
Political consumerism allows individuals, living under conditions of globalization
beyond control of accountable governments, to express their sense of justice as
citizens of the world. A defensible role as consumer and citizen under
globalization requires them to exercise their economic power responsibly when
seeking to promote a legitimate global economic order that treat all as equals.
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