A (New) Balancing Act:
The SCO as a Soft Balance Against U.S. Encroachment in Central Asia
A paper presented at the World International Studies Committee
Second Global International Studies Conference
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia
July 23-26, 2008
Chaka Ferguson,
cferg001@fiu.edu
PhD Student, Florida International University
Miami, FL, USA 33199
1
As nature abhors a vacuum, Kenneth Waltz once declared, so too does
international politics abhor unbalanced power.1 For Waltz and other realists, balance of
power is immutable in an anarchic international system – as fundamental to global
politics as gravity is to physics. Yet, the absence of balancing behavior in an era of
unipolarity has presented a systemic anomaly for adherents of balance-of-power logic.
Why have no grand coalitions yet been formed to resist American predominance in the
international arena? Why have the other great powers chosen to mostly bandwagon with
– instead of balance against – the United States? If unbalanced power is truly a danger to
other states, why have none attempted to restrain it? These questions pose a serious
challenge to the utility of balance-of-power theory in an age of unipolarity. Supporters of
balancing behavior, however, have argued that traditional “hard balancing” – formal
military alliances aimed explicitly at another state – is no longer effective in a unipolar
world because the gap in material capabilities between the superpower and its challengers
(whether singularly or combined) is too great. They contend that great powers have
resorted to another form of balancing – “soft balancing”– or ad hoc alliances that seek to
rebuff, or at least undermine, American foreign policy in different areas of the world.2
Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer
2000), pp. 5-41.
2
For example, see Stephen Walt, “Keeping the World ‘Off-Balance;’ Self-Restraint and U.S. Foreign
Policy,” in John G. Ikenberry, ed., America Unrivaled: The Future of Balance of Power, (New York:
Cornell University Press, 2002); T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International
Security, Vol. 30, No. 1, (Summer 2005), pp. 46-71; Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United
States,” International Security, (Summer 2005), Vol. 30, No. 1: 7-45; Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar
Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment,” International Security, Vol.
31, No. 2, (Fall 2006); T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michael Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory
and Practice in the 21st Century, (Stanford University Press, 2004).
1
2
But critics of soft balancing argue that this phenomenon is “much ado about
nothing”3 and maintain that supporters of soft balancing offer scant empirical evidence
for its existence and weak or indeterminate theoretical models for its efficacy. Other
skeptics of soft balancing simply contend that balance-of-power theory no longer holds
sway in a unipolar world.4 In this paper, I use the emergence of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) as empirical evidence of soft balancing by Russia and
China against the United States in Central Asia. Using the SCO as a case study, I attempt
to provide a stronger theoretical model and narrower definition for soft balancing by
arguing that it is largely a countervailing force to “off-shore” balancing – an “off-shore
defense”5 – as opposed to system-wide balancing. Moreover, this paper examines the role
of regionalism as a concept in security complexes and as the basis for limited/focused
balance-of-power exercises. The absence of “global balancing” enshrined in a concrete
military alliance does not preclude regionally-based alliances aimed at rolling back the
influence of a distant hegemon or superpower.6
In the first part of this paper, I review several balance of power theories and
balancing strategies. This section will begin with a review balance-of-power theory and
contrast “hard balancing” from “soft balancing” in the international system by providing
a narrower or more parsimonious definition for soft balancing. This is an important task
because a number of scholars have conflated balance of power (a theory) with balancing
Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World is not Pushing Back,”
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1, (Summer 2005), pp. 109-139.
4
For the most comprehensive rebuttals of soft balancing, see Stephen G. Brookes and William C.
Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), pp.
72-108; William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. I,
Summer 1999, pp. 5-41; Lieber and Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing.”
5
This term comes from Robert J. Art, “Striking the Balance,” International Security, Winter 2005/2006,
Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 177-185.
6
I would like to thank Professor Mohiadin Mesbahi of Florida International for offering this point to me.
3
3
(a mode of state behavior).7 This has led to a confusing proliferation of concepts that are
tantamount to balancing (i.e., “buffering,” “hedging,” “leash-slipping,” “low intensity
balancing”), but put forth in ways that diminish the utility of balance of power theory. 8 In
fact, many of these descriptors can be placed on a continuum of state action that ranges
from no balancing to hard balancing or viewed as tactical responses that might or might
not be part of an overall balancing strategy. Proceeding from there, I incorporate a
number of these terms into a narrower framework to develop a systematic methodology
that can test for occurrences of a soft balancing. Such a goal, if accomplished, would
provide some clarity and cohesion to the discussion of balancing in the contemporary
international system.
In the second part of the paper, I begin with a brief historical analysis of the
emergence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) from a treaty simply
covering border demarcations to an institution largely targeted at warding off American
influence in Central Asia. From there, I outline Chinese, Russian and American interests
in the region. That will be followed by a review of Chinese and Russian attempts to use
the SCO to counteract (soft balance) U.S. influence in Central Asia, a region replete with
vast energy resources. American unilateralism since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
has hardened the Sino-Russian alliance and the SCO could represent “a counterweight to
As TV Paul points out, balancing is distinct from balance of power: “In tune with the commonly
understood meanings of the terms, balancing is viewed as a state strategy or foreign policy behavior while
balance of power are regarded as outcomes at the systemic or subsytemic levels, that is, as conditions of
power equilibrium among key states,” in “Introduction,” Balance of Power, p. 2.
8
To take one example, John Ikenberry’s concept “buffering” is similar to what others describe as “soft
balancing,” but eschews the terminology of balance of power logic. Ikenberry defines buffering as
“reducing exposure to the lead state through the development of alternative regional political spheres” in
“Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity,” discussion
paper presented to the National Intelligence Council, 28, July 2003.
7
4
American influence and confirmation that a multipolar world is taking shape.”9 I
conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of soft balancing and the potential
role the SCO could play in the broader global arena. If the U.S. does not recognize efforts
at soft balancing and respond accordingly, such folly is likely to trigger a traditional hard
balancing alliance against it. States ignore soft balancing at their own peril.
To balance or not to balance
Waltz argues that for balance-of-power politics to prevail, only two requirements
must be met: that the international order be anarchic and that states wish to survive.10 In a
self-help system, when states face a threatening power, they will seek to form a balancing
alliance whether consciously or not. Waltz’s theory, however, simply makes assumptions
about the interests and motives of states, rather than describing them, and therefore offers
little utility as a predictive tool.11 Other theorists have attempted to rectify Waltz’s sparse
balance-of-power theory by adding variables or revising assumptions of state behavior in
anarchy to better predict state behavior. John Mearsheimer, for example, argues that great
powers don’t simply seek to survive in an anarchic system, but attempt to dominate it
because “survival mandates aggressive behavior.”12 Stephen Walt, on the other hand,
added “intent” to the traditional material variables such as economic strength, military
power and population size in his balance of threat theory. “States that are viewed
aggressively are likely to provoke others to balance against them,” Walt suggests. 13
9
Elizabeth Wishnick, “Russia and China: Brothers Again?” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 5, Sep/Oct 2001, p 800.
10
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Relations, (McGraw Hill, New York, 1979).
Lieber and Alexander argue that soft balancing theories are “nonfalsifiable” in “Waiting for Balancing:
Why the World is not Pushing Back,” p. 110.
12
John J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 21.
13
Stephen Walt, Origins of Alliance, (Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 25.
11
5
Waltz’s parsimonious balance of power theory also can be contrasted with Hedley
Bull’s more complex model. Similar to Waltz, Bull’s version of balance of power
requires only two neighboring states in anarchy seeking to survive (what he called a
“simple “ or bipolar balance of power system as opposed to “complex” or multipolar
balance of power system). Unlike Waltz, Bull’s logic doesn’t necessarily presume that
states are unconsciously guided to balance due to the anarchic structure of the
international system – balancing can be either “fortuitous” or “contrived.” “A fortuitous
balance of power is one that arises without any conscious effort on the part of either of
the parties to bring it into being,” Bull writes, whereas “a contrived balance is one that
owes its existence at least partially to the conscious policies of one or both sides.”14 For
Bull, the existence of general balance of power serves to prevent the system from being
transformed by conquest into a universal empire; the existence of a local balance of
power protects the independence of states from absorption by a neighboring predominant
power; and both general and local balance of power provide the conditions in which other
institutions of international order depend on to exist.15
In the abstract, balance of power simply predicts that states will seek to arrest the
rise of a preponderant power, either at the regional or global level. It leaves fully open to
question how such an end will be achieved. In other words, balance of power theory
explains much about the world, but is of little descriptive value. It does, however, offer a
protean framework to develop a number of strategies that states might adopt to balance a
growing or hegemonic power. Some of the more familiar balancing strategies, such as
internal arms buildups or external alliances, have been documented and discussed at
14
15
Hedley Bull, The Anarchic Society, (Columbia University Press, New York, 2002), p. 100
Bull, The Anarchic Society, p. 102.
6
length.16 Yet in the post-Cold War era of unipolarity, these traditional methods of
restraining preponderant power have not manifested themselves. Some have argued that
the lack of arms races and formal alliances demonstrate that balance of power logic no
longer maintains in a unipolar system. Nevertheless, a number of scholars have advanced
a plethora of new concepts that – at least implicitly – suggest forms of balancing. In the
next section, I attempt to incorporate some of the most salient into a systematic concept
of soft balancing.
Methods of balancing
A major problem with the concept of soft balancing, critics argue, is that it is too
vague or indeterminate. Another concern, which stems from the first, is the
overabundance of concepts or “theories” in the literature that can rise to the level of “soft
balancing,” but go under terminologies not associated with balance of power logic.17 I
term these concepts “methods of balancing,” which are a means, to balancing itself,
which is an end. To this end, I offer soft balancing as a distinct mechanism that states
might use to counteract actors that have become hegemonic or accumulated a
preponderance of material power in the international system or subsystem. A number of
strategies will fit into this framework.
Hard Balancing
16
See Paul et al, Balance of Power and Ikenberry, America Unrivaled.
Ikenberry suggests three separate approaches to adjudicate competing claims when faced with an
“overabundance” of theories or answers to a specific problem: empirical, aesthetic and analytical. This
study seeks to do all three through an empirical investigation of the SCO, the development of a more
parsimonious or rigorous theory of “soft balancing,” and the incorporation of a number of concepts of state
behavior under the rubric of soft balancing. See Ikenberry, “Introduction,” American Foreign Policy:
Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry, (Longman Press, New York, 2002).
17
7
Balancing of the hard variety is a core tenet of the realist research program,
whether it is external or internal. Unlike hard balancing, however, soft balancing is likely
to involve alignments rather than arms buildups and formal alliances. Glenn Snyder’s
definition of an alliance provides a strong description of what is generally thought of as
traditional hard balancing: “formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of
military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own
membership.”18 Snyder’s theory of alliance politics is based on the Austro-German
alliance of 1879, which was targeted at France, and the Franco-Russian alliance of 18911894, which countered the Austro-German pact. Although Snyder’s work is more about
alliance formation than balancing itself, it does demonstrate what balancing behavior
might look like. Another form of hard balancing is an internal arms buildup by one more
states to roughly match the power of the targeted state, or to at least develop defenses
effective enough to make invasion by a preponderant state cost prohibitive. Neither of
these versions of hard balancing appear to be relevant to contemporary international
affairs. No state has undertaken a massive arms buildup to match the military might of
the United States and no formal alliances have been established to target American
hegemony because of the high costs.
Although balancing behavior is absent in the modern world, balancing in past
international systems has been thoroughly documented.19 From the Peloponnesian War
to the Cold War, countervailing coalitions have sought to restrain rising great powers or
hegemons. That past coalitions were formed against non-hegemonic great powers that
18
Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics, (Cornell University Press, Ithica, N.Y., 1997), p. 4. Examples of nonuse
of force would include the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941.
19
Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, “The Balance of Power in International History: Theory and Reality,” The
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1973, pp. 33-61.
8
possessed far fewer material capabilities than the hegemonic United States currently
retains, leaves the lack of any serious balancing effort against America becomes
conspicuous by its absence.
A disappearing (balancing) act
So why has American hegemony gone unbalanced? William Wohlforth and
Stephen Brookes argue that American predominance in every critical dimension of power
explains why no challengers have arisen.20 Since no potential rival can match the United
States in material capabilities, there is no need to try, and bandwagoning is the preferred
strategy by other great powers in a unipolar system. And despite America’s war-making
and aggressive unilateral behavior abroad since the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Keir
A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander maintain that U.S. power is not threatening enough to
other states to provoke a countervailing coalition. “The major powers are not balancing
against the United States because of the nature of U.S. grand strategy in the post-Sept. 11
world. There is no doubt that this strategy is ambitious, assertive, and backed by
tremendous offensive military capability. But it is also highly selective and not broadly
threatening.”21 Others, such as political economist Richard Rosecrance, maintain that
economic interdependence has made war among great powers largely obsolete.22 And
liberals, such as Bruce Russet and John R. O’Neal, argue that the democratic nature of
the United States makes it a less threatening to other great powers.23 For many of these
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “American Primacy in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.
81, No. 4, July/August 2002, pp. 20-33.
21
Lieber and Gerard, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World is not Pushing Back,” p. 133.
22
Richard Rosecrance, “Power and International Relations: The Rise of China and its Effects,”
International Studies Perspectives, (2006), 7, pp. 31-35.
23
Bruce Russett and John R. O’Neal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International
Organizations, (Norton, New York, 2001).
20
9
scholars, balance-of-power no longer retains any utility in a unipolar world. If they are
correct, then what does this say for Waltz’s inviolable theory of balance of power? After
all, even if a great power behaves with moderation, restraint and forbearance,
“unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others.”24
New “balancing” strategies
In order to maintain balance-of-power logic, a number of scholars have employed
a variation of balancing that eschews traditional military alliances in favor of indirect
means or “low level efforts” such as the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions,
ententes, regional alignments and use of international institutions to check American
power.25 G. John Ikenberry, for example, observes a number of novel responses by great
powers to American hegemony.26 One reason for the development of these new
strategies, Ikenberry concludes, is the novelty of unipolarity (another is buck-passing:
who will volunteer to be the prime target of America’s “focused enmity?”). Indeed, “The
world is in a great geopolitical adjustment process [emphasis in the original],” he states.
Ikenberry finds that great power reactions aimed against the United States have been ad
hoc because they are still learning and adapting to a new international system. Although
American predominance is unlikely to trigger full-scale balancing, a variety of strategies
are emerging between balancing and bandwagon – what Ikenberry calls “resistance” and
“engagement.” Although Ikenberry doesn’t flesh it out, his concept of “resistance”
Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” p. 28.
Walt, “Keeping the World off Balance.”
26
G. John Ikenberry, “Strategic Reactions to American Preeminence: Great Power Politics in the Age of
Unipolarity,” discussion paper presented to the National Intelligence Council, 28, July 2003, p. 1.
24
25
10
appears significant because it resembles soft balancing.27 In between resistance and
engagement are “buffering” (the creation of alternative regional political spheres), and
“baiting” (developing counter-regional institutions to attract the dominant state into
conformity with a regional grouping). Buffering would likely fall somewhere between
“no balancing” and “soft balancing” along a continuum of state strategies.28
The converse of Ikenberry’s concept of “resistance” and “engagement” are
Rosemary Foot’s strategies of “hedging” and “accommodating.”29 Foot contends that
China’s strategy is not “soft balancing,” but “soft-bandwagoning,” in which Beijing tries
to make its interests coincide with those of Washington. In this sense, while Beijing’s
strategy can be viewed as accommodation with the current U.S.-dominated global order,
it also contains important “hedging” element, or insurance policy, through which China
seeks to secure its future.”30
Along those similar lines, but closer in intent to soft balancing, is Christopher
Layne’s notion of “leash slipping.”31 Layne makes a key rebuttal of opponents of soft
balancing who argue that because the U.S. is not an expansionist power – and therefore
not an existential threat to the territorial and sovereign integrity of other great powers –
that balancing against American power is unlikely. As Layne points out, the U.S. “quest
for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational, deterritorialized conception of security
Ikenberry defines resistance as ‘policies that seek to loosen ties and undercut or block American power
and policy, and engagement as ‘building cooperative ties in hope of gaining opportunities to influence how
American power is exercised.’
28
The same doesn’t appear to be true for “baiting,” which doesn’t neatly fit into the tripartite framework of
balancing, bandwagoning or buck passing. Baiting seems to fall loosely under liberal institutionalism. It
would be interesting to see whether the SCO could be used to “bait,” and thus tie down, the U.S.
29
Rosemary Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a U.S.-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,”
International Affairs, 1 (2006), pp. 77-94
30
Foot, citing Evelyn Goh, defines hedging as ‘ a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for
contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as
balancing, bandwagoning or neutrality, p. 88, footnote 32.
31
Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited.”
27
11
divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of
power in the international system and geography [my emphasis added].”32 In the liberal
economic order established by the United States after World War II, leash-slipping is less
about the fear of being attacked by a “predatory land-grabber” than a way for states “to
conduct an independent foreign policy,”33 and this is one of the main purposes for the
formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.34
Soft balancing as a hard concept
Returning to Bull’s decoupling of balance of power into local and general spheres
provides a strong framework to begin evaluating the concept of soft balancing. For Bull,
the general balance of power pertains to the absence of a preponderant power in the
international system as a whole, whereas the local balance of power applies to the lack of
a predominant power in a particular segment of the system. 35 In the Cold War for
example, the Soviet-U.S. dyad made up the central balance whereas subordinate or local
balances existed in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent.36 In an
age of unipolarity, global balancing is unlikely because the superpower’s capabilities far
Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited,” p. 40.
Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited,” p. 40. The term “predatory land grabber” comes from Paul,
“Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy.”
34
Similarly, Denny Roy argues that smaller Southeast Asian states have begun to engage in “low intensity
balancing” or “soft balancing” vis-à-vis China via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in
“Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 27, No. 2
(2005), pp. 305-322. “The most common approach in Southeast Asia to a rising China is low-intensity
balancing with the United States, combined with efforts to assure or engage China,” p. 319. The strategies
used by these states to reign in a powerful China are similar to the strategies Beijing and Moscow have
adopted to repel American encroachment in Central Asia. Also see, Yuen Foong Khong, “Coping With
Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia’s Post-Cold War
Strategy,” in Rethinking Security in East Asia; Identity, Power and Efficiency, J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein
and Allen Carlson, eds. (Stanford University Press, Calif., 2004), pp. 172-208.
32
33
35
Here, one presumes that Bull could not conceive of a unipolar system with one superpower and many
great powers since a preponderant power would likely have, in his view, resulted in a global empire.
36
Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 98.
12
outstrip those of each of its nearest competitors. But this does not preclude balancing at
the local or regional level, where soft balancing would be more effective. This logic
corresponds neatly with Mearsheimer’s concept of offensive realism. Mearsheimer’s
theory predicts states that have achieved hegemony in one region of the world will
attempt to arrest the hegemonic aspirations of great powers in other regions of the
world.37 Acting as an “off-shore balancer,” the United States, which has achieved
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, has thwarted attempts at regional hegemony by
Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and the Soviet Union. U.S. policy explicitly disfavors the
rise of any peer competitor, and many U.S. foreign policy and military officials are
concerned with the rapid development and ascent of China to superpower status.38 In
order to restrain the rise of a peer competitor, the United States has instituted a network
of military bases and diplomatic enclaves around the world to offset the rise of potential
regional hegemons. However, the action of the “off-shore” balancer is likely to provoke a
counteraction (“off-shore defense”) from the great powers in that particular region. It will
be in these contested regions, such as Central Asia and the Middle East, not at the
systemic level, where soft balancing will be played out.
What is soft balancing?
I have begun to lay the foundation of where soft balancing is likely to take place,
but have not described what it actually is. Some of the most widely cited supporters of
soft balancing, Stephen Walt, Robert Pape and T.V. Paul, have provided pieces of the
37
Mearsheimer, tragedy. Also see, notes from other paper on Iran.
This objective has been enshrined in U.S. foreign policy at least since the Monroe Doctrine. For current
U.S. policy, see the 2006 National Security Strategy.
38
13
puzzle but have failed to fit together the entire picture. For example, Walt uses his
balance-of-threat theory to explain why states will balance against the United States.
Because unbalanced power is an asset to the possessor but a potential danger to
others, Americans now face the novel prospect that other major powers might
concentrate on balancing them. At the very least, other states might be more
inclined to resist U.S. leadership and look for ways to circumscribe Washington’s
freedom of action, simply to make sure that the United States does not impose its
own preferences too enthusiastically.39
Waltz viewed unbalanced power as threatening in and of itself, and such a threat
will provoke a reaction from other actors within the international system. Smaller states
are likely to bandwagon with the hegemon, but other great powers have more options at
their disposal. Walt’s addition of “threat” as a variable, however, rectifies some of the
anomalies in Waltz’s theory because it explains why the American military presence in
Europe is not considered menacing by the states in that region, whereas a smaller U.S.
footprint in Central Asia has provoked consternation among the Russians and Chinese.40
Walt’s concept of “soft balancing,” though, is much more inchoate. He defines
soft balancing as “the conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain
outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences – outcomes that could not be gained if the
balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support.”41 Walt’s formation,
however, is so broad that it covers issue areas from global climate change to international
trade; any act that seeks to undermine American policy, from European objection to
Walt, “Keeping the World ‘Off-Balance,” p. 123.
There are other differences between Western Europe and Central Asia that help explain the disparate
reactions to American influence in those regions. In Western Europe, the United States acts as an off-shore
balancer and brings stability by tamping down great power rivalry. With no rising hegemons, America is
less likely to pose a threat to European states. In Central Asia, China is a rising power and Russia harbors
revanchist intentions, therefore the U.S. presence there is seen as much more threatening. For a thorough
discussion on “off-shore” balancing, see Mearsheimer, Tragedy. For more on the stabilizing role of
American military power in Western Europe, see Robert Art, “Why Western Europe Needs the United
States and NATO,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 1, (Spring 1996), pp. 1-39.
41
Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy, (W.W. Norton &
Company, New York, 2005), p. 126.
39
40
14
genetically modified foods to French/German/Russian opposition to the Second Gulf War
is tantamount to balancing. This expansive view limits the utility of Walt’s version of soft
balancing because it doesn’t offer criteria to distinguish between balancing and
diplomatic bargaining or friction among states. Furthermore, including such “low
politics” under the rubric of balancing diminishes the stature of balance of power, which
generally has been limited to the arena of “high politics.”
Other formulations of soft balancing further muddy the waters. Paul’s notion of
soft balancing involves “the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes,
especially in the United Nations, with the implicit threat of upgrading their alliances if
the United States goes beyond its stated goals.”42 And Pape characterizes soft balancing
as “actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use
nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. military
policies.”43 According to Pape, these methods include territorial denial (especially basing
rights), entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening (regional trading blocs, i.e.), and
signals of resolve to balance.44 Although these definitions broadly describe what can be
considered soft balancing, critics rightfully argue that the theoretical premises they are
founded upon are indeterminate.45 Indeed, how can one differentiate the denial of basing
rights as a measure of soft balancing from a maneuver by a government to quell public
displeasure with a foreign military force stationed in its country?
T.V. Paul, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1, (Summer
2005), p. 47. The weakness of this argument is that some U.S. goals could be unstated.
43
Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1.
(Summer 2005), p. 10.
44
Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States.”
45
Paul himself acknowledges that his version of soft balancing is indeterminate, “Soft Balancing in the Age
of U.S. Primacy,” p. 49.
42
15
Nevertheless, proponents of soft balancing have laid the groundwork for a fruitful
theory, even if their conceptions suffer from imprecision. Thus, integrating the more
salient aspects of soft balancing into the rigorous framework of offensive realism
provides a more streamlined approach. Before doing that, returning to Snyder’s theory of
alliances proves instructive here. In contrast to formal alliances, Snyder defines
alignments as tacit agreements “based solely on common interests, although the latter can
be as consequential as formal arrangements.”46 For Snyder, alliances are ways of
strengthening alignments and are based on elements of specificity, legal and moral
obligation, and reciprocity that are usually lacking from informal alignments, which
generally don’t have an explicit pledge of military support. Applying Snyder’s work to
balancing provides a demarcation between the soft and hard varieties.
Therefore, I define soft balancing as nonmilitary alignments (which can become
alliances) of at least two states that are implicitly or explicitly designed to reduce or
remove the military presence and direct or indirect external influence of an outside great
power or hegemon from a specific localized region. This definition of soft balancing is
not couched in formal language, so it conceals traditional balance-of-power discourse by
leaving the target of the coalition unnamed and vague.47 It also carves out the “region” as
46
Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 4.
Similar to the concept of threats, implicit alignments can be just as effective as explicit ones. Concerning
the effectiveness of implicit threats, Robert J. Art writes: “In permissive realms, moreover, threats often can
be more effective if left implicit. When one state makes an explicit threat, it raises the pressure on the state
against which the threat has been directed to follow suit. Threat spawns counterthreat, and in turn, another
threat, and so on. Voluntary agreement may be stymied in this escalatory process because threats stiffen the
bargainers and harden their positions. Implicit threats, on the other hand, have a better chance of avoiding
the escalatory dynamic and can more easily produce agreement, but only if the desire of both parties to
avoid breakdown is strong,” in “The Fungibility of Force,” in The Use of Force: Military Power and
International Politics, eds. Robert J. Art and Kenneth Waltz, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
Oxford, United Kingdom, 2004), p. 4.
47
16
something near to actors, which implies geographical limitation as a focus of cooperation
among local actors and method of denial to a distant power, i.e. the U.S.
The main goal of soft balancing would be an attempt by the alignment to reduce
or remove any military bases, garrisons, air fields or naval ports maintained by the
outside hegemon or great power from a specific region considered to be a sphere of
influence by one or more members of the alignment. Secondarily, a soft-balancing
alignment could seek to co-opt, and if unable, to remove or replace, any head of a state
(party or individual) in the specific localized region that has aligned or allied with the
outside hegemon or great power. Of tertiary concern, the members of the alignment
might seek to remove or eliminate indirect influences in a specific localized region
associated with the outside great power or hegemon, such as non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) supported by the great power/hegemon, multinational corporations
(MNCs) based in the great power/hegemon and cultural institutions (subversive elements
of cinema, media, artwork, music, etc.) derived from the great power/hegemon. This
theory holds true to the spirit of soft balancing because the alignment does not confront
the outside great power/hegemon directly (it doesn’t even have to be named), and
therefore, not subject to military reprisals.48 The balancing effort is localized to a specific
region (sphere of influence), and if successful, the removal of the great power’s influence
(hard and soft power) opens space for members of the regional alliance to “conduct an
independent foreign policy” outside the framework of the normative and rule-based
liberal order managed by the United States. Finally, it coheres to offensive realism, which
48
What Walt called “focused enmity” in “Keeping the World ‘Off-Balance,’ p. 136.
17
is one of the most rigorous of realist theories.49 If hegemons (i.e. the United States) in one
region of the world are expected to balance against potential hegemons elsewhere (i.e.
China), one should logically expect a counteraction by the state or states being off-shore
balanced against (an “off-shore defense”). In an era of unipolarity, great powers do not
have the material capabilities to physically evict a hegemon or superpower from their
region. Therefore, states must resort to soft balancing if they “wish for ways to fend off
[America’s] benign ministrations.”50
From borders to balancing
Over the past few years, the SCO increasingly has become the focus of scholarly
inquiry and interest of foreign policy and military analysts because of its rapid growth
and potential influence as a regional security regime. Yet its beginnings are humble.
Originally called the Shanghai Five, the SCO’s predecessor was formed in 1996 largely
to demilitarize the border between China and the former Soviet Union republics of
Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.51 The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization was officially established June 15, 2001 with the addition of Uzbekistan as
member for the purpose of “strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborly friendship
among the member states; encouraging effective cooperation among the member states in
political, economic and trade, scientific and technological, cultural, educational, energy,
communications, environment and other fields; devoting themselves jointly to preserving
For a critique of offensive realism, see Douglas Lemke, “Great Powers in the Post-Cold War World: A
Power Transition Perspective,” in Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, eds. T.V.
Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann, (Stanford University Press, 2004).
50
Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” p. 3.
51
Lionel Beehner, “The Rise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” June 12, 2006 at Council on
Foreign Relations website. Accessed Oct. 17, 2007
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10883/rise_of_the_shanghai_cooperation_organization.html#2
49
18
and safeguarding regional peace, security and stability; and establishing a democratic,
fair and rational new international political and economic order.”52 The territory of the
SCO states constitutes 60 percent of the Eurasian landmass (30 million square
kilometers) and has a population of about 1.5 billion. Together, with the four SCO
observers – India, Pakistan, Mongolia and Iran – the organization possesses huge energy
resources and a significant number of the world’s nuclear weapons.53 Formed at China’s
behest, the SCO “began as a sleepy club of six states … whose mandate involved little
more than resolving Beijing's outstanding border disputes and improving trade, energy,
and development ties in the region.”54 Recently, however, “the SCO paved the way for
the U.S. military's ejection from its base in Uzbekistan … [and] Iran … is clamoring to
become a full-fledged member. Between its member and observer states, the SCO holds a
large chunk of the world's natural gas supplies and nuclear ammunition. Some analysts
even suggest the group has the potential to become an Eastern version of NATO, a
conjecture the SCO's executive general has sought to dispel.”55
Both China and Russia have ties to Central Asia that date back to ancient times.
China has had its hand in Central Asia for more than 2,000 years, beginning with the Han
dynasty, as caravan traffic carrying Chinese silk to the Roman Empire carved out what
became known as the “Silk Road.”56 And Central Asia long had been an integral part of
52
SCO founding declaration, http://www.sectsco.org/html/00088.html
Ruslan Maksutov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Central Asian Perspective,” A Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute project paper, August 2006.
54
Beehner, “America’s Foil in Central Asia,” last accessed Oct. 18, 2007 at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/10887/americas_foil_in_central_asia.html.
55
Ibid.
56
Bates Gill and Matthew Oresman, “China’s New Journey to the West: China’s Emergence in Central
Asia and Implications for U.S. Interests, CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies report, Aug., 2003.
53
19
Russian strategic calculations for both the tsars and the Bolsheviks.57 During the Cold
War, however, the region was contested ground between Moscow and Beijing, including
frequent skirmishes over borderlines. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union,
China and Russia moved toward rapprochement in Central Asia with Soviet Premier
Mikhail Gorbechev and Chinese President Jiang Zemin signing a joint communiqué in
1989 to resolve the border disputes. “Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
relationship evolved even more quickly, and during the April 1996 summit between Boris
Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin, the two sides formally declared they would ‘develop an equal
and trustworthy strategic partnership aimed at the 21st Century.”58 The easing of tensions
between Beijing and Moscow led to the formation of the Shanghai Five (also called the
Shanghai Forum), which later evolved into the SCO. The partnership has continued to
solidify, with former Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chinese premier Hu Jintao
calling for a return to a multipolar world order. New Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
continued to endorse the partnership during his May 2008 trip to Beijing, saying it was
necessary for maintaining global balance. “Some don't like such strategic cooperation
between our countries, but we understand that this cooperation serves the interests of our
people, and we will strengthen it, regardless of whether others like it or not,” he said.
“Russian-Chinese relations are one of the most important factors of maintaining stability
in modern conditions.”59
In its founding declaration, The SCO states that it “adheres to the principle of
nonalignment, does not target any other country or region, and is open to the outside,”
Dmitri Trenin, “Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Politics, and Prospects,” in Central Asia: Views from
Washington, Moscow and Beijing, (ME Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y., 2007).
58
Bates and Oresman, “China’s New Journey to the West,” p. 5.
59
Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russian leader Medvedev defends Russia-China ties,” Associated Press, accessed
May 24, 2008, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080524/ap_on_re_as/china_russia_13
57
20
which is somewhat in contradistinction to Section 10 of the declaration, which reads in
part: “In the current international situation, it is of particular significance to preserve
global strategic balance and stability.” Implicit in this statement is a concern about
American unipolarity, although conforming to soft balancing, the target of the alignment
remains unnamed.60 Even those skeptical of the SCO as a balancing mechanism (whether
soft or hard) against U.S. interest in Central Asia acknowledge that the organization has
sent mixed messages by signaling a desire to remove the American presence from the
region and to recreate a multipolar world order.61 This view is bolstered by Chinese and
Russian attempts to use the SCO to carve out “sphere of influence” to be managed under
their joint purview. To demonstrate these ends, an outline of the three major actors’
interest in the region is necessary.
China
China’s broad goals in Central Asia are to strengthen security cooperation, fight
terrorism, promote regional stability, extend economic and trade relations, broaden
cooperation with Russia, create a new diplomatic image of China and promote
multipolarity.62 Central Asia also is viewed as an important future source of energy for
China’s rapidly growing economy. “China’s rising imports of oil at present and natural
Clearly no other state but the U.S. could plausibly be the target of the “global strategic balance” the SCO
seeks to preserve.
61
For example, Jan Arno Hessbruegge argues that the SCO is sending “mixed messages” about its
intentions in “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Holy Alliance for Central Asia?” al Nakhlah,
The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization, Spring
2004, Article 2, published by Tufts University. “On one hand, its leaders have expressly declared the SCO
is not an alliance directed against any other states or region. On the other hand, they have voiced their
opposition to Western hegemony by jointly speaking out for a multi-polar world, for the primacy of the UN
Security Council and … against humanitarian intervention” pp. 3-4.
62
Ren Dongfeng, The Central Asia Policies of China, Russia, and the USA, and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization process: A View from China, paper published by the Stockholm International Research
Institute (SIPRI), Oct.-Dec. 2003. Also see, Huasheng Zhao, “Central Asia in China’s Diplomacy,” in
Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing, (ME Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y., 2007).
60
21
gas in the future have made energy security one of the top concerns for the
government.”63 For some analysts, the formation of the SCO can be interpreted as an
effort by Beijing to secure energy dominance in Central Asia.64
China has other concerns in the region as well. Consistent with offensive realism,
the United States has begun to slowly encircle the PRC with military bases and
instillations in East Asia (Japan and Korea) South Asia (ASEAN members Singapore and
the Philippines and commitment to Taiwan) and now in Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan and
until recently, Uzbekistan). Whether or not Washington consciously seeks to constrain
the rise of a hegemonic China in Asia, the growing American military presence on the
Eurasian landmass is viewed by China as a threat. “One theme that continues to underlie
many of the relationships China has established has been the perceived need to act as a
counterbalance to the U.S. In China’s eyes, the U.S. is not only a global hegemon that
needs restraining, but may also pose a threat to the stability and status of China itself.”65
In order for China to assert its dominance in the region, it must first remove the U.S.
presence, which is an unstated goal of the SCO.66
Tianshu Chu, Fereidun Fesharaki and Kang Wut, “China’s Energy in Transition: Regional and Global
Implications,” Asian Economic Policy Review, (2006), 1, p. 134.
64
For example, see Akihiko Tanaka, “Global and Regional Geo-strategic Implications of China’s
Emergence,” Asian Economic Policy Review, (2006), 1, pp. 180-196.
65
Philip Andrew Speed and Sergei Vinogradov, “China’s Involvement in Central Asian Petroleum:
Convergent or Divergent Interests?” Asian Survey, March-April 2000, 40:2, p. 378.
66
For example, Richard Hu notes: “The United States war in Afghanistan has helped to build a stronghold
right on China’s very doorstep. Whereas China supports the fight against terrorism … it is also wary of an
American presence near its border. Indeed, China had spent considerable energy creating the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, and one of its principal aims is to minimize Western influence in Central Asia”
in “China’s Central Asia Policy: Making Sense of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Central Asia at
the end of the Transition, Boris Rumer, ed., (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York 2005), p. 147.
63
22
Russia
Similar to Beijing, Moscow has sought to use the SCO combat Islamic terrorism, foster
stability along the borders with its former Soviet republics, reassert its influence in the
region, and (at least for now) seek joint proprietorship with China over Central Asian
energy resources.67 Russia also shares with China the fear of U.S. encroachment on its
borders. NATO expansion to the east and the U.S. establishment of bases in Central Asia
has placed the American military directly in Russia’s strategic backyard. In its weakened
state, Russia no longer possesses the military capabilities to internally balance against the
United States through an arms buildup. Its current strategy, therefore, is to rely on China,
a strategy that Dmitri Trenin describes as “leaning on the east to raise its stakes in the
west.”68 Although a number of scholars and policy analysts have argued that the SinoRussian tensions outweigh their respective fears of U.S. hegemony, such concerns are for
the time being muted by American unilateralism. “Russia appears to regard the growing
American influence in Eurasia as more threatening to its interest than a rapidly growing
China. Thus, both China and Russia are eager to foster a strategic partnership aimed at
heading off American ability to extend its global dominance in the region.”69
United States
For much of American history, Central Asia has not registered on the strategic radar of
U.S. officials. Remote and inscrutable, the region was too distant to matter much to
67
Dongfeng, The Central Asia Policies of China, Russia, and the USA. On Russian desire to control
Central Asian energy resources, see Martha Brill Olcott, “The Great Powers in Central Asia,” Current
History, Vol. 104, October 2005, pp. 331-335.
68
Trenin, “Russia and Central Asia,” p. 83
69
Subodh Atal, “The New Great Game,” The National Interest, Fall 2005, p. 103. Also see Leszek
Buszynski, “Russia and the CIS in 2003: Regional Reconstruction,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 1, (Jan-Feb
2004), p. 163.
23
American security and too impenetrable during the time of the Soviet empire to be of
interest.70 Yet after the implosion of the Soviet bloc, the region slowly began to open to
American capital, and, much later, political and military objectives.71 Currently, U.S.
objectives in the region are to fight terrorism, open the energy-rich Caspian basin to
American capital and development, support human rights and foster democratization.72
Key to this strategy has been the stationing of American troops in Kyrgyzstan, which has
been an important command for anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan. More disturbing
for Moscow and Beijing, however, is the potential for the American presence in Central
Asia to become an off-shore balancer against Chinese hegemony and Russian
revanchism. “The USA appears to have at least a potential objective of containing both
China and Russia in geostrategic terms by its military presence (especially its long-term
presence) in Central Asia, even if the primary purpose of its deployment was to combat
terrorism.”73
Soft balancing in action
At the outset of this paper, I argued that both China and Russia have employed the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a soft balancing mechanism against U.S.
encroachment in Central Asia. I defined soft balancing as nonmilitary alignments that
seek to reduce or remove the military presence and external influence of an outside great
power or hegemon from a specific localized region. The main goal of soft balancing
Eugene Rumer, “The United States and Central Asia: In Search of a Strategy,” in Central Asia: Views
from Washington, Moscow and Beijing, (ME Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y., 2007).
71
Sharam Akbarzahed, “Keeping Central Asia Stable,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 689705, 2004.
72
All of these goals are cited throughout the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionII.html
73
Dongfeng, The Central Asia Policies of China, Russia, and the USA,” p. 16.
70
24
would be an attempt by the alignment to reduce or remove the military presence of an
outside great power from the targeted region. Secondary and tertiary aims would to
replace or co-opt heads of a state (party or individual) that have aligned or allied with the
outside actor and the removal of other influences associated with the external actor, such
as NGOs and MNCs based in the outside great power. I deal with each of these in order.
Removing U.S. military presence
Key to the soft balancing strategy of China and Russia is the removal of the U.S.
military presence in Central Asia. After the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, both Russia
and China acquiesced to American bases in the region to combat Islamic extremists in
Afghanistan. Although neither Russia nor China was in the position to deny American
basing rights in the region, both initially benefited from operation “Enduring Freedom,”
which overthrew the Taliban. Beijing and Moscow have battled Islamic insurgencies in
their own territories and used the invitation of U.S. forces in the region as a green light to
crack down on their own Muslim radicals (Russia in Chechnya and China in Xingjian).
However, neither great power is likely to countenance a long-term American military
presence on its borders. “While the Chinese and Russians recognized the Untied States’
right to respond to sources responsible for the terrorists attacks, the establishment of
bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan raised concerns.”74 Those concerns were voiced at
the July 2005 summit in Astana, where at the behest of Russia and China, the SCO called
for a timetable for the removal of the military contingents of the “antiterrorist coalition”
Maj. Jefferson E. Turner, “What is Driving India’s and Pakistan’s Interest in Joining the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization,” Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 8 (August 2005).
74
25
from the territories of member states.75 Many commentators have seen the declaration as
part of “concerted efforts to attack U.S. regional sway.”76
Further evidence of balancing came at the St. Petersburg summit in July 2002,
when the member states created the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) for joint
military maneuvers. In August 2005, China and Russia held their first-ever joint military
exercise through RATS. Dubbed “Peace Mission 2005,” the war games were ostensibly
an anti-terrorism exercise. Another “peace mission” was held in August 2007 and
included 10,000 troops from land, sea and air units. Many commentators believed the
exercises were meant to send Washington a message: “The fact that it involved
amphibious landings, sea blockades, and other operations that were irrelevant to the
geography of landlocked, desert Central Asia suggests that the SCO is primarily a vehicle
for a new Moscow-Beijing condominium in Asia, and is not intended as a true
multilateral security framework for Central Asia.”77
Overall, the American response to the SCO has been tepid, largely because of the
mixed signals being sent by Beijing and Moscow. U.S. reception has ranged from mild
apprehension (“We will watch with interest what the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
says, but we will especially watch what it does, and what it becomes”)78 to deep
The declaration reads in part: “Considering the completion of the active military stage of antiterrorist
operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (sic) consider it
necessary, that respective members of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use
of the above-mentioned objects of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of
the SCO member states.” Declaration of Heads of Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
July 5, 2005, http://www.sectsco.org/html/00500.html Also, for a U.S. response, see the 2005 Report to
Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
76
Tim Murphy, “East of the Middle East: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and U.S. Security
Implications,” 2006, Center for Defense Information, p. 2.
77
Ariel Cohen, “The Dragon Looks West: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Heritage
Lectures, published by the Heritage Foundation, Sept. 7, 2007, p. 3.
78
“The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Future of Central Asia,” prepared remarks of Sept. 6,
2007 speech by Evan A. Feigenbaum, Deputy U.S. Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs.
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/91858.htm
75
26
misgivings (“We see mixed signals, and we seek clarification”).79Although the U.S.
official response has been cool, there is an underlying disquiet. In July 2005, for example,
the House passed an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 2601)
for fiscal year 2006 and 2007 expressing concerns that the SCO called for a deadline to
remove U.S. troops from Central Asia.80 The status of Iranian membership in the SCO is
troubling for the United States. Currently, Iran is an observer, but Tehran is seeking full
membership. American officials would likely look askance upon the full participation of
Iran in a soft-balancing alliance against U.S. interests.81
Reducing Washington’s influence
In addition to removing the military presence of the outside great power or
hegemon from a region, the soft balancing-alignment also would seek to reduce
normative influences as well. Washington has been keen to advance democratization in
the region, primarily through so-called “Color Revolutions.” These “revolutions” have
been troubling to Moscow and Beijing, who view them as U.S. stratagems and
machinations to destabilize the region. Yet America’s push for democracy in the
autocratic Central Asia states, ironically, has pushed their regimes closer to Beijing and
Moscow. In May 2005, the U.S. called for an international investigation after Uzbek
President Islam Karimov’s forces conducted a bloody crackdown that killed hundreds of
“democratic” protestors in the city of Andijan. Karimov officially characterized the
79
Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld quoted in American Forces Press Service, Oct. 19,
2005. Rumsfeld was referring to Chinese efforts to work cooperatively with the U.S. in some areas while
excluding American participation in the SCO. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18039
80
The bill was not voted on by the Senate and never became law.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-2601
81
Both the U.S. Defense and State departments have criticized the SCO for allowing a “state-sponsor of
terrorism” such as Iran into the SCO.
27
protest as “terrorists acts.”82 The incident was denounced by the United Nations, United
States and European Union, but Karimov’ pointedly received the strong backing of SCO
members China and Russia. The U.S. rebuke of the Karimov regime over the Andijan
incident resulted in a rift that led to the eviction of U.S. forces from the Karshi-Khanabad
(K2) base in Uzbekistan.
More troubling for Beijing and Moscow was the American supported “Tulip
Revolution” that led to the ouster of Kyrgyz President Askar Akyev in March 2005. The
United States immediately recognized the elected government of Kurmanbek Bakiyev, an
opponent of Akyev. However, an increasingly autocratic Bakiyev, eventually recognizing
his tenuous hold on power in the face of “democratic” forces, slowly moved into the orbit
of Beijing and Moscow and endorsed their call for the removal of U.S. forces from the
Manas air base in Bishkek, although this request was later withdrawn.83 Still, Bakiyev
threatened to close the base at Manas if the U.S. did not increase its rent from about $2.6
million per year to more than $150 million, while offering Russia the use of a nearby
military base rent-free in an effort to “counteract” U.S. forces.84 The new terms extracted
by Kyrgyzstan from the United States “were a clear way for Bakiyev to demonstrate to
his SCO cohorts that Kyrgyzstan’s recent political revolution did not represent a
comprehensive Western tilt.”85
“Uzbekistan: Saving its Secrets, Government Repression in Andijan,” report by Human Rights Watch,
published May 2008.
83
Erica Marat, The Tulip Revolution: Kyrgyzstan One Year After, published by the Jamestown Foundation,
March 2006. Also see, Jim Nichol, “Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Crisis: Context and Implications for U.S.
Interests,” CRS Report for Congress, January 2005.
84
Murphy, “East of the Middle East.”
85
Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” CRS Report For
Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 12, 2006, p. 12.
82
28
The reactions of the Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments to democratic uprisings
indicate that international norms can sometimes be as threatening as armies and navies.86
The proliferation of Western NGOs promoting democratic reform in the region have
clearly disturbed its autocratic rulers, who despite initially benefiting from American aid
because of the “war on terror,” view democratization as a threat to their rule. In other
words, Western-style democracy has become more of a danger to the leaders of the four
Central Asian republics than their two great power neighbors. Because of the SCO’s
strong support of sovereignty in regards to domestic affairs, it is not “burdened” with
democratization and human rights issues that hamstring Western interests.87
Economic balancing – pipeline politics
The formation of economic blocs can be a key tactic in the strategic success of a
balancing coalition. Although economics generally take a backseat to security issues in
realism, a number of balancing strategies – such as blockades and economic boycotts –
are aimed specifically to diminish a state’s ability to generate wealth and reduce its
power. As Mark R. Brawley points out, economic ties can make alliances more credible
and solidify the support of allied partners’ domestic constituencies. “Alliances can
harness the mutually beneficial aspects of international economic policies to make
themselves more successful and more militarily powerful. If trade or international
86
For example, Russia was rumored to have worked successfully to block parliamentary confirmation of
Roza Otunbaeva, deemed “too pro-American,” as Kyrgyzstan’s foreign minister in Trenin, “Russia and
Central Asia,” p. 132, endnote 20.
87
Maksutov, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Central Asian Perspective,” p. 5.
29
investment makes both parties better off, then such activities should be diverted from the
threatening power. External balancing should redirect trade towards alliance members.”88
As in the sphere of international security, soft balancing alignments would likely
favor less confrontational economic and trade strategies to reduce the presence of the
outside actor in a targeted region. A major objective of the SCO, therefore, is the creation
of a regional economic bloc that sets asides preferences for Moscow and Beijing.89 To do
this, both great powers have signed lucrative, turn-a-blind-eye deals with Central Asian
autocrats, who have a visceral aversion to the democratization and human rights norms
attached to Western aid and development packages.
In an effort to carve up the region economically, Russia and China have attempted
to set up near monopolies with the petroleum and natural gas companies in Central
Asia.90 In June 2003, Russia signed a wide-ranging set of agreements with Kazakhstan,
ensuring a Russian near monopoly on the transit of oil from Kazakhstan. “The Russian
government and Russian companies have secured the largest share of the Caspian
Pipeline Consortium (CPC), totaling 43 percent, which gives Russia control of the
pipeline connecting the Teniz oil field in Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of
Novorossiik.”91 Similarly, the Chinese National Petroleum Company signed a $4 billion
Mark R. Brawley, “The Political Economy of Balance of Power Theory,” in Balance of Power: Theory
and Practice in the 21st Century, p. 81.
89
According to the June 2006 Declaration on Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
the SCO has “adopted a long-term plan, set direction for regional economic cooperation and identified the
goal, priority areas and major tasks of economic cooperation among member states. It has set up the SCO
Business Council and the Interbank Association.” See http://www.sectsco.org/html/01470.html
90
“Through the SCO, China and Russia embarked on a policy of restructuring their relationship in a new
global security environment, notably with a view to assuring their respective access to the very large,
untapped hydrocarbon reserves in Central Asia.” Maksutov, p. 3.
91
Dongfeng, “The Central Asia Policies of China, Russia and the USA,” p. 10.
88
30
deal for a 60 percent share in the Uzen oilfield in western Kazakhstan.92 Furthermore,
China views pipelines to Central Asia as key to its economic security because the United
States could strangle Chinese energy imports with a naval blockade during a crisis.93
Although energy competition would occur outside of any balancing effort, the
drive for energy extraction in Central Asia is especially acute, and U.S. officials are
aware of Chinese and Russian attempts to block American access to the region’s
resources. Too offset a Sino-Russian duopoly, the U.S. has advocated that pipeline routes
in the region be diverted from China and Russia and rerouted towards its ally Turkey.94
The push for energy dominance has become a national security concern, particularly for a
rapidly growing China, and to remove American interests from the region, the PRC has
joined Russia to limit American influence in the economic sphere.
Conclusion
This paper has endeavored to achieve two objectives – one theoretical, the other
empirical. In regards to the former, the goal was to develop a much more rigorous
definition of soft balancing than occurs in the existing literature. Current formulations of
soft balancing suffer from indeterminacy or drift too far from the essence of balance of
power theory, which largely concerns security matters. The version of soft balancing
described in this study seeks to adhere closely to the traditional – and limited – function
of balance-of-power logic while opening it up to new concepts of securitization, such as
the role of NGOs as an instrument of soft power. As noted above, the proliferation of
Mark Burles, “Chinese Policy Toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics,” RAND report, Santa
Monica, Calif., 1999, p. 23.
93
Lyle Goldstein, “China in the New Central Asia: The Fen (RMB) is Mightier than the Sword,” The
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Winter 2005, pp. 13-34.
94
Rumer, “The United States and Central Asia.”
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Western-backed human rights groups and media has in some cases been more
destabilizing for, and threatening to, Central Asian regimes than armed insurgencies.
As for the latter goal, this paper has sought to demonstrate the empirical evidence
for soft balancing in Central Asia. Both Beijing and Moscow have called for a timetable
for the removal of U.S. military troops from the Central Asia, have attempted to
monopolize the energy resources in the region by nudging out American influence and
continue to back autocratic regimes averse to many Western norms of democracy and
human rights. These strategic objectives are consistent with balance-of-power theory,
although the means to achieve them are non-traditional. American unipolarity is a novelty
and, thusly, has resulted in novel responses by other great powers to restrain U.S. power.
Whether China and Russia can sustain this “strategic partnership” or “marriage of
convenience” depends on U.S. foreign policy. Continued American unilateralism likely
will harden the Sino-Russian alignment into a formal alliance. However, a more
multilateral approach that respected Russia and China’s legitimate sphere of influence in
Central Asia would make the partnership unnecessary.95 Although somewhat
counterintuitive, a return to multilateralism could benefit American interests in the
region. Both Russia and China have their own conflicts of interests, and freed from the
threat of American encroachment, would likely set their sights on each other, reigniting
the classic balancing behavior that has been so much a part of the international system
since at least Westphalia.
95
See Walt, Taming American Power.
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