School of Public Policy Ph.D. First Year Comprehensive Examination, Normative Analysis, Spring 2008
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UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION IN CORE SUBJECTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
Monday, June 2, 2008
This examination tests your understanding of topics in normative analysis drawn from the
reading list assigned to help you prepare for this examination. Be sure to make use of the
readings, as appropriate, in framing your answers. A point weighting is listed beside each
question, along with a suggested time allocation. Answer the question in Section One and three
of four questions in Section Two.
Section One: General Question (40 points; roughly 3 hours)
Rawls’s Theory of Justice renewed political philosophy, as well ethics and public policy
in English-speaking countries and elsewhere. Discuss what you take to be Rawls’s most
important claims or arguments about distributive justice. Now take two political
philosophers – one classical and one contemporary -- and analyze how the two would
criticize Rawls’s position on distributive justice. How would (or did) Rawls respond to
these critics? Finally, in your view to what extent can Rawls answer his critics and to
what extent have they uncovered serious weaknesses in his thought? What ways, if any,
might a Rawlsian employ to overcome these weaknesses?
The Contribution of Rawls
Rawls has been hailed as one of the most important modern contributors to ethics and public
policy. He is often contributed with reviving liberal political philosophy since at the time many
believed the dominant concept behind the liberty of an individual was only possible at the
expense of social ills such as inequality. Rawls’s theory, called “justice as fairness”, attempts to
demonstrate that it is possible to reconcile the liberty of the individual and society’s ability to
redress inequality and injustice.
Traditional social contract theory includes a hypothesized “state of nature” prior to the formation
of government and society. This state of nature is commonly used to demonstrate the reason
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behind joining one another and forming society, “the legitimacy of government derives, thus,
from the consent of the governed, and the social contract approach provides a vehicle for
attempting to specify the proper role of government, its purpose and limits (Arther and Shaw).”
Rawls believes each person possesses an inherent right to liberty that cannot be overruled even
for the betterment of the society as a whole. In a just society, he argues, the liberties of equal
citizenship are taken as settled. In forming the original position, he is concerned with the basic
structure of society, in other words the major social institutions that distribute fundamental rights
and determine the division of advantages among citizens. His focus is the distribution of
inequalities that exist based on merit or desert, meaning those who are favored in some societies
simply because they enjoy a better starting place than others.
Rawls uses the social contract model to propose principles he believes free and rational persons
would choose to govern their society if they were brought together in an imaginary “original
position”. For Rawls, the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in
traditional social contract theory. The original position is used to create a situation where all
present are under a “veil of ignorance” in regards to their position in society, thereby making
each equal. This will set up a fair procedure in order to allow the formation of just principles to
be agreed upon. "Since all are similarly situated [in the original position] and no one is able to
design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair
agreement or bargain ... This explains the propriety of the name 'justice as fairness': it conveys
the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair." Race,
gender, class, income, intelligence, social position etc. are all unknown under the veil of
ignorance. Parties also do not know the conditions of their society; instead “the only particular
facts which the parties know is that their society is subject to the circumstances of justice and
whatever this implies.” In addition, they know general facts about human society including
political affairs and principles of economic theory.
Rawls assumes those in the original position to be rational persons, connecting his theory of
justice to the theory of rational choice. The original position assures that these rational persons
will not make decisions based on his or her personal status or conception of the good since in the
original position that information is not known. “The assumptions of mutually disinterested
rationality, then, comes to this: the persons in the original position try to acknowledge principles
which advance their system of ends as far as possible.”
Initially, Rawls maintains that persons in the original position under the veil of ignorance will
choose two principles of justice:
“First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably
expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.”
These principles are prioritized and the first principle cannot be overridden by other
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considerations. This priority maintains that those in the original position have no desire to try for
greater gains at the expense of equal liberties. The second principle, part b, called the fair
equality of opportunity, cannot be overridden by any circumstances of social or economic
advantage. Part a cannot be overridden by considerations of efficiency or maximization of social
welfare. In other words, not only does Rawls formulate principles of justice but he stipulates
rules and priority in conjunction with them. In addition, these principles are concerned with the
distribution of primary goods, “things that every rational man is presumed to want”, and those in
the original position are determining the distribution of social primary goods rather than natural
goods.
Rawls gave names to each of the four possible systems produced by combining these possible
combinations, but argued that “Democratic Equality” was the one that people would choose
behind the “veil of ignorance.”
“Everyone’s Advantage”
“Equally Open”
Principle of Efficiency
Difference Principle
Careers open to talents
System of Natural
Liberty
Natural Aristocracy
Equality of fair
opportunity
Liberal Equality
Democratic Equality
The democratic interpretation is arrived at by combining the principle of fair equality of
opportunity and the difference principle. The difference principle is the idea that “the higher
expectations of those better situated are just if and only if they work as part of a scheme which
improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of society.” Society should not work
to establish and secure the prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of
those less fortunate.
After consideration, he reformulates the Second Principle as
“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”
Criticism of Rawls: Hobbes
Hobbes insists that the state of nature, or a condition of no government, is one that deteriorates
into a war of all of against all. In this state of nature, people enjoy equality of liberty and scarce
resources, a world where there in only concern for oneself and no way to mediate disputes. In
order to survive, Hobbes maintains that people will go to any means to survive and obtain their
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objects of desire. According to Hobbes, all members will live in “continual fear, and danger of
violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
Despite the view that men are selfish and dangerous, Hobbes also believes that men are
intelligent and will recognize the benefits of peace. He argues that several laws will come out of
this desire for security; first and foremost, men will “lay down” their rights in order to achieve a
state of peace. Since words are not enough to bind such an agreement, the only answer is
coercive power in the form of a monarch. Hobbes argues that the only way to achieve a
successful state is for everyone to select, relinquish their rights to, and obey a sovereign.
In this state, liberty is not viewed as individual liberty but the liberty of the commonwealth. The
state must be free to do as it sees fit, the sovereign’s power is absolute. Any redistribution of
goods is up to the discretion of the monarch. In other words, if the King sees fit to redistribute
wealth to the poor, then the rich must surrender their goods in order to fulfill the mandate. But
citizens are not a part of the deliberation or decision when it comes to distribution, since in order
to achieve peace they agreed to forfeit their rights to the sovereign. Individual liberty is
restricted only to areas in which the monarch has not seen fit to create rules. In addition, justice
is entrusted to an arbitrator to determine what is due. Hobbes claims that this person will provide
“equal distribution to each man of that which in reason belongs to him.” This reason has to do
with past promises and the notion of merit.
While Rawls and Hobbes both utilize social contract for their foundation of justice and society,
their view on human nature and the elements of a secure state vary widely. Hobbes would
invariably maintain that Rawls is naïve in his understanding of humans and discount the original
position as implausible. Humans are driven by “a perpetual and restless desire of power after
power” that must be controlled. Hobbes believes the only way to create a secure society is
through absolute power and sovereignty, absent this there will be disagreements, paralysis of
effective government, and ultimately degeneration into a civil war over these disputes.
Criticism of Rawls: Nozick
Robert Nozick values liberty above all things. His work, Anarchy, State and Utopia, considers
whether economic inequality warrants or justifies coercive action by the state and provides an
extensive critique of Rawls’s theory of justice. In general, Nozick contends that distribution is
just if it adheres to three characteristics:



The original acquisition of a holding is just;
Subsequent acquisition of this holding is just, i.e. the transfer is just;
No one else is entitled to that holding.
And in sum, if each person’s holdings are just, then the total set (or distribution) of holdings is
just. He argues that as long as there is liberty, people will make transactions that alter whatever
distribution exists, using his famous Wilt Chamberlain example to demonstrate this point. He
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states, “no end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously
realized without continuous interference with people’s lives”.
In the end, Nozick believes no distribution freely arrived at will likely fit a pattern of distribution
and is thus a violation of people’s rights. He believes end-state principles, such as taxation, give
individuals in society a claim on the products produced by others, regardless of how the producer
wants to dispose of the holdings. He rejects any interference with the process of free exchange
by the government and believes only redistribution resulting from free transfers of legitimately
acquired property will be just.
In his critique of Rawls, Nozick begins with his issues around the original position. While Rawls
is concerned with showing what is just for the least advantaged in society, Nozick is concerned
with why the most advantaged in society would agree to such a system. He argues that the
difference principle is not realistic, and would only apply in the special case where distribution
of holdings “fell from heaven like manna”. He argues that more commonly the size of the pie is
not fixed, but instead can be enlarged due to the unequal application of effort by members of
society, in which case unequal distribution seems just. He accuses Rawls’s conception of only
considering end-state principles since it does not allow for any consideration of historical or
entitlement principles.
While Rawls rejects unequal distribution of national assets as being “arbitrary from a moral point
of view”, Nozick believes such rejection rejects national liberty. He says this will serve to
“denigrate a person’s autonomy and prime responsibilities for his actions” in the process. In
addition, Nozick takes exception to Rawls’s “distribution of the treatment of natural abilities as
viewed as a ‘collective asset’”. He contends that such an approach “does not take seriously the
distinction between persons”. In sum, Nozick states, “People’s talents and abilities are an asset
to a free community; others in the community benefit from their presence and are better off
because they are there rather than elsewhere or nowhere.”
Rawls’s Response
Rawls disagrees with Hobbes on the fundamental characteristics of human nature. He contends
humans are not irredeemably self-centered or singularly driven by power but instead have the
capacity for toleration and mutual respect. This leads Rawls to believe that humans will
ultimately endorse and accept a democratic regime rather than a monarchy made of absolute
power. He maintains that citizens are reasonable and would therefore accept diversity within
reason, such as religious tolerance. In addition, he believes the focal point for all reasonable
citizens is liberty, and given its place of protection in justice as fairness people will act in ways
that are just if place under the veil of ignorance in the original position.
In addition, Rawls would take exception of Hobbes’s view that the only stable society is one
ruled by an absolute sovereign. Rawls will maintain that a society whose conception of justice is
justice as fairness will be more stable since it promotes people’s natural inclination toward
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reciprocity. He assumes three things about the conditions under which humans form reciprocal
relationships with one another: (1) When family institutions are just, children will come to love
their parents because they promote their children’s good in ways that are obvious to them. (2)
When social arrangements are just and publicly known, people will develop a sense of goodwill
and trust toward one another as they will realize that others will honor their obligation as defined
by this public conception of justice. (3) When social arrangements are just and publicly known,
people will endorse this concept of justice when they and the people they care for benefit from
those social arrangements. Upon seeing these benefits, people will come to endorse the system
of justice and work to protect the system. This in turn promotes stability. These conditions all
hold under Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness.
Rawls has often been criticized by Nozick and others for the assumption that those in the original
position would realistically agree to his system of justice. He contends however, that those in the
original position are unaware of not only their position in society but are also the probabilities
surrounding these positions once the veil of ignorance is lifted. The “maximin” rule directs them
to consider the worst possible outcome that can happen under a proposed course of action.
These are grave consequences, with extreme situations like abject poverty, slavery, etc., and are
therefore outcomes that no rational person could accept for themselves. Since the rule takes no
account of the likelihood of being the one to live under those conditions, and the outcomes are so
severe, no rational human is going to risk that they will be on the extreme upper end of society
versus the extreme lower end.
In response to Nozick’s notion of autonomy and abilities, Rawls would agree people should be
able to do what they want with their natural abilities (unless using those talents in a certain way
violates other people’s rights), but disagrees with the fact that people are entitled to everything
they produce or acquire. He argues that people do not deserve their talents and abilities; thus,
there is no reason people deserve everything they produce using these abilities. Rawls maintains
that it is not a violation of liberty or autonomy for the state to require you to live up to your
moral responsibilities for those less fortunate than you are. For example, if the government
requires employers to pay “fair” wages, the state is not only treating employees as ends rather
than means but also the employers as well since the wages reflect the value of the employees’
marginal contribution to their product. If an employer exploits his employees by treating them
unfairly he does not have any right to the profit that results from that exploitation, even if these
employees voluntarily chose to work for them (rather than starving). Regulating economic
transfers to promote distributive justice therefore does not violate anyone’s rights, as Nozick
would maintain. In other words, Rawls would argue that the notion of “voluntary” transfer is
simply too thin and assumes a formal notion of autonomy. He takes issue with Nozick’s
assumption that unless someone is holding a gun to your head, then your action if voluntary.
When people are in radically different positions of power, one cannot say those in the lower
position are always making a voluntary choice if the options are subsistence wage or starving.
To ensure justice, we must ensure that choices are made voluntarily and freely.
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An Evaluation of the Critics and Rawls
In my view Rawls has sufficiently answered much of the criticism outlined above; however,
there does still seem to be areas for improvement. It should be noted that our reading list
contained Rawls’s Theory of Justice as part of Arthur and Shaw’s Justice and Distribution, so I
have not read other works by Rawls such as Law of Peoples. Therefore, I am hesitant to make
blanket statements on Rawls’s shortcomings and I hope you will allow for some ignorance on
my part when reading my assertions.
First, Rawls does not seem to fully answer the question of natural abilities and their place in
society. Can looking only at social primary goods be the best way to assess people’s overall well
being? What about those with severe handicaps or disabilities? Someone with special needs
may require a greater portion of certain primary goods like medicine and special equipment in
order to have the same quality of life as those without special needs. Rawls’s discount of natural
goods would seem to indicate that it is unjust to compensate them in this way as he is only
concerned with social primary goods.
Secondly, Rawlsians should also answer more fully the recognition of the influence of ambition
in his theory of justice. If one person in society works extremely hard to maximize is earning
and output, should that person be taxed to subsidize habits of those with equal abilities but less
ambition to work for their living? Personally, I believe this is an oversimplification of Rawls’s
theory, but it is a common critique of which I have not seen a thorough response.
Finally, Sen argues that the issue with Rawls Theory of Justice is not “the comparative
importance of rights, but their absolute priority.” He argues that while liberty should be a
priority, it should not have more prominence than other rights as it misses the need to evaluate
the overall individual’s own personal advantage. In other words, the Rawlsian Difference
Principle is good but not good enough. Sen agrees with the critique above that a strict equation
cannot be drawn between primary goods and well-being because the former cannot always be
converted into the latter.
In general, Rawls’s theory of justice, the difference principle and the idea of the original position
has made an enormous contribution to ethics and public policy. It is difficult to find a theory that
is perfect, but this work provides an important framework and foundation for justice and
distribution in society.
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Section Two: Special Topics (20 points each; roughly 1 1/2 hours per question.) Remember:
answer three out of four.
1. Identify and explain the moral or ethical issues—in contrast to the economic or political
issues—implicit or explicit in the current US debate or global debate about one of the
following topics: the world food crisis, terrorism, or the logging of the Amazon. Use this
debate to clarify the value but also the limits of normative or ethical analysis in public
policy formation. Anticipate and respond to at least one objection to your argument.
I will address the issue of the world food crisis and the ethical debate surrounding it. First, since
“world food crisis” is somewhat vague, for the purposes of my discussion I will discuss this in
terms of the increase in incidences of hunger and famine in the world’s poorest countries due to
the rising costs of food. Ethical and moral questions are raised in regards to our responsibilities
to those affected. Do we have a moral obligation to the world’s poor who are starving as a result
of this crisis? In my opinion, the ethical and moral issues are many and in some ways outweigh
the economic or political ones. If we have a responsibility to assist, is that responsibility one of
charity (or beneficence) on the part of those countries able to assist? Or is it one of justice and
human rights? These are difficult but important questions when it comes to issues such as this.
Libertarians such as Robert Nozick would argue that we have no responsibility other than
perhaps charity to assist in the world food crisis. Charity is morally good but not required by
justice as he would say it would infringe on economic rights of those in the wealthier countries to
tax them or use their money to assist in this crisis. In effect you are treating those citizens a
means to an end and that is unjust. Since citizens are born autonomous with the ability to
provide for themselves, you do not have a right to interfere with one for the benefit of another.
On the other hand one could argue that our goal should be to maximize global utility, and the
marginal benefit of our aid dollars to those in poverty is far greater than it is to those in affluent
countries, therefore total utility is raised by our giving a great deal of development aid or
humanitarian aid. Utilitarians such as Singer would contend that “if it in our power to prevent
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral
importance, we ought, morally, to do it.” If we accept the Utilitarian approach, we would solve
this problem by working out which of the many courses of action we might take produce the
most happiness or utility. However O’Neill argues that this approach, given its dependence on
results, would not be useful without accurate information. Since the many different reasons for
the world food crisis as well as various studies debating the best course of action, we do not have
sufficient information to approach the problem from a purely utilitarian perspective. In terms of
the debate between beneficence and justice, O’Neill argues that “we may not be able to pick out
any central core of perfect duties to which utilitarians are stringently bound. When all duties are
fundamentally a matter of beneficence, our only obligation is to do whatever is needed to
maximize happiness.” In other words, utilitarians would argue we may have an imperfect duty
to charity (as Nozick notes above) but not a perfect duty of justice to assist in cases of hunger
and famine. “If utilitarians cannot draw a clear distinction between the requirements of
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beneficence and those of justice, we cannot hope for more accuracy in matters of justice than the
theory as a whole offers us.”
Kant on the other hand posits a theory of human obligations. O’Neill mentions the “Formula of
the End in Itself: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end.”
Kant believes we should judge the underlying principles of the act and those principles should
follow the above formula. You will have different principles as long as they avoid treating
people as mere means.
Kant believes that we cannot use others as mere means if what we do reflects some principle to
which they could not consent. O’Neill posits, “The more vulnerable the other party in any
transaction or negotiation the less that party’s scope for refusal, and the more demanding it is
likely to ensure that action is non coercive… In Kant’s view acts done on maxims that endanger,
coerce, or deceive others, and thus cannot in principle have the consent of those others, are
wrong.” Thus, she concludes that Kantians are required to do what they can to “avert, reduce
and remedy hunger.” In Kant’s reasoning, we have a duty of beneficence rather than justice, but
he defines beneficence as more than charity. He believes that justice is a perfect duty and
beneficence is an imperfect duty, but he does not believe beneficence is any less a duty; rather,
he holds that it has (unlike justice) to be selective. “Duties of beneficence arise whenever
destitution puts the possibility of autonomous action in question for the more vulnerable.”
Finally, O’Neill concludes that both theories, utilitarian and Kantian, will get us to the same
conclusion; that is, we must be concerned about these issues of hunger and put our efforts where
they would bear fruit. In addition, she argues that we must be concerned both locally and
globally. She contends that helping our neighbors does not excuse us from helping those in
distant countries as well. “In a world in which action affects distant others, justice cannot be
local or national boundaries: there is no such thing as social justice in one country.”
O’Neill’s last point raises an additional argument among human rights theorists. What
responsibility do we have to those outside our borders? Nationalists would argue that we have
none. The nationalist view contends there are few causal connections between different
countries. Walzer (as stated by Orend) calls this the “relative self-enclosure” thesis, meaning
that since nations are relatively self-enclosed they have little causal impact on one another. It
follows that little can then be demanded from foreign nations in terms of assisting citizens from
other countries with human rights. Beitz lists skeptics as those who view international relations
the same as the Hobbsian state of nature, a constant state of war where international morality is
national self-interest only. He also notes the statist argument, meaning states are viewed as
autonomous and the only morality is national sovereignty. Beitz’s view (which I endorse), also
called the cosmopolitan view, would argue that today states are interdependent therefore
international morality should be distributive justice.
Orend agrees with Beitz’s view of international relations as do I. While it may have been true in
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the past that nations are mainly independent, it is definitely untrue now given our global society.
Today countries have significant impact on one another, both those nearby and across the globe.
Orend argues that if our actions impact the human rights of those outside our borders we should
bear duties correlative to such rights. While the heaviest burden falls on the country’s national
government, this does not mean we have no moral obligations at all. Since there are causal
connections that cross borders, then there are moral demands do a swell. Referring to Walzer’s
universally shared thin moral code, Orend notes that one can assume that we share a sense of
morality and human rights around the globe. In other words, the most important and
fundamental requirements of morality and justice are shared worldwide and are not altered
dramatically across borders as the traditionalist view suggests. While this does not suggest we
owe citizens of other countries the same as we do our own, it does imply that we owe them
something. In summary, all of us, individuals and institutions, bear duties in regards to human
rights and these duties stretch beyond our borders throughout the globe. “The general principle
is this: the more power and influence one has over the objects of another’s vital needs, the
greater the degree of responsibility one has in connection with that person’s human rights.”
Orend notes, in regard to our duty to the poorest of the poor, we have a responsibility to a global
realization of human rights. As citizens of comparatively privileged countries, we have an
international responsibility do our fair share to ensure that poor countries at least have enough to
fund a minimally decent life for all their people. In other words, establish genuinely global
protections for everyone against the infliction of grievous and unjust harm, which may imply a
duty of development assistance, or resource transfer, form the wealthiest nations to the poorest.
This is not to establish dependence, but instead to create a stable and sustainable human rights
respecting institution within the countries genuinely needing the assistance. He cites Sen’s
assertion that the main cause behind famine has been corrupt local and evil local institutions, not
a genuine lack of food to argue for international monitoring of aid as well as the need for human
rights respecting institutions.
One can see that a moral discussion around our responsibility regarding the world food crisis in
imperative to determining actions and policy. But one can also see that there is little agreement
on our best course of action and the level of involvement required. Even moral theories that
resolve our responsibility to assist differ widely on how to proceed in that assistance. But
despite these difficulties, can one argue that our analysis of an issue such as the world food crisis
should be on political and economic methods alone? I strongly pose the answer is no. Without
dialog around moral obligations our decisions would be greatly flawed and the outcomes perhaps
unacceptable.
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2. Compare and contrast the views of two thinkers, one classical and one contemporary, on
the question of humanitarian military intervention. Articulate what these thinkers said (or
would say) on the subject, and explain why their views differ, and what policy
implications that difference would have in the contemporary context. When, if ever, is it
in fact morally right or obligatory for one or more states to use military force within a
sovereign state (without that state's consent) where human rights abuses are occurring or
have occurred? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each approach and which do
you think is on balance best? Why? Anticipate and respond to one objection to your
argument.
Machiavelli
Machiavelli argues that authority and power are equal and that whoever has power has the right
to command. The only real concern for a ruler is the acquisition and maintenance of power and
the use of this power to maintain the state. In terms of morality, he believes there is no moral
basis to judge legitimate and illegitimate power. Goodness and right (to authority) is not
sufficient to win and maintain political power. The ruler must maintain the safety and security of
the state and should use any means of power necessary to do so (including the use of force).
Machiavelli poses that the legitimacy of law rest entirely on the threat of coercive force so rulers
must have the ability to use it in order to maintain authority.
Machiavelli shares a very pessimistic view of mankind with Hobbes and observes that “one can
say this in general of men: they are ungrateful, disloyal, insincere and deceitful, timid of danger
and avid of profit…. Love is a bond of obligation which these miserable creatures break
whenever it suits them to do so; but fear holds them fast by a dread of punishment that never
passes”. In order to maintain order and stability, the Prince as a head of state ought to do good if
he can, but must be prepared to commit evil if he must. Machiavelli has also been credited with
formulating for the first time the modern concept of the state. In addition, his teachings are also
closely related to many ideas behind the sovereign state. While he did not write explicitly about
the concept, his ideas amounted in substance to important developments behind the idea.
To many theorists, the idea of sovereignty applies both internally and externally. Sovereign
authority is exercised both within borders and by definition against outsiders so they will not
interfere with governance. This has been described as constitutional independence, or a state’s
freedom from influence upon its rights. The concept is similar to the one describe by Beitz as
the statist position, whereas states are autonomous and the basis of international morality is
sovereignty. In terms of policy, there is no room for intervention unless that state’s sovereignty
has been infringed upon.
Walzer
Michael Walzer agrees that states have territorial and sovereign rights. These rights are
comparable to individual rights such as life and liberty. In other words, states have a right to
self-determination. States, as with individuals, cannot be attacked by other states except with
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their right of sovereignty have been forfeited. Any violation of these rights without cause can be
deemed as aggression and that is not permissible.
Unlike a Machiavellian framework of absolute sovereignty, Walzer’s theory of just war provides
circumstances in which states lose their right to self-determination. “The ban on boundary
crossings is subject to unilateral suspension” when the issue regards:
1.
2.
3.
4.
aggression, which justifies a repellent of preemptive attack
succession or national liberation
counter-intervention
cases of enslavement or massacre
The fourth case is at issue in this question as it regards humanitarian intervention. A nation or
state enjoys legitimacy based on its ability to maintain order in a political community. This
community is made up of the people in that state. If the government turns savagely on its own
people we have a reason to doubt the existence of such a community and must therefore doubt its
legitimacy. In effect, the state loses its rights when it violates its political community. Walzer
states, “If the dominant forces within a state are engaged in massive violations of human rights,
the appeal to self-determination in the Millian sense of self-help is not very attractive… And
when a government turns savagely upon its own people, we must doubt the very existence of a
political community to which the idea of self-determination might apply.” Intervention is
justified on a moral justification if the acts “shock the moral conscience of mankind”. Because it
is a moral question, states do not need to wait for permission to invade and this includes waiting
for the UN.
Walzer summarizes, “The second, third, and fourth revisions of the paradigm have this form:
states can be invaded and wars justly begun to assist secessionist movements (once they have
demonstrated their representative character), to balance the prior interventions of other powers,
and to rescue people threatened with massacre. In each of these cases we permit or, after the
fact, we praise or don’t condemn these violations of the formal rules of sovereignty, because they
uphold the values of individual life and communal liberty of which sovereignty itself is merely
an expression.”
The policy implications are clear unless the international community cannot or will not
determine whether acts “shock the conscious of mankind”. Over 800,000 people died in Rwanda
while the UN deliberated whether the case fell under the category of genocide. Walzer’s
implications are clear; however, his definitions can be a source of debate.
When Do We Intervene?
Walzer suggests it is morally right and obligatory for states to use military force in the case of
extreme acts against humanity. Of course, he posits that this intervention must be done in a way
that supports the local population and is consistent with the rights of the population it is claiming
to assist.
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This argument is sufficient for the grossest human rights violations, but what about those that are
less flagrant? For example, what about the instance of Burma who refuses to allow victims of
the cyclone aid thus in some cases systematically starving them to death and exposing them to
life-threatening diseases. Is that a case for intervention?
Many human rights theorist propose that there is a universal moral code. Walzer in other works
details the concept of thick and think morality. As cited in Orend, he contends individual rights
to life and liberty underlie the most important judgments we make about how we should treat one
another and how we create the society that we share. These rights, natural or invented, “are
somehow entailed by our sense of what it means to be a human being.” He maintains that human
rights are a palpable feature of our moral world, and they are obvious and elemental moral
commitments shared by all humans. He lists two kinds of morally that we share in this moral
world, thick and thin.
“Thick, or “maximal”, morality is the sum total of the moral beliefs and ethical practices in a
given country or culture.” Walzer contends it is relative to time and place and thus differs from
one setting to another. Beliefs about sex and relationships are an example as this could be called
a part of a culture’s moral code. The legal system is another example.
Thin morality is “minimal and universal” according to Walzer. He believes there exists one
universal thin moral code that is “largely negative” consisting of bans on the “the grossest
injustices” like “murder, deception, betrayal, gross cruelty, torture, oppression, tyranny” etc.
While this is not the one true or universal morality, it is “that core set of values we find reiterated
in every thick moral and political code.” In short, it is those moral values that we as human
share, everyone everywhere believes in them. Walzer understands human rights to be these
universal and mainly negative core and primary entitlements we all have. He also believes that
thin morality serves as a check on thick morality and insists that any government that violates
thin morality is unjust. Appeal to thick cultural particularities cannot justify violations of the
thin moral code. I
Shue maintains that to enjoy many first-generation human rights requires the exercise of positive
and costly duties. He agrees with the traditional definition of positive and negative duties,
however he argues that correlative to any single human right is not just a negative or positive
duty, but a mixture of duties. He argues for three: 1) negatively, not to deprive someone of the
object of his/her right 2) positively, to protect someone in possession of the object of his/her
right 3) positively, to aid the person, should someone still manage to violate her or her right.
He maintains that the performance of these duties is mandatory to supply everyone of the object
of their rights. Human rights are protected only when relevant actors and institutions fulfill the
following duties: “1) all persons refrains from violating the right; 2) effective institutions exist to
protect the object of the right 3) all those in a position to do so come to one’s aid in case such
protection fails.”
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Orend (and I concur) maintains that the duties correlative to human rights are all duties of
justice, which are normatively negative duties that are considered imperative to perform. He
rejects the idea that human rights are benevolent or normatively positive duties where one
considers human rights as something we “ought” to do.
I conclude therefore it is our moral obligation to intervene in the case of humanitarian
intervention and in order to do so we must further define Walzer’s definition of “shock against
humanity” and thin morality. Hampton advocates what she calls “convention consent” to the
regime, that as along as their behavior supports or at least doesn’t undermine the consent of the
people. A regime that receives what Hampton calls endorsement consent gets from its subjects
not just activity that maintains it but also activity that conveys their endorsement and approval of
it. She asks, “How can one defend political authority if it has a relationship with dissidents that
cannot be morally defended?” The same can be asked of the relationship among its people in
general. A minimally moral state should include more than protection from genocide, it should
be protected from extreme neglect from its government, such as those that allow their citizens to
starve while investing in senseless civil war, weapons, and personal riches. A place to start is
Orend’s general principle that the more power and influence one has over the objects of
another’s vital needs, the greater the degree of responsibility one has in connection with that
person’s human rights. He argues for establishing genuinely global protections for everyone
against the infliction of grievous and unjust harm, which can be used for intervention rules as
well.
Many of the arguments to this position have been outlined elsewhere in this essay and the
previous one as well. This includes the objection that we are not responsible for citizens outside
of our border and a stern commitment to state sovereignty as a right regardless of a government’s
treatment of its people. Probably the argument most legitimate one is noted by Luban, who notes
the average American does not necessarily believe we should sacrifice money, resources, and
human lives for humanitarian reasons. Yet with education and a true international definition of
human rights, citizens will become more accepting of our responsibility and regimes more
reluctance to commit such atrocities. Without a true effort and commitment to intervention,
there is no incentive for improvement around the gravest human rights violations. The condition
of many in our society today are dependent on our furthering this issue and settling the debate.
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3. What do you consider to be the most important (classical or contemporary) challenges to
democracy as a mode of political governance? Now distinguish two ways in which
defenders of democracy have sought to meet this challenge. Which way is most
convincing? Why? Anticipate and respond to at least one objection to your position.
Challenge to Democracy
The most important challenge to democracy is the assertion that people are not qualified to run
their own country. Plato’s argument is one of the most important in this regard. He saw both
democracy (all the people ruled, the many) and oligarchy (few elite ruled) as both exploitative
and in the self interest of the rulers. In the Republic, he shows that oligarchy and democracy
could descend into tyranny. His objection to democracy is that it did not have an objective
standard of value and does not require people to follow reason. It leaves it open for people to
vote on the basis of their passions, their fears, their most irrational judgments, and for Plato the
most important thing was to be governed by reason. It should try to aim at what is generally
good not just what works best for the individual. He discussed the analogy of a ship where you
would want the caption to be steering rather than the crew given his higher level of expertise.
The same holds true for politics. In his opinion this led to the conclusion that we should be ruled
by philosophers because of their love of reason and because it is they who wanted to rule the
least. This absence of desire meant they could not be corrupted and would rule from the
expertise of the good for all of society. He argues that this will benefit the people the best, that
the point is not to control them but to give them enough discipline and order to set them free.
While much of Plato’s conclusions in the Republic (like state controlled breeding, the raising of
gold children and rampant censorship) is obviously disturbing, I could not help to see the value
behind his argument around reason. As I watched our political candidates take shots and drink
beer, be advised to sound “less intelligent” and disregard the “elite” opinion of economists, I
could not help but wonder about our system of democracy. When did intelligence and reason
become replaced by the need to woo the “white, working class voter?” Is this incentive to defy
reason and experience when necessary best for our politics and our government?
Dahl disagrees with Plato’s arguments and refutes the idea of guardianship in several ways. First
he claims there is no common good, only the interests and “good” of the members of the
community. These members are the only ones that know best what their interests include.
Second, there is no science that combines all of the moral and intellectual knowledge necessary
to run a complex modern state. No one person or small group of people can possibly have all of
the knowledge needed around the complex issues of today. Third, the most important political
decisions involve value questions, not technical questions, which are best left to the members of
the community. Finally, leaders such as the philosopher kings described by Plato do not exist.
Humans are fallible and there are limits to their knowledge. In addition, Dahl argues that an
imperfect democracy is misfortune for its people, while an imperfect authoritarian regime is an
“abomination”. If we seek to choose a strategy that seeks to choose the best of the worst
outcomes, guardianship will not come close.
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Of these arguments, I believe the strongest is the argument surrounding a guardian’s ability to
understand the common good. Individuals understand what is best for them and given the
diversity of most countries, it is impossible for a philosopher king to know what is best for each
individual and then determine a best outcome for the greater good. One could argue though that
the general good is not simply an aggregation of individual interests and therefore takes
understanding of how it differs. If it is true that most people are mainly concerned with their
own self-interest, then isn’t also true that most people cannot be counted on to understand or act
on the behalf of the greater good? If this is the case, then one can argue that it is better to entrust
the task of deciding the general good to persons trained to understand how to bring it about.
Again, this leads us back to Dahl’s argument that there is no such training and a difficulty
finding a conclusive rational basis for judgments such as the general good. He argues that no set
of guardians could reasonably sustain the claim that they possessed a “science of ruling” which
consists of “objectively true” knowledge of the public good.
In addition, Sen points to studies which have shown there is little evidence that authoritarian
governments are beneficial to economic development, nor has there been shown a link to a
general conflict between political freedoms and economic performance. He points democracy as
the best form of government that allows people to express their needs and generate a response to
those needs. Governmental response to the acute suffering of people often depends on the
pressure that is put on government, or the exercising of political rights. This relates to the
instrumental role in democracy as noted above and the incentives the system places on the
actions of the government.
In the end, democracy is founded on the concept of equality, or as Dahl calls it, the idea of
intrinsic equality. In addition, he points to the principle of equal consideration which holds that
since we are all of equal worth, our interests deserve equal consideration in the political process.
Dahl contends democracy promotes individual and collective freedom, human development and
is the surest process that allows people to protect and advance their interests and conceptions of
the good. Hampton said it well when she stated, “Now we see the way in which a modern
democratic regime accommodates rebels. It allows people to withdraw their consent, at regular
intervals, from particular persons holding power and particular rules or offices in the regime,
even while keeping them within the overall political structure of the regime. . . . In this kind of
state, disgruntled residents are confronted not with tools of mastery but with procedures laid
down by the governing convention for changing their rulers or the offices they hold or these
procedures themselves”
While our political system is sometimes frustrating and we inevitably elect flawed leaders, I
believe democracy is our best opportunity for representation of the public good. I consider
myself to be very left of center so it can be frustrating to see people more centered or slightly
right of center. But our system protects me from “tyranny” of those extremely right of center (at
least most of the time and/or short durations at a time!).
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