AMERICAN EMBASSY, TOKYO
PUBLIC AFFAIRS SECTION
OFFICE OF TRANSLATION AND MEDIA ANALYSIS
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DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS
April 19, 2002
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------INDEX:
(1) Simulating emergencies: What if war breaks out between two East Asian
neighboring countries in 20XX?
(2) My view on emergency legislation by Asaho Mizushima, Waseda University
professor; Emergency legislation is a Cold War relic running counter to the times
(3) Diet reply by Foreign Ministry director general: In hypothesizing an armed
attack on Japan, no obligation on U.S. to defend Japan
(4)
On additional anti-deflation measures, discussions straying off course,
complicated by tug-of-war over proposed early implementation of tax cuts;
Government urged to compile package, without taking optimistic view
ARTICLES:
(1) Simulating emergencies: What if war
breaks out between two East Asian
neighboring countries in 20XX?
ASAHI (Pages 2&3) (Full)
April 17, 2002
How will Japan respond to emergencies if the
government-drafted three emergency-related bills are
passed in their original form? The Asahi Shimbun
simulated government actions and Self-Defense
Force operations based on interviews with
government bureaucrats and SDF staff officers
involved in the work of drawing up the bills. [Ohki
(or Hiroki) Arima, Political Section, and Kuratoshi
Yokoyama, Local News Section]
Simulation 1—Neighboring contingency: U.S.
intervenes in conflict, asks Japan for support
In the year 20XX, a military conflict broke out
between two neighboring states in East Asia,
Country "A" and Country "B." The United States,
allied with Country "B," began its military
intervention with air strikes against Country "A" in
order to back up Country "B."
Policemen guard U.S. military bases
The U.S. president made up his mind to
commit troops from U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ). In
conformity with a Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
provision, the U.S. president proposed "prior
consultations" to the Japanese government for the
first time (as stipulated in the exchanges of notes
regarding the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty's Article 6).
The Japanese prime minister approved the proposed
use of bases in Japan. The president then requested
the prime minister to conduct rear support for U.S.
forces and tighten the security of USFJ bases.
The government acknowledged the conflict
between Country "A" and Country "B" as "a situation
in areas surrounding Japan that will have an
important influence on Japan's peace and security (or
a neighboring contingency)." Japan started out with
2
logistical support activities, such as refueling U.S.
naval vessels on the high seas away from combat
areas and treating sick and wounded soldiers in Japan,
in conformity with the Article 6 provisions of the
Law for Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (or
the so-called regional contingency security law).
In response to the outbreak of terrorist attacks
in the United States, Japan amended the Self-Defense
Forces Law. As a result, the SDF is allowed to
engage in "security operations" for USFJ bases and
facilities. However, this newly added provision of
the SDF Law is intended to deal with terrorism. The
government therefore judged that it would be
inapplicable to USFJ in this case, and the government
instead mobilized riot police squads to intensify the
security of USFJ bases and facilities.
Simulation 2—Predictable attack: Country "A"
regards Japan as enemy
Country "A" released a statement to the effect that
it regards Japan, which backs up U.S. forces, as an
enemy. Country "A" possesses ballistic missiles
that can reach Japan, and limited guerrilla attacks
against Japan were also predicted.
SDF builds up strongpoints on paddy fields
Article 2 of the armed-attack contingency law
defines "a situation in which an armed attack is
predictable with an imminent threat of such an
attack" as an emergency, even when there is no armed
attack against Japan. The law's definition of a
contingency is ambiguous. Moreover, some in the
government and in the ruling coalition were cautious
about acknowledging such a situation as an armedattack contingency because such might be
internationally taken as a declaration of war on
Country "A." But the prime minister made up his
mind. The premier ordered the Security Council of
Japan (SCJ) to work out a basic course of action.
The SCJ set up a permanent committee of
experts on contingency countermeasures in
accordance with the Article 8 provisions of the
revised SCJ establishment law.
The newly
established panel usually prepares a course of action
responding to every possible emergency pattern.
Japan intensified its defense of coastal
districts, anticipating armed spy boats' infiltration in
the disguise of fishing boats or refugee boats. Japan
also steps up its anti-air surveillance to provide
against missile attacks… Based on the SCJ's report,
the prime minister decided on a basic course of action
in a cabinet meeting. The government immediately
asked for Diet approval in conformity with the Article
9 provisions of the armed-attack contingency law.
The prime minister has also set up an armed-attack
contingency headquarters—which is headed by the
prime minister himself and consists of all cabinet
ministers—in conformity with the Article 10
provisions of the armed-attack contingency law.
In the basic course of action, the government
takes a serious view of the possibility of guerrilla
attacks on atomic power plans in particular. The
government designated coastal areas surrounding
those atomic power plants as "areas for SDF
deployment."
At the Defense Agency director
general's request, the governors of prefectures with
those atomic power plants entered into procedures for
the use of agricultural and forest land in the
designated areas. Armed SDF contingents, ordered to
build up defensive facilities, began to build up
strongpoints there in conformity with the Article 103
provisions of the revised SDF law. One farmer
reluctantly complied with the government's need to
use his farmland because he will be fined if he refuses
to offer his land.
Although there will be
compensation from the government, he could not find
it in his heart to see his paddy field being dug up.
On the other hand, the government intended
to evacuate the local residents of those designated
areas. However, the government had foregone
legislative measures needed to alert and evacuate
local populations for future legislation, as prescribed
in the Article 22 and Article 23 provisions of the
armed-attack contingency law.
Simulation 3—Increasingly imminent threat:
Armed spy boats in disguise of refugee boats
3
A large number of refugee boats were crowding to
Japan's coastlines from Country "A" and Country
"B." Japan Coast Guard (JCG) patrol boats are on
the alert. Then, top-secret information came in
from the United States. There are armed spy boats
from military ports in Country "A" among those
refugee boats…
MSDF destroyer warning, standing off refugee
boats
Government officials from relevant ministries
and agencies met at the prime minister's official
residence to discuss countermeasures. One of those
officials in the meeting said, "There's no choice but to
dispatch the SDF against armed spy boats. We want
the government to issue an order to the SDF for
defense operations." Another said, "JCG and police
can cope with them if they're on the scale of several
dozens."
With the government reaching no
conclusion, JCG patrol boats encountered refugee
boats. The JCG, based on its police authority, told
the refugee boats to stop, and JCG officers began
boarding each of those refugee boats to inspect.
However, one of those refugee boats ordered
to stop at sea began scuttling. Its structure was
similar to suspicious ships ever identified by the
government. The prime minister judged that the
scuttling boat is highly likely to be an armed spy boat,
and the premier issued an order to a Maritime SelfDefense Force destroyer standing by around there for
maritime security action in conformity with SDF Law
Article 82.
The MSDF destroyer on stage fired warning
shots. The covert-operations ship returned fire with
such weapons as a rocket launcher and a machinegun.
However, the MSDF destroyer there was on an
extension line of activities based on police authority.
Therefore, the MSDF, remaining unauthorized to use
armed force to repel the spy ship, was standing off the
spy ship.
On the other hand, the prime minister sounded
out the government of one prefecture for the SDF's
use of a local seaside airport in that prefecture as a
base for a heliborne detachment. It was a request
based on the headquarters chief's overall coordination
authority stipulated in Article 14 of the armed-attack
contingency law. The governor, however, was
reluctant to cooperate, pointing to the danger of
incurring retaliatory attacks and insisting on the
necessity of ensuring commercial airlines' flight
services.
The prime minister is authorized to instruct
the heads of local governments to implement
necessary measures "if and when there is an obstacle
to protecting people's lives and property or to
expelling an armed attack, and if and when the
necessity thereof is recognized in particular," as
prescribed in Article 15 of the armed-attack
contingency law. However, in case there is no
specific law by then to stipulate legal grounds, the
prime minister is not allowed to execute such
necessary measures instead of the governor
disobeying the instruction, according to Article 15 of
the armed-attack contingency law.
Simulation 4—Possible attack: Information about
missiles being prepared
There is another information from USFJ to the
effect that Country "A" is fueling ballistic missiles.
Their target unknown. On the other hand, a spy
ship broke through the network of maritime
security, and armed operatives on board the spy ship
landed in Japan.
Diet approval after SDF mobilization for defense
operations
Faced with an increasing threat to Japan, the
prime minister judged that an armed attack is feared
to occur. The prime minister therefore decided to
order SDF mobilization for defense operations in
conformity with Article 76 of the SDF law. The
government modified its basic course of action,
which is based on the armed-attack contingency law,
in order to meet a new phase of developments, as
prescribed in Article 9 of the armed-attack
contingency law.
In principle, SDF mobilization for defense
operations requires the Diet's prior approval.
4
However, the prime minister decided to ask for ex
post facto approval after mobilizing the SDF for an
emergency.
The Japanese government asked the U.S.
government to strike missile sites in Country "A"
before that country launches missiles. The United
States held Country "A" in check by announcing its
readiness to raid missile sites for joint actions in
conformity with Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty.
On the other hand, the mobilized SDF tanks
and helicopters headed for the intruding guerrillas'
possible landing points. SDF troops were to be
moved at night for operational reasons. However, a
special measure allowing SDF vehicles to run with no
headlights on was precluded from the amendment to
the SDF law this time because evacuated people
would be endangered.
A rocket hit an armored vehicle at night when
it was running with its headlights on to abide by the
road traffic law, and some SDF members were either
killed or injured. The government judged that it was
an attack launched by an armed spy, and the
government permitted the SDF to use armed force in
conformity with Article 88 of the SDF law.
However, the SDF's rules of engagement
(ROE), which are a manual with specific criteria for
military actions, are unclear. The use of weapons was
up to each SDF commanding officer in effect.
"When shot at by a pistol, can we fight back
with a tank?" One active SDF commanding officer
did not know what to do. But his tank troops
continued to search for the invisible guerrillas.
Those intruding guerrillas, moving faster than
expected, forestalled the SDF's encirclement.
Information failed to reach local populations due to
the lack of a law for alerting and other procedures.
Therefore, some civilians evacuated were hit by
armored vehicles heading for a battlefield, and some
residents were left on a battlefield. The guerrilla
commandoes engaged in subversive activities at
various locations, and many houses and farms were
damaged.
About a month later, the SDF completely put
down all guerrillas. And the damage totaled more
than several hundred billion yen. The government
announced its intention to consider special
compensation that is not stipulated any of the current
laws. On the other hand, the government was at a
loss how to treat captured guerrillas because there is
no law regarding the treatment of captives, as
described in Article 22 of the armed-attack
contingency law.
(02041705im)
(2) My view on emergency legislation by
Asaho Mizushima, Waseda University
professor; Emergency legislation is a Cold
War relic running counter to the times
ASAHI (Page 4) (Excerpt)
April 18, 2002
-- The government has submitted three emergency
legislation-related bills to the Diet.
They are designed only to deal with armed attacks.
This emergency legislation is essentially a Cold War
relic. During the Cold War, attacks by the Soviet
Union were conceivable. But today, chances are
much higher for Japan to come under armed attacks
as a result of the United States' intervention. This
implicates a shift from defense-oriented legislation to
intervention-oriented emergency legislation. If the
United States attacked a "rogue state" or an "axis of
evil" and Japan provided logistical support, Japan
would naturally face a counterattack. Creating
legislation looking like a relic of the Cold War era
runs counter to the currents of history.
True intension is to empower the prime minister
to deal with emergencies
5
-- There is criticism that the government has put
measures to fight terrorism and suspicious ships on
the back burner.
Japan has strong muscles, namely, the Self-Defense
Forces (SDF), National Police Agency and Japan
Coast Guard. But our country has not been able to
use those muscles in a coordinated way. Although
those bills focus on the government's response to a
foreign military attack, the government's real
intention, in my view, is to establish flexible
emergency legislation. In any country, the top leader
is constitutionally allowed to have special powers in
national emergency. Such powers are left out of our
Constitution. As the government of a constitutional
country, they should squarely propose amendments to
the Constitution to enhance the authority of the prime
minister.
Of all types of emergencies, natural disasters seem
the most realistic to Japan. There might be an
eruption of Mr. Fuji, large-scale earthquakes, or
devastating typhoons. To deal with such disasters,
there is the Disaster Measures Basic Law that
stipulates necessary measures, such as the
establishment of an emergency task force. As for
public peace, the Police Law allows the prime
minister to declare an emergency situation and to
direct the national police system. There is criticism
that Japan is ill prepared for emergency situations,
but that is not always true. It was just that military
emergencies has been ruled out simply because
mobilizing troops runs counter to Article 9 of the
Constitution.
-- A bill dealing with an armed attack has a number
of principles, such as minimizing restrictions on
people's rights. Don't they serve as brakes?
The order of those "principles" has problems. For
instance, "measures for local public organizations and
designated public organizations" and "the people's
cooperation" take precedence of "efforts for averting
an armed attack." This offers a glimpse into the
government's intention of totally controlling local
governments, public organizations and the people for
national defense.
-- The definition of an armed attack seems unclear.
"A situation where an armed attack is expected"
comes form Article 77 of the SDF Law that stipulates
requirements for issuing an "order to stand by for
defense operations." "An order to stand by" means
SDF personnel have to stay at their bases. At that
stage, the government is not allowed to expand its
interpretation of emergency and restrict civic rights.
The SDF Law has a provision requiring business
operators in such sectors as medicine, construction
and transport to obey the government's order. That
provision, however, will not be applied until after an
order for defense mobilization is issued.
government officials who know little or nothing of
the actual situation. The government should push
ahead with decentralization in security as well.
-- "Cooperation of the people" was added as a result
of talks with the ruling coalition.
Is the government trying to press a sense of loyalty on
the Japanese people who have been taking peace for
granted for decades?
As was proven by the
volunteers after the Great Hanshin [Osaka-Kobe]
Earthquake, people are not helpless at all when they
are united to save their country. The government
regards citizens only as objects to obtain cooperation.
(02041804st)
Setback in Diet involvement
-- How should the Diet involved in the matter?
In principle, defense mobilization requires prior Diet
approval. However, according to basic response
policy, Diet approval can wait until after a Cabinet
decision. What's more, the government does not have
to obtain Diet approval until after taking measures.
So it is essentially a setback on the part of the Diet.
The question is, what if the Diet did not approve
defense operations? Mobilized SDF personnel are
required to withdraw "immediately." But according
to basic policy, they are required to withdraw
"swiftly." In legal terms, "swiftly" is slower than
"immediately."
The neighboring emergency law stipulates that the
mobilized SDF personnel must withdraw "swiftly,"
deeming they cannot pull out "immediately" because
U.S. troops are also involved. The government used
the same expression. This indicates that "Diet
disapproval" is not in the dictionary of bureaucrats.
-- The relationship with local governments is one of
the focal points.
The government has created a system that will allow
the prime minister to issue orders directly to local
governments by bypassing governors. But there
might be cases where decisions by local areas are
correct. Chances of making erroneous decisions
might increase if matters were left to central
6
(3) Diet reply by Foreign Ministry director
general: In hypothesizing an armed attack on
Japan, no obligation on U.S. to defend Japan
YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full)
April 18, 2002
North America Bureau Director General
Ichiro Fujisaki of the Foreign Ministry yesterday in
the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee
expressed his interpretation that in a contingency that
hypothesizes an armed attack on Japan, there would
be no obligation on the United States to defend Japan.
He said: "The obligation (for a joint response by
Japan and the U.S. as set) under the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty would be at the time when Japan had
been attacked by an armed force."
He was
responding to a question from Minshuto (Democratic
Party of Japan) member Yutaka Kuwahara.
On this matter, a government source
explained: "It means that [although] the U.S. armed
forces bears no obligation under the security treaty,
there is still a possibility of the U.S. mobilizing its
forces."
(02041804bb)
(4) On additional anti-deflation measures,
discussions straying off course, complicated by
tug-of-war
over
proposed
early
implementation of tax cuts; Government
urged to compile package, without taking
optimistic view
YOMIURI (Page 9) (Page 9) (Slightly abridged)
April 18, 2002
Discussions in the government on additional
anti-deflation measures are straying off course. The
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy and the
Finance Ministry have been at loggerheads over the
propriety of the proposed early implementation of tax
cuts – an eye-catcher in the additional package. The
Japanese economy, beset with huge non-performing
bank loans, remains feeble. Japan relies on the U.S.
economy in bringing about economic recovery. Some
signs of economic recovery have already appeared,
but should the government fail to hammer out proper
and effective additional measures, it might find it
difficult to achieve it.
Positive arguments tone down
During a meeting of the Council on Economic
and Fiscal Policy on April 16, a member from the
private sector who was positive about additional antideflation measures suggested that the government
should judge whether it is proper to work out
additional measures after looking into the national
income statistics in the January – March term due out
in early June. This suggestion seems to have
prompted many participants to incline toward
shelving the task of additional measures
After the government came up with the
package of anti-deflation measures late in February,
stock prices shot up in part because of the effect of
restrictions on short selling, and eventually concerns
about a "March financial crisis" were diminished.
Such a circumstance has eased the heightened sense
of alarm in the government and also affected the
proceedings of discussions in the policy advisory
council.
7
On April 2, the three ruling parties issued an
emergency package of additional anti-deflationary
measures featuring tax breaks. But set off by the
disclosure of the results of the Financial Services
Agency's special inspections into leading banks,
positive arguments for additional measures have been
toned down.
Some persons criticize the inspections as
insufficient, but an increasing number of observers,
looking at surging stock prices, suggest, "It would be
better to take a drastic treatment from a medium- to
long-term perspective."
Struggle for leadership
Many see sometime before the Kananaskis
summit in Canada this June as the targeted time limit
for additional anti-deflation measures.
But some have begun to call for implementing
tax cuts first, instead of mapping out an additional
package of various types of measures.
In the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy
and ruling parties, many members are calling for
implementing tax breaks related to investment, land
and inheritance during fiscal 2002. To make up for
the drop in tax revenues, they call on the government
to cut its expenditures and use the proceeds from the
sale of state property.
Finance Minister Shiokawa in a meeting of
the advisory panel on April 16 also indicated his view
of tolerating earlier tax cuts on the condition of tax
hikes in the near future. Some observers predict that
affected by his suggestion, the trend of discussions in
the government and ruling camp might incline toward
earlier implementation of tax cuts.
Finance Ministry officials, however, are
prudent about the possibility of tax cuts being carried
out alone.
Prime Minister Koizumi also holds a cautious
stance toward early tax cuts, saying: "Ongoing
discussions on the tax system should be reflected in
our policy for fiscal 2003. We should not conduct the
discussions in a hasty manner."
Some business leaders voice expectations for
early tax breaks as a measure to put the economy on a
steady recovery path. But what conclusion will come
out remains murky, with various motives
crisscrossing and due to the struggle for leadership
between the Prime Minister's Office and the ruling
camp as well as between the Council on Economic
and Fiscal Policy and the Finance Ministry.
Specific tax-cut measures
In case the government decides to implement
tax breaks during this fiscal year, the focus of
discussions will likely be on stepped-up measures to
bolster corporate research/development and capital
investment. Now, discussions have been conducted
on measures to allow not only small firms but also
major companies to deduct a certain percentage of
their research/development expense accounts from
their corporate taxes and to introduce a depreciationacceleration
system
aimed
at
retrenching
depreciations by moving up the allocation of
depreciation outlays for machinery and facilities.
Some expect measures to be worked out to
expand the amount exempted from taxation on gifted
funds to purchase housing as well as to lighten the
burden of land transfer profit tax and real property
acquisition tax. Another measure to be considered is
the possible introduction of a new system to
consolidate gift and inheritance taxes so that the tax
burden charged on property donated by relatives
while alive will be eased, thereby encouraging the
transfer of assets from elderly people to younger
relatives.
In addition, discussions have been conducted
on an expansion of financing by governmentaffiliated financial institutions and positive utilization
of the government's fiscal investment and loan
program.
Households have trimmed their spending due
to such factors as concern about job security. Under
such circumstances, no one can predict the future of
8
the Japanese economy. In order to put the economy
on a stable recovery track, the government needs to
swiftly come up with substantial additional measures.
Major items emerging as additional anti-deflation
measures
[Tax system]
 Significantly upgrade the depreciationacceleration system to boost corporate capital
investment.
 Expand the scope of subjects applicable to the
measure to deduce a certain percentage of the
research/development expense accounts from
the corporate tax.
 Increase the amount exempted from taxation
on gifted funds to purchase housing (now 5.5
million yen)
 Introduce a new system to consolidate gift and
inheritance taxes so that the tax burden
charged on property donated by relatives
while alive will be eased, thereby encouraging
the transfer of assets from elderly people to
younger relatives.
 Reduce taxation on land transfer, such as the
real property acquisition tax and the
registration tax.
 Implement a package featuring the above
measures in fiscal 2002.
[Fiscal investment and loan program]
 Expand financing by the government's
financial institutions for small companies.
 Promote urban-redevelopment projects by
making use of the Urban Development
Corporation.
 Strengthen the function of the Resolution and
Collection Corporation with an eye on
accelerating the disposal of non-performing
loans.
[Others]
 Establish "economic special districts" to urge
startups in frontier industries by promoting
deregulation.
 Introduce a consecutive-vacation system to
activate the tourist and leisure industry.

Ease restrictions on the building-to-land ratio
and the ratio of building volume to lots with
the aim being to effectively use land.
(02041804ys)
9