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Zero risk of escalation- self interest checks
Fettweis ’7 (Christopher J. Fettweis, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College, 2007 “'On the Consequences of Failure
in Iraq”)
No matter what the outcome in Iraq, the region is not likely to devolve into chaos. Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most
traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East
regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these
countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four.
The region’s autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam’s rather
unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual
for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The
region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception,
as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but
none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the
region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq’s
neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury
propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their
coreligionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with
its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could
do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle
East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor – the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the
world – to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to
address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare. Even a Turkish invasion of the north is hardly inevitable.
Withdrawal from Iraq would, after all, hardly rob the United States of all its tools with which to influence events. Washington and the rest of
NATO still wield significant influence over Ankara; a cross-border invasion would almost certainly doom Turkey’s prospects of entering the
European Union. It is puzzling why anyone would think that no incentive structure could be devised to convince Turkey not to attack its
neighbour. Should such an assault prove undeterrable, it is not clear that intervention would be in the strategic interest of the United States. One
of the worst suggestions that occasionally surfaces in the withdrawal debate is that the United States should ‘redeploy’ troops to Kurdistan in
northern Iraq, in order to ‘deter’ Turkey and reward its Kurdish allies.18 Such a move would allow a continuation of what amounts to statesponsored terrorism, and risk embroiling the United States in yet another local, intractable conflict. The removal of de facto US protection
would presumably encourage the Kurds to act more responsibly toward their more powerful neighbours, and may well prove to be good for
stability. Clearly, elements in Kurdistan actively support Kurdistan Workers’ Party terrorists in Turkey, but that would change if they faced the
possibility of paying a price for their behaviour. A regional descent into the whirlwind following a US withdrawal cannot be ruled out; using
that logic, neither can benevolent transitions to democracy. Just because a scenario is imaginable does not make it likely. In fact, most of the
chaotic outcomes pessimists predict require unprecedented breaks with the past. Since the United States has historically overestimated the
threats it faces, there is every reason to believe that it is doing so again.
Prolif causes middle east peace
Sadr ‘5 (THE IMPACT OF IRAN'S NUCLEARIZATION ON ISRAEL Ehsaneh I Sadr. Middle East Policy. Washington: Summer 2005.
Vol. 12, Iss. 2; pg. 58, 15 pgsMs. Sadr is a graduate student in the department of government and politics at the University of Maryland,
College Park.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that Iran’s access to nuclear weapons may increase the prospects for regional stability and even Middle
East peace. Given the horrendous consequences of an accidental nuclear war, it will be imperative that Iran and Israel develop some sort of
ability to communicate with one another directly. It is not outside the realm of possibility that the institutionalization of such
communications may be the first step in the normalization of relations between the two countries and the future integration of Israel
into its neighborhood.
Proliferators are not aggressive – they care about the economy and regime survival
Alagappa, 2008 (Muthiah – distinguished senior fellow at the East-West Center, The Long Shadow, p. 508-509)
Another major conclusion of this study is that although nuclear weapons could have destabilizing consequences in certain situations, on net they
have reinforced national security and regional stability in Asia. It is possible to argue that fledgling and small nuclear arsenals would be more vulnerable to
preventive attacks; that the related strategic compulsion for early use may lead to early launch postures and crisis situations; that limited war under nuclear conditions to alter
or restore the political status quo can intensify tensions and carry the risk of escalation to major war; that inadequate command, control, and safety measures could result in
accidents; and that nuclear facilities and material may be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These are legitimate concerns, but thus far nuclear weapons have not
undermined national security and regional stability in Asia. Instead, they have ameliorated national security concerns, strengthened the
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status quo, increased deterrence dominance, prevented the outbreak of major wars, and reinforced the regional trend to reduce the
salience of force in international politics. Nor have nuclear weapons had the predicted domino effect. These consequences have strengthened regional security and stability
that rest on multiple pillars. The grim scenarios associated with nuclear weapons in Asia frequently rely on worst-case political and military situations; often they are
seen in isolation from the national priorities of regional states that emphasize economic development and modernization through
participation in regional and global economies and the high priority accorded to stability in domestic and international affairs. The primary goal of regional
states is not aggrandizement through military aggression but preservation of national integrity, state or regime survival, economic growth
and prosperity, increase in national power and international influence, preservation or incremental change in the status quo, and the construction of regional and global
orders in which they are subjects rather than objects. Seen in this broader perspective, nuclear weapons and more generally military force are of greater
relevance in the defense, deterrence, and assurance roles than offensive ones. This does not imply that offensive use of force or military clashes will
not occur; only that force is not the first option, that military clashes will be infrequent, and that when they do occur they will be limited in scope and intensity. Security
interaction in Asia increasingly approximates behavior associated with defensive realism.
New state behavior is rational. The aff is based off ethnocentric claims
Preston, 2007 (Thomas – associate professor of international relations at Washington State University, From Lambs to Lion, p. 37-38)
5.) New Nuclear
States Will Not Act in the Same Rational, Mature Manner the Great Powers Did in the Stewardship of Their Nuclear Weapons This
represents an immensely ethnocentric line of argument, and one which is completely devoid of any historic empirical support. In fact,
if anything, the history of new nuclear state behavior over the past decades has shown nothing but rational, mature stewardship of their
arsenals—and no recourse to war. Early new nuclear states (Britain, France, China) went on to develop fairly similar minimal deterrent doctrines
and could certainly not be argued to have been irresponsible or irrational regarding their weapons (cf. Lewis and Xue 1988; Hopkins and Hu 1995; Johnston 1995/1996;
Goldstein 1992, 2000). Similarly, the second wave of nuclear states ( Israel, Pakistan, and India) have behaved responsibly as well, with all three adopting
notions of minimal deterrence to prevent external attacks threatening their survival, while moving to make their arsenals more stable and secure (cf.
Hersh 1991; Sundarji 1996; Cohen 1998; Hagerty 1998; Kampani 1998; Ahmed 1999; Tellis 2001). Even would-be nuclear states like North Korea and Iran, the longstanding favorites of worst-case scenario pessimists seeking "rogue states" governed by "crazy" leaders whose behavior would be irrational and aggressive (e.g., Dunn 1982;
Martel 1998), have not been shown to be any less rational (if one understands their cultures and societies) than other states.
Indo-Pak war doesn’t escalate
Gwynne Dyer, Ph.D. in war studies from the University of London, serves on the Board of Governors of Canada’s Royal Military College,
independent journalist, May 24, 2002, Hamilton Spectator, “Nuclear war a possibility over Kashmir,” p. Lexis
For those who do not live in the subcontinent, the most important fact is that the damage would be largely confined to the region. The Cold
War is over, the strategic understandings that once tied India and Pakistan to the rival alliance systems have all been cancelled, and no
outside powers would be drawn into the fighting. The detonation of a hundred or so relatively small nuclear weapons over India and
Pakistan would not cause grave harm to the wider world from fallout.
War over Kashmir won’t go nuclear
Keith Lawrence, June 4, 2002, Duke News, “News Tip: Despite ‘Intractable’ Differences, Nuclear War Between India And Pakistan
Unlikely, Duke Experts Say,” http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/2002/06/indiatip0602.html
Though India and Pakistan probably will never agree on who should control the Kashmir region, it is highly unlikely the two South Asian
neighbors will resort to nuclear war to resolve their dispute, says a Duke University professor emeritus who has been researching Pakistan
since 1957. “While they have serious divisions, the Indian and Pakistani regimes are rather rational on this matter,” said Ralph Braibanti,
James B. Duke Professor Emeritus of Political Science. “Even though there is saber rattling going on, I doubt very much they would use
nuclear weapons.”
Deterrence prevents escalation
The Record, February 21, 2002, “Conflict in Kashmir,” p. Lexis
Milton Israel, a professor of modern Indian history at the University of Toronto, says the idea of owning Kashmir has been absorbed into each side’s national
psyche. India argues it can’t let Kashmir go just because it’s primarily Muslim -- that would undermine its status as a secular democracy, he says -- and Pakistan believes “it
must bring the Kashmiris home.” “So there’s 50 years of learning how to hate each other, 50 years of centring this issue into the international relations identity bank -- it’s a
real toughie,” Israel says. The dispute flared again in December, when both countries massed troops on the border, after a suicide squad of Muslim militants attacked the
Indian Parliament in New Delhi. It was then that fears began to grow that the conflict could escalate into all-out war and a nuclear conflagration. Though neither has used
weapons of mass destruction in battle, the rivals have engaged in tit-for-tat nuclear testing, most recently in January when India test-fired a nuclear-capable
missile off its coast. Prof. Israel suggests this muscle-flexing is really an attempt to gain the attention and support of the Americans, especially on the
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he believes the chances of
nuclear war are low because it would be in neither country’s interest. “These are not irrational people. They’ve got the bomb, it’s a problem,
but they’re unlikely to use it,” he says. “In the present kind of sabre rattling, it’s very much a political exercise.”
part of India, which he says is fearful of the growing cosiness between Pakistan and the U.S. over the anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan. And
Hardline Egyptian regime causes military escalation, drawing in the entire middle east
– and kills the economy
Susser, 2/1 – diplomatic correspondent for the Jerusalem Report (Leslie, 2/1/11. “Unrest in
Egypt could lead to Israel’s worst nightmare.”
http://www.jta.org/news/article/2011/02/01/2742789/unrest-in-egypt-could-lead-to-israelsworst-nightmare)
For Israel, the popular uprising against the Mubarak regime raises the specter of its worst strategic nightmare: collapse of the peace treaty with
Egypt, the cornerstone of its regional policy for the past three decades. That is not the inevitable outcome of the unrest; a modified version of
the Mubarak government could survive and retain the "cold peace" with Israel. But if, in a worst case scenario, democratic or Islamic forces
were to come to power denouncing Israel and repudiating the peace deal, that could herald the resurrection of a major military threat on Israel's
southern border. The largely American-equipped and American-trained Egyptian army — by far the most powerful military in the Arab world
— numbers around 650,000 men, with 60 combat brigades, 3500 tanks and 600 fighter planes. For Israel, the main strategic significance of the
peace with Egypt is that it has been able to take the threat of full-scale war against its strongest foe out of the military equation. But a hostile
regime change in Cairo could compel Israel to rethink its military strategy, restructure its combat forces, and, in general, build a bigger army,
diverting billions of shekels to that end with major social and economic consequences. A hostile government in Cairo could also mean that
Egypt would be aiding and abetting the radical Hamas regime in neighboring Gaza, rather than, as at present, helping to contain it. Worse: If
there is a domino effect that also leads to an anti-Israel regime change in Jordan, with its relatively large Islamic political presence, Israel could
find itself facing an augmented military threat on its eastern border, too. That could leave it even worse off than it was before 1977, facing a
combined military challenge from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians -- with the added menace of a fundamentalist Iran that
seeks to acquire nuclear weapons.
U – FRIENDLY REGIME COMING NOW
Western-friendly regime coming now
Kashmir Times, 2/2 (“Egypt's revolution: Obama backing regime change?” Lexis.)
Odds are Mubarak will leave, and stability will return under a new regime, very much subservient to Washington like all other global despots wanting
to go along to get along, or put another way - survive long enough to enjoy power and related privileges.
EGYPT U – FOCUS NOW
State Department focused on bringing an Israel-friendly regime to power now
Israel National News, 2/3 (Chana Ya’ar, 2/3/11. “Obama's Commitment to the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty?”
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/142131)
The United States recognizes that the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has been "of tremendous value to the United States and to the region " -- but will it hold,
and will America feel any commitment towards pushing for its enforcement? A briefing at the State Department on Thursday left troubling questions on the issue. Israel's Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, warned Wednesday in an
address to the Knesset that it was possible that the upheaval in Egypt could lead to the formation of a new Gaza-like gateway to Iran. Journalists at a State Department
briefing in Washington Thursday asked spokesman P.J. Crowley if the U.S. shared Israel's concern on the matter -- but hit a brick wall. "We would hope that the next government of Egypt will play a constructive role
in the peace process and will recognize the importance of having a peaceful relationship with Israel ," he responded dryly. In contrast to the urgency with which Crowley repeatedly stressed that "this
transition, this process for fundamental change needs to begin now," the spokesman had little to say about the threat to the stability of the region, and Israel's security. "We are doing an aggressive, active outreach to
a broad range of figures," he told the reporters. "We have always done that. We're going to continue to do that . We've been very active in the last few days... We have not had contact with the Muslim
Brotherhood," he said, but added, "we will meet with figures. If we meet with anyone along those lines, we'll let you know."
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Now key
Canberra Times, 2/2/11 (“Obama settles on delicate course to get rid of Mubarak.” Karen DeYoung. Lexis.)
The Obama administration, after initially underestimating the force and determination of anti- Government demonstrations in Egypt, appears now to have settled on a public and private
course of action that officials hope will lead to President Hosni Mubarak's departure from office sooner rather than later. Senior officials moved to
further define the "orderly transition" they called for over the weekend, and made clear in public statements that they were not impressed by the steps Mubarak has taken to respond to the protests. In private, officials
across the Administration continued calling contacts in the Egyptian Government, military and opposition to urge movement toward a transitional
process leading to free elections. The State Department sent retired diplomat Frank Wisner, a former ambassador to Egypt, to Cairo on Monday to deliver the message personally. The Administration finds itself in the
uncomfortable position of being a spectator rather than a principal actor in the drama being played out in the streets of Cairo. To some extent, its ability to get in front of events has been hampered by time zones and Mubarak's shutdown of
officials said they were well aware of the need to tread carefully. Key regional allies most of them guilty of at least some of the same repressive
k are watching US actions closely for overt signs that a long-term partner is being pushed out the door. On the other hand, any effort to keep Mubarak in office would probably
doom the US relationship with a new government. Amid reports of increased looting and violence, and the return to the streets of police who attacked demonstrators last week, the Administration "recognises that time
is not our friend," according to one of nearly two dozen outside experts invited to an off-the-record meeting with White House officials. "They are trying to find ways to speed it up.
internet and mobile phone communications. But
practices that appear to have doomed Mubara
The US will play a key role in the Egypt power transition
Chehade, 1/31 – independent political analyst, PhD Candidate (Ghada, 1/31/11. “Egyptian Uprising Must Address U.S Interference and the Role
of Israel in the Region.” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=23018)
the Egyptian people cannot confront local despots and
“regime change” without addressing the patron of Mubarak’s regime--The United States. Second, because of the U.S’ influence and because Egypt is so
strategically important to the U.S-Israel agenda for the Middle East, the U.S will attempt to control their investments and their interests by regaining
control and maintaining patronage. In other words it will attempt (or may have already attempted) to co-opt the public uprising and manage it at some level and continue to do so. Last, in order to adequately
address foreign meddlers within the context of the local region and its politics , one must also eventually address the role of Israel.F
As an analyst and observer of the recent rebellions in the Middle East, specifically Egypt, I want to make three developing observations. First,
US State Department focus on Egypt key to ensure a smooth relationship with Israel
AFP 2/2 (Agence France Presse, 2/2/11. “US wants 'constructive' Egypt on Mideast peace.” Lexis.)
The United States said Wednesday it hopes the future Egyptian government will keep the peace with Israel and play a "constructive role" in bridging
the Jewish state's divide with Palestinians. Nearly 10 days of protests shaking the most populous Arab nation have sent shockwaves through Israel,
leading Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to express fears that the crisis could destabilize the region. "We would hope that the next
government of Egypt will play a constructive role in the peace process and will recognize the importance of having a peaceful relationship with
Israel," said State Department spokesman Philip Crowley. Since the protests began last week, Israel has stressed its focus is to preserve regional stability and its peaceful relations
with Egypt, one of only two Arab nations to have signed a peace treaty with the Jewish state.
U.S. diplomacy is crucial to maintain Israel-Egypt relations
Curry, 1/28 – national affairs writer, msnbc.com (Tom, 1/28/11. “What the United States has at stake in Egypt.”
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41317259/ns/politics/)
Kurtzer, a former U.S. ambassador to Egypt who now teaches at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, said the investment was worth it. “We’ve
gotten more than 30 years of very strong relations with the most important country in the Middle East — and that has taken a large investment from the
United States. We’ve put in billions of dollars of military and economic assistance, but we’ve also gotten a very strong return on that investment: A peace treaty between with
Egypt and Israel that has persisted and really never been violated during the course of 30-plus years, and an ally in a region that every American knows is unstable and potentially dangerous for
Daniel
us.”
2NC/1NR LINK WALL
Plan drains the State Department’s budget
Twu, 10 – Articles Editor and JD Candidate, University of North Carolina Law School (Marianne, Spring. “COMMENT: A Sanctuary for Those
Who Serve: United States Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa Programs.” Winner of the William T. Joyner Award for Excellence in Journal Writing. North
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Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation. 35 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 723.)
Congress should conduct careful reviews of policies regarding resettlement benefits under the SIV programs. The policies must [*756] ensure
proper and adequate delivery of the benefits once the immigrants arrive in the United States, keeping in mind the challenges of such benefits
delivery in other countries. To begin, such an ambitious undertaking calls for increased staffing and resources, which requires more funds. n202 More
importantly, the Department of State must remain realistic about the costs of providing refugee resettlement benefits to SIV recipients and their
families. The funds to provide these benefits will come out of the current refugee account of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
(PRM), and will certainly have no small effect on its holdings. n203 While it is too early to measure the full monetary impact of offering resettlement
benefits to Iraqi SIV recipients, it has been estimated that "the annual cost of refugee benefits payable to holders of SIVs from PRM monies [is] up
to $ 48 million." n204 This estimate assumes a modest caseload of two individuals per case. n205 Increasing the total caseload by just one individual
per case to a total of three individuals per case (which some believe is a more realistic estimate) would increase the annual resettlement cost to nearly
$ 75 million. n206 It is crucial that the Department of State and other relevant governmental agencies anticipate these costs especially as they are
promising the benefits to Iraqis coming through the SIV programs. The U.S. government should prevent any misrepresentation of resettlement
benefits to Iraqis prior to arrival, a problem that befell the Iraqi interpreter resettlement programs in Britain, Australia and Denmark. n207 Learning
from those mistakes, the United States should make it a priority to follow through with their resettlement promises and policy objectives.
Plan causes State Department overstretch – resources and staff
Office of Inspector General, 08 (“Status of Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa Programs,” Report by the United States Department of State and the
Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General. http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/109298.pdf)
. Under the Kennedy Bill, SIV applicants are not required to pay processing
fees, including a $400 SIV issuance fee and a $190 USCIS petition filing fee.10 In addition, the team learned that consular offices in Amman, Baghdad, and Damascus will have to add additional staff and make
physical changes to their workspace to accommodate the increased workload . Depending on howthe Department decides to divide the SIV processing workload, Embassy Amman estimated it will
The Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs supports its operations through fees it collects for services rendered
require as many as five staff and an expanded work space to meet the increased workload. In Baghdad, with the move to the new embassy compound in May 2008, the consular section has sufficient workspace to process cases, but offi- cials
estimated they will require two additional staff members to handle the expected 800-1,200 applications a year there. However,
due to the fee waiver provision in the legislation, these additional staff resources
and costs will not be offset by the corre- sponding increase of user fees.
Expanding the SIV program costs State Department resources
DiploPundit 08 (9/21, “Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqis: Bag with Holes.” http://diplopundit.blogspot.com/2008/09/special-immigrant-visasfor-iraqis-bag.html)
A footnote in the report indicates that the Bureau of Consular Affairs retains approximately $45 per individual filing fee and the remaining $355 is deposited in the U.S. Treasury’s general fund. Since these applicants won't be charged these fees,
processing 5,000 SIV cases (with three individuals per case) will cost the Bureau of Consular Affairs approximately $675,000 in lost revenue per year and the U.S.
Treasury more than $5 million per year. In addition, it also requires additional staff and office space to handle the additional workload in Iraq and several other
consular sections in the region.
Plan drains the PRM budget
Geisel, 08 – Acting Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General of the United States (Harold W, July. “Status of Iraqi Special Immigrant
Visa Programs,” Report by the United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General.
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/109298.pdf)
Recommendation 2: The Bureau for Consular Affairs should verify staff- ing and resource needs to meet the expected increase of SIV applications
and should request additional funds to sustain staffing and resource needs to effi- ciently and effectively manage the SIV programs in Iraq. (Action:
CA)
Furthermore, the provision of refugee resettlement benefits to SIV recipients and their families – transportation, processing, reception, and
placement – will be funded from PRM’s current refugee account. At the time of OIG team’s evaluation, the bureau was estimating the budget
impact of meeting the projected cost of this new caseload based upon an anticipated case size of two individuals per case. In March 2008 at a
congressional hearing on Iraqi refugees and SIVs, the senior coordi- nator on Iraqi refugee issues estimated the annual cost of refugee benefits
payable to holders of SIVs from PRM monies at up to $48 million. However, the team believes the bureau may be underestimating the case size and
thus the overall cost of the re- settlement program. According to Department refugee and consular officers in the region and previous experience
with similar programs, the team believes the average case size will be close to three individuals resulting in an annual resettlement cost of nearly $75
million.
The State Department has to reallocate resources for the plan
IRC, 08 – International Rescue Committee (March. “Five years later, a hidden crisis: report of the IRC Commission on Iraqi Refugees.”
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/iraq/ircreport-iraq2008.pdf
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The Kennedy legislation expands the categories of Iraqis who will have priority for admission to the United States as refugees. The Kennedy bill
does not specify the number of Iraqis who should come to the United States each year as refugees, but the emphasis on expanded categories could
result in higher refugee admissions and more focus on vulnerable groups. The legislation also authorizes a significant increase in the number of
Iraqis who can come to the United States with special immigrant visas (SIVs). Under a prior law, a total of 500 Iraqis and Afghans who worked as
translators for the U.S. government can get such visas each year and they can bring their family members. Under the new law, another 5,000 Iraqis
and their family members (expected to total 10,000 to 12,000 persons) will be able to get such visas for the next five years, and they will be eligible
for the same services and benefits as those admitted as refugees. The State Department was already planning to resettle 12,000 Iraqi refugees in fiscal
year 2008. The impact of the SIVs and refugee provisions of this legislation could boost admissions this year to at least 25,000 Iraqis—and
potentially many more—for whom no other viable solution exists. 9
The DA is linear – every immigrant costs a given amount
Rusch 08 – former Director, Office of Admissions, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State (Terry, 2/4. “Briefing
on Developments in the Iraqi Refugee and Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) Admissions Programs.”
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/iraq/State/100030.pdf)
QUESTION: Speaking of Peter, Paul and payment, how much is this – how much money is being expended on this program currently?
AMBASSADOR FOLEY: Which program?
QUESTION: The – well, on bringing Iraqi refugees in?
MS. RUSCH: It’s hard to specify. It’s on average somewhere between $4,000 and $4,500 per refugee, of any nationality. That’s the cost to the State
Department. That doesn’t include DHS costs, and it certainly doesn’t cost – take into account the actually larger contribution from Health and
Human Services for refugees once they get here.
New responsibilities massively drain the State Department’s diplomatic capital
Housworth 06 - Managing Principal @ Intellectual Capital Group LLC [Gordon Housworth, “The ventriloquist, the ventriloquist's dummy and SecState Rice,” Intellectual Capital
Group, 12/26/2006 - 11:52, pg. http://spaces.icgpartners.com/index2.asp?NGuid=8918CA77EC73456A872330FE3EB4437D]
Diplomatic capital shares many characteristics with its more fungible financial cousin. It is invariably less expensive to raise when it is not needed, when the cost of capital is low.
Often the act of attempting to raise it under adverse circumstances devalues the applicant, placing it in a less advantaged position. Arbitrarily
placing key assets outside a deal or restricting the class of instruments by which one can raise capital can be seen as daft, even specious, and so cause the deal to
delay, even collapse.
6