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Paul Carls
8 May 2009
Nietzsche Seminar
The Meaning of Gefahr in Nietzsche’s Oeuvre
Introduction/Summary
The text for this seminar is an entry into the Nietzsche Dictionary by Benedetta
Giovanola concerning the word Gefahr. The article gives an outline of the meanings of
this word that Nietzsche uses and in what context in order to better understand what
Nietzsche means when he discusses Gefahr in his works. The article is broken into six
different categories, and the majority of the content is a series of exerts taken from
Nietzsche’s books in which he uses the word Gefahr. The main goal of the article is to
employ a systematic presentation of the word Gefahr in Nietzsche’s works in order to
understand better Nietzsche’s philosophy, and I believe that the article succeeds largely
in this effort.
The first category of the article discusses information about the use of Gefahr in
Nietzsche’s, oeuvre, taking note of how many times and where the word is used and of
the semantic field of Gefahr. The second category is a table of contents concerning the
thematic and structure of the passages the article cites from Nietzsche’s work. In other
words, it is the table of contents for sections 3 and 4 which include the cited passages.
The third and fourth categories are the parts of the article that reproduce exerts of
Nietzsche’s work in which the word Gefahr is used. The first section (1) of exerts falls
under the title, “Was heisst Gefahr?” It is subsequently broken up into even more subsections, the first of which looks at Gefahr as “Etwas Negatives bzw. Passives” (1.1).
This sub-section begins by examining the danger of the negation of life and the nihilistic
outlook on life it brings with it. It is largely related to Christianity’s moral system, which
seeks to repress the natural aspects of life as much as possible. The idea of a conservation
of life, of the conservation of something already existing, as opposed to its growth, is also
listed as a danger. Nihilism is also described as “Die Gefahr der Gefahren: Alles hat
keinen Sinn.” (I.1.1.4) The article then discusses the danger in the loss of the interior
form and organization of an individual, with a concentration instead on the content.
Namely, once an individual’s belief, the content, is gone, their inner form, or constitution
of spirit, will not be strong enough to survive. The danger of the infinite (I.1.4.2) is also
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discussed in the article, Nietzsche claiming that modern man is like someone in a horse
carriage who has let go of the reins. Next is mentioned Nietzsche’s belief that modern
man is overwhelmed by the excessive excitation of ‘Nerven- and Denkkräfte’ and has
become neurotic as a result. (I.1.4.3) Next, excessive adoration of the past is discussed as
a danger because it prevents the birth of new life. The article then mentions the danger of
morality, or morality that does not strive for the creation of the strongest individual as
being, again, “die Gefahr der Gefahren.” (I.1.5) The article next mentions the danger of
the education system, which breeds individuals who are complacent and accepting of the
modern culture.
The second sub-section, “Etwas Positives bzw. Aktives” (1.2), investigates the
positive and active aspects of danger. This section begins by looking at the ability to risk,
and the overflowing of strength and confidence needed in order to do so. According to
Nietzsche, “gefährlich leben” is the most effective way to the greatest enjoyment in life.
(Beleg 14) Such a dangerous life in fact is a way of embracing and rejoicing in life, rather
than holding it in contempt. The article then goes into the question of danger as it relates
to science and knowledge. For Nietzsche the problem of science is the most dangerous. If
one is to abandon the pride of humans with regards to science and truth, it will be
necessary that science become more dangerous, i.e. that science gain the ability to
abandon its faith in itself. Nietzsche also says that the only way to truly get to know
someone is when our fate, or the fate of loved ones, lies in that individual’s hands. (Beleg
18) He also says that in the modern age there is too much safety and we are not able to
truly know a human. The article then discusses how Nietzsche believes that the
philosophers of the future are those who are able to live a dangerous life and risk
everything as regards the truth. The article then mentions an interesting play on danger to
the masses. In one instance, Nietzsche claims that the herd wants not only to make those
who are dangerous undangerous, but to punish those individuals as well, and to get to the
point where there is no more danger posed to the herd. On the other hand, Nietzsche says
that the dangerous, free-thinking individuals need protection from precisely this harmful
herd-morality.
The article then goes on to describe danger as it relates to humanity as it is the
“Noch-Nicht-Festgestellt” Tier. (1.2.3) The article mentions how even in Christian ideals
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there is a love of danger and a feeling of power involved. It also mentions Nietzsche’s
approval of the agon, which includes an aspect of danger. Next the article mentions
Nietzsche’s concept of good and overabounding health as a way of being able to live in a
dangerous and experimental way. It permits a freedom for adventure. Thus, Nietzsche
advises people to live in an un-philosophical manner, in a foolish way even. This is
because is allows the individual to continually risk themselves and “spielt das schlimme
Spiel,” which is life itself. (Beleg 29) Next, the image of man as a thread between the
animal and the Übermensch is mentioned. Man is not a goal, or an end-point in evolution,
but merely something that must be overcome in order to achieve a higher state of
existence. Nietzsche also claims that humanity is the sickest animal, precisely because it
is always experimenting with itself and thereby making itself sick. Because humans are
always thinking about the future they are never satisfied with what they are, which is a
dangerous game that makes humanity profound and, yet, sick. Nietzsche also says that
modern man wants above all else to be protected from the dangerous. With this
protection goes a good deal of vivacity and life. Yet, the remedy for humans is thus
revolutions and wars, indicating that within humanity there is constantly a need for
danger. The end of this sub-section ends with a mentioning of the death of God. This is
our greatest moment of danger, because it removes all sheltering identity for man, but it
likewise has the ability to be the most courageous moment since it allows humanity to
take responsibility for itself and to live dangerously.
The second category concerns itself with investigating the content of danger. It is
titled, “Was ist in Gefahr (Was wird Bedroht?) (II). The first sub-section, or the first
thing threatened is “das Leben” (II.1) One way in which life is threatened by danger, is
through history and historical reflection. An incorrect reflection upon and understanding
of history by individuals would result in a decline of life. The second sub-category deals
with the threats to humanity (II.2). The article then discusses the difficulties and dangers
involved with the creation of moral values on the part of the individual. Not only are
these morals by themselves difficult to create, but for the individual creating them, there
is the danger of being ostracized from society. Morality itself, as the article demonstrates,
is in any case formed according to the degree of danger the individual feels themselves
in. Humanity is also threatened when there is a collapse of values. There is also a danger
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for the individual who looks beyond the beliefs of the modern age, who hears their
hollow clang in a universe void of God’s influence. This individual knows the fate of the
West and feels great anguish in its presence. (II.2.2) There is also a danger when looking
upon the suffering of another, because it reminds us of our own frailty. As for strong
individuals, the sick are their greatest danger. For the excellent individuals there are also
dangers, one of which is found in their constitution, the other of which is a result of the
time period in which they are born. The Übermensch is also threatened in a similar way;
by the small people.
The third and final category of Nietzsche’s quotes deals with the sources of
danger. It is aptly named, “Was ist die Quelle der Gefahr?” (III). The first source of
danger is a morality that abstracts from reality. These “Carikatur des Menschlichen” are
the most dangerous. (Beleg 43) Herd morality also poses a threat to the free-thinking
individual. The morality of pity is also specifically mentioned as dangerous. It represents
heard morality, the sickness and weakness of individuals, and also a deep nihilism and
rejection of life, all of which have already been discussed. This makes it the most
dangerous morality. Religion is also seen as a source of danger. Christianity for example
is a religion that despises the world and has made it ugly. Monotheism, the belief in one,
normal god (Normalgott) is also a source of danger, for it removes the plurality that is
found in life and also within a group of individuals. (III.3.2) It breeds excessive
conformity and equality among individuals.
Another source of danger for a thinker comes from science, knowledge, or
questions the truth, for it leads to the despair at the truth. This feeling is connected to
science, and the will to truth. The will to truth is a dangerous will, because in the end it
will lead to a questioning of itself, which will lead to the realization that there is no truth
at all. History is a similar point of danger, which advances with its motto, “fiat veritas
pereat vita.” (Beleg 58) This makes a strong statement, saying that truth is more
important to life, and can be connected to the dangers that are found within the will to
truth. Too much historical knowledge destroys our perceptions of the present and can be
dangerous to the truth. Nietzsche also says that too much scientific knowledge is
damaging to a people in the same way that too much money at once is.
After this outline of Nietzsche’s use of Gefahr, Giovanola next discusses in the
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fifth category of the article the etymology of the word Gefahr, tracing its German and
Latin roots. She also investigates the use of Gefahr as it relates to the sublime, which
includes a feelings such as majesty and danger, and to Greek tragedy, in which the hero
must face danger.
In the sixth and final category, Giovanola begins by discussing the philosophical
significance of Gefahr in Nietzsche’s work and also how the concept has been treated and
received by other philosophers. In the second half of this section, Giovanola investigates
the traditional meaning of Gefahr and its utilization in Nietzsche’s works. She notes that
Gefahr, in the early works, is used to designate something negative, whereas later on in
Nietzsche’s works it comes to designate something more positive and affirmative.
Nietzsche develops largely the latter of these two meanings, Gefahr being “strictly linked
with individuals’ capability to run risks, to form and transform themselves in a neverending process of Selbstüberwindung and creation of future.” (12) This is also linked to
the fact that man is not a defined animal, and therefore is either obliged to experiment
with himself, or to passively search for security.
Giovanola then discusses Gefahr as a ‘Lebensideal.’ Beginning largely in
Morgenröte, this ideal develops itself and Gefahr is seen as a stimulus for life, urging
humanity to continually improve and change itself. In this way, Gefahr gains ‘an
existential connotation.’ (13) An important step in this process is the overcoming of
morality. Within morality arises an interesting double-edged (maybe triple-edged?)
sword. On one hand, morality is dangerous to life because it negates life and to the
individual because it attempts to destroy the individual’s ability to view itself as
individual and to force the individual to conform to a norm. Thus, morality, in seeking to
reduce danger for the majority of the population constitutes a danger to life and to higher
men. Thus morality can on the one hand be dangerous for some and on another hand be
protective of a majority of people. Gefahr, on yet another hand however, can be used to
subvert morality. By living dangerously and experimenting with itself, humanity is able
to overcome the danger of morality. A similar two-fold stance can be seen with science as
well. Science is dangerous to life if it becomes something secure, solid, and ‘pure.’
Gefahr can be introduced into science in order to shake this security and ‘Wahrheit um
jedem Preis.’ (13) This allows for more creativity and an embracing of the Wille zur
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Macht, which views being as becoming.
Discussion
1) Our first point of discussion centered around the structure of the article itself
and how exactly one could distinguish between different types and sources of danger.
This is especially important as in the same text the word Gefahr has a plurality of
meanings depending on the context in which the word Gefahr is used. Prof. van Tongeren
mentioned that the structure of the article is such that the different meanings of the word
Gefahr are torn apart and placed into their respective categories for the purpose of
clarification. If for example in the same text there are different significations for the word
Gefahr, the same text would be repeated in different sections of the article in order to
separate out all of the different meanings and uses of the word. Others mentioned the risk
of the loss of semantic meaning in this process, that by separating out different meanings
for the Gefahr you risk losing the complexity of the context in which the word is
mentioned. In other words, you risk performing a reductionism that simplifies too much
the variety of meanings that Gefahr can have within a text. Prof. van Tongeren mentioned
in connection the five meanings that he would ideally prefer in the article. They are; 1)
the Grundbedeutung of Gefahr, or defining exactly what is Gefahr, i.e. risk, threat, what
one fears; 2) What does danger consist in, or what is the constitution of Gefahr; 3) What
is the efficacy of Gefahr, or what effects does it produce; 4) What is in danger; and lastly
5) What are the causes of Gefahr.
2) There were also numerous questions concerning how exactly it was possible to
define Gefahr, and it was even noted that in the first section Giovanola does not present
an adequate description of what exactly Gefahr is for Nietzsche. There were two options
discussed concerning this question, a complex approach or a minimalist approach. Prof.
van Tongeren noted that it was necessary to name the perspective of the individual
viewing the danger and to understand the definition of Gefahr in this way. Thus, when
we are discussing what Gefahr is, or means, it is necessary to begin with the different
meanings of Gefahr in their particular context. The minimalist approach, on the other
hand, searches for the unity of the meaning of Gefahr. It was noted in the discussion that
this unity could constitute the fact that whenever there is Gefahr, there is always
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something/someone that is opened to a threat, there is a risk and the possibility of losing
something.
It was noted that wherever there is someone who is wanting security and safety
from one’s own Gefahr, there is another who is willing to open themselves up to the
Gefahr. Gefahr, in this way, is always having some sort of threat, but this threat
manifests itself differently in different situations. The threat to the individual can be the
threat of a destroying or a weakening for example. Whenever an individual quits their
security and opens themselves up in order to gain something else, there is always the risk
that they will lose something valuable. In this way, if Gefahr is understood as a threat to
existence, it might be the unity of Gefahr that would fit within the minimalist approach.
Objections were raised, however, as some doubted whether the presence of a threat was
sufficient to constitute something as a Gefahr.
3) We then discussed the fifth section of Giovanola’s article, especially the notion
of the sublime. Some objections were raised at this connection between the historical use
of the sublime and Nietzsche’s use of the word Gefahr. Giovanola noted that before
Nietzsche the idea of Gefahr has no presence in philosophical literature, and so her
discussion of the sublime in her article is searching for a connection wherever it is found.
Some people wondered whether the connection is legitimate and if it actually aids the
reader to understand what Nietzsche means with the word Gefahr. Florian made the point
of bringing up the idea of Fortuna, fortune, chance, luck, that is used by Machiavelli in
Principe. As he pointed out, it is a source of danger for the ruler of a state and its people.
It is an un-calculable and un-predictable force that can bring bad fortune upon a ruler and
its people. In this sense it constitutes a danger. As it relates to Giovanola’s sixth section,
this discussion by Machiavelli demonstrates that there is a history of the use of Gefahr as
a philosophical concept that could be included in her paper.
4) One final point of our discussion concerned Schopenhauer als Erzieher and the
three types of Gefahr that Nietzsche mentions therein. Nietzsche mentions three types of
Gefahr that are necessary for the creation of a genius; isolation, doubt of the truth, and a
hardening of the intellect. Giovanola looks for the Gefahr that is used as the Lebensideal
that develops the genius the most. We noted the difficulty inherent in the process, as there
are three types of Gefahren, and the make-up of each of the Gefahr is difficult to
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determine. There are, for example, Zeitgefahren, which are specific to the time period in
which one lives, and also the Constitutiongefahren, which are inherent within the
constitution of the individual themselves. Due to these reasons, the idea of a Lebensideal
as a Gefahr, is almost impossible to determine.
Critical Points/Personal Reflections
Personal Reflection
I will concentrate here on my impressions on the goal of the method employed by
the dictionary article and how it succeeds in its task of clarifying certain concepts used by
Nietzsche. I believe that the dictionary method of research is an effective way of
concentrating the researchers’ attention on a specific concept. By concentrating on the
meaning of one word the researcher is able to pick out a piece of the intricately woven
puzzle that is Nietzsche’s philosophy and to examine it closely. Thus, they catch a
glimpse of minute or barely audible aspects of Nietzsche’s thinking and are able to
magnify them, whereas, otherwise, these aspects might be overlooked. After the
magnification process, these aspects can be re-integrated into the framework of already
understood elements of Nietzsche’s thought. This has, obviously, the advantage of
providing new perspectives and fresh looks when it comes to interpreting what Nietzsche
is saying in his books. This method provides an important depth with regards to the
hermeneutical process and allows a more comprehensive and nuanced interpretation of
Nietzsche’s text. By taking into account all of the different contexts in which the word is
used, the methodology also assembles apparently disparate aspects of Nietzsche’s
thought together under the rubric of a singular idea. This allows, thus, the researcher to
see connections between different themes in Nietzsche’s work that they may not see
otherwise.
Another advantage of the dictionary method is that it allows for a new way of
understanding how Nietzsche’s thinking changes over time. As noted in the article on
Gefahr, after Morgenröte there is a pronounced shift in Nietzsche’s use of the word
Gefahr. By cataloguing the use and context of different words the researcher is able to
see not only general shifts in Nietzsche’s thinking, but also shifts that are reflected on a
much more subtle level. The meanings of some words, for example, may change at
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different points in Nietzsche’s life, and by taking note of the shifts that exist within
certain concepts it is possible to see a much more detailed description of how Nietzsche’s
thought progresses.
Critical Point
One personal reflection and subsequent critical point I have on the content of the
article itself deals with the idea of ‘gefährlich leben.’ I am wondering to what extent it is
beneficial to the individual to live in this manner. I am thinking this question especially
as it concerns truth and the normalization effect of morality. Is it worth the risk to break
free from its grip, is it foolhardy, is it too nihilistic, is all of this precisely Nietzsche’s
point? To stare down into the infinite chasm and then to look up again at humanity,
happily dancing on top of it, as if on nothing at all. This seems to be a thematic that
occurs throughout Nietzsche’s work, especially in Über Wahrheit und Lüge im
Aussermoralischen Sinne in which Nietzsche depicts humanity on the back of a tiger,
dreaming of the truth in a full state of illusion. One could also point to Die Fröhliche
Wissenschaft, aphorism 344, or Jenseits von Gut und Böse, aphorism 1 for a similar
discussion of the topic. Living dangerously seems to indicate living a life in the absence
of truth, whether it be societal or otherwise. It is a dangerous task to do so, for as with the
image of the person on the tiger’s back, if the illusions of truth are shaken, the person
runs the risk of being eaten by the tiger. So again, to what extent is living dangerously
beneficial to the individual? As Nietzsche asks in aphorism 344 of FW, ‘But why not
deceive? But why not allow oneself to be deceived?’ Is breaking the illusion of truth
merely an accident, a victim of the will to truth that the individual follows faithfully,
ignorant of its fatal consequences? And once the veil of naive innocence has been broken,
is it then a necessity to live dangerously if the individual is to create any meaning and
value within life? Once the foundation of all truth and morality has been removed due to
thorough questioning, would it not be necessary for the individual to begin rebuilding
from the base in order to continue living, assembling their structure based on the
experiments they perform on themselves? Is not, in this sense, living dangerously a
necessity? Having once broken the glass of truth, would it ever be possible to piece it
back together in its original form, believing in its validity in good faith? It would seem
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then that, on one level, truth and morality are beneficial to life, and not dangerous to it as
is noted in the article. Perhaps here is a point of critic, as Giovanola might be
differentiating between a positive and negative Gefahr a bit too easily. Each Gefahr,
whether it be seen as ‘gefährlich leben’ or the Gefahr that morality poses to life, has its
positive and negative aspects.
Nevertheless, what is to be made of this seeming paradox? Does it even make
sense to ask the question? Does the individual, who is driven by the will to truth, even
have a choice in the matter of rejecting or accepting normative values, and thus whether
or not they are to live dangerously?
Conclusion
The article presented by Giovanola is an interesting examination of how the word
Gefahr is utilized by Nietzsche in his works. The result of reading the article is an
interesting examination of the word’s use that provides for a new perspective on several
aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially the famous phrase ‘gefährlich leben’.
Nevertheless, there are issues concerning the structure of the article and its subsequent
sub-categories that need to be addressed. The distinction between negative and positive
Gefahr would also need to be reconsidered. Despite these facts, the article presents a
good contribution to Nietzsche studies.