Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace and
Development Network (SWEPD) and Faith-Based
Organizations in Sudan
Presentation by Dr. Balghis Badri 
This paper will first give a brief classification of faith-based
organizations (FBOs) in Sudan. In the second section an introduction to the
evolution of SWEPD’s activities will be given. Section three will analyze
factors that led to minimum links between FBOs and SWEPD, while in the
conclusion the way forward for possible links and engagement are outlined.
The information is based on the writer’s experience and knowledge of
the Sudanese context as well as some interviews undertaken with key members
of three of the networks, namely civil society, Nuba women and Southern
women.

Balghis Badri is a Professor of Social Anthropology and Gender Studies, Director of the
Institute of Women, Gender and Development Studies in Ahfad University for Women, and
a Member of the Advisory Council of SWEPD Network.
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Section I: Introducing Faith-Based Organizations in Sudan
Faith-based organizations in Sudan can be classified into Islamic and
Christian. The Islamic ones can be placed into three main categories with subcategories as follows:
1- Organizations of belief in sainthood of the Sufi sects. These are many,
however they belong to five main branches. They are concentrated
geographically in Khartoum, northern and central Sudan, with a few
followers in Kordufan and Darfur. Their main aim is to achieve spiritual
purification and love association with God using rituals to achieve this
goal. The activities of the saints’ heirs – the shaikhs of the sect – are
mainly to give blessings, lead prayers, teach Quran, help to solve
individual problems and medication using herbal remedies and Quranic
verses. They do not engage in politics, although their followers may
belong to various political parties. Nor do they engage in social
problems such as campaigning against illiteracy, poverty, female genital
mutilation (FGM), women’s or minority rights, HIV/AIDS or conflict
and peace. They have only recently been approached either by
government or by NGOs to be engaged on some of the above issues by
making use of the respect they have amongst their followers to be
advocates for social issues, but in my judgment, the result has been a
limited response and impact, as with our experience of invoking their
enthusiasm to deal with FGM, family planning and HIV/AIDS.
However, they have potential, as will be explained later.
2- Organizations led by learned national non-elite religious scholars in the
nineteenth century but which have political allegiances. They are also
based on a belief in a religious leader’s teachings. There are only two of
these, namely the Ansar followers (established 1883-1886) and the
Khatmiya followers of Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani al-Kabir, founded
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in the eighteenth century. Their followers are widespread in Khartoum,
central regions, Kordufan and Darfur for the Ansar sect, and in
Khartoum, northern and eastern Sudan for the Khatmiya. The leaders
(not founders) in the 20th century became engaged in political opposition
to British colonization and hence formed political parties named the
Umma and People’s parties respectively. They encourage their followers
to be members of the party. Such orientations led the sects to be to some
extent involved in social issues, and they have the potential to be
engaged in spreading a culture of peace and mobilization to achieve
other millennium development goals (MDGs). Their potential for
reconciliation could be widely accepted as they are not exclusionist and
didn’t involve themselves in holy war propaganda. Many members of
SWEPD are followers of either of these two organizations.
3- Organizations led by elites to bring new ideas in the 20 th century of how
religion should be practiced and purified. These are part of regional
organizations and follow the path of organizations whose roots are either
in Egypt, like the Muslim Brotherhood, or in Saudi Arabia following
Wahhabi teachings, like Ansar al-Sunna al-Mohammadia. These groups
formed organizations or changed into political parties in the sixties and
eighties for the former and latter respectively. The organizations formed
by them engaged in social services such as education, water provision,
health and some poverty alleviation. However, as their line of thought is
not pragmatic and greatly exclusionist, maintaining that the only Right
Path is the one they follow, their potential for peace building can be
doubted. Moreover, as they allied themselves with the Islamist political
movement to motivate youth for holy war (jihad) as a means to go
paradise, it is doubtful that their role in reconciliation will be accepted.
Government leaders coming from a background of either of these two
organizations formed many NGOs in the 1990s with Islamic-related
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names to provide health, education, water and poverty alleviation
services. Before 2004 some of them also became engaged in propaganda
for holy war, and supporting it materially and with people. They can be
described as governmental Islamic NGOs (GINGOs). There are some
big international organizations formed during this regime based in
Khartoum
such
as
al-Dawa
al-Islamia
(Islamic
Missionary
Organization), a large wealthy Islamic organization engaged in
spreading Islam as well as providing social services. Their activities can
be compared to those of the church. They work amongst the displaced
and offer good services, however they have no links to the SWEPD
group. Their potential to work on women’s issues is doubted as their
organizational hierarchy is male-dominated and they have not taken part
in scholarly debates on Islamic women’s rights or the culture of peace
from an Islamic perspective. Discussing these two issues remains the
monopoly of the formal governmental Islamic establishment and other
GINGOs remained outside it for a long time. The experience of
women’s NGOs with the formal governmental Islamic establishment has
not been encouraging, as the latter opposed their campaigns for ratifying
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), and passing a law to incriminate FGM.
Hence, their establishment is dogmatic, male-dominated, has access to
official resources and channels of communication but is not easy to
penetrate, influence or link with unless through high-level instructions
from the authorities. Their stance greatly influences GINGOs.
4- Christian-based organizations are few and it is mainly the churches
themselves that engage directly in social and civic activities beside their
main role in faith-building and holding prayers. The Sudanese Council
of Churches (SCC) in which all Sudanese churches (Protestant, Catholic,
Orthodox and Coptic) are represented, plays a role in peace initiatives
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and has a women’s desk to coordinate all churches’ women-specific
activities. The members of the SCC, with a common broad goal and
competitor Islamic organizations, are currently united despite internal
differences and the potential for cleavage or conflict. Some churches are
more dominant than others. It seems that most Southern women belong
to two main churches: Protestants, who are themselves from several
different backgrounds; and Catholics. The chairperson of the women’s
desk at the SCC for quite some time was also the chairwoman of the
Southern women’s peace network based in northern Sudan and
Khartoum. That made the Southern women’s peace network a voice for
Christian Southern women and linked it more to the church to seek
support for some of its activities.
In conclusion, the above background is crucial for assessing whether the
women’s peace networks approached FBO in their advocacy, training or any
other activities, and to recommend a way forward.
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Section II: Introducing Sudanese Women Empowerment for Peace
(SWEP)
The evolution of SWEP started through an initiative of the Royal
Netherlands Embassy (RNE) in 1997 and then in consultation with Sudanese
women’s groups, the IGAD countries and other stakeholders, the programme
started in 1998. The RNE in Khartoum and Nairobi took the lead in making it a
success. Five groups in Khartoum and four groups based in Nairobi were
formed as follows:
 The southern sector based in Nairobi:
1- Sudanese People Democratic Front (SPDF) women’s group.
2- Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) United women’s
group.
3- Non-partisan women’s group.
4- Sudanese Women Voice for Peace group.
 Five groups were formed in the northern sector based in Khartoum:
1- Sudanese Women’s Civil Society Network for Peace.
2- National Democratic Alliance groups (mainly political parties’ women’s
sectors).
3- National
Working
Committee
for
Peace
(mainly
government
representation).
4- Nuba women’s group for peace.
5- Southern women’s group for peace.
Three of the groups in the northern sector managed in 2003 to register
themselves as networks. Hence, the Sudanese Women’s Civil Society Network
for Peace was renamed as the WEPD. The Nuba and Southern networks carried
similar titles, with the prefix Nuba women or Southern women at the
beginning. WEPD has the following vision, mission and objectives. Their
vision, objectives and programmes are similar to all other networks. This has
made it possible for all networks to have solidarity. Hence, what will be
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highlighted in WEPD’s mission and objectives represents the others to a great
extent.
Vision
The vision of the networks is to participate in building a Sudan where all
people have sustainable peace, equality, justice and freedom.
Mission
1- Recognizing the important role of women in the peace movement.
2- Increasing the actual participation of Sudanese women in the peace
process and influencing the processes of peacebuilding.
3- Empowering women to achieve gender equality and develop their own
agenda without domination.
Membership
Membership is open for all national NGOs, community-based
organizations (CBOs), educational and research institutions or centres which
are abiding with the networks’ constitution and work towards achieving their
objectives.
Main Objectives
1- Create an enabling environment for the empowerment of Sudanese
women in civil society (WEPD) to play a crucial role in the peace
process.
2- Create a joint forum of Sudanese women to share their experiences and
initiatives in promoting peace.
3- Enhance women’s participation in relevant international, regional and
local events.
4- Identify the appropriate methods to incorporate women in peace
campaigns.
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5- To advocate for the integration of women’s rights in the constitution.
6- To conduct research, document and publish information in the area of
peace, human rights and democracy.
7- To undertake capacity building of member organizations of the network,
NGOs and CBOs.
8- Mobilization of women at different levels towards gender and peace
issues.
9- To enhance women’s role in the post-conflict arena.
Achievements in Past Years as Part of Other Broader Women’s Peace
Networks
 Advocacy Activities
1- Participated in developing the Sudanese women’s minimum agenda for
peace, Nairobi, January 2000.
2- Participated in developing the Maastricht Declaration of the Sudanese
women’s centre for peace, Maastricht, Netherlands, April 2000.
3- Undertaking research at the grassroots level in different geographical
areas (North, South, East and West Sudan) about their perception of war,
peace and solutions.
4- Participated in developing the Machakos position paper by Sudanese
women (in collaboration with other national NGOs).
5- Participated in the inter-Sudanese consultation group to advance the
peace process, June 2004.
6- Participated in developing the Sudanese women’s position paper and in
the ten women delegated from the networks who participated in
lobbying for policies for peace and engendering the peace agreement in
Naivasha, December 2003.
7- Participated in JAM process, as focal points for engendering the process.
8- Prepared, with other NGOs and academic institutes for women, a
priorities document for the donor meeting in Oslo, March 2005. Also
8
participated in the Oslo civil society forum and gender symposium,
donor conference and events.
9- Participated in developing the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP)
in Nairobi, September 2004. The network presented a paper on pro-poor
poverty policy.
10- Participated in the Sudanese Peace Women Making a Difference
conference in Washington arranged by Women Waging Peace,
September 2004, which resulted in policy recommendations to:
a- The UN General Assembly
b- The US government
c- The Government of Sudan
d- SPLM
e- IGAD
11- Participated effectively in the evaluation of the IGAD peace process by
the UN mission to Sudan, 2003.
12- Engaged
in
UNDP
forum
for
increasing
women’s
political
participation.
13- Engaged in the UNDP forum for civil society participation in postconflict development.
14- Participated in campaigns to promote a culture of peace since 2003.
15- Mobilization of youth, particularly university students, through
awareness-raising programmes, as a result of which three youth
organizations were established with commitment to work for the
promotion of a culture of peace.
16- Training of trainers on peace, conflict resolution and human rights
issues at different levels, NGOs, CBOs in different geographical
locations (Darfur, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile State and Kassala) and
establishing links with these associations.
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Capacity Building for Network Members as Part of Other Networks
1- Participated in a training course in conflict resolution, Cairo, July 1999.
2- Participated in ACCORD, South Africa: nine days’ training in conflict
resolution, preventive diplomacy advocacy, and a lobbying and study
tour.
3- Training on how to do networking and research.
4- Training of trainers in report writing, fundraising, human rights and
promoting peace culture.
Awareness-Raising Activities
Launching of workshops to:
1- Promote a culture of peace.
2- Discuss the paper on WEPD’s vision of peace.
3- Discussion at a general assembly level of specific issues related to the
peacebuilding process and poverty alleviation among the displaced by
war.
4- Orientation sessions to women prisoners about women’s legal rights.
5- Orientation session on the peace initiatives and the comprehensive peace
agreement (CPA) to member organizations of the network.
6- Development of strategies and plans of action for WEPD involving the
members.
7- Briefing to members by delegates from WEPD who attended different
regional and international conferences and other events.
Current Activities Targeting Women and Youth
IGAD World Bank small project, including the following activities:
1- Training in peacebuilding, reconciliation, and co-existence targeting
youth organizations and members of the network (NGOs and CBOs).
2- Training on gender awareness.
3- Training on leadership skills.
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4- Training on legal rights.
5- Training on human rights.
6- Training on producing popular music instruments.
7- Training on Tie and Dye.
8- Training on food processing.
9- Training on African hair braiding.
Partners of WEPD Activities
1- International Rescue Committee (IRC)
2- OXFAM
3- IGAD
4- Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum
5- Norwegian Church
6- World Bank
7- Hunt Alternatives Fund
8- Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
Networking
WEPD is a member in local and regional networks:
1- Sudanese civil society network for alleviation of poverty
2- Population network
3- Horn of African women network for peace and development
Future Perspectives
1- To engender the post-conflict arena (DDR, reconciliation processes).
2- To ensure Sudanese women have greater participation in all the
commissions during the interim period.
3- To document all WEPD’s achievements.
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Section III: Links with FBOs – An Assessment
As a leading partner in the overall initiative, a member of the civil
society peace network and member of the advisory council, having personal
contacts with other networks and participated in most joint activities nationally
and some regionally, as well as relying on written reports on the network’s
activities, one can safely make the following observations in reference to its
links with faith-based organizations (FBOs):
1- The different women’s peace networks largely worked in the first phase
of their initiative (1998-2002) through a guided framework from the
Netherlands Embassy’s gender advisors and experts, who themselves did
not include a religious dialogue or discourse component in their work or
involve FBOs in the structures of the initiative.
2- The members (NGOs) of the network themselves were not known for
being related to religious-based organizations, with the exception of the
Southern women’s peace network which had the SCC as a partner.
3- The national committee which represents the government groups did not
include pro-government religious-based NGOs in its members, while it
included civil servants’ representatives and greatly relied on having an
official
female
representation.
The
government-linked
women
themselves were not part of the religious structures within the
government such as the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Imams (prayer
leaders) of mosques or the council of learned religious leaders. Women
generally are outside the circle of the formal religious establishment, and
have not engaged the male-dominated religious structures in their peace
activities.
4- The network of the political parties in the National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) was greatly dominated by a secularist discourse and did not
include religious-based political parties such as the Muslim Brothers,
Ansar al-Sunna, the Republicans, or the National Islamic Front (NIF),
currently divided into the National and People’s Congress parties.
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Hence, they did not use religious discourse in their activities or
collaborate with faith-based political parties. Even the members of NDA
political parties connected with FBOs, like the Umma party with its links
to the Ansar, or the DUP, linked to the Khatmiya, both FBOs, were not
involved in the NDA women’s peace network, and the network remained
isolated from FBOs.
5- The Nuba Mountains network (NWEPD) of NGO members was not
formed on a religious basis, hence it did not use religious discourse,
particularly as its members were both Christians and Muslims, making it
unique amongst other groups whose memberships are largely drawm
from one religion. They claimed that in the initial stage they were
striving to achieve unity amongst all Nuba women, and that religion
could be a source of division rather than unity, as the issue of separating
religion from the state was amongst the hot issues of debate in the peace
negotiations and women’s different positioning was clear. However, at
later stages after 2004 some of their social activities of literacy, basic
education, credit and health education were done in partnership with the
church as some of their members are key figures in the church.
However, no partnership in activities was undertaken with Muslim-based
religious organizations (Source: interview with network members,
October 2005, and report of a plan of action for 2002).
6- The Southern Women Peace and Development network (SWEPD)
claimed that their call for women’s rights and engendering the peace
process didn’t engage the church. However, they worked in partnership
with it in other social service programmes or civic education. Moreover,
they worked in collaboration on such issues of special concern to both as
the South/South dialogue, the dialogue on the future of the Nile waters
and issues of good governance, especially after the CPA agreement in
2004. In certain cases SWEPD started the initiative and then asked the
SCC to adopt it, which they did in the last two cases (interview with key
13
members, October 2005). The same pattern of involving the church or
traditional religious groups for peace happened with Southern women’s
networks based in Nairobi, particularly the NGO networks rather than
the politically-oriented networks of SPLM or SPDF. (Source: Through
by the Stick, 2002).
7- The WEPD network is made up of NGOs, most of whose discourse and
backgrounds are not religious-based. They can rather be described as
secularists. Those NGOs that are religious-based are considered to be
pro-government, while most of the NGOs that frame WEPD standpoints
are not in line with the government advocates, either on peace
negotiations or on women’s rights; hence a difference discourse from
that of the government is used. They don’t involve religion but rather a
human rights discourse as an entry point for their activities. The case
study of WEPD outlined above indicates that no partnership with
Muslim FBOs was undertaken in any of the activities, nor was religious
discourse used in their activities (interview with deputy and chairperson
of WEPD, October 2005).
The reasons for this situation need to be analyzed. The analysis is based
on my conviction of the following:
1- The initiative and the activities heavily emphasize issues of women’s
rights in the peace process (representation in negotiation delegations,
inclusion of their perspective for peace, integration in the agreement of
their rights in the new Sudan after peace, and ensuring their role after the
peace processes. However, the last component was not a focal one). The
initiative was based on a principle of creating unity amongst women
despite ethnic or religious diversity. These issues of women’s rights and
engendering the peace process could easily be deliberated and a common
agenda reached using international standards and discourses, such as
reference to the Beijing plan of action, Security Council Resolution
14
1325, and even CEDAW which the Sudanese government has not
ratified yet. Hence, reference to these issues of women’s rights avoided
religious discourse, as was clear from the entire common agenda
documents produced after Machakos, Naivasha and Oslo.
2- The religious-based organizations that are registered as NGOs and could
have been part of the networks are heavily politicized and are considered
as government NGOs, hence their engagement with other networks was
not envisaged as these networks thought of themselves as independent
from the government and hence were reluctant to include Islamic-based
NGOs. Moreover, these FBOs are not engaged in any issues of relevance
to the networks’ basic objectives such as empowerment of women,
women’s rights or peace issues.
3- The other faith-based bodies of the Sufis, the Ansar and Khatmiya are
not registered as NGOs to be members of the SWEPD. They are not
directly involved either in peace or women’s issues, and the Ansar only
recently started to engage with women’s rights issues, discussing
CEDAW, FGM and women’s rights in the constitution. Hence, WEPD
have not considered involving them in their activities.
4- WEPD itself, during the first phase of its existence, exerted great efforts
in capacity building and organizational issues, resolving internal conflict
and developing internal strength that absorbed most of the first five years
of its young age (1998-2005). Some of its members on an individual
level belong to the Ansar, Khatmiya or other Sufi sects, but may be
reluctant to enter into dialogue with these FBOs for fear of being
accused of co-opting the network for other purposes.
5- The tradition of links between modern civil society organizations and
traditional ones was not there. Hence, the modern elitist urban-based
NGOs largely worked in isolation from the traditional rural-oriented
FBOs. The modern NGOs are a recent phenomenon in Sudanese history
evolving after independence in 1956, while the traditional Islamic FBOs
15
date back to the seventeenth century. However, with the spread of
modern education in recent years since the 1980s many of the leaders of
those FBOs are highly educated and hence could be expected to take on
other roles than purely religious ones. The separation between the two
could be bridged.
6- Sudanese Muslim scholars for quite a long time remained silent on
women’s rights from an Islamic perspective or scholarly interpretation of
Quran on any of the rights and peace issues. It is only a handful of
scholars who have recently been engaged in revisiting Islam to consider
the culture of peace, love, equality, and the rights dimension within it.
Leading scholars are Al-Sadig Al-Mahdi, Al-Turabi, the late Mahmoud
Mohammed Taha, the Republican leader, and a few academics. The
Sudanese feminists themselves rather late in the mid-1990s, led by the
Institute of Women, Gender and Development Studies (IWGDS), started
quietly using other Muslim feminists’ revisiting of Islam. This low level
of discourse and dialogue amongst Muslims themselves to revisit Islam
and engage in voicing a new face of Islam away from the holy war,
antagonism, aristocracy, exclusionism, and male supremacy that
dominated the space from 1989 until the CPA was signed, need to be
strengthened. This change needs to be undertaken before WEPD can be
able to engage effectively with FBOs.
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Conclusion: The Way Forward
It became evident form the above analysis that if we need to engage
FBOs in peace, gender and other civic issues we have to undertake the
following:
1- Research to consider whether it is crucial to involve FBOs in the
peacebuilding process and women’s rights issues; if so, which FBOs,
and how to define FBOs. A profile of FBOs is needed, as such coherent
information in document form is lacking. This is crucial so as to
delineate the characteristics of the different FBOs, their activities,
potential and map the road for the future.
2- Urgent need for a programme targeting FBOs for capacity building,
which could be given to a few as models who have currently started to
engage into women’s and/or peace issues. I recommend four main
FBOs, two from the traditional politically-oriented ones, namely the
Ansar and Khatmiya, as they have the potential – both are organizations
with large numbers of followers, have women members in their
organization’s structures and are involved in workshops on women’s and
peace issues. The other is the Ghadiriya Al-Samaniya, which is a Sufi
group, but the only one that has a women’s section from educated
women and which has also started to be involved in social and women’s
issues. The last is a modern FBO, namely Al-Dawa Al-Islamiya, which
is amongst the oldest and biggest of modern FBOs. It has resources but
needs to be oriented to deal with gender issues and the culture of
peacebuilding. I recommend some orientation, tracking cases, dialogue
workshops, and logistical support so as to do advocacy and awarenessraising campaigns.
3- A special program for WEPD to interlink with FBOs should be
developed or supported. Lessons from how Christian FBOs are involved
with other NGOs or are themselves doing civic and social activities need
17
to be highlighted. An advisor could be appointed to help them at the
initial stage.
4- Exchange of experiences nationally, regionally and internationally on
how FBOs, especially those with a traditional setup, could be
encouraged to engage in civic, peace and gender issues is greatly needed.
A special workshop could be held in Sudan as a starting point for future
activities listed above. Papers to be presented in the workshop could give
substantial needed information and recommendations.
5- Support to publicizing the available discourse on Islam and peace, Islam
and human rights, Islam and feminist rights at a national or international
level could be promoted through the production of simple information
and educational materials using different media.
Challenges and Conclusive Factors Relevant to the Above
Recommendations
1- The patriarchal ideology dominating the cultural make-up of the society
at large and the highly male-dominated structures of FBOs threaten any
initiative to persuade them to accept to work in equal partnership with
women’s groups.
2- The use of Islamic discourse to address peace and women’s rights entails
two messages, supporting peace as well as war. Furthermore, on
women’s rights, it can support them as equal as well as advocate for
their subordination. This ambivalence made certain groups take either
one of the standpoints as representing them, while others try to
contextualize to the past the views that are not relevant to the current
context. Hence, a clear standpoint needs to be stated for each FBO
before engagement in such programs as advocates for peace and
women’s rights.
3- The centrality of spirituality and religiosity in the sainthood-based Sufi
organizations makes it difficult for them to engage in discourse and
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dialogue, and other less intellectual entry points may be needed to
engage them in peace issues.
4- The signing of the CPA and the aftermath of John Garang’s death clearly
indicated the need for all to work on peacebuilding.
5- Currently, the government media is promoting slogans related to
Sudanese culture’s heritage of forgiveness, peace and love. Hence, the
political context is conducive.
6- The international pressure on the government to implement the CPA, the
space opened for NGOs and political parties, and the strength of
WEPD’s networks gained over the years, will enable the recommended
initiative to work, but special consideration needs to be given to the
challenging factors discussed, and the new discourse has to come to the
forefront and to be integrated.
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References
1- Badri, Balghis (2003), “Women at the Centre in a New Sudan: Prospect
and Challenges”. National Civil Forum, Khartoum.
2- Badri, Balghis (2004), “Different Islamic Discourses and Women’s
Images in Sudanese Religious Leaders’ Writings”.
3- Badri, Balghis (2005), “Feminism in Sudan”. A paper presented in a
seminar on feminism in Africa, Berlin.
4- Hamza, Hind (2004), “Women Participation in the Peace Negotiation”.
Unpublished MSc. Dissertation in Gender and Development, Ahfad
University for Women, Omdurman.
5- Mansour, Duria (2005), “Women Empowerment for Peace and
Development Network Report and Proposal for Institutional Support”.
6- Verwijk, Margret (1998), “Them on Paper: In Engendering the Peace
Process”, Khartoum.
7- Project Document (2000), “Support to Sudanese Women Empowerment
for Peace”. The Royal Netherlands Embassies in Khartoum and Nairobi.
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