Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™)
Meeting Report
for
TSG SA WG3
meeting: 72
QingDao, China, 08/07/2013 to 12/07/2013
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
2
3
4
4.1
4.2
4.3
5
Opening of the Meeting ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Approval of Agenda and Meeting Objectives .................................................................................................... 3
IPR Reminder .................................................................................................................................................... 3
Meeting Reports................................................................................................................................................. 3
Approval of the Report from SA3 #71 ......................................................................................................... 3
Report from SA #60 ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Report from SA3-LI ..................................................................................................................................... 4
Items for early consideration ............................................................................................................................. 4
6
Reports and Liaisons from other Groups ........................................................................................................... 4
6.1
3GPP Working Groups................................................................................................................................. 4
6.2
IETF ............................................................................................................................................................. 4
6.3
ETSI SAGE .................................................................................................................................................. 4
6.4
GSMA .......................................................................................................................................................... 5
6.5
3GPP2 .......................................................................................................................................................... 5
6.6
OMA ............................................................................................................................................................ 5
6.7
TCG.............................................................................................................................................................. 5
6.8
oneM2M ....................................................................................................................................................... 6
6.9
Other Groups ................................................................................................................................................ 6
7
Work Areas ........................................................................................................................................................ 6
7.1
IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Security ................................................................................................... 6
7.1.1
Media Plane Security .............................................................................................................................. 6
7.1.1.1
Study on Extended IMS media plane security features ..................................................................... 6
7.1.1.2
Extended IMS media plane security features .................................................................................... 6
7.1.2
Other Common IMS Issues .................................................................................................................... 8
7.2
Network Domain Security .......................................................................................................................... 10
7.3
UTRAN Network Access Security............................................................................................................. 10
7.4
GERAN Network Access Security............................................................................................................. 10
7.5
GAA ........................................................................................................................................................... 11
7.5.1
Security enhancements for usage of GBA from the browser ............................................................... 11
7.5.2
GBA extensions for re-use of SIP Digest credentials ........................................................................... 11
7.5.3
Other GAA Issues................................................................................................................................ 11
7.6
Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS) .................................................................................... 11
7.7
SAE/LTE Security ..................................................................................................................................... 11
7.7.1
TS 33.401 Issues ................................................................................................................................... 11
7.7.2
TS 33.402 Issues ................................................................................................................................... 12
7.7.3
Relay Node Security ............................................................................................................................. 13
7.7.4
EEA3 and EIA3 Issues ......................................................................................................................... 13
7.7.5
Other SAE/LTE Security Issues ........................................................................................................... 13
7.8
Security Aspects of Home (e)NodeB ......................................................................................................... 13
7.8.1
TS 33.320 Issues ................................................................................................................................... 14
7.8.2
TR 33.820 Issues .................................................................................................................................. 14
7.9
Security Aspects related to Machine-Type Communication ...................................................................... 14
7.10
Security Aspects of Public Warning System .............................................................................................. 28
7.11
Firewall Traversal ...................................................................................................................................... 38
7.11.1
Study on Firewall Traversal ................................................................................................................. 38
7.11.2
Tunnelling of UE Services over Restrictive Access Networks ............................................................. 38
7.12
Security Aspects of WLAN Network Selection for 3GPP Terminals ........................................................ 41
7.13
Security Aspects of Proximity-based Services ........................................................................................... 46
7.14
Other areas ................................................................................................................................................. 50
8
Studies ............................................................................................................................................................. 51
8.1
Study on Security aspects of Integration of Single Sign-On (SSO) frameworks with 3GPP networks ..... 51
8.2
Security Study on Spoofed Call Detection and Prevention ........................................................................ 53
8.3
Study Item on Security Assurance Methodology for 3GPP Network Elements ........................................ 53
8.4
Other Study Areas ...................................................................................................................................... 64
9
Review and Update of Work Plan ................................................................................................................... 65
10
Future Meeting Dates and Venues ................................................................................................................... 65
11
Any Other Business ......................................................................................................................................... 65
12
Close ................................................................................................................................................................ 66
Annex A: List of contribution documents ........................................................................................................................ 67
Annex B: List of change requests ..................................................................................................................................... 78
Annex C: Lists of liaisons ................................................................................................................................................. 80
C1: Incoming liaison statements ....................................................................................................................................... 80
C2: Outgoing liaison statements ....................................................................................................................................... 81
Annex D: List of agreed/approved new and revised Work Items ..................................................................................... 82
Annex E: List of action items ........................................................................................................................................... 83
Annex F: List of participants ............................................................................................................................................ 84
Annex H: List of future meetings ..................................................................................................................................... 86
1
Opening of the Meeting
Lydia on behalf of the host (Huawei) gave a warm welcome to the SA3 delegates.
2
Approval of Agenda and Meeting Objectives
S3-130600
Agenda
Source: WG Chairman
Abstract:
Decision:
3
The document was approved.
IPR Reminder
The attention of the delegates to the meeting of this Technical Specification Group was drawn to the fact that 3GPP
Individual Members have the obligation under the IPR Policies of their respective Organizational Partners to inform
their respective Organizational Partners of Essential IPRs they become aware of.
The delegates were asked to take note that they were thereby invited:
to investigate whether their organization or any other organization owns IPRs which were, or were likely to become
Essential in respect of the work of 3GPP.
to notify their respective Organizational Partners of all potential IPRs, e.g., for ETSI, by means of the IPR Information
Statement and the Licensing declaration forms (http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/document/Legal/IPRforms.doc)
4
Meeting Reports
4.1
Approval of the Report from SA3 #71
S3-130603
Report from last SA3 meeting
Source: ETSI Secretariat
Abstract:
Discussion:
The action point of last meeting was closed as Ericsson has prepared the requested pseudoCR
Decision:
4.2
The document was approved.
Report from SA #60
S3-130601
Abstract:
Discussion:
Report from last SA meeting
Source: WG Chairman
The SA3 Chairman commented that the current delay in SA2's work for Rel-12 will affect the progress of the work in
SA3 for items such as ProSe. Some of the work will be finished in May 2012.
A warning about references to external documents (non 3GPP) shall be avoided in SA3. This is a recommendation from
SA.
The Chairman asked the Rapporteurs to check the external references in their specs and make CRs where possible in
order to remove those which are unnecessary.
NTT-DoCoMo wanted to clarify how to avoid external references, the Chairman admitted that is is to be decided case
by case.
ACTION:
Decision:
4.3
All Rapporteurs should check their specifications to make sure that there are no external
references (to non 3GPP documents) as recommended by SA.
(action on: Chairman / due by: 2013-09-26)
The document was noted.
Report from SA3-LI
Greg (Sprint) gave a brief report on LI.
SA3-LI#50 – Sophia Antipolis/ETSI
Topics discussed included;
Reference versions as per SA plenary action, addressed;
IMEI availability in IMS, R10+ solution based on GRUU registration information;
ProSe, Identity and Location management aspects;
Stage 2 GBA LI;
Location Services, LI Security.
CRs and new WID out for SA3 email approval by 11/07/13.
Next meeting confirmed for Burlington,VT in October.
5
Items for early consideration
6
Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
6.1
3GPP Working Groups
6.2
IETF
Martin (AT&T) gave a brief update on the work on the spoofing area. IETF will meet in Berlin shortly. It is likely that a
working group will be created
6.3
ETSI SAGE
Aguibou (Vodafone) gave a brief summary on the work from ETSI SAGE:
SAGE has one substantial piece of work on at the moment, which is defining a second 3G authentication and key
generation algorithm. This is being done particular with a view to embedded UICCs, so that both Milenage and this
new algorithm can be pre-installed on eUICCs and available for SIM applications to use.
SAGE has made good progress in developing the algorithm, which will be based on the Keccak hash function that is
also at the heart of the upcoming SHA-3 standard. SAGE has been in touch with the Keccak design team, particularly
to learn about the details of the message padding that is likely to be used in SHA-3, so that we can align the new SAGE
algorithm with the NIST standards as far as possible.
SAGE still expect to deliver this algorithm specification, including the usual example C code and test vectors, before
the GSMA eUICC Fast Track project delivers its stage 3 specifications.
One question on which SA3's advice would be welcome is how to turn the new SAGE algorithm specification into
public standards that operators and vendors are happy to use. Milenage is published as a 3GPP standard (TS 35.206),
but other crypto algorithms have been published by GSMA. What route should we take this time? Who does SAGE
need to liaise with in order to publish as 3GPP documents?
6.4
GSMA
Loic (Orange) gave a brief comment on GSMA-SG:
During their latest meeting in Lyon, there was discussion on the GSMA participation in the SECAM work. It was
decided that the Network Equipment Security Assurance Group (NESAG) will be established and mobilized the when
the need arises. The only news at this stage is that this group will be established and that there was sufficient member
support to commit GSMA SG to participate and support the initiative.
6.5
3GPP2
Anand (Qualcomm) gave a brief update on the work of 3GPP2:
Similar to 3GPP, 3GPP2 also has an M2M requirement for binding of cdma2000 access subscription to specific M2M
device or a group of MTC devices and the 3GPP2 security group (TSG-SX WG4) has been evaluating various solution
approaches. At the 3GPP2 meeting in June 2013, a network based enforcement solution for cdma2000 1xRTT system
based on MEID authentication was baselined and will be published as S.S0152 (Security Framework for Binding of
Access Subscription with Devices). The necessary stage 3 enhancements for 1x air interface and network enhancements
has started.
6.6
OMA
6.7
TCG
Tdoc S3-130708 gives an update on TCG work:
1: Trusted Mobility Solution (TMS)
TNC WG is studying use cases for BYOD. The Use Case Document and BYOD Framework document are available
at the TCG TMS home page (available for TCG members only):
https://members.trustedcomputinggroup.org/apps/org/workgroup/tms_wg/
2: Mobile Platform Working Group (MPWG)
2.1 TPM 2.0 specification:
The Mobile Platform Work Group (MPWG) has created a two part specification for implementing a TPM 2.0 on a
mobile platform. The first specification describes the architecture of a device implementing TPM Mobile 2.0 and the
second part of the specification defines features of the Mobile TPM 2.0 implementation (algorithms, commands,
capabilities, etc.).
2.2 TPM Mobile security evaluation and certification
MPWG is continuing to work on TPM Mobile security evaluation and certification. Layered certification model for
TPM is being considered.
The preliminary document, TPM Mobile 2.0 Certification Strategy, is available from the MPWG portal.
TCG PC Client WG used Common Criteria methodology to develop PC Clint Protection Profile. TCG PC Client
Compliance test suite is being use as the base for use with TPM Mobile certification.
Documents are available from the MPWG portal (members only):
https://members.trustedcomputinggroup.org/apps/org/workgroup/mobilewg/documents.php
3: TCG face-to-face meeting highlights
TMS WG did not meet at the Dublin face-to-face meeting.
Global Certification Forum overview presented in Dublin at MPWG f2f meeting by Bjarke Nielsen (Qualcomm).
TPM Mobile tutorial was presented by John Mersh from ARM.
Next TCG face-to-face meeting will be in October in Osaka.
S3-130708
TCG progress report in the areas of TMS and MPWG
n/a v..
Source: Interdigital
Abstract:
This contribution provides a brief summary of the progress in TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions (TMC) and Mobile
Platform (MPWG) working groups.
Decision:
The document was noted.
6.8
oneM2M
6.9
Other Groups
7
Work Areas
7.1
IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Security
7.1.1
Media Plane Security
7.1.1.1
Study on Extended IMS media plane security features
7.1.1.2
Extended IMS media plane security features
S3-130698
Abstract:
KMS based solution for immediate messaging
33.328 CR-0054 (Rel-12) v12.3.0
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Support for immediate messaging with the KMS based solution for media plane security is agreed in the conclusions
and recommendations in TR 33.829.
Discussion:
NSN commented that these things are usually handled by CT1.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130832.
S3-130832
KMS based solution for immediate messaging
33.328 CR-0054 rev 1 (Rel-12) v12.3.0
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
(Replaces S3-130698)
Discussion:
It indicates what CT1 spec is affected.
Decision:
The document was agreed.
S3-130700
Secure UDPTL based T.38 fax
33.328 CR-0055 (Rel-12) v12.3.0
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130833.
S3-130833
Secure UDPTL based T.38 fax
33.328 CR-0055 rev 1 (Rel-12) v12.3.0
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
(Replaces S3-130700)
Decision:
The document was agreed.
S3-130752
Secure fax progress in IETF
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Discussion:
IETF active companies are encouraged to support this
Decision:
The document was noted.
7.1.2
Other Common IMS Issues
S3-130605
LS on NAT and GIBA
Source: C1-131743
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was replied to in S3-130617.
S3-130617
LS reply on NAT and GIBA
Source: S2-132323
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130835
LS reply on NAT and GIBA
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
(Replaces S3-130754)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130699
Clarification regarding NAT and GIBA
33.203 CR-0200 (Rel-12) v12.1.0
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
CT1 has misunderstood the text
Discussion:
Anand (Qualcomm) commented it is not clear what to do when the source IP address and the IP address in the contact
header of the SIP message. This was triggered by a CR presented by Qualcomm in CT1 on changing the contact header.
What happens when there is a NAT? this is not being clarified.
NSN wanted to know more about the context of this discussion in CT1.
Decision:
The document was agreed.
S3-130834
Clarification regarding NAT and GIBA
33.203 CR-0200 rev 1 (Rel-12) v12.1.0
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Decision:
The document was withdrawn.
S3-130754
(Draft) LS reply on NAT and GIBA
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130835.
S3-130607
Reply LS on Enhancing IMEI based Lawful Interception in IMS
Source: C1-131767
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130615
Reply LS on enhancing IMEI based Lawful Interception in IMS
Source: S2-131521
Abstract:
Discussion:
Greg (SA3-LI) commented that there are no privacy issues to be addressed in the case of sending the IMEI across
networks.
Colin (BT) wondered to which network the IMEI belongs.
Greg (Sprint) commented hat it is up to SA3-LI to make this question to SA2.
Decision:
The document was replied to in S3-130836.
S3-130836
Reply to: Reply LS on enhancing IMEI based Lawful Interception in IMS
Source: Sprint
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130619
Reply LS on IMEI based Lawful Interceptions in IMS
Source: SA3-LI
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130779
Revised WID for Web Real Time Communication (WebRTC) Access to IMS
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Discussion:
Qualcomm preferred to have the objectives at a higher level, not at the level of "using SIP digest credentials". It is a bit
premature since we should consider all existing authentication aspects.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130837.
S3-130837
Revised WID for Web Real Time Communication (WebRTC) Access to IMS
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
(Replaces S3-130779)
Decision:
7.2
The document was approved.
Network Domain Security
S3-130726
Multiple operator certificates enrolment
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon, TeliaSonera
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was withdrawn.
S3-130824
Update of S3-130726 Multiple operator certificates enrolment
Source: Huawei, Hisilicon, TeliaSonera, Vodafone
Abstract:
Discussion:
BT commented that the NEM (Network Element Manager) is not subject to Network Sharing.
NSN agreed with BT and commented that there is only one NEM, and that may be a problem.
Greg commented that network sharing management is being handled in SA5 and also in SA1; comments on NEM here
are being a bit premature since this scenario hasn't been worked on yet.
Huawei commented that there are some findings on this issue in SA5.
Magnus (TeliaSonera) commented that this is the kind of input we need to provide to other groups.
The Chairman commented that we need to check what the current status in SA1 is. A Work Item might be needed here
to be proposed in future meetings (although NSN believes that there is no need to work on this).The quantity of this
work needs to be measured and maybe a WI could be proposed.
There was no consensus on the models proposed by Huawei.
Decision:
The document was noted.
7.3
UTRAN Network Access Security
7.4
GERAN Network Access Security
S3-130606
LS on MS's reaction to network's choice of an unsupported ciphering algorithm
Source: C1-131749
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130608
Reply LS to the LS on Optimization of the IMS Information and Security Parameters for CS to
PS SRVCC from GERAN to E-UTRAN/HSPA
Source: C1-132535
Abstract:
Decision:
7.5
The document was noted.
GAA
7.5.1
Security enhancements for usage of GBA from the browser
7.5.2
GBA extensions for re-use of SIP Digest credentials
7.5.3
Other GAA Issues
7.6
Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS)
7.7
SAE/LTE Security
7.7.1
TS 33.401 Issues
S3-130611
Reply LS on Follow-up LS on KeNB re-keying
Source: R2-131538
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130769
Discussion on KeNB re-keying
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130771
Revision of clause on KeNB re-keying
33.401 CR-0522 (Rel-12) v12.8.0
Source: Qualcomm, Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks, Alcatel-Lucent, AT&T, Orange
Abstract:
Discussion:
Huawei: would this be mandatory or optional?
ZTE:It is up to MME to decide, it is not clear in the CR.
Ericsson: It should be clarified: KeNB re-keying from the same KASME optional for implementation or for use? NSN
replied that optional for the implementation.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130838.
S3-130838
Revision of clause on KeNB re-keying
33.401 CR-0522 rev 1 (Rel-12) v12.8.0
Source: Qualcomm, Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks, Alcatel-Lucent, AT&T, Orange
(Replaces S3-130771)
Decision:
The document was agreed.
7.7.2
TS 33.402 Issues
S3-130671
Correction of the editorial errors and the incorrect description
33.402 CR-0114 (Rel-11) v11.4.0
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Discussion:
Qualcomm didn't agree with removing the reference to 9.3.1.2 in section 6.1.
It was agreed to change it to Rel-12 since this is not an essential correction for a frozen Release (11).
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130839.
S3-130839
Correction of the editorial errors and the incorrect description
33.402 CR-0114 rev 1 (Rel-12) v12.0.0
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
(Replaces S3-130671)
Decision:
The document was agreed.
7.7.3
Relay Node Security
7.7.4
EEA3 and EIA3 Issues
7.7.5
Other SAE/LTE Security Issues
7.8
Security Aspects of Home (e)NodeB
S3-130628
Response LS on H(e)NB Access Control Verification
TS 33.320 v..
Source: 3GPP SA WG3
Abstract:
Proposed Response LS to the 3GPP RAN3 on H(e)NB Access Control Verification.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130841.
S3-130841
Response LS on H(e)NB Access Control Verification
TS 33.320 v..
Source: 3GPP SA WG3
(Replaces S3-130628)
Decision:
The document was agreed.
S3-130629
Access mode verification for H(e)NBs
33.320 CR-0094 rev 2 (Rel-12) v11.6.0
Source: NSN, Ericsson, ST Ericsson, Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Following an exchange of LSs with RAN3, SA3 concluded that verification of the access mode is only required if the
network determined during S1 set-up that the H(e)NB operates in closed access mode. Corresponding text added in
sec.4.4.9.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130840.
S3-130840
Access mode verification for H(e)NBs
33.320 CR-0094 rev 3 (Rel-12) v11.6.0
Source: NSN, Ericsson, ST Ericsson, Alcatel-Lucent
(Replaces S3-130629)
Decision:
The document was agreed.
7.8.1
TS 33.320 Issues
7.8.2
TR 33.820 Issues
7.9
Security Aspects related to Machine-Type Communication
S3-130610
LS on interaction of oneM2M with Underlying Networks
Source: oneM2M Technical Plenary
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was replied to in S3-130842.
S3-130842
Reply to: LS on interaction of oneM2M with Underlying Networks
Source: China Mobile
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130800
Reply LS on interaction of oneM2M with Underlying Networks
Source: S2-132326
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130612
Reply LS on evaluation of MTCe solutions
Source: R2-132189
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130618
LS on requesting input on security aspects for MTCe solutions
Source: S2-132327
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was replied to in S3-130843.
S3-130843
Reply to: LS on requesting input on security aspects for MTCe solutions
Source: Intel
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130889.
S3-130889
Reply to: LS on requesting input on security aspects for MTCe solutions
Source: Intel
(Replaces S3-130843)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130732
MME overload threat analysis
33.868 v..
Source: Intel
Abstract:
NAS overload threat through NAS based solutions for MTC small data transmission and the corresponding editor's note
is deleted.
Discussion:
Intel commented that this is a solution for small data, not all the user data.
NTT-DocoMo commented that we need to have the NAS packets cheaper than the SMS. Extra load in the MME has a
price issue.
NSN commented that this is different from making revenue.
ALU had some objections on the changes proposed by Intel.
NTT-DoCoMo proposed to keep the original text and add this new text as well by removing the word "conventional".
NEC supported this.
Intel didn't agree with this, Achim proposed to reword the deleted sentences NSN proposed some additional wording.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130844.
S3-130844
MME overload threat analysis
33.868 v..
Source: Intel
(Replaces S3-130732)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130758
Clarification of small data fast path threats and requirements
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Discussion:
Some objections from NSN since the attack details are not clear enough. An update was created to address these
discussions.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130846.
S3-130846
Clarification of small data fast path threats and requirements
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
(Replaces S3-130758)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130778
More details on fast path security protocol
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Discussion:
NSN proposed to add some more text clarifying several details on the MME and the SDTSec
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130848.
S3-130848
More details on fast path security protocol
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
(Replaces S3-130778)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130686
Security context synchronization when SGW relocates for fast path solution
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Discussion:
It was proposed to reformulate the text in the handover cases.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130849.
S3-130849
Security context synchronization when SGW relocates for fast path solution
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
(Replaces S3-130686)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130775
Security Evaluation of MTCe SDDTE Solution 6A
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks, Intel, China Unicom, ZTE
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130850.
S3-130850
Security Evaluation of MTCe SDDTE Solution 6A
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks, Intel, China Unicom, ZTE
(Replaces S3-130775)
Abstract:
Merging S3-130775 and S3-130827
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130827
Comments on Tdocs 0775 on Security Evaluation of MTCe SDDTE Solution 6A
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Discussion:
Ericsson commented that complexity and resource consumption are not security issues.
Some of the work proposed here is already taken into account in S2 contributions.
Huawei supported NSN in the bullet "Separation between security contexts for small data fast path and for regular EPS
bearer". They didn’t agree with removing it. The separation is done in the UE.
It was proposed to merge both documents to address Ericson's comments.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130850.
S3-130660
MTCe Connectionless Solution: Enhancements
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Discussion:
NSN queried about the capability of the cookie that the MME sends to the eNodeB. They also queried about the
possible impact on MME. ALU replied that SA2 is aware about this.
Huawei requested some changes and this was taken offline in a revised document.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130851.
S3-130851
MTCe Connectionless Solution: Enhancements
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
(Replaces S3-130660)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130661
MTCe Connectionless Solution Threat Scenarios
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Discussion:
Ericsson wanted to consider other scenarios where the eNodeB is unprotected and there are no "off hours". An editor's
note was added for this use case.
Huawei also wanted to point out the additional processing load on the eNodeB
It was revised to address this and other comments
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130852.
S3-130852
MTCe Connectionless Solution Threat Scenarios
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
(Replaces S3-130661)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130685
Security problems on small data connectionless solution
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130851.
S3-130818
ALU Comments on S3-130685
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130851.
S3-130743
Security aspects of connectionless Data Transmission
Source: Samsung
Abstract:
Discussion:
China Mobile had an issue with having different eNodeBs using the same key.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130853.
S3-130853
Security aspects of connectionless Data Transmission
Source: Samsung
(Replaces S3-130743)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130662
MTCe Connectionless Solution Evaluation Changes
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130858.
S3-130858
MTCe Connectionless Solution Evaluation Changes
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
(Replaces S3-130662)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130776
Security Evaluation of MTCe SDDTE Solution 6B
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks, Intel, China Unicom
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130858.
S3-130820
ALU Comments on S3-130776
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Discussion:
Intel: resource consumption is security related.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130858.
S3-130746
MTC-IWF based security solution remaining issues
Source: NEC Corporation
Abstract:
Discussion:
ALU challenged the proposals from NEC.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130747
pCR: Modification to MTC-IWF based security solution for small data transmission
Source: NEC Corporation
Abstract:
Discussion:
Intel had some concerns on these contributions since this could lead to a change in the network architecture. Achim
(Intel) wanted to send a LS to SA2, but wasn't sure about how to present this new solution.
NEC said that this would be part of solution 3.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130861.
S3-130861
pCR: Modification to MTC-IWF based security solution for small data transmission
Source: NEC Corporation
(Replaces S3-130747)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130745
SDT: Evaluation of SA2 remaining solutions
Source: NEC Corporation
Abstract:
Discussion:
China Mobile and Intel challenged the last sentence : "Solution 1, 2, 3, 6a, 6b, and 8 of SA2 can only partially fulfil the
security requirements for Small Data Transmission described in clause 5.7.3."
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130862.
S3-130862
SDT: Evaluation of SA2 remaining solutions
Source: NEC Corporation
(Replaces S3-130745)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130774
Security Evaluation of MTCe SDDTE solutions - Overall
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks, Intel, China Unicom
Abstract:
Discussion:
Quite many objections on the Overall Evaluation section:
Samsung, Huawei and Ericsson wanted to remove the sentence "Among solutions in category “CP”, solution 3 has been
concluded as having no security impact"
NSN preferred to keep it, but adding "security functionality impact". It was agreed another wording proposed by NSN.
ALU also had problems with some of the conclusions, so some offline work was needed in order to tackle all the
comments from the companies.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130862.
S3-130690
draft Reply LS on input on security aspects for MTCe solutions
33.868 v..
Source: Intel
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130687
Discussion on reply LS on requesting input on security aspects for MTCe solutions from SA2
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130843.
S3-130742
Discussion on draft reply LS on SDDTE security aspects
Source: Samsung
Abstract:
Discussion:
Huawei proposed to go for a table for the mapping and do an overall analysis of the solutions.
ALU found this proposal clearer.
The Chairman found this approach more useful, combining the table and the overall solution analysis.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130843.
S3-130668
HSS filtering for discussion
Source: ZTE Corporation
Abstract:
Discussion:
NSN found this not security related, but something to be handled in SA2.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130669
HSS filtering SMS-delivered device trigger message
23.682 CR-0075 (Rel-11) v..
Source: ZTE Corporation, China Unicom
Abstract:
Discussion:
The Chairman commented that this should be aligned with our own TS in Rel-12.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130863.
S3-130863
HSS filtering SMS-delivered device trigger message
23.682 CR-0075 rev 1 (-) v..
Source: ZTE Corporation, China Unicom
(Replaces S3-130669)
Decision:
The document was agreed.
S3-130683
Network based filtering solution
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130684
Clarification of information elements related to device trigger in SMS based device trigger
message
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130755
Aligning TP Protocol Id in draft TS 33.187
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
-
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130688
Security requirement of preventing MTC device triggers coming from normal UEs
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130748
Updates on triggering with regular GBA
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130750
Triggering with GBA push over Tsms
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130751
Updates on Triggering with GBA push over Tsp
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130739
Security requirements on MTC
Source: China Unicom
Abstract:
-
Discussion:
Samsung: we should wait for solution and then go for the requirement in our TS.
BT: this is different from the SA1 requirement, we should wait for the requirement from SA1 before jumping into
solutions.
The Chairman stated that we should go forward this way.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130709
pCR to TR 33.868: Provisioning of HSS-generated KME for MTCe IMEI Binding
TR 33.868 v..
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
This pCR introduces a replacement text for TR 33.868 section 5.4.4.2.3.3 on provisioning of the symmetric devicespecific key KME. As in previous proposal, the KME is generated by the HSS. Two approached are shown: in one the
KME
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130710
pCR to TR 33.868: Provisioning of UE-generated KME for MTCe IMEI Binding
TR 33.868 v..
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
This pCR introduces additional alternative for TR 33.868 section 5.4.4.2.3.3.3 on provisioning of the symmetric devicespecific key KME. In this alternative, the KME is generated by the ME.
Discussion:
NSN challenged this contribution. Some offline discussions were needed and eventually it was approved.
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130711
Editorial cleanup of sec.5.4.4.2.3.1 and 5.4.4.2.3.2
TR 33.868 v..
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
This pCR proposes clarifications of TR 33.868 sec. 5.4.4.2.3.1 and 5.4.4.2.3.2. In addition, the text describing
provisioning of the symmetric key is moved to a new section, as proposed in a separate pCR.
Discussion:
Telecom Italia: if an operator wants to implement this, does it have to upgrade the HSS to be able to perform this
feature? Does this have a cost?
ALU: it depends on the scenario, in some cases there are changes.
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130695
Conclusion on USIM/ME binding solution
Source: Morpho Cards, Gemalto
Abstract:
Discussion:
Deutsche Telekom welcomed the introduction of a table summarizing all the criteria, but found it difficult to find and
standardize a single solution that fits all.
One UE based solution and one network based solution was proposed by BT.
Morpho Cards: more than one solution on each side would be too complex. Going for one solution in the device side
and another in the network side would be the way to go.
The Chairman found it hard to agree on a table during the meeting. He suggested to stay in the facts rather than using a
table, since it is always hard to reach a consensus here. Everything will be open now but the next meeting might need
show of hands in order to see how many support each solution.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130801
comments to S3-130695
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130819
ALU Comments on S3-130695
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130731
Solution of restricting the USIM to specific UEs
Source: Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks, Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Samsung
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130729
CR to 23.060: Solution of restricting the USIM to specific UEs
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130730
CR to 23.401: Solution of restricting the USIM to specific UEs
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130656
secure connection
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130785
EAP/PANA-based Solution for Secure Connection
Source: Samsung
Abstract:
Discussion:
The Chairman to group all EAP based solutions, then the EAP-AKA based solutions and so on.
Later the similarities between the solutions and differences will be studied.
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130657
secure connection evaluation
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130793
pCR to TR 33.868: evaluation of Secure Connection
TR 33.868 v..
Source: Gemalto, Morpho Cards
Abstract:
pCR to TR 33.868: evaluation of Secure Connection
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130658
lightweight M2M consideration
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Discussion:
The Chairman asked whether it would be possible to have more information on this issue for next meeting.
NSN asked how this work is related to the work in OneM2M. It was concluded that maybe LS could be a tool to align
with them.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130740
Network based method for privacy concern
Source: China Unicom
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
S3-130749
33.868: Missing References and Hanging Paragraphs
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
S3-130828
Secure Connection details on GBA based solutions
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130829
Update of 729: CR to 23.060: Solution of restricting the USIM to specific UEs
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks, TeliaSonera
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130830
Update of 730: pCR to 23.401: Solution of restricting the USIM to specific UEs
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks, TeliaSonera
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130831
update of S3-130731 Solution of restricting the USIM to specific UEs
Source: Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks, Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Samsung, TeliaSonera
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130845
Draft TR MTCe
33.868 v..
Source: Rapporteur
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130864
New draft TS MTCe
Source: Rapporteur
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130890
Version of TR MTCe after email approval
Source: Rapporteur
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
7.10
Security Aspects of Public Warning System
S3-130664
Evaluation of UE capability for OTA based PWS security
Source: ZTE Corporation, China Unicom
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications.
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130665
Evaluation of UICC capability for OTA based PWS security
Source: ZTE Corporation, China Unicom
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130666
PWS Security Requirement Analysis-mod by hy-ztev2-clear
Source: CATR, ZTE Corporation
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130667
Some PWS Requirement vs Security Solutions Analysis-v4
Source: ZTE Corporation, China Unicom
Abstract:
Discussion:
NSN suggested that in requirement 3 it should be clarified that the user is roaming to a visiting network in China. ZTE
agreed, but Vodafone didn't agree to mention an specific country. They should be general and not regional
requirements.
The Chairman proposed to talk about CCSA requirements instead of regional requirements.
Sprint queried about the difference between this requirement and the SA1 requirement. The Chairman replied that the
difference is that there is no requirement for roaming in SA1.
ZTE clarified that the requirements in the Discussion section are taken from the CCSA document.
NTT DoCoMo wanted to let SA1 know about these requirements and include them in their requirements. NSN
commented that this is already covered since they mention national roaming.
Some offline work on the table was needed.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130866.
S3-130866
Some PWS Requirement vs Security Solutions Analysis-v4
Source: ZTE Corporation, China Unicom
(Replaces S3-130667)
Discussion:
NSN: there are no security requirements anymore.
Noted, waiting for the official statement from CCSA
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130675
Open issues in generalized certificate-based approach for PWS
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130676
Deleting Editor's note in section 7.3.1
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130677
Removal of editor's note for SAI
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130678
Discussion about IDs in the warning message
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130679
Editor's note on 2G subscribers over UTRAN
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Discussion:
The Chairman proposed to have the working assumption that 2G subscribers will not be considered.
The group agreed.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130680
Mechanisms of NAS solution for GSM/GPRS
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Discussion:
NSN wanted to clarify how the attack is resolved with more text in the draft TR.BT also wanted to have a better
analysis on this.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130681
Clarification for parameters included in NAS_based solution
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130682
Corrections on NAS_based solution for GERAN
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130689
pCR on Considerations on networks in disaster areas
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
The current text does not provide any information on the network in a box. This pseudo-change request provides
clarification on this term.
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130757
Clarifications on Implicit Certificate approach
Source: Research In Motion UK Ltd.
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130759
pCR: Clarifications on PWS CA update message for Implicit Certificates
Source: Research In Motion UK Ltd.
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130760
pCR: Clarifications on Timestamps for Implicit Certificates
Source: Research In Motion UK Ltd.
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130761
pCR: Clarifications on Roaming and application of Implicit Certificates
Source: Research In Motion UK Ltd.
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130763
Security considerations on implicit certificates with Keyed MAC signature
Source: Research In Motion UK Ltd.
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130768
Conclusion on Signature Algorithms
TR 33.869 v..
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Discussion:
Vodafone disagreed with the conclusion. TeliaSonera agreed.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130694
Improvement CA update from USIM
Source: BlackBerry, Vodafone
Abstract:
The following proposes a simpler way to update CA certificate within the ME from the USIM by relying on the USIM
initialisation procedure rather than creating new (U)SIM toolkit commands.
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130702
Restrictions on signature length in PWS security
TR 33.869 v..
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Discussion:
NSN asked whether ETWS is used anywhere else in Japan. NTT-DoCoMo saw no point in this issue.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130701
Resolution of editor's notes in OTA based PWS security solution
TR 33.869 v..
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Gemalto, Morpho Cards
Abstract:
Discussion:
NSN requested to mention CT6 in an editor's note. It was approved with this modification
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130712
Threat section restructuring pCR PWS
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
This pCR proposes to change the placement of the threat section in the TR because a threat analysis should come before
the requirements which are a consequence of the threats.
Discussion:
Vodafone didn't agree with this structure being clearer.
TeliaSonera and BT supported this new structure.
Some offline discussions were needed in order to agree on a new structure, and finally noted.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130713
Threat discussion pCR PWS
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
This pCR applies editorial changes to the security threat section (introducing headlines) and proposes some additions.
The subsection on the placement of the node does not specifically mention the threat of a public key compromise. This
is added as a new
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130714
Requirement on origin and integrity of public key pCR PWS
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
PWS security requirement proposal
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130777
Securely distinguishing between genuine and false warning notifications without signature
TR 33.869 v..
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130867.
S3-130867
Securely distinguishing between genuine and false warning notifications without signature
TR 33.869 v..
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
(Replaces S3-130777)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130715
Circumvention attack pCR PWS
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
This pCR provides a description of an attack we call the PWS security circumvention attack. It is shown that it is, under
certain conditions, possible for an attacker to circumvent PWS security implemented in a particular country,
independently of the pub
Discussion:
BT pointed out that even Bluetooth could be used as an access network for these attacks.
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130716
Requirement to avoid circumvention attack pCR PWS
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
A companion pCR in S3-130715 provides a description of the PWS security circumvention attack. This pCR introduces
a requirement that the circumvention attack shall be prevented.
Discussion:
Vodafone didn't agree with the use of "shall".
Huawei pointed out that the use of "shall" in a TR is not correct.
The Chairman proposed to name this section "additional potential requirements" that could be used in the TS. This was
endorsed by the group.
Approved with modifications.
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130717
Circumvention attack-measures pCR PWS
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
A companion pCR in S3-130715 provides a description of the PWS security circumvention attack. This pCR introduces
potential countermeasures.
Discussion:
ZTE thinks that the circumvention attack can be solved in one country which have the security requirement if the Cons
of the solutions are acceptable
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130867.
S3-130718
Considerations to PWS UE settings pCR
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Depending on SA3 decisions whether PWS security for roamers is considered (at all, in the first step, or later), this
section will point out possible threats due to PWS settings in the UE.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130888.
S3-130888
Considerations to PWS UE settings pCR
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
(Replaces S3-130718)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130764
Text for scope and abbreviations and removal of editor's notes
TR 33.869 v..
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
-
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130765
PWS and PWS Security Requirements
TR 33.869 v..
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Discussion:
China Unicom asked about the deletion of the reception of warning messages in the roaming area.
BT: there is no security requirement for roaming users
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130868.
S3-130868
PWS and PWS Security Requirements
TR 33.869 v..
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
(Replaces S3-130765)
Discussion:
The sentence "A solution for PWS security will be able to support national roaming" found" was found controversial
by some companies like Vodafone and NSN.
An editor's note about the requirement needing some clarification was agreed.
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130693
Rework of PWS security requirements
Source: BlackBerry, Vodafone
Abstract:
Discussion:
Qualcomm found the requirement of the mechanism to indicate the PWS-UE the credentials to use for verification of
the authenticity of the warning notification, very hard to implement.
Ericsson was in the same line.
Vodafone: no need to worry about this, the regulator will take care of it.
It was agreed to change it adding a "may"
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130753
Way forward on TR33.869
Source: Research In Motion UK Ltd., Vodafone
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130756
pCR: Conclusion section of TR33.869
Source: Research In Motion UK Ltd., Vodafone
Abstract:
Discussion:
NSN found it too early to make any conclusions.
BT leaned to support the conclusion but it needed more time to consider it.
China Unicom commented that they would support the conclusion if it considered different solutions for different
regions.
The Chairman found it hard to reach a conclusion during this meeting, although there was some support for the implicit
certificate solution. A conclusion should be reached next meeting including a show of hands if necessary.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130722
Implicit Certificates and CA updating
33.269 CR-0001 (Rel-12) v..
Source: Research In Motion UK Ltd.
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130865
new draft TR PWS
Source: Rapporteur
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
S3-130871
LS to SA1 on PWS security requirements
Source: NTT Docomo
Discussion:
Vodafone didn’t agree with SA3 sending this kind of LS. It should be delivered by SA,SA1.
TeliaSonera supported sending it.
NTTDocomo needed official input from CCSA before setting down the requirements, but Vodafone didn't see it
necessary.
The Chairman clarified that official input from organizations must come through LS and not from companies. The
Chairman proposed that companies who are active in CCSA could work it out in CCSA in order to make them send an
official LS to SA3 for the next meeting.
Decision:
7.11
The document was noted.
Firewall Traversal
S3-130614
Reply LS on Notifications on Firewall Traversal from LS Reply SA2 S2-130722 and CT1 C1-
130773
Source: S1-133279
Abstract:
Discussion:
Prashant (Oracle) commented that CT1 is waiting for SA3's response.
Orange: UE and WiFi access point, accessing to the P-CSSCF there might a firewall in the middle but no ePDG in the
path. How do you manage this kind of access? The UE couldn't have access to IMS due to this firewall.
It was proposed to send a LS to CT1,but NSN didn't see a reason for that before seeing more contributions.
Decision:
The document was replied to in S3-130879.
S3-130879
Reply to SA1: LS on Notifications on Firewall Traversal
Source: Oracle
Decision:
The document was approved.
7.11.1
Study on Firewall Traversal
S3-130721
TURAN:pCR: Update to FW traversal flow chart
Source: Oracle
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130869
Draft TR for Firewall Traversal
Source: Rapporteur
Decision:
The document was approved.
7.11.2
Tunnelling of UE Services over Restrictive Access Networks
S3-130767
Correction of Specification of Tunnelling of UE Services over Restrictive Access Networks -
IMS case
33.203 CR-0201 (Rel-12) v12.2.0
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Discussion:
Orange: this is very unclear and I support this clarification very much.
Qualcomm didn't support these changes because it would modify architecture decisions.
As proposed by Orange, there was consensus that requirements on iFire in 22.228 are not limited to EPC,i.e. 4G
technology, but apply to any IP transport between UE and the IM CN.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130883.
S3-130883
Correction of Specification of Tunnelling of UE Services over Restrictive Access Networks -
IMS case
33.203 CR-0201 rev 1 (Rel-12) v12.2.0
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
(Replaces S3-130767)
Decision:
The document was agreed.
S3-130720
TURAN: IMS FW traversal CR, update to flowchart
33.20 CR-0198 (Rel-12) v12.1.0
Source: Oracle
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130870.
S3-130870
TURAN: IMS FW traversal CR, update to flowchart
33.20 CR-0198 rev 1 (Rel-12) v12.1.0
Source: Oracle
(Replaces S3-130720)
Discussion:
Fixes errors on CR cover and throughout the CR
Decision:
The document was agreed.
S3-130780
Missing caption and hanging paragraph
33.203 CR-0202 (Rel-12) v12.2.0
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
-
Decision:
The document was agreed.
S3-130697
Firewall traversal for IMS services based on ICE
33.203 CR-0199 (Rel-12) v12.2.0
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Huawei
Abstract:
This CR describes a solution for firewall traversal for IMS signalling and media based on SIP over TLS and ICE. A
placeholder for this solution already exists in TS 33.203.
Discussion:
Huawei and Oracle supported removing the Editor's note "ICE TCP is required for TCP based media (e.g. MSRP) but is
not yet supported in TS 23.228 [3] and TS 24.229 [8]. These specifications need to be updated."
Vodafone,Qualcomm and Deutsche Telekom didn't fully support these solutions.
NSN considered too difficult to go for one solution during this meeting.
Ericsson: in environments where we use ICE this would be the preferred choice.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130872.
S3-130872
Firewall traversal for IMS services based on ICE
33.203 CR-0199 rev 1 (Rel-12) v12.2.0
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Huawei
(Replaces S3-130697)
Decision:
The document was agreed.
S3-130724
discussion of firewall traversal for IMS plane based on ICE and Media over TCP
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130725
Firewall traversal for IMS plane based on ICE and Media over TCP
33.203 CR-0203 (-) v..
Source: Huawei , HiSilicon
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130847.
S3-130847
Firewall traversal for IMS plane based on ICE and Media over TCP
33.203 CR-0203 rev 1 (Rel-12) v12.2.0
Source: Huawei , HiSilicon
(Replaces S3-130725)
Discussion:
Ericsson: this optimization works in a limited set of scenarios. We prefer to have this solution in a TR first.
Oracle supported this contribution.
NSN didn't support it either.
The Chairman commented that more information on the benefits were needed and also contact with other groups to get
more information on the architecture.
Decision:
7.12
The document was noted.
Security Aspects of WLAN Network Selection for 3GPP Terminals
S3-130672
Categorize key issues in TR33.865
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130670
WLAN_NS TR33.869 reference and abbreviations
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130791
33.865 WLAN: Proposal for structure and editorial corrections
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130674
Trusted relationship of the WLAN network
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130877.
S3-130877
Trusted relationship of the WLAN network
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
(Replaces S3-130674)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130736
Security requirement for key issues
Source: China Unicom
Abstract:
Discussion:
NSN wondered about the impact on the user experience.
BT: the access would be overloaded. To some extent, this is work for IEEE.
NSN proposed that the practical feasibility of this solution is left for further study. China Mobile supported this, but
finally the contribution was noted.
The Chairman invited more contributions with solutions to solve these problems.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130799
security requirements for WLAN network selection
Source: Samsung
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130738
Enhancement to Key issue- Interaction between WLAN network selection and networkprovided policies for WLAN selection
Source: China Unicom
Abstract:
Discussion:
Discussed together with China Mobile's S3-130653.
It was commented that we had agreed on requirements of confidentiality protection, so all ANDSF traffic is already
protected. China mobile pointed out that this is about conflict between policies and not in scope of SA3.
There was more support for deleting the issue as China Mobile proposed in S3-130653.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130653
Discussion on WLAN key issue
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130733
Threat in key issue- Use WLAN load Information for network selection
Source: China Unicom
Abstract:
Discussion:
NSN: the consequence is just bad user's experience. Not convinced that this is a real issue. Qualcomm supported this by
saying this is out of scope of 3GPP.
BT supported including this threat.
The Chairman proposed to leave this description but with an editor's note saying that is unclear whether 3GPP can do
something about it.
Intel commented that this wasn't a valid threat.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130734
Threat in key issue - Use WLAN Access Network Type and Venue Information for network
selection
Source: China Unicom
Abstract:
Discussion:
Intel: the user knows where he is despite the information sent by this WLAN.
BT: we don’t care about the WLAN but about the service. It's an automatic service.
The handset application changes some parameters according to the location.
Intel: this is not the threat explained here.
The Chairman proposed to explain better this threat and asset whether this is something we need to take care about or
not
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130735
Common threats in key issues
Source: China Unicom
Abstract:
Discussion:
The Chairman proposed that everything seems to lead to the working assumption is that WLAN access information
will be treated as untrusted. We won't consider potential threats and counter measures that are related to this untrusted
information.
BT wasn't fully convinced by this but didn't object.
NSN: what is left to be done if we take that working assumption?(they supported the working assumption)
Samsung: We would only do something about the information that is coming from 3GPP networks.
The working assumption was endorsed.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130673
Key issue: Hotspot 2.0 indication element
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130737
Solution of support WLAN access through roaming agreements
Source: China Unicom
Abstract:
Discussion:
The solution wasn't completely understood by some companies, so it was eventually noted.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130766
33.865 WLAN: Observations on Solution 1
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
-
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130788
solution of supporting security protection for WLAN network selection
Source: Samsung
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was withdrawn.
S3-130789
Authentication for communication with WLAN network
Source: Samsung
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was withdrawn.
S3-130792
security requirements for WLAN network selection
Source: Samsung
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was withdrawn.
S3-130798
Authentication for communication with WLAN network
Source: Samsung
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130797
Solution of supporting security protection for WLAN network selection
Source: Samsung
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130873
Draft TR WLAN NS
33.865 v..
Source: Rapporteur
Decision:
The document was approved.
7.13
Security Aspects of Proximity-based Services
S3-130613
LS on Feedback on Proximity Services and Lawful Interception
Source: S1-132171
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130616
Reply LS on Proximity Services and Lawful Interception
Source: S2-131522
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130781
Proposed overview text for Prose
Source: Qualcomm Incorporated
Abstract:
Discussion:
Adrian (Qualcomm) commented that all this content is taken from SA1.
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130744
Security for ProSe system
Source: NEC Corporation
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130727
Security requirement for ProSe architecture
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130782
Inclusion of the SA2 architecture in the Prose TR
Source: Qualcomm Incorporated
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130783
Proposed configuration data key issue for Prose
Source: Qualcomm Incorporated
Abstract:
Discussion:
Morpho: I don't know why this authorization should be there.
It was agreed to remove it.
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130654
Security analysis for restricted ProSe discovery
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Discussion:
Overlapping text with 784 can be fixed in a pCR for the next meeting.
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130784
Proposed new key issue on Restricted Direct Discovery for the Prose TR
Source: Qualcomm Incorporated
Abstract:
Discussion:
Vodafone: there are privacy issues.
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130655
Security analysis for restricted ProSe communication
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Discussion:
NEC proposed to add that it's a one-to-one communication
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130786
Proposed key issue for 1-1 communication
Source: Qualcomm Incorporated
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130728
Authentication for ProSe UE
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon
Abstract:
Discussion:
Intel didn’t find this contribution relevant since it seems to imply that there is a single solution for authentication.
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130773
ProSe authentication
33.cde v..
Source: Intel
Abstract:
Mutual authentication of ProSe enabled Public Safety UEs when not in network coverage is added as key issue.
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130795
ProSe accounting considerations
Source: Qualcomm Incorporated
Abstract:
Discussion:
Intel queried whether SA5 Charging group should be contacted since it involves the operator's policy.
Deutsche Telekom: It is an operator’s decision whether they want to charge based on information provided by the UE.
We support removing the editor's note.
China Mobile had problems with the analysis and didn't support the conclusion. They found it incomplete.
Deutsche Telekom: there is no solution for this fundamental problem.
Finally the proposal was agreed and the paragraph below was requested to be recorded in the minutes:
The editor's note in the ProSe SA2 TR: "Whether such UE-provided info can be considered a trusted source of
information to base accounting procedures on or whether other solutions need to be developed is subject to SA3
evaluation." was studied in SA3 as requested by SA2 and it was agreed that it can be removed from the TR.
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130796
ProSe discovery id semantics and operator risks
Source: Qualcomm Incorporated
Abstract:
Discussion:
In the clause 6.1.1.2.3.2of the ProSe SA2 TR [1], the following Editor’s Note calls for a study of control and risk
relating to semantics of discovery identifiers (also referred to as expression codes) shared between UEs :
Editor’s note: Risks to an operator arising from the possibility of liability for improper use of ProSe service due to the
lack of control on the semantic of the expression codes shared with the interested parties by the application layer need
to be studied by SA3.
SA3 has studied the above editor’s note as requested by SA2 and believe that it can be removed from the SA2 TR
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130787
Proposed solution for configuration data delivery in ProSe
Source: Qualcomm Incorporated
Abstract:
-
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130790
Security for restricted ProSe direct discovery
Source: Qualcomm Incorporated
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130794
Solution for ProSe one-to-one communications
Source: Qualcomm Incorporated
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130884.
S3-130884
Proposed resolutions for comments on Solution for ProSe one to one communications
Source: Qualcomm Incorporated
(Replaces S3-130794)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130825
Comments on S3-130794 Solution for ProSe one-to-one communications
Source: Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130884.
S3-130882
Draft TR Prose
Source: Rapporteur
Decision:
The document was approved.
7.14
Other areas
S3-130719
Abstract:
Discussion:
Updated WID proposal GCSE_LTE security
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks
Blackberry, Qualcomm,At&T,Huawei, Samsung and others supported the WI.
China Mobile wanted to extend the schedule, but Bengt commented that this could be seen as an extension of stage 2 of
Rel-12 not finishing in December.
Bengt will comment in SA that SA3 will do as much as possible to finish it for Rel-12 but it will be most likely finished
in March 2014.
It was accepted to put SA#64 as target.
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130880.
S3-130880
Updated WID proposal GCSE_LTE security
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks
(Replaces S3-130719)
Decision:
The document was approved.
8
Studies
8.1
Study on Security aspects of Integration of Single Sign-On (SSO)
frameworks with 3GPP networks
S3-130609
LS/o on draft Recommendation ITU-T X.sap-8, Efficient multi-factor authentication
mechanisms using mobile devices
Source: ITU-T SG17
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was postponed.
S3-130703
PCR to 33.895: Editor's Note #1, 2, 3 in Sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2
33.895 v..
Source: Interdigital, AT&T
Abstract:
This PCR is one of the series of PCRs attempting to resolve Editor's Notes in Section 8.3.2. It addresses three Editor's
Notes with regards to reuse of existing solutions. It also adds one new reference to PAPE in Section 2.
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
S3-130704
PCR to 33.895: Editor's Note #5 in Section 8.3.2
33.895 v..
Source: Interdigital, AT&T
Abstract:
This PCR resolves Editor's Note in Section 8.3 of TR 33.895 v.0.6.0
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
S3-130705
PCR to 33.895: Editor's Notes #4 and 6 in Section 8.3.2
33.895 v..
Source: Interdigital, AT&T
Abstract:
This PCR is one of the series of PCRs resolving the Editors Notes in Section 8.3.2. This particular PCR resolves the
following Editor's Notes : Editor's note: The high level diagram above has to be harmonized with more detailed call
flow examples pro
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
S3-130706
PCR to 33.895: Editor's Note #7, 8 in Section 8.3.2.1
33.895 v..
Source: Interdigital, AT&T
Abstract:
This PCR resolves Editor's Note in Section 8.3 of TR 33.895 v.0.6.0
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
S3-130707
PCR to 33.895: Editor's Note #9 in Section 8.3.2.1
33.895 v..
Source: Interdigital, AT&T
Abstract:
This PCR resolves Editor's Note in Section 8.3 of TR 33.895 v.0.6.0
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
S3-130723
Alternative method for two-factor authentication
TR 33.895 v..
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, AT&T
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
S3-130762
Using user consent for GBA and SSO
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and revised to S3-130891.
S3-130891
Using user consent for GBA and SSO
Source: Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130887
Draft TR SSO
Source: Rapporteur
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
8.2
Security Study on Spoofed Call Detection and Prevention
8.3
Study Item on Security Assurance Methodology for 3GPP Network
Elements
S3-130814
SECAM comments on 647 and 692
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130855.
S3-130822
Comments on S3-130646,S3-130647,S3-130652 etc and related to S3-130633 and S3-130632
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130636
Test methodology and skills requirement owner
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130874.
S3-130874
Test methodology document - Update of 636 after the evening session 2
Source: CMCC
(Replaces S3-130636)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130633
Vulnerability testing activities
Source: China Mobile, Orange, TeliaSonera, China Unicom
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130859.
S3-130812
SECAM comments on 633
Source: Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130859.
S3-130859
Vulnerability testing activities and accreditation
Source: China Mobile, Orange, TeliaSonera, China Unicom, Nokia Siemens Network
(Replaces S3-130812)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130647
Vulnerability Testing framework
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130855.
S3-130855
Clarification on VT and definitions
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks, Orange, China Mobile
(Replaces S3-130647)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130691
comments to S3-130647
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130855.
S3-130692
[SECAM] Comments on S3-130647 - Vulnerability testing framework
Source: Orange
Abstract:
-
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130855.
S3-130802
[SECAM] comments on contribution S3-130647
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130855.
S3-130632
Difference between security compliance testing and vulnerability testing
Source: China Mobile, BT Group, China Unicom, NSN, Teliasonera
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130811
SECAM comments on 632
Source: Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130652
[SECAM] Criteria for compliance tester accreditation
Source: Orange
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130860.
S3-130860
Update of S3-130652 after the first evening session
Source: Orange
(Replaces S3-130652)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130803
[SECAM] comments on contribution S3-130652
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
-
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130860.
S3-130816
SECAM comments on 652
Source: Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130860.
S3-130630
clarification on hardening requirements
Source: China Mobile, TeliaSonera, BT, Orange, China Unicom, NSN
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130646
Details on the content and structure of the SAS and what can be reused from CC on this specific
point
Source: Ericsson, Orange, Telecom Italia
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130875.
S3-130875
SAS Writing - Update of 646 after the evening session 2
Source: Telecom Italia, Orange, Ericsson, China Unicom
(Replaces S3-130646)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130807
[SECAM] comments on contribution S3-130646
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130875.
S3-130813
SECAM comments on 646
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
-
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130875.
S3-130631
Operator's Operational requirements
Source: China Mobile, BT
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130643
Semantics consistency in security requirements description
Source: China Unicom, ZTE Corporation
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130875.
S3-130649
SECAM - terminological clarification on Security Requirements and Security Assurance
Specifications
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130620
[SECAM] SAS instantiation
Source: Orange
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130856.
S3-130808
SECAM comments on 620
Source: Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130856.
S3-130856
SAS instantiation content after the first evening session
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks, Orange
(Replaces S3-130808)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130659
Comments on 130620
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130856.
S3-130625
[SECAM] SAS instantiation usage and evaluation
Source: Orange
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130857.
S3-130810
SECAM comments on 625
Source: Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130857.
S3-130857
SAS instantiation evaluation and compliance testing activities
Source: Nokia Siemens Network, Orange
(Replaces S3-130810)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130806
[SECAM] comments on contribution S3-130625
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130857.
S3-130635
SAS instantiation evaluation
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130821.
S3-130821
SECAM comments on S3-130625
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130857.
S3-130621
[SECAM] Operational guidance
Source: Orange, Alcatel-Lucent, Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130634
Discussion on ToE
Source: China Mobile
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130876.
S3-130639
[SECAM] Scope of evaluation, use of TOE and TSF
Source: Orange
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130876.
S3-130876
TOE/TSF, scope of evaluation – Update after the evening session 2
Source: Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks, Ericsson,China Mobile
(Replaces S3-130639)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130770
[SECAM] Merge of S3-130634 and S3-130639 (on TOE/TSF definition and use)
Source: Orange, China Mobile, Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130876.
S3-130772
[SECAM] Merge attempt of S3-130770 and S3-130648 (TOE/TSF definition)
Source: Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130876.
S3-130648
Clarification of TOE and TSF - Discussion and pCR
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130876.
S3-130815
SECAM comments on 648 and 770
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130876.
S3-130823
[SECAM] comments on contribution S3-130770
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130876.
S3-130622
[SECAM] Vendor development process and lifecycle management - discussion
Source: Orange
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130623
[SECAM] Vendor development process and lifecycle management - pCR
Source: Orange
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications (combined with 804)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130804
[SECAM] comments on contribution S3-130623
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130644
Life cycle management
Source: China Unicom, Orange, China Mobile, ZTE Corporation
Abstract:
Discussion:
Approved with modifications
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130627
[SECAM] Clarification of the term Certification Body in M2
Source: Orange
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130817.
S3-130650
SECAM - Umbrella organization example for accreditation labs
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130817.
S3-130817
SECAM merger of 627 and 650
Source: Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130638
Requirement for Accreditation Body
Source: Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130637
self-declaration and certification
Source: Huawei, Hisilicon, China Unicom
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130640
[SECAM] Editorial improvements
Source: Orange
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130826
Comments on S3-130640 Section 5.2.8.x
Source: Juniper Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130642
Clarification on the overview of methodology 2
Source: China Unicom, ZTE Corporation
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130875.
S3-130641
Generalize the environment of functions and nodes to cover NFV scenarios
Source: China Unicom
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and revised to S3-130892.
S3-130892
Generalize the environment of functions and nodes to cover NFV scenarios
Source: China Unicom
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130645
Scope of Core Network Products
Source: China Unicom, ZTE Corporation
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
S3-130626
[SECAM] Generic consideration (partial vs full compliance)
Source: Orange
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
S3-130624
[SECAM] TR conclusion and next steps
Source: Orange
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130878.
S3-130809
SECAM comments on 624
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130878.
S3-130878
TR 33.805 conclusion -merge
Source: Nokia Siemens Networks, Orange, Juniper Networks
(Replaces S3-130809)
Decision:
The document was approved.
S3-130651
Work Item on Security Assurance Specification for 3GPP Network Products
Source: TeliaSonera
Abstract:
This is a new work item for the specification work of Security Assurance Specification(s) for 3GPP Network Products.
Decision:
The document was withdrawn.
S3-130663
Comments on 130634
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was withdrawn.
S3-130805
[SECAM] comments on contribution S3-130624
Source: Alcatel-Lucent
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was withdrawn.
S3-130854
SECAM evening sessions at SA3#72 – minutes
Source: Orange
Decision:
The document was noted.
S3-130885
First version of SECAM draft TR
Source: Rapporteur
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
S3-130886
Second version of SECAM draft TR
Source: Rapporteur
Decision:
The document was Left for email approval and approved.
8.4
Other Study Areas
S3-130741
Study on Subscriber Privacy Impact in 3GPP
Source: AT&T, CATR, CATT, China Telecom, China Unicom, Ericsson, HiSilicon, Huawei, Intel,
InterDigital, KPN, Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks, Samsung, ST-Ericsson, TeliaSonera, TNO, ZTE
Corporation
Abstract:
Decision:
The document was revised to S3-130881.
S3-130881
Study on Subscriber Privacy Impact in 3GPP
Source: AT&T, CATR, CATT, China Telecom, China Unicom, Ericsson, HiSilicon, Huawei, Intel,
InterDigital, KPN, Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks, Samsung, ST-Ericsson, TeliaSonera, TNO, ZTE
Corporation
(Replaces S3-130741)
Decision:
9
The document was approved.
Review and Update of Work Plan
S3-130604
SA3 WorkPlan
Source: ETSI Secretariat
Abstract:
Discussion:
Rapporteurs are asked to send the progress on their WIs after the meeting to the Chairman and Secretary.
Decision:
10
The document was noted.
Future Meeting Dates and Venues
S3-130602
SA3 meeting calendar
Source: ETSI Secretariat
Abstract:
Discussion:
November 17th-November 21st 2014
Mega meeting next year
Decision:
11
The document was noted.
Any Other Business
Next meeting will have the elections. Candidates are welcome.
Possibly there will be a joint meeting with SA2 in the next meeting in San Francisco. SA2 may send LS related to the
WIs we have dependency on.
S3-130696
Updates on SA3 guidelines
Source: ETSI Secretariat
Abstract:
Decision:
12
The document was noted.
Close
The Chairman thanked Huawei for the hosting, MCC for the support and the delegates for the hard work.
After this, the meeting was closed.
Report prepared by: Mirko
Annex A: List of contribution documents
Document
S3130600
S3130601
S3130602
S3130603
S3130604
S3130605
S3130606
S3130607
S3130608
S3130609
S3130610
S3130611
S3130612
S3130613
S3130614
S3130615
S3130616
S3130617
S3130618
S3130619
S3130620
S3130621
Title
Source
Decision
Replaces
Agenda
WG Chairman
approved
-
Replaced
by
-
Report from last SA meeting
WG Chairman
noted
-
-
SA3 meeting calendar
ETSI Secretariat
noted
-
-
Report from last SA3 meeting
ETSI Secretariat
approved
-
-
SA3 WorkPlan
ETSI Secretariat
noted
-
-
LS on NAT and GIBA
C1-131743
replied to
-
-
LS on MS's reaction to
network's choice of an
unsupported ciphering
algorithm
Reply LS on Enhancing IMEI
based Lawful Interception in
IMS
Reply LS to the LS on
Optimization of the IMS
Information and Security
Parameters for CS to PS
SRVCC from GERAN to EUTRAN/HSPA
LS/o on draft
Recommendation ITU-T
X.sap-8, Efficient multi-factor
authentication mechanisms
using mobile devices
LS on interaction of oneM2M
with Underlying Networks
Reply LS on Follow-up LS on
KeNB re-keying
Reply LS on evaluation of
MTCe solutions
LS on Feedback on Proximity
Services and Lawful
Interception
Reply LS on Notifications on
Firewall Traversal from LS
Reply SA2 S2-130722 and
CT1 C1-130773
Reply LS on enhancing IMEI
based Lawful Interception in
IMS
Reply LS on Proximity
Services and Lawful
Interception
LS reply on NAT and GIBA
C1-131749
noted
-
-
C1-131767
noted
-
-
C1-132535
noted
-
-
ITU-T SG17
postponed
-
-
oneM2M Technical Plenary
replied to
-
-
R2-131538
noted
-
-
R2-132189
noted
-
-
S1-132171
noted
-
-
S1-133279
replied to
-
-
S2-131521
replied to
-
-
S2-131522
noted
-
-
S2-132323
noted
-
-
LS on requesting input on
security aspects for MTCe
solutions
Reply LS on IMEI based
Lawful Interceptions in IMS
[SECAM] SAS instantiation
S2-132327
replied to
-
-
SA3-LI
noted
-
-
Orange
revised
-
[SECAM] Operational
guidance
Orange, Alcatel-Lucent, Nokia
Corporation, Nokia Siemens
approved
-
S3130856
-
S3130622
S3130623
S3130624
S3130625
S3130626
S3130627
S3130628
S3130629
S3130630
S3130631
S3130632
S3130633
S3130634
S3130635
S3130636
S3130637
S3130638
S3130639
S3130640
S3130641
S3130642
S3130643
S3130644
S3130645
S3130646
S3130647
S3130648
S3130649
Networks
Orange
noted
-
-
Orange
approved
-
-
Orange
revised
-
Orange
revised
-
Orange
approved
-
S3130878
S3130857
-
Orange
revised
-
3GPP SA WG3
revised
-
NSN, Ericsson, ST Ericsson,
Alcatel-Lucent
China Mobile, TeliaSonera, BT,
Orange, China Unicom, NSN
China Mobile, BT
revised
-
approved
-
S3130817
S3130841
S3130840
-
noted
-
-
China Mobile, BT Group, China
Unicom, NSN, Teliasonera
noted
-
-
revised
-
Discussion on ToE
China Mobile, Orange,
TeliaSonera, China Unicom
China Mobile
revised
-
SAS instantiation evaluation
China Mobile
revised
-
Test methodology and skills
requirement owner
self-declaration and
certification
Requirement for Accreditation
Body
[SECAM] Scope of
evaluation, use of TOE and
TSF
[SECAM] Editorial
improvements
Generalize the environment
of functions and nodes to
cover NFV scenarios
Clarification on the overview
of methodology 2
Semantics consistency in
security requirements
description
Life cycle management
China Mobile
revised
-
Huawei, Hisilicon, China Unicom
approved
-
S3130859
S3130876
S3130821
S3130874
-
Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom
noted
-
-
Orange
revised
-
S3130876
Orange
noted
-
-
China Unicom
revised
-
S3130892
China Unicom, ZTE Corporation
revised
-
China Unicom, ZTE Corporation
revised
-
S3130875
S3130875
China Unicom, Orange, China
Mobile, ZTE Corporation
China Unicom, ZTE Corporation
approved
-
-
approved
-
-
Ericsson, Orange, Telecom Italia
revised
-
S3130875
Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
Nokia Siemens Networks
approved
-
S3130855
S3130876
-
[SECAM] Vendor
development process and
lifecycle management discussion
[SECAM] Vendor
development process and
lifecycle management - pCR
[SECAM] TR conclusion and
next steps
[SECAM] SAS instantiation
usage and evaluation
[SECAM] Generic
consideration (partial vs full
compliance)
[SECAM] Clarification of the
term Certification Body in M2
Response LS on H(e)NB
Access Control Verification
Access mode verification for
H(e)NBs
clarification on hardening
requirements
Operator's Operational
requirements
Difference between security
compliance testing and
vulnerability testing
Vulnerability testing activities
Scope of Core Network
Products
Details on the content and
structure of the SAS and what
can be reused from CC on
this specific point
Vulnerability Testing
framework
Clarification of TOE and TSF
- Discussion and pCR
SECAM - terminological
clarification on Security
S3130650
S3130651
S3130652
S3130653
S3130654
S3130655
S3130656
S3130657
S3130658
S3130659
S3130660
S3130661
S3130662
S3130663
S3130664
S3130665
S3130666
S3130667
S3130668
S3130669
S3130670
S3130671
S3130672
S3130673
S3130674
S3130675
S3130676
S3130677
S3-
Requirements and Security
Assurance Specifications
SECAM - Umbrella
organization example for
accreditation labs
Work Item on Security
Assurance Specification for
3GPP Network Products
[SECAM] Criteria for
compliance tester
accreditation
Discussion on WLAN key
issue
Security analysis for
restricted ProSe discovery
Security analysis for
restricted ProSe
communication
secure connection
Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
S3130817
TeliaSonera
withdrawn
-
-
Orange
revised
-
S3130860
China Mobile
approved
-
-
China Mobile
approved
-
-
China Mobile
approved
-
-
China Mobile
approved
-
-
secure connection evaluation
China Mobile
approved
-
-
lightweight M2M
consideration
Comments on 130620
China Mobile
noted
-
-
Alcatel-Lucent
revised
-
MTCe Connectionless
Solution: Enhancements
MTCe Connectionless
Solution Threat Scenarios
MTCe Connectionless
Solution Evaluation Changes
Comments on 130634
Alcatel-Lucent
revised
-
Alcatel-Lucent
revised
-
Alcatel-Lucent
revised
-
Alcatel-Lucent
withdrawn
-
S3130856
S3130851
S3130852
S3130858
-
Evaluation of UE capability
for OTA based PWS security
Evaluation of UICC capability
for OTA based PWS security
PWS Security Requirement
Analysis-mod by hy-ztev2clear
Some PWS Requirement vs
Security Solutions Analysisv4
HSS filtering for discussion
ZTE Corporation, China Unicom
approved
-
-
ZTE Corporation, China Unicom
approved
-
-
CATR, ZTE Corporation
noted
-
-
ZTE Corporation, China Unicom
revised
-
S3130866
ZTE Corporation
noted
-
-
HSS filtering SMS-delivered
device trigger message
WLAN_NS TR33.869
reference and abbreviations
Correction of the editorial
errors and the incorrect
description
Categorize key issues in
TR33.865
Key issue: Hotspot 2.0
indication element
Trusted relationship of the
WLAN network
Open issues in generalized
certificate-based approach for
PWS
Deleting Editor's note in
section 7.3.1
Removal of editor's note for
SAI
Discussion about IDs in the
ZTE Corporation, China Unicom
revised
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
S3130863
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
revised
-
S3130839
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
revised
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
S3130877
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
-
130678
S3130679
S3130680
S3130681
S3130682
S3130683
S3130684
S3130685
S3130686
S3130687
S3130688
S3130689
S3130690
S3130691
S3130692
S3130693
S3130694
S3130695
S3130696
S3130697
S3130698
S3130699
S3130700
S3130701
S3130702
S3130703
S3130704
S3-
warning message
Editor's note on 2G
subscribers over UTRAN
Mechanisms of NAS solution
for GSM/GPRS
Clarification for parameters
included in NAS_based
solution
Corrections on NAS_based
solution for GERAN
Network based filtering
solution
Clarification of information
elements related to device
trigger in SMS based device
trigger message
Security problems on small
data connectionless solution
Security context
synchronization when SGW
relocates for fast path
solution
Discussion on reply LS on
requesting input on security
aspects for MTCe solutions
from SA2
Security requirement of
preventing MTC device
triggers coming from normal
UEs
pCR on Considerations on
networks in disaster areas
draft Reply LS on input on
security aspects for MTCe
solutions
comments to S3-130647
Huawei, HiSilicon
noted
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
noted
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
revised
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
revised
-
S3130851
S3130849
Huawei, HiSilicon
revised
-
S3130843
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
-
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
Intel
approved
-
-
noted
-
-
China Mobile
revised
-
[SECAM] Comments on S3130647 - Vulnerability testing
framework
Rework of PWS security
requirements
Improvement CA update from
USIM
Conclusion on USIM/ME
binding solution
Updates on SA3 guidelines
Orange
revised
-
S3130855
S3130855
BlackBerry, Vodafone
approved
-
-
BlackBerry, Vodafone
approved
-
-
Morpho Cards, Gemalto
noted
-
-
ETSI Secretariat
noted
-
-
Firewall traversal for IMS
services based on ICE
KMS based solution for
immediate messaging
Clarification regarding NAT
and GIBA
Secure UDPTL based T.38
fax
Resolution of editor's notes in
OTA based PWS security
solution
Restrictions on signature
length in PWS security
PCR to 33.895: Editor's Note
#1, 2, 3 in Sections 8.3.1 and
8.3.2
PCR to 33.895: Editor's Note
#5 in Section 8.3.2
PCR to 33.895: Editor's Notes
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Huawei
revised
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
revised
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
agreed
-
S3130872
S3130832
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
revised
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Gemalto,
Morpho Cards
approved
-
S3130833
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
noted
-
-
Interdigital, AT&T
approved
-
-
Interdigital, AT&T
approved
-
-
Interdigital, AT&T
approved
-
-
130705
S3130706
S3130707
S3130708
S3130709
S3130710
S3130711
S3130712
S3130713
S3130714
S3130715
S3130716
S3130717
S3130718
S3130719
S3130720
S3130721
S3130722
S3130723
S3130724
S3130725
S3130726
S3130727
S3130728
S3130729
S3130730
S3130731
S3130732
S3130733
#4 and 6 in Section 8.3.2
PCR to 33.895: Editor's Note
#7, 8 in Section 8.3.2.1
PCR to 33.895: Editor's Note
#9 in Section 8.3.2.1
TCG progress report in the
areas of TMS and MPWG
pCR to TR 33.868:
Provisioning of HSSgenerated KME for MTCe
IMEI Binding
pCR to TR 33.868:
Provisioning of UE-generated
KME for MTCe IMEI Binding
Editorial cleanup of
sec.5.4.4.2.3.1 and
5.4.4.2.3.2
Threat section restructuring
pCR PWS
Threat discussion pCR PWS
Interdigital, AT&T
approved
-
-
Interdigital, AT&T
approved
-
-
Interdigital
noted
-
-
Alcatel-Lucent
approved
-
-
Alcatel-Lucent
approved
-
-
Alcatel-Lucent
approved
-
-
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
noted
-
-
approved
-
-
approved
-
-
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
approved
-
-
approved
-
-
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
revised
-
revised
-
Oracle
revised
-
Oracle
approved
-
S3130867
S3130888
S3130880
S3130870
-
Research In Motion UK Ltd.
noted
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, AT&T
approved
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
noted
-
-
Huawei , HiSilicon
revised
-
S3130847
Huawei, HiSilicon, TeliaSonera
withdrawn
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
noted
-
-
CR to 23.060: Solution of
restricting the USIM to
specific UEs
CR to 23.401: Solution of
restricting the USIM to
specific UEs
Solution of restricting the
USIM to specific UEs
MME overload threat analysis
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Nokia,
Nokia Siemens Networks
noted
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Nokia,
Nokia Siemens Networks
noted
-
-
Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks,
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Samsung
Intel
noted
-
-
revised
-
Threat in key issue- Use
WLAN load Information for
China Unicom
noted
-
S3130844
-
Requirement on origin and
integrity of public key pCR
PWS
Circumvention attack pCR
PWS
Requirement to avoid
circumvention attack pCR
PWS
Circumvention attackmeasures pCR PWS
Considerations to PWS UE
settings pCR
Updated WID proposal
GCSE_LTE security
TURAN: IMS FW traversal
CR, update to flowchart
TURAN:pCR: Update to FW
traversal flow chart
Implicit Certificates and CA
updating
Alternative method for twofactor authentication
discussion of firewall traversal
for IMS plane based on ICE
and Media over TCP
Firewall traversal for IMS
plane based on ICE and
Media over TCP
Multiple operator certificates
enrolment
Security requirement for
ProSe architecture
Authentication for ProSe UE
S3130734
S3130735
S3130736
S3130737
S3130738
S3130739
S3130740
S3130741
S3130742
S3130743
S3130744
S3130745
S3130746
S3130747
S3130748
S3130749
S3130750
S3130751
S3130752
S3130753
S3130754
S3130755
S3130756
S3130757
S3130758
S3-
network selection
Threat in key issue - Use
WLAN Access Network Type
and Venue Information for
network selection
Common threats in key
issues
Security requirement for key
issues
Solution of support WLAN
access through roaming
agreements
Enhancement to Key issueInteraction between WLAN
network selection and
network-provided policies for
WLAN selection
Security requirements on
MTC
Network based method for
privacy concern
Study on Subscriber Privacy
Impact in 3GPP
China Unicom
noted
-
-
China Unicom
noted
-
-
China Unicom
noted
-
-
China Unicom
noted
-
-
China Unicom
noted
-
-
China Unicom
noted
-
-
China Unicom
approved
-
-
AT&T, CATR, CATT, China
Telecom, China Unicom, Ericsson,
HiSilicon, Huawei, Intel,
InterDigital, KPN, Nokia
Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks, Samsung, ST-Ericsson,
TeliaSonera, TNO, ZTE
Corporation
Samsung
revised
-
S3130881
revised
-
Samsung
revised
-
S3130843
S3130853
NEC Corporation
approved
-
-
SDT: Evaluation of SA2
remaining solutions
MTC-IWF based security
solution remaining issues
pCR: Modification to MTCIWF based security solution
for small data transmission
Updates on triggering with
regular GBA
33.868: Missing References
and Hanging Paragraphs
Triggering with GBA push
over Tsms
Updates on Triggering with
GBA push over Tsp
Secure fax progress in IETF
NEC Corporation
revised
-
NEC Corporation
noted
-
S3130862
-
NEC Corporation
revised
-
S3130861
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
noted
-
-
Way forward on TR33.869
Research In Motion UK Ltd.,
Vodafone
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
noted
-
-
revised
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
-
S3130835
-
Research In Motion UK Ltd.,
Vodafone
Research In Motion UK Ltd.
noted
-
-
noted
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
revised
-
S3130846
Research In Motion UK Ltd.
approved
-
-
Discussion on draft reply LS
on SDDTE security aspects
Security aspects of
connectionless Data
Transmission
Security for ProSe system
(Draft) LS reply on NAT and
GIBA
Aligning TP Protocol Id in
draft TS 33.187
pCR: Conclusion section of
TR33.869
Clarifications on Implicit
Certificate approach
Clarification of small data fast
path threats and
requirements
pCR: Clarifications on PWS
130759
S3130760
S3130761
S3130762
S3130763
S3130764
S3130765
S3130766
S3130767
S3130768
S3130769
S3130770
S3130771
S3130772
S3130773
S3130774
S3130775
S3130776
S3130777
S3130778
S3130779
S3130780
S3130781
S3130782
S3130783
S3130784
S3-
CA update message for
Implicit Certificates
pCR: Clarifications on
Timestamps for Implicit
Certificates
pCR: Clarifications on
Roaming and application of
Implicit Certificates
Using user consent for GBA
and SSO
Security considerations on
implicit certificates with Keyed
MAC signature
Text for scope and
abbreviations and removal of
editor's notes
PWS and PWS Security
Requirements
33.865 WLAN: Observations
on Solution 1
Correction of Specification of
Tunnelling of UE Services
over Restrictive Access
Networks - IMS case
Conclusion on Signature
Algorithms
Discussion on KeNB rekeying
[SECAM] Merge of S3130634 and S3-130639 (on
TOE/TSF definition and use)
Revision of clause on KeNB
re-keying
[SECAM] Merge attempt of
S3-130770 and S3-130648
(TOE/TSF definition)
ProSe authentication
Security Evaluation of MTCe
SDDTE solutions - Overall
Security Evaluation of MTCe
SDDTE Solution 6A
Security Evaluation of MTCe
SDDTE Solution 6B
Securely distinguishing
between genuine and false
warning notifications without
signature
More details on fast path
security protocol
Revised WID for Web Real
Time Communication
(WebRTC) Access to IMS
Missing caption and hanging
paragraph
Proposed overview text for
Prose
Inclusion of the SA2
architecture in the Prose TR
Proposed configuration data
key issue for Prose
Proposed new key issue on
Restricted Direct Discovery
for the Prose TR
EAP/PANA-based Solution
Research In Motion UK Ltd.
approved
-
-
Research In Motion UK Ltd.
approved
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
revised
-
Research In Motion UK Ltd.
noted
-
S3130891
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
revised
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
-
S3130868
-
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
revised
-
S3130883
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
noted
-
-
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
Orange, China Mobile, AlcatelLucent
noted
-
-
revised
-
S3130876
Qualcomm, Nokia Corporation,
Nokia Siemens Networks, AlcatelLucent, AT&T, Orange
Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
S3130838
revised
-
S3130876
Intel
approved
-
-
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks, Intel, China Unicom
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks, Intel, China Unicom,
ZTE
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks, Intel, China Unicom
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
revised
-
revised
-
S3130862
S3130850
revised
-
revised
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
revised
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
revised
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
agreed
-
-
Qualcomm Incorporated
approved
-
-
Qualcomm Incorporated
noted
-
-
Qualcomm Incorporated
approved
-
-
Qualcomm Incorporated
approved
-
-
Samsung
approved
-
-
S3130858
S3130867
S3130848
S3130837
130785
S3130786
S3130787
S3130788
S3130789
S3130790
S3130791
S3130792
S3130793
S3130794
S3130795
S3130796
S3130797
S3130798
S3130799
S3130800
S3130801
S3130802
S3130803
S3130804
S3130805
S3130806
S3130807
S3130808
S3130809
S3130810
S3130811
S3130812
S3130813
S3130814
S3-
for Secure Connection
Proposed key issue for 1-1
communication
Proposed solution for
configuration data delivery in
ProSe
solution of supporting security
protection for WLAN network
selection
Authentication for
communication with WLAN
network
Security for restricted ProSe
direct discovery
33.865 WLAN: Proposal for
structure and editorial
corrections
security requirements for
WLAN network selection
pCR to TR 33.868: evaluation
of Secure Connection
Solution for ProSe one-to-one
communications
ProSe accounting
considerations
ProSe discovery id semantics
and operator risks
Solution of supporting
security protection for WLAN
network selection
Authentication for
communication with WLAN
network
security requirements for
WLAN network selection
Reply LS on interaction of
oneM2M with Underlying
Networks
comments to S3-130695
Qualcomm Incorporated
approved
-
-
Qualcomm Incorporated
approved
-
-
Samsung
withdrawn
-
-
Samsung
withdrawn
-
-
Qualcomm Incorporated
approved
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
-
-
Samsung
withdrawn
-
-
Gemalto, Morpho Cards
approved
-
-
Qualcomm Incorporated
revised
-
Qualcomm Incorporated
approved
-
S3130884
-
Qualcomm Incorporated
noted
-
-
Samsung
approved
-
-
Samsung
approved
-
-
Samsung
approved
-
-
S2-132326
noted
-
-
China Mobile
noted
-
-
[SECAM] comments on
contribution S3-130647
[SECAM] comments on
contribution S3-130652
[SECAM] comments on
contribution S3-130623
[SECAM] comments on
contribution S3-130624
[SECAM] comments on
contribution S3-130625
[SECAM] comments on
contribution S3-130646
SECAM comments on 620
Alcatel-Lucent
revised
-
Alcatel-Lucent
revised
-
Alcatel-Lucent
approved
-
S3130855
S3130860
-
Alcatel-Lucent
withdrawn
-
-
Alcatel-Lucent
revised
-
Alcatel-Lucent
revised
-
Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
SECAM comments on 624
Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
SECAM comments on 625
Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
SECAM comments on 632
Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
noted
-
S3130857
S3130875
S3130856
S3130878
S3130857
-
SECAM comments on 633
Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
SECAM comments on 646
Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
SECAM comments on 647
and 692
SECAM comments on 648
Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
S3130859
S3130875
S3130855
S3-
130815
S3130816
S3130817
S3130818
S3130819
S3130820
S3130821
S3130822
S3130823
S3130824
S3130825
S3130826
S3130827
S3130828
S3130829
S3130830
S3130831
S3130832
S3130833
S3130834
S3130835
S3130836
S3130837
S3130838
S3130839
S3130840
S3130841
S3130842
and 770
SECAM comments on 652
130876
S3130860
-
Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
revised
-
SECAM merger of 627 and
650
ALU Comments on S3130685
ALU Comments on S3130695
ALU Comments on S3130776
SECAM comments on S3130625
Comments on S3-130646,S3130647,S3-130652 etc and
related to S3-130633 and S3130632
[SECAM] comments on
contribution S3-130770
Update of S3-130726 Multiple
operator certificates
enrolment
Comments on S3-130794
Solution for ProSe one-to-one
communications
Comments on S3-130640
Section 5.2.8.x
Comments on Tdocs 0775 on
Security Evaluation of MTCe
SDDTE Solution 6A
Secure Connection details on
GBA based solutions
Update of 729: CR to 23.060:
Solution of restricting the
USIM to specific UEs
Update of 730: pCR to
23.401: Solution of restricting
the USIM to specific UEs
update of S3-130731 Solution
of restricting the USIM to
specific UEs
KMS based solution for
immediate messaging
Secure UDPTL based T.38
fax
Clarification regarding NAT
and GIBA
LS reply on NAT and GIBA
Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks
approved
-
Alcatel-Lucent
revised
-
Alcatel-Lucent
noted
-
Alcatel-Lucent
revised
-
China Mobile
revised
-
China Mobile
noted
-
Alcatel-Lucent
revised
-
Huawei, Hisilicon, TeliaSonera,
Vodafone
noted
-
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
revised
-
S3130884
Juniper Networks
approved
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
revised
-
S3130850
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
noted
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Nokia,
Nokia Siemens Networks,
TeliaSonera
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Nokia,
Nokia Siemens Networks,
TeliaSonera
Nokia, Nokia Siemens Networks,
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Samsung,
TeliaSonera
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
noted
-
-
noted
-
-
noted
-
-
agreed
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
agreed
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
withdrawn
S3130698
S3130700
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
-
Reply to: Reply LS on
enhancing IMEI based Lawful
Interception in IMS
Revised WID for Web Real
Time Communication
(WebRTC) Access to IMS
Revision of clause on KeNB
re-keying
Sprint
approved
S3130754
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
S3130779
-
Qualcomm, Nokia Corporation,
Nokia Siemens Networks, AlcatelLucent, AT&T, Orange
Huawei, HiSilicon
agreed
S3130771
-
agreed
S3130671
-
NSN, Ericsson, ST Ericsson,
Alcatel-Lucent
3GPP SA WG3
agreed
-
China Mobile
approved
S3130629
S3130628
-
Correction of the editorial
errors and the incorrect
description
Access mode verification for
H(e)NBs
Response LS on H(e)NB
Access Control Verification
Reply to: LS on interaction of
oneM2M with Underlying
agreed
S3130851
S3130858
S3130857
-
S3130876
-
-
-
-
S3130843
S3130844
S3130845
S3130846
S3130847
S3130848
S3130849
S3130850
S3130851
S3130852
S3130853
S3130854
S3130855
S3130856
S3130857
S3130858
S3130859
S3130860
S3130861
S3130862
S3130863
S3130864
S3130865
S3130866
S3130867
S3130868
S3-
Networks
Reply to: LS on requesting
input on security aspects for
MTCe solutions
MME overload threat analysis
Intel
revised
-
S3130889
Intel
approved
-
Draft TR MTCe
Rapporteur
approved
S3130732
-
Clarification of small data fast
path threats and
requirements
Firewall traversal for IMS
plane based on ICE and
Media over TCP
More details on fast path
security protocol
Security context
synchronization when SGW
relocates for fast path
solution
Security Evaluation of MTCe
SDDTE Solution 6A
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
S3130758
-
Huawei , HiSilicon
noted
S3130725
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
S3130778
S3130686
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks, Intel, China Unicom,
ZTE
Alcatel-Lucent
approved
S3130775
-
approved
-
Alcatel-Lucent
approved
Samsung
approved
S3130660
S3130661
S3130743
Orange
noted
-
-
Nokia Siemens Networks, Orange,
China Mobile
Nokia Siemens Networks, Orange
approved
-
Nokia Siemens Network, Orange
approved
S3130647
S3130808
S3130810
Alcatel-Lucent
approved
-
China Mobile, Orange,
TeliaSonera, China Unicom, Nokia
Siemens Network
Orange
approved
S3130662
S3130812
-
NEC Corporation
approved
S3130652
S3130747
NEC Corporation
approved
-
ZTE Corporation, China Unicom
agreed
Rapporteur
approved
S3130745
S3130669
-
new draft TR PWS
Rapporteur
approved
-
-
Some PWS Requirement vs
Security Solutions Analysisv4
Securely distinguishing
between genuine and false
warning notifications without
signature
PWS and PWS Security
Requirements
Draft TR for Firewall
ZTE Corporation, China Unicom
noted
S3130667
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
S3130777
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
-
Rapporteur
approved
S3130765
-
MTCe Connectionless
Solution: Enhancements
MTCe Connectionless
Solution Threat Scenarios
Security aspects of
connectionless Data
Transmission
SECAM evening sessions at
SA3#72 – minutes
Clarification on VT and
definitions
SAS instantiation content
after the first evening session
SAS instantiation evaluation
and compliance testing
activities
MTCe Connectionless
Solution Evaluation Changes
Vulnerability testing activities
and accreditation
Update of S3-130652 after
the first evening session
pCR: Modification to MTCIWF based security solution
for small data transmission
SDT: Evaluation of SA2
remaining solutions
HSS filtering SMS-delivered
device trigger message
New draft TS MTCe
approved
approved
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
130869
S3130870
S3130871
S3130872
S3130873
S3130874
S3130875
S3130876
S3130877
S3130878
S3130879
S3130880
S3130881
S3130882
S3130883
S3130884
S3130885
S3130886
S3130887
S3130888
S3130889
S3130890
S3130891
S3130892
Traversal
TURAN: IMS FW traversal
CR, update to flowchart
LS to SA1 on PWS security
requirements
Firewall traversal for IMS
services based on ICE
Draft TR WLAN NS
S3130720
-
-
S3130697
-
-
approved
S3130636
-
Telecom Italia, Orange, Ericsson,
China Unicom
Orange, Nokia Siemens Networks,
Ericsson,China Mobile
approved
S3130646
S3130639
-
Huawei, HiSilicon
approved
-
Nokia Siemens Networks, Orange,
Juniper Networks
Oracle
approved
S3130674
S3130809
-
Nokia Siemens Networks
approved
-
AT&T, CATR, CATT, China
Telecom, China Unicom, Ericsson,
HiSilicon, Huawei, Intel,
InterDigital, KPN, Nokia
Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks, Samsung, ST-Ericsson,
TeliaSonera, TNO, ZTE
Corporation
Rapporteur
approved
S3130719
S3130741
approved
-
-
Correction of Specification of
Tunnelling of UE Services
over Restrictive Access
Networks - IMS case
Proposed resolutions for
comments on Solution for
ProSe one to one
communications
First version of SECAM draft
TR
Second version of SECAM
draft TR
Draft TR SSO
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
agreed
S3130767
-
Qualcomm Incorporated
approved
S3130794
-
Rapporteur
approved
-
-
Rapporteur
approved
-
-
Rapporteur
approved
-
-
Considerations to PWS UE
settings pCR
Reply to: LS on requesting
input on security aspects for
MTCe solutions
Version of TR MTCe after
email approval
Using user consent for GBA
and SSO
Generalize the environment
of functions and nodes to
cover NFV scenarios
Nokia Corporation, Nokia Siemens
Networks
Intel
approved
S3130718
S3130843
-
Rapporteur
approved
-
-
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
approved
-
China Unicom
approved
S3130762
S3130641
Test methodology document Update of 636 after the
evening session 2
SAS Writing - Update of 646
after the evening session 2
TOE/TSF, scope of
evaluation – Update after the
evening session 2
Trusted relationship of the
WLAN network
TR 33.805 conclusion -merge
Reply to SA1: LS on
Notifications on Firewall
Traversal
Updated WID proposal
GCSE_LTE security
Study on Subscriber Privacy
Impact in 3GPP
Draft TR Prose
Oracle
agreed
NTT Docomo
noted
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson, Huawei
agreed
Rapporteur
approved
CMCC
approved
approved
approved
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Annex B: List of change requests
Document
S3-130669
S3-130863
S3-130720
S3-130870
S3-130697
S3-130872
S3-130699
S3-130834
S3-130767
S3-130883
S3-130780
S3-130725
S3-130847
S3-130629
S3-130840
S3-130698
S3-130832
Title
HSS filtering SMSdelivered device
trigger message
HSS filtering SMSdelivered device
trigger message
TURAN: IMS FW
traversal CR,
update to flowchart
TURAN: IMS FW
traversal CR,
update to flowchart
Firewall traversal
for IMS services
based on ICE
Firewall traversal
for IMS services
based on ICE
Clarification
regarding NAT and
GIBA
Clarification
regarding NAT and
GIBA
Correction of
Specification of
Tunnelling of UE
Services over
Restrictive Access
Networks - IMS
case
Correction of
Specification of
Tunnelling of UE
Services over
Restrictive Access
Networks - IMS
case
Missing caption
and hanging
paragraph
Firewall traversal
for IMS plane
based on ICE and
Media over TCP
Firewall traversal
for IMS plane
based on ICE and
Media over TCP
Access mode
verification for
H(e)NBs
Access mode
verification for
H(e)NBs
KMS based
solution for
immediate
messaging
KMS based
solution for
immediate
Source
ZTE Corporation,
China Unicom
Spec
23.682
CR
0075
Rev
-
Rel
Rel11
Cat
-
-
ZTE Corporation,
China Unicom
23.682
0075
Oracle
33.20
Oracle
WI
Decision
revised
1
-
-
-
agreed
0198
-
Rel12
B
TURAN
revised
33.20
0198
1
Rel12
B
TURAN
agreed
Ericsson, STEricsson, Huawei
33.203
0199
-
Rel12
B
TURAN
revised
Ericsson, STEricsson, Huawei
33.203
0199
1
Rel12
B
TURAN
agreed
Ericsson, STEricsson
33.203
0200
-
Rel12
D
SEC12
agreed
Ericsson, STEricsson
33.203
0200
1
Rel12
D
SEC12
withdrawn
Nokia
Corporation,
Nokia Siemens
Networks
33.203
0201
-
Rel12
F
TURAN
revised
Nokia
Corporation,
Nokia Siemens
Networks
33.203
0201
1
Rel12
F
TURAN
agreed
Ericsson, STEricsson
33.203
0202
-
Rel12
D
TURAN
agreed
Huawei , HiSilicon
33.203
0203
-
-
-
-
revised
Huawei , HiSilicon
33.203
0203
1
Rel12
-
TURAN
noted
NSN, Ericsson,
ST Ericsson,
Alcatel-Lucent
NSN, Ericsson,
ST Ericsson,
Alcatel-Lucent
Ericsson, STEricsson
33.320
0094
2
Rel12
C
TEI12,
EHNB-Sec
revised
33.320
0094
3
Rel12
C
TEI12,
EHNB-Sec
agreed
33.328
0054
-
Rel12
C
eMEDIASEC
revised
Ericsson, STEricsson
33.328
0054
1
Rel12
C
eMEDIASEC
agreed
S3-130700
S3-130833
S3-130771
messaging
Secure UDPTL
based T.38 fax
Secure UDPTL
based T.38 fax
Revision of clause
on KeNB re-keying
S3-130838
Revision of clause
on KeNB re-keying
S3-130671
Correction of the
editorial errors and
the incorrect
description
Correction of the
editorial errors and
the incorrect
description
S3-130839
Ericsson, STEricsson
Ericsson, STEricsson
Qualcomm, Nokia
Corporation,
Nokia Siemens
Networks, AlcatelLucent, AT&T,
Orange
Qualcomm, Nokia
Corporation,
Nokia Siemens
Networks, AlcatelLucent, AT&T,
Orange
Huawei, HiSilicon
33.328
0055
-
Rel12
Rel12
Rel12
B
eMEDIASEC
revised
33.328
0055
1
B
eMEDIASEC
agreed
33.401
0522
-
C
TEI12,SAES
revised
33.401
0522
1
Rel12
C
TEI12,SAES
agreed
33.402
0114
-
Rel11
F
TEI12,SAES
revised
Huawei, HiSilicon
33.402
0114
1
Rel12
F
TEI12,SAES
agreed
Annex C: Lists of liaisons
C1: Incoming liaison statements
Document
Original
Title
From
Decision
S3-130605
LS on NAT and GIBA
C1-131743
replied to
S3-130605
LS on NAT and GIBA
C1-131743
replied to
S3-130606
LS on MS's reaction to network's choice of an
unsupported ciphering algorithm
Reply LS on Enhancing IMEI based Lawful
Interception in IMS
Reply LS to the LS on Optimization of the IMS
Information and Security Parameters for CS to PS
SRVCC from GERAN to E-UTRAN/HSPA
LS/o on draft Recommendation ITU-T X.sap-8,
Efficient multi-factor authentication mechanisms
using mobile devices
LS on interaction of oneM2M with Underlying
Networks
C1-131749
noted
C1-131767
noted
C1-132535
noted
ITU-T SG17
postponed
oneM2M
Technical
Plenary
R2-131538
R2-132189
S1-132171
replied to
S1-133279
replied to
S2-131521
replied to
S2-131522
noted
S2-132323
S2-132327
noted
replied to
S2-132327
replied to
SA3-LI
Intel
noted
noted
S2-132326
noted
S3-130607
S3-130608
S3-130609
S3-130610
S3-130611
S3-130612
S3-130613
S3-130614
S3-130615
S3-130616
S3-130617
S3-130618
S3-130618
S3-130619
S3-130690
S3-130800
Reply LS on Follow-up LS on KeNB re-keying
Reply LS on evaluation of MTCe solutions
LS on Feedback on Proximity Services and Lawful
Interception
Reply LS on Notifications on Firewall Traversal from
LS Reply SA2 S2-130722 and CT1 C1-130773
Reply LS on enhancing IMEI based Lawful
Interception in IMS
Reply LS on Proximity Services and Lawful
Interception
LS reply on NAT and GIBA
LS on requesting input on security aspects for MTCe
solutions
LS on requesting input on security aspects for MTCe
solutions
Reply LS on IMEI based Lawful Interceptions in IMS
draft Reply LS on input on security aspects for MTCe
solutions
Reply LS on interaction of oneM2M with Underlying
Networks
Reply
in
S3130835
S3130754
S3130842
noted
noted
noted
S3130879
S3130836
S3130889
S3130843
C2: Outgoing liaison statements
Document
S3130835
S3130836
S3130841
S3130842
S3130879
S3130889
Title
To
Cc
LS reply on NAT and GIBA
CT1,SA2
-
reply to i/c
LS
S3-130605
Reply to: Reply LS on enhancing IMEI based
Lawful Interception in IMS
Response LS on H(e)NB Access Control
Verification
Reply to: LS on interaction of oneM2M with
Underlying Networks
Reply to SA1: LS on Notifications on
Firewall Traversal
Reply to: LS on requesting input on security
aspects for MTCe solutions
SA2,SA3-LI
-
S3-130615
RAN3
-
R3-130419
oneM2M Technical
Plenary
SA1
SA1,SA2,CT3
S3-130610
CT1,SA2
S3-130614
SA2
RAN2,RAN3,GERAN2
S3-130618
Annex D: List of agreed/approved new and revised Work Items
Document
S3130881
Title
Study on Subscriber Privacy
Impact in 3GPP
S3130837
Revised WID for Web Real
Time Communication
(WebRTC) Access to IMS
Updated WID proposal
GCSE_LTE security
S3130880
Source
AT&T, CATR, CATT, China Telecom, China Unicom,
Ericsson, HiSilicon, Huawei, Intel, InterDigital, KPN, Nokia
Corporation, Nokia Siemens Networks, Samsung, STEricsson, TeliaSonera, TNO, ZTE Corporation
Ericsson, ST-Ericsson
new/revised
new WID
Nokia Siemens Networks
revised WID
revised WID
Annex E: List of action items
Meeting/Number
S3-72/1
Agenda
item
4.2
Document
S3130601
Details
All Rapporteurs should check their
specifications to make sure that there are no
external references (to non 3GPP documents) as
recommended by SA, and remove those which
are there by using CRs.
Responsible
Chairman
Due
by
201309-26
Annex F: List of participants
Name
Representing
Status (OP)
Aldén, Magnus (Dr.)
TeliaSonera AB
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Barry, Aguibou (Mr.)
VODAFONE Group Plc
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Blanchard, Colin (Mr.)
BT Group Plc
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Buckley, Eoin (Dr.)
Research in Motion UK Limited
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Calvez, Christophe (Mr.)
EADS
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Cano Soveri, Mirko (Mr.)
ETSI
3GPPORG_REP (ETSI)
Castagno, Mauro (Mr.)
TELECOM ITALIA S.p.A.
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Chen, Jing (Mr.)
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Co. Ltd.
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Dolly, Martin (Mr.)
AT&T GNS Belgium SPRL
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Escott, Adrian (Dr.)
Qualcomm Korea
3GPPMEMBER (TTA)
Fan, Dongyang (Mr.)
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Co. Ltd.
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Frankel, Sheila (Mrs.)
U.S. Department of Commerce
3GPPMEMBER (ATIS)
Gamishev, Todor (Mr.)
France Telecom
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Gan, Lu (Ms.)
ZTE Corporation
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Gao, Feng (Dr.)
China Unicom
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Guo, Wei (Miss)
CATR
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Habermacher, Loic (Mr.)
ORANGE SA
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
He, Chengdong (Mr.)
HuaWei Technologies Co., Ltd
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Holtmanns, Silke (Dr.)
NOKIA UK Ltd
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Horn, Guenther (Dr.)
Nokia Siemens Networks
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Jerichow, Anja (Miss)
Nokia Siemens Networks Oy
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Jiajia, Chen (Mr.)
HuaWei Technologies Co., Ltd
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Jiang, Haiyu (Mr.)
Juniper Networks
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Kohalmi, Steve (Mr.)
Juniper Networks
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Kraemer, Isabelle (Miss)
France Telecom
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Krainioukov, Oleg (Mr.)
Morpho Cards GmbH
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Li, Zhiwei (Dr.)
Huawei Technologies France
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Lu, Wei (Miss)
Nokia Siemens Networks
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Luft, Achim (Mr.)
Intel
3GPPMEMBER (ATIS)
Meng, Nan (Miss)
CATR
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Nair, Suresh (Mr.)
Alcatel-Lucent
3GPPMEMBER (ATIS)
Norrman, Karl (Mr.)
Ericsson Japan K.K.
3GPPMEMBER (ARIB)
Ohlsson, Oscar (Mr.)
ST-Ericsson SA
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Palanigounder, Anand (Mr.)
Qualcomm Japan Inc
3GPPMEMBER (ARIB)
Pauliac, Mireille (Miss)
Gemalto N.V.
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Persson, Staffan (Mr.)
Ericsson Japan K.K.
3GPPMEMBER (ARIB)
Prasad, Anand (Dr.)
NEC Corporation
3GPPMEMBER (ARIB)
Prashant, Kumar (Miss)
Oracle Corporation
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Qi, Minpeng (Mr.)
China Mobile Com. Corporation
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Quan, Mingming (Mr.)
Juniper Networks
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Rajadurai, Rajavelsamy (Mr.)
SAMSUNG Electronics Co., Ltd.
3GPPMEMBER (ARIB)
Sahlin, Bengt (Mr.)
Telefon AB LM Ericsson
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Schroeder, Stefan (Mr.)
T-Mobile Austria GmbH
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Schumacher, Greg (Mr.)
Sprint Nextel Corporation
3GPPMEMBER (ATIS)
Suh, Kyungjoo Grace (Ms.)
Samsung R&D Institute UK
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Wang, Jiangsheng (Mr.)
HuaWei Technologies Co., Ltd
3GPPMEMBER (ATIS)
Wang, Xiaobo (Dr.)
Huawei Technologies (UK)
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
WENYU, He (Mr.)
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Co. Ltd.
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Wong, Marcus (Mr.)
Huawei Technologies France
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Wu, Hui (Miss)
Nanjing Ericsson Panda Com Ltd
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Wu, Yizhuang (Miss)
HiSilicon Technologies Co., Lt
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Xu, Kehang (Mr.)
China Unicom
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Xu, Lydia (Ms.)
HUAWEI Technologies Japan K.K.
3GPPMEMBER (ARIB)
Xu, Yang (Mr.)
China Unicom
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Ying, Jiangwei (Mr.)
Huawei Technologies Sweden AB
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Yu, Bo (Mr.)
CCSA
3GPPORG_REP (CCSA)
Zhang, Dajiang (Mr.)
NOKIA Corporation
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
ZHANG, Xiaowei (Dr.)
NEC EUROPE LTD
3GPPMEMBER (ETSI)
Zhang, Xuwu (Mr.)
HuaWei Technologies Co., Ltd
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Zhu, Judy (Mrs.)
China Mobile Com. Corporation
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Zhu, Li (Dr.)
ZTE Corporation
3GPPMEMBER (CCSA)
Zugenmaier, Alf (Dr.)
NTT DOCOMO INC.
3GPPMEMBER (ARIB)
Annex H: List of future meetings
Title
3GPPSA3#51-LI
3GPPSA3#73
3GPPSA3#74
3GPPSA3#52-LI
3GPPSA3#53-LI
3GPPSA3#75
3GPPSA3#54-LI
3GPPSA3#76
3GPPSA3#55-LI
Start date
22/10/2013 09:00:00
11/11/2013 09:00:00
20/01/2014 09:00:00
04/02/2014 09:00:00
29/04/2014 09:00:00
12/05/2014 09:00:00
22/07/2014 09:00:00
25/08/2014 09:00:00
28/10/2014 09:00:00
End date (OP)
24/10/2013 17:30:00
15/11/2013 17:30:00
24/01/2014 17:30:00
06/02/2014 17:30:00
01/05/2014 17:30:00
16/05/2014 17:30:00
24/07/2014 17:30:00
29/08/2014 17:30:00
30/10/2014 17:30:00
Town
USA
San Francisco
Taipei
Sophia Antipolis
US
Sapporo (TBC)
Sophia Antipolis
Sophia Antipolis
US
Country
US
US
TW
FR
US
JP
FR
FR
US
Reference
S3-ah-31138
S3-73
S3-74
S3-ah-31149
S3-ah-31150
S3-75
S3-ah-31151
S3-76
S3-ah-31152