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Lessons from the 1986 Libya
Airstrike
W. Hays Parks*
Before turning to the principal portion of my remarks, I believe it is
necessary to preface them with a few points.
First, my remarks are offered as a participant in the events I will describe.1
Second, it should be noted that my official curriculum vitae notes that I
was a legal adviser in 1986, not the legal adviser. Working at a higher
level was Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, a panelist this afternoon, who was the
Legal Adviser at the Department of State at the time, and Michael J.
Matheson, his Principal Deputy Legal Adviser. Due to security
compartmentalization, we had no contact with one another with respect to
the primary events I am about to describe during the course of their
planning.
Third, consideration of this mission must be taken in the context of the
time in which it was conducted. I will elaborate on this later in my presentation, but it is made to emphasize that one must measure a mission’s degree of success based upon what it was intended to accomplish, and what
it accomplished at the time.
Finally, the law does not operate in a vacuum. It operates within the
political and military structure of our national security system. Hence my
presentation will provide a summary of events leading up to the attack, a
look at the legal issues with which I was concerned, a summary of the
*
Special Assistant for Law of War Matters to The Judge Advocate General of the Army. Remarks offered to the Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law, “Responding to Rogue Regimes: From Smart Bombs to
Smart Sanctions,” New England School of Law, Boston, MA, November 9, 2001.
The comments are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily represent official positions of the Department of the Army or any other agency of the
United States Government.
1. The primary source for these remarks is the author’s personal particip ation in those events, previously recorded for the most part in W. Hays Parks,
Crossing the Line, U.S. NAV. INST. PROC. (Nov. 1986), at 40-52. Secondary
sources include DAVID C. M ARTIN & JOHN WALCOTT, BEST LAID P LANS (1988);
BRIAN L. DAVIS , QADDAFI, T ERRORISM AND THE ORIGINS OF THE U.S. ATTACK ON
LIBYA (1990); and ROBERT E. VENKUS, RAID ON QADDAFI (1992).
755
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attack, a few words on the immediate aftermath, and my view of the attack’s effects.
I. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ATTACK
Terrorism has been with us for some time. Modern terrorism as a direct
threat to the United States and its citizens began in the 1960s. It is a long
story told elsewhere which, due to time constraints, cannot be detailed
here.2
A leading and outspoken proponent of the use of terrorism was Libyan
dictator Moammar Ghadafi. Ghadafi gained power on September 1, 1969,
dramatically reversing the good relations that had been enjoyed between
Libya and the United States. From 1972 until President Ronald Reagan
formerly severed diplomatic relations in 1981, the United States declined
to enjoy an ambassadorial relationship with Libya. In the years between
his assumption of power and the airstrike, Ghadafi provided economic aid,
training, and logistical support for dissident factions, terrorist groups, or
insurgent movements in at least twenty-six nations, including the United
States. He joined with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to
provide praetorian guards for the murderous regimes of Emperor Bokassa
in Central Africa and Uganda’s Idi Amin. He also provided Amin refuge
following his ouster. Ghadafi established strong ties with terrorist groups
such as George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) and began a long, close relationship with Ramirez Sanchez, the
Venezuelan terrorist known as “Carlos.”
Ghadafi also provided the funds, arms, and training for the terrorists
who committed the 1972 Olympic Games massacre in Munich. 3 The
terrorists departed for Munich from Libya, and were awarded bonuses by
Ghadafi upon their return. Connections were found between Libya and the
Black September attack on the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum on
March 2, 1973, in which U.S. Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr., and Charge
2. As terrorism relates to the 1986 airstrike, see generally Edward Wei sband & Damir Roguly, Palestinian Terrorism: Violence, Verbal Strategy, and
Legitimacy, in YONAH A LEXANDER , INTERNATIONAL T ERRORISM : NATIONAL,
REGIONAL, AND G LOBAL P ERSPECTIVES 258-310 (1976); EDGAR O’B ALLANCE,
LANGUAGE OF V IOLENCE: THE B LOOD POLITICS OF TERRORISM (1979); CLAIRE
STERLING , THE TERROR N ETWORK, THE S ECRET WAR OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM (1981); AMIR TAHERI, HOLY TERROR : INSIDE THE WORLD OF
ISLAMIC TERRORISM (1987); and NEIL C. LIVINGSTONE & DAVID HALEVY, INSIDE
THE P LO (1990).
3. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 11, 13. The lengthy record of Libyan support for terrorism is provided in D AVIS, at 33-91, and in chronological order at
181-90. A recent account of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre is discussed in
SIMON REEVE, ONE D AY IN SEPTEMBER (2000).
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d’Affairs George C. Moore were murdered. 4 Ghadafi established terrorist
training camps in Libya and attracted terrorists from the PLO and PFLP,
as well as every other major terrorist group. 5 His investments paid the
dividends he sought. For example, on December 17, 1973, Palestinian
terrorists attacked a Pan Am flight in Rome’s Fiumicino Airport, killing
thirty-one passengers. “Italian authorities determined that the terrorists
had obtained their weapons and money from Libya, and traveled from
[Libya] to carry out the attack.”6 In July 1984, eighteen merchant vessels
struck sea mines in the Suez Canal and Red Sea, apparently laid by the
Libyan cargo ferry Ghat.7 On October 7, 1985, PLO terrorist Abul Abbas
hijacked the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro. A 69-year-old, wheelchair
bound American, Leon Klinghofer, was murdered in the process.8 The
operation was attributed to Ghadafi.9 On November 23, 1985, Abu Nidal
terrorists hijacked an EgyptAir airliner. When the aircraft landed in Malta,
the terrorists shot Israeli and American passengers. 10 Fifty-seven other
passengers died in a subsequent failed hostage rescue operation.11 Three of
the four terrorists had embarked on their mission aboard a Libyan airliner,
and the weapons they used to kill the passengers were traced to Libya. 12
Ghadafi’s open reliance on and support for terrorism continued unabated
through the 1970s and up to the time of the 1986 U.S. airstrike.
Parallel to Libya’s overt support of terrorism, another event occurred
relevant to U.S. action. On October 11, 1973, in response to U.S. resupply of Israel’s Yom Kippur War, Ghadafi declared that portion of the
Mediterranean Sea south of 32° 30´, known as the Gulf of Sidra (or Sirte),
to be Libya’s internal waters. In a demarche´ dated February 11, 1974, the
U.S. Department of State characterized the Libyan claim as “unacceptable
4. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 13, 35, see also DAVID KORN,
ASSASSINATION IN KHARTOUM 48-49 (1993).
5. Including the Japanese Rengo Sekigun (Red Army), Irish Republican
Army (IRA), Basque Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), West Germany’s Red Army
Faction, Italy’s Red Brigades, Nicaragua’s Sandanistas, Argentina’s Montoneros,
Uruguay’s Tupomoro’s, Peru’s Shining Path, and the Ecuadorian Alfaro Vive,
Carajo. See Parks, supra note 1, at 41.
6. Parks, supra note 1, at 41.
7. See Scott C. Truver, Mines of August: An International Whodunit, U.S.
NAV. INST. PROC ., at 42-48 (Aug. 1986).
8. See YOSSI MELMAN, THE M ASTER TERRORIST: THE TRUE STORY OF ABU
NIDAL 173-74 (1986).
9. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 76; Parks, supra note 1, at 44 and MELMAN,
supra note 8, at 182-89.
10. See MARTIN & WALCOTT, supra note 2, at 267.
11. See id.
12. See MARTIN & WALCOTT, supra note 1, at 266-67; DAVIS, supra note 1,
at 77.
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as a violation of international law.” 13 In the course of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, the United States maintained a policy
and program of challenging excessive sea claims. A naval challenge to
Libya’s illegal claim was considered during the Carter Administration, but
was shelved due to concerns for the safety of U.S. citizens working in
Libya, and a fear that it would result in the loss of support of moderate
Arab nations, such as Tunisia, who were acting as intermediaries with Iran
for release of the U.S. hostages (held mainly by Libyan-trained militants)
held in Tehran.14 President Carter’s reluctance to challenge the illegal
Libyan claim was met by an unsuccessful attack on September 16, 1980,
by two Libyan MiG-23 Floggers on a U.S. Air Force RC-135 operating in
international airspace, well outside the area Libya claimed. 15
Challenge to the illegal Libyan claim was an early priority of the
Reagan Administration. Such a challenge was intended first as a warning
to Ghadafi, regarding his continued emphasis on training terrorists and
exporting terrorism. It also was the start of a vigorous program to challenge the illegal claims to the high seas around the world that continue to
this day. On the second day of the U.S. freedom-of-navigation (FON)
challenge to the illegal Libyan claim, which began on August 18, 1981,
one of two Libyan Su-22 Fitters fired an air-to-air missile at two U.S. Navy F-14 Tomcat aircraft. The F-14s maneuvered to avoid the missile before downing the two Libyan fighters with Sidewinder missiles.16 The
FON exercise concluded the following day without further incident. During the next four years, U.S. military forces would enter the challenged
area four more times.17
Libya’s actions in support of terrorism brought matters to a head when,
13. The note continued:
The United States Government views the Libyan action as an attempt to
appropriate a large area of the high seas by unilateral action, thereby
encroaching upon the long-established principle of freedom of the seas .
. .. The [U.S.] Government reserves its rights and the rights of its n ationals in the area of the Gulf of Sirte affected by the action of . . . Libya.
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW at 293-94 (Arthur
W. Rovine, ed., 1974).
14. See Parks, supra note 1, at 42; See also DAVIS, supra note 1, at 37.
For discussion of the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-1980, see Warren
CHRISTOPHER , ET AL., AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN (1985).
15. See Parks, supra note 1, at 43.
16. See Dennis. Neutze, The Gulf of Sidra: A Legal Perspective, U.S. N AV.
INST. PROC. at 26-31, (Jan. 1982).
17. See Parks, supra note 1, at 44. A separate incident would conclude the
Reagan Administration, when on January 21, 1989, Navy F-14 Tomcats shot down
two Libyan Mi G -23s manifesting hostile intent during their attempt to penetrate a
U.S. carrier battle group’s defensive perimeter.
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on December 27, 1985, Abul Nidal terrorists attacked El Al Airlines ticketing counters in the Rome and Vienna airports, killing twenty civilians,
including five Americans. Ghadafi publicly described the attacks as “heroic,” and provided a safe haven for the raid’s mastermind. Moroccan passports found on the gunmen had been taken from Moroccan laborers in
Libya by Libyan officials.18 The line had been crossed, at least with respect to the patience of the United States.
II. THE PATH TO THE AIRSTRIKE
While something needed to be done to quell terrorism, exactly what,
remained to be determined. One endeavor begun during the Reagan Administration was to exclude terrorist acts from the “political offense” exception in extradition treaties.19 Another step taken by the Reagan Administration was legislation establishing extra-territorial jurisdiction in United
States Federal District Courts over any individual who seizes or detains,
threatens to kill, assaults or murders a U.S. citizen anywhere in the
world.20 Of course, it was unlikely Ghadafi would turn over anyone to
U.S. authorities for terrorist acts he supported and praised. Extraterritorial
military force had been used in the past, generally, however, only to rescue hostages during an on-going incident.21 Actions by Israel outside its
18. See MELMAN, supra note 8, at 182; See also DAVIS, supra note 1, at
78-79; MARTIN & WALCOTT, supra note 1, at 267-68; Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism, The Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 91, 103 (1989).
19. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ,
901, 906.(Summer, 1986) [hereinafter Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law].
20.
See Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage Taking, 18
U.S.C. § 1203 (1994). The law bore fruit on September 13, 1987, when FBI
agents arrested Fawaz Yunis in international waters off Beirut. Yunis and four
others hijacked Royal Jordanian Airlines flight 402 in Beirut, Lebanon, on June
11, 1985. Two of its passengers were U.S. citizens. The plane made two unsu ccessful circuits of the Mediterranean before returning to Beirut, where the hijac kers destroyed it. See U.S. v. Fawaz Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir., 1991). Details of Yunis’s capture are provided in OLIVER REVELL & DWIGHT W ILLIAMS , A
G-MAN’ S JOURNAL 262-63, 265-72 (1998).
20. See Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage
Taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994). The law bore fruit on September 13, 1987,
when FBI agents arrested Fawaz Yunis in international waters off Beirut. Yunis
and four others hijacked Royal Jordanian Airlines flight 402 in Beirut, Lebanon,
on June 11, 1985. Two of its passengers were U.S. citizens. The plane made two
unsuccessful circuits of the Mediterranean before returning to Beirut, where the
hijackers destroyed it. See U.S. v. Fawaz Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir., 1991).
Details of Yunis’s capture are provided in OLIVER REVELL & DWIGHT W ILLIAMS ,
A G-M AN’ S JOURNAL 262-63, 265-72 (1998).
21. Classic examples are the July 4, 1976, Israeli rescue of the passenger s
and crew of Air France flight 139 in Entebbe, Uganda, and a mission by the West
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borders in response to terrorism were generally condemned – in all probability for political as much as legal reasons – and had not been supported
by the United States.
Terrorist attacks against the United States prompted re-thinking in the
early 1980s of the legal bases for use of force in self-defense. The right of
self-defense, articulated in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
was widely interpreted as condoning self-defense against an existing
armed attack by conventional forces. It is safe to say that at the time the
Charter was promulgated, its drafters did not contemplate that one state
would resort to regular and continuous acts of terrorism, often covert,
against the citizens of another state or other states. In the briefest of terms,
the analysis developed at the national level reasoned that self-defense
could be used against a continuing threat, such as that posed by Libya’s
actions. I suspect that I have not done fairness to this argument, but must
refer you to the explanation by Judge Abraham Sofaer, State Department
Legal Adviser at the time, due to time limitations. 22 We can explain what
the airstrike was and what it was not intended to be. It was neither a
peacetime reprisal nor an act of retaliation. It was a limited act of selfdefense against a continuing threat for the purpose of deterring Libya’s
continued reliance upon illegal acts of terrorism as a foreign policy tool.
The perfect legal answer seldom resolves a problem, and this certainly
was the case within the Reagan Administration with respect to gaining the
support of other governments for a response to terrorism in general and
Libyan terrorism in particular. In the interim, in the opening days of 1986,
the national leadership directed the military to begin to develop military
options ranging from a naval presence mission off Libya to an airstrike.
The mission statement was straightforward: If directed, “inflict damage on
German Federal Border Guard Group 9 Special (GSG9) on October 18, 1977, in
Mogadishu, Somalia, when the unit rescued the passengers and crew of Lufthansa
flight 181 that had been hijacked by four Palestinian terrorists. See generally
YESHAYAHU BEN-PORAT, ET AL., ENTEBBE RESCUE (1976); see also R OLF
TOPHOVEN, GSG9: G ERMAN RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 66-73 (2d ed., 1985);
LEROY THOMPSON, THE RESCUERS 23-28, 30-33 (1986); BARRY DAVIES, FIRE
MAGIC (1994); and Sofaer, supra note 18, at 107.
22. See Sofaer, supra note 18, at 92-98; see also Sofaer, Terrorism and the
Law, supra note 19, at 911; D AVIS, supra note 1, at 84. Secretary of State George
Shultz commented:
The law is a weapon on our side and it is up to us to use it to its maximum extent. . .. [A] state which supports terrorist or subversive attacks
against another state, or which supports or encourages terrorist planning
and other activities within its own territory, is respo nsible for such attacks. Such conduct can amount to an ongoing armed aggression
against the other state under international law.
Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, supra note 19, at 910.
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target complexes that support terrorist operations.” Simultaneously the
President signed Executive Order 12543, terminating commerce between
Libya and the United States, and prohibiting work by U.S. citizens in Libya.23 Its intent was to encourage U.S. citizens working in Libya to depart,
lest Libya take them hostage.
U.S. naval presence off the coast of Libya grew during the first three
months of 1986 from a single carrier battle group to three carrier battle
groups, culminating in a successful freedom-of-navigation exercise from
March 23rd to 27th below the so-called “line of death” which Ghadafi had
drawn across the Gulf of Sidra.24 Diplomatic initiatives were not as successful. Efforts to enlist support for sanctions against Libya were rebuffed
by European governments. Most gained substantial revenue and/or oil
from trading with Libya, had citizens working in Libya, and/or feared retaliatory terrorist attacks by Libya.25
III. LEGAL ISSUES AT THE AIRSTRIKE PLANNING LEVEL
The planning for a possible airstrike began in the days immediately following the terrorist attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports, with the
view that the more time permitted for planning and coordination, the better its execution. It remained an option rather than a foregone conclusion.
While lawyers at the national leadership level were focused on the jus
ad bellum, that is, the law relating to when force may be used, the airstrike
planning involved the jus in bello, commonly known as the law of war.
At the outset I laid out some basic principles:
Only legitimate targets may be attacked. But a legitimate target may be attacked at any time, wherever it is located.
No nation possesses the means or capability of accurately forecasting likely
civilian collateral casualties at a given target, under all circumstances.
The inevitability of collateral civilian casualties and collateral damage to
civilian objects is recognized as regrettable but not necessarily illegal.
The obligation to reduce collateral civilian casualties and collateral damage
to civilian objects is the responsibility of all parties, including the attacker,
defender, and the civilian population. Civilians who choose to remain near a
target do so at an assumed risk.
The obligation of the attacker to reduce collateral civilian casualties and
collateral damage to civilian objects is limited to those precautions that are
feasible and consistent with mission accomplishment and security of the at-
23. See Prohibiting Trade and Certain Transactions Involving Libya, 51
Fed. Reg. 875 (Jan. 7, 1986).
24. See Parks, supra note 1, at 40-41, 44.
25. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 85-88.
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tacking force.
A defender cannot use individual civilians or the civilian population as human shields to prevent the attack of a lawful target. At the same time, the inevitable intermingling of civilian objects and military objectives is not illegal.
Not all collateral civilian casualties or collateral damage to civilian objects
can be attributed to either the attacker or the defender. Some are the result of
the friction of war, beyond the control of either the attacker or defender.
Target selection did not involve the determination of whether a target was
“legal” or “not legal,” but rather, in accordance with the mission statement, whether targets were terrorist-related. Targets also were considered
on the basis of force risk and/or risk to innocent civilians. Many traditional military objectives or terrorist-related targets were not selected for one
or both of these reasons. One terrorist-related facility – Al Arafiq, the
Libyan intelligence service headquarters - was not selected for attack due
to its proximity to densely populated areas, including diplomatic residences. Ultimately two targets were selected that were in populated areas. The
following target nominations by the combatant commander were endorsed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense, and approved by
President Reagan:
Murrat Sidi Bilal Terrorist Training Camp: a combat swimmer and naval
commando school in the Tripoli area where PLO and other terrorist organization frogmen were trained.
Tripoli Military Airfield: Il-76 Candid transports used to support Ghadafi’s
export of terrorism were the primary targets.
Benghazi Military Barracks/Jamahiriyah Guard Barracks: an alternate terrorist command and control headquarters. Like Aziziyah Barracks, it was a billeting area for Ghadafi’s elite Jamahiriyah Guard. It also contained a warehouse for storage of MiG aircraft components, housing for members of the
Islamic Legion, and served as a terrorist training facility.
Benina Military Airfield: Although not directly tied to Ghadafi’s export of
terrorism, Benina Military Airfield was selected for attack because it contained MiG-23 fighter aircraft manned by Libyan pilots capable of night operations against U.S. strike aircraft. 26
Tarabulus (Aziziyah) Barracks: Located in Tripoli, it was the principal
command and control center for Ghadafi’s worldwide terrorist program. It
was also Ghadafi’s residence on occasion. However, because he feared an
internal coup, he stayed there infrequently. We did not know where he
would be if an airstrike was ordered. He was not designated as a target, even
though an attack on his person would have been lawful.
26.
See Parks, supra note 1, at 48; DAVIS, supra note 1, at 136-38.
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Means for mission execution were considered concurrent with selection of
targets. A variety were available, including a special operations or Marine
raid; use of AC-130 gunships, capable of precision fire; and a tactical airstrike. Naval gunfire from a battleship might have been considered, but
none were available. Moreover, accuracy limitations would have limited
its use against targets in heavily populated areas. Cruise missiles were not
considered because of a lack of confidence in their capabilities at that
time. Also, a decision was made not to employ the newly-operational F117 stealth fighter and reveal its existence. In considering the level of
damage sought, reducing the risk to civilians, and risk to the attacking
force, the decision to use tactical aircraft was made in about as much time
as it has taken to summarize the force options available and factors considered. This decision process highlights another law of war principal: a
nation is not legally obligated to use its most precise means to attack a
target. A balancing process exists, and a reasonable commander is entitled
to make his decisions based upon the mission, his assessment of force risk,
and other information reasonably available to him at the time.
In addition to the carrier-based A-6E Intruder, the theater commander
sought use of U.S. Air Force F-111F and EF-111 aircraft in order to
achieve maximum effectiveness while limiting risk to the attack force.
Accordingly, while Navy and Air Force units began joint planning, legal
issues arose with regard to basing from, and overflight of, foreign nations.
Quiet, diplomatic approaches to several foreign governments were not
successful,27 causing U.S. Air Force planners to resort to another international law principle – freedom of the high seas, and the air space above it
– in establishing the air route to and from their targets for the F-111s and
EF-111s that would launch from bases in Great Britain. Their use was
conditional, however, based on British consent. In the first three months of
1986, such consent was not a foregone conclusion. On January 10, 1986,
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher rejected economic sanctions
against terrorism, arguing that they “don’t work,” and characterized retaliatory military attacks against terrorism as “against international law” and
likely to cause “much greater chaos.”28 In the ensuing months, European
governments lobbied Prime Minister Thatcher heavily to deny the United
States use of British bases in England for any military action against Libya.29
Up to this time – early April, 1986 – a U.S. airstrike against Libya had
been only an option. The only steps taken had been those of planning and
coordination, and a number of unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to energize
See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 125-26.
DAVIS , supra note 1, at 84; see also MARGARET THATCHER , THE
DOWNING STREET YEARS 442 (1993).
29. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 125.
27.
28.
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European governments to support the United States in discouraging Libya’s unabated reliance upon terrorism.
Ghadafi was to force the issue when, eight days after the U.S. freedomof-navigation exercise in the Gulf of Sidra, a bomb exploded aboard TWA
flight 840 en route from Rome to Athens, killing four U.S. citizens. The
Abu Nidal group claimed responsibility in retaliation to the U.S. naval
exercise.30 Two days later a terrorist bomb, detonated in the La Belle discotheque in Berlin, killed two people, including a U.S. serviceman, and
seriously injured 230 others, including 80 Americans. One American soldier died from his wounds two months later. Evidence of Libyan responsibility, gathered by U.S., British and German intelligence, was “incontrovertible.”31 While the decision to strike was almost immediate, authorization was not given until a week later, as the U.S. leadership made one final
but unsuccessful attempt to persuade Western European governments to
go along with peaceful measures to isolate Libya, and to enhance antiterrorism capabilities in order to deter Libya and others from engaging in
terrorism. Media speculation about the raid raised the legal issue as to
whether Ghadafi’s death would violate Executive Order 12333, which
prohibits assassination (it would not have). Time was of the essence, as
Ghadafi announced that he was taking hostage all foreigners in Libya in
order to use them as human shields around key Libyan military bases.
While most European leaders continued to express timidity, British Prime
Minister Thatcher responded favorably to President Reagan’s request to
permit U.S. use of British bases by Air Force components. 32
IV. SUMMARY OF THE ATTACK
The attack against targets in the vicinity of Tripoli was executed by F111F aircraft, while Navy A-6E Intruder aircraft attacked the two targets
in eastern Libya. Simultaneously, carrier-based Navy and Marine Corps
aircraft engaged in suppression of enemy air defenses while protecting the
strike force against any potential enemy air threat. Each target was damaged. One F-111 was lost in-bound, and not as a result of hostile action.
Damage was not as severe as it might have been, particularly against Ta-
See PARKS, supra note 1, at 45; see also DAVIS, supra note 1, at 110.
DAVIS , supra note 1, at 116. On November 13, 2001, four persons -- a
German woman, a Palestinian man, a Libyan man, and a Lebanese-born German
woman -- were convicted of murder or attempted murder by a German court for
their involvement in the La Belle discothèque attack. Peter Finn, 4 Convicted in
’86 Berlin Nightclub Bombing, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2001, at A30; Geir Moulson, 4 Guilty in Disco Bombing; Ghadafi Link Rejected, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 14,
2001, at A13.
32. See Parks, supra note 1, at 50; DAVIS, supra note 1, at 125-27;
THATCHER , supra note 28, at 443-46.
30.
31.
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rabulus (Aziziyah) Barracks, due to overly restrictive rules of engagement
imposed by an intermediate command.33 Errant bombs from one F-111F
struck the French Embassy, one and one half miles away from its intended
target of Tarabulus (Aziziyah) Barracks when the aircraft’s crew selected
the wrong off-set point.34
V. IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
As soon as the last U.S. aircraft was “feet wet,” that is, safely over water and headed away from Libya, President Reagan addressed the American people on nationwide television. His statement was a careful articulation of the rationale for the attack, as well as the degree to which the rule
of law influenced the mission and its planning.35 Rather than do the President’s address injustice by attempting to summarize it, I recommend it to
you.
Following the attack, Libya claimed that thirty-six Libyans had died,
some of whom were Libyan soldiers, many of whom may have been killed
by Libyan anti-air munitions rather than U.S. bombs. Media tours arranged by the Libyan government to spread disinformation were less than
successful, while U.S. officials were able to refute Libyan claims of U.S.
losses through quick analysis of Libyan photographs. Of particular note
was the claim that an adopted daughter of Moammar Ghadafi had been
killed in the airstrike on Ghadafi’s “home” – a Bedouin tent – located at
Tarabulus (Aziziyah) Barracks. The Gucci-made tent was not Ghadafi’s
residence, but where Ghadafi held his press conferences; and there was no
record that an adopted daughter existed, much less had been killed in the
air raid.36
Finally, in somewhat of a humorous post script, in April 1987 former
U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark and Illinois law professor Francis
Boyle brought suits against President Ronald Reagan, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and all other officials involved in the planning or
execution of the air strike ostensibly on behalf of the next of kin of those
killed during the air strike. The suit was seen as lacking any merit, and
was dismissed quickly.37
VI. ATTACK’S EFFECTS
33.
34.
35.
See Parks, supra note 1, at 51; DAVIS, supra note 1, at 137-38.
See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 140.
36.
37.
See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 140-42.
See Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 322 (D.C. 1988).
President’s Address to the Nation, United States Air Strike Against
Libya, 1986 PUB. PAPERS 491 (Apr. 14, 1986).
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The attacks brought both supporters and detractors. In light of the Libyan bombing of Pan American flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, it might be argued that the April 1986 attack did not
teach Ghadafi a lesson.38 Such an argument would miss the point. No one
believed that a single limited air strike would defeat terrorism, or that it
would serve as anything more than a temporary deterrence.39 It did have
several effects. First, it established a critical precedent that force could and
would be used against those who support, plan, or finance terrorism, or
who use their sovereign territory to harbor or train terrorists. Second, as
British Prime Minister Thatcher acknowledged, it placed terrorism on the
international agenda of Western governments. 40 Finally, while alliances in
responding to terrorism and other acts by rogue regimes may be nice, they
are not critical. U.S. actions on the night of April 15, 1986, indicated to
others that their timidity to respond to terrorism would not restrain the
United States where action was necessary.
38. For discussion of the Lokerbie bombing and its aftermath, see Michael
P. Scharf, Terrorism on Trial: The Lockerbie Criminal Proceedings, 6 ILSA J.
INT’ L & COMP. L. 355 (2000).
39. See, e.g., THATCHER , supra note 28, at 444 (containing President
Reagan’s statement).
40. See id. at 498.