Australia and the Asia Pacific
R. James Ferguson © 2007
Lecture 3:
The Transformation of Indonesia (1997-2007)
and its Regional Significance
Topics: 1. Indonesian 'Centrality' to Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific Strategies
2. National Diversity Amid Democratic Transition and Decentralisation
3. Transnational, Transboundary and Regional Challenges
4. International Terrorism and Militant Islam
5. The Need for a Viable and Democratic Indonesia
6. Bibliography, Resources, and Further Reading
1. Indonesian 'Centrality' to Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific Strategies
Indonesia, with a population of over 219 million (2005), the largest population
within ASEAN and one of its founding members, a strategic location straddling trade
flows between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, is a modernising, developing nation
with a GDP per capita of around [PPP] US$4753 in 2006 (DFAT 2007). It has sought
to play a strong role in Asian affairs generally while retaining a strong degree of
relative non-alignment. Indonesia was one of the key nations in the Non-Aligned
Movement, which it chaired from 1992-1995, though in effect it tilted towards the
West during the last three decades (Economist Intelligence Unit 2005). In this lecture
we will focus on Indonesian transition through 1997-2007, and its regional
importance. (For the earlier history of Indonesia see Mackerras 1992;
Koentjaraningrat 1990; Moejanto 1986; Cribb & Brown 1995; Aveling 1979; Church
1995). Not only is Indonesia sometimes viewed as a future Asian regional or great
power (after China and India), but Indonesia is already an important diplomatic player
in key multilateral groupings (ASEAN, ARF, APEC, ASEM, EAS).
Indonesia (map courtesy PCL Map Library)
1
Indonesia, which declared independence in 1945, can be conceptualised as a
cultural grouping and archipelago, and for centuries has had a pivotal geopolitical and international role in Southeast Asia and the wider corridor of IndoPacific interactions stretching from East Africa to Japan and the western Pacific. As
early as the 7th to 8th centuries, major civilisations were linked by these routes, e.g.
contact between China and the mandala system of Srivijaya, which flourished 7-13th
centuries, focusing on south-east Sumatra, but with influence spread through the
splendour of its court and its trading networks, as well as its control of the Malacca
and Sunda straits (Simkin 1968, pp112-117; Mackerras 1992, pp94-95; Highham
1989, p342; Watson 1992, pp78-79; SarDesai 1994, pp41-43; see also, Kautilya
Arthasastra 261). Arab and Persian traders likewise had contact with Srivijaya,
though mainly involved in transit trade (Di Meglio 1970, p109; SarDesai 1994, p42).
Srivijaya's loose control of an extended domain relied on prestige, trade and influence
rather than direct territorial conquest, though for two to three centuries it had maritime
control of the main trade routes (SarDesai 1994, p42). Likewise, Majapahit through
the 14th to early 16th centuries1 was part of an extended island domain, with trading
networks focused on east Java, linking cultures and commodities in Southeast Asia
and China. Kenneth Hall has suggested that: "Collective recognition of the fourteenth
and fifteenth century east Java-centered Majapahit polity are the basis of
contemporary self-definitions of 'nation' and 'region' among the Javanese, Balinese,
Malays, and other island peoples" (Hall 2001, p89).
In this sense, Indonesian islands and cultures have had a deep regional
engagement that precedes the territorial unity framed by Dutch colonialism
(SarDesai 1994, p53). Rather the parallel here is of regional engagement rather than
strict national and territorial delimitation (for the diverse conceptual usages of
Majapahit by early Indonesian nationalists including Sukarno, see SarDesai 1994,
p53; Hall 2001, pp104-105; Hoey 2003). Likewise, it is possible to conceptualise the
cultural and regional foundations of ASEAN as going back to the trading networks
and shared political structures of the 15th century (Hall 2001; Ferguson 2001).
This deep regional interaction remains a crucial component for the development
of modern Indonesia in the 20th and 21st centuries. In the last forty years
Indonesia has had a central role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in the
creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and in wider
dialogue process such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN-PlusThree group (ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea). Indonesia has positioned
itself as a developing, multi-religious state. The constitutional structure Pancasila
enshrined an accepted role for several religions within Indonesia, including Islam,
Hinduism, Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism, though religious tensions have
emerged in some parts of the country over the last decade. The five principles of
Pancasila included Belief in God, National Unity, Humanitarianism, People's
Sovereignty, Social Justice and Prosperity, and under the former Suharto government
these principles had become a central commitment compulsory for all political
organisations, and strongly emphasised in all formal educational settings, and from
1985 had been required for all non-Government organisations (Robinson 1993, p44).
Although in theory an inclusive system, the Suharto government prior to 1998 had
managed to repress or control opposition groups and marginalise civil society
1
The traditional date for extinction of the Majapahit polity, but not its influence, is 1527 (Hall 2001,
p99).
2
movements (see Rosser et al 2005). It also used tools such as Panacasila to suppress
the ideology of militant Islamic groups.
Though in theory Panacasila remains in place in Indonesia, democratic reform and
some degree of de-centralisation have opened up a wider political space in which
Islamic has had a stronger local voice (see further below): The country has remained unified under its state ideology, Pancasila, which promotes
multicultural and religious harmony. But now even that's under threat. In 1999,
Indonesia's Parliament passed a law allowing the implementation of Sharia in the
strife-torn province of Aceh--even though it violates the country's secular Constitution.
The move has opened a Pandora's box. Earlier this year Muslim parties in Jakarta
submitted antipornography legislation that would have jailed women for 10 years for
showing their arms and legs in public. More than two dozen provincial governments
have issued Sharia-inspired bylaws, including one district in West Java that bans
women from walking alone at night. Today in Aceh, morality police detain women for
not wearing headscarves and break into homes without warrants looking for Muslims
engaged in "bad behavior." Despite the abuse of power, provincial officials from other
areas of Indonesia are visiting Aceh to study its Islamic model. "I think it's going to
expand," says Jones of the International Crisis Group.
There are also blurry lines in Malaysia between religion and the state. Conservative
Muslims are gaining more bureaucratic power through their positions in the civil
service and education system. More disturbing, religious edicts issued by Muslim
clerics, called fatwas , are legally binding for Muslims, even if they don't regularly
practice their religion. Each state has its own Sharia legal code and religious police to
enforce it. They ensure mandatory fasting during Ramadan, and raid nightclubs, bars
and even homes to stamp out illicit drinking and sex. (Cochrane and Kent 2006)
ASEAN as a whole, and to a lesser degree Australia, Japan and the U.S., for the 1980s
and the early 1990s had viewed Indonesia as a known, stabilising factor in the
wider region (regardless of human rights problems and self-determination crises in
East Timor, West Papua and Aceh). The potential and centrality of Indonesia has
long been noted: . . . Indonesia is a tremendous potential market for the region and globally and, as by
far the largest country in Southeast Asia, it is a regional power of importance.
Moreover, the archipelago sits astride the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the Straits
if Malacca that flow between the Indonesian island of Sumatra and Malaysia carries
more than 40 percent of the world's ship-borne commerce, making a stable Indonesia
desirable for global commercial activity. Moreover, the outcome of how Indonesia
deals with the future will almost certainly have a ripple effect in other, smaller
countries in the region facing similar economic and political situations. (Snow 2003,
p157)
The end of the Suharto from 1998, based on economic (see Rosenberger 1997) and
governance crises that his authoritarian government could not control, has since
allowed stronger democratic credentials for Indonesia, though combined selfdetermination claims, economic problems, political pressures and natural
disasters have charted a rough path for the nation in the 1998-2007 period (see
below).
3
Table I: Timeline - General Outline of Indonesian History till Feb 2002 (Church 1995; BBC 2004): 6-8th centuries:
13th century:
16th century:
1602:
1796:
1942-45:
1945:
1946-49:
1950:
1959-65:
1965:
1965:
Late 1980s:
1997-1998
1997-1998
1998
1998
Early 1999
September 1999
1999
1999:
1999-2000
December 2000
2000-2001
July 2001
Feb 2002
August 2002
Borobudur and Prambanan temples build
Islam spreads throughout islands
Portuguese first to establish trading posts
Netherlands East India Company (VOC) formed, attacks Jakarta in 1619
VOC bankrupt, control assumed by Dutch government
Japanese occupation
Independence unilaterally declared on 17 August
Dutch try to resume control and guerrilla war starts
President Sukarno elected
Period of Guided Democracy
Unsuccessful coup attempt by some army officers, period of crisis
New Order government under President Suharto
Non-oil exports exceed oil exports, Indonesian economy undergoes steady
liberalisation and internationalisation.
‘Asian’ economic crisis undermines Indonesian economy,
Australia supports softened IMF package for Indonesia
President Suharto resigns in the face of economic crisis, political
opposition and demands for reform.
Caretaker Habibie government contains crisis and prepares for elections
Reversal of Australian policy on East Timor
INTERFET military mission to East Timor to be led by Australia
20 October: Democratic elections result in moderate Wahid government
Mirage of 'Howard Doctrine' (Australia as regional sheriff) undermines
relations with Indonesia
Human Right abuses in Indonesian control of East Timor revealed
Ministerial Meeting to improve Australia-Indonesia relations
Ongoing tensions with Australia, tuning of Indonesia towards East Asia
Parliament dismisses President Wahid over allegations of corruption and
incompetence. Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri is sworn in as
President.
East Timor, Indonesia sign agreements aimed at easing relations before East
Timor becomes fully independent in May.
Top legislators pass constitutional changes seen as a key step towards
democracy. For the first time, Indonesian voters able to elect their president
and vice president.
At the same time, from late 2003, Indonesia has helped push forward pro-active
new policies for ASEAN and the wider region, both in enhancing regional
integration, and deepening 'strategic partnerships' with India and China. As a whole,
though tensions continue over the South China Sea, over low Chinese labour costs
affecting ASEAN's competitiveness (Suryodipuro 2002, p208, though Indonesia may
now have the some advantages in overall average unit costs see Tham 2003, p34), and
Chinese military modernisation, there has been a distinct opening up of relations
among Indonesia, ASEAN and China. First, China has gradually turned towards a
dialogue approach with Southeast Asia, e.g. via the Indonesia hosted South-China
dialogue process and then via convergence on a Code of Conduct for the South
China Sea. From early 2002 a system of sharing intelligence to fight against terrorism
was set up among Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines, and Thailand (Xinhua 2002a).
Furthermore, once Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia, and once US-China relations
improved, Indonesia moved to normalise and improve relations with PRC, as had
all ASEAN members by 1991 (see further Ba 2003). This process was aided by some
improvement in Sino-Vietnam relations, by the formation of the ASEAN-Plus-Three
and its regular Summits, by the acceptance of the Declaration on the Conduct of
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Parties in the South China Sea, and the 2002 agreement for an ASEAN-China free
trade agreement to begin by 2010 (Chin 2003, po19-20). This reduced recent
historical impediments in the centuries old relationship between Indonesia and China.
In spite of successes at the diplomatic and regional level, Indonesia in recent years has
had to face severe problems that have challenged its goals of national resilience,
human development, and democratic transition. These include rapid if uneven
economic reform, a new political openness that accelerates local and national political
competition, coming to terms with the difficult path of independence for East Timor,
renewed military crises in Aceh, ongoing political tensions in West Papua (see
McGibbon 2003), and sustained ethno-religious and inter-communal violence in
Maluku and Central Sulawesi, including problems in Ambon and Poso, (Crouch 2003,
p27) though these were partly stabilised from late 2001 onwards, in part due to peace
efforts by respective religious communities (Smith 2003, p107).
Likewise, Indonesia was perceived internationally as one leg of a failed Asian
capitalism, though the lessons of the 1997-1998 crises suggested that poorly
regulated hot-money and lack of the reading of warning signs by investors, banks and
credit-rating agencies, plus a problematic IMF program, were part of the wider
economic problem. Domestic Indonesian growth (GDP) returned to approx. 4.4%
in 2003, and 5.1% in 2004, 5.6% in 2005, and 5.2% for 2006, but this was from a
'low baseline' (Chin 2003, p3; ADB figures via www.aric.adb.org; DFAT 2007; Ikhsan
2003, p49). This will probably not be enough by itself to seriously reduce
unemployment and poverty levels (though the government had hoped that poverty
might decline by 4-7% through 2004, Perdana 2002). The issue to be confronted is not
just reform, but the sustainability of the reform process (Ikhsan 2003, pp54-55).
Thus, even as Indonesia continues to grow as an economy, there been some
rebound on poverty figures to 18% through 2005-2006: After declining for six years the number of poor people has increased sharply. Some
39m, 18% of the population of 220m, are now officially poor, according to data just
released by the government's statistics bureau, 4m more than in 2005.
That the poverty level has stopped falling is no surprise. A 126% increase in fuel
prices last October catapulted inflation to 18%, while wages increased only
marginally. The number of poor Indonesians would have soared even more, to 51m
according to the statistics office, if the government had not given cash handouts to
some 76m people to cushion the effects of the fuel-price increase (which eliminated a
costly subsidy). But activists are questioning the data. They argue that the figures fail
to give the full alarming picture.
The Urban Poor Consortium believes, for example, that the number of people falling
into poverty in Jakarta has risen by almost twice as much as the statisticians state. It
also says that more people are, relatively speaking, even poorer than they were a
year ago. (Economist 2006)
Poverty and unemployment levels had seriously increased through 1998
(estimates for those living below the poverty line in 1998 varied from 50%, an
International Labour Organization figure, to revised Indonesian figures of 34-39% in
mid-1998, Perdana 2002, or as low as 24.2% for December 1998, Ananta 2003, p10),
though by 1999 there was some rebound and gradual adaptation to the new
conditions, with one source suggesting only 18.2% under the poverty line in August
5
1999 (Hatmadji & Mursitama 2003, p290). Though calculations vary, most show
some reduction in poverty from 2001 (BPS and LPEM figures),2 with World Bank
figures revealing a longer and slower decline through 2001-2002 (see Ikhsan 2003,
figure 3.8, p41; for poverty mapping from the village level up in selected provinces,
see Suryahadi et al. 2003). Poverty in the developmental context, of course, needs to
look at not just a 'poverty line' based on income, but also include issues such as
transient verses chronic poverty, and those vulnerable to dropping below the poverty
line due to 'capability deprivation' (Perdana 2002). Poverty in a developmental sense
should include measures of opportunity, empowerment, security, and capability
(UNFPA 2001), thereby incorporating measures sensitive to social vulnerabilities and
a wider notion of privation (Ogata & Sen 2003; Kumar 1999; Ferguson 2004).
Official unemployment estimates remained above 9% through 2002-2005 (DFAT
2005). Take as a whole, this reflects wider concerns about productivity and
poverty gaps across half the population of Southeast Asia: Output per worker in ASEAN grew only 15.5 percent between 2000 and 2005,
compared to 26.9 percent in India and 63.4 percent in China in the same period, said
the report, which was released in Jakarta this week.
Large disparities also exist between ASEAN nations with wealthy Singapore’s
productivity level nearly 17 times that of Cambodia, 10.6 times that of Myanmar and
10 times that of Vietnam.
In the Philippines, productivity growth has been less than one percent annually for the
last five years, it said.
It said many ASEAN nations have made huge strides in reducing poverty among their
growing populations and employment has increased overall in the bloc by 11.8
percent since 2000. (Daily Times 2007)
Concerns have also been expressed about the Social Safety Net (SSN) program, and
the National Movement for Poverty Alleviation. Although a number of communities
have been aided by these programs, up to 10-14% of the early SNN loans may have
been 'corrupted' and gone to the 'non-poor' (Ananta 2003, p20; see further Hatmadji &
Mursitama 2003; for efforts in the directions of a long-term National Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper, see SMERU 2003). The SNN, targeting both the short-term
impact of the 1997-1998 crisis and focusing on long term development, has programs
in Health, Education, provision of rice at cheap prices, and regional empowerment to
increase local incomes. Though money flows were quickly dispersed they were not
always well targeted (Hatmadji & Mursitama 2003, pp278-280). This problem
become an issue of sustainability when combined with wider concerns about
ongoing vulnerability to renewed political shocks (though the domestic economy
and investors seem to pay limited attention to 'security threats', Ababta 2003, p13). In
this context, the Tsunami of December 2004 (and later natural disasters) was a major
blow to regional development, especially in Aceh (see below).
At the regional level, there has also been a number of intensifying transnational
problems, including international terrorism, undocumented migration flows,
deportation of illegal workers (as has recently soured Malaysia-Indonesia relations,
with another round of tensions on this issue through early 2005), money laundering,
2
BPS = Statistic Indonesia, LPEM = Economics and Management Research Institute, University of
Indonesia.
6
people smuggling, and piracy across international borders (Suryodipuro 2002, pp211212; Singh & Chin 2003, pix; see below). Transboundary environmental damage,
especially the 'haze' from major fires in Sumatra and Borneo,3 plus ongoing concerns
about resource extraction from EEZ (exclusive economic zones) have also been of
concern (see Tan & Boutin 2001; Glover & Jessup 1999). Tensions also emerged
through early 2005 with Malaysia over sea boundaries and legal control of energy
resources in disputed areas. These factors have placed a number of new pressures on
Indonesia that give it a problematic prominence in the 21st century structuring of
non-traditional 'global threat perceptions'. As we shall see, Indonesia, to protect its
economic and democratic transitions, may need to sustain its democratic and
developmental transitions see Timeline (2002-2007).
Timeline B: Indonesia in Transition 2002 – 2007 (After BBC 7)
2002 October - Bomb attack on the Kuta Beach nightclub district on Bali kills 202 people, most of
them tourists. Another bomb explodes near the US consulate in Sanur near Kuta, without causing any
injury.
2002 December - Government and separatist Free Aceh Movement (Gam) sign peace deal in Geneva,
aimed at ending 26 years of violence. The accord provides for autonomy and free elections in the
Muslim oil-rich province of Aceh; in return the Gam must disarm.
2003 May - Peace talks between government and Gam separatists break down; government mounts
military offensive against Gam rebels. Martial law is imposed.
2003 August - Car bomb explodes outside the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 14 people.
2003 August-October - Three Bali bombing suspects are found guilty and sentenced to death for their
roles in the 2002 attacks. A fourth suspect is given life imprisonment.
2004 April - Parliamentary and local elections: Golkar party of former President Suharto wins greatest
share of vote, with Megawati Sukarnoputri's PDI-P coming second.
2004 July - First-ever direct presidential elections; first round narrows field to Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono and incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri.
2004 September - Car bomb attack outside Australian embassy in Jakarta kills nine, injures more than
180.
2004 September - Former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono wins second round of presidential
elections, unseating incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri.
2004 December - More than 220,000 people are dead or missing in Indonesia alone after a powerful
undersea earthquake off Sumatra generates massive tidal waves. The waves devastate Indian Ocean
communities as far afield as Thailand, India, Sri Lanka and Somalia.
2005 March - Court finds Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir guilty of conspiracy over 2002 Bali
bombings, sentences him to two-and-a-half years in jail. He is freed in June 2006.
3
The 1997-1998 fires destroyed some 8 million hectares of forest, with regional damage estimates of at
least US$4.5 billion and some 70 million people affected regionally (Schweithelm & Glover 1999).
Fires in following years were of a lesser order but still created strong regional concerns. By 2003, some
estimates suggested that a total of 10 million hectares had been effected, with a regional economic loss
of up to US$9.3 billion (Jakarta Post 2003b). This led to efforts to monitor regional air pollution, with
problems being seriously operationalised within ASEAN in 1998, using some ADB funding, utilising
the 1995 ASEAN Co-operation Plan on Transboundary Pollution and the 1997 Regional Haze Action
Plan. By late 2003 this led to the ASEAN signing of the Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution,
with strong monitoring, regulation, and cooperative mechanisms that were praised by the UNEP
(Jakarta Post 2003b).
7
2005 August - Government and Free Aceh Movement separatists sign a peace deal providing for rebel
disarmament and the withdrawal of government soldiers from the province. Rebels begin handing in
weapons in September; government completes troop pull-out in December.
2005 October - Three suicide bombings on the resort island of Bali kill 23 people, including the
bombers.
2006 January - East Timorese report accuses Indonesia of widespread atrocities during its 24-year
occupation, holding it responsible for the deaths of more than 100,000 people.
2006 December - First direct elections held in Aceh province, consolidating the August 2005 peace
accord. Former separatist rebel leader Irwandi Yusuf elected governor.
2. National Diversity Amid Democratic Transition and Decentralisation
Within Indonesia, in spite of the relative dominance of Javanese populations, the
archipelago has a diverse ethnic and religious mix that has only been partially
explored in recent censuses (see Suryadinata et al. 2003). The problem of ethnicity,
identity, custom and religion among diverse socio-economic groups has received
renewed attention during the difficult years of transition. Survey data suggests that
ethnic diversity remains the norm for most across Indonesia, with strong
regional variations. Collations of data from the 2000 census show that Javanese
comprise almost 42% of the population, followed by Sundanese (approximately 15%),
then by another 7 major groups with over 2% of the total population (Suryadinata et
al. 2003, Figure 1.2.1, p13). One sensitive issue has been the under-reporting of
Chinese ethnic identity, and though there was some slightly increase in the 'absolute'
number of Chinese reported between 1930-2000, this has been masked by sensitivity
to inter-ethnic tensions (Suryadinata et al. 2003, p11, pp73-75). Some small migration
outflows occurred during crisis periods, e.g. after May 1998, with some concerns
about business safety at that time (Suryadinata et al. 2003, p79; Darwin 2003, p129;
Economist Intelligence Unit 2005, p17). Past estimates of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia
have thus varied from 2.4 to 5%, but a more recent calculation based on census
figures put this group at approx. 1.5% of the population (Suryadinata et al. 2003,
p73, p101).
Historically, dozens of different languages and culture systems exist, with the
history of very diverse Javanese courts, Aceh and Minangkabau societies (both in
Sumatra), and the Buginese people (originally of the north Celebes) giving a small
sample of the different cultures of Indonesia (see Kumar 1979). We can sense
something of this complexity when we note, for example, that though Java is the most
populous island of Indonesia, houses its capital, and is the most influential politically,
the official language of Indonesia (Bahasa Indonesian) is in fact a variant of the
Malay found originally in Sumatra. Malay, however, was used as a widespread
trading language at least from the 17th century and therefore was effective as a shared
language, which was actively promoted by the Dutch in the early 20th century
(Kumar 1979, p17; Van Niel 1979, p146). It had also been preferred by some of the
pro-Dutch Javanese administrators in the nineteenth century (a fact disapproved of by
the 19th century Javanese rebel leader Dipanagara, see Carey 1979, p77). The choice
of this language rather than Javanese as the national language was in fact a wise
diplomatic move by the modern Indonesian government, since it emphasised
national identity transcending that of Java alone.
8
Indonesia as a Multicultural nation-state: the Barong Dance
(Musical drama, based on animist and Hindu traditions, performed in Bali, Indonesia –
Photo copyright: R. James Ferguson 1998)
Indonesia has 88% Muslims, and smaller numbers of Christians (8.92%) and
Hindu's (1.81%), who nonetheless are concentrated in key regions, e.g. Christian
communities in North Sumatra, East Nusa Tenggara (86%), North Sulawesi (52%),
West Kalimantan (30%) and West Papua (83%), and Hindus in Bali, East Java, and
Central Kalimantan (Suryadinata et al. 2003, pp104-105, p114, p120; Rabasa 2003,
p14, Table 1). Furthermore, Islam in Indonesia has also been culturally transformed
by these earlier beliefs, so that village religion in many parts of rural Java is
sometimes termed Kejawen, i.e. a mixture of Islam with Hindu and animistic
conceptions. Likewise, in parts of Java Islam has been historically influenced by
Sufism, leading to highly individualistic and tolerant forms of religious belief, though
this has come under increasing pressure since 1998 and 2001.
Within the great diversity of Indonesia, likewise there has been some limited ability to
make real the dictum of 'unity in diversity'. However, when combined with
economic crises, military engagement, police-military rivalries, and community
violence, there have been real limits to ethnic justice and developmental balance
within specific Indonesian localities (Smith 2003, p108). At the territorial level of
involvement there is still some involvement by the TNI (Indonesian army playing a
traditional dual-function civil and developmental role) from village level upwards (see
Darwin 2003, p228; Mietzner 2003, p250). This territorial engagement has been
debated closely in reent years, with two reform options failing to change the status
quo (Mietzner 2003, pp245-251). Part of the issue here is the need of the army to
secure up to 66-70% of its funding from outside of the central government
budget, in part through running some 250 or more business enterprises (Crouch 2003,
p31; Economist Intelligence Unit 2005). Likewise, local government has sometimes
been billed via 'stability funds', or funds allocated for TNI operations 'ranging from
security interventions to disaster relief and developmental programs' (Mietzner 2003,
p255). With some 302,000 persons in its active armed forces (and 400,000 reserves),
this is as important issue, with total funding for the armed forces down through 1998-
9
2002, but with some rise again in 2003-2006, reaching around US$10.3 billion (see
Chipman 2007; Economist Intelligence Unit 2005, p15).
However, other areas were viewed as a security zones, e.g. the extension of the
military state of emergency in Aceh through November 2003 for a further six months
(Tempo Interactive 2003b), and thereafter given 'civil emergency status' (Economist
Intelligence Unit 2005, p16). Likewise, developing states have to cope with the
realities of ethnic identity and mobility. In the case of Indonesia, there is a complex
legacy from the earlier, government-sponsored transmigration scheme, aimed at
reducing pressure on high population islands such as Java, and used as an integrative
assimilation strategy (Tirtosudarmo 2003, p218). In some cases the scheme caused
changes in local ethnic and religious ratios, heightening conflict between migrants
and local populations, e.g. in Ambon (Maluku), Poso (Sulawesi), and West Papua,
resulting in some return flow of migrant families (Crouch 2003, p31; Tirtosudarmo
2003, p213; Rabasa 2003, pp28-31).
Thus, it has been recognised by Indonesian leaders that separatist movements, e.g. in
Aceh and Papua, in part flourished because 'the social discontent in the region' was 'a
product of a long conflict in the region which is basically related to justice, honour
and prosperity of the people' (Yudhoyono 2002, p5). Likewise, serious tensions have
been experienced among Dyak and Madurese villages in West Kalimantan through
early 1997 and again in 1999-2000 (Tirtosudarmo 2003, pp231-234). On this basis,
administrative decentralisation and fairer access to resource revenues will not by
themselves be enough to ensure the social harmony needed for development. The
Indonesian government as gone part of the way in this direction by trying to develop a
'comprehensive approach' drawing on social, political, and economic factors, as
supported by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (then Coordinating Minister for Political
and Security Affairs and now President), in contrast to more hardline military
approaches (Crouch 2003, p20). However, the comprehensive approach has been
difficult to engage in Aceh due to continued military conflict and the after-effects
of natural disasters, and is hampered by a number of factors in Papua, including
perceptions of impunity in a locally unreformed military sector, with claims on
ongoing political violence against students and activists through 2006 and early
2007 (McGibbon 2003, p195; see further below). Human security, conceived at a
social and civil level (see for example Lizée 2002), needs to be added to
decentralisation and democratisation gains for developmental outcomes, with claims
that the Special Autonomy status given to the region having failed to deliver
improvements, leading to local protests through May 2007 (Huxley 2005; Institute for
Papuan Advocacy 2007).
Although in the short term democratic transition may have 'uncorked' some of
these divisive issues, and has allowed more competing claims to enter the political
area, the political process is also an avenue that allows the expression of needs,
interests and claims based on local and religious identities. On this basis,
Indonesia will prosper when it positively utilises its diversity rather than attempts to
suppress it (Darwin 2003, p236, following Clifford Geertz). The outcomes of the
1999 elections clearly showed strong commitment by major parties for a more tolerant
and democratic Indonesia (based on secular or Pancasila models). Political Islam in
Indonesia, whether expressed through party voting or major religious
organisations, remained largely committed to pluralism and democracy. Though
10
smaller groupings sought some greater official role for Islam within the conception of
the Indonesian state, and for Shari'a law among Muslims, this was not sufficient to
move mainstream politics in this direction. Hence the Jakarta Charter (a short
phrase that was removed from the Indonesian Constitution in 1945, 'with the
obligation for adherents of Islam to follow syari'ah, or Islamic law'), aimed at
enforcing Shari'a law of Muslims within Indonesia, and again debated over the last
several years, has been unable from 1999 onwards to gain the one third in the MPR
(People's Consultative Assembly) needed for consideration of the amendment, with
only about 14% of 1999 elected parties supporting it (Hosen 2005; Smith 2003, p102;
Crouch 2003, p23).4 Legal reform has also been made to allow for some greater
application of Shari'a at the local level for Muslims in Aceh and elsewhere (based
on decentralisation of policy), but full Shari'a 'has not been applied and the
government says it will proceed only gradually', though religion in a general sense is
allowed to play some role in public (Hosen 2005; Crouch 2003, p28).
Though problematic in several areas, the democratic transition in Indonesia is
remarkable in others. The elections of 2004 created an MPR (People's Consultative
Assembly) entirely based on freely elected officials in the DPR (House of
Representatives, or Parliament) and the DPD (House of Regional Representatives),
including the removal of military and police non-elected seats in the DPR through
2004-2009 (Siboro 2004; Smith 2003, p101; Crouch 2003, p18). Local elections have
also reduced the numbers of the bupati and mayors drawn from the military and
police, with career-path civil servants being the major new source (Malley 2003,
p113). Press censorship has been lifted, and a wide range of NGOs, civil society
groups, peasant federations, labour unions, citizens' forums (forum warga) and village
democracy processes, via the Village Representative Board (BPD), have begun in
earnest (Anlöv 2003, pp78-84). Through 2000-2001 local elections were held in most
of Indonesian's 52,000 villages (Anlöv 2003, p80). Organisations aiming at public
accountability and improved governance have also sprung up around the
country, e.g. numerous 'Watch' organisations monitoring the government, parliament
and judiciary, as well as groups such as Indonesia Corruption Watch, the Presidium of
the Papuan Council (PDP) and the Forum for NGO Cooperation in Papua (Rasyie
2003, p70; Malley 2003, p110; McGibbon 2003, pp196-197). In part, such
organisations have prospered as part of a rethinking of governance, and an increased
recognition of the wider resource that civil society organisations (CSOs) represent
(Lizée 2002, p510).
Indonesian parliamentary elections were strongly contested by a large number of
parties through May 2004, with The Golkar party securing 21.6% of the vote, with
President Megawati Sukarnoputri's PDI-P party coming second with 18.5% (BBC
2004), indicating no clear dominance of a single party. Likewise, from July 2004,
Indonesia moved to direct presidential elections, with a range of candidates. Main
contenders included: The five contestants include incumbent Megawati Soekarnoputri paired with Hasyim
Muzadi; retired army general Wiranto with Solahuddin Wahid; former security minister
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono with Jusuf Kalla; upper house speaker Amien Rais with
Siswono Yudohusodo; and incumbent Vice President Hamzah Haz with Agum
Gumelar. (Jakarta Post 2004a)
4
Militant Islamic parties represented less than 6% of the total vote (Rabasa 2003, p27).
11
Yudhoyono and Megawati emerged with the most votes, and in a second round
Yudhoyono won the Presidential elections convincingly through September 2004,
with a lead of around 24 million votes (UPI 2004).
The other great initiative that Indonesia has undertaken is its decentralisation
program. Decentralisation has been viewed over the last decade as a major strategy
to aid democratisation and development, and by 1997 had been adopted in varying
degrees by 75 developing countries (Colongon 2003, p88; see also Malley 2003,
p103). Under the Indonesian initiative (via laws 22/1999 & 25/1999), there has been a
serious devolution of economic and administrative power to district level,
resulting in higher autonomy and local responsibilities that were implemented from
early 2001 onwards (Smith 2003, p105; Malley 2003, p109). Governance areas
devolved include 'public works, health, education and culture, agriculture,
transportation, trade and industry, investment, the environment, land affairs,
cooperatives and labour' (Colongon 2003, pp91-92). Jakarta has seriously reduced the
power of the centre through some devolution of decision-making, through the
relatively untied General Allocation Fund (DAU), and through the more targeted
Special Allocation Fund (DAK) designed to help 'poorer regions maintain and
improve services such as public education, health, environment, transportation and
water supply' (Rasyid 2003, p68). Local funding has in many cases increased, with
developmental expenses being the second largest area of local government
expenditure, after salaries,5 in 2002 (25% and 57% respectively, Colongon 2003,
p94). Total development expenditure, including major items on agriculture, education,
health, forestry and plantations, and settlements and regional infrastructure reached
26,469 billion rp in 2002 (Rohdewohld 2003, p272). It has been difficult to meet
some official developmental targets for these local budgets, i.e. 30% of the budget
to go to education, and 15% to health (Colongon 2003, p94). Thus, in 2002
developmental expenditure for education was 26.8% and 9.1% on health
(Rohdewohld 2003, p272).
In most cases power was devolved not to the provincial level, but to the district
level below this (kabupaten/kota), thereby reducing the likelihood of political
fragmentation and separatism (Aspinall & Fealy 2003, pp3-4). Though a serious
benefit for local interests and democratisation, there have been serious problems in
the framing of these laws, including administrative confusion, problematic local
taxation laws, power capture by old elites, some political 'bossism' at the local level,
and possible entrenchment of local corruption during transition (see Bell 2003;
Aspinall & Fealy 2003, p5; Rasyid 2003, p66; Malley 2003, pp102-103). There have
also been claims of local vote buying, corruption, and collusion by some leaders to
enrich themselves, with 2007 claims levelled against political leaders such as Amien
Rais and even President Yudhoyono that they might have received funds illegally
during the 2004 elections (ABC 2007a; Malley 2003, p110), and concerns about
uneven gains for women at the local level (Satriyo 2003). The national government
now has to oversee some 360 local governments to ensure that their laws comply
with national statutes, a slow and difficult task, with the Indonesian Chamber of
Commerce suggesting that up to one thousand 'local regulations' had been
inappropriately passed (Rasyid 2003, p67; Aspinall & Fealy 2003, p6). Likewise,
5
More than 2.3 million civil servants have been moved from central to district government
administration (Rohdewohld 2003, p260).
12
there has been a concern that decentralisation might increase the gap between
poor and rich regions within the country (Aspinall & Fealy 2003, p5), while local
power division can intensify conflict, e.g. in South East Maluku (see ICG 2007).
Beyond this, Aceh and Papua have been singled out under special laws (Special
Autonomy Laws of August 2001 and November 2001) framing high levels of
provincial resource control and autonomy as Special Autonomous Provinces (but not
independence), with approximately 70% for Aceh and 80% for Papua of resource
flows going back to the region (Smith 2003, p105, p106; Crouch 2003, p28). Under
this legislation Papua, in particular, would benefit from recognition of indigenous
verses non-indigenous Papuans, affirmative action in relation to representation in the
bureaucracy, and the ability of the provincial government to control migration into the
territory (McGibbon 2003, pp200-201). Unfortunately, both provinces have been
subject to ongoing conflict, military engagement, and political uncertainty (Smith
2003, p106). Peace talks in Aceh, in particular, had broken down and a military
solution attempted, with the Indonesian government making it clear through
November 2003 it was closing down dialogue with Free Aceh Movement (GAM),
even though renewed dialogue was requested by some NGOs and the National
Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM). This was done on the basis of GAM
still desiring separation from Indonesia (i.e. complete independence) rather than
accepting the autonomy package (Tempo Interactive 2003a).6 Following the Tsunami
crisis there was temporary 'informal ceasefire' while both sides sought to deal with
the humanitarian crises, and although some political talks had been held (in Helsinki
in January 2005), this did yield a clear peace-settlement and some government
counter-insurgency activities have continued (Economist Intelligence Unit 2005;
Huxely 2005, p128). Further peace talks were held in April 2005, and even though the
government still only offers autonomy rather than independence to Aceh these talks
resumed through 2005, with peace deals leading to rebel disarmament through
September 2005 and a pull out of most armed forces through December 2005 (Xinhua
2005; BBC 2005; Renner 2006).
The aim of regional autonomy laws has been to re-balance power between
Jakarta and regional areas, without leading to intensified communal conflict
(Yudhoyono 2002, pp2-3) or to new independence movements that might continue to
fracture the unitary state concept that remains central to the Republic of Indonesia.
Nor would this policy allow any vision of a federal state, views re-reiterated by the
Government in 2003 (Rasyid 2003, p63; Antara 2003). In this setting, Indonesia has
for over five decades opposed any notion of a federal or federative state structure, in
part drawing on negative and positive lessons from China, former Yugoslavia and the
USSR. In spite of Special Autonomy laws passed as early as 2001 (no. 18 and no. 21)
in relation to Aceh and Papua (Yudhoyono 2002, p5), these provisions have not been
able to remove intense political tensions.
Likewise, distrust of Jakarta in Papua deepened after the murder of independence
leader Theys Eluay in November 2001, continued with the creation of civilian militias
in 2002, and extended by police operations against 'separatists' in late 2002
(McGibbon 2003, pp204-206). The plan to divide Papua into three provinces, as
instructed by former President Megawati in January 2003 (under Law No. 45/1999)
6
For the socio-religious implications of 'independence or freedom (merdeka)' for some Papuan
communities, see McGibbon 2003, p208.
13
but postponed in August 2003 due to the extreme opposition it generated (McGibbon
2003, p210; Xinhua 2003), would undermine the political implications of the Special
Autonomy Law. Through 2004-2005: In the extreme east of the country, a broad cross-section of native Papuans support
independence by peaceful means, but the Free Papua Organisation (OPM), which is
fighting for the same goal, is poorly armed and badly organised. Discontent with
Indonesian rule has been inflamed by gross abuses of human rights by the military,
and by the plunder of the province’s natural resources. Recent attempts to partition
the province into three separate smaller provinces have also caused resentment.
Although the partition was ruled illegal by the Constitutional Court, one of these
provinces, West Irian Jaya, has nevertheless been established. The Yudhoyono
administration has, however, pledged its full support for “Special Autonomy” in
Papua, and has promised to push ahead with the creation of the necessary
institutions. (Economist Intelligence Unit 2005, p16)
These factors have meant that the two regions that might have benefited most, and
towards which autonomy laws were strongly directed, have not yet gained strong
advantages 'on the ground' from these daring reforms. In turn, the fate of these two
areas remains a major challenge for the legitimacy of a democratic Indonesia.
In the case of West Papua, tensions have also spilled over into relations with
Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG). Through early 2006, Australia moved to
give political asylum to forty-two West Papuan refugees, who in turn have reported
on human rights abuses within their homeland. There have also been allegations that
relatives of those who escaped have come under political pressure and threats by
Indonesian officials (see Hart & Fitzpatrick 2006, p2). In turn, Indonesia felt that the
granting of asylum suggested support for these criticisms, leading to a chill in
relations with Australia through April-May 2006, perhaps remembering earlier
periods (1962-1973) when thousands of refugees crossed from western Papua into
PNG (the Dutch left ‘West New Guinea’ in 1962, with a UN interim administration
being replaced by Indonesian authorities from early 1963, see Neumann 2006). The
Australian government, though it may at first have hoped to improve the perception
of its treatment of refugees, soon found itself obliged to return to a tighter control
of asylum processing from Papua by a new re-drawing of Australia’s migration
zone, and a return to 'Pacific solution' with processing occurring at Nauru or possibly
the PNG centre at Manus island, with three later arrivals onto islands in the Torres
Strait being treated as off-shore arrivals (Hart & Fitzpatrick 2006; ABC Online
2006d). These trends have been protested by the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees as not within the spirit of the Refugee Convention (Bita & Edwards 2006).
Moreover, PNG itself has been placed under greater pressure with the tightening of
Australian processing: in the past West Papuan refugees had 'seven days' to move on
across the Torres Strait before becoming PNG responsibility. Now, even with a UN
High Commission for Refugees office in Port Moresby, it is feared that PNG
resources might be stretched by tension in West Papua, e.g. 500 students who
have fled West Papua die to clashed with Indonesian military forces, while clashes
within west Papua led to four deaths in April 2006 (ABC Online 2006a; ABC
Online 2006c). Indonesian parliamentarians have stated that they are closely
watching how Australia’s tightening of asylum will work out in practice, while in
turn Australia’s ambassador, Bill Farmer, stated to the Indonesian Parliamentary
Commission on foreign affairs in May 2006 that ‘Australia supported a united
Indonesia and had no interest in the country’s fragmentation’, but does support
14
‘special autonomy’ for Papua (ABC Online 2006b). This ‘cold spell’ is in sharp
contrast to the strong cooperation between Australia and Indonesia through 20022005 which led to the Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership Between
Australia and the Republic of Indonesia, which reads in part: We are not only neighbours with close and deep bilateral ties but we are also both
closely engaged in our shared region. We are determined jointly to provide a lead in
tackling the major issues of our region. The work we have already done together on
people smuggling, encouraging a regional response to the scourge of terrorism and
bringing the great faiths of our region together shows what we can do. Reflecting
Australia's significant and warm bilateral ties with all the countries of East Asia,
Indonesia recognises and supports the inclusion of Australia in the process of
integration in the East Asian region. (April 2005)
It is in this context that Australia has signaled that it wished to move forward with
a framework agreement on security cooperation, aimed at reducing such tensions
in the future, an agreement that Indonesia says should include explicit understandings
on Papua (Maiden 2006).
Bearing in mind these factors, the Indonesian polity has made a partially
successful democratic transition, in spite of serious conflicts in some regions and
uneven progress (see Suhardi 2003) towards decentralisation.7 However, a secure
developmental path for all Indonesians remains problematic, in part because of
the nexus among national, security and transnational problems. The fate of the
Indonesian community, at the heart of ASEAN and Australia’s closest neighbour, thus
remains a crucial issue for the wider region and for Australia.
3. Transnational, Transboundary and Regional Challenges
Nation-building and development have been problematic throughout Southeast Asia
during the second half of the 20th century because (with the partial exception of
Thailand) these processes had not been fully established before globalisation
processes began to open international borders and deregulate key aspects of national
economies. In such a setting, key transnational problems can overwhelm national
capacity, undermine national governance, and require more coordinated regional and
multilateral responses. For Indonesia, the regional setting has posed ongoing
challenges during the transition period. This can be seen in several cases where
transnational contexts undermine national goals. These issues have not always been
adequately moderated by regional cooperation.
For example, regional piracy has remained a serious problem for both Indonesia
and ASEAN, with increasing incidents reported through the 1990s (a global total of
469 in 2000, with 119 of these being in Indonesian waters), and has come to the
attention of Japan, India and the United States (see Liss 2003, p55; Young & Valencia
2003, p271). Through 2003 'out of 445 actual and attempted pirate attacks on
merchant ships, 189 attacks occurred in Southeast Asian waters' with Southeast Asia
still accounting for more than 50% of world cases in 2004 (see Banlaoi 2005).
Generally, it is likely that piracy cases are under-reported, in part due to repercussions
7
It should be noted, of course, that the decentralisation program is only through the initiation and
installation stages, and has yet to be consolidated and stabilised, as viewed in the 2000-2007 timeline
suggested by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Colongon 2003, p101, footnote 8).
15
for large cargo carriers, while local attacks on small boats and fishermen may not
technically be viewed as 'piracy on the high seas'. Piracy in Southeast increased 37%
through the first half of 2003, and there have been fears that terrorists could use oil or
LPG tankers to create a major disaster in a port or in narrow SLOCs (sea lines of
communication) such as the Malacca Strait (Australian 2003a). Although the nexus
between piracy and terrorism has yet to been fully, established, an operation planned
by the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines provides one example of such capabilities
(see Banlaoi 2005; Australian 2003a),8 it indicates another layer of regional instability
that has a link to poverty and gaps in regional coordination. Increases in regional
piracy have been noted since 1997, and the focus of activity has shifted from the
Malacca Strait, then into Indonesian and Philippines waters and the South
China Sea. Historically, of course, key raiding and pirate groups such as the Iranun
and Balangingi took to piracy and slave raiding as other forms of livelihood were
eroded, and as the emerging global trade of the 18th and 19th centuries made these
waters a highway of wealth and a covert emporium for slaves and stolen merchandise
(Warren 2002; Liss 2003, p57). This is a warning that piracy should not be viewed
just as robbery on the high sees or across state jurisdictions but is sensitive to
regional economic conditions (for modern definitions, see Djalal 2002, pp106-107)..
Here, cooperation among Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia has been
extremely useful as a model, forcing attacks from the Malacca Straits area eastwards
into the South China Sea (Liss 2003, p56). However, since 1997 it has been suggested
that economic recession in Indonesia and governance problems during political
transition may have given a specific boost to local piracy (Djalal 2002, p108; Liss
2003, p56). However, it may be wise to distinguish between sophisticated pirate
gangs (linked to organised international crime rackets), and opportunistic 'searobbers', with the latter often targeting local fishermen and their boats (Liss 2003,
pp59-60). Likewise, though the tactics used by pirates and terrorists may seem
similar, their goals in the modern period are highly divergent (see Young and
Valencia 2003).
Wider regional cooperation and training initiatives, with some recent Japanese
financial support for the creation of a new anti-piracy centre to be established in
Southeast Asia (Agence France Presse 2003), has already begun through regular
workshops and technical working groups, as well as the establishment of a Maritime
Transport Working Group (MTWG), often hosted by Indonesia and other ASEAN
states (Djalal 2002, p108-112; Suryodipuro 2002, p214). Likewise, the U.S. has
welcomed the idea that Indian naval escorts might play a role in monitoring shipping
on routes up to the eastern routes into the Malacca Strait, and there has been increased
maritime coordination among India, the U.S. and Japan (Limaye 2003, p49;
Suryodipuro 2002, p212). Recent search and rescue operations (November 2003)
between Indian and Chinese navies have signalled increasing bilateral cooperation
(Wu 2003). Here, the problem of improved documentation, international
communication and tracking, and new registry procedures may be needed to cope
with the issue of 'phantom' ships, seizure of entire cargoes, and re-registration of
stolen vessels (Liss 2003, p63). Strengthened regional cooperation, based on existing
8
This is a nexus explored by the commercial operation, Aegis Defence Services (a London based
consultancy). However, in terms of attacked targets for 1999-2003, maritime assets comprise less than
1%, as noted in an overview of the Aegis "October 2003 Terrorism Report", located at
http://www.aegisdef.com/sep2003terroristreport.htm.
16
agreements among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore from 1992 onwards, and joint
naval patrols by Malaysia and Thailand, and Malaysia and the Philippines (via Border
Patrol Coordinating Groups), are needed to reduce these problems (Djalal 2002,
pp109-110). Further coordination with the International Maritime Bureau Regional
Piracy Center (IMBRPC) in Kuala Lumpur and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) have also been suggested (Djalal 2002, p113), while through
late 2003 an IMO regional office was established in the Philippines (AFX News 2003).
In the wider region, Japan has been keen to develop a comprehensive regional
approach to piracy, and has supported ASEAN in its ASEAN Maritime Policy and
Development Framework Plan 2002-2007 (Suryodipuro 2002, pp214-217).
However, some differences in national approaches remain: The Japanese motivations include comprehensive security concerns, the perception
of Japan as a piracy victim, and a range of institutional interests. Singapore,
possessing interests closely aligned with those of Japan, has been most receptive.
Indonesia has been the least receptive because it places low priority on fighting
piracy and sees cooperation as relatively costly. Malaysia has engaged in moderate
cooperation, but us the value it places on cooperation increases, Malaysia is
becoming more favourable towards Japanese proposals. (Bradford 2004)
Efforts from 2004 to push forward 'US proposals for a Regional Maritime Security
Initiative (RMSI)' have 'resulted in a degree of consensus, facilitating practical
multilateral collaboration', but Indonesia remains under-funded in its ability to build
the surveillance and patrol requirements for a secure regional network against piracy
(Strategic Comments 2004).
4. International Terrorism and Militant Islam
The last example we can briefly mention is the problem of transnational terrorism.
Part of the problem is the mobility of small groups that can pick targets at will on
almost a global scale. This was highlighted in the September 2001 attacks on the
U.S., and brought home to Australia and Indonesia in the Bali bomb blasts of 12th
October 2002, the attack on the JW Marriott hotel in Jakarta in 2003, and against the
Australian embassy in 2004. This not only caused a major revision of AustraliaIndonesia relations (leading to closer cooperation), but also revived a sense of threat
from militant Islam within the Southeast Asian setting (see Singh 2004). Recently
calls have been made for new methods to make cities, population centres, key
infrastructures (service points, transportation systems, communications, computer
networks, and energy infrastructure) less vulnerable to terrorist attack (Advani 2003,
p19; see further Lukasik et al 2003). This approach, though well meaning, has been
found to be problematic even in countries such as the U.S. and Australia, and can only
be fully applied to particular cases with a known logistic structure and limited
territorial extensions, e.g. the Port of Singapore. Likewise, efforts have been made to
clamp down on money flows that support such groups, including money laundering
via organised crime networks, e.g. via APEC agreements from 2004-2007 (see lecture
2).
In this setting, although security cooperation and local policing remain important, it is
also important that the local culture remain critical of radical groups that may
directly or indirectly host such activities. In the case of Indonesia, 'a more immediate
and strong counterbalance will come from mainstream Muslim groups, including
17
Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama' (Soesastro 2002, p15; Rabasa 2003, p37).
Indonesia is a transitional, developing country in which terrorists have been able to
use existing tensions in order to find a temporary niche from which to link
regional and global networks (see further Singh and Chin 2003, pix). As we have
seen, the vast majority of Indonesians do not want to see the creation of an
Islamic state, which has little support in terms of constitutional reform (see above).
Thus the organisation held responsible for these attacks, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) had
links in Malaysia, Singapore Indonesia and Thailand, plus a probable wider but loose
linkage to Al-Qaeda funding and training (Chin 2003, p2003; Abuza 2003; Smith
2003, p104). It is unfortunate that this term Jemaah Islamiyah literally means “Islamic
Congregation’, when in fact JI itself is a smaller group that does not represent the
wider Muslim community in Indonesia (Singh 2004, p65). Earlier JI operations
may include a number of smaller bombings in Jakarta from 1999 through 2002,
smaller bombings in Jakarta through 2003, and the Marriott Hotel bombing in August
2003 (Singh 2004, p56). Likewise, it has been suggested that Al-Qaeda had contact
with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines
(Chin 2003, p10), though the political credentials of the latter organisation remain
relatively weak.
The origins of JI remain uncertain, and there were initial fears within Indonesia that
the role of JI was exaggerated by the U.S. and Western intelligence agencies seeking
to undermine the political role of Islam, especially in Indonesia and Southeast Asia
(Singh 2004, p47). JI is probably a modern offshoot of the earlier Darul Islam
which was formed through 1942-1949, a militant Islamic organisation that was
gradually suppressed as an armed group, especially under Suharto, but remained for a
time as an organisation within Indonesian society (Singh 2004, pp50-51). JI became
regionally active in Southeast Asia from 1993, but could only become operational in
Indonesia again since 1998, after the collapse of the Suharto regime, and seeks to
transform Indonesia into an Islamic state, with some members willing to use violent
and terrorist methods (Singh 2004, pp52-54). It is not certain to what degree its
spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir, via the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), lead
such strategies – he was found guilty of subversion but through early 2005 argued that
he was not directly linked to terrorist strategies, with the 2004 convictions being
overturned by Indonesian courts in December 2006 (Fiztpatrick 2006, Radio New
Zealand 2006). ‘Field operatives’ such as Hambali, Amrozi, and Imam Samudra were
willing to plan violent destabilisation strategies aimed at increasing the political
space for radical Islam in the region, with operations planned in Indonesia,
Singapore, Malaysia and southern Thailand, the Philippines, and perhaps even
Australia and Papua (Singh 2004, pp54-55). JI seems to have had links with AlQaeda, and with small radical groups in Malaysia (Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia),
the Philippines (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), southern Thailand (Germakan
Mujahideen Pattani), and perhaps Burma (Singh 2004, p55). A disturbing part of this
pattern has been the use of suicide bombers from 2002, and reports of suicide squads
linked to Indonesians who had formally fought or been trained in Afghanistan (Singh
204, p57).
Within Indonesia, though a number of radical groups exist, most of these are
concerned with either political reform, religious adherence, or internal conflicts,
18
and do not readily fit into the straight-jacket of 'international terrorism'.9 Fortunately,
these groups are neither united nor able to put strong pressure as a block on national
electoral politics. In contrast, Muslim mass organisations such as Nahdlatul
Ulama10 and Muhammadiyah have criticised extremist groups, making it clear
that such militants do not represent Muslims, nor Indonesians as a whole (Smith 2003,
p104). It would be more accurate to suggest that: "While the vast majority of Muslim
populations in the region are overwhelmingly moderate, globalization has sharpened
their sensitivities towards and awareness of discontents in the Muslim world and
resentments of America' (Chin 2003, p4). The activities of Jemaah Islamiyah,
unfortunately, were able to focus negative international attention on Indonesia,
generate a degree of local turmoil and sense of crisis, forced an admission that
terrorism needed to be countered in Indonesia and at the regional level (for negative
views, see Jones & Smith 2002), and made Indonesia's opposition to the war against
Afghanistan and Iraq a more difficult foreign policy task. Likewise, the role of Islam
within the modern Republic of Indonesia has been long-disputed, since the so-called
Jakarta Charter was set aside in favour of a formally multi-religious state (the
Pancasila system, see Singh 2004, p48; see above). However, most voters seem to
prefer either a continuation of religious tolerance and/or a secular state system
(see above). It has been argued that some weakening of Asian and Indonesia
studies combined with the actions of small terrorist groups may compound
public misperceptions of Indonesian politics in Australia: The impact of the Bali, Marriott Hotel and Australian embassy bombings on the
Australian psyche has been considerable. Popular consciousness, encouraged by the
media, has exaggerated the extent of the threat of militant extremists to the stability of
Indonesia and created a deeply misleading conflation of Islam with terrorist factions,
and in some minds even a conflation of the Indonesian state with the very militant
groups that seek to dismantle it. (Lindsey 2007)
In the long run, it will be 'cooperation with mainstream and moderate Muslims' that
will be crucial in dis-empowering such radicals (Wanandi 2003, p105). Hence, these
and related problems need to be situated as a regional process drawing on
cooperative and multilateral solutions (within ASEAN, and with Australia via
counter-terrorism agreements signed as early as February 2002), alongside stronger
policing and new tough anti-terrorism laws (Law No. 15/2003) and a Task Force of
Anti-Terrorism within Indonesia, allowing easier arrest of suspects (Singh 2004,
pp59-61). Through 2005, positive relations between Australia and Indonesia, in part
following on from Australia's generous aid in the Tsunami crisis and to island of Nias
(over US$764 million being pledged), have let to initial discussions on a free trade
agenda, and on a comprehensive security agreement, possible including 'counterterrorism, people-smuggling, money laundering and defence' (Economist Intelligence
9
Groups such as Laskar Jihad, Laskar Mujahidin, Laskar Jundullah, and FPI (Islamic Defenders Front)
may pose a real challenge to Indonesia and its communal harmony (see Smith 2003, p105; Rabasa
2003, pp30-31), but are less directed towards international operations. There is no clear evidence that
they are 'part of' the Al Qaeda network (Crouch 2003, p24), and their international operations are
limited (contra the somewhat wider formulation for Laskar Jihad in Tow 2003, p317). Angel Rabasa
suggests that some support for Laskar Jihad 'and other militant groups' may have come from KISDI,
the Committee of Solidarity with the Muslim World, and that the FPI was 'an extortion group in
Islamic guise known for raiding bars and nightclubs in Jakarta' (Rabasa 2003, p26, p35). From late
2002 Laskar Jihad came under strong pressure from the Indonesian government (Rabasa 2003, p33).
10
Nahdlatul Ulama has also been 'hospitable to inter-faith dialogue and cooperation' (Rabasa 2003,
p15).
19
Unit 2005, p14; Huxley 2005, p125), but these issues have been complicated by
tensions through early 2006. Tensions were renewed through early May 2006 with
Indonesian protests over the giving of asylum protection to West Papuans, with
concerns in Indonesia that this signaled indirect support for independence movements
in West Papua, or at least a criticism of Indonesia’s management of the area. By late
May 2006 Australia signaled that it formally recognized that sovereignty of
Indonesia over West Papua, and that it wished to move ahead with a security
understanding (see above).
Furthermore, the wider pattern human insecurity within Indonesia does not just
derive from high profile acts of horror such as the Bali bombing. Day to day
economic insecurity, communal violence, sporadic riots and violence, the role of
organised crime through preman (gangsters) (Ananta 2003, p14), an ongoing role for
'political thugs' and bosses (preman politik) (Antlöv 2003, p73), unresolved conflict in
Papua, the impact of Military Operations Areas and 'civil militias' (Darwin 2003,
pp110-112), plus unfinished democratic and decentralisation transitions are in fact
greater dangers to national and regional development. From this point of view,
terrorist groups such as JI have used Indonesia’s fragile transition to attack the
Indonesian government as well as Australia and 'Western' interests. Ironically,
the Indonesian government has had a long struggle against small extremist Muslim
groups for over fifty years. The combination of economic crisis from 1997,
governmental transition form 1998, and the ‘war on terror’ from 2001, generated the
renewed sense of crisis through 2002-2003 which has begun to stabilize only slowly
through 2003-2007. However, in a wider context, this challenge remains. Peter
Varghese, head of Australia’s Office of National Assessments, suggested in May
2006 that transnational terrorism remains as a ‘large, diverse and fluid network’, with
such networks still active in Southeast Asia (in Walters 2006). Indeed, even as
Indonesia has moved to kill or arrest more 'JI associates' through the first half 2006,
others have remained active, e.g. Noordin Top (Taylor 2006). Also of concern are the
long-term implications of some radical Islamic schools and religious institutions
(pesantren and madrasah) in Southeast Asia, though it is important not to overgeneralise from a small number of cases (see McAmis 2002). For example, since
1994 many schools in Indonesia have been modernised through the adoption of the
curricula developed by the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of
Religious Affairs (Azra 2005, pp13-14).
Some have argued that policing methods have had success in suppressing
militant group in Indonesia: As for direct assistance in fighting the terrorists, the lesson of recent experience in
Southeast Asia is to rely less on military establishments--which, as in Iraq, have
proved to be unreliable and often corrupt--than on specially trained forces, cordoned
off from ordinary soldiers. Some elite units similar to Detachment 88 in Indonesia
have already been created in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more should follow. Not only
are they uniquely capable of familiarizing themselves with and exploiting local
conditions, but their successes raise the morale of the armed forces as a whole.
Equally important, Southeast Asia's elite units and police forces have won their
victories through dogged investigative work, not by resorting to brutal interrogation
techniques. In Indonesia, the Yudhoyono government has expanded its fight against
terror while at the same instituting democratic reforms, establishing national human-
20
rights bodies, and generally creating a more open, accountable government. With few
reported incidents of abuse or torture, counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia
continue to have a high standing in public opinion. By contrast, the much more
coercive tactics of, for example, the Mubarak government in Egypt have tarnished the
war on terror and made it easier for Islamists to stir up rage against the U.S. and its
Middle Eastern allies. (Kurlantzick 2007)
At the same time, it is not clear that human rights have been well-supported in Aceh
until very recently, and not very well in West Papua, while the ground conditions that
might support a wider trend towards a more militant Islam still remain. However, in
spite of over 500 arrests across on the region in relation to terrorism, is been argued
through early 2007 that JI has become operational in Sulawesi and has been
involved in sectarian violence in Poso, with some transnational linkages and
movement of personnel into the Philippines (Neighbour 2007). JI, it is claimed, is
returning to its roots as part of 25-year plan to destabilise the Indonesian government
(Neighbour 2007).
5. The Need for a Viable and Democratic Indonesia
Australia and ASEAN as a whole has a strong interest in the continued viability
of an integrated and prosperous Indonesia. Indonesia has historically been one of
the key players of ASEAN, even if it consciously backed away from the role of
regional hegemon. The position of the Indonesian islands remains strategic, with key
sea lanes passing through waters abutting Indonesian territories (Chandrasekaran
2003, p152). A weak Indonesia would be less able to patrol the Malucca Straits, be
less effective in controlling local smuggling, piracy and transnational terrorism threats
that are already problematic (see above). Even in the case of the handling of Aceh,
which ASEAN deemed an internal matter, there have been real concerns about
outflows of refugees (Darwin 2003, p128) and increased numbers of illegal workers
leaving the region in the long term, while the unlikely advent of a more conservative
Muslim substate, based on Aceh (Chandrasekaran 2003, p152), would be a
complicating factor for Malaysia and Singapore. These factors mean that in spite of
ASEAN's non-interference principles (and later formulations such as 'enhanced
interaction'),11 ASEAN as a whole has a strong interest in fostering a successful
democratic and economic transition in Indonesia. Indeed, the fate of Indonesia is
central to the future of a viable and credible ASEAN (to be discussed further in later
weeks).
There is a three-way linkage among democratic, developmental and security
agendas, both at the national and regional levels. In Indonesia, there has been marked
progress in the holding of open elections, in reform of the Constitution, and in the
increased activity of the annual MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) meetings
(Soesastro 2002, p11), as well as increased activity in local government and civil
society organisations. Likewise, though in the short term the ending of repression of
opposition groups may increase political infighting, in the long run access to
democratic and representative power should reduce the need for political violence.
Moreover, through 2002-2007 the gradual strengthening of civil society in
Indonesia has laid the basis of providing a vigorous partner in local and grass roots
11
Allowing for some limited frankness in dealing with trans-boundary problems and in discussing
reform issues, see Henderson 1999, p12, p52.
21
development (Yudhoyono 2002, p8), but with partial exceptions in Aceh and West
Papua.
Ironically, in the current 'hard' age of military interventions, 'soft power' modalities
of influence, dialogue and broadly-based development are more important than
ever in achieving the interlinked goals of human, national, and regional security. It
has become increasingly recognised that a strong level of national stability combined
with communal and local security is needed in order to promote development at
levels. This ranges from creating a stable environment for foreign investment (which
suffered downturns in Indonesia of 35% through 2002, Smith 2003, p112) and the
activities of aid agencies, through to the promotion of local stability to avoid civilian
deaths, the destruction of community schools, housing, infrastructure and public
resources, including forests and fisheries. States unable to balance core-periphery
interests, or with high levels of social injustice, often find access to natural resources
highly complicated, e.g. closures of some gas fields in Aceh that may have lost state
revenues of up to $1 billion through 2001 (Chandrasekaran 2003, p152). Likewise,
local conflicts often have strong spill-over effects, whether in terms of international
refugee flows, increased smuggling of weapons, drugs and illicit funds, and indirect
benefits for organised crime networks.
Several key organisations allow Indonesia to expand its zone of regional
cooperation. These international, multilateral organisations include ASEAN, AFTA
(ASEAN Free Trade Area), the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), the ASEAN-plusthree, APEC, NAM (the Non-Aligned Movement), and the West Pacific Regional
Cooperation forum (Southwest Pacific Forum) including Australia, East Timor,
Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines (Yudhoyono 2002,
p7; Smith 2003, p111), though the latter has yet to have had a strong impact on
developmental conditions in East Indonesia. Indonesia has emphasised an active
foreign policy combined with patterns of 'soft regionalism' within ASEAN and its
associated dialogue processes (Acharya 1999; Ferguson 1999). Although terrorist
groups have tried to access and mobilise Islamic public opinion (see Tow 2003,
pp322-324), ‘soft power’ can also be used against such groups by generating
patterns of international cooperation that support civil societies and undermine the
legitimacy of radical claims and counter-narratives (see Ramakrishna 2005; Tow
2003, p325).
ASEAN, moreover, has moved to conclude an anti-terrorism declaration with the
United States, agreed to in the ASEAN Summit Meeting of November 2001, which
was then formalised as the U.S.-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat
International Terrorism (Chin 2003, pp15-16; see www.aseansec.org/7424.htm), and
has made efforts to undermine money laundering and organised crime networks. The
intent of these agreements was to block 'terrorist financing', enhance intelligence
exchange, and improve border controls (Chin 2003, p16). There were, however,
difficulties in extending the more detailed trilateral agreement made by Malaysia,
Indonesia, and the Philippines (May 2002) to fight terrorism to the rest of ASEAN,
due to legal incompatibilities, definitional problems, and the lack of a regional
extradition treaty (Chin 2003, pp16-17). Through late 2002 Indonesia also endorsed
two emergency anti-terrorism decrees that allowed the short-term arrest of suspected
terrorists on the basis of intelligence information, though JI seems to have remained
operation through 2007 (Neighbour 2007; Rabasa 2003, p35).
22
It can be argued that the future success of Indonesia will also dependent on 'functional
international, regional, and local networks of communication and a sense of common
heritage' (Borneo Bulletin 2003) combined with the institutional structuring of shared
interests mediated through organisations such as ASEAN. It part, this will rely on a
serious return to a regional agenda based on shared development and a shared
vision of embedded human security. In developmental terms it is crucial to look at
social, educational and human rights outcomes alongside economic growth. In this
setting, 'human capital' embraces education and health levels, labour mobility,
'freedom from fear' (Darwin 2003, p129; Ananta 2003, p4, p13), and the ability to
participate in community and national politics. 'Freedom from want' needs to be
supported by 'freedom from fear', both parts of a wider human security equation
(Lizée 2002, p512). In these terms, Indonesia has made serious strides to set up the
preconditions for development and growth (Lindsey 2007), but has not set in place
all the components needed for sustainable human development
Indonesia has experienced a rapid transition since the crisis years of 1997-1998.
Indonesians rightly hope that current democratic and constitution reforms will lay the
basis for a just, stable and diverse nation-state (Yudhoyono 2002, p6). However, these
expectations have been modified and somewhat reduced (Soesastro 2002, p11) by
real, though slow and uneven, economic growth, and by a wider range of security
problems that have placed international and local pressures on Indonesian
governance. This included the loss of East Timor (for improved relations through
2004-2005, see Economist Intelligence unit 2005, p13), a period of high tension and
then reshaped relations with Australia, and ongoing problems in Aceh (2003-2005)
and Papua (ongoing in 2006-2007). Indonesia remains a lynch-pin in regional
cooperation and future stability, and through 2007-2020 may move towards an
implicit goal of shared human and regional development, but only if key development
and internal problems are faced (for these linkages, see Acharya 2003).
6. Bibliography, Resources, and Further Reading
Resources
The Jakarta Post newspaper provides a range of news coverage on Indonesia and the
region at www.thejakartapost.com
Worldwatch
Institute
provides
useful
reports
on
Global
Security
at
news
at
http://www.worldwatch.org/features/security/
Tempo
Interactive
provides
http://www.tempointeractive.com/
detailed
Indonesian
The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta, provides a
number of free Working Papers on a wide range of Indonesian and regional topics
[Access via http://www.csis.or.id/publications_index.asp?tab=0]
The International Crisis Group provides a number of useful reports on Indonesia, which
can be accessed via http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2959&l=1
23
CSIS of Indonesia, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, has a range of
papers and publications, and can be accessed via http://www.csis.or.id/
Further Reading
You might like to look at one of the following: ABUZA, Zachary "Funding terrorism in Southeast Asia: the financial network of Al
Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25 no. 2, August 2003,
pp169-199 [Acces via BU Library Databases]
ANANTA, Aris (ed.) The Indonesian Crisis: A Human Development Perspective, Singapore,
ISEAS, 2003
ASPINALL, Edward & FEALY, Greg (eds) Local Power and Politics in Indonesia:
Decentralisation and Democratisation, Singapore, ISEAS, 2003
HOSEN, Nadirsyah "Religion and the Indonesian constitution: a recent debate", Journal
of Southeast Asian Studies, 36 no. 3, Oct 2005, pp419-440 [Access via Infotrac
Database]
HUXLEY, Tim "The Tsunami and Security", Survival, 47 no. 1, Spring 2005, pp123-132
ICG "Indonesia: Decentralisation and Local Power Struggles in Maluku", International
Crisis Group, Asia Briefing N°64, 22 May 2007 [Access via
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4849&l=1]
JONES, David Martin & SMITH, Mike Lawrence "From Konfrontasi to Disintegrasi:
ASEAN and the Rise of Islamism in Southeast Asia.", Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 25 no. 6, Nov/Dec 2002, pp343-356 [Access via BU Library
Databases]
LINDSEY, Tim "Relaxed, Complacent and Risible: A Critical Decline in Asian Studies is
Widening the Gulf Between Australia and Indonesia", Australian Literary Review,
7 March 2007, pp19-20
NEUMANN, Klaus “Hush-Huhing the Whole Matter: The UNHCR, Australia, and
West Papuan Refugees”, Refuge, 23 no. 1, Winter 2006, pp69-80 [Access via
Infotrac Database]
RAMAKRISHNA, Kumar "Delegitimizing global jihadi ideology in Southeast Asia",
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27 no. 3, December 2005, pp343-369 [Access via
Infotrac Database]
ROSSER, Andrew et al. "Indonesian Politics: The Politics of Exclusion", Journal of
Contemporary Asia, 35 no. 1, March 2005, pp53-77 [Access via Infotrac Database]
SINGH, Bilveer “The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia”,
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58 no. 1, March 2004, pp47-68
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