TURKEY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, 1923-1939:
THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY
By
Dilek Barlas, PhD
Associate Professor of History
Koc University, İstanbul, Turkey
dbarlas@ku.edu.tr
Serhat Guvenc, PhD
Assistant Professor of International Relations
İstanbul Bilgi University, İstanbul, Turkey
serhatg@bilgi.edu.tr
Rev: 25 August 2008
CONTENTS
Page
List of Abbreviations
2
INTRODUCTION
1. THE CONCEPT OF MIDDLE POWER AND INTERWAR TURKEY
Middle Powers and Regional Great Powers
Interwar Conditions for Middle Power Activism
Turkey as a Middle Power
2. BUILDING A VIABLE COUNTRY: POLITICS AND FORCE
Political Rivalry
Inter-service Rivalry
3. TURKEY’S SECURITY DILEMMA: BUILDING A NAVY
Naval Instructors: Revival of German Influence?
Turkish Naval Building and International Disarmament
4. TAMING THE ITALIAN THREAT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
Italy as a Potential Menace in the Mediterranean
Italian Overtures to Turkey
5. BREAKING OUT OF INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION
Italian-Turkish Naval Arms Trade
Italy as Turkey’s Sponsor in International Organizations
6. THE RISE OF A “EUROPEAN” MIDDLE POWER
7. A MIDDLE POWER AT WORK: THE BALKAN ENTENTE
The Balkan Predicaments
Turkish Diplomatic Activism
8. IN SEARCH OF A WIDER ROLE: THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION
The Italian “Menace” Renewed
9. THE MEDITERRANEAN – A REGION TOO FAR?
10. LIMITS OF ACTIVISM: FROM BRIDGING TO BALANCING
CONCLUSION
ANNEX
3
12
12
19
25
39
39
45
54
54
60
73
74
85
93
95
108
117
130
131
137
147
148
162
178
195
198
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
1
ADM
ASMAE
BCA
BOA
FO
MEA
NARA
RG
PRO
SHM
SMS
TBMM
TCG
UN
USS
Admiralty
Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri
T. C. Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi
T.C. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
Foreign Office
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
National Archives and Records Administration
Record Group
Public Records Office
Service Historique de la Marine
Seiner Majestat Schiff
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Gemisi
United Nations
United States Ship
INTRODUCTION
2
The present work is a product of more than a decade of research undertaken
individually or collectively by its authors in various diplomatic and military/naval archives in
Turkey, Britain, France, Italy and the United States. Drawing on the same research, the
authors have already published co-authored or single-author articles in various international
and Turkish journals on various aspects of Turkish foreign policy in the interwar period.
Such works have, in principle, focused on lesser known and understudied aspects of the
Turkish foreign policy of the period, including relations with Italy, naval policy and the arms
trade, and diplomatic activism in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.
The interwar period is the time-frame for the present work, while the Mediterranean,
including the Balkans, provides the geographical background against which we try to analyze
Turkish diplomatic and naval activism. There is a wealth of publications on interwar Turkish
foreign policy. However, most of these works deal with bilateral relations with the great
powers and/or neighbours,1 or specific issues such as the Montreaux Convention or the Sanjak
of Alexandretta.2 As most of these works have a relatively narrow focus, they usually stop
short of providing a coherent understanding or general conception of Turkish foreign policy in
the interwar period.3 It has to be granted that a number of factors make such a venture
For instance, see Cemil Koçak, Türk-Alman İlişkileri : 1923-1939, (Ankara: Türk Târih
Kurumu, 1991); Dilek Barlas, “Friends or Foes: Diplomatic Relations between Italy and
Turkey, 1923-1936,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 36/2 (May 2004): 231-252.
2
See Serhan Ada, Türk-Fransız İlişkilerinde Hatay Sorunu: 1918-1939, (İstanbul: İstanbul
Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005); Yücel Güçlü, The Question of Sanjak of Alexandretta: A
Study in Turkish Syrian Relations, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2001). Güçlü, a creer
diplomat, is a prolific writer on Turkish interwar foreign policy. Nevertheless, his works are
usually narratives of specific issues. See, for instance, Yücel Güçlü, “Turkey’s Entrance into
the League of Nations,” Middle Eastern Studies 39/1, (January 2003): 186-206; “The Nyon
Arrangement of 1937 and Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies 38/1, (January 2002): 53-70;
“Fascist Italy’s ‘Mare Nostrum’ Policy and Turkey,” “The Uneasy Relationship: Turkey's
Foreign Policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union at the Outbreak of the Second World War”
Mediterranean Quarterly 13/3 (2002) 58-93.
3
Aydın’s work may be regarded as an exception in this regard. Aydın focuses on history,
geography and leadership in search of an analytical framework to understand Turkish foreign
policy behaviour. Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical
Framework and Traditional Inputs,” Middle Eastern Studies 35/4, (October 1999) 152 – 186.
1
3
remarkably difficult for students and scholars of Turkish foreign policy. First, the interwar
period was a period of international transition. By definition, international transitions tend to
be periods of uncertainty which do not lend themselves to clear-cut explanations.
Another factor that renders a coherent understanding difficult is Turkish attempt for
transformation. During the period under examination, a far-reaching and transformative
reform process was underway in Turkey. The pursuit of a fresh start with the advent of the
Republic represented the deliberate choice of a clean break with the Ottoman past or heritage
which Republican decision-makers considered a burden on their new country. The Turkish
transformation and its attendant domestic and international challenges caused ups and downs
or inconsistencies in the country’s foreign policy. The reforms may be regarded as having
eventually paid off externally in the 1930s with the recognition of Turkey as a power
interested in preserving the status quo. Finally, inaccessibility of Turkish diplomatic and
military/naval archives of the time explains in part why diplomatic historians have shied away
from attempting to offer a general conception of Turkish foreign and naval policy in the
interwar period.4
Based on primary sources available in a number of foreign diplomatic and
military/naval archives, the main purpose of the book is to explore the links and interaction
between Turkey’s diplomatic efforts for political cooperation in the Mediterranean and its
efforts to build a navy, in other words, the link between its diplomatic and naval activism.
Despite the inherent uncertainties of the period and inconsistencies in Turkish policies,
Turkey exhibited some attributes of a “middle power” in its diplomacy between the two world
wars, particularly in the 1930s. It should be noted that there is as yet no evidence to show that
4
For an elaborate presentation of the restrictive impact of this archive-access policy on
foreign policy research in Turkey, see Cemil Koçak, “Hatay Neden Sorun Oldu? Neden Sorun
Olmaktan Çıktı?, Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar 3, (Bahar 2006): 265-272.
4
Turkish statesmen or diplomats ever defined their country as a “middle power.”5 On the
contrary, they were committed to the principle of equality of all states in the international
system, hence, avoided representations that might imply a hierarchy of states. More often
than not, they defined their international status in behavioural terms. For instance, Foreign
Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras talked of a “new class of states” that was trying new methods in
the conduct of their foreign policies in 1930. Aras’ “new class of states” definition sounds
very similar to the “middle powers” concept, particularly where there is an emphasis on
behavioural aspects.
Therefore, the present study begins with a discussion of the concept of middle power,
its alternative definitions, and various cases of middle power diplomacy. Since the bulk of
academic works draws on the analysis of Canadian and Australian foreign policies in the Cold
War and beyond, interwar Turkey will be compared to and contrasted with the experiences of
these two countries. Moreover, an alternative or complementary definition, “regional great
power,” will also be taken into consideration in judging Turkish policy. At this point, Turkey
will be compared to one of its contemporaries, Poland, which occupied a similar position in
international power hierarchy at the time, in terms of the style and substance of its foreign
policy.
We will look at works which define Turkey as a “middle power” at different periods in
time. As these works usually employ completely different measures for establishing what
constitutes a middle power, The challenge ahead is not only that it requires one to provide a
coherent view of Turkish foreign policy in the interwar period, but also to bridge all these
conceptions of middle power status in the context of the interwar Turkey.
5
It may be worth-noting that a popular Turkish encylopedia of Great Powers featured a
section on Turkey, implying that it was one of the eight Great Powers in the world. The
others were naturally Germany, Britain, Soviet Russia, Italy, Japan, France and the US. Faik
Sabri, Büyük Devletler, (İstanbul: Yedigün, 1937-1938).
5
We argue that the Balkans and the Black Sea constitute integral parts of the
Mediterranean geographical sphere and have considered as such in Turkish diplomacy and
naval policy during the period under review here.6 In sum, we treat the Balkan Peninsula and
the Black Sea as sub-regions of the Mediterranean. Turkish diplomatic and naval activism,
though largely concentrated on and relatively more effective in the two sub-regions, featured
a profound and wider Mediterranean dimension, particularly from the mid-1930s onwards.
Moreover, primacy of the Mediterranean in Turkey’s international relations owed to a great
deal to normalization of its foreign relations with two Mediterranean countries first, namely
Italy and Greece. It should also be borne in mind that it was the relative success of Turkish
diplomatic and naval activism in the early 1930s in the Balkans and the Black Sea that paved
the way for Turkey acting as a middle power in the second half of the 1930s. Only after that
phase did Turkey seek to project its enhanced status onto the Mediterranean scene in order to
promote multilateral arrangements to preserve peace and stability there.
In the process of carrying out our intentions, we also focus on key features of the early
post-war world order as well as its attendant uncertainties. We, thus, attempt to understand
analytically the new international power hierarchy and emerging international institutions so
that we can locate within this new international context a Turkey which, being itself a powerin-transition, was gradually evolving from a dismembered empire into a new Republic.
Having inherited the geographical core of the Empire, the leaders and institutions of
the Republic had to tackle the old security problems of a territory now under-populated by the
European standards of the time in the 1920s and 1930s. Obviously, the loss of population had
a greater impact on the security of the new state than the loss of territory. Hence, Turkey had
to come to terms with its new international status as a power of lesser degree rather than a
(nominal) Great Power.
See, for instance, Cavid Oral, Akadeniz Meselesi, Vol. II, (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası,
1945): 57.
6
6
Therefore, Chapter 1, which is the analytical chapter, attempts to conceptualize
interwar Turkey as a middle power. It begins with a survey of different interpretations of
middle power status in international relations theory, from Martin Wright’s and Carlsted
Holbraad’s more conventional, power-centered approach to behavioural interpretations of
middle power foreign policy as in the works of Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgot and
Kim Nossal. This chapter then focuses on interwar period to assess if or to what extent the
conditions that normally favour middle power activism existed. It points to the absence of
leadership from more traditional resources which create room for initiatives and activism by
middle powers. This chapter concludes with a discussion of interwar Turkey’s middle power
credentials both in conventional and behavioural terms. The case of Poland is introduced to
the discussion for contrasting foreign policy choices of two comparably placed actors. The
difference in two states’ behaviour is linked to their differing paths to middle power status.
Chapter 2 analyzes the roles ascribed to force in securing the survival of the new state
and its ramifications on domestic politics. Although it inherited the geographical core of the
Empire, the Republic had to come to terms with its new international status as a power of
lesser degree. Moreover, the Ottoman diplomatic experience suggested to the new rulers that
conventional self-help strategies compromised the Ottoman sovereignty and independence.
The Turkish attempt to unburden itself of the Ottoman past, thus, featured a new thinking to
avoid diplomatic trappings of the Empire. The perceived fragility of the new regime was yet
another source of insecurity. In creating means of defence, the institutions were carefully recrafted to prevent their use by domestic opposition. This chapter takes naval restructuring as
a case in point and argues that the new Ministry of Marine instituted in 1924 reflected a desire
on the part of the new rulers to transform the Navy into an institution loyal to the Republic.
Chapter 3 focuses on the international implications of Turkish naval rejuvenation in
the 1920s for a number of reasons. First, the self-help strategy Turkey initially adopted
7
required accumulation of naval power. Therefore, Turkey seemed to defy the international
naval disarmament which in turn accentuated its outcast status, indicating a security dilemma
of a different sort and order. The naval rejuvenation included re-commissioning of the
notorious SMS Goeben (later Yavuz), a battlecruiser that was regarded as “the curse over the
Orient” 7 for its association with the Ottoman Empire’s entry to the First World War.
Moreover, the recruitment of former German naval officers as advisors for the rejuvenation of
the navy set the seal on Turkey’s international image as a power poised to challenge the new
European order. Finally, since the Mediterranean would soon become the key geographical
focus of Turkish diplomacy, its naval power would count in regional issues as a functional
lever.
The next chapter discusses gradual normalization of Turkey’s relations with Italy as a
result of their shared frustration with the existing international system in the late 1920s and
early 1930s. It begins with an account of how Fascist Italy’s policies initially heightened
Turkish sense of insecurity. Then, it identifies lack of international recognition and French
policies as factors that brought these two countries closer. In the process, Turkey’s image in
Italy changed from a non-viable political entity to a potential proxy in the Mediterranean.
This last point suggests a potential for tension in their relations, as Turkey did not seek a
Great Power patron.
Chapter 5 argues how Rome’s expectation to create an Italian-led regional alliance
paradoxically facilitated Turkey’s international normalization. Failing to grasp that Turkey’s
resentment of the existing international system did not necessarily entail a revisionist stand, Italy
attempted to lure Turkey into its orbit by exploiting the latter’s international isolation. However,
Italian policy was counter-productive, as Italian-supported Turkish-Greek rapprochement took a life
of its own and formed the cornerstone of a larger Balkan cooperation. In addition, Italian
7
Geoffrey Bennet, Naval Battles of the First World War, (London: Pengiun Books, 2001): 14
8
sponsorship of Turkey in international and European settings to undermine French initiatives and
influence helped Turkey return to the international fold.
The processes through which Turkey acquired qualifications of a middle power in
functional and identity terms are examined in Chapter 6. Functionally, Turkey succeeded in
building a modest, but modern and credible navy. Also functionally, its diplomacy adapted to
new circumstances and turned the Ottoman heritage into an advantage to promote regional
cooperation. Finally, Turkey’s diplomatic pursuit of admission to European states system
included a bid for “European” identity. In this last respect, another Mediterranean state,
Greece, merits particular attention for its support to Turkey’s inclusion into the two ill-fated
European union proposals of the interwar era. Although the proposals did not lead to tangible
results, they helped Turkey gain half-hearted yet formal recognition of its European identity.
This, in turn, cleared its way into the European state system and eventually into the League of
Nations, a development which marked the end of Turkey’s “outcast” status.
Chapter 7 is an operational chapter which focuses on the Balkans where Turkey
stepped in to fill the leadership vacuum particularly after the 1929 World Economic Crisis.
Futility of proposals for Balkan economic cooperation prompted Ankara to switch to political
cooperation with continued Greek support. Turkish diplomatic activism was at its peak after
Turkey’s admission to the League of Nations in 1932. Turkish diplomats made frequent visits
to Balkan capitals in pursuit of “other-help” strategies. They made extensive use of Turkish
naval ships, including the battlecruiser Yavuz, as their preferred means of transportation for
their visits. In the end, the Balkans proved to be amenable to middle power activism as it
consisted of like-minded (pro-status quo) states of more or less comparable strength. As a
result, the Balkan Entente was concluded by Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania in
1934. The major success of Turkish diplomacy lay in that it secured a managerial role for
Turkey in a region where alliances had previously been formed against the Ottoman Empire.
9
This can also be regarded as the phase when Turkey consolidated its pre-eminence as a
regional power or regional great power.
Chapter 8 brings Italy back into the discussion in line with Mussolini’s increasingly
vocal demands for territorial expansion towards Asia and Africa. It discusses various
Mediterranean pact proposals which were picked up by Turkish diplomacy in search of
security. Ankara pursued bridging rather than balancing or bandwagoning strategies. For
instance, it contemplated an arrangement that would link the Balkan Entente and the proposed
Mediterranean pact, including Britain and France. Its motivation was to complement
collective security under the League of Nations. Turkish diplomatic activism was
supplemented by endeavors to strengthen the navy in response to an increasingly revisionist
Italian policy. Turkish appeals on both diplomatic and naval accounts did not strike a chord
with Britain at this stage.
Chapter 9 addresses the Mediterranean as a target for Turkish diplomatic and, to a
lesser extent, naval activism from the mid- to late-1930s. An account of Turkish efforts is
provided here to show structural constraints on middle powers around the case of the
Abyssinian Crisis. The Crisis itself reaffirmed the weaknesses of the whole League system.
In addition to Turkey’s limited resources, the absence of like-minded and comparably-ranked
actors was a major impediment to achieving results by diplomatic activism. In this respect,
the Mediterranean stood in stark contrast to the Balkans. While the former was marked by an
absence of leadership from traditional sources, the latter had witnessed contenting claims for
leadership by France, Italy and Britain who preferred to deal with each other on balance of
power terms. Therefore, Turkey failed to use its regional pre-eminence in the Balkans to
claim a managerial role on a larger scale in the Mediterranean. This period of attempted
middle power activism drew to a close with the Turkish demand for revision in the
10
demilitarized status of the Straits in 1936. It was followed by shift to a more conventional
diplomatic strategy of balancing against Italy.
The final chapter discusses the reasons for the change in Turkish foreign policy and
strategy on the eve of the Second World War. While Turkey came to terms with structural
constraints on its diplomacy and navy in the Mediterranean, it began to lose its Balkan
partners one by one to great powers. Their return to self-help strategies forced Ankara to
reconsider its policy of avoiding alliance relationships with great powers as well. As a middle
power committed to the status quo, Turkey was prone to side with Britain and France. Only
one issue stood before such rapprochement. That was the future status of Alexandretta. After
this stumbling bloc was removed, Britain, France and Turkey concluded a Treaty for security
against Italian threat. This treaty closed the middle power diplomacy era for Turkey.
We should note that some of the chapters above are built on our previous publications.
However, this book is not a collection or compilation of them. On the contrary, it is a
substantially modified text and therefore is coherent whole. In terms of sources used, as
stated above, the present work draws on diplomatic and naval documents mostly from Italy,
Britain, France and the United States. Our request to have access to Turkish foreign ministry
archives for the period under study was not granted, as they were not yet made available for
private research. Nevertheless, we have also attempted to take advantage of Turkey’s
increasingly liberalized archive-access policies for the Presidential Archives and Prime
Ministry Archives in Ankara. Both proved very valuable sources in verifying information
from foreign archives. Archive documents are supplemented by official publications and the
published memoirs of statesmen, diplomats, intellectuals, military and naval officers from
Turkey.
11
1. THE CONCEPT OF MIDDLE POWER AND INTERWAR TURKEY
Middle Powers and Regional Great Powers
The concept of middle power has regained currency in international relations since the
end of the Cold War. One explanation for the recent popularity of this concept may possibly
be related to the absence of a sufficient number of great powers or superpowers, the
traditional subjects of study in international relations. In contrast, there is a growing number
of important powers of lesser degrees. The tendency is to label those powers as “middle
powers” in an attempt to recognize their significance at both regional and global levels but at
the same time to underline their status as secondary or inferior to great powers or
superpowers8 or hyperpowers.9
Although the label has been quite liberally used to describe a plethora of countries
which, one way or another, have mattered regionally and globally, there is as yet no
consensus on the definition of middle powers. From a rather conventional power politics
perspective, Wright offers the following definition:
“... a middle power is a power with such military strength, resources and strategic
position that in peacetime the great powers bid for its support, and in wartime, while it
has no hope of winning a war against a great power, it can hope to inflict costs on a
great power out of proportion to what the great power can hope to gain by attacking
it.”10
8
Hyperpowers
9
For an attempt at grading of powers, see Martin Wight, Power Politics, edited by Hedley
Bull and Carsted Holbraad, (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1978): 295-301.
10
Wight, Power Politics…, 65.
12
It is possible to talk about a number of different approaches in situating middle powers
within a context. The first approach defines middle powers in terms of their position in the
international power hierarchy. This rather conventional approach takes into consideration
quantifiable factors such as area, population, geographic area, military capability or capacity,
economic size and rate of economic growth.11
According to Holbraad, for instance, middle
powers are “states that are weaker than the great powers in the system but significantly
stronger than minor powers and small states with which normally interact.”12 This approach
may also be called statistical approach.13
The second, yet less employed, approach tends to view middle power status as a
function of a state’s geographic position. As such, a middle power is one that is located “in
the middle” of the great powers in the system. A Cold War derivative of the idea focuses on a
position between the two superpowers that is ideological rather than geographical.
The third approach identifies middle powers on a normative basis and argues that
middle powers are “potentially more trustworthy as they can exert diplomatic influence
without likelihood of recourse to force”.14 In addition, due to their past roles in major
conflicts (on the side of the “right” or “good”), they regard themselves as having earned
certain rights and proved that they do not shy away from their responsibilities in the
establishment and preservation of global order. Hence they stake a claim to moral high ground
in international relations. Such claims have been aired in the past particularly as justifications
11
Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgot and Kim Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers:
Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University
Press, 1993): 17-18.
12
Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1984): 4.
13
Jonathan H. Ping, Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific,
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005): 51.
14
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…,18.
13
for representation of middle powers, such as Australia and Canada, on the UN Security
Council. At this point, the normative stand blends with a functional definition of middle
power which rests on “capacity to use [power] for the maintenance of peace.” In a similar
frame of mind, the term “security powers” was coined to emphasize the link between the use
of force and the preservation of peace. In this definition, not only the capacity but also the
will to use force to resist aggressors is taken into account.15 However, the evidence to support
the middle powers’ claim to moral high ground as guardians of international order is weak at
best. Historically, middle powers have not made reliable guardians and have even
occasionally played destabilizing roles when their weight was sufficient to affect the balance
of power.16
A fourth approach, which is also called ‘functional’ or ‘behavioural’ approach, focuses
less on moral aspects but more on a particular style of behaviour in international relations
which is considered the hallmark of “middlepowermanship.” In practical terms, this approach
defines middle powers primarily by their behaviour that emphasizes pursuit of multilateral
solutions to international problems and adherence to compromise positions in international
disputes and last, but not least, adherence to the notion of “good international citizenship” to
guide their foreign policy. However, even the chief proponents of this view , Cooper, Higgot
and Nossal, grant that this kind of middle power behaviour is not completely devoid of
“healthy doses of self-interest.”17
Finally, there is a derivative of the fourth approach which is grounded in political
economy. Departing from a statistical definition of ‘middle powers,’ it challenges the
normative definitions of middle power and revolves, instead, around the concept of
‘statecraft’ in locating middle powers. This may be regarded as an extension of ‘functional’
Holbraad, Middle Powers…, 59-61.
Holbraad, Middle Powers…, 205-6.
17
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…,19.
15
16
14
or ‘behavioural’ approach with a shift of geographic focus away from ‘tradititional’ middle
powers.18
In this book, we rely on the ‘functional’ or ‘behavioural’ approach in analyzing
Turkish diplomatic activism in the Mediterranean during the interwar years as introduced by
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal. However, like Ping, we will depart from a statistical
interpretation of Turkey’s status in the international hierarchy between the two world wars
and employ the concept of ‘statecraft’ with its four main components: domestic, international,
tools and practitioner.19
Therefore, we should first provide an examination of attributes of typical middle
power behaviour. To begin with, the middle powers are noted for their tendency to look for
like-minded and comparably placed or situated states in the international hierarchy as partners
of choice in building coalitions. Coalitions of such states are expected to contribute to the
“growth and health of international institutions.” As a corollary to this, multilateralism is the
preferred means of advancing their foreign policy interests, inter alia, “for reasons of
enlightened self-interest: in order to maximize parochial interests that could not be advanced
alone.”20 Middle powers are also considered to have a vested interest in collective security
due to their intermediate position. This interest is an inevitable outcome of the mismatch
between their relatively large size, coveted resources and strategic importance and their means
to defend the former. This mismatch turns them into reliable partners in international
organization.21
However, security is the field which offers the least latitude to middle powers for
coalition-building. In other words, the leadership potential of middle powers is much more
restricted on the issue of security than on any other issue as military capabilities retain their
18
Ping, Middle Power Statecraft…
Ping, Middle Power Statecraft…,22.
20
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…, 116.
21
Holbraad, Middle Powers…, 68-69.
19
15
significance in a range of issues in international relations.22 In this field, “the middle power
coalition-building associated with multilateralism has another side. This is the passive and
largely reactive role of follower... Middle powers may be active leaders in coalition-building,
but they are just as willing to have multilateral coalitions ‘built on them’”.23
In this context, Canadian and Australian reactions to the Gulf Crisis in 1990/91 can be
compared to Turkey’s reaction to the Abyssinian Crisis in 1935-1936 and its position at the
Nyon Conference in 1937. In the former, both countries followed the U.S. lead in the
coalition to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. These countries’ responsiveness to the
U.S. leadership stemmed partly from their shared concern for upholding the norm of territorial
integrity and for securing the highest possible number of subscribers to this norm by joining
the coalition by joining the coalition. For Australia, upholding territorial integrity not only
reflected a normative concern but also its historical experience of the threat of Japanese
invasion during the Second World War which could only be averted by U.S. intervention. In
sum: “if the international community acted in concert to uphold the sanctity of borders,
would-be violators of the territorial integrity of others would be deterred, and Australia would
be safer for it.”24
Throughout the crisis and subsequent war both remained committed to the coalition,
despite the fact that their role in the coalition would be secondary or peripheral in the larger
game and that they were probably uneasy about the idea of committing their forces to the
actual battle.25 Hence, the dilemma of middle powers as followers in coalitions built and led
by powers of higher degrees is portrayed by Cooper, Higgot and Nossal as follows: “For
followership in coalition-building creates a dynamic for the followers that, once they have
joined, binds them tightly to the preferences of the coalition’s leader. Once the leader has
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…,117.
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…,118.
24
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…, 136-137.
25
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…,141.
22
23
16
gathered a coalition around itself, it can radically alter the preferences of the coalition as a
whole, relying on its subordinate power to keep its junior members with it, regardless of their
preferences.”26
The level of development of international organizations may be an element that either
facilitates or hinders middle power activism. For instance, Cooper, referring to Cox, argues
that attention should be paid to the evolution of middle power role in the context of dynamic
historical processes linked to the development of international organizations.27 On the
relationship between size and foreign policy goals, Cooper identifies middle powers as ardent
supporters of the international system with an “impulse towards the creation and maintenance
of world order.”28
In the absence of leadership from traditional sources, middle powers’ ability to assume
high profile international roles may be contingent on the quality of their diplomacy. Building
on the Australian and Canadian experiences after the end of the Cold War, Cooper, Higgot
and Nossal29 argue that in the absence of leadership from a hegemonic power or of an
agreement on the sharing of leadership responsibilities between the major economic powers,
the vulnerability of the middle powers increases dramatically. In response to their increased
vulnerability to the lack of leadership from traditional sources, secondary actors such as
middle powers may step in to fill the leadership vacuum. Unlike the great powers, the
secondary powers’ leadership and initiative draw largely on non-structural forms of power
and influence such as the quality of their diplomacy.30 Consequently, “middle power
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…,118.
Andrew F. Cooper, “Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview,” in Niche Diplomacy:
Middle Powers after the Cold War, Andrew F. Cooper (ed.), (London: MacMillan Press Ltd.,
1997): 8.
28
Cooper, “Niche Diplomacy…”, 8.
29
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…, 4.
30
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…,23-24
26
27
17
diplomacy, which is geared towards mitigation of conflict and building consensus and
cooperation, can be as important as structural sources of leadership.”31
At this point, it may worth introducing a different but complemenatry method of
identification of international actors into our discussion of middle powers. ‘Great regional
power’ denotes yet another category of power in international politics. Although it is regarded
as a category of its own, it is sometimes confused with, and used as being synonymous to the
term middle power. For instance, Osterud argues that “however we define them, middle
powers or regional great powers make an ambiguous category, with a rather arbitrary lower
limit.”32 It should also be borne in mind that these two categories may not necessarily be
mutually exclusive. “A regional great power may be a middle power in the global context...
On the other hand, a middle power is not necessarily a great power regionally, since it may
exist in the close and dominated vicinity of really great powers, or a number of powers
aspiring to a leading regional role”33. By the same token, “[generally a middle power is
defined within an international hierarchy of powers, while a regional great power is
determined within a regional division of globe”.34 A regional great power “either has a
dominant position within the regional hierarchy of states, or is party to a regional balance of
power system – presumably able to defend itself against a coalition of other parties... It has a
managerial role at the regional level. It balances other forces, maintains codes of conduct,
stabilizes spheres of influence and polices unruly clients”35. The concept of ‘regional great
power’ will provide us with a yardstick against which we will assess Turkey’s position within
the Balkan regional context in the mid-1930s.
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…,115.
Oyvind Osterud, “Regional Great Powers,” in Regional Great Powers in International
Politics, Neumann, Iver B. (ed.), (New York: St. Martin’s Pres, 1992): 6.
33
Osterud, “Regional Great Powers,” 6-7.
34
Osterud, “Regional Great Powers,”7.
35
Osterud, “Regional Great Powers,”7.
31
32
18
Interwar Conditions for Middle Power Activism
One of the principal characteristics of the interwar world order was the lack of
international political leadership from traditional sources. The United States’ decision to stay
out of the League of Nations accounted to a large extent for this lack of political leadership
which had become even more accentuated by the World Economic Crisis of 1929. Hence, by
the 1930s, international systems offered nearly optimum conditions for emerging middle
powers like Turkey to attempt to fill the leadership role with regional initiatives. The
continued absence of international leadership in both political and economic fields by the end
of the decade propelled Turkey into extending its diplomatic and naval activism to levels
which up to then had remained traditionally great power domains.
Moreover, contrary to the original expectations and desires of its intellectual fathers,
the League of Nations failed to provide a viable alternative to traditional great power
management in international relations. An Italian delegate to the League of Nations confided
that in the League he never saw a dispute of any importance settled otherwise than by an
agreement between the Great Powers. The procedure of the League was “a system of detours,
all of which lead to one or other of these two issues: agreement or disagreement between
Great Britain, Italy, France and Germany”.36 Edward Carr pointed out that the earliest British
and American drafts of the Covenant planned that membership of the Council of the League
would be limited to the Great Powers. According to Karl Polayni, the League of Nations was
a product of the victorious powers of the First World War who pursued restoration of an
enlarged and improved Concert of Europe system after the war. For that reason, he called the
1920s the ”Conservative Twenties.”37
36
Edward Carr, The Twenty Years (London: MacMillan&Co. Ltd, 1951), 103-104.
Karl Polayni, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2001), 21-22.
37
19
James Barros wrote in his book The Corfu Incident of 1923 that, throughout the
interwar years, Britain and France approached the problems facing the League, including the
Corfu crisis, within the context of their own conflicting interests and desires.38 In fact, the
Corfu incident formed a good example to prove how France tried to involve the League
Council in the solving of an international issue. In August 1923, the Italians bombarded and
occupied the Greek island of Corfu after the murder of Italian General Tellini, on Greek soil
while he was performing his task of delimiting the Greco-Albanian frontier.
The Poincaré government in France did not want to bring the Corfu issue before the
League Council. A number of factors accounted for the French unwillingness to refer to the
League over the Corfu issue. First of all, if the Corfu issue had come before the League
Council, Germany could also have attempted to bring before the Council the French
occupation of the Ruhr39 Secondly, France did not want to alienate Italy because the latter
gave support to the Franco-Belgium occupation of the Ruhr. In more general terms, Paris
needed to rebuild its relations with Italy against Germany. France was not only disappointed
by Anglo-American co-operation against Germany after the Treaty of Versailles but also
estranged from London because of the Ruhr occupation.
Although France did not want to alienate Italy during the Corfu crisis, Eastern Europe
and the Balkans were controversial regions in French-Italian relations. During the Corfu
crisis, the Czech press maintained that France had weakened the League by supporting
Mussolini and wrote that the League had no jurisdiction when the interests of big powers were
at stake.40 The Czech delegate to Geneva, Eduard Benes, said that if Mussolini escaped
38
James Barros, The Corfu Incident of 1923: Mussolini and the League of Nations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1965), 303.
39
Barros, The Corfu Incident…, 88.
40
William I. Shorrock, From Ally to Enemy: The Enigma of Fascist Italy in French
Diplomacy, 1920-1940 (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1988), 42.
20
unpunished from the Corfu affair, he would likely implement his expansionist program in
Fiume and Dalmatia.41
Just before the Corfu crisis, Belgrade, fearing fascist violence, officially requested
France to assume the protection of Yugoslav citizens in Fiume. In November 1922, the
Poincaré government did not approach the Yugoslav request positively. Yet in April 1923,
France approved a 300 million franc loan to Belgrade for the reorganization of the Yugoslav
army.42 In the wake of Locarno, Belgrade wanted to sign a Franco-Yugoslav pact immediately
because it had to accept the Italian annexation of Fiume by signing the Italian-Yugoslav
accord of January 1924. But Berthelot instructed the French Minister in Belgrade that such a
pact could be interpreted differently by Rome which had given guarantees to France’s frontier
along the Rhine.43
As for British foreign policy in the post-war era, Brian McKercher, for instance, wrote
that those who dominated the Foreign Office saw the League as only another tool in the
British diplomatic arsenal.44 According to him, “Edwardian” balance- of -power thinking still
dominated interwar British foreign policy. In fact, the “Edwardians prided themselves on
seeing the world for what it was, not what it should be”.45 For them, essential British interests
had not changed because of the war. These interests were compounded thanks to the
acquisition of mandated territories in the Middle East and Africa. Therefore, the Edwardians
did not see a balance which existed only on continental Europe but saw several balances
judged vital to British and imperial security in different areas of the globe.
Shorrock, From Ally to Enemy…, 42.
Shorrock, From Ally to Enemy…, 36.
43
Shorrock, From Ally to Enemy…, 47.
44
Brian McKercher, “Old Diplomacy and New: The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy,
1919-1939” in Diplomacy and World Power, Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher (eds.),
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 84.
45
McKercher, “Old Diplomacy and…,” 83-84.
41
42
21
A very good example of the British reluctance to find international solutions to
stability issues was its rejection of the Geneva Protocol prepared by a subcommittee of the
League. In the fall of 1924, a special subcommittee of the League produced a document
entitled “Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes”. The Czech Foreign
Minister, Benes, as rapporteur of this subcommittee, advocated that the Geneva Protocol use
arbitration for the purpose of defining aggression with the slogan “arbitration, security and
disarmament”.46
The British Conservative government refused to accept the Geneva Protocol even
though it was endorsed unanimously by the Assembly of the League. London criticized the
Protocol for not providing for arbitration of possible causes of war, namely the existing
frontiers on the Continent.47 According to Wandycz, London at the same time criticized the
French for using the Protocol to involve Britain in its defence. In contrast to the British
officials, this time the Herriot government in France favoured international reconciliation. For
the French Foreign Minister, Aristide Briand, the Geneva Protocol was a way to reach a pact
of mutual help between the great powers and the minor ones.48 In fact, France, Poland and
Czechoslovakia closely cooperated in the making of the Geneva Protocol. The latter was
distinguished as being the only state which ratified the Protocol.
But not all regions of the globe, not even those in Europe had equal value for the
British. For example, Austin Chamberlain divided Europe between east and west saying that
“in Western Europe we are a partner … in Eastern Europe our role should be that of
46
Piotr S. Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies 1919-1925: French-Czechoslovak-Polish
Relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno (Minneapolis: The University of
Minnesota Press, 1962), 320.
47
Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies…, 321.
48
Aristide Briand, Discours et Ecrits de Politique Etrangère: La Paix-l’Union Européenne, la
Société des Nations, Achille Elisha (ed.), (Paris: Plon, 1965): 149.
22
disinterested amicus curiae”.49 Goldstein argued that, even in the post First World War era,
Eastern Europe’s place on the British mental map of Europe was still very much terra
incognita. At the time of Locarno, Chamberlain told the British ambassador in Berlin Lord
d’Abernon “for the moment I think the less that is said about the east the better it will be “.50
In fact, Goldstein made an important point: that in 1925 Britain was still uncertain as to
whether these newly created states would survive.51
Carr believed that treaties of non-aggression, such as the Locarno Treaty, signed in the
1920s were an expression of the power politics of a particular period and locality.52 In fact, to
define the nature of Locarno Jon Jacobson gave as a reference Chamberlain’s declaration to
the Committee of Imperial Defence in July, 1925. Chamberlain’s three main concerns
summarized well the aim of Locarno: first, to prevent Germany from overrunning Europe,
second to prevent a Russo-German understanding and third to create a friendlier France.53
In fact, the goal of a friendlier France was reached while Briand was in office. In his
memoirs, a French diplomat, Jules Laroche, talks about two successive policies in France in
the 1920s. One was executed by Poincaré: He focused on German reparations and separatism
in the Rhineland in order to get extra concessions from Germany for French security. This
policy failed because of British opposition which did not want a French hegemony to succeed
the German one. The second policy was led by Briand who emphasized the reinforcement of
French security and searched for an entente with Britain. This policy was implemented by
ending the French occupation of the Ruhr and the adoption of the Dawes plan. The
implementation of this policy was facilitated by the German desire for the evacuation of
Erik Goldstein, “The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Locarno Pact, 19241925” in Diplomacy and World Power, 126.
50
Goldstein, “The Evolution of British Diplomatic…,” 126.
51
Goldstein, “The Evolution of British Diplomatic…,” 125.
52
Carr, The Twenty Years…, 106.
53
Jon Jacobson, “Locarno, Britain and the Security of Europe” in Locarno Revisited,
European Diplomacy 1920-1929, Gaynor Johnson (ed.), (London: Routledge, 2004), 16.
49
23
“Cologne” and by the presence of Chamberlain in Foreign Office who favoured this. In the
end, Briand led this policy up to the Locarno agreements.54
Locarno was not only a continuation of the balance- of -power system but also an
attempt to transform the Treaty of Versailles. As Polayni argues, the outcome of the war and
the treaties signed afterwards had eased political tension superficially by eliminating German
competition.55 This was superficial because it aimed at the unilateral permanent disarmament
of the defeated nations. But by the mid-1920s, the victorious countries, especially Britain,
realized that they had to move beyond that. As an example of this, Cohr gave MacDonald’s
pursuit of the US and German involvement in the existing system which was an indication of
the shifting of post-war politics away from the Versailles system.56
One could argue that German involvement in the existing system started at the signing
of the Locarno Treaty and continued through the membership of Germany in the League of
Nations. But meantime Locarno confirmed the deadlock of French policy. When the French
delegation came to Locarno, it intended to recover as much of France’s interests and
commitments in Eastern Europe as were possible. According to Wandycz, the French aim was
to assume a position in Eastern Europe comparable to that of Britain in the west by making
France a guarantor of the German-Polish and Czechoslovak-German arbitration treaties.57
However, Locarno destabilized France’s position by excluding Eastern Europe from
the guarantee.58 Before Locarno, France could have given immediate assistance to Poland in
any situation it considered a threat to peace. After Locarno, France could help Poland only if
Jules Laroche, Au Quai d’Orsay avec Briand et Poincaré, 1913-1926 (Paris: Hachette,
1957), 228-229.
55
Polayni, The Great Transformation…, 22.
56
Patrick O. Cohrs, “The Quest for a New Concert of Europe: British Pursuits of German
Rehabilitation and European Stability in the 1920s” in Locarno Revisited, European
Diplomacy 1920-1929, p. 42.
57
Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies…, 359.
58
Anthony Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery: France’s Bid for Power in Europe 19141940 (London: Arnold, 1995), 121.
54
24
the latter invoked Article 16 of the Covenant.59 In other words, from Locarno on, France’s
eastern pacts were linked to the League and their implementation depended on the
interpretation of the Covenant.
To sum up, Germany recognized the Versailles order in the west but this did not imply
renunciation of territory in the east. For example, if Germany attacked an Eastern European
country, France could only reply by counter-attacking in the west across the Rhine.60
Adamthwaite also argues that no military agreements were concluded between France and its
Eastern allies. For example, in June 1928, France rejected a Yugoslavian request for military
talks. On the other hand, according to Shorrock, France hammered out a series of defensive
military alliances with Poland and the members of the Little Entente between 1921 and
1927.61
But the application of the Locarno system in Western Europe only could not and did
not bring stability to Europe. Allan Cassels argues that exclusion of Eastern Europe from the
Locarno system allowed Mussolini to pursue a dynamic policy in the Balkans and the Danube
valley where his main concern was to diminish France’s influence.62 Both times when the
League was called on to defend the integrity of one of its smaller members, first France and
then Britain sought a solution by undercutting and bypassing the League.63
Turkey as a Middle Power
Although his definition of middle powers is fairly conventional, Holbraad captures
strikingly Turkey’s evolution in the international system in his general description of middle
Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies…, 363.
Adamthwaite, Grandeur and Misery…, 120-21
61
Shorrock, From Ally to Enemy…, 32.
62
Allan Cassels, “Locarno: Early Test of Fascist Intentions” in Locarno Revisited…, 91.
63
Alan Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975),
126.
59
60
25
powers. To him, “... the intermediate category of states... is the meeting place of once great
but declining powers, tired from generations of power politics at the highest level but rich in
experience, and of lesser but ascending powers, conscious of their potential and stirred by
ambition.”64 This description is obviously inspired by Martin D. Wight’s work on Power
Politics where he expresses a similar observation: “Middle powers appear when qualifications
for great power status are being revised... The most obvious middle powers today are the
powers which have lost the status of great power as a result of two World Wars: Britain,
France, Germany and Japan.”65
Turning to the international power hierarchy before the First World War, Holbraad
identifies the Ottoman Empire as one of the two states that occupied intermediate positions in
the European hierarchy of powers in the second half of the nineteenth century, Italy being the
other one.66 However, he argues that, compared to Italy, the Ottoman Empire was a unique
example of its kind.
“... it was not really a part of the international society of Europe. Geographically
marginal, culturally alien and historically hostile, it was still a frontier country...
though it was a member of the state system in the sense that it interacted with
European powers and filled some role in the balance of power, its status in the system
was uncertain. On the one hand, its large population of various races, nationalities and
religions, its vast territories in Europe as well as Asia, and its strategic importance to
several great powers, clearly marked it off from the minor powers and small states of
the system. On the other hand, its military weakness, inefficient administration and
long record of economic decline had long since taken it out of the rank of great
powers. This combination of qualities placed the Empire in a particularly exposed
position in relation to Europe”.67
Holbraad, Middle Powers…,3.
Wight, Power Politics…, 65
66
Holbraad, Middle Powers…, 33-35.
67
Holbraad, Middle Powers…, 34.
64
65
26
Yet in his seminal work he stops short of recognizing as a middle power the modernday or republican Turkey, which acquired, among other things, the geographical core and the
diplomatic tradition of the Ottoman Empire.68 His definition of middle powers is based on
traditional indicators of size and national strength, namely population and Gross National
Product (GNP). In his attempt at producing, in accordance with these two criteria ,a list of
middle powers in the Cold War years, Holbraad admits that Turkey would have qualified as a
middle power by virtue of its population and GNP (both comparable to those of Iran), if it
could have been classed under Asia. However, as Turkey considers itself a European power,
ranked as the eighth-strongest small power with its then-current population and GNP, it fails
to qualify for middle power status in a European context.
The case of Turkey illustrates how much Holbraad’s conception of middle power
status is contingent on the regional context. Although he offers a convincing argument for
excluding Turkey from the league of middle powers of the Cold War period, he overlooks
Turkey’s middle power status and behaviour in the European context in the interwar era.
Indeed, it is the major assertion of our work that modern Turkey displayed the characteristics
of a middle power (at least an emerging one) in the interwar period in terms of its activist
diplomacy and, though to a lesser extent, of its naval policy.69
Unfortunately, there is no accurate statistical data based on traditional indicators of
size and strength to provide a convincing argument regarding Turkey’s middle power status in
the period under study. There is only a single compilation that attempts to bring together such
indicators for the interwar period. The Yearbook of International Disarmament which was
published regularly by the League of Nations from 1926 to 1938, covering 60 states, remains
to this date the only data series in hand to gauge conventionally the relative positions of states
Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An ‘Active’
Neutrality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 3
69
Holbraad, Middle Powers…, 89.
68
27
in the international power hierarchy. These Yearbooks had been published as part of the
League’s promotion of international disarmament efforts in the 1920s and 1930s.
Notwithstanding their obvious shortcomings and major inaccuracies, the data compiled by the
League at least offer a perception of the relative strengths of these states.70 Accordingly, the
available data may be used to provide a very crude presentation of Turkey’s size, population,
and military strength in comparison to that of the others.71
Based on data presented in the Yearbooks of International Disarmament, Turkey’s
relative position in the international system can be compared to four other countries in
Europe: Spain, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Poland. These countries were selected for
comparison in line with a proposal made by General Smuts regarding the composition of the
League of Nations Council back in December 1918. In a pamphlet titled, The League of
Nations – A Practical Suggestion, General Smuts proposed a distinction between the two
types of lesser powers: intermediate powers and minor powers.
“In the first place, the Great Powers will have to be permanent members of [the
Council]. Thus, the British Empire, France, Italy, the U.S.A. and Japan will be
permanent members to whom Germany will be added as soon as she has a stable
democratic government. To these permanent members, I would suggest that four
additional members be added in rotation from two panels, one panel comprising the
important intermediate powers below the rank of Great Powers such as Spain,
Hungary, Turkey, Central Russia, Poland, Greater Serbia etc., the other panel
comprising all the minor states who are members of the League.” 72
Andrew Webster, “Making Disarmament Work: The Implementation of the International
Disarmament Provisions of the League of Nations Covenant, 1919-1925,” Diplomacy and
Statecraft 16/3, (2005): 560-563.
71
The whole series of Yearbooks of International Disarmament from 1924 to 1939 is
accessible electronically at http://www.library.northwestern.edu/govinfo/collections/league.
72
J. C. Smuts, The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion, (London: Hadder and
Stoughton, 1918): 37-38.
70
28
This proposal is considered unusual in two respects. First, it boldly disregarded the
distinction between winners and losers of the War. Secondly, it did not consider the
perceived contribution of these to the victory or their responsibility for the First World War.73
As Smuts originally cited Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Central Russia, Poland and Greater Serbia
among the “intermediate powers,” his categorization (with the exception of Central Russia) is
taken here as a basis for comparing the relative strengths of European middle powers.
A simple survey (or reading) of data on area, population, size of the army, number of
aircraft and total tonnage of units presented in the Yearbooks for these five countries yields a
rather interesting result.74 A further distinction may be made as to the lower-echelon and
higher-echelon middle powers among them. While Poland and Spain stand out as two higherechelon middle powers due to the magnitude of resources they commanded at that time, the
interwar Hungary and Yugoslavia can be regarded as lower-echelon middle powers. Having
fared worse than the two higher-echelon middle powers but better than the two lower-echelon
middle powers in most data categories, Turkey indeed presents the ultimate middle power in
the context of interwar Europe from the conventional perspective. Only in terms of
geographical area, Turkey stood a cut above the rest.
On the other side of the coin, size of population was the category in which Turkey
seriously lagged behind the two higher-echelon middle powers – Poland and Spain. Indeed,
many foreign observers regarded population as a serious vulnerability for the new Turkey.
For instance, writing in the early 1930s, an Austrian diplomat in Ankara identified two
problems with Turkey’s population. First, given the size of the country (almost as large as
Germany and Italy combined), Turkey was under-populated for national defence purposes.
Holbraad, Middle Powers…, 48. Interestingly, 13 years later, in 1931 Turkish Foreign
Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras went a step further than General Smuts and hinted that Ankara
would not consider joining the League of Nations without a permanent seat in the League
Council. T.B.M.M Zabıt Ceridesi, Term IV, Vol. 3, (15 July 1931): 133.
74
Comparative data based on the on the League statistics are provided in Annex 1.
73
29
The mismatch between its population and territory posed a defence problem, particularly in
and around the coastal regions.75 Second, an under-populated Turkey could be seen as
potential outlet for settling immigrants from European countries, such as Germany and Italy,
whose resources had been strained by population pressure.76
This final observation is indeed a confirmation of a typical middle power dilemma,
resulting from the mismatch between its relatively large size and strategic importance and the
limited means at its disposal to defend itself. This dilemma provides a strong motivation for
multilateralism among the middle powers. Their interest in collective security is also linked
to this mismatch. Hence, they make reliable partners in international organizations.77
Turning to less tangible manifestations of middle power activism in international
relations, the case of Turkey in the 1930s was very much reminiscent of Australian and
Canadian relocation in the international system in reaction to lack of economic leadership in
the 1980s. Half a century earlier, in the absence of leadership from traditional powers,
Turkey took various initiatives and actively promoted cooperation in the Balkans. One major
difference, however, is that, as Turkey evolved from a regional (great) power to a middle
power, its diplomacy could count on fewer and less developed international and regional
organizations than their Australian and Canadian counterparts several decades later.
The quality of a viable diplomacy is considered a middle power asset. The new
Turkey inherited not only the core geography of the Ottoman Empire but, to a great extent, its
diplomatic traditions and institutions.78 This heritage facilitated gradual enhancement of the
75
On the significance of population in international power hierarchy, see Geoffrey McNicoll,
“Population Weights in the International Order,” Population and Development Review 25/3,
(September 1999): 411-442.
76
Norbert von Bischoff, Ankara: Türkiye’deki Yeni bir Oluşun İzahı, Burhan Belge (trans.),
(Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1936): 295.
77
Holbraad, Middle Powers…,68-69.
78
For a discussion of Ottoman diplomacy and European state system, see A. Nuri Yurdusev,
“The Ottoman Attitude Toward Diplomacy,” in Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or
30
new Turkey’s voice in international fora. Building on their experience with the Ottoman
capitulations and debts, Turkish diplomacy also took on an economic dimension after the
World Economic Crisis of 1929.79 The failure of various international initiatives led Turkey
to turn its attention to regional arrangements such as promoting cooperation in the Balkans
where there had been a marked absence of leadership from traditional sources.
Under circumstances that accorded primacy to economics, the traditional Turkish
diplomatic apparatus was supplemented (or complemented) by other bureaucratic institutions.
The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economics both began to develop international
postures. An observer sees this diversification of actors involved in Turkey’s international
relations as a natural outcome of a policy of statism (étatism) which was impossible to serve
by means of traditional diplomacy only.
To manage Turkey’s international economic relations, Türkofis was set up as a
separate agency under the Ministry of Economics. It grew into a large network with offices in
the countries of Turkey’s major foreign trade partners. The Ministry of Finance’s rising
profile in Turkey’s foreign relations during the same period stemmed principally from the
need to handle the Ottoman debt. Interestingly Turkey’s major arms procurement programs
through foreign loans provided another impetus for the Finance Ministry’s involvement in the
economic diplomacy of Turkey in the 1930s.80
In evaluating Turkey’s middle power activism in international economic affairs, it has
to be borne in mind that Ankara operated within a far less connected and interdependent
international economy than Canada or Australia would decades later. In fact, the Turkish
economic diplomacy was largely confined to bilateral economic and trade relations and
Unconventional? A. Nuri Yurdusev, (ed.), (Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan,
2005): 21-30.
79
See Dilek Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy
Strategies in an Uncertain World, 1929-1939, (Leiden, Brill, 1998).
80
T.C. Maliye Bakanlığı, Dışişleri Hizmetleri ve Teşkilatlanması, (Ankara: T.C. Maliye
Bakanlığı Hazine Genel Müdürlüğü ve Milletlerarasi İktisadi İşbirliği Teşkilatı, 1963): 59-65.
31
proved unable to offer sufficient incentives for multilateral regional arrangements. The failed
Balkan economic union proposal is a case in point.
Turning to security issues, as a middle power Turkey was faced with similar dilemmas
and exhibited foreign policy behaviour typically attributed to middle powers. The Italian
attack on Abyssinia and piracy in the Mediterranean during the Spanish Civil War were two
cases in point. Apprehensive of its own security, Ankara regarded the Italian attack on
Abyssinia as a clear breach of an independent country’s territorial integrity. It went along
with the international community in imposing and implementing sanctions on Italy. Also
during the Spanish Civil War, it politically supported the international action regarding
submarine activity in the Mediterranean, though it stopped short of supplying naval units to
international patrols in the Mediterranean. That became a divisive issue, creating a rift
between the proponents and opponents of the internationalist line in Turkish foreign policy at
the time.
Regional great power is another concept used to identify Turkey’s position in the
world. Osterud identifies the new Turkish Republic as a regional great power, though only in
the Middle East context. “The break-up of empires meant new political realities in regional
affairs, with nationalist Turkey as a new ‘regional great power, in the Middle East...”81
However, it should be noted that middle power and regional great power are two categories
that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Wight argues that the latter refers to states “with
general interests relative to a limited region and capacity to act alone.” Hence, “great power”
status of such states is strictly confined to a sub-system in the regional context. Although
middle powers and regional powers are portrayed as two distinct categories, the latter is
occasionally an interim step to becoming a middle power. In other words, “such regional
81
Osterud, “Regional Great Powers…,” 8.
32
great powers will probably be candidates, in the states-system at large, for the rank of middle
power.”82
The issue here is whether or to what extent such an evolutionary trajectory is
applicable to the case of Turkey between the two World Wars. Another question is how
regional great powers evolve into middle powers or attempt to do so. What has to be firmly
established is whether Turkey displayed the attributes of a regional great power to a
sufficiently sustainable degree between the two World Wars to be called a middle power or
whether the status it inherited from the Ottoman Empire can be taken as an indication of such
previous status. With its mixed record, Turkey definitely tried to act like a middle power. It
may be claimed that its transition to middle power status could not materialize due to the
outbreak of the Second World War.
On the other hand, Poland, which fits both middle and regional great power categories
in the interwar context and the choices it made, offers a contrast in behaviour as a comparably
situated international actor. Poland preferred to act as (or pretend to be) a “Great Power.” In
other words, Turkey and Poland presented two opposite diplomatic and military/naval choices
and styles both regionally and internationally in the interwar period. To begin with, while
Poland signed a treaty of alliance with France in pursuit of protection from Russian and
German powers, Turkey took the opposite way and tried to preserve its diplomatic
independence. These two different types of middle power behaviour may be related to the
varying degree of intensity of great power rivalry each was exposed to. Poland was caught
between Germany and Russia and allied with France, which in turn was preoccupied with
Germany, whereas Turkey at this time did not stand in such close proximity to any great
82
Wight, Power Politics…, 63.
33
power rivalry. Italian-British rivalry in the Mediterranean came much later to influence
Turkish foreign policy behaviour.83 Similarly, Neumann argues:
“For an aspiring regional great power, there is a difference between being constrained
by geographically distant powers with an abstract interest in regional balance, or by
immediately neighboring great powers with specific hegemonic interests and
aspirations. Poland was exposed to the latter experience, and could actually count two
great powers among its regional challengers.”84
Turkey and Poland stand at two different ends of the spectrum of middle powers
and/or regional great powers in evolutionary terms as well. While Turkey represents more or
less a power that stepped down from the rank of a great power, Poland is a power that
graduated up to the same rank from years of non-existence. Neumann offers a vivid
description of the typical middle power dilemma for Poland in the interwar period: “With a
population of around 30 million and a standing army of over 250.000 men, Poland did not lag
hopelessly behind a great power like France... Because of its weak economy, however, Poland
could ill-afford to keep an army of this size. In the 1930s, defence costs reached as much as
27.5 percent of government expenditure.”85
The simultaneous, yet temporary decline of both Germany and Russia facilitated
Poland’s graduation to a higher rank in the European power hierarchy. However, this sudden
change of status in turn prompted “an inflated view of its own role in the European system...
especially after the conclusion of the Russo-Polish War in 1921.”86 The Locarno Treaties
represented a shock both to Polish security and to its great power aspirations (or pretensions).
Holbraad, Middle Powers…,189.
Iver B. Neumann, “Poland as a Regional Great Power: the Interwar Heritage,” Regional
Great Powers in International Politics, Neumann, Iver B. (ed.), (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1992): 140)
85
Neumann, “Poland as a Regional Great Power… “ 123.
86
Neumann, “Poland as a Regional Great Power… “129.
83
84
34
It was a watershed for Polish dreams of equality with great powers. However, even this
watershed did not end Polish self-perception of great power status.87
“... as Poland’s aspirations to great powerhood remained constant, so did an integral
part of that policy, in other words, the aspiration to play the role of a regional great
power. Throughout the interwar period, in order to boast its security and underline its
stature, Poland was trying to establish regional alliances under Polish leadership.”88
Hence, the Poles viewed various schemes of regional security, from the Little Entente
to the suggested “Eastern Pact,” as impediments to its regional leadership aspirations. In
contrast to Turkey’s success in restoring its relations with its smaller neighbours, Polish
diplomacy failed to achieve similar results by peaceful means in the interwar period.
Moreover, it took advantage of its neighbours' troubles with great powers to advance its own
interests. There are two cases in point. After the Anchlus in 1938, Poland delivered an
ultimatum to Kaunas (Lithuania) to establish diplomatic relations.. Also, following German
intervention in the Sudetenland, it took Teschen by force from Czechoslovakia.89
Poland’s problems with its smaller neighbours can be linked to the fact that Lithuania
and Czechoslovakia had just gained their independent nation status from multi-ethnic empires
and their governments and people were intent on guarding jealously their new states’
independence. A neighborhood of newly independent states indeed points to the existence for
Polish diplomacy of an operating environment similar to one that was in place in the Balkans
for Turkish diplomacy. Understandably, Poland’s neighbours were reluctant to forego this by
the “forging of a union of states under Polish leadership...” To the new elites in Kaunas and
Prague, to play a subordinate role once again in a union of states was not a tempting option.90
Neumann, “Poland as a Regional Great Power… “ 132.
Neumann, “Poland as a Regional Great Power… “ 133.
89
Neumann, “Poland as a Regional Great Power… “ 135-136.
90
Neumann, “Poland as a Regional Great Power… “ 138.
87
88
35
By 1936, Polish imperial ambitions were stated more bluntly. The authoritarian
government began to demand colonies as a solution to both its overpopulation and “the
Jewish problem.” In a similar frame of mind, Poland embarked on naval rearmament to
become a naval power overseas. Shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War,
“General Sosnkowski announced in 1939 Poland’s youth were to play the role due to Poland”.
Such moves completed Poland’s isolation.91
The ultimate manifestations of Polish and Turkish diplomatic behaviours can be found
in their reactions to Mussolini’s Four-Power Pact proposal. Both resented and rejected
Mussolini’s proposal, however, for diametrically opposed reasons. Mussolini basically
proposed a European order to be dictated and managed by four great powers: Italy, France,
Britain and Germany. The proposal deepened the Turkish suspicion regarding Great Power
behaviours. Ankara was convinced that despite intensity of rivalries among themselves, the
Great Powers would cooperate at the expense of smaller states in the Balkans and the
Mediterranean, if their interests warranted so. Consequently, Turkey intensified its
diplomatic efforts for Balkan cooperation and, therefore, chose an ‘activist’ path after March
1933. Polish reaction, although featured a strong element of deep resentment, differed from
Turkey’s in its causes. The Poles were resentful not over the scheme itself but over their
exclusion from the circle of Great Powers. Polish Prime Minister even hinted at pulling his
country out of the League of Nations. In so doing, he indicated that his country would choose
isolation to “constant interference by the big-four.”92
Re-discovery of Turkey’s and Poland’s middle power credentials had to wait until the
end of the Cold War. The Cold War international order did not leave either country much
Rolf Ahmann, “’Localization of Conflicts’ or ‘Indivisibility of Peace’: The German and
Soviet Approaches towards Collective Security and East Central Europe, 1925-1939,” in The
Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security, 1918-1957, Ahmann, R., A. M.
Birke, and M. Howard (eds.), (Oxford: Oxford University Pres, 1993): 226).
92
Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies…, 283.
91
36
latitude for diplomatic activism as middle powers. For instance, Spero’s recent work is a
typical example dealing with Poland’s restoration to middle power status. Based on the
Polish case after the Cold War, Spero defines middle power in behavioural terms and indeed
associates typical middle power behaviour with a function called “bridging.” He defines
bridging as “alignment by middle powers with all neighbours to lessen historic security
dilemmas rather than playing countries off against one another, or hiding behind neutrality or
nonalignment.”93
In other words, bridging represents a type of alignment different than ‘balancing
against’ or ‘bandwagoning’ with specific states, or aggressive alignments for territorial
aggrandizement or regional domination. Accordingly, he argues that Poland as a middle
power sought security by bridging with other middle or great powers in the post-Cold War
era. This represents a strategy based not on “self-help” but “other-help” view of the world.
The choice of such an alternative strategy stems from Poland’s own historical experiences
because self-help strategies had previously failed to guarantee Polish security and
sovereignty.94 The historical experience and fear of losing sovereignty and independence are
two explanations for the Polish change of heart.95
In this respect, it is very reminiscent of a path Turkish diplomacy had attempted to
follow in the interwar period. The Ottoman diplomatic experience suggested to the new rulers
of Turkey that self-help strategies had worked only to a certain (or limited) extent to keep the
Empire from unraveling. Like Poland’s, Ottoman independence was, however, very much
compromised by the Great Powers. So the new Turkish strategy which was devised and
implemented between the two world wars was indeed a strategy aimed at bridging first the
Balkan and then the Mediterranean divides in light of the lessons learned from the Ottoman
93
Joshua B. Spero, Bridging the European Divide: Middle Power Politics and Regional
Security Dilemmas, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.: 2004): 3.
94
Spero, Bridging the European Divide…, 307.
95
Spero, Bridging the European Divide…, 25.
37
experience. This was regarded as best option to secure Turkey’s survival without loss of
sovereignty and independence.
38
2. BUILDING A VIABLE COUNTRY: POLITICS AND FORCE
The domestic context within which the new Turkish government tried to revive
Turkish naval power in the 1920s was not very favourable.. At home, regime consolidation
problems and the Sheik Said rebellion militated against a swift recovery of Turkish naval
power. A naval program in the proper sense of the word could only be embarked upon after
the country had stabilized internally and externally towards the end of the 1920s. The
external and internal threats that had to be tackled almost concomitantly stretched the modest
diplomatic and military resources of the new country to the limit. In the mid-1920s, Turkey
looked like a country with very slim prospects for survival. It was more or less an
international outcast left out of the collective security system of the League of Nations. A
number of issues that had defied settlement at Lausanne hindered the normalization of
relations with its neighbours, some of which were prominent great powers such as Britain,
France and Italy.
Political Rivalry
In 1923, the new rulers of Turkey embarked on the ambitious task of creating a
modern republic. This task inevitably required transforming the society and institutions
inherited from the Ottoman Empire into a society and institutions loyal to the Republic.
However, the march towards reform met with opposition. The proclamation of the Republic
on 29 October, 1923 sharpened the rivalry between the proponents and opponents of reforms
which eventually resolved into the establishment of two political parties in the Parliament
(TBMM). The Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (The Republican People's Party) led by Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk, the founder and first president of the Republic, was formed by the ruling
39
group, whereas the opposition was organized into the Terrakiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası
(Progressive Republican Party).
Former comrades during the War of Independence began to part company and engage
in a political struggle over the future shape and direction of the new Turkey. Rauf Orbay
gradually emerged as the key figure opposing Mustafa Kemal and his intended reforms.
Orbay's comments in the Istanbul press about the Republic, and his visit to the Caliph were
seen as open challenges to the new regime.96 To expand their support bases, both individuals
tried to recruit political allies. Orbay was joined by two prominent military leaders of the War
of Independence, Generals Kazım [Karabekir] and Ali Fuat [Cebesoy]. President Mustafa
Kemal enlisted Chief of Staff Field Marshal Fevzi [Çakmak] and Prime Minister İsmet
[İnönü] on his side. The latter group decided to press on with the reforms, including the
abolition of the Caliphate in March 1924, to consolidate the regime.
During this power struggle, the loyalty of the Turkish navy became a significant issue.
Initially, the navy was seen by a new Turkish ruling elite as an institution with questionable
pro-republican credentials. The whole process of transformation thus involved as well
conversion of the navy into a republican institution. The Ministry of Marine was created in
December 1924to serve this end. This office was the first (and shortly to become the last) of
its kind in modern Turkey. Although it had been standard practice for the governments in the
late Ottoman era to have a Ministry of Marine, particularly after 1867, the new regime of
Turkey did not immediately adopt the Ottoman model.97
96
In his six-day marathon speech, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk devoted a large section to Rauf
Orbay's anti-republican stand and acts. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Speech (Ankara:
Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1981): 676-697. For Rauf Orbay’s remarks, see “Rauf Bey’in Vatan
Gazetesine Demeci, 1 Kasım 1923 [1 November 1923], in Yücel Demirel and Osman Zeki
Konur, (eds.) CHP Grup Toplantısı Tutanakları (1923-1924), (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi
Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2002): 23-30. Cf. Rauf Orbay, Cehennem Değirmeni: Siyasi Hatıralar
II, 2nd edition (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2001).
97
See Ali İhsan Gencer, Bahriye’de Yapılan Islahat Hareketleri ve Bahriye Nezareti’nin
Kuruluşu (1789-1867) (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1985).
40
The Turkish War of Independence of 1919-1922 was overwhelmingly a land war in
which naval operations had peripheral influence at best. The amount of space devoted to
naval operations in the official military history of the War of Independence is illustrative of
the extent of the naval contribution to the nationalist effort during the War of Independence.
Air and naval operations combined account for only a single volume in the 20-volume series
published by the General Staff History service.98
Although a large number of junior- rank naval officers either fought in land
campaigns, mostly with infantry units, or were involved in smuggling arms to the nationalist
forces in Anatolia, the majority of senior-rank naval officers remained by choice or by order
in Istanbul.99 The most prominent naval figure of the War of Independence was Hüseyin
Rauf [Orbay], a retired naval captain and a former Ottoman Minister of Marine, who had
become a legendary figure for the daring raids of the cruiser Hamidiye under his command in
the Aegean against the Greek navy during the Balkan Wars. In 1919, he joined the Turkish
nationalists in Anatolia and then returned to Istanbul to serve as a deputy in the last Ottoman
Assembly. Subsequently, the British exiled him to Malta in 1920 for his pro-nationalist stand
in the Assembly. When finally released, he went to Ankara to serve as the Minister of Public
Works and then as Prime Minister until 1923.100
The President and his supporters also successfully implemented a series of legislative
measures related to the military. First, serving military officers were barred from engaging in
politics. Until 1924, officers in uniform could be elected as deputies and be involved in the
Assembly's activities. During and in the immediate aftermath of the War of Independence,
this was an acceptable practice. After 1924, they were asked to make a choice between their
[Saim Besbelli], "Deniz Cephesi," in Türk İstiklal Harbi: Deniz Cephesi ve Hava Harekatı,
Vol. 5 (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1964).
99
Afif Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasi, 1923-1960 (İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 1967):
13.
100
See Rauf Orbay, Cehennem Değirmeni: Siyasi Hatıralar I, 2nd. Edition (İstanbul: Emre
Yayınları, 2001).
98
41
uniforms and seats in the Assembly. Secondly, in March 1924, the Ministry of War headed
by the Chief of Staff was abolished and replaced by a civilian-led Ministry of National
Defence. The office of Chief of Staff was then placed on a purely military footing.
These measures excluded the Turkish military from politics only nominally. The
ultimate aim was not to remove the military from politics but to secure its loyalty to Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk and the new regime. To this end, he could depend on Chief of Staff FieldMarshal Fevzi Çakmak who was granted exclusive authority over military matters.101 When
the two generals in opposition, Karabekir and Cebesoy, decided to engage in politics, they
were asked to relinquish their military commands before joining the Assembly. Both resigned
in October 1924. Their resignations enabled President Atatürk consolidate its control over the
armed forces. According to İsmet İnönü, it was a decisive event that showed unmistakably
who was in charge of the country and the Turkish military.102
In March 1924, the TBMM adopted a bill that authorized funds for the repair of naval
vessels left over from the Ottoman Empire, including the battlecruiser, Yavuz Sultan Selim
(ex-SMS Goeben). The prospects for Turkish naval development sparked a campaign in the
press calling on the government to institute a Ministry of Marine. It was argued that a project
of such magnitude warranted the supervision of a politically empowered and accountable
office. Hence, the creation of a Ministry of Marine was also brought to the agenda of the
National Defence Commission in the Assembly. Captain Ali Rıza, the former Chief of Staff
in the Ottoman Ministry of Marine, had already tabled a bill to this end. However, the
National Defence Commission initially saw no reason to institute a ministry to replace the
Navy Department that had stood at the apex of naval organization since the War of
101
William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, (London: Routledge, 1994): 76; Andrew
Mango, Atatürk (London: John Murray, 1999): 415-417.
102
İsmet İnönü, Hatıralar, Vol. II, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987): 191.
42
Independence.103 Captain Ali Riza's bill then was left to hibernate until the formation of an
opposition party under former Ottoman Minister of Marine, Rauf Orbay, in November 1924.
The War of Independence experience in a sense enabled the Ottoman army officer
corps to acquire pro-Republican credentials. The majority of naval officers did not or could
not go through a similar mass transformation or conversion. The large-scale purge of officers
who did not fight in the War of Independence affected particularly the senior officers of the
Navy. With the purge, the navy was then relegated to a service staffed by of largely junior
officers. In contrast, the army ranks were filled with War of Independence veterans.104
Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that the purge of a large number of naval officers removed
fully suspicions regarding political loyalty of the navy and its officer corps.
The most striking examples of the navy’s questionable loyalty can be found in
Mustafa Kemal's well-publicized cruise on the cruiser Hamidiye in the Black Sea in
September 1924.105 The published accounts of this cruise point to the ruling elite's doubts
about the navy’s loyalty and Rauf Orbay’s influence on the naval officer corps. Aware of
such doubts the commanding officer of the cruiser and his staff decided to remove Rauf
Orbay’s photograph from the officers' quarter before Mustafa Kemal arrived on board ship, as
the former legendary commander of the Hamidiye had turned into an opponent of Mustafa
Kemal.106 Some in Mustafa Kemal’s entourage even asked if the Navy identified itself with
Rauf Orbay. Many junior officers on board flatly rejected such identification and vocally
dissociated themselves from Rauf Orbay and other "old generation" officers.107
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM) Zabıt Ceridesi, Vol. II, Term 2, Meeting 2 (22
December 1924): 216-220.
104
Fahri Çoker, Bahriyemizin Yakın Tarihinden Kesitler (Ankara: Dz. K.K. Karargah
Basımevi, 1994): 179-183.
105
Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donaması…, 21-23; and Raşit Metel, Atatürk ve Donanma…,
(İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 1966) 52-58.
106
Metel, Atatürk ve Donanma…, 52.
107
Metel, Atatürk ve Donanma…., 58; M. Celaleddin Orhan, Bir Bahriyelinin Anılari, 19181981 (İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınları, 2001): 259.
103
43
In December 1924, Captain Ali Rıza’s earlier bill for a Ministry of Marine found a
new lease on life. The chain of political events suggests a link between the bill’s revival and
the formation of Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası as the opposition party.108 This link was
also obvious to the members of the opposition party. They justifiably questioned the sudden
change of heart on the part of the ruling Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası about the Ministry of
Marine which had been considered unnecessary a few months previously. The debates on the
revived bill basically centered on the issue of an independent naval staff for the Ministry of
Marine. The opposition party deputies were notagainst the idea of a Ministry of Marine per
se. Instead, they argued for an independent naval staff for the Ministry.
On the other hand, the Ministry itself could be seen by Chief of Staff Field Marshal
Çakmak, a key ally of President Atatürk, as a challenge to his exclusive authority. An
independent naval staff for the Ministry would certainly prejudice his authority over the
armed forces. For the ruling political elite, therefore, the Ministry of Marine without an
independent naval staff was the best option to consolidate political control over the Navy
without alienating the General Staff. In the end, the bill was adopted and the Ministry of
Marine was instituted as a government post with the votes of the ruling Cumhuriyet Halk
Fırkası. The opposition party deputies, including Rauf Orbay himself, cast their votes against
the creation of the Ministry of Marine without an independent staff.109
Ali İhsan [Eryavuz] was appointed the first Minister of Marine of the Republic. He
was a retired artillery officer, a former İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Union and Progress Party)
hardliner and an outspoken critic of Rauf Orbay.110 After the War of Independence, he
became an ardent supporter of President Mustafa Kemal. He was among the most vocal
108
Erik Jan Zürcher, Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive
Republican Party (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1991).
109
TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi (22 December 1924): 287-304.
110
Before the split in the ranks of CHP, interestingly enough Ali İhsan Eryavuz tabled a
motion against Rauf Orbay in the party assembly for his comments in newspaper Vatan.
Demirel and Konur, CHP Grup Toplantısı…., 17-20.
44
members of the ruling Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası in the TBMM. His appointment lends further
credence to the claim that the Ministry was devised to consolidate political control over the
armed forces and to eliminate Rauf Orbay's influence over the navy.111
This organizational change served the overall objective of political control of armed
services well. It also marked an institutional gain for the navy against the army-dominated
General Staff in the inter-service rivalry. Chief of General Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak
was an advocate of unity of command in the armed services and scorned the idea of an
independent Ministry of Marine, even with significantly crippled powers. At any rate, the
Ministry provided the Navy with a semblance (or a false sense) of parity with the Army. In
reality, the General Staff retained its key military decision-maker status in strategy and
procurement issues.
Inter-service Rivalry
In the 1920s, Turkey was in a state of flux. This situation was reflected in Turkish
naval policy. Coupled with the impact of interservice competition for limited funds, the poor
or deteriorating state of Turkey's relations with potential suppliers of naval armaments
restricted its freedom of action. However, there was one requirement given in all naval
programs devised: the reconditioning of the battlecruiser, Yavuz Sultan Selim (renamed
Yavuz). This battlecruiser became the symbol of Turkish naval revival, a symbol around
which the Republican fleet was to take shape. For years, she also became the focus of
Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Siyasi Hatıralar, Part II (Ankara: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1960): 123.
Foreign observers shared the same view. Public Record Office (PRO) FO 371 10870
E3338/3338/44 (1 June 1925); Ministere de Affaires Entrangeres (MAE), Serie E
Levant/Turquie, Vol 76/II, no. 305 (24 December 1924).
111
45
international attention that remained mostly skeptical about her fate until her recommissioning in 1930.112
This battlecruiser was by no means an uncontested symbol. The Army and the Navy
had substantially diverging conceptions of sea power. The Navy was clearly in favour of a
big surface fleet with dreadnoughts and destroyers for superiority over other Balkan nations,
including Greece.113 The Navy, indeed, set its sights on revitalizing the last Ottoman naval
program which had failed to materialize as result of the outbreak of the First World War In
1914,.114 This last Ottoman naval program had provided for forming a fleet around three
dreadnought battleships, complemented by two protected cruisers, ten destroyers and four
submarines. When war broke out in July 1914, the Ottoman Navy had two battleships nearing
completion (Reşadiye and Sultan Osman), and a third one (Fatih) on order at British
shipyards. The order for lighter units had been split between British and French shipbuilders,
while the lion's share had again gone to the British with an order for two protected cruisers,
four destroyers and two submarines. The French shipyards had to settle for six destroyers and
two submarines.115 Using the last Ottoman naval program as a yardstick for Turkish naval
revival could drain the new state's finances.
Moreover, the Republican Turkey inherited from the Ottoman Empire was the
popularity of naval power as well. The navy enjoyed a strong public appeal and had
influential friends in the press. This was a consequence of the deep imprint the last Ottoman
naval program had left on the minds of the Turkish public. Through the Ottoman Navy
League, the Ottomans had been called on to participate through their donations in the building
of a navy commensurate with the great power status of the Ottoman Empire. In particular, the
112
MAE, Serie E, Levant/Turquie, Vol. 84, no. 306, (20 August 1923): 12.
Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanması…, 21-23.
114
Afif Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu Sırasında 60 Yıl Hizmet, (19181977), Vol. 1, (İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 2005): 89.
115
Serhat Güvenç, Birinci Dünya Savaşına Giden Yolda Osmanlıların Dretnot Düşleri,
(İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008 forthcoming).
113
46
big dreadnoughts with big guns, partially funded by the donations of the people, ordered from
British shipyards had captured the popular imagination.116 Moreover, their unlawful seizure
by the British in August 1914 continued to haunt the people and naval officer corps. In 1924,
two deputies in the TBMM tabled a motion for the revival of the Navy League. Before
deciding on the issue, the government sought the opinion of the Turkish General Staff. FieldMarshal Fevzi Çakmak clearly expressed his preference for air power and aircraft over naval
power and naval vessels. He recommended the resuscitation of the League as the Navy and
Air League so that the funds at its disposal could be employed in the procurement of military
and naval aircraft.117
President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself had apparently not been very much
influenced by the naval advocates of a large surface fleet. He stated that the Turkish naval
programs' initial focus would be limited to training.118 In the same frame of mind, Prime
Minister Fethi [Okyar] reiterated that the government had no intention of placing new orders
for naval vessels before the existing fleet had been refurbished to operational status.119
The weight of Turkish General Staff opinion was felt in two crucial institutional
matters relating to the reorganization of its armed services. The first one was the fate of naval
aviation in Turkey and the other the naval strategy for the new republic. Both issues perfectly
echoed the contours of the debate in several other navies of the interwar years. However, the
way these two issues were handled also exposed unique features of Turkish military culture.
The Turkish Navy inherited a relatively established naval aviation tradition from the Ottoman
era. Even during the War of Independence, the nationalist forces maintained a detachment of
See Selahittin Özçelik, Donanma-yı Osmani Muavenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti (Ankara: Türk
Tarih Kurumu, 2000); Mehmet Beşikçi, The Organized Mobilization of Popular Sentiments:
The Ottoman Navy League, 1909-1919, Unpublished MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, Social
Science Institute, İstanbul, 1999.
117
BCA, 030.18.1.1/80.525.8 (6 February 1925).
118
Metel, Atatürk ve Donanma..., 57.
119
TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi (22 December 1924): 227.
116
47
naval aircraft at Amasra on the Black Sea, under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department.
After the War of Independence, this detachment was relocated to İzmir as a Naval Aviation
company in 1924. Soon, the General Staff decided to integrate both army and naval air
services under a single command. In spite of opposition from the Navy, which wanted to
keep its wings under its own jurisdiction, the single naval aviation company in İzmir was
amalgamated into the Army Aviation Corps.120
The Turkish case does not really represent an exception, particularly in light of the
Italian and British experiences of the time. For instance, in Britain, when the Royal Air Force
(RAF) was established in 1918, the Royal Navy lost its aviators to this service.121 Around the
same time, the Italian Navy also lost its wings to the Air Force.122 The Turkish case differed
from both British and Italian experiences only in one major institutional respect. An
independent air force did not exist in Turkey at the time. The Turkish Navy had to give away
its wings to the General Staff. Interestingly, the Turkish General Staff continued to purchase
aircraft dedicated to the navy and recruit naval officers for flying duties until the mid1930s.123
Hulusi Kaymaklı, Havacılık Tarihinde Türkler 2, (1918-1939), (Ankara: Hava Kuvvetleri
Yayını, 1997): 161.
121
Geoffery Till, "Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American and Japanese Case
Studies," in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Williamson Murray, Allan R.
Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1996): 207-208.
122
Rimanelli, Marco, Italy Between Europe and the Mediterranean: Diplomacy and Naval
Strategy from Unification to NATO, 1800s-2000 (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1997):
500-506.
123
In this respect, the organization of Turkish military aviation represents a hybrid approach
between an independent air force and an air service designed for the benefit of the parent
military service. Charles M. Westernhoff, “Airpower and Political Culture,” Airpower
Journal 11(4) (Winter 1997): 49. By 1973 the Turkish navy built its own “air service” with
both fixed-wing and rotary-wing naval aircraft. See Serhat Güvenç, "Deniz Havacılığın
Türkiye'de Seyri," Savunma ve Havacılık (September 2000): 28-33; İki Mavi: Türk Deniz
Havacılık Tarihi, (İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 2007): 57-107.
120
48
The interwar years offer interesting cases for the study of debates on strategy and
doctrine in many aspects of warfare.124 The sea power debates of the time usually centred
largely on a submarine-battleships axis. The crucial question was whether navies had to stick
to the concept of sea command with large surface fleets or develop new strategies around
lighter forces in view of technological advances in submarines and aviation.125 Essentially,
that was the crux of the naval strategy debate in Turkey. Broadly speaking, the navy was
arguing for a surface fleet, whereas the General Staff and the army officer corps were in
favour of lighter, and therefore cheaper, units. The latter idea was justifiable because of lack
of funds. A navy, particularly a large surface fleet, was an expensive investment which was
likely to absorb a substantial portion of the defence budget. For the General Staff, this would
mean allocation of scarce resources to a low-return service, as they could not see any decisive
role for a navy in the defence of the Republic.126 Hence, the budget argument worked in
tandem with Turkish military culture in shaping the Republican Navy. Williamson Murray
describes military culture
"as the sum of intellectual, professional, and traditional values of an officer corps; it
plays a central role in how that officer corps assesses the external environment and
how it analyzes the possible response that it might make to 'the threat'... The past
weighs in with a laden hand of tradition that can often block innovation. And not
without reason. The approaches that succeeded on earlier battlefields were often
124
For recent contributions, see W. Murray and A.R. Millet (eds.) Military Innovation in the
Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1996); and Elizabeth Kier,
Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999).
125
See Holger Herwig, "Innovation Ignored: The Submarine Problem - Germany, Britain and
the United States, 1919-1939," in Murray and Williamson, 227-264. For comparable Soviet
and Italian experiences, see Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail Monakov, “The Soviet Union’s
Ocean-Going Fleet, 1935-1956,” International History Review 18(4) (November 1996): 838845; Rimanelli, Italy Between Europe…, 494-495.
126
Büyüktuğrul, Büyük Atamız…, 92. A well-informed observer later claimed that a certain
strand in the Turkish military advocated abolishing the navy altogether. Abidin Daver,
"Donanmamızın İhyası İsmet Paşanın Muvaffak Olduğu En Büyük Eserlerinden Biridir,"
Cumhuriyet (25 August 1930).
49
worked out at a considerable cost in blood. Consequently, military cultures tend to
change slowly, particularly in peacetime."127
In the context of the above, the Turkish military culture of the interwar period offers a
textbook case. The army-dominated Turkish General Staff enjoyed an unchallenged
monopoly in setting military strategy and priorities. In the early 1920s, the Turkish military
mind was preoccupied with the gap caused in Turkish defences by the demilitarization
requirement for the Turkish Straits under the Lausanne Convention. This situation was
thought to have exposed Turkey to an Italian threat in the West. The main strategic objectives
were thus to fill this defence gap and counter a possible sea-borne assault by Italy from the
Dodecanese in the Aegean. In both objectives, the navy was relegated to an auxiliary role.
The way Turkish defence was organized reflected the prevailing culture of the officer corps.
The first generation of the Republic’s military leaders had been involved in
overwhelmingly defensive land battles from the War of Tripoli in 1911 and the Gallipoli
Wars in 1915 to the end of the War of Independence in 1922. In all these conflicts, friendly
naval forces performed peripheral roles. As a result, the early Republic military mind saw, at
best, a coastal defence function for the navy. In practical terms, the Navy was treated as a
natural extension of the Army.128 Hence, submarines and sea mines were weapons of choice
and offered an affordable alternative to the expensive surface vessels that the naval officer
corps yearned for.129
If the submarine was one weapon of choice for the Turkish General Staff, the other
was aircraft. Throughout the interwar period, submarines and aircraft topped their shopping
127
Willamson Murray, "Innovation: Past and Future," in Murray and Millet, 312-313.
When it was inaugurated in 1930, the Naval War College curriculum included infantry
tactics at company and battalion levels drawing on experiences from the Gallipoli War and
the War of Independence. Afif Büyüktuğrul, Osmanlı Deniz Harp Tarihi ve Cumhuriyet
Donanması, Vol. IV (İstanbul: Deniz Kuvvetleri Basımevi, 1984). 641.
129
Osman Nuri, “Tahtelbahir ve Göreceği İşler,” Deniz Mecmuası 41/312 (March 1929): 83
128
50
lists for arms. It is no coincidence that in 1924 two military commissions were touring
Europe at around the same time; one visited Britain, France, Germany and Italy to buy
aircraft, and the other toured France, the Netherlands and Sweden to buy submarines.130 Their
missions clearly reflected the military priorities of the new Republic. However, airpower
enjoyed a distinct advantage. Its popular appeal in Turkey was no less than its appeal to the
Turkish military mind. Aircraft and the aviator offered useful symbols of progress and power
for the image of the new Republic in Turkey. This helped the Turkish government to
overcome funding problems for at least one aspect of its armament program. A countrywide
fund-raising drive translated aviation's popular appeal into the finances to create a 200-aircraft
air arm in the 1920s. Only the Yavuz could compete with aircraft in capturing the hearts and
minds of the Turkish public.131
The Republic could spare only limited funds for the naval program. However, in the
1920s, even these small funds had to be diverted to other areas of national defence.132 The
Mosul crisis with Britain and the Sheik Said rebellion in 1925 presented serious threats to the
Republic’s survival. The security of the eastern borders and provinces become a top military
priority for Turkey. The Turkish General Staff quickly discovered the use of airpower in
dealing with insurgencies in remote areas, 133 as the Royal Air Force had experienced earlier
in neighboring regions of Iraq.134 For problems encountered in the east, the government
depended on the army backed by air power. In the west, both offered the primary means of
defence against a possible Italian assault. Hence, a surface fleet for the navy was relegated to
Kaymaklı, Havacılık Tarihinde 2…, 160 and Raşit Metel, Türk Denizaltıcılık Tarihi
(İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 1960): 31.
131
For an argument that the Yavuz had enjoyed an undeserved popularity see Hasan Ersel,
"Yavuz Geliyor Yavuz," Toplumsal Tarih 76/4, (April 2000): 28-39.
132
PRO FO 371/11544 E2050/523/44 (29 March 1926).
133
Robert Olson, “The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said (1925), Mt. Ararat (1930), and
Dersim (1937-38): Their Impact on the Development of the Turkish Air Force and on Kurdish
and Turkish Nationalism”, Welt des Islams 40/1, (March 2000): 67-94.
134
Phillip S. Meilinger, “Clipping the Bombers Wings: The Geneva Disarmament Conference
and the Royal Air Force, 1932-1934,” War in History 6/3, (1999): 323.
130
51
the bottom of the arms procurement priorities of the new Republic. A final indication of the
primacy of air power over all other considerations was the Turkish interest in developing a
national aviation industry. To this end, Ankara probed for a prospective cooperation with
Berlin which was seeking a way around the Versailles restrictions on German air power and
industry.135
Problems related to the Yavuz’s reconditioning presented Field-Marshal Çakmak with
an opportunity to restore his authority over Turkish defences which he regarded as
compromised by the existence of an independent ministry of marine. Shortly after awarding
of the contract, a number of technical problems emerged with the floating dock, and the
situation became more complicated with corruption charges against Minister of Marine Ali
İhsan Eryavuz. The result was a significant delay in the realization of the project. The
corruption charges caused not only the impeachment of the Minister himself but also resulted
in the abolition of the Ministry of Marine in December 1927. The demise of the Ministry of
Marine can be linked to several factors. The first one was the personal rivalry between
Minister of Marine Ali İhsan and Prime Minister İsmet İnönü.136 Secondly, Chief of Staff
Field-Marshal Fevzi Çakmak had never approved of the idea of an independent ministry of
marine. In June 1927, he strongly recommended that the Ministry be disbanded to ensure
unity of command in the Turkish armed forces.137
The corruption case thus provided a strong pretext to get rid of the Minister and his
Ministry. A third factor that may be added to the above is that by 1927 the Republican regime
could afford to dispense with the Ministry of Marine. It had consolidated its rule domestically
Yavuz Özgüldür, Türk-Alman İlişkileri (1923-1945), (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi,
1993): 65-69.
136
Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Politikada 45 Yıl, 2nd ed., (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları,
1984): 105.
137
BCA 45.292.15 “General Staff to Prime Ministry,” (3 June 1927). The written
recommendation of Marshal Çakmak on disbanding the Ministry of Marine was also brought
to the attention of President Atatürk.
135
52
and achieved complete control of the Turkish military by 1926. In addition, the opposition
party, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, had been closed down in 1925. Later some of its
members were tried and executed for their alleged involvement in the attempted assassination
of President Mustafa Kemal in 1926. The leader of the party, Rauf Orbay, had to flee the
country. The ruling elite’s consolidation of power marked the beginning of single-party rule
in Turkey, which was to last until 1946.138
138
Zürcher, Political Opposition…, 92-93.
53
3. TURKEY’S SECURITY DILEMMA: BUILDING A REPUBLICAN NAVY:
The early interwar years remained a true self-help environment for Turkey as the new
regime had to count on its own means for security. In that period, Turkey’s efforts to arm
itself to ensure its own security initially reinforced its image as an outcast bound to challenge
the post-war order in Europe. Moreover, other international outcasts or dissatisfied powers,
such as Germany, the Soviet Union and Italy, figured prominently as suppliers of arms to
Turkey. This pattern of arms trading emerged for a number of reasons, including the renewal
of old links or influences and the reluctance of other suppliers to subsidize or open credit lines
for arms sales to foreign powers like Turkey.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that the old links or influences featured the same
degree of resilience for every traditional supplier of arms to Turkey (to the Ottoman Empire,
to be precise). Britain was a case in point. Understandably, the British government had no
interest whatsoever in funding or subsidizing arms for others while it was seeking ways of
curbing arms expenditure at home. Finally, and as a corollary to the above, Turkey’s growing
appetite for arms seemed to contradict the enthusiasm for international disarmament which
was initially focused on navies. Hence, Turkish naval revival had to take place against this
largely unsuitable international diplomatic and naval background.
Naval Instructors: Revival of German Influence?
The hiring of foreign instructors or advisors in reforming the military along European
(or Western) models had largely been a dictate in pursuit of military reform in the Ottoman
54
Empire since the early 19th Century.139 On the eve of the First World War, the foreign
advisors' authority in the Empire had grown immensely. At that time, the German military
mission was practically in command of the Ottoman Army whereas it was the British naval
mission which ran the Navy.140 When the Empire entered the war in 1914, a German naval
mission took over the Navy from the British mission. Although their competence and even
their authority were questioned and occasionally challenged by Ottoman officers,141 foreign
advisors had a lasting influence on Turkish military culture, a fact not missed by foreign
observers. For instance, while evaluating the state of the Turkish Navy for its annual report of
1924, the British Embassy in Turkey concluded: "from the British point of view, any
weakening of the navy is to be regretted, as it is an important stronghold of the ancient
traditional Anglophile sentiment in Turkey."142
Foreign influence in the armed services manifested itself in the procurement decisions,
operational, organizational, and training procedures in Republican Turkey. In 1924 the
Turkish Navy was hampered by a lack of uniform operating rules and drill procedures for the
ships. When the British and German naval missions left the country, they took with them the
manuals they had prepared for the Ottoman Navy. This caused a great degree of discontinuity
in Turkish naval development. The officers had to rely at best on their memories in
reconstructing procedures the foreign missions had devised. The navy initially adapted mixed
procedures that reflected the diversity of training the Ottoman navy had undergone at the
139
See David B. Ralston, Importing the European Army (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1990): 54-55. For naval missions see, Celalettin Yavuz, Osmanlı Bahriyesi’nde
Yabancı Misyonlar, (İstanbul: Dz. İk. Grp. K.’lığı Basımevi, [1999].
140
Jehuda Wallach, Bir Askeri Yardımın Anatomisi: Türkiye'de Prusya-Alman Askeri
Heyetleri, 1835-1919 (translated by F. Çeliker) (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basımevi, 1985);
Chris B. Rooney, "The International Significance of the British Naval Mission to the Ottoman
Empire," Middle Eastern Studies 34/1 (January 1998).
141
Orbay, Cehennem Degirmeni I…, 160.
142
PRO FO 371/10870, E3338/3338/44 (1 June 1925).
55
hands of British and then German instructors.143 However, the new rulers of Turkey were
determined not to repeat the Ottoman experience with foreign military and naval missions.
Before hiring naval advisors, the Turkish government considered a variety of options.
It was pragmatic enough to approach even London, although Anglo-Turkish relations were far
from cordial after the Mosul debacle.144 In addition to the poor state of their relations, the
high rates of pay demanded for British advisors presented a practical econmic problem.
London turned out to be willing to discuss the possibility of sending retired officers at lower
rates of pay.145 By the time this alternative offer was made in 1926 Ankara had made its
choice in favour of the Germans to advise and train Turkish naval officers. In hindsight, it
can be argued that the Turkish order for German-designed submarines from the Netherlands
in 1925 more or less defined the choice of foreign naval advisors. The submarine order and
the decision to recruit German naval advisors intensified international interest in Turkish
naval programs. London considered the hiring of retired German naval officers as a violation
of Article 179 of the Treaty of Versailles. It even contemplated filing a protest note to the
Turkish government. It never did so, as British diplomats admitted that they did not possess
any lever to induce Ankara to backtrack from its decision.146
Contrary to international perceptions, some Turkish authors argue, that, for a number
of reasons, since the end of the First World War up until 1933, no significant progress was
made in reviving Turkish-German military relations. First and foremost, the Versailles
restrictions had remained a barrier to such a revival. Secondly, there was a certain element of
Afif Büyüktuğrul, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Donanmasının Ellinci Yılı," Belleten 37/148,
(October 1973): 503.
144
PRO FO 371/10870, E4368/3543/44 (27 July 1925). London was interested in restoring
naval links with Turkey. In response to a British shipyard's request for clearance to bid for a
Turkish tender for destroyers, the Admiralty wrote "the fact that our relations with Turkey are
strained is an additional reason for encouraging Messrs. Beardmore to tender, as it is
preferable that the Turks should have to rely on us for ammunition, torpedoes, spare parts,
etc." PRO FO 371/11521, E121713/44 (20 February 1926).
145
PRO FO 371/10870, E7305/3543/44 (26 November 1925).
146
PRO FO 371/11544, E4168/513/44 (10 July 1926).
143
56
distrust and resentment from the Turkish public and press towards the Germans whom they
held responsible for the Ottoman entry into the First World War. Finally, others, particularly
the powers victorious in the war, eyed any attempt having military/naval implications between
the former allies with great suspicion and from time to time tried to block any improvement in
military relations between the two countries.147
Nevertheless, the hiring of former German officers and non-commissioned officers as
instructors/advisors was regarded as a manifestation of continued German influence in
Turkish military/naval affairs. The choice of Germans over others as instructors/advisors
reflected two motivations of the Turkish government. First, the whole military system that
had been inherited from the Empire was based on the Prussian/German system in terms of
organization and training. Military rejuvenation required a revival of the German link, at least
for training purposes. Secondly, as a result of large scale demobilization of the German
armed forces, unemployed or retired former German officers and non-commissioned officers
were available in large numbers to serve other countries. As a corollary to that, it was much
cheaper to hire them than to hire the British, for instance, as advisors/instructors. The hirings
began in 1926. Under individual service contracts, former German military/naval personnel
were recruited as contracted instructor officers, first in the faculties of the War and Naval
Academies. Their numbers remained modest until 1933. However, their impact on the
shaping of the new Turkey’s military organization and military thinking is considered to have
gone beyond what their number would normally suggest. The process witnessed a revival of
admiration for the German military tradition in Turkey.148
From the outset, the Turkish government and the General Staff were very sensitive
about how the German naval advisors’ role and status would be perceived by foreign
147
148
Özgüldür, Türk-Alman İlişkileri…, 63.
Özgüldür, Türk-Alman İlişkileri…, 64-65.
57
governments.149 Different from the practice during the Ottoman period, foreign advisors
were kept out of the chain of command. The body of German naval advisors was designated
as an “advisory group” rather than a “naval mission” to avoid any resemblance to the British
or German Naval Missions of the Ottoman era.150 From time to time, the Turks vocally
expressed their disappointment with the German naval advisors’ “unsatisfactory”
performance.151 There was a certain degree of truth in such statements. However, they can be
considered more as political statements aimed to appease the foreign governments that
attentively followed their activities. In spite of official “disappointment,” Ankara continued
to hire retired German naval advisors or instructors until 1939.
The arrival of German naval advisors also exposed the rift between the adherents of
“the British school” and those of “the German school” in the Turkish Navy. Particularly for
the former group, the new German advisors were not in the same league as the British Naval
Mission in the Ottoman navy had been.152 Moreover, the senior member of the advisory
group, Admiral Von Gagern initially suggested a naval force very much in line with the
Turkish General Staff’s concept of naval power. He advised that all remaining Ottoman naval
units be scrapped and the navy be built from scratch with motorboats and aircraft.153
However, eventually, the German advisors devised an order of battle for the Turkish Navy154
which included a battleship squadron of eight vessels supplemented by a flotilla of eight
destroyers.155
Cemil Koçak, Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923-1939 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi,
1991): 46.
150
Büyüktuğrul, Cunhuriyet Donanması…, 27.
151
Koçak, Türk-Alman İlişkileri…, 46.
152
Büyüktuğrul, Osmanlı Deniz Harp…, 622.
153
PRO FO 371/11544 E2050/513/44 (29 March 1926).
154
Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanması…, 32
155
Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanması…, 32
149
58
In 1926, Germans figured prominently in another significant naval affair. The contract
for the Yavuz’s repair and reconditioning was split between German and French contractors.
The German company, Flanders, was to build a floating dock to hold the Yavuz. Then the
French company, Penhoët, was to undertake her repairs and reconditioning. French
diplomatic archives indicate that it was President Mustafa Kemal’s own political choice to
involve the French in spite of strong lobbying by the German naval advisors in favour of
German contractors.156 He was probably motivated by a desire to avoid dependence solely on
Germany in naval matters. Paris also viewed the Yavuz’s reconditioning as a politically
significant venture. The French Embassy strongly encouraged Penhoët to proceed with the
contract, although the contracted work looked financially and technically risky for the French
company. Official French support of the private contractor was, however, devoid of any
financial commitment.157
Turning to German influence in Turkish military and naval affairs, it should be added
that although German ways dominated the Army, it is not possible to trace a similar degree of
German penetration into and influence on other services. This was mostly due to German
reluctance to send active-duty officers to serve in the air force and naval branches of the
Turkish war colleges. In view of its own priorities, the Nazi government could not spare
active-duty German officers to serve as instructors in Turkish war colleges, particularly after
1933. Hermann Goering, for instance, turned down a Turkish request for German aviators to
train Turkish officers at the Air Force War College.158
156
It should be noted that France was the only Triple Entente power with which Turkey had
cordial relations at the time. MAE, Serie E, Levant/Turquie, Vol. 77/I, no. 305, (1 and 10
November 1926).
157
MAE, Serié E, Levant/Turquie, Vol. 599, No. 305, (12 March 1930).
158
Özgüldür, Türk-Alman İlişkileri…, 95.
59
Turkish Naval Building and International Disarmament
Turkish efforts to develop a navy stood in sharp contrast to the great powers’
professed willingness to voluntarily agree to naval limitations in the aftermath of the First
World War. Like Turkey, most powers of lesser degree did not want to accept production
controls or non-proliferation agreements that worked to their disadvantage.159 As far as the
Great Powers were concerned a distinction had to be made between the attitudes of the public
and the government. Particularly in the 1920s, the idea of disarmament captured the popular
imagination. There was strong popular sentiment in the United States favouring disarmament.
This sentiment was equally shared by the American press. In Britain, on the other hand,
public sentiments and press interest in disarmament were not of a comparable degree,160
although it was public demand for ending conscription that compelled the British government
to take up the issue of German and general disarmament.161
Disarmament efforts were not confined to the navy. Indeed, German disarmament
provided for under the Treaty of Versailles was justified as being the beginning of a general
international disarmament. The French advocated German disarmament although they were
not interested in a general disarmament at all, despite both Wilson’s Fourth Point and the
League Covenant’s Article 8 suggesting this was so.162 League debate on general
disarmament led to the establishment of a Preparatory Commission in September 1925. The
Preparatory Commission became the main venue for a discussion of general disarmament,
particularly in the absence of political will on the part of the major powers. However, this
159
Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of the Naval Arms Limitation, 19141922, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976.): 78.
160
Dingman, Power in the Pacific…, 217.
161
Zora Steiner, “The League of Nations and the Quest for Security,” in The Quest for
Stability: Problems of West European Security, 1918-1957, Ahmann, R., A. M. Birke, M.
Howard (eds.), (Oxford: Oxford University Pres, 1993): 61.
162
Steiner, “The League of Nations…, 61.
60
evident lack of political will did not end or kill the pursuit of the issue. The Preparatory
Commission created its own momentum as a result of the emergence of sprit of camaraderie
and an interest in finding acceptable compromises among the experts who worked on the
specialized committees.163
Moreover, the efforts of smaller should also be taken into account among the sources
of sustained momentum for disarmament negotiations.164 The issue was added to the agenda
of the League’s first Assembly by three Scandinavian countries in 1920. , The smaller powers
were to gain disproportionately more than the great powers from a general disarmament.
Finally, “for the first time they were given, in the League, an opportunity to make their voice
heard on all international issues.”165 The disarmament discussions at Geneva revealed the
skill of the experts and the national egoism of the participating powers, as each Great Power
came up with an innovative proposal that called for the abolition of a category of arms in
which its rival enjoyed clear superiority. All these proposals were made in pursuit of a
principle of qualitative disarmament.166
In light of recent evidence and scholarship on interwar disarmament, the extent to
which Turkish naval building defied the general trend is at least debatable. Evidently, back
then the Turkish rulers and the elite did not hide their skepticism on the issue. For instance,
Afet Inan, a protégé of President Atatürk, wrote in a government-endorsed pamphlet in 1930
that “disarmament is very humanitarian as an idea. It is desirable to see that this idea is put
into practice in the world, yet it is not practical at all. It will [hence] remain eternally a noble
Steiner, “The League of Nations…, 64-65.
Philip Towle, “British Security and Disarmament Policy in Europe in the 1920s,” in The
Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security, 1918-1957, Ahmann, R., A. M.
Birke, M. Howard (eds.), (Oxford: Oxford University Pres, 1993): 148
165
Towle, “British Security..., 149.
166
Maurice Vaisse, “Security and Disarmament: Problems in the Development of the
Disarmament Debates, 1919-1934,” in The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European
Security, 1918-1957, Ahmann, R., A. M. Birke, M. Howard (eds.), (Oxford: Oxford
University Pres, 1993): 189-190.
163
164
61
idea.”167 Turkish suspicions regarding Great Powers’ motivation for championing
disarmament and restrictions on arms trade had already been put on record by Turkish
representative at the Arms Traffic Conference in Geneva in 1925. Mehmet Tevfik Bey
expressed a vocal opposition to the proposals for licensing requirement for arms exports. He
argued “If the governments of arms-producing states could halt the flow of arms by denying
licensing, the Convention [on arms trade] could become a tool for the Great Powers to
dominate the small.”168
On the other hand, successive British governments between 1919 and 1934 managed
to foster the impression both in words and deeds that they fully embraced the idea of
disarmament. Later studies on disarmament between the two World Wars consistently
indicate skepticism regarding disarmament rather than enthusiasm among the British
ministers and diplomats in the Foreign Office. Richardson links the politicians’ and
professionals’ skepticism to their collective experience. He argues that ministers and career
diplomats “... had grown up during the high-noon of the Empire, when British power was
unrivalled, and found it difficult to adjust to the changed circumstances of the 1920s. They
might declare themselves in favour of disarmament in public, but in the confines of the
cabinet room they were reluctant to take decisions that would translate their word into
action.”169
Whom McKercher dubs “Edwardians,” refers to a generation of British foreign policymaking-elite “who prided themselves on seeing the world for what it was, not what it should
[Afet İnan], Yurt Bilgisi Notlarımdan Askerlik Vazifesi, (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1930):
36-37.
168
David R. Stone, “Imperialism and Soverignty: The League of Nations’ Drive to Control
the Global Arms Trade,” Journal of Contemporary History 35/2, (2000): 224
169
Dick Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s, (London:
Pinter Publishers, 1989): 46-47.
167
62
be.”170 The “Edwardians” did not see any substantial change in essential British interests as a
result of the First World War. On the contrary, the geographical scope of those interests was
expanded with the acquisition of mandates in the Middle East and Africa after the war. The
only change the war brought about was in the constellation of powers that could pose a threat
to British interests. Consequently, until 1937, the career diplomats and the foreign secretaries,
with the exception of Anthony Eden, viewed the League of Nations only as “a tool in the
British diplomatic arsenal.”171
Pointing to the link between domestic and international dynamics in the case of
America, O’Connor argues that international disarmament caused tension between politicians
and naval/military professionals at home. Such a tension was inevitable for each side set out
with a completely different set of assumptions. For civilian decision-makers, security was at
times viewed in the broader context of goodwill and international agreement, whereas for
naval experts or professionals, it was an issue to be strictly regarded within the context of
armaments. For instance, in America “... professional military views were clearly overridden
by the civilian policy-makers, for the naval experts failed to secure the two-to-one superiority
over the Japanese that they deemed essential, and they had to abandon the island bases in the
Western Pacific... In effect, military advantage was sacrificed to the broader gains, which, at
the time, seemed a real prospect”.172
Indeed, the architects of the Treaty of Washington of 1922 shaped an international
naval order which no single power might dominate.173 They were hardly idealists; even
B. J. C. McKercher, “Old Diplomacy and New: The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy,
1919-1939,” in Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890-1950,
M. Dockrill and Brian McKercher (eds.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 1996): 84.
171
McKercher, “Old Diplomacy and New...,” 84.
172
Raymond G. O’Connor, Force and Diplomacy: Essays Military and Diplomatic, (Florida:
University of Miami Pres, 1972: 25). See also Raymond G. O’Connor, Perilous Equilibrium:
The United States and the London Naval Conference of 1930, (Lawrence: University of
Kansas Pres, 1963: 125).
173
Dingman, Power in the Pacific…, 212.
170
63
Wilson himself appreciated the link between naval power and successful diplomacy. They
were actually realists who tried to reconcile the forces for change with the international
system as well as with conditions at home. Their common aim was to establish a more stable,
less tension-filled international political and naval order than had existed before 1914.174 The
above analysis more or less accurately portrays the essence of American, British and Japanese
behaviour regarding naval disarmament.
Two lesser naval powers, France and Italy, differed in motivation from these three. To
start with, the Washington limitations on capital ships did not generate any immediate
practical impact on either French or Italian navies as the current tonnages they were allotted
were far below the Treaty limits. French participation in the Washington Treaty seemed to
have been diplomatically motivated, whereas Italy became a party to the Treaty which,
indeed, granted Italy the status of naval parity with France. Thus, the Treaty itself stood more
as an endorsement of Italy’s great power status than as a curb on it. Writing in 1935, Chaput
argued “that the Washington agreements included France and Italy was therefore purely
incidental.”175
The idea of banning submarines altogether was hotly debated at Washington. When
several proposals aimed at abolishing submarines or limiting their production failed, for a
while attention shifted to the subject of submarines being used. A Republican Congressman,
Elihu Root, came out with a proposition that would regard unwarned submarine attacks on
merchant vessels as an act of piracy. The Treaty relating to the use of Submarines and
Noxious Gases in Warfare of 6 February 1922 represents a futile attempt to regulate the use of
submarines. Although it was signed by all signatories to the Treaty of Washington, it could
Dingman, Power in the Pacific…, 216.
Roland Aimé Chaput, Disarmament in British Foreign Policy, (London: Unwin Brothers
Ltd., 1935): 198.
174
175
64
not be put into effect because of France’s failure to ratify it.176 Unwarned submarine attacks
as acts of piracy would later form the basis for the Nyon arrangement in 1937.
There were also efforts to extend naval limitations not only to other types of vessels
but also to other naval powers. The British, for a while, tried to persuade naval powers which
were not represented at Washington to reduce their forces. This idea was first brought up by
Rear-Admiral Segrave in July 1922. Consequently, a conference of experts met in Rome
from 14 to 25 February, 1924 to discuss the issue. Obviously, the idea of naval disarmament
did not resonate well with most of the smaller naval powers. Indeed, Spain, Brazil, Argentina
and the Soviet Union rejected the idea of freezing or reducing their naval forces.177
The British reaction to the news of Turkish submarine orders from the Dutch I.v.S.
shipyard may, for instance, also be regarded in the context of general British dislike for
submarines, particularly for those in the possession of the small powers. The British stood
firmly, for instance, against the idea of allowing the small countries bordering on the Baltic to
acquire submarines for their naval defence needs. The British representative on the Naval
Subcommission [of the Permanent Advisory Commission] voted against the idea on the
grounds that possession of submarines was likely to add a new dimension of hostility to the
existing unsettled conditions in the region. Moreover, the British argument went on, these
countries were located in such close proximity to each other that this ruled out the imposition
of an individual tonnage limitation “to ensure the purely defensive use of the submarine.”178
In 1922, before the new Turkish state placed an order for two submarines with the
I.v.S, international disarmament had already culminated in the major naval powers’ first
agreement on limitations on capital ships under the Washington Treaty.179 This early success
Dingman, Power in the Pacific…, 208-209.
Towle, “British Security…,” 136.
178
Chaput, Disarmament in British…, 130: n. 1.
179
See E. Goldstein, J. Maurer and E. R. May (eds.), The Washington Conference, 1921-22:
Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (Essex: Frank Cass, 1994).
176
177
65
was taken over-optimistically as the harbinger of worldwide disarmament in the interwar
period. Although only the United States, Britain, France, Italy and Japan were signatories to
the Washington Treaty, other nations were also invited to adhere to its limitations. In June
1924, Athens declared its willingness to accept a 35,000-ton limit for capital ships on two
conditions: first, Turkey’s tonnage would not exceed this figure; second, Greece would
reserve the right to acquire or build a cruiser in place of the Salamis if the latter could not be
completed.180
In the 1920s, the better-trained and better-equipped Greek Navy enjoyed an
unchallenged edge over the Turkish navy, which was a motley collection of antiquated vessels
inherited from the Ottoman Navy.181 Greek naval supremacy in the Aegean clearly hinged on
the status of Yavuz. Prospects for her return to service prompted the Greek government to
seek a ten-year “naval holiday” with Turkey modeled on the Washington Treaty. However,
Athens attached additional strings to its proposal. It would reserve the right to build two
cruisers to replace two pre-dreadnought battleships, Lemnos and Kilkis (formerly USS Idaho
and USS Mississippi). In that case, the naval balance in the Aegean would be preserved on
the side of Greece even if Turkey re-commissioned the battlecruiser Yavuz.
In reply, Ankara justified its naval program by pointing to growing Soviet naval power
in the Black Sea.182 In hindsight, it appears that the Soviet naval programs provided Ankara
with a solid excuse to continue with its own naval program in disregard of the proposals for
naval limitations in the Aegean.183 It is questionable if they had ever considered the Soviet
180
PRO FO 371/9598 A3838/52/45 (24 June 1924).
For an interesting comparison of Turkish and Greek naval strengths, see PRO FO
371/13085, E252/43/44 (5 January 1928). For the Ottoman naval units, see Bernd
Langensiepen and Ahmet Güleryüz, The Ottoman Steam Navy: 1828-1923 (İstanbul: Denizler
Kitapevi, 2000).
182
PRO FO 371/10223 E6637/3189/44 (28 July 1924).
183
See for instance, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “The 1930 Greek-Turkish Naval Protocol,”
Diplomacy and Statecraft 9/1 (March 1998): 92-93.
181
66
Navy a potentially hostile power against which offensive plans or measures were needed, at
least until 1939.184 Nevertheless, the two Black Sea navies could not help but keep a weary
eye on each other’s naval programs and movements that might tip the balance of power in
favour of the other.
The views espoused by the Soviet delegate at the Rome Naval Conference, Eugene
Berens, revealed the Soviet approach to the issue of disarmament in general and its regional
implications in the Black Sea. Berens argued that a strong navy was a dictate of geography
for the Soviet Union as the First World War experience had shown. Throughout the war,
Russia’s northern and Black Sea coasts had remained exposed and vulnerable to enemy
attack. Hence, he adopted a position that linked the Soviet Union’s adherence to the idea of a
naval holiday to the fulfillment of certain conditions that were supposed to enhance security
for his country. The Soviet Union would be willing to freeze its navy at the Russian Navy’s
1921 level, if all Russian warships, wherever located, were included in the Soviet tonnage for
1921. The Soviet naval freeze would also be conditional on certain “insignificant”
amendments to post-First World War arrangements, including closure of the Black Sea and
revision of the Lausanne Convention which called for an international administration and
demilitarization of the Turkish Straits.185
The initial Soviet proposal demanded a capital ship tonnage allowance nearly
comparable to those of the United States and Britain, the two greatest naval powers of the
time.186 In their subsequent proposal, the Soviets backtracked and offered to reduce their
capital ship tonnage to 280,000 tons, on the following conditions:
184
PRO ADM 1/9992 NID 02286/MO87/40 (15 December 1939).
Robert W. Lambert, Soviet Disarmament Policy: 1922-1931, Research Report 64-2,
(Washington, D.C.: United States Arms Control Control and Disarmament Agency,
1964: 6-7.
186
Lambert, Soviet Disarmament Policy…, 7-8.
185
67
“1. The Council of the League of Nations is replaced in the draft [treaty] by another
organization.
2. The Bosphorus and the Dardanelles (the Straits) are closed, in accordance with the
proposal which we [the Soviets] made at the Lausanne Conference.
3. The vessels of war belonging to non-riparian states of the Baltic are forbidden
access to the Baltic by the Sound and Belt.
4. The Straits of Korea are demilitarized (disarmed).
5. The vessels of war at present retained at Bizerta are restored to the Union…”187.
There is no definite account of the original scope of the Turkish naval program in the
1920s. Foreign archives indicate that the Turkish government had advertised largely
inflated numbers for its naval orders.188 In December 1924, the French naval authorities
were convinced that the program would cover six light cruisers, 24 destroyers and 16
submarines to be built in five years.189 According to an earlier French naval attaché report,
the program would include 20 destroyers and nine submarines to be built in 10 years.190
Two years later, in 1926, the British naval attaché reported that the initial naval program
the German naval advisors had drawn up provided for six submarines, two destroyers and
one cruiser.191
However, the priority always remained on submarines, the favourite naval weapon of
the Turkish General Staff. When the Turks went shopping for submarines, the interwar
international arms trade system presented them with additional difficulties. The new arms
trade system mirrored the post-First World War political order. In Europe, Britain and
France retained their arms-production capabilities. While London considered arms
Cited in Lambert, Soviet Disarmament Policy…, 11-12.
For foreign assessments of Turkish naval programs in that period, see Serhat Güvenç,
“Yabancı Arşivlere Göre Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Deniz Kuvvetleri” Deniz Kuvvetleri
Dergisi, No. 586, (March 2003): 3-11.
189
SHM, Carton 1BB2/86, Bulletin de Rensignements, No. 1231 (December 1924): 58.
190
SHM, Carton 1BB7/189 “Marine Turquie: Renseigments Generaux: Chapitre Second” (10
July 1924).
191
PRO FO 371/11557, E7070/7070/44 (28 December 1926).
187
188
68
production and trade issues in the context of disarmament, Paris continued to pursue
traditional balance-of- power objectives in the arms trade.192
Another European arms producer and trader, Germany, was kept out of the system
until 1934. An extra-territorial power in Europe, the United States, also emerged as a
major supplier of arms. There was strong public aversion to arms production and trade
after the First World War, particularly in Britain and the United States. Consequently, the
temporary absence of Germany, coupled with British and American policies of selfrestraint, resulted in a supplier vacuum in the international arms trade system. The
reluctance of major arms suppliers to spend even on their own armed services produced
two significant consequences.193 First, private arms producers turned to foreign markets in
a world of shrinking domestic procurement bases. Second, the pro-disarmament nations
stopped providing government guarantees or subventions for foreign sales.
This situation restricted Turkey in its choice of naval arms suppliers. Given the poor
state of its economy, foreign credits and government guarantees were imperative for
building new naval units. Only European powers unsatisfied by the status quo would
provide such facilities for political purposes. Italy had already embarked on ambitious
arms projects to fill the supplier vacuum, whereas Germany was seeking a way around the
Versailles restrictions.194 Consequently, both countries figured prominently in Turkish
naval programs in the 1920s. France was also a potentially strong supplier to the Turkish
arms market. However, the deterioration of political relations soon ruled out the French
option.
For instance, see Martin Thomas, “To Arm an Ally: French Arms Sales to Romania, 19261949,” Journal of Strategic Studies 19/2 (June 1996): 231-259.
193
For an account of British naval policy, see David Mac Gregor, “Former Naval Cheapskate:
Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy, 1924-1929,” Armed
Forces and Society 19/3 (Spring 1993): 319-333.
194
Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992): 72-78.
192
69
By August 1924, British, American, French and Italian shipyards had already offered
to supply submarines to the Turkish navy. According to the French naval attaché report,
British ship-builder Armstrong Vickers' offer to build five submarines was conditional on the
scrapping of the battlecruiser Yavuz within five years. Among the French shipyards,
Schneider was singled out as the strongest contender, as it had an outstanding contract to
deliver to Ottoman Navy two submaries from its 1914 order at a cost of 4.760.000 French
francs.195 Along similar lines, it was speculated that the Italian shipbuilder Ansaldo might be
preferred by the Turks because of its outstanding obligation to supply a cruiser that had been
ordered by the Ottoman Empire but commandeered by the Italian navy after the invasion of
Tripoli in 1911.196
The British-Turkish rift over the status of Mosul in September 1924 had immediate
impact on the submarine deal. During the crisis, Italy supported Britain and was poised to
stake a claim in Western Turkey, if the crisis led to a British-Turkish war and to the collapse
of the fragile regime in Turkey. Hence, when the Turkish government invited bids for one
submarine, the British bidder Armstrong Vickers was eliminated par principe, whereas
Ansaldo's bid was rejected on the grounds that its submarines were of outdated design.197 In
December 1924, the strongest contenders for the Turkish submarine contract were two
French, one Dutch (offering German designs) and one Swedish shipbuilder.
The Turkish navy decided to place its order with the Dutch shipyard. The Turkish
decision disappointed the French, who had been almost sure that their shipyards would
receive the contract.198 The order was justifiably taken as a clear indication of the continued
German influence on the Turkish navy. In fact, of the three officers that evaluated the designs
See, BOA, 99/4-2, 1338, C26, “Gouvernement Imperial Ottoman-Schneider & Cie.
Convention,” (30 April 1914).
196
SHM, Carton 1BB7/150, Bulletin de Informations Militaires, (Turquie), No. 292 (12
August 1924).
197
MAE, Serie E, Levant/Turquie, Vol. 77/I, no. 305, (3 December 1924): 54.
198
MAE, Serie E, Levant/Turquie, Vol. 77/I, no. 305, (5 June 1925): 69-73.
195
70
offered, two had had training on German submarines during the First World War.199 Thus,
they were certainly likely to be more inclined towards German designs. The disappointed
French also mentioned the possibility of bribery in view of reportedly higher Dutch unit
prices.200 All these factors may have contributed to the outcome. However, the decisive
factor was the secret funds Germany pledged to the building of these submarines. Indeed, the
Dutch shipyard of Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw (I.v.S.) had been set up by three
German shipbuilders, Krupp Germaniawerft (Kiel), A.G. Weser (Bremen) and Vulkanwerft
(Hamburg and Stettin), seeking a way around the Versailles restrictions on German
submarine-building. German financial support meant that Ankara could order two
submarines instead of a single unit. In return, Turkish submarines could be counted on in the
training of a new generation of German submariners.201
The naval programs of Turkey, already an outcast in the 1920s, even though modest
by any standards, served to reinforce Turkey’s image as a potential revisionist. The hiring of
German naval instructors, the ordering of submarines secretly funded by Germany and finally
the refurbishing of the “notorious” battlecruiser Yavuz were all regarded as manifestations of
Turkish ill-will towards the post-war international settlement.202 It was around this time that
European intellectuals such as Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi were espousing ideas about
the need for a European union. Not surprisingly, he conceived the European Union as an
Metel, Türk Denizaltıcılık…, 27-28.
MAE, Serie E, Levant/Turquie, Vol. 77/I, no. 305, (2 June 1925): 73.
201
Björn Forsén and Annette Forsén, “German Secret Submarine Exports, in Girding for
Battle: the Arms Trade in a Global Perspective, 1815-1940, (eds.) Donald J. Stoker Jr. and
Jonathan A. Grant, (London: Preager, 2003): 116-117; also Herwig, “Innovation Ignored…”,
232
202
See, for instance, “The Goeben Again.” The Times, (26 May 1925). This reputation of the
battlecruiser Yavuz was a direct result of the role attributed to her as SMS Goeben in the
Otoman Empire’s “drift” into the First World War. Churchill himself wrote that “For the
peoples of the Middle East SMS Goeben carried more slaughter, more misery and more ruin
than has ever before borne within the compass of a ship.” Cited in Geoffrey Bennet, Naval
Battles of the First World War, (London: Penguin Books, 2001): 14.
199
200
71
answer to what he imagined as a Russo-Turkish military threat to Europe in general203 and a
Turkish threat to the Balkan countries in particular.204 Thus, in the 1920s, Turkey seemed to
have a long way to go in order to be accepted back into the European states system as a
legitimate member. Strangely, Turkey’s way back into the international fold began with the
improvement of its diplomatic and naval relations with Italy who at the time considered the
existing European system unfair.
Daniel C. Villanueva, “Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa as the Elusive
‘Object of Longing,’” Rocky Mountain Review 67, (Fall 2005): 70.
204
Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe (New York: Alfred.A. Knopf, 1926): 177178.
203
72
4. TAMING THE ITALIAN THREAT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
During the interwar period, Italian-Turkish relations oscillated between antagonism and
friendship. From time to time antagonism and friendship went hand in hand, which led French
diplomats to label Italian-Turkish relations as amiadversion (amity-adversity).205 The cycles of
antagonism and friendship in Italian-Turkish relations were best summarized by a British diplomat
who described the evaluation of Italian-Turkish relations in stages of ‘warmth’, ‘cooling off’ and
‘frost.206 The “warmth” was the prevailing climate between 1928 and 1932 during which Ankara’s
foreign policy featured many contradictions that resulted from shifts and re-orientations in foreign
relations, mostly for pragmatic reasons in search of security in an external environment perceived as
largely hostile to Turkey.
Their frustration with the existing international system provided a common ground for Italy
and Turkey in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Ankara was not a challenger to the status quo. Its
resentment stemmed largely from being excluded from the post-War international order and from
lack of recognition of Turkey as an equal and legitimate member of the international community.
This resentment did not necessarily entail a revisionist stand. Mussolini’s Italy, on the other hand,
pursued recognition of its political equality. Mussolini’s policy was aimed at securing a greater say
and share in world affairs as a fully-fledged Great Power, not as the least of the great powers.
While Ankara viewed the international system as being composed of horizontally ordered equal and
sovereign states, Fascist Italy’s policy was premised according to a Great -Power-managed internal
system of hierarchically ranked states. Consequently, the common ground was not to last long and
Italian and Turkish policies evolved in diverging directions after the mid-1930s, particularly after
205
MEA, Levant/Turquie, Vol. 616, no. 316, (27 April 1935): 49-51. Amiadversion defined a
relationship which includes elements of both friendship and adversity.
206
PRO FO 371/19039, E1213/1213/44, (10 February 1935).
73
Turkey’s admission to the League of Nations which symbolized the end of its exclusion from the
international system. It must be granted that unintended consequences of this short-lived ItalianTurkish friendship included rapprochement between Ankara and Athens as well as international
endorsement of Turkey’s European identity through its participation in various schemes and
proposals for political and economic union in Europe. Finally, Turkish naval revival in the early
1930s with Italian government loans can be regarded as another unintended consequence of the
years of “warmth.”
Italy as a Potential Menace in the Mediterranean
The ambiguous relationship between Italy and Turkey depended, in part on Turkey’s
concerns about security. These concerns were based on the fact that Turkish people had witnessed
Italian aggression in Tripoli and the Dodecanese in 1912 and, following the First World War, had
had to endure the Italian occupation of part of Anatolia. Although Italy withdrew its occupation
forces during the Turkish War of Independence,207 Mussolini’s advent to power with a pronounced
rhetoric of change in foreign policy, dubbed tono fascista (fascist tone), immediately revived
Turkish fears of Italy.208 While history loomed large in shaping Turkish leaders’ views of Italy,
Turkey’s approach was also influenced by two inter-related factors: the need for foreign economic
support and its international isolation. These two factors prompted Ankara to seek rapprochement
with the great powers of Europe in order to survive as a new nation-state.
Mevlüt Çelebi, Milli Mücadele Döneminde Türk-İtalyan İlişkileri, (Ankara: Dışişleri
Bakanlığı Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 1999); Fabio L. Grassi, L’Italia e la Questione
Turca (1919-1923) (Turin: Silvio Zamaroni Editore, 1996). For Turkish translation of the
book, see Fabio L. Grassi, İtalya ve Türk Sorunu 1919-1923 Kamuoyu ve Dış Politika,
(İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2000).
208
H. James Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period 1918-1940
(Connecticut: Praeger, 1997): 55.
207
74
Between 1922 and 1927, Mussolini’s tono fascista translated into Italy’s refusal to see
Turkey as a sovereign state. It viewed the new country only as a geographical entity, Anatolia, with
promising opportunities for Italian expansion. In the case of the collapse of the new regime in
Turkey, the Italians were planning to invade the country by taking advantage of the proximity of the
Dodecanese Islands and using them as a staging post. It was expected that the ongoing Mosul issue
between Ankara and London would lead to the disintegration of Turkey and would offer an
opportunity for Rome to get its share of Anatolia. Mussolini was convinced that the new Turkey
was not strong enough to resist a powerful country such as Britain. As ”a frustrated potential ally of
Britain”, Mussolini’s Italy expected to be treated by Britain like ”a sister rather than a waitress”. 209
Mussolini believed that, due to the Mosul crisis, Turkey would offer Rome this chance.
After he came to power in Italy, Mussolini pursued an Italian version of Lebensraum in the
Balkans.210 The Balkan Peninsula, an area between the Adriatic and the Aegean, lies north of the
Mediterranean, the Mare Nostrum of Mussolini. Actually, the early twenties offered conditions
conducive to Italian expansion into these territories as Mussolini’s advent to power followed the
collapse of both the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Empire. Mussolini aimed to extend Italian
control over the new nation-states that had thus come into existence in the territories of these former
multi-ethnic empires. The Balkans, at the crossroads of the two collapsed empires, became a natural
target and preoccupation for the Fascist regime.
For Mussolini, Turkey, in the first half of the 1920s, was not a country in the Balkans
worthy of attention. In fact, the fascist leader intended to keep Turkey out of Balkan affairs through
diplomacy. This goal prompted Mussolini to personally appear at the Lausanne Conference
(November 1922-July 1923). Mussolini’s policy at Lausanne was a typical example of the
persistence of Italy’s former colonial policies. Italy had a special interest in the Dodecanese, which
formed the maritime border of the two Mediterranean and Balkan countries, Turkey and Greece. He
209
210
J. B. Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World 1860-1960 (London: Routledge, 1996): 41.
Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy…, 24-27.
75
sought to contain Turkey because he feared that victorious Turkish nationalists might assert claims
over these islands. Mussolini must have also disliked the idea of Greece controlling various
strategic islands in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since Greece had already acquired the Northern
Aegean Islands, it had to be deterred from demanding the Dodecanese Islands.
Once in power, Mussolini invigorated Italian expansionist designs over Anatolia.
During the Lausanne Conference, the Italian representative Montagna, in a conversation with
Americans, compared Turkey to a mummy “which so long as it remained sealed in its tomb
retained its normal state but as soon as the tomb was opened and it came into contact with the
outside air it immediately began to decompose and to crumble away.” Then Montagna added
when Turkey’s collapse came, the other nations would be there to profit from it and Italy
could not be left out in the cold.211
In the final analysis, Mussolini’s presence at Lausanne was meant to convey a clear warning
to Turkey. At a time when Turkey emerged as a sovereign state, Mussolini secured formal
recognition of the Italian possession of the Dodecanese Islands. Even though at Lausanne the fascist
leader recognized the Turkish presence in the Balkans (limited to Eastern Thrace), his insistence on
the annexation of the Dodecanese by Italy made Balkan Turkey more vulnerable to any attack on
the demilitarized Straits. In addition, Mussolini was present at Lausanne to assert that Italy was an
equal “partner” with other European powers and that he would not allow Italy’s wartime allies to
cheat Italy again over the spoils of war.212
The Lausanne Conference offered Mussolini a venue to further his quest for
recognition among the Great Powers. On his way to the conference, Mussolini stopped at
Territet, several miles short of his ultimate destination. In so doing, he compelled his French
211
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Lausanne, (30 April 1923).
H. Stuart Hughes, “The Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism, 1922-1932”, in Gordon A. Graig
and Felix Gilbert (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919-1939 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981):
219.
212
76
and British counterparts to meet him for a pre-conference discussion. This may be regarded
as an achievement in terms of securing recognition of Italy’s equal status with France and
Britain. Indeed, the official communiqué issued after the meeting emphasized this equal
status. However, such recognition inevitably implied that previously Italy had not been
exactly equal.213
For Mussolini, international conferences such as the one at Lausanne were not the only fora
where Italy could assert itself. He also demonstrated that Rome could resort to violent methods in
the Balkans without regard to international organizations. When the Lausanne Conference was
drawing to an end in July 1923, Italian expansionism manifested itself over the port city of Fiume
on the Adriatic coast of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Mussolini proposed the
incorporation of Fiume into Italy. His plan was to annex the city if Belgrade rejected the proposal.
However, the chain of events prompted him to shift his immediate attention to Corfu, a Greek island
in the Adriatic. Italy attacked the island, yet had to withdraw its troops under British pressure.
Intimidated by Italy’s aggressive behaviour during the Corfu incident, Belgrade eventually
conceded and recognized Italy’s full sovereignty over Fiume.214
These developments led Ankara to conclude that Turkey would be the next target of Italian
expansionism in the Balkans. However, Mussolini’s attention at that time was directed towards the
Adriatic coast of the Balkans where he found himself blocked by French dominance.215 France
remained “public enemy number two” for Italy but after the collapse of Austro-Hungary there was
no “public enemy number one” .216 The fascist leader was obsessed with the idea of putting an end
Barclay, Glen St. J., (1973), The Rise and Fall of the New Roman Empire: Italy’s Bid for
World Power, 1890-1943, (London: Sidgwick and Jackson): 132.
214
Mussolini’s seizure of Fiume was against the Rapallo Treaty that Conte Sforza signed with
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1920.
215
In 1922, the year Mussolini came to power Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes established the Little Entente with the support of France. Eliza
Campus, The Little Entente and the Balkan Alliance (Bucaresti: Academiei Republicii
Socialiste Romania, 1978): 13-17.
216
Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World…, 44.
213
77
to French influence in the region. The best way to undermine France was to weaken its ally, the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Only after that, could he turn to Turkey, whose
viability as a new state, he believed, was questionable.
In the latter half of the 1920s, Mussolini was better situated to implement his strategy once
he had consolidated his power domestically and taken complete control of the Palazzo Chigi. Thus,
the fascist leader openly announced his dictatorship.217 The authoritarian state was also reinforced
in the foreign office by the dismissal of many officials and their replacement by committed fascists.
In fact, Mussolini was convinced that the foreign office ought to be the most fascist of all
government departments. He gave preference for diplomatic posts to those with party membership
dating back to before October 1922.218 With these new civil servants in place, Mussolini was able
to put his assertive foreign policy into practice with tono fascista.
The new phase in Italian foreign relations had a clear impact on Italian-Turkish relations.
Italian diplomatic papers indicate growing Italian interest in 1924 and 1925 in Turkish defensive
measures along the Western coast.219 Two events specifically, the Mosul issue and the signing of
the Locarno Treaties in 1925, marked a transition in Turkish-Italian relations. On the one hand, the
Locarno Treaties concerned Italian policy in Europe and the Balkans, and, therefore, inevitably
concerned Turkey as well. On the other hand, Rome expected that the Mosul issue between Ankara
and London would lead to the disintegration of Turkey and would provide Italy with a share of
Anatolia.
Distinct from the question of Mosul, Mussolini’s visit to Tripoli around the same time
was to give similar messages to Turkey. Ankara was visibly apprehensive regarding Italian
colonial aspirations in Anatolia as a result of Mussolini’s demonstrative Mediterranean cruise.
The Turkish press pointed out Italy’s recent activities in the Balkans and wrote about the loan
217
Martin Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fascist Italy, (London: Routledge, 1994): 26.
Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini, (New York: Vintage Books, 1983): 153.
219
ASMAE, Pacco 1704/7859, (29 August 1924) and Pacco 1714/7889, (21 January 1925).
218
78
recently granted to Greece for the purchase of ammunitions.220 In fact, according to
Mussolini, the British-Greek-Italian alignment was a great conspiracy against Turkey. After
the Corfu incident, the new regime of Theodoros Pangalos in Greece offered Mussolini
opportunities stemming from this alignment.
The coming to power of the military dictator, Pangalos, transformed Greece from
victim into potential junior partner. In fact, in the winter of 1925-1926, Mussolini apparently
contemplated a Corfu -style descent on Turkey.221 US High Commissioner Admiral Bristol
wrote from İstanbul to Washington that Mussolini’s visit to Tripoli preceded by Greco-Italian
pourparlers was coincidental with the British Ambassador’s return to Turkey and the
reopening of the Mosul negotiations. All these developments occasioned considerable
concern to the Turkish government as well as general uneasiness on the part of the public.222
On the one hand, the Turks were suspicious of the existence of an Italian-Greek
alliance. On the other hand, they were apprehensive about collaboration between Italy and
Britain. In fact, when Mussolini and Chamberlain met at Rapallo, the semi-official newspaper
Milliyet wrote that it would have been highly desirable for the Italian ambassador in Turkey to
have informed the Turkish public regarding the nature of the Mussolini-Chamberlain Rapallo
interview. By the end of April, there was already news in the Turkish press on the nature of
the Rapallo Conference.223
The Turkish press stated that the news of an Italian-British agreement dividing
Abyssinia into spheres of influence had thrown light on the situation. They added that the
clouds which at present darkened the European horizon had not been dispersed but on the
220
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (14 April 1926).
MacGregor Knox, Common Destiny, Dictatorship, Foreign Policy and War in Fascist Italy
and Nazi Germany, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 122.
222
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (19 April 1926).
223
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (23 April 1926).
221
79
contrary were becoming darker because of the violation of the country’s independence.224
According to the Turkish press, such a violation would indicate first that there existed no
difference between the mentality of present-day European statesmen and that of their pre-war
predecessors and secondly, that there was no international principle or doctrine which could
resist violation by the ambitious and egoistic designs of European states.225
Turkey’s feeling of insecurity concerning the European powers continued all through
the 1920s. Although Turkey accepted the solution to the Mosul issue in June 1926 in favour
of Britain for reasons of its own security, it was aware that political instability in the region
could create further problems for Ankara. After the signing of the treaty between Britain and
Turkey on the Mosul issue, an American diplomatic dispatch drew attention to the Daily
Express of London which published an article on the decision by Italy to occupy its former
“sphere of influence” in Turkey and claimed that Britain had requested the intervention of the
United States in order to maintain peace.226
Even though there was no evidence of the accuracy of the Daily Express’ report,
certain milieus in Turkey feared Italian-Greek cooperation in an Italian occupation of Cilicia.
The US legation in Bulgaria reported that Soviet and Turkish Commissioners for Foreign
Affairs discussed at Odessa the alleged existence of an Italian-Greek-Bulgarian pact,
supported by Britain, against Turkey.227 At the beginning of 1927, the Turkish press wrote
that Britain, in return for Italy’s military cooperation in China, accorded Italy absolute
freedom of action in its Turkish policy.228
This kind of rumor was a reflection of deep Turkish suspicion vis-à-vis the intentions
of the European powers such as Italy and Britain. The fact that secret agreements continued to
224
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (23 April 1926).
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (23 April 1926).
226
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (27 October 1926).
227
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Sofia, (22 November 1926).
228
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (24 February 1927).
225
80
be established, as had happened in the First World War, made the Turkish political leadership
distrustful towards the reliability of the world system. For instance, the way the Mosul issue
was resolved at the League aggravated Turkish distrust. During the Mosul discussions, Lord
Balfour said that the way had been left open for the Council to say that Turkey would only be
asked to take part in its deliberations upon terms of inequality with other members of the
Council.229
The Mosul crisis between Britain and Turkey offered an opportunity for Italy to carve out a
future sphere of influence in Anatolia. In this way, Mussolini would be able to realize the Italian
colonial dream in Anatolia since he expected the disintegration of the Republic of Turkey during
the crisis. Therefore, fascist policy was geared towards reviving the old expansionist designs of
Italy over Turkey by profiting from the conflict between Britain and Turkey. London used all of its
resources in order not to relinquish this oil-rich region to Ankara. At Lausanne, it was decided that
the Mosul issue would be settled within nine months by direct negotiations between Turkey and
Britain, or, failing that, the problem would be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.230
Bilateral negotiations led to a deadlock and the Council of the League of Nations decided in
December 1925 on the attachment of Mosul to Iraq, which was placed under British mandate for 25
years. On 6 June 1926 Turkey accepted the League of Nations’ decision by signing a treaty with
Britain concerning the establishment of the Turkish-Iraqi frontier. According to this treaty, Turkey,
in return for relinquishing Mosul, was to receive ten percent of Iraqi oil revenues for 25 years.231
229
Stephen Josep Stilwell, Jr., Anglo-Turkish Relations in the Interwar Era, (New York: The
Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd., 2003): 62.
230
Amidst the Mosul crisis, some scholars argue that London also kept in close contact with
different ethnic groups in the region that were potential threats against the new Republic of
Turkey. Mim Kemal Öke, Musul Meselesi Kronolojisi (1918-1926) (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası
Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1991): 112-140. Others state that there is no proof to show a direct link
between the rebellions and London. Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri 1919-1926
(Ankara: A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1978): 314.
231
Soysal claims Turkey preferred instead to receive five hundred thousand pound sterling
upfront from Britain in lieu of annual shares. İsmail Soysal, Türkiye’nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları
Vol. I. (1920-1945) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983), 307. In Uluğbay’s detailed study of
81
In January 1925, meanwhile, Italian diplomats in Turkey recommended to the governor of
the Dodecanese Islands that the Datça and Marmaris regions be inspected for possible landing
operations. The Italian Consul in Antalya even complained that his location was not suitable for
obtaining information on Turkish military measures on the coastal line across from the
Dodecanese.232
Ankara was alert to the possibility that Italy might send troops to Anatolia due to the Mosul
crisis.233 The Turkish press reports of the time emphasized the possibility of Italy using Rhodes as a
military base in the case of war.234 In fact, Italian diplomatic reports included extracts from daily
Turkish newspapers such as İkdam whose headlines pointed in alarm to Italian military
preparations.235 Moreover, the Turkish press in Antalya published articles against the presence of
Italians in the province. The press proposed that Italian schools and hospitals be closed. The
perpetuation of these institutions, the press argued, proved that Italy had not given up the idea of
taking over Antalya. The governor of the province had a similar opinion. He openly stated to the
Italian authorities his belief that Italy still had territorial ambitions concerning Antalya and that the
existence of Italian hospitals and schools confirmed these intentions. 236
The Italian mindset, which was fixated on colonialist expansion plans, was unsurprisingly
reflected in the strategies developed by some Italian diplomats in Turkey. A telegram sent from the
Italian Embassy in Turkey to the Italian Foreign Ministry focused on the advantages to Italy of
pursuing colonial goals in southeastern Turkey. The telegram identified 1927 as the critical year in
which to pursue colonial expansion into Turkey as the new Turkish regime began to consolidate
Turkish budgets, it is established that Turkey actually received a total of 3.5 million pound
sterling in annual instalments up until 1958. Hikmet Uluğbay, İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete
Petropolitik, (Ankara: Turkish Daily News, 1995): 263.
232
ASMAE, Pacco 1714/7889, (21 January 1925).
233
Rıfat Uçarol, Siyasi Tarih (Ankara: Havacılık Basın ve Neşriyat Müdürlüğü, 1979): 426.
234
Ayın Tarihi, 55 (August 1928): 3889.
235
ASMAE, Pacco 1714/7890, (10 April 1925).
236
ASMAE, Pacco 1714/7890, (7 April 1925).
82
domestically and before it acquired effective means to defend itself. It suggested that Italy occupy
the Adana region, instead of İzmir and Antalya, as an Italian presence in this region offered better
economic as well as political benefits. The Adana region was rich in resources that would be a great
contribution to the Italian economy. 237
Politically, possession of the region would be a substantial reward for Italian expansionism.
It would offer an opportunity for Italy to cooperate closely with Britain in the Middle East. Since
Italy would provide a counter balance in the Adana region, Britain could be at ease in Mosul.
Moreover, if the opportunity arose for Italy to support a Kurdish revolt in the region in cooperation
with Britain, the door to Persia and the Caucasus would also be wide open. The telegram also
claimed that such a scenario might even help Italy to come to better terms with the Soviet Union. In
other words, if Italy could offer the Soviets economic advantages in the Mediterranean, then
Moscow might withdraw its support of Turkey.238
The handling of the Mosul issue by the great powers convinced the Turkish political leaders
that these powers could at any time form a coalition against Turkey. It added fuel to the Turkish
fear of Europe’s great powers as the main threat to Turkey’s independence and territorial
integrity.239 Between 1923 and 1927, the Turkish Foreign Ministry let Rome know on various
occasions that they were not certain about the policies of the great powers vis-à-vis Turkey. Turkish
Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras openly declared to the Italian Ambassador in Ankara, Felice
Orsini, that, in the case of Italian-British collaboration, Turkey would consider approaching other
great powers. More specifically, Aras warned Orsini that Turkey might even conclude an
agreement on the Mediterranean with France, although Turkey was not at all on good terms with
France at the time. Ankara had in fact signed a convention of friendship and good neighborliness
with France in May 1926. The main purpose of this convention was to secure the border between
237
ASMAE, Pacco 4171/584, (9 June 1927).
ASMAE, Pacco 4171/584, (9 June 1927).
239
Haluk Ülman, “Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler I,” A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler
Fakültesi Dergisi, 26/3 (1968): 244.
238
83
Turkey and Syria, then a French mandate, in the case of armed confrontation with the European
powers, particularly over Mosul. However, Rome saw the signing of the 1926 convention as the
Turks courting the French. 240
Thus the nature of Italian-Turkish relations in general had not changed when Mussolini
came to power. The same Italian colonial intentions towards Turkey that had existed at the
beginning of the twentieth century remained in effect. The Italian military presence in the
Dodecanese islands was perceived as a continuous threat to Turkey’s security, which had already
been compromised by the demilitarization of the Straits at British insistence during the Lausanne
Conference.241 Almost weekly, the Turkish press carried reports on the imminence of an Italian
landing at Izmir.242 The Italian involvement in Albania heightened Turkish uneasiness towards
Italy. In fact, the Turkish fear of Italy was not unjustified. Referring to a conversation with the
Italian Consul-General at Mersin, a British diplomat wrote later: “[he] was at no pains to hide his
belief that at no distant date the flag of Savoy would be waving in the fertile Cilician plain.”243
A possible Turkish-French agreement was not to the advantage of Italy which
considered France as its main rival in the region. Moreover, the Mosul issue was resolved and
did not give Mussolini the chance to intervene in Anatolia. Finally, the new Turkish Republic
did not collapse. Ankara gave concession to London on the issue in order not to be vulnerable
to any great power intervention. Mahmut Bey from Siirt, in his statement released to Milliyet,
reported the opinion of a member of the opposition in Italy who said that Turkey had acted
wisely in settling the question of Mosul and had ruined all the hopes and plans which Italy
240
ASMAE, Pacco 1719/7938, (19 February 1927).
Not until 1936 at Montreux, would the Straits question be resolved to the advantage of
Turkey. Feridun Cemal Erkin, Les Relations Turco-Sovietiques et la Question des Détroits
(Ankara: Başnur Matbaasi, 1968): 62-65 and Seha L. Meray, Lozan Barış Konferansı,
Tutanaklar-Belgeler, Vol. 1 (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1993): 131-180.
242
See, for instance, Ayın Tarihi, 48 (April 1928): 3336.
243
PRO FO 371/ 13085, E 3218/43/44, (25 June 1928).
241
84
cherished with regard to Turkey. Then he added that Mahmut Bey should not be surprised if
he saw the Italian press speak of Turkish friendship and publish “Turcophile” articles.244
This member of the Italian opposition predicted quite well the intentions of the fascists
in the region. At that stage, it was hard for Italy to attack Turkey without British support.
During the Mosul crisis, it was in the British interest to collaborate with Italy in order to
create more pressure on Turkey. But once the crisis was over, the British felt the need to draw
the attention of Italy away from the Near East in which belligerence was getting out of hand.
Nevertheless, Chamberlain owed Italy a favour. Mussolini’s belligerence towards Turkey had
contributed to Britain’s victory in the Mosul question. The best choice for Britain was to
encourage Italy in Albania. Then Chamberlain was prepared to recognize Albania as “Italy’s
Belgium.”245
Italian Overtures to Turkey
By late 1927, Italian diplomatic papers indicate there was constant probing on both sides for
a high level Turkish diplomatic visit to Rome. Consequently, such a visit took place in 1928.
Various factors contributed to the changing relations between Turkey and Italy. Between 1925 and
1926, the Turkish land frontiers were secured under the friendship treaties concluded with the
Soviet Union and Iran. Moreover, in order to solve the Syrian-Turkish and Iraqi-Turkish border
problems, in May 1926 Turkey signed a convention with France and in June 1926 a treaty with
Britain. Turkey had already realized by that time that it could not afford to confront the great
244
Milliyet, (28 June 1926).
Alan Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970):
328.
245
85
powers on all fronts. In 1927, Turkey was finally able to turn its attention from its land borders to
the Mediterranean Sea.
Secondly, contrary to Rome’s expectations, the Mosul issue did not lead to the collapse of
the Republic of Turkey. Ankara chose to make concessions to the British on the Mosul issue for the
sake of the survival of the Republic. The Turkish leaders knew that they were ill equipped militarily
to confront Britain on matters such as Mosul. In a sense, they had to compromise in order not to
aggravate their international isolation. Turkey’s political leaders did not want to give the great
powers a pretext in the Mosul issue that could lead to the collapse of the new Republic.246 With the
resolution of the Mosul problem, Turkey would be less likely to disintegrate or fall into the hands of
the great powers.
Thirdly, as Fascist Italy’s frustration with the existing international arrangements
continued to grow, Rome considered ways of enlisting international outcasts like Turkey and
the Soviet Union on its side to amplify Italy’s voice in world councils. Indeed, this view had
a long history that dated back to the time of the Treaty of Lausanne where Italy was presented
with an ultimatum by the British on the status of the Dodecanese Islands. The ultimatum
included a threat by the British Prime Minister to sign the treaty without including Italy. Back
then, this British ultimatum prompted Mussolini to seriously consider siding with Turkey and
the Soviet Union as a diplomatic alternative. According to Lowe and Marzari, a sufficient
basis for such a diplomatic option was already in place:
“The Consulta had supported Russia’s request for equal treatment at the [Lausanne
Conference] and cordial contacts had been maintained throughout with the unofficial
Russian delegation. Moreover, the Italian Navy pronounced in favour of the Russian
and Turkish programme for the Turkish Straits, that they remain under Turkish
According to Mango, Mustafa Kemal’s diplomatic tactic was as ever to split the Allied
ranks. A compromise in Mosul would satisfy Britain. It would then be easier to resist the
economic demands of the French and the Italians. Andrew Mango, Atatürk (London: John
Murray, 1999): 378.
246
86
control, and against the British programme that the transit be free and the region
demilitarized.”247
Above all, Rome’s image of Turkey began to change. Turkey was no longer identified
only with Anatolia but was increasingly seen as part of the Balkans. The new Italian image of
Turkey was mainly shaped around the new situation in the Balkan Peninsula. The attitude of
the Italian press towards Turkey started changing from 1927 on. Rumors of Italian
preparations for an attack on Anatolia were described as “fantastically false” in the Popolo
d’Italia of 30 December 1927.248 In July 1927, there was already news from Athens as well as
London that Mussolini was working actively for the realization of a Turkish-Italian
rapprochement.249 According to Mussolini a Turkish-Italian rapprochement would also be a
step towards a pro-Italian alliance in the region.
Its troubled relations with Belgrade resulted in a dramatic shift in Italian strategy towards
Turkey within the Balkan context. In the winter of 1925-1926, there had been attempts to bolster an
Italian-Yugoslav rapprochement. Rome had already created a kind of supremacy over Yugoslavia
by the Pact of Rome signed in January 1924. In fact, France and Czechoslovakia wanted to join the
Italo-Yugoslav treaty. Mussolini rejected this because the Pact of Rome not only “liberated” Fiume
from Yugoslavia but also Yugoslavia “from French tutelage”.250 During the 1925-1926
negotiations, King Alexander proposed to Rome that the two powers partition Albania. At the same
time, in order to defy Italy, Belgrade aimed at a Yugoslav-Greek rapprochement that might prepare
the ground for a Balkan Locarno.
Mussolini not only opposed a Balkan Locarno but also opposed partition of Albania with
another power. In fact, he decided to sign the Pact of Tirana with Albania to have complete control
over this country. This time Belgrade turned to Paris which led to the signing of an alliance in
247
C. J. Lowe, and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940, (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1975):190-191.
248
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Rome, (6 January 1928).
249
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (18 July 1927).
250
Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy…, 143.
87
November 1927 between the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and France to deter
Italian aggression. This alliance meant consolidation of French influence in Eastern Europe which
began with the formation of the Little Entente in 1922. The alliance with France was soon followed
by the Yugoslav parliament’s refusal to ratify the Conventions of Nettuno, signed with Italy on 20
July 1925.251
The Paris-Belgrade alliance prompted Rome to seek closer links with Ankara as an
extension of Mussolini’s plan to create a group of client states that looked exclusively to Rome.252
French influence in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and in Romania, and the
entente system which Paris established in Eastern Europe constituted models for the new Italian
policy towards Turkey in the Balkans. At that stage, Turkey began to appear to Italy more as a
regional actor than as simply a potential colony. Mussolini’s diplomacy then featured new aspects
in its relations with Ankara. Rome wanted to take advantage of Turkey’s international isolation to
turn Ankara into a pro-Italian actor. Not a member of the League of Nations until 1932, Turkey
was a suitable candidate to be part of an Italian-led system in the Eastern Mediterranean.
In short, Turkey began to matter to Rome in the context of Italian-French rivalry in the
Mediterranean. The French, for their part, had a “rooted distrust” of Italy.253 Another source
of discord between the two countries was the Italian pursuit of recognition of equality with
France in various venues. Before the ascendance of the Fascists, Italy had already been
granted parity with France as a naval power at the Washington Conference in 1922. The
Fascist Italian government did not bother to participate in the subsequent Geneva Naval
Conference of 1927, as France would be sure to oppose the extension of this parity to other
categories of naval units. Later, Mussolini confided to the American Ambassador that Italy
“had been granted parity with France at Washington in 1922 and was determined not to give it
251
Nettuno would have guaranteed the rights of Italians living in Dalmatia. Burgwyn, Italian
Foreign Policy…, 42.
252
Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini (New York: Vintage Books, 1983):,151-158.
253
Adamwaith, p. 136
88
up. The Fascist government could scarcely accept less than its predecessor had won”.254 The
Italian demand for parity with France in every category of naval vessel had already
undermined the progress of preparatory negotiations for the Conference. In fact, as Italy’s
financial position was not seen as promising for competitive shipbuilding, its insistence on
parity was considered as having merely been an issue of prestige for that country.255
On the one hand, the fascist regime was trying to settle problems between Turkey and
Greece left unresolved since Lausanne. In this way, Rome intended to form a bloc in the
Balkans against Yugoslavia. On the other hand, this alignment would work against France,
the main supporter of Yugoslavia in the region. But the US Embassy in Turkey reported to
Washington that the ground for a tripartite agreement between Turkey, Greece, and Italy had
not yet been prepared. While the British Embassy agreed with the Americans, the Hungarian
diplomats believed that such a tripartite agreement was certain.256
The American Embassy had, in general, doubts as to whether Turkey had the same
intentions as Italy. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew wrote: “I decidedly doubt if Turkey’s new
found friendship with Italy has any definitely planned anti-French intent, since an aggressive
policy against any nation is entirely inconsistent with Turkey’s present interests and
herdetermination to remain independent of political combinations and entanglements”.257 It
was even more doubtful that Turkey was to be involved in any alliance against Yugoslavia.
When a Treaty of Neutrality, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement was signed between
Turkey and Italy in May 1928, there were various comments in the Turkish and the Italian
press. Some of these found their way into American diplomatic reports. To give but a few
examples, the Cumhuriyet wrote that Italy had become convinced of the desirability of
developing Turkey as a market rather than a place of colonization and of political penetration.
O’Connor, Perilous Equilibrium…, 55.
O’Connor, Perilous Equilibrium…, 57.
256
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (25 April 1928).
257
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (25 April 1928).
254
255
89
Siirt deputy Mahmut Bey believed that the signing of the agreement would completely disarm
people who had motives for reporting Italy as being ready to attack. Konya deputy Reşid
Safvet Bey wrote in the Journal d’Orient on 30 May 1928 that this agreement would prevent
third states from settling other Mosul questions with the threat of an alleged Italian invasion
and would likewise facilitate the settlement of the on-going Turkish-Greek controversy.258
The Turks were not alone in believing that some western European countries were
forming obstacles for Turkey’s settling of its political problems. The Americans reported on
25 April, 1928 from Istanbul to Washington that the German ambassador was of the opinion
that the French were working in Greece to prevent a settlement of the population exchange
question in order to prevent the possibility of a Turkish-Greek rapprochement. The Italian
press also accused France of messing up the Near East to give a wrong image of Italy. The
Giornale d’Italia stated: “Being the greatest Mediterranean power, Italy has, more than any
other country, direct responsibilities in maintaining order in that region”.259
The US Embassy summarized the benefit that might be derived from an understanding
with Turkey as follows: It was merely a move in the Italian-French game for influence in the
Mediterranean, and was immediately induced as a means of bringing about the settlement of
Greece’s difficulties with Turkey, and the conclusion of Greco-Italian understanding, the
Italian ultimate objective being establishment of ascendancy in the Near East in general and in
the Balkans in particular.260 The Americans also added that the French had lost whereas the
Italians had gained since the signature of the Turkish-Italian Treaty.261 What were the benefits
of this treaty for Turkey? Again according to the American diplomats, Turkish foreign policy
for some time had been centered on the negotiation and conclusion of neutrality and nonaggression pacts, such as the one with Italy, in order that it might feel secure against the
258
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (6 June 1928).
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Rome, (13 December 1928).
260
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (6 June 1928,).
261
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Rome, (25 September 1928).
259
90
political and territorial aggression and ambitions of its neighbours, with a view to obtaining
the full benefits of a much needed period of years of peace for the development of its internal,
legislative and economic reforms and for putting its house in order.262
Interestingly enough, the French Ambassador, Count de Chambroun, confided to the
Americans that he saw no immediate danger in such treaties as the Turkish-Italian pact, but
five, or ten or twenty years from then it might be a different matter. But if it were Italy’s and
Turkey’s intention, tacitly or otherwise, to develop a political encircling movement around
Yugoslavia, bringing Greece, Bulgaria, and eventually Hungary into the circle, France would
be fully able to take care of the situation when the moment should be ripe.263
However, on 28 April 1929 when Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras visited
Rome, in a reply to Mussolini’s welcoming speech, he stated that the Turkish government had
given many proofs of its sincere desire for peace and considered French-Italian friendship of
prime importance for peace in the Mediterranean.264 In fact, an American diplomat in Rome
reported to Washington that Italy was seeking to benefit economically from the cordial
relations established between Italy and Turkey since the political results in favour of Italy of
the Italian-Turkish Treaty of Neutrality were rather symbolic and meager.265
Foreign diplomats in Turkey had attributed Turkey’s desire for an agreement with
Italy to its natural willingness to ward off for some years the menace of an Italian descent
upon the Anatolian coast as well as to heighten its own prestige in Asia and elsewhere by the
conclusion of an agreement of this character with a European power.266 Other commentators
argued that the apparent ideological similarities between the Italian and Turkish regimes also
262
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Rome, (25 September 1928).
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (1 January 1929).
264
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Rome, (3 May 1929).
265
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Rome, (3 May 1929).
266
NARA RG 59, M530, R 5, Constantinople, (6 June 1928).
263
91
facilitated rapprochement between Turkey and Italy. Moreover, beyond the Mediterranean
balance of power, Italy needed Turkey for a secure access to Soviet natural resources. 267
267
Bischoff, Ankara: Türkiye’deki…., 286.
92
5. BREAKING OUT OF INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION
For a while, Turkey’s old arms trade links seemed to have survived the First World
War and the Turkish War of Independence. There was even an impression of the resilience of
British influence on Turkish naval affairs, both by necessity and from choice. It should be
borne in mind that on the eve of the First World War, the last Ottoman government placed a
large order for naval units in British shipyards. In April 1914, the Ottoman Ministry of
Marine awarded contracts to British shipbuilders for a third dreadnought and a large number
of lighter units, including cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Although the payments the
Ottoman government had made for the two ill-fated dreadnoughts had been counted towards
the Ottoman debts at Lausanne, the other contracts were to be liquidated. A document in the
Republican Archives reveals that the new Turkish government authorized Captain Hamdi
Bey, also a deputy in the TBMM, to procure one of the three submarines in London without a
tender in 1923.268 This procurement could never materialize and Ankara turned to another
traditional supplier of naval arms, Germany, to supply the submarines. Thanks to secret
German subsidies, the new Turkish Republic could order two submarines rather than one
from the nominally Dutch shipyard I.v.S. in 1924.
The abolition of the Ministry of Marine in 1927 was a decisive institutional victory
for the General Staff. The Ministry of Defence and the General Staff took over the functions
of the defunct Ministry of Marine; the latter’s army-dominated ranks retaining ultimate
jurisdiction over the navy and naval strategy. Chief of Staff Field-Marshal Fevzi Çakmak had
long been noted by foreign observers as a formidable opponent of expensive naval
268
The text of the Government decree talks of three submarines that had been sold off without
providing any details on them. It is tempting to assume that they might part of the large
Ottoman order of April 1914, as the transaction authorized was to be undertaken by an agent
of the Republic of Turkey in London. BCA, 09.25.11, (19 May 1340 [1923]).
93
programs.269 For instance, the British naval attaché interpreted the corruption charges against
the Minister of Marine as an indication of the Turkish government’s desire to cancel the
contract, because, as a fighting unit, Yavuz had very little to offer. Moreover, after being recommissioned, Yavuz would need a destroyer escort to protect her against submarine menace.
The bill for the naval program was likely to mount with the cost of acquiring destroyers, to
the dismay of Field-Marshal Çakmak.270
Now that Field-Marshal Fevzi Çakmak had recovered his full authority over the navy,
a loss of momentum in naval programs seemed unavoidable. However, the turn of events
proved otherwise. First, in April 1928, the TBMM authorized a 30-million Turkish Lira
appropriation for the first ten-year naval program.271 Secondly, in September 1928, the Greek
navy conducted an exercise off the Dardanelles which was perceived as a provocation.
Ankara reciprocated with a similar exercise personally commanded by President Atatürk. The
1928 incident in a sense defined the parameters of the Turkish naval policy. The aim was to
possess a fleet in the Aegean superior to that of Greece. Consequently, Yavuz’s reconditioning
gained momentum and the shipbuilding program was revived, though on a modest scale.272
The next Turkish naval order was to include two destroyers, two submarines and a number of
lighter vessels.273 Funding remained a central issue for the procurement of new naval units.
269
ASMAE, Pacco 1727/7975, Turchia 1927 (17 December 1928).
PRO FO 371/13085, E252/43/44 (5 and 12 January 1928).
271
Law No. 1244, Düstur, Series III (1175-1352), Vol. IX (1927-1928): 130.
272
Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanması, 46-47.
273
PRO FO371/13081, E5864/17/44 (25 November 1928).
270
94
Italian-Turkish Naval Arms Trade
In the new Turkish naval program, another politically unsatisfied European power,
Italy, began to loom large. The process witnessed Italy’s transformation from a source of
threat into a major supplier of arms to Turkey. French-Italian rivalry in the Mediterranean
after 1927 provided Turkey with an unexpected opportunity for financing its modest naval
program.274 Fascist Italy began to entertain the idea of establishing an Aegean bloc consisting
of Italy, Turkey and Greece to counter French influence in the Adriatic and the Balkans.
Consequently, Rome sought not only to improve its bi-lateral relations with Turkey and
Greece but also encouraged these countries to reconcile their differences. In May 1928,
Turkish-Italian negotiations resulted in the conclusion of the Italian-Turkish Treaty of
Neutrality and Reconciliation. The Treaty marked a drastic change in Fascist Italy’s image of
Turkey. It was no longer seen as a potential colony but as a sovereign state which had to be
won to the Italian side through political, economic and military penetration. Here arms
supplies stood as appropriate instruments for such a policy.275
The Italian shipyard Odero had offered to supply destroyers to the Turkish Navy before the
ten-year naval program had been adopted. In December 1926, the Italian Air and Naval Attaché in
Turkey, Lieutenant Commander Maroni, identified the Odero destroyers offered to the Turkish
Ministry of Marine as perfect vehicles for Italian penetration into Turkey.276 Around the same
time, Italian Ambassador Orsini urged the Italian Foreign Ministry to encourage Italian
shipbuilders to take advantage of the recent opening-up in Turkey by bidding individually or
On French-Italian naval rivalry in the Mediterranean see Paul G. Halpern, “French and
Italian Naval Policy in the Mediterranean,” in John B. Hattendorf (ed.) Naval Strategy and
Policy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future (London: Frank Cass, 2000): 78-106.
275
ASMAE, Pacco 1727/7975, Turchia 1928 (3 December 1928).
276
ASMAE, Pacco 1727/7988, Turchia 1926, Maroni to Navy Headquarters, (6 December
1926).
274
95
collectively for the upcoming Turkish naval programs.277 The German naval advisors’ arrival in
Turkey had already intensified Italian interest in Turkish naval matters. The Italians did not miss
the obvious link between the delivery of the German-funded Dutch-built submarines and the
arrival of the German naval advisors. This may have reinforced the conviction that the supply of
naval hardware would entail the provision of training by the supplier and hence facilitate military
penetration. With this in mind, Mussolini expressed his disappointment over the absence of any
Italian military or civilian experts in Turkey. He particularly regretted that although 43 German,
17 French, two Austrian and one English advisor were then employed in the Turkish military
service not a single Italian was even in civilian service in Turkey. He also encouraged the Italian
Ministry of Marine to invite Turkish military and naval missions to promote the Italian arms
industry, while cautioning them not to show any secret facilities or weapons to the visiting
Turks.278
In response to Mussolini’s remarks, Maroni reported that it was a long-established great
power practice to exert military influence on the Ottoman Empire through military/naval advisors.
He pointed to the current fierce rivalry between France and Germany, each with a large number of
advisors in the Turkish military service. Italy had been absent from this rivalry until a few months
earlier. This was due to Rome’s indifference before the First World War and then because of
Turkish suspicions.279 Historical experience suggested to the Italians a strong link between arms
transfers and the presence of foreign military/naval advisors. They concluded that the supply of
arms was a tested great power method of gaining economic, political and military influence in
277
ASMAE, Pacco 1727/7988, Turchia 1926, Orsini to Foreign Ministry, (31 December
1926).
278
ASMAE, Pacco 1720/17271,Turchia 1928, Mussolini to Italian Embassy (Turkey) and
Mussolini to Ministry of Marine, (23 November 1928).
279
ASMAE, Pacco 17271/7975, Turchia 1928, Maroni to Navy Headquarters, (3 December.
1928).
96
Turkey.280 With the first signs of warming in Italian-Turkish relations in 1927, the Italians were
further encouraged by the noticeably positive attitude towards Italian shipyards in Turkish military
circles.281 It seems safe to argue that the political significance of the Turkish naval tender to the
Italian government far exceeded its commercial significance for the Italian shipbuilders. Rome
was willing to provide a financial guarantee for the tender that no other foreign government could
match.
This guarantee was significant, as the financing of the Turkish naval order was the key
question. Turkey had not recovered economically from the devastation of the wars. It was also
struggling to settle the Ottoman debt.282 Ankara could afford to order ships only under long-term
financial agreements with favourable terms. Rome agreed to provide Italian shipbuilders with a
financial guarantee for up to seventy percent of the value of a possible Turkish order.283 Maroni
drew attention to the political and military significance to the contract of the Italian government’s
guarantee. First and foremost, it decisively demonstrated lack of aggressive motives in the Italian
approach to Turkey. Secondly, it proved Italy’s genuine interest in, and its wholehearted
commitment to, strengthening Turkey militarily.284
British shipbuilders were among the most serious contenders for the Turkish naval tender.
Like their Italian rivals, British bidders combined their efforts to meet the diversity of vessel types
the Turkish tender involved. The most prominent tie-up was the one between two large British
shipbuilders: Vickers-Armstrongs and J.I. Thornycroft & Co., Ltd. Unlike the Italians, the British
For the foreign military influence in the Ottoman Empire, see C.B. Rooney, ‘The
International Significance of the British Naval Mission to the Ottoman Empire,
1908–1914’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.34, No.1 (January 1998); J. Wallach, Bir Askeri
Yardımın Anatomisi: Türkiye’de Prusya-Alman Askeri Heyetleri, 1835–1919, F.
Çeliker (trans.), (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basımevi, 1985).
281
ASMAE, Pacco 1720/7939,Turchia 1927, Maroni to Navy Headquarters, (3 June 1927)
282
Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy…, 114–23.
283
ASMAE, Pacco 1727/7948, Turchia 1927, Ministry of National Economy to Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, (21 July 1927).
284
ASMAE, Pacco 1727/7948, Turchia 1927, Maroni to Navy Headquarters, (15 August
1927).
280
97
did not find the Turkish repayment proposal financially acceptable. Ankara’s proposal involved a
ten-year payment schedule according to which two percent of the contract value was to be paid
upon signature of the contract, another two percent in 1929-1930, and then five percent in 19301931. The balance was to be paid off in seven years through Turkish treasury bonds, at around 13
percent each year. The British shipyards’ financially acceptable minimum was 20 percent of the
value of the contract during the construction period of three years, the balance payable in treasury
bonds over six years from the contract date. They accurately predicted that they might lose the
tender to the Italians who enjoyed government backing.285 The disarmament-oriented British
government was not able or willing to furnish similar financial guarantees to the private arms
producers competing for overseas markets.
The Italians enjoyed a psychological edge over the British shipbuilders, too. In 1927, the
Italian shipbuilder Ansaldo made an important gesture that tilted the scales further in favour of the
Italians. This was related to a financial dispute that dated back to the Ottoman Empire. In 1907,
the Empire had ordered a protected cruiser from Ansaldo. Shortly before the outbreak of the war
in Tripoli, the Italian government had commandeered the cruiser, Drama, on the grounds of nonpayment. The cruiser was subsequently commissioned as the Libia by the Italian Navy in 1913.286
Ansaldo had never returned the payments the Ottoman Empire had made for the cruiser.
However, on the eve of the Turkish naval tender, Ansaldo turned surprisingly accommodating and
agreed to repay the Turkish government 70,000 pounds sterling for the disputed Drama/Libia
cruiser.287
The Italian move contrasted sharply with the British shipbuilders’ uncompromising stand
in a somewhat similar dispute a year before. In 1926, the Turkish government sought
285
PRO FO 371/13817, E1855/189/44, Department of Overseas Trade Memorandum, (15
April 1929).
286
Libia served with the Italian Navy until 1938. Langensiepen and Güleryüz, The
Ottoman Navy…, 65.
287
Ayın Tarihi 12 (1927): 1945.
98
unsuccessfully to settle another leftover Ottoman financial dispute with British shipbuilders. When
the First World War broke out, the two dreadnought battleships ordered in Britain for the Ottoman
Navy faced a similar fate to that of the Drama. The British commandeered the Reşadiye and
Sultan Osman dreadnoughts built by Vickers and Armstrong for the Ottoman Navy. After the
war, the British shipyards did not return the payments for these two ships. Indeed, Turkey was
barred from claiming compensation for the two dreadnoughts under the Treaty of Lausanne.288
The legal remedies the Turkish government sought against various British companies were
unsuccessfully concluded in 1926.289 Hence, Ansaldo’s move in settling the Drama/Libia dispute
was wisely timed and executed. It must have helped the Italians to eclipse their British
competitors in the first major naval contact for the Turkish Navy.
After the Italian shipyards submitted their bids in December 1928,290 there were frequent
contacts between the Naval Undersecretary of Turkish General Staff, Captain Mehmet Ali Dalay,
and the Italian Naval and Air Attaché, Lieutenant Commander Maroni. On 9 December, 1928,
Italian Ambassador Orsini reported Maroni’s conversation with Undersecretary Dalay about the
tender. Maroni was led to believe ‘the contract may be split between the French and Italian
shipbuilders, although the French designs are technically inferior and Turkey’s political relations
with France do not warrant such a deal.’291 A week later, Dalay visited Maroni in his residence to
discuss matters of significance to Italian-Turkish naval relations. During his visit, he assured
Maroni that the contract would be awarded to the Italian shipyards. Undersecretary admitted that
the present political climate worked in Italy’s favour. The Italian attaché then brought up the issue
of German naval advisors in Turkey. This was an issue of significance second only to the supply
of warships in terms of offering a venue for the Italians to penetrate the hitherto inaccessible
See Soysal, Türkiye’nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları I…, 105–6.
Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanması…, 35–6.
290
ASMAE, Pacco 17271/7975, Turchia 1928, Orsini to Foreign Ministry, (4 December
1928).
291
ASMAE, Pacco 17271/.7975, Turchia 1928, Orsini to Foreign Ministry, (9 December
1928).
288
289
99
Turkish military. The Undersecretary confirmed that ‘their contacts will terminate in the coming
April and will not be renewed as the General Staff has not been very satisfied by their
performance.’ The attaché finally offered the services of Italian officers in their stead, adding ”in
the case of serving officers not being preferred, retired Italian navy officers may act as instructors
to the Turkish Navy.” Captain Dalay promised to relate this offer to Deputy Chief of Staff
General Asım Gündüz. He also expressed his gratitude for the permission granted to two Turkish
navy officers to visit the Italian warships.292
On 24 May 1929, the conclusion of the Turkish naval tender in favour of the Italian
shipbuilders was announced to the public. According to a Turkish daily newspaper, Cumhuriyet,
Italian and British bidders had pulled down their bids to financially affordable levels, yet the
Italians won the tender because the British bidder was found politically unreliable. The notorious
‘merchant of death’, Basil Zaharoff, was serving on the Vickers’ board of directors. Italian
shipbuilders were asked to submit an accelerated delivery schedule to finalize the agreement.293
Next day, the Italian Foreign Ministry officially notified the Ministry of Marine in Rome that the
contract to supply warships to the Turkish Navy had been finalized.294 The order included only
two destroyers, two submarines and three submarine chasers, well below the highly inflated
numbers advertised previously.295
292
ASMAE, Pacco 17271/.7975, Turchia 1928, Maroni to Navy Headquarters, (17 December
1928). Ironically, one of these officers did not rate Italian shipbuilding very highly. See K.
Münir, Avrupaya Tetkik için Gönderilen Dz. Zabitlerinin Raporları –3 (Istanbul: Deniz
Matbaası, 1929).
293
‘Bahri Siparişleri İtalyanlar Aldılar’, Cumhuriyet, (24 May 1929). Basil Zaharoff was born
an Ottoman subject around 1850. He figured as a prominent arms salesman. He sold arms
to both Greece and the Ottoman Empire. Zaharoff symbolized the archetypal ‘merchant of
death’ for his lack of morals. He was later portrayed as ‘a figure of historical importance;
for he was not merely a master of salesmanship and bribery, but an operator who
understood the connections between arms and diplomacy, between arms and intelligence,
and who could serve as both salesman and spy’. A. Sampson, The Arms Bazaar: The
Companies, the Dealers, the Bribes, from Vickers to Lockheed (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1977): 49.
294
ASMAE, Pacco 1731/8003, Turchia 1929, Telegram, (25 May 1929).
295
‘Yeni Gemilerimiz’, Cumhuriyet, (2 June 1929). The Evening News claimed ‘portentous
100
The Turkish orders given to Italian shipyards represented the high water mark in ItalianTurkish relations in the interwar years. The Italians were quick to conclude that the naval contract
also signified a substantially modified view of Italy in the Turkish military mind. The new cordial
atmosphere in Italian-Turkish relations produced immediate consequences of military significance.
In 1929, the Turkish General Staff changed the location of the annual large-scale military exercise
from Izmir in the west to Diyarbakır, near the Iraqi and Syrian borders in the east.296 The shift in
Turkish threat assessments was obvious. Also in 1929, the Turkish Navy sent its first junior
officers to Italy for training.297 In 1929, Italy seemed on the verge of gaining a stronghold for
itself in the Turkish military. The growing Italian connection with the Turkish Navy led some
foreign observers to conclude that ‘an Italian mission is about to take over [from the Germans] the
supervision of the rejuvenation of the Turkish fleet.’298
In addition to closer naval relations with Italy, the period of ‘warmth’ in Italian-Turkish
relations witnessed intensified military, political and social contacts. In June 1929, four Italian
destroyers visited Istanbul. On board the destroyers were 20 Italian journalists.299 This visit was a
sort of prelude to a more daring and politically significant venture. A squadron of 35 Italian
seaplanes visited Istanbul. The squadron was led by Italy’s famous aviation hero, Air Minister
Italo Balbo. When they arrived in Istanbul, Balbo and his aviators were received exceptionally
warmly.300 Around the same time, the Turkish Ambassador to Rome, Suat [Davaz], was in
rumbling in the mountain spread over several years has brought a forward a very small
mouse’. ‘Turks Order More Warships’, Evening News, (29 May 1929), newspaper cutting in
the Venizelos Archives, Athens, Folder 173/53, 1929, VI–VII.
296
ASMAE, Pacco 1728/2319, Turchia 1929, Orisini to Foreign Ministry, (3 June 1929).
297
Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanması…, Büyüktuğrul himself had
training with the Italian Navy between 1929–30. For his impressions, Büyüktuğrul,
Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu..., xx-xx.
298
‘Italy to Develop Turkey’s Fleet’, Morning Post, (6 June 1929), newspaper cutting in the
Venizelos Archives, Athens, Folder 173/53, 1929, VI–VII.
299
‘İki İtalyan Torpidosu Geldi’, Cumhuriyet, (4 June 1929); ‘İki İtalyan Torpidosu Daha
Geldi’, Cumhuriyet, (5 June 1929).
300
‘Dün İtalyan Tayyareleri Geldiler ve Hararetle Karşılandılar, Cumhuriyet, (7 June 1929).
On Italo Balbo and his aviation exploits, see R. Barbalenardo, ‘The Odyssey of Italo Balbo’,
101
Turkey. In his comments to Cumhuriyet, he stated that a large number of Turkish civil servants
were being trained in Italy. He also announced that a group of Turkish scouts was to visit Italy in
September. Last, but not least, Italian-Turkish relations would soon be intensified by a credit
agreement.301 The dramatic turn in Italian-Turkish relations since 1928 was evident in many
aspects of their relations. The ‘warmth’ also unleashed vocal expressions of admiration of Italian
Fascism by the Turks.302 For instance, the Chairman of the Turkish Association of Journalists,
Hakkı Tarık Us, praised Italian aviators highly in his speech during the dinner organized for the 20
Italian journalists. He went so far as to refer to them as ‘heirs to the victorious Carthaginians’ so
as to endorse the Italian Fascists’ claim for imperial heritage in the Mediterranean. 303
Regarding the Mediterranean naval situation, the Turkish naval orders in 1929 did not
threaten to upset the balance per se. Their impact was likely to be more prominent in the Black
Sea and the Aegean. In response, Turkey’s neighbours moved to adjust their shipbuilding and
deployment plans. Interestingly, Ankara’s most trusted partner, the Soviet Union, was concerned
about the Black Sea naval balance after Turkish naval modernization. Hence, they deployed one
battleship and one cruiser from the Baltic Sea to augment the fleet in the Black Sea from
December 1929/January 1930.304 This, in turn, must have caused apprehension in Ankara
regarding the Black Sea naval situation. For instance, Prime Minister İnönü himself made a note
Airpower, 30/4 (July 2000); B. Taylor, Fascist Eagle: Italy’s Air Marshal Italo
Balbo (Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories, 1996).
301
‘Roma Sefirimizin Beyanatı: Talebelerimiz Çok İyi Çalışıyor’, Cumhuriyet, (8 June 1929).
302
Examples of Turkish admiration of Fascism’s achievements in organizing the society may
be found in Falih Rıfkı Atay, Faşist Roma, Kemalist Tiran ve Kaybolmuş Makidonya
(Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1931): 5–53; and Moskova–Roma (Istanbul:
Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1932): 73–109.
303
‘Matbuat Cemiyeti İtalyan Gazetecileri Şerefine Bir Ziyafet Verdi’, Cumhuriyet, (16 June
1929).
304
J. Rohwer, ‘Soviet Naval Strategies and Building Programs: 1922–1941’, in Acta XIXth
International Colloquium of Military History, Istanbul, Turkey (Ankara: ATASE, 1993):.425.
102
in his daybook regarding the need for destroyers specifically for the Black Sea,305 which would
shortly be ordered again from Italy.
The prospective Turkish fleet expansion worried the Greeks most. Here Italy faced a
problem. The Italian policy was originally aimed at seeking simultaneous improvement in
relations with Turkey and Greece. The supply of new warships was meant to serve as an
instrument to this end. In the short run the plan failed to serve the intended objective. It actually
ran the risk of deepening the Turkish-Greek rift. Rome had to find a way to tune the plan to the
objective. The opportunity soon arose with the new Greek shipbuilding program.
When the Yavuz’s re-conditioning and new Turkish naval acquisitions looked imminent,
the Greek government discussed measures to counter the Turkish naval modernization program.
During the discussions, the head of the British naval mission to Athens, Captain Turle, suggested
expansion of the naval air power and reinforcement of the fleet by light naval units.306 However,
to the Greek public, the prospects of Yavuz’s return to active duty warranted a far more credible
response. In search of a publicly acceptable match for the Yavuz, the Greek government turned to
a cruiser, Salamis, that had lain incomplete in the German shipyard Vulcan Works in Kiel since
1914.307 Pointing to the poor shape of the country’s finances, the British naval mission in Greece
and the British government tried to dissuade the Greek government from such an expensive
İsmet İnönü, Defterler (1919-1973), Vol. I, Ahmet Demirel (ed.), (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi
Yayınları, 2001): 155.
306
‘Turkish Naval Plans’, Times, (29 May 1929), newspaper cutting in the Venizelos
Archives,
Athens, Folder 173/53, 1929, VI–VII.
307
The cruiser Salamis was ordered by Greece in 1913. It could never be completed after the
First World War broke out. In 1927, the shipbuilder Vulcan demanded compensation for
building costs from the Greek government. Greece’s reluctance led to a dispute which was
subsequently submitted to arbitration. Norwegian Admiral Scott Hansen suggested
Greece’s purchase of the cruiser with minimum armaments installed to settle the issue.
Athens did not consider this suggestion until May 1929. ‘Yunanlılar Salamisi Alırlarsa’,
Cumhuriyet, (15 June 1929). “Greek Battle Cruiser Salamis: Pre-War Contract Binding,” The
Times, (12 December 1925); “The Salamis Case: Neutral Admiral’s Report,” The Times, (15
June 1928).
305
103
venture.308 Amidst a heated debate in the Greek press, the Venizelos government decided to order
two destroyers as an emergency measure to preserve the naval balance in the Aegean.309 Thus set
in motion a naval arms race between Turkey and Greece.310
The British were quick to grasp that Greece’s choice of supplier for new destroyers would
be a political one. In spite of strong British naval influence in Greece, from the onset British
shipbuilders were aware that a Greek contract was not a sure-fire win for them. They were
informed that Greek Prime Minister Venizelos ‘will use the order for destroyers as a means of
securing Italian, French or British diplomatic support in the conference at The Hague with a view
to revising German Reparation Schemes which sacrifice Greek interests.’311 In October 1929, it
was evident that Venizelos was personally more inclined towards Italy as the supplier for the new
destroyers.312 The Turkish naval order had put at risk the prospects for an Italian-brokered
Turkish-Greek reconciliation in the Eastern Mediterranean. .However, the Greek order for
destroyers put Italian strategy back on track. Improved relations with Ankara and Athens were
evident in the Italian Navy’s strategic war plans for 1929-1931. In the case of a war against
Yugoslavia or against Yugoslavia and France, the Italian Navy assumed Turkish and Greek
neutrality in the Eastern Mediterranean.313
308
PRO FO 371/13656 C4148/752/19, Foreign Office Minute, (11 June 1929); PRO FO
371/13648 C4304/14/19, Lorraine to Foreign Office, (17 June 1929).
309
‘The Greek Navy: Two More Destroyers to be Ordered, Daily Telegraph; ‘Greece to Have
Two New Warships’, Manchester Guardian, (29 May 1929), newspaper cuttings in the
Venizelos Archives, Athens, Folder 173/53, 1929, VI–VII.
310
The press in both countries featured extensive reports that exacerbated public fears for
failure to keep up with the other side. The Greek press accused Turkey of preparing to take
over several Greek islands in the Aegean once the Yavuz was recommissioned. For a
summary of Greek press coverage see PRO FO 371/13656 C7131/752/19, British Legation
(Athens) to Henderson, (12 September 1929). For Turkish response in press, see ‘Bahri
Siparişlerimiz Harp İçin Değil, Harbe Mani Olmak İçindir’, Cumhuriyet, (13 June 1929); A.
Daver, ‘Sahte Bir Telaş”’, Cumhuriyet, (15 June 1929).
311
PRO FO 371/ 13648 C6078/14/19, Yarrow and Company Limited to Foreign Office, (7
August 1929).
312
PRO FO 371/13648 C7796/14/19, British Legation (Athens) to Henderson, (7 October
1929).
313
Rimanelli, Italy Between Europe and the Mediterranean…, 528.
104
In March 1930, Naval Undersecretary of the General Staff, Captain Mehmet Ali Dalay,
visited Italy. Interestingly, Dalay’s visit coincided with the London Naval Conference. 314 While
delegates from the major navy-oriented nations were discussing the extension of naval limitations
to lighter units such as cruisers, submarines and destroyers,315 Turkey ordered two more
destroyers from Italy, in part to rectify the situation in the Black Sea. During the conference,
France stood firm against the Italian demand for parity with France in lighter naval units. FrenchItalian antagonism undermined the entire venture. While the conference was still in progress in
March 1930, a Turkish daily newspaper quoted the Chicago Tribune which pointed to ItalianTurkish cooperation as a major cause of French concern and the principal reason for the ItalianFrench rift at the London Naval Conference.316
Portraying improved Turkish-Italian relations as the principal cause of the Italian-French
differences may be an exaggeration. At any rate, Turkish and Greek orders for destroyers from
Italy caused the French to become suspicious. To make matters worse for the French, Athens
ordered two more destroyers from Italy.317 The total of eight destroyers in construction in Italy for
Turkey and Greece constituted a major naval asset with significant impact on the naval situation
in the Mediterranean.. France felt particularly uneasy about the fact that in the case of hostilities
in the Mediterranean, Italy could easily add these eight destroyers to its fleet and form a new
flotilla with them.318
The Italian success in securing contracts for war materials prompted British interest also.319
Italy's share in foreign markets had been consistently increasing. Italian naval arms exports
accounted for 24 percent of submarines and 17.8 percent of warships in the interwar years. By
‘Deniz Müsteşarı İtalya’dan Geldi’, Cumhuriyet, (19 March 1930); PRO FO 371/14567
E1017/206/44, Rendel (Foreign Office) to Admiralty, (27 February 1930).
315
Fanning, Peace and Disarmament…, 106–32.
316
‘Türkiye–İtalya’, Cumhuriyet, 26 March 1930.
317
‘Deniz Haberleri’, Deniz Mecmuası, Vol.43, No.319 (Jan. 1931), p.2.
318
PRO FO 371/14421, C4368/1906/22, Ramsey to Henderson, 27 May 1930.
319
PRO FO 371/14421, C7776/1382/22, Foreign Office Memorandum, 7 Oct. 1930.
314
105
1939, in both categories Italy ranked second only to Britain.320 The Greek orders seemed to have
caused more concern to London than the Turkish orders. The former placed orders in Italy in spite
of a British naval mission being employed in Athens. The mission had access to classified details
of the destroyer contact. To explain Italian willingness to build warships for foreign governments,
the British naval intelligence report from Athens speculated thus:
“... The anxiety of the Italians to get tenders for destroyers unquestionably appears to be
greater than that dictated by financial considerations… The self-imposed heavy penalties
for delays in completion and failure to reach contract speed indicate either... extreme
confidence in their ability, or ... a desire to commence building ships which could, in the
event of hostilities breaking out between Italy and other countries, be commandeered, and
added to the Italian Navy.”321
British identified the subsequent Turkish destroyer order from Italy as politically
motivated. It was viewed as a by-product of the loan of one million pounds sterling to Turkey by
the Banca Commerciale.322 The overall financial magnitude of the new order (60 million lira or
645,000 pounds sterling) also surprised the British, who thought the Ottoman debt would render
such an expensive venture financially unacceptable to Turkey. In hindsight, the timing of the
Turkish 1930 order for destroyers suggests also link with the London Disarmament Conference
and with Turkish-Greek diplomatic negotiations on freezing naval arms in the Aegean. It may be
argued that Ankara rushed to secure these destroyers before the London Naval Conference placed
restrictions on the production and trade of lighter naval units, including destroyers. Secondly,
there had been proposals and counter-proposals by Ankara and Athens for naval arms limitations
in the Aegean since January 1928.323 In 1930, the Turkish-Greek negotiations looked promising
320
Krause, Arms and the State, p.74.
PRO FO 371/14421, C8541/1382/22, British Naval Mission in Athens to Naval
Intelligence, (13 October 1930).
322
PRO FO 371/14567, E1242/206/44, Clerk to Henderson, (28 February 1930).
323
See for instance, PRO FO 371/13085, E252/43/44, Memorandum by M.H.S. MacDonald,
321
106
in resolving the post-Lausanne problems. It is possible that Ankara wanted to complete its fleet
modernization before a Turkish-Greek agreement froze naval forces levels.324 Two factors
support this argument. First, in spite of vocally expressed dissatisfaction with the first two
destroyers ordered in Italy, Ankara decided to stick with Italian shipbuilders without going
through a lengthy tender process for new units. Secondly, the new Turkish contract demanded an
extremely short delivery period of 12 months.325
In 1930, Rome had reasons to be optimistic about its Eastern Mediterranean project. It had
secured naval orders from Greece and Turkey. Subsequent Turkish and Greek orders for
additional units, in particular, were placed directly in Italy without opening international tenders.
This may be taken as a precursor to emerging dominant supplier status for Italy in the Turkish and
Greek arms markets in the early 1930s. On the subject of Italian-French rivalry in the Eastern
Europe and the Mediterranean, Turkey stood closer to Italy than France, without, however,
making any political or military commitment. It should be noted that in the interwar years
Ankara always avoided attaching itself to any great power or joining any bloc. It was not
interested in the formation of an anti-French bloc in the late 1920s either.
Short of declaring any support for Italy, Turkish decision-makers identified France as the
main cause of European problems. For instance, after his visit to Geneva, Turkish Foreign
Minister Aras told the British: ‘the root of uneasiness in Europe was fear of French hegemony.’
Even though he ruled out the emergence of a bloc against France and the states in its orbit, Aras
claimed it was French policy which made this a possibility.326 Ankara was particularly resentful
(5 January 1928); ASD Pacco 1732/8022, Turchia 1930, Secchi to Navy Headquarters
(Rome), (15 August 1930).
324
For a different interpretation of the link between Turkish naval modernization and
Turkish–Greek negotiations, see Mango, Atatürk…,486.
325
PRO FO 371/14567, E1792/206/44, Graham to Henderson, (7 April 1930).
326
PRO FO 371/14351, C9143/3519/62, Clerk to Henderson, (8 December 1930).
107
of French foot-dragging in ratifying the French-Turkish Treaty of Friendship, Reconciliation and
Arbitration of February 1930.327
In 1930, Turkey and Greece finally worked out their differences and concluded a treaty.
They also signed a protocol to end the naval arms race in the Aegean. In his address to the
Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras expressed Ankara’s gratitude to
Signor Mussolini and Signor Grandi for their help over Turkish-Greek reconciliation.328 In 1930,
Rome could justifiably claim that it enjoyed some degree of political influence in Turkey and
Greece.329 The Turkish-Greek reconciliation was certainly a reward for the Italian attempts to
bring Ankara and Athens together into the Italian orbit. However, after 1930, Turkey and Greece
gradually parted company with Italy. In addition to major political changes, a number of events
proved that the Italians lacked the naval technology and economic resources to foster a patronclient relationship through the arms trade.
Italy as Turkey’s Sponsor in International Organizations
One unintended benefit for Turkey to come out of this brief period of warmth in its
relations with Italy was its gradual accommodation into various European projects through
Italian sponsorship. A case in point is the Turkish participation in the works of the
Preparatory Commission for European Union. The issue was profoundly linked to ItalianFrench rivalry in Europe which took a new turn with French Foreign Minister Aristide
Briand’s proposal in September 1929 to create a federal link between the European nations.
In the introduction to his speech, he pointed out that the League had to fill a serious gap in
Soysal, Türkiye’nin Siyasal, p.385. The French Parliament ratified the Treaty
three years later in 1933.
328
TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Vol.25, Term 3, Session 3, Meeting 28 (12 February 1931): 35–7.
329
ASMAE Pacco 1732/8022, Turchia 1930, Aloisi to Foreign Ministry (Rome), (28 July
1930).
327
108
order to reach a peaceful settlement. In fact, he believed that the League functioned too slowly
and too feebly.330 Other representatives, in turn, asked Briand to publish a memorandum on
European federation on 1 May 1930. Its final version was transmitted to the European states
on May 17.331
The Briand proposal at first came as a blow to the Turkish pursuit of recognition as a
European member of an international society in the early 1930s, as Briand did not initially
include Turkey among the twenty-six European countries which were invited to discuss his
memorandum on the European project. Turkey was excluded from the project for two reasons.
First, it was not a member of the League of Nations; secondly, Turkey was not part of
geographical Europe as defined by Briand.
Although not officially invited to discuss the project, Ankara was profoundly
interested in the proposal.332 In its initial form, Briand’s project was largely regarded as a
manifestation of the imperialist and chauvinistic aims of French Prime Minister Poincaré who
was seeking to divide the European nations.333 That Briand did not include Turkey within the
proposed European Union confirmed the existing Turkish suspicions regarding France’s
political motives. The Turkish press criticized the way in which the French defined the
borders of Europe. The French project was not considered viable because it was based on
subjective criteria, including some countries and excluding others. According to the Turks,
Turkey was geographically in Europe, since it was bounded by two European seas: the Black
Marie-Renée Mouton, “La Société des Nations et le Plan Briand”, in Le Plan Briand
d’Union Fédérale Européenne, (Bern: Peter Lang, 1998): 237.
331
For Briand’s memorandum and replies to it, see, League of Nations, Documents relating to
the Organisation of a System of European Federal Union, A.46.1930. VII, (Geneva, 15
September 1930).
332
The British opposed Briand’s European Union project as predicted by most observers. In
general, British observers equated France with Poincaré rather than Briand who seemed a
tragic figure, struggling against the atavistic forces to which Poincaré allegedly gave
expression. Robert W. D. Boyce, “The Briand and the Crisis of British Liberalism,” in Le
Plan Briand d’Union Fédérale Européenne, Antoine Fleury (ed.), (Bern: Peter Lang, 1998):
132.
333
Zeki Mesut [Alsan],“Poincaré’nin İstifası,” Milliyet, (3 August 1929).
330
109
Sea and the Mediterranean, even though the French ignored this.334 Moreover, it was argued
that the values and norms accepted by societies were more significant than the geographical
criterion in defining European-ness which, in any case, was met by Turkey.
Around that time, Turkey was adopting European institutions in both political and
social spheres. For the ruling elite, to become part of a wider European project was a goal to
be achieved. A member of the Turkish Parliament wrote that the European project would not
be taken seriously, nor would it be successful, if it was based on the definition of its people as
eastern, occidental or Balkanic. Instead, people should be distinguished from each other by
their civilization, mentality and life-style.335
Again political leadership in Ankara was confused concerning Turkish reaction to the
Briand project. Prime Minister, İsmet İnönü, admitted there was confusion resulting from
Briand’s proposal. In a sense, the Turkish leaders of the early 1930s were caught off guard as
they were preoccupied with gaining recognition as a legitimate member of the international
community through League membership. The Turkish leaders believed that Turkey should be
part of any international initiative. By excluding Turkey, the Briand proposal, in a way, set
the bar for Turkey’s admission to world councils on equal footing with others at a higher
level. Consequently, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras criticized the European
Union project as being planned only for the continent. In his opinion, a harmonious
international order could be established only if it included all nations which already had
connections with each other in this small world.336
Tevfik Rüştü Aras later wrote that the reactions of European countries to the Briand
project were diverse in the sense that they did not all welcome it. Meanwhile, Ankara lobbied
in several European countries, namely, Italy, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Bulgaria, to
“Avrupa Devleti,” Ayın Tarihi 22-23/75-78 (June-September 1930): 6440.
Mahmut, “Milletlerin İttihadı” Milliyet, (29 September 1929).
336
Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2003), 75-76.
334
335
110
push for the extension of an invitation to Turkey to be a participant in the deliberations on
European Union.337 Turkish diplomatic lobbying paid off, as each of these European capitals
mentioned, in one form or another, the desirability of Turkey’s inclusion in their replies to
Briand’s memorandum on the Organization System of European Federal Union.338 While
Italy and Germany recommended the participation of both Turkey and the Soviet Union in the
European Union project in their responses to Briand,339 Greece also supported Turkey’s
participation.340
Mussolini’s Italy objected to Briand’s project, arguing that France wanted to
emphasize the disparity between the victorious and the defeated powers in the war. In other
words, France intended to ratify only the existing European system and its inequalities.341
The fascist leader’s professed aim was to put an end to this inequality. In fact, similar
arguments were made in the Turkish press of the time. For instance, a columnist in the
Turkish daily newspaper, Cumhuriyet, wrote that France aimed to establish a European Union
based on the division between the victorious and defeated powers of Europe.342 Leaders of
Turkish opinion could not help but sympathize with Italian criticism of Briand who excluded
Turkey from the European project.
At the same time, Turkish political leadership knew well the real motives behind the
Italian opposition to Briand’s project. A major stumbling block in the way to a European
Aras, Atatürk’ün Dış…, 76.
See League of Nations, Documents relating to…, 23, 32, 37, 43 and 61.
339
Petricioli argues that Italy was fighting against French hegemony in Europe either by a
rapprochement with Britain (as in the naval disarmament conference), or by forming an
entente with Berlin or by drawing new forces such as Turkey and the Soviet Union into the
European system. Marta Petricioli, “Dino Grandi et la Réponse Italienne”, in Le Plan Briand
d’Union…, 331-346. Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen believed that Italy had pressed for an
invitation to Turkey and the Soviet Union as a means of killing the scheme (possibly
discrediting the League). Maarten L. Pereboom, Democracies at the Turning Point, Britain,
France and the End of the Postwar Order, 1928-1933, (NY: Peter Lang, 1995):167.
340
BCA, 254.712.20, (3 August 1930).
341
See Pierre Milza, Mussolini, (Paris: Fayard, 1999): 633.
342
Muharrem Feyzi [Togay], “Avrupa Birliği,” Cumhuriyet, (14 June 1930).
337
338
111
Union was the rivalry between Italy and France. Turkish leaders and the press were not
convinced that these two countries were ready to give up this rivalry for the sake of a
European Union.343 According to Zeki Mesut Alsan, the minds of European leaders were not
even clear on what Europe was. For instance, he believed that, for France, Europe meant
Western Europe, while Germany and Austria focused on Central Europe and t Italy was
interested in creating an Italian-led bloc in Europe. 344
In fact, the Italians perceived the Briand proposal as an opportunity to capitalize on the
increased sense of isolation in Turkey. As an alternative to the exclusivist union idea of
France, Mussolini intended to press on with a plan for an Italian-Soviet-Turkish alliance.345
He thought that the three countries could collaborate in the Black Sea against “French
intrigues”.346 Mussolini was also pushing for triangular collaboration against France in the
Mediterranean. The fascist leader was working for a Turkish-Greek reconciliation that would
lead to a triple alliance with Italy in order to compete with France in that region. At the same
time, Mussolini started using the motto “the Balkan pact in the same spirit as Locarno”.347
This spirit was supposed to bring together countries like Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary
and Turkey around Italian leadership in a way that would compel Yugoslavia to bow to Italian
pressures, and therefore, to neutralize the Entente.
Like the Italians, Turkish political leaders thought that the root of uneasiness in
Europe was French hegemony. Ankara particularly resented French foot-dragging in ratifying
the French-Turkish Treaty of Friendship, Reconciliation and Arbitration of February 1930.348
343
There was a series of article on the topic in Cumhuriyet and Hakimiyeti Milliye in 1930 and
1931.
344
Zeki Mesut [Alsan], “Avrupa”nın Manası” Hakimiyeti Milliye, (4 April 1931).
345
ASMAE, Pacco 1732/8021, (17 November 1930).
346
Domna Dontas, “La Grece et la Politique de Reconciliation de Briand”, in Le Plan
Briand…, 519.
347
Dontas, “La Grece et la Politique…,” 519.
348
Dilek Barlas and Serhat Güvenç, “To Build a Navy with the Help of Adversary: ItalianTurkish Naval Arms Trade, 1929-1932,” Middle Eastern Studies 38(4), (October 2002): 158.
112
However, Turkey’s suspicions of France did not necessarily prompt Ankara to rush into any
alliance system, particularly an Italian-led one. The reserved Turkish attitude towards
alliances of unequal strength found its expression in an interview in the Italian daily
newspaper, Popolo d’Italia, with Turkish Foreign Minister Aras who stated that, as three
separate treaties of friendship already bound Turkey, Greece, and Italy, there was no need for
an additional tripartite pact.349
In fact, to be a part of a bloc would not help Turkey to become a member of the
League of Nations. Since Turkey wanted to be recognized as a legitimate actor, it could not
alienate either Italy or France. For that reason, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü told the Italian
ambassador in Turkey that the Turkish government would consider Briand’s proposal and the
Italian response to it together.350 In other words, İsmet İnönü was concerned not only about
the Briand initiative but also about the countries’ reactions to it. The Turkish press of the
time mirrored İnönü’s mindset to a certain extent, as most Turkish newspapers devoted more
attention to the Italian reply to Briand’s proposal than to the proposal itself. Obviously, in its
conception of Europe, Mussolini’s Italy did strike a responsive chord in Ankara.351
The issue of extending invitations to the Soviet Union and Turkey came up during the
first meeting of the second session of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union on 16
January 1931. German and Italian Foreign Ministers figured prominently in the consequent
debate, advocating both Soviet and Turkish participation.352 Despite Briand’s reservations,
the question of Turkish and Soviet incorporation into the Commission led to agreement
among the member states acting on different yet compatible interests and motives. For
349
MAE, Levant/Turquie, Vol. 609, No. 234, (25 August 1930) and No. 111, (26 November
1930). For the neutrality and friendship treaties concluded in 1928 and 1930 with Italy and
Greece respectively, see Soysal, Türkiye’nin Siyasal I…, 333-339 and 391-396.
350
ASMAE, Pacco 1732/8021, (8 September 1930).
351
For Turkish press coverage see, Ayın Tarihi 77 (August 1930): 6430-6441.
352
League of Nations, Commission of Enquiry for European Union, Minutes of the Second
Session of the Commission, C.144.M45. 1931. VII, (Geneva, 16 to 21 January 1931), 22.
113
instance, Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu said his country would welcome the
participation of these two countries the moment it appeared expedient.353 For Italian Foreign
Minister Grandi, the admission of Turkey and the Soviet Union was meant to move Britain
and Germany away from France.354
At the end of deliberations on 20 January, 1931, the first resolution the Commission
drafted was about inviting Iceland, Turkey and the Soviet Union to join the Union. This
resolution was eventually adopted with Norway, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Spain, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland maintaining their reservations regarding the
issue.355 Adoption of this resolution cleared the way for Turkey’s official involvement in the
work of the Commission of Enquiry beginning with its third session in May. On 20 January,
1931, Briand in Geneva wrote to Paris that the French government hoped to see a positive
response to this invitation from the Turkish government.356
This invitation can hardly be seen as a manifestation of a French change of heart
towards Turkey less than a year from Briand’s League of Nations address. At best, it can be
regarded as a pragmatic move to prevent Turkey from drifting into the Italian orbit. There
were indications that the French were concerned about Italian manipulation of Turkey, even
within the framework of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union. Again, in January,
French diplomats in Rome warned Paris about this possibility. They quoted an Italian daily,
Giornale d’Itallia, which stated: “Turkey will accept the invitation of the powers to
353
Titulescu also said that Briand made a mistake in subordinating economics to politics. Dan
Berindei, “La Roumanie et le Plan Briand” in Le Plan Briand..., 470.
354
Petricioli, “Dino Grandi et la…,” 341-324.
355
League of Nations, Minutes of the Second Session of the Commission…, 40 and 81.
Although reserved about the Commission’s expansion, Denmark insisted on the inclusion of
Iceland among the European states to be invited. League of Nations, Minutes of the Second
Session of the Commission…, 24.
356
MAE, 1918-1940, Série Y Internationale, Vol. 642, No. 32/35, (20 January 1931): 32.
114
participate in the work of the conference [on the European Union] and will not forget the
friendly attitude of Rome.”357
The Italian officials, for their part, did not try to hide their expectations either. After
his return to Rome from Geneva, Italian Foreign Minister Grandi informed the Italian
delegation that the presence of these two countries in the debates on the Briand project was in
the Italian interests. Later, Grandi hinted to the ambassadors of Turkey and the Soviet Union
that Italy would support their participation if they declared their preliminary acceptance of the
invitation.358 The Italian sponsorship for Turkish membership in various schemes for
European initiatives was not devoid of ulterior motives.
In 1931, various proposals and counter-proposals were made to eliminate tariffs and
other barriers among the countries in Eastern Europe in response to the 1929 World Economic
Crisis. Both Italy and France tried to modify the proposed schemes to suit their political
interests in the region. When Paris came up with modifications to turn the whole scheme into
an anti-German political coalition, Italy sought a way out in order not to lose its leverage over
Berlin. One tactic Rome resorted to was to “attempt to enlarge the technical difficulties by
pleading for the inclusion of Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Poland and Turkey, who could be
counted on to make negotiations more complicated and lengthy and, if they none the less
succeeded, to counterbalance the influence of the Little Entente.”359
Nevertheless, in the subsequent sessions of the Commission of Enquiry for European
Union, Turkey strengthened its position through its involvement in various committees,
including the one that was tasked with studying the Soviet proposal for an economic non-
357
MAE, 1918-1940, Série Y Internationale, Vol. 642, No. 111/112, (29 January 1931): 194
Petriocioli, “Dino Grandi et la…,” 339-340.
359
Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy…, 230.
358
115
aggression pact.360 However, after the death of Aristide Briand in March, 1932, the work of
the Commission of Enquiry Union lost much of its momentum. During its sixth session on 30
September, 1932 that opened with a tribute to the memory of Aristide Briand, Turkey was
already a full-fledged participant owing to its membership in the League of Nations as from
18 July, 1932.361 Although Briand’s proposal could not be realized, his half-hearted inclusion
of Turkey into the Commission of Enquiry for European Union secured Turkey’s admission
to the League as a European rather than an Asian country. League membership, in a way, set
the seal on Turkey’s identity as a European country for France as well. Two weeks after
Turkey’s admission to the League, the French Parliament hailed Turkey’s entry as “a moral
and political event of extraordinary significance … to Europe’s interest.”362
360
See, League of Nations, Commission of Enquiry for European Union, Minutes of the
Fourth Session of the Commission, C.681.M.287, 1931. VII (Geneva, September 3rd to 5th,
1931): 21.
361
See Yücel Güçlü, “Turkey’s Entrance into the League of Nations, Middle Eastern Studies
39(1), (January 2003), pp. 186-206.
362
BCA, 222.498.4, Foreign Minister Aras to Prime Minister İnönü, (5 August 1932).
116
6 THE RISE OF A “EUROPEAN” MIDDLE POWER
The period following a general war prompts secondary powers to fight for their causes
together with their peers and this strategy makes them separate from great and minor powers.
Turkey’s role in the Balkans in the first half of the 1930s illustrates quite well the position of
middle powers soon after a period of general war. Turkish efforts in this period were geared
towards the construction of a coalition of “like-minded” states in the Balkan Peninsula as a part
of its “other-help” strategy.363
The operating environment in the Balkans made coalition building among these
countries relatively easy. First, they were geographically contagious. This factor alone
facilitated collaboration of like-minded states. Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania
and Romania all had a frontier (continental or coastal) with at least one of the others. Secondly,
in the Balkans, with the exception of Albania, power was more or less evenly distributed
among geographically and economically minor states of comparable strength. Turkey was the
only Balkan country with a sizeable territory. Thirdly, no specific great power exerted decisive
influence in the region in the first half of the 1930s. In fact, immediately after the First World
War a power vacuum occurred in the peninsula, which was only deepened by the World
Economic Crisis of 1929.364
Compared to other Balkan states, Turkey had the greatest potential to act as a middle
power in the region, not merely because of the size of its territory but mainly as a result of its
diplomatic capacity in the Balkans. Turkey could tap its middle power capacity mostly in
diplomatic terms. At the time, Turkey already had in place a highly developed diplomatic
363
Ravenhill writes that the creativity of middle powers is directed towards the construction
of coalitions of “like-minded” states. John Ravenhill, “Cycles of Middle Power Activism:
Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies”, Australian Journal of
International Affairs, 52/3 (1998): 312.
364
See Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy…
117
tradition and establishment. The Turkish ruling class in the interwar period inherited the
administrative experience of the Ottoman Empire. They used the knowledge, the skill and the
know-how that they had gained from the Ottoman experience to promote their diplomatic
goals. In functional terms, the Ottoman heritage added an element of creativity to the new
Republic’s diplomacy.365
Moreover, Ankara began to acquire muscle to back its diplomacy in the form of a
growing military power, including its rejuvenated navy. The naval programs had come to
fruition by the late 1920s and the early 1930s. The two submarines ordered in the Netherlands
had been delivered in 1928. Their arrival marked the beginning of the growth trajectory for the
the Turkish Navy. The battlecruiser Yavuz was finally ready for re-commissioning in 1930.
The contractor, Penhoët, completed the work satisfactorily but incurred a substantial financial
loss.366 To be considered of combat value, the Yavuz needed destroyers to protect her. In 1931
the Turkish navy was anxiously awaiting the delivery of these destroyers and other units built
in Italy under the 1929 order.
The three submarine chasers were first to arrive although they had been delayed
because of speed problems.367 Italian government exerted pressure on Ankara to accept the
three submarine chasers despite their failure to reach the contract speed.368 These three boats
were officially received by the Turkish Navy in September 1931 in İstanbul.369 The first two
destroyers, Kocatepe and Adatepe, were originally due for delivery in the spring of 1931.
Selim Deringil, “Dış Politikada Süreklilik Sorunsalı: II. Abdülhamit ve İsmet İnönü”
Toplum ve Bilim, 28 (Winter 1985): 95-96.
366
For a long memorandum by the French naval attaché on the Yavuz’s reconditioning by
Penhoët, see MAE, Serié E, Levant/Turquie, Vol. 599, Carton 305, “Refection du ‘Yavuz’ par
la Société des Chantier et Atèliers de Saint-Nazaire (Penhoët) a Guldjick-Golfe d’Ismidt’ (12
March 1930). SHM, Carton 1BB2/89, Bulletin de Rensignements, No. 222 (June 1930): 7173. “Yavuz’un Atış Tecrübeleri,” Cumhuriyet (11 August 1930).
367
PRO FO 371/14567, E6865/206/44 (18 December 1930).
368
SHM, Carton 1BB2/97, Bulletin de Rensignements, No. 225 (November 1931): 72-73.
369
“Hücumbotlarımız Fennin En Son Tekamülatına Göre İnşa Edilmişlerdir,” Yenigün (8
September 1931).
365
118
They were marred by serious stability problems370 and it was attempted to rectify these
problems that delayed their delivery until October 1931. The two submarines, Sakarya and
Dumlupınar, were delivered a month later, in November 1931.371 The last Italian-built units
were the two additional destroyers, Zafer and Tınaztepe. They were supposed to be delivered
within 12 months after the order but when they finally arrived in İstanbul in June 1932, the
delivery term had been exceeded by more than a year.372 The arrival of these units, however,
strengthened naval power and provided Ankara with another functional leverage in addition to
its diplomacy.
Its new navy and the quality of its diplomacy (as an Ottoman heritage) could both
have functioned either as a burden or an asset in Turkish efforts to promote regional
cooperation in the 1930s. To start with, reorganization of its navy under German instruction
and the acquisition of modern naval units could have been regarded as indications of Turkey’s
aggressive intentions or revisionist foreign policy. However, from 1928 onwards, Turkey had
been participating in international disarmament conferences. Ankara shared and, to a certain
extent, subscribed to Soviet views on disarmament. For instance, in March 1928, at the fifth
session of the Preparatory Commission, the Soviets submitted a proposal that called for total
disarmament. The proposal drew severe criticism from all but two delegates. Only the
Germans and the Turks supported the Soviet proposal. On his return to Moscow, Litvinov,
the Soviet delegate at the Geneva talks, singled out these two countries’ delegates in his oral
report to the Soviet Central Executive Committee. While he assigned a “special place” to the
370
For detailed engineering notes and calculations related to the stability problems, see Ata
Nutku, “Ansaldo Destoyerleri,” [The Ansaldo destroyers] (Unpublished manuscript), the Ata
Nutku Collection, Turkish Naval Academy Library, Tuzla, İstanbul.
371
‘Tahtelbahirlerimize Dün Sancak Çekildi,” Cumhuriyet (7 November 1931).
372
‘Zafer ve Tınaztepe,” Cumhuriyet (6 June 1932).
119
German delegation, the Turkish delegation was commended for the “considerable support”
they lent to the Soviet proposal.373
The Soviet proposal for total disarmament was finally included on the agenda of the
Preparatory Commission on 15 April 1929. Revised and amended in the meantime, the
proposal in broad terms called for a) reduction, rather than limitation, of armaments; b)
proportional reduction of all categories of armaments; and c) abolition of offensive
armaments, i.e. primarily aircraft, tanks and long-range artillery. When a vote was about to
be taken to kill the Soviet proposal, the Turkish representative tabled a resolution that added a
new lease of life to it.374 It has been argued that “The Turkish delegate apparently thought
these principles were basically sound, but he was prepared to acquiesce in shelving the Soviet
plan if the Turkish proposal [calling for equalizing armaments for all countries] was
discussed”.375
Also in 1929, Turkey took advantage of another Soviet initiative to normalize its
international status. In view of the delays in the Kellogg-Briand Pact’s ratification by various
signatories, Litvinov proposed a protocol to bring the pact into immediate operation. Such a
special protocol was signed on 9 February 1929 by Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania and the
Soviet Union. It was open to other countries’ accession too, and so Turkey, Persia and Danzig
subsequently acquiesced to the Protocol and thus to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.376
Although Turkey had not yet been a party to any general disarmament or naval
limitation treaty, in 1930 it signed naval protocols with its two neighbours, Greece and the
Soviet Union, which ushered in a naval holiday in the Aegean and the Black Sea. In other
words, Turkey committed itself not to seek further expansion of its naval power without
notifying others well in advance. The naval protocol with Greece was particularly important,
Lambert, Soviet Disarmament Policy…, 56.
Lambert, Soviet Disarmament Policy…,, 70-75.
375
Lambert, Soviet Disarmament Policy…,, 75.
376
Lambert, Soviet Disarmament Policy…,, 65.
373
374
120
as it confirmed lack of aggressive or expansionist motives against each other on the part of
both governments. In sum, it was a clear manifestation of both countries’ adherence to the
status quo.377
Similarly, the new Turkey managed to turn a potential burden or hindrance into a
functional and activist advantage through the diplomatic tradition it had inherited from the
Ottoman Empire. This Ottoman heritage, which now provided a functional advantage for
Turkey to assume a high profile diplomatic role, could have hindered its efforts. To put it in
different terms, Turkey had inherited in the Balkans the negative public image of the Ottoman
Empire that had resulted from nearly four centuries of Ottoman rule. Turkey’s relations with
its Balkan neighbours, hence, remained burdened with this negative image. The Greeks felt
particularly strongly about the Ottoman past. The resolution of Turkish-Greek problems that
had defied solution since the Treaty of Lausanne generated an equally strong impact, this time
in a positive direction in the early 1930s. Ankara’s mending fences with Athens helped
Turkey drastically change its international image to that of a status quo power that rejected
cross-border expansionism or irredentism so that the new Turkey began to be perceived as a
potential partner rather than a source of threat in the Peninsula.
Turkey’s rapprochement with Greece was also rewarded by unqualified support from
Athens of Ankara’s pursuit of endorsement of its European credentials. From the onset,
Turkey had sought international recognition as a European rather than an Asian country. For
instance, in the 1920s, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras defined his country’s new
orientation and identity as being a western power to whom “the death of a peasant in the
Balkans is of more importance than the death of a king in Afghanistan.”378 During the
interwar period, Turkish decision-makers and intellectuals were adamant in asserting the new
See Hatzivassiliou, “The 1930 Greek-Turkish Naval…,”89-111.
Quoted in Feroz Ahmad, “The Historical Background of Turkey’s Foreign Policy,” in the
Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, (eds.) Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Kerides, (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2004): 18.
377
378
121
republic’s European credentials. This was a reflection of the Turkish desire for acceptance in
the European states system.379 This aspiration met with mixed success initially. Turkey’s
European credentials were not a foregone conclusion for many, even after Turkey was
admitted on equal footing into various pan-European schemes.380
In the 1930s, the new Turkish state was gradually brought into the European fold
through participation in two significant European Union projects of the time. It should be
noted that Greece, or the Venizelist government in Greece to be precise, played a profoundly
important role in the process by sponsoring Turkey’s inclusion. When the Commission of
Inquiry for European Union discussed the prospects for the participation of Turkey and the
Soviet Union in the works of the Commission on 16 January 1931, Greece stood out as
Turkey’s principal sponsor.381 Greek Foreign Minister Michalakopoulus expressed in no
uncertain terms where Turkey stood from the Greek perspective: “it is the opinion of the
Greek government that, from an economic and even from the geographical point of view,
Turkey belongs to Europe rather than Asia.”382
Similarly, Athens’ support seems to have been instrumental in the fundamental change
of mind on the part of a prominent European intellectual regarding Turkey’s place in his
European Union proposal. In his first major work, Paneropa, Richard von CoudenhoveKalergi regarded the new Turkey as a source of risk rather than a full-fledged participant in
See, for instance, Cemal Tukin, Bugünkü Avrupa Devletler Manzumesinin Doğuşu ve
Türkiye’nin Bu Manzumeye Duhulü, Konferanslar Seri: 1- Kitap 18, (Ankara: Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi Yayını, 1938). Georges-Henri Soutou, “Was there a European Order in the
Twentieth Century? From the Concert of Europe to the End of the Cold War, Contemporary
European History 9/3, (August 2000): 337-338
380
Despite persistent Turkish efforts, participation in various pan-European schemes did not
necessarily bring recognition of Turkey’s European identity, to the frustration of Turkish
diplomats and intellectuals. Prominent Turkish journalist, Falih Rıfkı Atay who covered the
London Conference in 1933 for Cumhuriyet, argued that Turkey should reconsider its claim
rather than assert its being a European country each time Turkey was referred to as an Asian
country in meetings or in the press, as The Times did during the Conference. Falih Rıfkı
[Atay], Londra Konferansı Mektupları, (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1933): 48.
381
BCA, 254.712.20, (3 August 1930).
382
League of Nations, Minutes of the Second Session…, 22.
379
122
his interwar conception of the European Union. His proposed union was devised, among
other things, to permanently insure the existence of the Eastern European states which would
be relieved of the crushing burden of arming themselves. The Petite Entente would be secured
against the Hapsburg danger; the prospect of Scandinavian countries uniting against the
Russian; the Balkan countries against the Turkish.383
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s view of Turkey reversed itself completely during the period
from 1923 to 1934. Interestingly, Coudenhove-Kalergi used Turkey’s admission to Aristide
Briand’s project as justification for the change in Turkey’s status into a European country in
his own project.384 Moreover, in the first half of the 1930s, Turkey was among the countries
Coudenhove-Kalergi visited in order to enlist allies for his struggle against Nazism. In 1934,
Coudenhove-Kalergi published his second book, Europa Erwacht! (Europe Awake!), which
rejected racist theories of the Nazis.385
Coudenhove-Kalergi ‘s visit to Turkey obviously helped him change his mind about
this country’s place in Pan-Europe, because in his book published in 1934, he included
Turkey, along with the other Balkan countries, within a political Europe. However,
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s inclusion of Turkey in his Pan-Europe was not devoid of geopolitical
considerations or his usual anti-Soviet motives. Although, at the time, Turkey had been
denied full sovereignty over the Straits, he claimed that European enlargement into
southeastern Europe was significant as the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were now in the
hands of a European power, namely Turkey.386
383
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europe…, 177-78.
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europa Erwacht!, (Zurich: Paneuropa-Verlag, 1934), 140.
385
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Europa Erwacht!...
386
Coundehove-Kalergi, Europa Erwacht!..., 21.
384
123
In fact, it was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s reforms that compelled him to reconsider his
view of Turkey.387 He then regarded the Turkey of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1930s as a
compensation for what had been lost to Europe in the north and in the east as a result of the
First World War. This compensation (or gain) resulted from Turkey’s detachment from the
Arabic world, a process that was completed by the Turkish reforms which rid Turkey of
Islamic culture and replaced it with European culture. This development changed Turkey into
a member of the European civilization.388 He later wrote in his autobiography:
“The most important step toward such a new understanding between Europe and the
Near East has been accomplished by Modern Turkey, that recently under its leader
Kemal Atatürk, embraced without any European pressure all the vital elements of
Western civilization. This Turkish Revolution is paving the way for a complete
reconciliation between Europe and the Near East.”389
Moreover, Coudenhove-Kalergi was now convinced that Turkey belonged integrally
to Pan-Europe.390 Interestingly enough, it was the Greek Prime Minister, Eleutherios
Venizelos, who persuaded him that Turkey under the rule of Kemal Atatürk had become an
integral part of Western civilization and that, whatever the future of Pan-Europe, Turkey
should be made a part of it. Coudenhove-Kalergi wrote: “He [Venizelos] assured me that
Peter Bugge, “The Nation Supreme: the Idea of Europe 1914-1945” in Kevin Wilson and
Jan van der. Dussen (eds.), The History of the Idea of Europe, (London: Routledge, 1995): 99101.
388
Coundehove-Kalergi, Europa Erwacht!..., 21.
389
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe…, 280
390
While, Coudenhove-Kalergi changed his mind about Turkey and its place in political
Europe, it is difficult to argue that he represented the majority opinion. For instance, another
Austrian, who served in Turkey as a diplomat in the early 1930s, regarded Turkey as an Asian
country and the Turks as Asiatic people. Norbert von Biscoff in his book on Turkey, however,
could not help but admire the Turkish civilizational transformation like Coudenhove-Kalergi.
This transformation turned Turkey into a model for other Asiatic or non-Western societies to
emulate. He went further and suggested a leadership role for Turkey for Iran and Afghanistan
both of which seemed to have embarked on a similar modernization path. Bischoff, Ankara:
Türkiye’deki Yeni…, 290-291.
387
124
Greece could only cooperate with our movement if Turkey were also included.”391 He also
wrote that peace had been concluded between Turkey and Greece thanks to the two farsighted and energetic statesmen, Atatürk and Venizelos. These two statesmen had concluded
an alliance and hence laid the foundations of a Balkan union.392
According to Coudenhove-Kalergi, the only bright spot in the dark picture of
continued European strife was the reconciliation between Greece and Turkey. He argued that
while Franco-German reconciliation had stalled, the reconciliation between Greece and
Turkey constituted a major success in the East in that respect. The old arch-enemies, Greece
and Turkey, had consolidated their reconciliation which provided the core for the Balkan
Entente.393 Later, he maintained his positive view on Turkey and Greece. For instance, he
pointed out: “Since then I had often thought of the inspiring example Greece and Turkey had
given their sister nations by securing national peace and prosperity at the price of a generous
compromise. I thought of them now. I compared their attitude with that of France and
Germany.”394 In this comparison, contrary to his views on Turkey and Greece, he was more
pessimistic towards France and Germany. He said: “If France … recognizes that it cannot
destroy Germany without putting itself in danger of annihilation, it must … resolutely take the
path of reconciliation”.395
Meanwhile, the ‘warmth’ in Italian-Turkish relations was already drawing to an end as
Italian and Turkish views of the Balkans and the Mediterranean evolved in increasingly divergent
directions in the first half of the 1930s. To begin with, Turkish-Greek cooperation went out of
Rome’s control. Ankara and Athens began to promote political and economic cooperation among
the Balkan states to preserve the status quo rather than to serve as Italian proxies in the Peninsula.
391
Coundehove-Kalergi, Europa Erwacht!..., 126-127
Coundehove-Kalergi, Europa Erwacht!..., 21.
393
Coundehove-Kalergi, Europa Erwacht!..., 156.
394
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Crusade for Pan-Europe…, 280.
395
Peter M. R. Stirk, A History of European Integration since 1914, (London: Continuum,
2001): 8.
392
125
It was difficult to imagine that the Italians would approve such independent moves in the region,
as Greek Prime Minister Venizelos confided to French diplomats in 1933.396
Italy’s financial limitations seriously undermined its pursuit of political, military and
economic influence in Turkey. The World Economic Crisis in 1929 aggravated financial
problems in Italy. In 1931, for instance, the Del Tirreno shipyard that was building the destoyers
Zafer and Tınaztepe demanded an adjustment of the payment basis in view of changes in the
exchange rates.397 These two destroyers would only be delivered after Turkish Prime Minister
İsmet İnönü’s visit to Rome in May 1932. In addition to the renewal of the Italian-Turkish Treaty
of 1928, this visit culminated in a new 300 million Lira credit agreement between Italy and
Turkey. However, Rome turned out to be unwilling or unable, or both, to release the cash portion
of the credit.
Related to the Turkish naval orders, the union of Italian shipyards requested the Italian
Foreign Ministry to reserve one third of this credit against payments for the Turkish naval units
constructed in Italian shipyards.398 It was suggested that another one third would be allocated for
the additional Turkish naval units and naval aircraft under construction in Italy. The protracted
negotiations on the conditions for the release of the credit frustrated both the Italians and the
Turks. Italian diplomats in Turkey accused the Turkish government of acting with a ‘Balkan
mentality’ in dealing with the great powers on economic issues. Haunted by the Ottoman debt
experience, Ankara was extremely sensitive about the (particularly political) terms attached to
foreign loans.399 Turkey then turned to Paris for fresh foreign loans in December 1932. This
volte-face, the British argued, was aimed at playing off the great powers against each other. In
practical terms, this tactic was expected to extract maximum benefits from France while exerting
396
MEA, Série Levant, Sous-Série Turquie, Vol. 611, no. 252, (5 October 1933).
ASMAE, Busta 3/6, Turchia 1931, Cantieri Del Tirreno to Ministry of National Defence
(Ankara), (21 October 1931).
398
ASMAE, Busta 6/8, Turchia 1932, Cantieri Reuniti Dell’ Adriatico to Foreign Ministry
(Rome), (5 August 1932).
399
ASMAE, Busta 6/8, Turchia 1931, Koch to Foreign Ministry, (30 October 1932).
397
126
pressure on Italy.400 Rome interpreted this Turkish move as turning its back on old friends.
Ankara should not have been so particular about the terms for credits from old friends.401
However, the sharp deterioration in Italian-Turkish relations resulted principally from
their diverging policies in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Rome had never approved of
Ankara’s policies promoting regional economic and political cooperation even though the
Turkish efforts were geared towards preserving the status quo on the Peninsula. Italy’s
supplying naval arms failed to bring Turkey into the Italian orbit to serve as a proxy to
Rome’s revisionist policies in these two regions. Finally, Mussolini’s opposition to Turkey’s
admission to the League of Nations revived the Turkish fear of Italy’s ulterior motives. By
1933, Italy had begun to appear as a potential threat to Turkey in the Aegean and the
Mediterranean.402 The Italian connection with the Turkish navy was already in decline. The
Italian naval arms suppliers began to face a number of bureaucratic troubles with their
deliveries to Turkey. For instance, Turkish authorities insisted on charging customs fees on
the ammunition and fire control devices for the Italian-built destroyers.403 The last Italian
engineer assigned to help the Turkish navy put the Zafer (Turbine) class destroyers into
operational status returned home in January 1934.404 His departure ended the Italian
connection with the Turkish navy.
Membership of the League of Nations, nevertheless, provided Turkey with a means to
magnify its diplomatic voice in regional and international councils from the onset. First, a
seat in the League as an international forum enabled Turkey to go beyond the limits of
biletaral diplomacy in finding and working with other like-minded and comparably -placed
400
PRO FO 371/19089, E6237/55/44, Turkish Financial Situation and Financial Policy, (1
December 1932).
401
ASMAE, Busta 6/8, Turchia 1932, Director-General, Office 1 to Undersecretary of
Foreign Ministry (Rome), (14 December 1932.
402
Sermet Fuat, “Donanmamız…,” 411-412.
403
ASMAE, Busta 6/48, Turchia 1933, (18 and 29 March 1933).
404
SHM, Carton 1BB7/169 Compte Rendu De Rensignements (Turquie) No. 5, (16 April
1934).
127
states for common objectives. Secondly, its admission to the League on 18 July 1932 can be
taken for all intents and purposes as a formal ending to its international “outcast” status. In
other words, it clearly meant that Turkey had been endorsed unquestionably as a power
committed to the international status quo.405 The significance of this endorsement was not
missed by careful observers in Geneva. Reporting the occasion, Manley O. Hundson,
commented:
“It is notable that Turkey was not called upon to give any special ‘guarantee of its
sincere intention to observe its international obligations,’ nor to accept any special
regulations with respect to its armaments; the Assembly resolution merely recited that
‘it is established that the Turkish Republic fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 1
of the Covenant.’ This procedure is unlike that followed when Germany was
admitted.”406
In addition to that, its Balkan neighbours, primarily Greece, continued to promote
Turkey’s appointment to positions of influence within the League structure. Shortly after
Turkey had been admitted to League membership, Greek Delegate Nicolas Politis was elected
as the new Chairman of the Assembly in September 1932. Included among the delegates he
nominated for the Agenda Committee was Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rüştü Aras.
Upon approval of Politis’ nominations, Aras was then elected as its chair for the meetings.
On his first appearance at Geneva, Aras was catapulted into a sort of executive post at the
League Assembly due mostly to his nomination by Politis.407
Finally, in 1934, two years after it had been admitted to the League of Nations, Turkey
was elected to succeed China on the League Council. Although this election was regarded as
See also, Yücel Güçlü, “Turkey’s Entrance into the League of Nations,” Middle Eastern
Studies 39(1), (January 2003): 186-206.
406
Manley O. Hudson, “Admission of Turkey to Membership in the League of Nations,”
American Journal of International Law, 26(4), (October 1932): 814
407
The League of Nations, Verbatim Record of the Thirteen Ordinary Session of the
Assembly, Pleanary Sessions (26 September 1932): 1-7.
405
128
recognition of Turkey’s international prominence, most Turkish commentators were careful to
emphasize that the League had made an exception to its established practices by allowing
Turkey, a European country, to succeed China, an Asian country, on the Council. For them,
to take the place of an Asian country on the Council was acceptable as long as it did not
compromise Turkey’s European credentials.408
For Turkish press coverage of the issue, see Ayın Tarihi 10, (October 1934), 181-183 and
218-228.
408
129
7. A MIDDLE POWER AT WORK: THE BALKAN ENTENTE
The new rulers of Turkey remained jealous guardians of their country’s European
identity and its legal and formal equality with other states. Rather than seeking a primus inter
pares status as the heir to the former imperial ruler, their persistent emphasis on the equality of
states most probably improved their image in the Balkans. Therefore, when Turkey embarked
on diplomatic initiatives in the Balkans, it was able to convince other nations that it was
working towards creating a coalition of like-minded states in the Balkans rather than reviving
Ottoman domination.
Balkan cooperation took root initially as a reaction to the emergence of revisionist
powers, in particular Italy. Soon after the First World War, Italy was engaged in a series of
aggressive moves in the region. Italian forces first bombarded Corfu in Greece and took over
Fiume from the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Thus, Rome’s direct involvement
in the Balkans prompted Turkey to seek ways of forming a Balkan entente. The idea was aired
for the first time by a Turkish diplomat, Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur, in conversation with the
Romanian Foreign Minister, I. G. Duca, in 1926.409 The idea itself may not have been
original410 or may have had many fathers,411 yet probably no other Balkan state pursued it as
vigorously and relentlessly as Turkey did in the interwar period.
Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy…, 137.
According to Stavrianos, the Balkan Entente of 1934 represented a third Balkan Alliance
system. The first two attempts featured strong anti-Ottoman elements. L.S. Stavrianos,
Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement Toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times,
(Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1964): 224-258
411
For instance, King Alexander of Yugoslavia is also considered “the primary architect of
the [Balkan] pact.” Bogdan Raditsa, “Venizelos and the Struggle around the Balkan Pact,”
Balkan Studies, 6/1,(1965): 120.
409
410
130
The World Economic Crisis in 1929 became a further stimulus for Turkey to take the
lead in Balkan cooperation. The crisis was a drastic manifestation of a transitional period
during which different forces were competing to control the terms of the new world order.
Changes at global level reinforced Turkish activism and initiatives in the international arena.
Furthermore, the inability of the European great powers to find solutions to the crisis gave
Turkey more latitude in shaping Balkan diplomacy with its neighbours between 1930 and 1933
when the Balkan countries called for regional conferences to jointly overcome the economic
and political effects of the crisis.
The Balkan Predicaments
Balkan unity or union had stood been easier said than done as the Peninsula had been
home to contending and competing claims of regional as well as extra-regional powers.
Greece and its awkward relations with Italy and Bulgaria was a good case in point. In the first
half of the 1920s, Greece was both a victim of aggression and an aggressor. Earlier it had had
to face Italian aggression over Corfu; yet, in 1925, Greece itself committed an act of
aggressing against its northern neighbor, Bulgaria. When two Greek soldiers were killed in a
border incident, Greek troops invaded parts of Bulgaria. In reaction, Sofia appealed to the
League of Nations. The Bulgarian appeal resulted in Council President Aristide Briand’s call
for the Greek government to withdraw its troops.
The Council of the League endorsed and backed Briand’s action. Moreover, it
appointed a military commission to oversee the withdrawal of Greek troops from Bulgaria.
Finally, a commission of inquiry was set up and it found Greece at fault. Then the Council
decided that Greece had to pay an indemnity because its invasion of Bulgaria constituted a
clear violation of the League Covenant. In effect, Greece was subjected to a punitive
131
sanction. On the surface, the whole venture seemed to have been handled fairly smoothly and
successfully under the League framework and the League was credited with having settled a
border dispute between the two Balkan neighbours. However, O’Connor argues “there were
no public threats; but behind the scenes there was talk of a naval demonstration and even the
sanctions of Article 16 of the Covenant... Though hailed at the time as a victory for the
League... the decisive action was more reminiscent of the Concert of Europe, for the Great
Powers were united, none of their interests were at stake and the disputants were small
nations.”412
Compared to the confrontation with Bulgaria, however, the great power aggression
towards Greece left a deeper and much more lasting influence on Greek thinking about Italy
between the two World Wars. What reinforced the lessons learned from the debacle with
Bulgaria was the fact that Mussolini could get away with what he had done in and on Corfu.
The whole venture “left Greece continually looking over her shoulder to make sure that her
actions in no way disturbed the Italian state, particularly its bellicose leader”.413
At first, the situation on the ground, marked as it was by mutual suspicions and
rivalries, did not look very promising for regional cooperation. During his visit to Sofia on 10
December 1930, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras stated that the formation of
opposing camps was the pre-war method of conducting foreign relations. According to him, in
the post-war period there was a need for new methods in the conduct of foreign relations. The
new class of states wished to be on good terms with all, especially with their neighbours. This
new class of states had been signing neutrality treaties which contributed to regional
rapprochements. All these efforts, in fact, would facilitate general rapprochements. Aras’
“new class of states” and the behaviour he attributed to them are very much reminiscent of a
O’Connor, Force and Diplomacy…, 49-50.
James Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions, Ethiopia, 1935-36, (London:
Royal Historical Society, 1982): 2).
412
413
132
“middlepowermanship” approach that defines middle powers primarily by their pursuit of
multilateral solutions to international problems, their adherence to compromise positions in
international disputes and last, but not least, their adherence to the notion of “good
international citizenship” to guide their foreign policy.414
Nevertheless, some people, such as the Polish Minister in Bulgaria, interpreted the
visit of Aras to Sofia as a further step in the creation of a revisionist group. The American
Minister in Sofia, Henry W. Shoemaker, also wrote that the Italian Minister in Sofia was
aware of Aras’s interest in a Greco-Bulgarian rapprochement. Later he pointed out that Aras
could work in the interests of a Greco-Bulgarian understanding without having as an aim the
creation of a revisionist bloc. According to the American Minister, Turkey was trying to
prevent Serbian hegemony over the Southern-Slavs.415
Suspicion of Yugoslavia existed for a while among certain Balkan states such as
Greece. When President Atatürk suggested that İstanbul become the center of an eventual
Balkan Union, the comments of some Greek officials concentrated on the role of Yugoslavia.
The most striking comment was made by the Greek Minister to Turkey, Mr. Polychroniadis.
He stated that so long as Yugoslavia nourished imperialistic views and a desire for Balkan
hegemony, it was not very likely to consent to any genuine rapprochement with the other
Balkan states, which would be possible only on a basis of perfect equality. 416
Polychroniadis was not very positive about Romania either. He said: “Rumania is so
hypnotized by her fear of the Bolsheviks that she can not think of anything else and shows a
polite indifference towards the Balkan conference”.417 However, the Romanian diplomat
Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers…,19.
As a matter of fact, the new Yugoslav Minister to Sofia left for Belgrade immediately after
the visit of Aras. NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 4, Sofia, (10 December 1930)
416
Polychroniadis was Minister to Belgrade before his transfer to Ankara and instrumental in
solving the Greco-Serbian differences, which arose over the free zone of Salonica after the
fall of Pangalos. NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul, (23 February 1932).
417
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul, (23 February 1932).
414
415
133
Viorel Virgil Tilea, did not agree with the Greek Minister to Turkey, Mr. Polychroniadis.
According to him, in 1930-31 Romanian Prime Minister, Maniu had improved the relations of
his country with its neighbours. Tilea said: “He and his Foreign Minister must have their full
share of credit for the Conference of Balkan states which Romania has just been attending in
Athens.”418
Yet Yugoslavia was apprehensive about Romanian foreign policy and considered
Romania the weak link in the Little Entente. The reason for such apprehensions was a
possibility that Romania might extend its bilateral pact of friendship with Italy. But after
Mussolini’s declaration of the Four Power Pact, the Little Entente states sought to strengthen
their own alliance.419 Meanwhile, the Turkish Foreign Ministry had been actively supporting
an early settlement between Bulgaria and Greece. The American Minister in Sofia,
Shoemaker, interpreted Turkish activities as efforts geared towards creating something similar
to the Little Entente in extreme South-eastern Europe between Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece.
The British Minister in Sofia was also of the opinion that there were plans for creating a
Turkish-Bulgarian-Greek group and welcomed such a development in Southeastern
Europe.420
However in September 1933, when İsmet İnönu and Aras visited Sofia with the hope
of persuading Bulgaria to become a party to the Greco-Turkish pact, they were disappointed
with the Bulgarian approach. Bulgarian Prime Minister Mooshanoff made the Bulgarian
revisionist demands quite open. He said that Bulgaria could not sign any pact which did not
take into consideration the points that Bulgarian territory in Thrace was not ceded to Greece,
418
Ileana Tilea (ed.), Envoy Extraordinary, Memoirs of a Romanian Diplomat, Viorel Virgil
Tilea (London: Haggerston Press, 1998): 136-137.
419
Eugene Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic Relations with Yugoslavia in the Interwar Period,
1919-1941 (Boulder: East European Monographes, 1993): 167.
420
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 4, Sofia, (30 May 1933).
134
that the Dobrudjan settlement of 1913 was not just to Bulgaria and that Bulgaria had a good
case against Yugoslavia with reference to the Bulgarian minority in Macedonia.421
At the same time, Mooshanoff assured İnönü that Bulgaria had no design on Turkish
territory and its revisionist demands at the expense of Greece would never be prosecuted in a
manner to upset the peace. In return, Turkish officials assured the Bulgarian government that
the Greco-Turkish pact was not directed against Bulgaria. Both sides also agreed to extend
for a period of five years the Treaty of Neutrality signed between Bulgaria and Turkey. 422
But the most interesting remark that the Bulgarian Prime Minister made to the Turkish
officials was that Bulgarian policy must remain attached to the League of Nations and to the
Four Power Pact.423 Mooshanoff’s declaration on the Four Power pact was in a sense a proof
that the Bulgarians were thinking along the same lines as the Italians because this pact was
initially proposed by Italy to other powers, primarily Britain, France and Germany.
Also in 1933, Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu encouraged Aras to obtain from
Jevtic a secret written assurance that Yugoslavia would not reach an agreement with Bulgaria
without Turkey’s prior assent. According to Titulescu, all Balkan treaties were to have a
similar clause, therefore covering Romanians too.424 The aim was to prevent a BulgarianYugoslav agreement. Different from the Yugoslavs, the Romanians recommended a
simultaneous agreement between Romania, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece with or without
Bulgarian participation. Titulescu found in Ankara similar distrust of Bulgaria since Inonu
and Aras had recently returned from Sofia empty-handed.425
421
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 4, Sofia, (29 September 1933).
On 27 November 1933 the Treaty was signed between the two countries.
423
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 4, Sofia, (29 September 1933).
424
Raoul V. Bossy, Recollections of a Romanian Diplomat 1918-1969, Diaries and Memoirs
of Raoul V. Bossy, Vol. I, G. H. Bossy and M. A. Bossy (eds. and trans.), (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 2003): 138
425
Dov B. Lungu, Romania and the Great Powers 1933-1940 (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1989): 30-31
422
135
Meantime, in August 1933, American Charge d’Affaires G. Howland Shaw in İstanbul
reported to Washington that the last three or four months had witnessed the revival of French
prestige in Turkey. The debt settlement, the commercial agreement and the visit of Eduard
Herriot were the major steps in this revival. Shaw also pointed out that France could have
influence in Turkey if it approached Turkey from the basis of closer relations with the Soviet
Union.426
In January 1934, when efforts towards concluding a Balkan pact intensified, the
American Ambassador in Turkey, Robert P. Skinner, wrote that Italy did not want the
domination of one of the Little Entente states in such a union. This in fact meant for Italy the
domination of Yugoslavia. Skinner also emphasized that Turkey felt very strongly on the
subject of the Balkan Pact and preferred to stay neutral rather than take sides in the revisionist
and anti-revisionist camps. Moreover, he added that even though Turkey found revision of the
postwar treaties dangerous for the moment, it would not oppose a later date revision as long as
it was done with the full accord of the parties concerned. But for Turkey the Balkan Entente
must come first.427
In February 1934, not withstanding combined Romanian, Turkish and Greek
pressures, the Yugoslavs were still hesitant to leave the Bulgarians aside so long as the
envisaged pact between the four Balkan states did not provide the security they sought. They
considered such an agreement worth joining only if it provided Yugoslavia with Turkish
military assistance. Lungu wrote that the Turkish army was the only Balkan army that the
Yugoslavs respected. Since Titulescu was aware of the Yugoslav position, he tried to secure
Turkish approval for a military convention to take place among the four states.
King Alexander of Yugoslavia also wanted Titulescu to convince the Turks and the
Greeks that the proposed pact should guarantee not only the maintenance of the existing
426
427
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 1, Istanbul, (25 August 1933).
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 1, Istanbul, (19 January 1934).
136
Boundaries between the contracting parties and Bulgaria but also of all other Balkan
countries. Although the Turks and the Greeks had been wary of getting entangled in the
Italian-Yugoslav conflict, the desire to conclude the agreement prevailed and the Yugoslav
request was granted.428
Turkish Diplomatic Activism
In March 1933, Mussolini’s proposal of the Four-Power Pact propelled Turkey and its
neighbours to move towards a Balkan entente. In the pact, the fascist leader proposed
cooperation in Europe between Italy, Britain, France, and Germany in order to dictate the terms
of the European peace. Mussolini’s initiative did not really surprise the Turkish leadership
because the latter was already convinced that, despite intense rivalry among themselves, the
great powers would collaborate when their interests required them to do so.429 The Four-Power
Pact, however, ignored the demands and interests of the smaller states in shaping Balkan and
Mediterranean politics.
On the surface, Mussolini’s Four-Power Pact seemed in contradiction with his strategy
vis-à-vis Turkey which he had outlined to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Foreign
Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras during their visit to Rome in 1932. In Rome, Mussolini had told
İnönü and Aras that Italy in general was against any kind of alliance system in the region and
Lungu, Romania and the Great Powers …, 32-33. If Italy attacked Yugoslavia through
Albania, irrespective of Bulgaria’s attitude, the other three states were bound to come to
Yugoslavia’s assistance.
429
PRO FO 371/16801, C1237/175/22, Concerning Turkey, according to the British
Archives, French ambassador in Rome M. de Jouvenal had recognized the priority of the
Italian claim to penetrate Anatolia in the event of a break-up of Turkey on the demise of M.
Kemal. But it also opined that any Italian penetration into Anatolia was like dividing the
lion’s skin before the animal was dead and could hardly be regarded as a serious proposition.
428
137
his country preferred to develop close collaboration with Turkey.430 Nevertheless, Turkish
political leaders believed that the European powers had not given up their intention of dividing
the Balkans into separate spheres of influence. This division might reveal itself in the form of
conflict or collaboration.
Yet Mussolini continued to foster the image of friendly relations between Turkey and
Italy. In fact, after the Four-Power Pact proposal, Mussolini approached the Turkish
government to assure them that there was no change in Italy’s friendship policy towards
Turkey. He also added that Italy would inform Turkey of all its political activities. In the same
way, Mussolini expected loyauté from Turkey. Moreover, if there was any criticism of Italy on
Turkey’s part, he would like to hear of it directly from Ankara. In other words, Italy did not
want to see or hear any intermediary between Rome and Ankara. Accordingly, Balkan affairs
were to be debated directly between the two countries without involving other countries.431
Italy’s expectations did not resonate with those of Ankara, which believed that great
power involvement in the region might endanger Turkey’s relations with its Balkan
neighbours.432 Ankara opposed France’s intention of incorporating Bulgaria in cooperation
with Yugoslavia into the Little Entente. Instead the Turkish aim was to include these two
Balkan countries within a possible Balkan entente.433 Related to that, Turkey focused on
cooperation with other Balkan nations instead of developing its bilateral relations with Rome.
Ankara endeavoured to enlist as many Balkan countries as possible into a Balkan entente.
430
ASMAE, Busta 7, Rapporti Politici, 1933/1. However, Mussolini was willing to form a
more limited alliance system with Turkey and Greece.
431
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri A. IV-6, D. 54, F. 85-4.
432
ASMAE, Busta 7-Turchia 1933, (18 June 1933).
433
ASMAE, Busta 7-Turchia 1933, (11 July 1933). According to Italian archival documents,
Turkey would do everything possible to preclude the formation of any Slavic bloc. If such a
bloc were realized, Ankara would come to a special agreement with the Soviet Union, Italy,
Austria and Hungary. ASMAE, Busta 7/5-Turchia 1933, (16 September 1933). In fact,
Yugoslavia could not convince Bulgaria to cooperate within the Little Entente as France
expected.
138
In this way, Turkey hoped to prevent the manipulation of the smaller states in the
region by the great powers. In other words, Ankara’s aim was to form a “neutrality” bloc in
south-eastern Europe. In September 1933, it signed the Entente Cordiale with Greece that
guaranteed the inviolability of their common boundaries. In October and November, 1933,
Turkey signed separate treaties of friendship, non-aggression and reconciliation with Romania
and Yugoslavia respectively.434
Rome inferred that these treaties did not bind Ankara politically to Bucharest and
Belgrade because they concerned the relations between these countries only in case of
aggression. The Italians argued that the treaties of neutrality Turkey had signed separately with
Italy in 1928 and with Bulgaria in 1929, unlike those signed with Romania and Yugoslavia,
entailed political responsibilities in peacetime also.435 Thus, Rome was convinced that
Turkey’s relations with Romania and Yugoslavia were not comparable in scope to those with
Italy and Bulgaria. There was a tendency among Italian officials to believe that Turkey was
more inclined to the Italian-Bulgarian camp than to that of Romania and Yugoslavia, members
of the Little Entente.436
Italy continued working towards rapprochement between the Balkan countries which
were not members of the French-sponsored Little Entente, namely Bulgaria, Greece and
Turkey. In fact, Rome had favoured Turkey’s signing treaties with Bulgaria in 1929 and with
Greece in 1930. After the signing of these treaties, Italian political leaders thought that they
would have even more control over the Balkan states. Moreover, Rome expected that the
Turkish-Italian and the Greek-Italian treaties would serve as building blocks for a tripartite
434
These three countries agreed to bring up the strength of their armies to the same level.
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri A. IV-6, D. 54, F. 85-15.
435
ASMAE, Busta 7-Turchia 1933, (19 October 1933). According to these treaties, they
would not be engaged in any economic and political agreement against each other. In fact,
Rome had favoured Turkey’s signing neutrality treaties with Bulgaria in 1929 and with
Greece in 1930.
436
ASMAE, Busta 11/1 Turchia, (26 May 1934).
139
alliance.437 For them, the amelioration or deterioration of Turkish-Greek relations was
dependent on the state of Turkish-Italian relations. Some Italian leaders were convinced that
Turkey would determine the future of Balkan cooperation in a way that would not damage
Italian influence in the Peninsula.
However, in 1934, with the new developments in the Balkans, Turkish-Italian relations
became more complicated. The correspondence between the Foreign Ministries of Turkey and
Italy during this year was dominated by the formation of the Entente and its likely
ramifications in Turkish-Italian relations. This correspondence suggests that the majority of
Italian officials believed that the Balkan Entente would lead Turkey into taking up a strong
anti-Italian position. 438
The Italian Ambassador in Turkey, Lojacono wired Rome that the formation of the
Balkan Entente was a clear sign of such behavior for a number of reasons. First of all, Ankara
had taken advantage of the Italian initiative to become reconciled with Greece and orient
Turkish-Greek reconciliation towards a pact excluding Italy. However, Rome did not see any
future in Turkish-Greek relations unless led by Italy. 439 Secondly, Lojacono believed that
existing anti-Italian feelings in Turkey and Yugoslavia had brought these two countries closer.
He argued that in the Entente Yugoslavia and Turkey were championing anti-Italian solidarity.
For more details, see Dilek Barlas “Friends or Foes: Diplomatic Relations between Italy and
Turkey, 1923-1936,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, (May 2004).
438
ASMAE, Busta 11/2 Turchia, (21 May 1934)
439
ASMAE, Busta 11/1, (26 April 1934) and (26 May 1934).
437
140
Lojacono did not wish this solidarity to work against Italy.440 Otherwise, he threatened, Italy
would defend its interests in the Mediterranean.441
As Lojacono observed, Ankara had been enthusiastic about the formation of the Balkan
Entente. President Atatürk even favored the idea that the entente be signed in Istanbul. His
desire was to make Turkey the leader in such an initiative. Ankara’s diplomatic behavior was
characterized by pursuit of multilateral solutions and compromise positions. As a corollary to
this, to the dismay of certain great powers, Ankara was intent on promoting multilateral and
compromise initiative against all odds. For instance, Atatürk had warned his colleagues that
Italy could obstruct the formation of a Balkan entente. He had written to İnönü that Rome was
against this entente and Bulgaria, as an Italian proxy, could, with Italian encouragement,
attempt to undermine it.442
In February 1934, the Balkan Entente was signed between Turkey, Yugoslavia,
Romania and Greece. Ankara tended to dismiss Greek concern about a possible conflict
between Italy and Greece that the Entente might create. Venizelos, who had initiated a proBalkan policy in Greece, argued during the signing of the Balkan Entente that Greece was
more a Mediterranean country than a Balkan one. He believed that Greece had to avoid any
activity that could provoke its Mediterranean neighbour, Italy.443 While the Greeks approved
the entente, under the influence of Venizelos the Greek senate added the reservation that under
440
The Balkan Entente did not include Bulgaria as Italy expected, but ended up with the
inclusion of Yugoslavia in the entente. Undersecretary in Italian Foreign Ministry Fulvio
Suvich pointed out that Ankara rejected the demands of Romania and Yugoslavia, which
sought that the Entente take under guarantee their boundaries with Italy and Hungary.
ASMAE, Busta 11/2 Turchia, 29 December 1933. According to some Italian officials, Turkey
and Greece had not been instrumental in the formation of the entente and these two countries
seemed to be pushed into it by Yugoslavia.
441
ASMAE, Busta 11/1 Turchia, (26 May 1934).
442
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, D. 54, F. 63-10.
443
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A.IV-16-b, D. 65, F.20-18. In his visit to the British Embassy,
Venizelos talked about a possibility of an armed dispute not only between Italy and Yugoslavia
but also between Italy and Turkey and concluded that Greece had not to be involved in any of
these disputes.
141
no circumstances would the application of the pact involve Greece in hostilities with a great
power.444
A few months after the signing of the Balkan Entente, in his speech to Parliament
Mussolini reiterated his friendly feelings towards Greece and Turkey. According to the Turkish
Foreign Ministry, Mussolini’s speech was a sign that Italy would take up a position against the
Balkan Entente, but not specifically against Turkey or Greece.445 Therefore, Italy was likely
continue to perceive Turkey and Greece not as a part of the Balkan cooperation but as potential
“allies” in the formation of its Mediterranean policy.
The entente was designed only to tackle threats from within the Balkan Peninsula,
namely from Bulgaria. This was mainly because of reservations on the part of the Greeks.
However, Ankara was aware that Bulgaria could form a threat to its neighbours with the
support of a great power such as Italy. According to Ankara, Sofia had to be won to the ranks
of the Entente countries because a Balkan Entente including Bulgaria would better serve the
Balkan security interests by distancing Sofia from Rome. In this frame of mind, Turkey made a
last-ditch effort to enlist Bulgarian support for the Balkan Entente by renewing its invitation to
join the Entente. Although Ankara did not receive any positive response from Sofia, it
managed to get a provision made for incorporating Bulgaria in the Entente, should it change its
mind and wish to join later. Moreover, unlike Greece, Turkey signed separate military accords
with Yugoslavia and Romania according to which each party would declare war to help the
other in the event of a Balkan attack, with or without the support of any external power.446
The Balkan countries which formed the Balkan Entente welcomed Turkish diplomatic
initiatives and Turkish leadership towards building a coalition of Balkan states in the 1930s.
These countries were convinced that Turkey had rejected its Ottoman heritage and did not have
Soysal,Türkiye’nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları I…, 450.
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A.IV-16-b, D. 65, F. 20-10.
446
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, D. 54-1, F. 79
444
445
142
any imperial aspirations in the Peninsula. In fact, during 1926 and 1927, Turkey was the first
Balkan country that proposed the formation of a Balkan Entente with the motto “The Balkans
for the Balkan people”.
Besides political stability, as a new nation-state, Turkey, like other Balkan countries,
needed economic stability but lacked a strong economy to fight single- handed the
repercussions of the 1929 crisis in the region. To find common solutions to the crisis, Turkey,
together with Greece, initiated the Balkan conferences. The Turkish-Greek rapprochement not
only led to the signing of the Balkan Entente but also opened the way for debates on the
Balkan Union. In this process, the Greek political leader Papanastassiou even proposed that
Istanbul become the capital of a possible Balkan Union.447
On their way towards cooperation, the Balkan countries realized that they had to stand
together against great power rivalry in the region since, individually, these countries were not
strong enough militarily. These common interests of the Balkan countries offered Turkey the
opportunity to develop a Balkan strategy independent of the great powers. In the 1930s, Turkey
did not have any great power patron and was indeed at odds with most of the great powers over
a multitude of questions that could not be worked out at Lausanne. Therefore, Turkish policy
was generally perceived as promoting the interests of the regional countries and diluting great
power control in the Balkans.448 Turkish resistance to Italian-French rivalry in the Balkans was
a very good example of this policy.
Turkey’s ability to take such an initiative in the Balkans derived from its historical
experiences. It was true that the new Turkish Republic aimed at a deliberate break with the
Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Atatürk’ün Dış Politikası, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2003): 139.
The only great power Turkey maintained good relations after the War of Independence
was the Soviet Union. Ankara had been careful to avoid any engagements that might have
alienated its neighbour in the North. However, Moscow did seem to approve of Turkey’s
championing Balkan cooperation. See T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Türk Dış Politikasında 50
Yıl: Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı (1923-1934), (Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı,
1974), 335-347
447
448
143
Ottoman past. Nevertheless, it inherited from the Ottoman Empire the historic role of serving
as both a land bridge connecting Europe and Asia and as a fortress in the region. Moreover,
Turkey still had control over the only seaway linking the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.449
Then, Turkish political leaders believed, like their predecessors, that the geo-strategic location
and value of Turkey had not changed. In other words, such a position could not allow Turkey
to remain aloof from new developments. Turkey, therefore, had to be strong and stable within
its own region. To achieve this goal, it had to avoid polarization in international relations in
order to avoid the patronage of any great power.450 Its diplomatic capacity was the most
effective tools at Turkey’s disposal to promote multilateral and compromise solutions in the
Balkans.
Turkey became the first signatory to ratify the Balkan Entente on 6 March. Due to
domestic opposition in Athens, Romania and Yugoslavia postponed ratification. Turkish
proposals to include military conventions clearly specifying the obligations of each state in
time of war broke the impasse.451 In case of an Italian-Bulgarian attack on Yugoslavia,
Turkey undertook to supply not only its share of troops but also Greece’s share as well, so
that Greece would not get involved in hostilities with a great power. Having received this
assurance, Greece ratified the Pact on 2 April.452
In other words, the role of Turkey not only in the formation of the Balkan Entente but
also in the development of regional strategy was quite important. Titulescu considered that
Ankara had become pivotal to the foreign policy of Romania. At the time, it was believed in
Romania that Ankara was to play the role of facilitator in bringing about Romanian-Soviet
rapprochement. Moreover, Titulescu saw the participation of Turkey in the Balkan Entente as
Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and
Traditional Inputs” Middle Eastern Studies, 35, 4 (October 1999): 157-167.
450
Deringil, “Dış Politikada Süreklilik…,” 94.
451
Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic Relations…, 192.
452
Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic Relations…, 192. Romania and Yugoslavia ratified it on 16
June.
449
144
an indication that the Soviet Union no longer contested the legality of the existing RomanianBulgarian border.453
A few months after the signing of the Balkan Pact, a Romanian newspaper, Dimineata,
reported during Aras’s visit to Bucharest that there was not a single divergence between
Romania and Turkey. According to Americans in Romania, both Aras and Titulescu were
concerned in the same way about new developments. There was a belief that Greece would
withdraw from the Balkan Pact. Another belief was that Yugoslavia was not completely
devoted to the treaty.454
Another reason for Romanian-Turkish collaboration might be the weakening of sense
of solidarity among the members of the Little Entente (Romania, Czechoslovakia, and
Yugoslavia) towards each other as a result of political developments in Europe. Italy‘s
declaration of sympathy for Austria and Hungary, Germany’s negative attitude towards
disarmament and German-Polish rapprochement made the Little Entente members uneasy
about adapting to the new atmosphere in Europe. 455 Under these conditions, Romanians felt
that they could count more on Turkey than on other members of the Little Entente or the
Balkan Pact.
By the end of 1934, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras openly criticized revisionism in a
conversation with an American diplomat, Robert P. Skinner. He did see any possibility of
satisfying Bulgarian ambitions to recover its ‘lost’ territories. The Bulgarian attitude would
open up the question of frontiers all over Europe and only increase international difficulties.
Aras also suggested that those who lost must learn how to adapt themselves to the
Bossy, Recollections of a Romanian Diplomat…, 144. Lungu added that the Romanians
were unaware of the fact that the reservations made by Turkey about their involvement in an
anti-Soviet war were inspired by Moscow and concerned a possible armed conflict between
the Soviet Union and Romania for the possession of Bessarabia. Lungu, Romania and the
Great Powers …,, 33
454
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 4, Bucharest, (12 May 1934).
455
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 4, Bucharest, (12 May 1934).
453
145
consequences-that was exactly what Turkey had done-because war was a terrible
experience.456
By 1932, signs of renewed Italian interest in the Balkans were emerging. Grandi’s
departure from the portfolio of Foreign Affairs was followed by a major reshuffling of the
Italian diplomatic service which reflected a reorientation towards the Adriatic and the
Balkans. Two key appointments revealed this reorientation. Fulvio Suvich assumed the post
of Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs due to his background and experience in the Danubian
and Balkan affairs. Baron Alosi became Mussolini’s chef de cabinet. This change of guard
and reshuffling in the diplomatic service were regarded as signs of two contradictory strands
in Italian foreign policy.
“On the one hand, the elevation of experts in Balkan affairs, such as Suvich, a native
of Trieste, and Alosi, , seemed to confirm the pre-eminence of the Adriatic wing in the
Italian Foreign Office and suggested a continued emphasis on East European affairs;
on the other hand, the dismissal of Grandi, impatience with the machinery of the
League of Nations and the resurgence of fascist influence at Plazza Chigi led one to
anticipate a more bellicose mood in Italy”.457
All these reshufflings should be regarded in the light of changes in a wider context. To
start with, Italo Balbo’s succession of Grandi was a major sign of a new and even more
strained phase in Italy’s relations with the League of Nations. Rome’s scorn for the League
and its institutions had long been in place. Mussolini’s Four-Power Pact was, indeed, aimed
at undermining the League and its authority.458 While Rome began to steer clear of the
League, there was a radical change of Soviet heart regarding the League. From 1933 on, the
456
RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 1, Ankara, (1 November 1934).
Lowe and Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy…, 220.
458
Vaisse, “Security and Disarmament…,” 199-200.
457
146
Soviets declared their support for the status quo of Versailles as well as for the League. They
went so far as to devise a scheme in cooperation with France for an Eastern security pact. 459
8. IN SEARCH OF A WIDER ROLE: THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION
Turkey’s admission to the League of Nations had a bearing on its bilateral relations
with Italy and the Soviet Union. Italy reluctantly approved this development which ended
Turkey’s isolation. As for the Soviet Union, until 1932 Ankara had been careful to align itself
with the Soviet positions in international fora such as the Preparatory Commission for
Disarmament and the Commission of Inquiry for Europe Union. Both Turkey and the Soviet
Union had participated in such meetings as non-members of the League. Hence, membership
of the League represented a major departure from this policy of aligning with the Soviet
positions in international organizations. Two years later, this situation was rectified with the
Soviet entry into the League. In the process, Italy became Turkey’s major worry. Turkish
policy was gradually geared towards tackling the emerging Italian threat in the Mediterranean.
A new naval policy and naval building program was embarked upon in line with these
changes.
Following the signing of the Balkan Entente, Ankara turned its attention to the
Mediterranean where great power rivalry was intensifying. The operating environment for
Rolf Ahmann, “’Localization of Conflicts’ or ‘Indivisibility of Peace’: The German and
Soviet Approaches towards Collective Security and East Central Europe, 1925-1939,” in The
Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security, 1918-1957, ed. by Ahmann, R., A.
M. Birke, M. Howard, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993): 224).
459
147
Turkish diplomacy in the Mediterranean was different from that in the Balkans. The sheer size
of the Mediterranean, stretching from Portugal to Turkey in the North and Morocco to Syria in
the South, denied Turkey the advantage of geographic proximity to the Balkans in middle
power diplomacy. In this vast geographic area, the number of potential partners for middle
power diplomacy was disproportionately limited. In the north, France and Italy were the two
great powers in competition. The lesser powers included Spain and Portugal in the northwest
and Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey in the northeast. The southern part consisted at the time of
colonies of Italy, France and Great Britain. The diplomatic and naval rivalry among the great
powers left very limited latitude for middle power diplomacy. Hence, for Turkey to operate in
the Mediterranean was not as easy as in the Balkans.
This unpromising operating environment did not deter Turkey from promoting
collaborative schemes. Ankara realized that the rivalry between the great powers was the
primary obstacle in the way of peace. On the other hand, these powers knew how to cooperate
with each other when their interests required them to do so. For example, Fascist Italy and
National Socialist Germany "shared the same doctrine, aimed at the same ends, and had the
same enemies," asserted Goering.460 Mussolini’s desire to establish Italian leadership in
Europe and promote the cause of the “have-not”461 nations was the source of his proposal for
the Four-Power Pact between Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. In other words, according to
Rome, the “have-not” nations, Italy and Germany, should have the same rights as the “have”
nations, Britain and France, in dividing the region into spheres of influence.
The Italian “Menace” Renewed
460
Armando Borghi, Mussolini, Red and Black, (NY: Haskell House Publishers, 1974): 205.
Mussolini defined the revisionist countries such as Italy and Germany as the “have-not”
nations.
461
148
Mussolini realized that he would not be very successful in his Four Power-Pact proposal
because both France and Britain did not want to involve Hitler in the pact. Then Rome shifted
its efforts from cooperation to competition. On 18 March, 1934, Mussolini openly stated his
goal - to assert Italian power in the region - by declaring that Italy’s future lay in Africa and
Asia. Mussolini continued: “Italy’s position in the Mediterranean, the sea which has regained
its historic function of joining East and West, gives her the right and duty to accomplish this
task”.462 This was the message given to other European powers, that they could not ignore the
Italian challenge in the region.
Mussolini’s declaration caused apprehension in Turkey, a Mediterranean as well as an
Asian country. Shortly afterwards, Mussolini felt the need to appease Ankara, pointing out that
he did not have Turkey in mind when making this declaration. In his speech at the Grand
National Assembly, Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras talked about Mussolini’s
declaration and his explanation to Ankara. But, unlike the early 1930s, he avoided any mention
of “friendly relations” between Italy and Turkey.463
On the contrary, within a month, Aras openly affirmed the Turkish fear of Bulgarian
rapprochement with a “Mediterranean power.”464 Moreover, during his visit to Ankara, Greek
General George Kondylis warned İnönü about the possibility of an Italian attack in
collaboration with Bulgaria.465 Soon after, Mussolini declared that a new era had started in the
history of mankind, in which the disarmament issue made no sense and rearmament was
Meir Michaelis, “Italy’s Mediterranean Strategy in the Mediterranean, 1935-1939”, in M.
J. Cohen and M. Kolinsky (eds.), Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s (London:
MacMillan, 1992): 47.
463
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A.IV-6, D. 54, F. 64-3.
464
ASMAE, Busta 11/1 Turchia, (21 April 1934).
465
ASMAE, Busta 11/1 Turchia, (26 May 1934).
462
149
inevitable.466 At the same time, Italian diplomats in Ankara reported that İnönü had expressed
the need to increase the military budget.467
Around the same time, the Turkish press carried reports that Rome was dispatching
reinforcements to Rhodes to suppress the Greek people who were in revolt against the Italian
units on the island.468 Italian build-up of naval fortifications and armaments was not limited to
Rhodes. For instance, Turkish Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya declared that the key to Turkish
mistrust of Italy was the fortification of Leros. This was a gun pointed at Turkey, he said, and
from an aviation point of view, within easy striking distance of Turkey.469 The location of
Leros at the northern tip of the Dardanelles accentuated the existing Turkish sense of
vulnerability due to demilitarized status of the Straits.
Mussolini, in his conversation with Turkish Ambassador Hüseyin Ragıp in Rome, stated
that it was vital for Italy to fortify its base on Leros. He added that the fortification of Leros
had more to do with Italian competition with Britain and France than with Turkey.470 Hüseyin
Ragıp had a similar conversation with the Italian ambassador in Ankara, Lojacano, in order to
ascertain what motivated the Italians to fortify the Dodecanese. Ragıp asked Lojacano why
Italy had felt the need to fortify Leros since Italy had freedom of passage through the Straits.471
Lojacono argued that fortifying Leros was principally a defensive measure against France, as
Italy felt hemmed in by France in the Mediterranean.472
Ayın Tarihi 6 (June 1934): 299
ASMAE, Busta 11/2 Turchia, (18 May 1934).
468
Ayın Tarihi, 7 (May 1934): 279-81. Ankara was also suspicious about the British support
of the Greek population in the islands. In other words, the islands in the Aegean could easily
become a hotbed of rivalry between Britain and Italy and the population on the islands could
be manipulated to this end. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-16-b, D. 65, F. 3-(302-302).
469
PRO FO 371/18432, R 7064/471/22, f. 341-342
470
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, d. 54-1, F.90.
471
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, d. 54-1, F.90.
472
PRO FO 371/18432, R 7064/471/22, f. 341-342
466
467
150
According to Aras, these measures were taken against either Turkey or France. If the
former was the case, Turkish uneasiness was amply justified.473 If the latter, then FrancoItalian naval hostilities in Turkish territorial waters were something that Turkey did not want
to be involved in. Turkish officials thought, in spite of the relatively large size and strategic
importance of Turkey, that its security was jeopardized because it did not have the means to
defend its territory single-handedly.474 Faced with this reality, Ankara realized that Turkey
had to be part of a greater project for security than just that of collaborating with its Balkan
neighbors.
Every Italian move had been carefully observed and considered by Ankara to gauge
Italian intentions. Frequent news of Italian vessels that sailed out to unknown destinations
continued to unsettle Turkish leaders, including President Atatürk himself, right up until the
Italian attack on Abyssinia.475 Indeed, even the preparations for that attack at first caused
alarm in Ankara. In the meantime, the Italian navy proved to be a real nuisance in the Aegean
for Greece and Turkey. For instance, its muscle-flexing off Crete irritated President Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk. He asked Prime Minister İnönü about the measures the government was
contemplating to deter a similar Italian attitude towards Turkey.476
Aras expressed to the American diplomats the general Turkish feeling that the Italian
fortifications of the islands could only be intended to facilitate some ultimate operation
against Turkey.477 In fact, the freedom of action secured to Italy by its accords with France
might cause Turkey more anxiety in regard to Italian activity. According to the American
diplomat in Athens, Lincoln MacVeagh, Turkey desired the Balkan Entente to trade its
473
PRO FO 371/17964, E 3073/2260/44, f. 365
Holbraad argued that this was a typical characteristic of a middle power. Holbraad, Middle
Powers…, 69.
475
Hasan Pulur (ed.), Muhafızı Atatürk’ü Anlatıyor: Emekli General İsmail Hakkı Tekçe’nin
Anıları, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2000): 56-57.
476
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, AIV-18b, D-74-2, F1-194 (10 July 1934).
477
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, AIV-18b, D-74-2, F1-194 (10 July 1934).
474
151
unconditional adherence to the Pact (the Rome agreements between Italy and France)
guaranteeing the independence of Austria in return for some sort of guarantee of the territorial
status quo in the Near East.478
Whether Ankara had reason to fear an Italian attack has remained a contested issue to
this day. The conventional Turkish account does not rule out Turkey’s becoming a victim of
Italian aggression. The minority view, however, argues that the Turkish fears of Italian
aggression were exacerbated by an unnecessarily alarmist Turkish Consul at Bari, who
witnessed the departure of the Italian fleet for the Adriatic. On the other hand, Turkish
Ambassador in Albania, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, who was asked by Ankara to confirm
the Consul’s conclusions, argued that the Consul had completely misread the Italian intentions
and regarded an Anatolian rather than an Abyssinia campaign as imminent, despite clear
indications otherwise. In his memoirs, Karaosmanoğlu grants that Yugoslav Ambassador in
Tirana, pointing to Mussolini’s unpredictable behavior, concurred with Turkish consul’s
view.479 Interestingly, the late Admiral Afif Büyüktuğrul in his seminal work on Turkish
naval history adheres to this minority view espoused by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu. 480
However, the Turks were alone in their uneasiness regarding Italian policy in the
Mediterranean. In February 1935, the British Ambassador in Turkey wrote “the Turks
habitually exaggerated this [Italian] danger.”481 The gulf between Turkish and British
assessments on the Italian aims, however, was soon to narrow down. In the summer of 1935,
Turkey monitored with concern intensified Italian naval activity on and off the Dodecanese.
The Italian navy was preparing for an overseas campaign whose target could not as yet be
478
479
RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 6, Athens, (28 January 1935).
Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Zoraki Diplomat, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984): 88-
89.
Büyüktuğrul served with Italian Navy as a “trainee” for almost two years from 1931 to
1933. For his views, see Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu I…, 43-315.
481
PRO FO 371 19039 E1213/1213/44 (10 February 1935).
480
152
identified. The Turkish fleet was dispersed to its designated forward areas in the Marmara Sea
in anticipation of an Italian landing in Turkey.482
A few documents available in Republic archives indicate that Turkish diplomats had
forewarned Ankara regarding Italian intentions on Abyssinia. For instance, a report to the
Foreign Ministry by the Turkish Ambassador in Rome identified Abyssinia as the most likely
target for Italian military action. However, the ambassador concluded that although Italy was
not ready to launch a military campaign, Mussolini would sure act as soon as a favourable
domestic and international setting emerged.483
A year before the Italian attack on Abyssinia, Turkey had intensified its diplomatic
efforts to promote a pact in the Mediterranean. In May 1934, when Aras was in Paris on an
official visit, French Foreign Minister Louis Bartou asked him about considering consolidation
of the Balkan Entente by means of a Mediterranean pact.484 Turkey welcomed Bartou’s
proposal, as did other Balkan countries. Although the idea of a Mediterranean pact came
originally from the French, the Turks enthusiastically picked up the idea. In 1930, even before
Bartou’s proposal, Suad Darvaz, theTurkish Ambassador in Moscow, had told French
Ambassador, M. de Beaumarchais, that Turkey was interested in the development of a
“Mediterranean Locarno” project.485 In fact, when Counselor M. Franzoni of the Italian
Embassy in Paris visited the French Foreign Ministry, the French officials gave him the
impression that Turkey desired to participate in any entente consolidating peace.486
In other words, Ankara had long been in favor of a Mediterranean pact which would
include Mediterranean countries like Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, France and Spain.
Interview with Şemsettin Bargut, Captain (Ret.), Turkish navy, (13 April 2001), Ankara.
BCA 238.605.2 (7 October 1934),.
484
Ljudmil Spasov, “Les Projets d’un Pacte Méditerranéen et l’Entente Balkanique 19341937”, Etudes Balkaniques 2 (1987): 7
485
MAE, 1918-1940, Série Y Internationale, Vol. 571, c. 63, D. 7, no. 104, (18 February
1930).
486
MAE, Levant 1918-1940, Turquie, Vol. 624, Directeur Politique, (28 November 1934).
482
483
153
Since the Mediterranean pact was to guarantee naval frontiers against any naval or air attack in
the Mediterranean, Britain, the most important naval power, should also be part of such a pact.
In June 1934, Turkish interest in a Mediterranean pact was manifested by various articles in the
Turkish press. For instance, Cumhuriyet reported that representatives from Turkey, Greece,
Britain, and France were engaged in talks in Geneva on the formation of a defensive
Mediterranean entente.487
Again, in June 1934, in a meeting between France and the Little Entente countries, a
decision was taken for the creation of a Mediterranean entente which would include France,
Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria. France would also work towards the participation
of Italy.488 However, not all countries were as eager as Turkey to join a Mediterranean entente.
By the end of June, the Turkish press contained reports that Britain and Italy had already
decided to stay out of a possible Mediterranean entente.489
Again in 1934, the Turkish Ambassador in Rome, Hüseyin Ragıp, asked Mussolini’s
opinion on Italy’s possible participation in a Mediterranean entente. He responded by focusing
on two points: First, he questioned how effective this entente would be if Britain was not a
member. Then, concerning the Mediterranean as a security issue, Mussolini said that Italy had
already concluded treaties with Turkey and Greece, and Italy might consider extending the
scope of these treaties in case of need.490 Moreover, Athens was as lukewarm as Rome towards
the idea of a Mediterranean pact. A foreign press summary in Turkish reported that the Greeks
did not believe in French initiative on such an issue or in the Little Entente.491 For them, a
Mediterranean pact could not be concluded without the support of two great Mediterranean
487
Cumhuriyet, (12 June 1934).
Cumhuriyet, (24 June 1934).
489
Cumhuriyet, (29 June 1934).
490
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, D. 54-1, F.90
491
Ayın Tarihi 8 (June 1934): 183-184.
488
154
powers, Britain and Italy. Greece might join the pact only if it included all Mediterranean
countries.492
Moreover, in October 1934, the death of Louis Bartou, the French Foreign Minister and
the initiator of a Mediterranean pact, affected the development of regional cooperation in the
Mediterranean. For instance, just before his death, Bartou had decided to make an official visit
to Rome to discuss directly with Mussolini questions pending between the two countries. At
this meeting, it was expected that Mussolini would promise to respect the independence of
Austria and not to make revisionist demands on its neighbour, namely Yugoslavia.493 But on 9
October 1934, Barthou, who had formerly welcomed King Alexander of Yugoslavia to
Marseilles in pursuit of this alliance, also became a victim of the Croatian Nationalists who had
assassinated the King.494
After Barthou’s death, French policy towards Italy became more ambiguous. Pierre
Laval, who replaced Barthou, focused on bilateral relations with other Mediterranean countries
rather than regional cooperation. In November 1934, Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu
asked a French Foreign Ministry official whether France would either work towards a
Mediterranean pact or sign a treaty of alliance with Turkey. The French diplomat approved the
latter option.495 Although Ankara did not oppose a rapprochement between France and Turkey
per se, it preferred multilateral cooperation to a bilateral treaty. The general conviction in
Turkey was that a pact would serve Turkish interests better in spite of a change in French
regional policy.496 It was also reported that the Turkish Foreign Ministry aimed to enhance the
492
Cumhuriyet, (13 July 1934) and Milliyet (14 July 1934).
P. Milza and S. Berstein, Le Fascism Italien (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1980): 328-29.
494
. P. M. H. Bell, France and Britain 1900-1940 (London: Longman, 1996): 182.
495
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, D. 54-1, F. 97-1. At the same time, both Foreign
Minister of Romania Titulescu and Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia Yetvich declared that they
agreed with Laval on the need for an alliance treaty between France and Turkey similar to that
concluded between France and Yugoslavia. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri A. IV-6, D. 54, F.
100-3
496
Ayın Tarihi 10 (September 1934): 115-6.
493
155
relations between Turkey and France. But since Turkey’s main interest was the creation of a
Mediterranean pact, the essential point is that this relationship had to be completed by a
Mediterranean entente.497
In January 1935, Laval, who had observed Turkey’s insistence on a Mediterranean
entente, assured the Turkish Ambassador in Paris that he would not spare any effort necessary
to convince Mussolini to agree to such an entente.498 Again in January, Laval made an official
visit to Rome. However, during his visit, instead of discussing Mediterranean cooperation, he
struck a bilateral deal with the Italians. Laval agreed to give up French economic interests in
Abyssinia in exchange for Italian solidarity against any German action in Austria. He also
agreed to cede to Italy some territories from Libya, the south of Tunisia, Chad and Eritrea. On
his part, Mussolini promised eventually to renounce his revisionist demands over
Yugoslavia.499
To put it differently, the French were persuaded to turn a blind eye in Africa, in return for
other promises of support in Europe from Italy.500 In April, Britain endorsed at Stresa the
Rome agreements between Italy and France. Even though Mussolini was unsuccessful in
imposing his Four-Power Pact on Europe, the Rome agreements seemed like the start of a
‘Three-Power Pact’ between Italy, France, and Britain.
Above all, France, as a “half-ally” of Italy became less eager for the formation of a
Mediterranean pact. In fact, Tevfik Rüştü Aras told the British Ambassador in Turkey, James
Morga, “Now that Italy is a half-ally of France, she can not possibly pretend - unless she is
insincere - that any Mediterranean power constitutes a danger to her”.501 Once Italy came to a
497
Cumhuriyet, (28 and 29 November 1934).
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-16-b, D. 65, F. 5-17
499
Pierre Milza, Mussolini (Paris, Fayard, 1999): 650-54.
500
Martin Clark, Modern Italy (London: Longman, 1996): 281. According to the Italian
diplomats in Ankara, the French-Italian agreement prevented Turkey from playing off France
and Italy against each other. ASMAE, Busta 15/1 Turchia 1935, (16 August 1935).
501
PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 4367/950/67, f. 212.
498
156
bilateral agreement with France, it had no incentive to accept the previous French proposal of a
Mediterranean entente. On the contrary, Mussolini had an alternative proposal. In February,
1935, the Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade, Ali Haydar, told the British Ambassador, N.
Henderson, that the Italian government had already made proposals to the governments of
Greece and Turkey for a tripartite Mediterranean agreement.502 It was more convenient for the
fascist government to form a coalition with a few Mediterranean countries that they could
easily control than to favor a Mediterranean entente that included great powers such as France.
Italian undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Fulio Suvich, suggested to the Greek
Ambassador in Rome in an explicit statement that it was desirable to exclude all other powers
and to confine the agreement to Greece and Turkey.503 Furthermore, he added that the Turkish
government was in favor of this principle. Turkish Foreign Minister Aras, however, expressed
complete ignorance as to what Suvich was referring to. Moreover, the new Italian ambassador
in Ankara, Carlo Galli, had convinced his government that Şükrü Kaya, who had been acting
for Aras, was in favour of a tripartite pact between Italy, Greece, and Turkey that would
exclude Yugoslavia and Romania. Şükrü Kaya admitted that he had discussed the general
possibilities of a Mediterranean pact with M. Galli but denied absolutely that there had been
any question of a tripartite agreement. 504
The Greek Ambassador in Rome had been instructed to reply to Suvich on behalf of both
governments that no agreement was possible unless it included Romania and Yugoslavia, their
partners in the Balkan Entente. Suvich objected, arguing that the latter was an Adriatic and the
former a Black Sea country and consequently had nothing to do with the Mediterranean. But he
502
PRO FO 371/ 19500, R 1719/302/67, f. 102.
PRO FO 371/ 19500, R 1719/302/67, f. 102.
504
Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932-1939, 1ere Série (1932-1935) Vol. IX (Paris:
Imprie Nationale: 1980): 572-73.
503
157
later added that the proposal to include them merited consideration. Suvich also asked, if
Yugoslavia and Romania were to be included, why Albania and Bulgaria should not be also. 505
In his report to London, the British Ambassador, Henderson, pointed out two interesting
features of this affair: Suvich’s original insistence on the exclusion from the agreement of the
other great powers and the subsequent expression of his willingness to consider the possibility
of a pact which would include the other members of the Balkan Entente, though still excluding
France and Britain.506 In the spring of 1935, the Italian Ambassador to Turkey, Galli, again
proposed a tripartite pact between Italy, Turkey, and Greece to Turkish Foreign Minister Aras.
In order to persuade Aras, he said that once a tripartite pact had been formed, the membership
of Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria could follow. Aras would have liked to believe that Italy
was ready to conclude such a pact with the four powers of the Balkan Entente. But the most
crucial point for Ankara was that a Mediterranean pact must be guaranteed by Britain and
France. The pact would be useless without these two powers.507
However, in August 1935, the British Secretary of State’s minute on Turkey pointed out
the misapprehensions of Ankara, first about Britain’s reluctance under any circumstances to
guarantee a “Mediterranean Locarno”, and, secondly, Mussolini’s idea of including Romania
and Yugoslavia in this agreement.508 The minute emphasized the “exaggerated fears of Aras”
about Italy and talked of his “pathetic attempts to protect his country”.509 The British Secretary
of State affirmed that the Turkish Foreign Minister had the following concerns: that British
naval power in the Mediterranean was decreasing and that of Italy increasing; the League was
505
PRO FO 371/ 19500, R 1719/302/67, f. 103.
PRO FO 371/ 19500, R 1719/302/67, f. 103
507
PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 2051/950/67, f. 210
508
PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 215
509
PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 215
506
158
breaking up and if the system of collective security broke down, Turkey’s present alliances
with the Soviet Union and the Balkan Entente’s powers might afford inadequate protection.510
As a result, Turkish officials had been working towards a special Mediterranean pact that
would guarantee Turkey’s integrity. From the British Secretary of State’s minute, it is possible
to conclude that Turkish Foreign Minister Aras had tried to give the impression to the British
that Italy seemed ready to conclude a pact with the four powers of the Balkan Entente. But at
the same time, Italy’s unsecured signature was not sufficient and for that reason a
Mediterranean pact must be guaranteed by Britain and France. The Turkish Foreign Ministry
thought that Britain and France respectively must guarantee Italy and the Balkan Entente
against aggression.
Therefore, Turkish officials tried to convince the British of the urgency of forming a pact
in the Mediterranean. According to them, the formation of a Mediterranean pact was a naval
affair and, as such, of particular concern to Britain. The British Ambassador to Turkey Percy
Loraine wrote to London that Turkish Foreign Minister Aras wanted him to understand that the
French government would favor such a scheme. 511 Aras had already spoken to Loraine of the
danger that Turkey felt of the Mediterranean becoming a Latin lake. In fact he raised the issue
explicitly by asking: “Might not this come about if France joined the proposed pact and
England was not associated?”512
The conversation between the Turkish Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador to
Turkey reflects quite well a typical reaction of a middle power like Turkey. Ankara was
making attempts to be a mediator between the great powers to prevent any regional instability.
As in the first half of the 1930s, Turkey was attempting to guarantee stability in the region not
by having recourse to force but by forming coalitions with other countries. However, as a
510
PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5366/950/67, f. 224
PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 221.
512
PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 221.
511
159
middle power, it was aware from the onset that it had limited physical and military assets. In
addition to this, by the mid-1930s, Turkey was faced with the increasing aggression of
individual great powers in the region. As a result, it had to cooperate not only with like-minded
states but also with status quo great powers such as Britain.
By 1935, Turkish political leadership was already convinced that Britain would be a
determinant factor in preventing any aggression in the Mediterranean. At the same time,
Ankara knew that the British factor alone could not prevent the Italian threat to the region from
increasing. For that reason, Turkey insisted on pushing for the formation of regional pacts in
cooperation with its neighbors. When Mussolini seemed likely to agree to incorporate Romania
and Yugoslavia into a possible alliance with Italy, Turkey, and Greece, Aras suggested that the
Italian proposal of alliance with these five countries ought to be replaced by a Mediterranean
Locarno. 513
At the same time, the Turkish Foreign Minister questioned Rome’s sincerity in including
the whole Balkan Entente in a Mediterranean multilateral non-aggression pact. Aras was
suspicious that this volte face was inspired by Italy’s desire, in the event of Abyssinian war, “to
guard Italy’s Eastern flank and to ensure that the Straits should remain open as a source of
supplies”.514 In this case, the speedy conclusion of the pact might have the effect of facilitating
and encouraging Italy’s hostile designs on Abyssinia. Rome, in fact, would have recourse to
such a tactic in order to take the region under its control.
In order to achieve this goal, Italy also intended to gain access to the Black Sea region
through the Straits. For this purpose, Rome aimed at concluding a separate pact with the Black
Sea powers, Turkey and the Soviet Union. The Italian Ambassador in Turkey, Galli, in his
conversation with Aras in the spring of 1935, said that the best solution would be the
513
514
PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 216 and R 5366/950/67, f. 225
PRO FO 371/ 19502, R 5218/950/67, f. 216 and R 5366/950/67, f. 225
160
conclusion of a Mediterranean pact between Italy, Turkey, and the Soviet Union.515 By
promoting a pact between Italy, the Soviet Union, and Turkey, Rome sought influence in the
Black Sea region at the expense of other regional powers such as Romania.
The Italians were already able to reach the Black Sea through the Straits by their presence
in the Dodecanese. Yet they thought that the international status of the Straits could not in itself
secure Italy’s access to the Black Sea.516 The best way to gain access was to come to a regional
agreement with Turkey and the Soviet Union. Consequently, it was not a coincidence that at
the time (May 1935) when France signed a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union, the
Italian Ambassador to Turkey was discussing with the Turkish Foreign Minister the possibility
of forming a tripartite pact which would include the Soviet Union.
Italy’s main strategy was to form coalitions with different countries in the Mediterranean
to divide the regional powers. Rome, therefore, embarked on efforts to prevent the conclusion
of pacts initiated by regional powers. Mussolini had never welcomed the Balkan Entente. For
him, it had been formed under the influence of France. He had insisted that Yugoslavia, an ally
of France, make its policy clear towards Italy before joining any regional pact. Otherwise, the
inclusion of Yugoslavia might bring an end to the Balkan Entente517 Moreover; Rome had
lobbied for a tripartite alliance between Italy, Turkey, and Greece in order to split the Balkan
Entente.
Turkey was able to resist Italian attempts in the region by continuing to collaborate with
its neighbours. Moreover, after the signing of the Balkan Entente, Ankara insisted on even
Spasov, “Les Projets d’un Pacte…,“ 12
ASMAE, Busta 11/1, 7.12.1934. Lojacano argued that the Soviet Union, as a Black Sea
power, provoked the Turks into objecting to the fortification of Leros. According to the
Turkish Archives, Mussolini found it indispensable for Italy to have a base in the Black Sea.
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, d. 54-1, F.90-1
517
ASMAE, Busta 15/1 Turchia 1935 (16 August 1935). In fact, Turkish Foreign Minister
Aras thought that if an entente was concluded between Italy and Yugoslavia, the Balkan
Entente would not carry any weight and Turkey would be isolated. Documents Diplomatiques
Français 1932-1939, 1ere Série (1932-1935) Vol. IX (Paris: Imprie Nationale: 1980), 424-25.
515
516
161
expanding the scope of regional collaboration. Turkish political leadership was aware that it
had to fight against the control of the region by a major power and work for the participation of
as many countries as possible in regional collaboration. However, immediately after the
signing of the Balkan Entente, Turkey had to alter its earlier strategy in the sense that it now
welcomed regional efforts initiated by powers such as France, and sought support from Britain,
too.
The attempt to create a Mediterranean pact formed a good example of such a policy.
Even though the first initiative for a Mediterranean pact came from France, this initiative was
mainly supported by Ankara. Here Ankara was in a dilemma as a middle power: Although
Turkey was very supportive of such an initiative, it was aware that it had limited tangible
sources compared to powers like France. It was difficult for Turkey to take the initiative in the
Mediterranean as it had in the Balkans. Nevertheless, as a Mediterranean country, it felt
responsible for contributing to peace in the Mediterranean.
162
9. THE MEDITERRANEAN – A REGION TOO FAR?
From the mid-1930s on, Ankara continued to take political initiatives in the
Mediterranean, which was the great power playground of the time. In this process, the Italian
policy in Abyssinia had a great impact on the Mediterranean policy of Turkey. From the
summer to the fall of 1935, Italy had greatly increased its military strength in the Eastern
Mediterranean. It concentrated its forces between the Adriatic, the Dodecanese Islands, and the
Red Sea, and expanded the construction of the 1934-35 naval programme beyond its original
scope.518 The expansion of the Italian navy in the Eastern Mediterranean could be taken as a
sign of Mussolini’s belief that the time was ripe for the total conquest of Abyssinia.519 In fact,
Italy, which had already secured the acquiescence of France and Britain regarding Italian
interest in Abyssinia in the spring of 1935, invaded this country in October.
Immediately after the Italian occupation of Abyssinia, Aras became active during the
discussions of the Council of the League of Nations in favour of the application of sanctions
against Italy. Moreover, Turkey was elected to the Commission of the Five that was set up by
the Council of the League of Nations to find a peaceful settlement of the Abyssinian question.
The Committee was composed of Britain, France, Poland, Spain and Turkey. Aras also made
a special trip to Paris to convince the French Foreign Minister Laval to join the British and the
other powers in implementing sanctions. As for the British, they were prepared to give the
518
See R. Mallet, The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism: 1935-1940 (London: Frank
Cass, 1998).
519
Michaelis, “Italy’s Mediterranean Strategy…,” 49.
163
Italians compensation in other directions if they abandoned their plans of conquest in
Abyssinia. They had even suggested an international conference at which colonial questions
could be discussed following the settlement of the Abyssinian adventure.520 Aras anxiously
added:
“Do not forget that the British have provided only an opening, that when nations go into
conference and when the door is opened for discussion, anything may result, and it is by
no means out of the question that, if a colonial conference takes place, it may end in a
shuffling about of frontiers, especially in Africa, with the ultimate result that Italy will
obtain something substantial of its own in a region where no other interests would be
disturbed”.521
Turkey promptly decided to adhere to the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations
on Italy during the Abyssinian War.522 Wight uses the case of the Abyssinian Crisis and the
issue of sanctions as an example of a status quo bias of minor powers in the international
system. He argues:
“When sanctions were imposed on Italy in 1935-1936 to restrain its aggression against
Abyssinia, the small powers showed a resolution and readiness for sacrifice, which do
much to answer the argument that they can afford to champion international ideas
because they do not have the responsibility of enforcing them. It was the great powers
who destroyed the League system, by a combination of aggression and defections”. 523
Turkish policy during the Abyssinian crisis did not fit the behaviour pattern Wight
attributed to powers of lesser degrees. Ankara assumed a high-profile diplomatic role and
indicated its ability and willingness to assume responsibility from the beginning.
520
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Ankara, (1 November 1935).
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Ankara, (1 November 1935).
522
BCA, 59.89.19, (15 November 1935),.
523
Wight, Power Politics…,
521
164
Commencing a diplomatic mission at Addis-Abbaba constituted an early indicator of Turkish
diplomatic activism regarding the Abyssinian issue. Turkish Chargé D’Affaires, B.
Nizamettin, had arrived in Addis-Abbaba in August 1935, just before the Italian attack. With
his arrival Turkey was added to a handful of states, including Britain, France, the United
States, Belgium and Greece, that had diplomatic representation in Abyssinia. During the war,
the Turkish diplomatic mission served as a valuable source of information regarding Italian
military activities in Abyssinia. As soon as he took up his post, Turkish Chargé D‘Affaires
began to send in reports to Ankara that predicted the imminence of an Italian attack. Indeed, a
private letter received by Turkish authorities specified even the date of a possible Italian
attack as 21 September 1935.524
The reports of the Turkish Chargé D’Affaires indicate that Ankara was particularly
interested in finding out what the British reaction would be in the case of an Italian attack on
that country. In his report of 27 September, 1935, B. Nizamettin ruled out direct British
intervention, unless London secured French military support. He also speculated that a
British military involvement, if it were to occur, would come only in the form of supplying
arms and ammunition to the Abyssinians. He also regarded it as possible that the British
troops stationed in Sudan would be dispatched deep into Abyssinia in a race with the Italians
for controlling strategically important terrain, such as Lake Tsana. In that case, he predicted
an inevitable showdown between Italian and British troops advancing from opposite
directions. The result would be a new Fashoda incident according to the Turkish Chargé
D’Affaires.525 Such a situation would inherently carry the risk of escalation into a military
conflict between Italy and Britain. General Kazım Karabekir, a veteran of the Turkish War of
524
525
BCA, 266.798.6 “Interior Ministry to Prime Ministry,” (24 September 1935),.
BCA, 266.798.7 “Turkish Legation (Abyssinia to Foreign Ministry,” (27 September 1935).
165
Independence, also predicted a military conflict to happen more or less along the lines
described in the Turkish Chargé D’Affaires’ memorandum.526
In a subsequent message, Turkish Chargé D’Affaires described the military situation in
Abyssinia and the state of Abyssinian defenses based on what he identified as a “secret
report” he had been shown by Belgian officers. He pointed to the failure of their efforts over
six and a half years to raise and train a modern force of six thousand troops. According to the
report, a prolonged military campaign would cause food shortages among the Abyssinian
troops who habitually wasted supplies and ammunition. The Italians might be able to
persuade the Abyssinian troops and locals to surrender in exchange for food which was
already in short supply. This, of course, would be contingent on the Italians ability to
transport food and supplies in large quantities. Since desert warfare demanded long and
arduous preparations and it was possible to make only modest advances (or progress), a
possible Italian campaign would be difficult and costly. Taking control of the whole
Abyssinia territory would demand patience.527
Once the Italian military campaign was underway, the Turkish General Staff wanted to
have a first-hand assessment of the military situation on the ground. Observing a potential
adversary in the field was a matter of utmost significance for the Turkish defense. In
November 1935, the Turkish General Staff asked the Ministry of Interior to dispatch two war
correspondents, one to the Italian army headquarters, and the other to the Abyssinian army
headquarters. Stating that this was a matter more for the government than the military, Chief
of Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak complained about dependence on foreign sources for
information on the Italian-Abyssinian War. He also recommended that the correspondents
should be selected from among reserve officers recently discharged from service. Only such
Kazım Karabekir, İngiltere, İtalya ve Habeş Harbi, (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 1995).
Originally published in 1935.
527
BCA 266.798.8 “Turkish Legation (Ethopia) to Foreign Ministry,” (1 October 1935),.
526
166
correspondents would be able accurately to assess the military situation on the ground and
inform the government accordingly. Pointing to the presence there of many foreign war
correspondents accredited to the Italian and Abyssinia military authorities, Field Marshal
Çakmak demanded prompt attention to his request, which he considered a vital issue for
Turkey.528
Once again, it was evident that this was more of a matter of financial means than of will.
Subsequent correspondence between the Interior Ministry and the Finance Ministry reveals
how limited the Turkish budget was in 1935. Appropriating 28,360 TL to cover the expenses
of two war correspondents became a serious challenge for the Finance Ministry. In view of
the prohibitively high costs of keeping two correspondents in a war zone, Interior Minister
Şükrü Kaya discussed the issue with Deputy Chief of Staff General Asım Gündüz who settled
for only one correspondent to be accredited to the Italian military authorities. He also agreed
to cut down substantively the provisions for wire charges on the grounds that “the
correspondent is in fact not needed for the kind of news that will be wired and should be
writing letters rather than wire reports.” He was convinced that 7,000 TL would be sufficient
and asked that the matter be resolved urgently and swiftly.529
Meanwhile, the Venizelist coup in 1935 in Greece accentuated Turkish fears regarding
the Italian aspirations that had already been outlined by Mussolini in his speech a year before
(in March 1935). Aware of Venizelos’ opposition to the Balkan Entente, Ankara was worried
that his return to power could result in Greece’s withdrawal from the Entente and propel
Athens into the Italian orbit. Such a divergence in Greek foreign and security policy would
most likely set the seal on Bulgaria’s orientation, again to the Italian orbit.530 Through
Turkish Permanent Representative at the League of Nations Cemal Hüsnü Taray, Greek
BCA 68.451.8 “General Staff to Interior Ministry,” (15 November 1935),.
BCA 68.451.8 “Interior Ministry to Prime Ministry,” (6 January 1935),.
530
Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 42.
528
529
167
diplomats became aware of Ankara’s skepticism regarding the Great Powers’ (French and
British) inclination towards the Italian position in the Abyssinian crisis.531 During the crisis,
Athens felt the consequences of its support for sanctions on Italy in the form of repeated
violations of Greek territorial waters and airspace by Italian vessels and aircraft respectively.
Literally, Italy tried to exert naval pressure on Greece particularly in the Aegean. The
frequency of such Italian incursions infuriated Greek public opinion.532
Italian pressure on Greece also heightened Greek fears of Turkish motives in the
Aegean. The major concern was that Turkey could be tempted to take advantage of ItalianGreek tension to take control of some of islands in the Aegean. Indeed, in the fall of 1935,
there were reports of Turkish intention to seize the Greek Islands of Chios, Mytilene and Syra
in the case of a war between Italy and Greece. Although these reports could not be
confirmed, the Greek General Staff took them seriously, particularly after Tevfik Rüştü Aras’
comment that Ankara wished to re-acquire the Dodecanese.533 According to the British, this
was the essence of Turkish policy during the Abyssinian crisis. Therefore, the only option for
Greece seemed to be to avoid alienating Italy at any cost.534
Although Turkey also supported sanctions, compared to Greece it came under little, if
any, pressure from Italy. Aras commented that “Italy’s distrust of Greece was greater than its
distrust of Turkey”. 535 Sir Sidney Waterlow [British Ambassador] defined in a memorandum
Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 62.
Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 75-94..
533
Published memoirs of naval officers mention an interesting contingency planning ordered
by Chief of Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak regarding Rhodes. The late Admiral
Büyüktuğrul recalls when and how he received an order to form and train a regiment to be
employed for capturing Rhodes in anticipation of proliferation of the Second World War to
Turkey’s vicinity. The order came on 15 November 1940, just three days after the Italian
fleet was put out of action by the British aircraft. However, the plan was subsequently
shelved, when Chief of Staff changed his mind about capturing the island of Rhodes as
quickly as he had come up with it. Afif Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu
II…, 434.
534
Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 95-96)
535
Cited in Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 105.
531
532
168
to the Foreign Office the relationship between Italy and Greece during the preceding years as
having been essentially that of wolf and lamb.536
The British military and naval authorities who tried to assess Greek military capabilities
in the event of an Italian attack as a result of Athens implementation of the sanctions
concluded that Greece would be a liability rather than an asset in the Mediterranean naval
situation. Therefore, the Greek request for material assistance to augment its armed forces did
not receive priority treatment from London.537
The Greek policy during the Abyssinian crisis reflected a typical dilemma for a minor
power, caught between two great powers. During this period Athens unsuccessfully sought a
great power patron, namely Britain, to resist Italian power. Interestingly, included among the
perceived sources of threat to Greece was Turkey, though this threat was remote compared to
those from Albania and Bulgaria.538
In March 1936, the American Embassy in Ankara sent a dispatch to Washington on
Turkey’s present international position in the light of war between Italy and Abyssinia. At the
time, Turkey’s relations with Germany, England and the Soviet Union were of special
importance according to the Americans. There was no planned rapprochement between
Turkey and Germany. But certain factors, such as the economy and the emigration of some
German citizens to Turkey, had contributed to this rapprochement.
American Chargé d’Affaires in Ankara, G. Howland Shaw, in his dispatch, argued that
British and Turkish ideas concerning the freedom of the Mediterranean coincided. He
emphasized that the Turks had stood openly by the British with respect to sanctions, the
assurances to the British government in the event of Italian aggression and the several replies
to Italian remonstrances. However, the self-centered attitude of France in the Abyssinian
Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…,128.
Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 174.
538
Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 163-194
536
537
169
question was contrasted at Ankara with previous French declarations concerning the
protection of small countries. 539
As far as Ankara’s relations with Moscow were concerned, both Turkey and the Soviet
Union wished for peace in order to consolidate their revolution. In fact, Turkey desired first
good relations with its neighbours and then with countries more distant from its frontiers. G.
Howland Shaw wrote that Turkey definitely felt herself in danger in a world which was
rearming and would make every sacrifice to maintain its means of defence in a state of
efficiency.540 Under these conditions, the concern of the leaders of Turkey’s foreign policy
had been aroused by Italy. The fear of Italy would always be in evidence at Ankara as long as
the Dodecanese Islands were Italian possessions, according to the American diplomat.
Almost a year later, the issue began to have a visible impact on Turkish-Italian relations.
The foreign press monitored by the Interior Ministry included translations from Italian
newspapers such as Il Giornali that carried out a feature article critical of the Turkish press
stance in the Abyssinian crisis. Il Giornali argued that Turkey’s stand against Italy in the
Abyssinia issue did not make any sense as Turkey had no interest or stake in Abyssinian
territory. Moreover, according to the Italian paper, Turkey no longer considered itself
representative of the Muslim world or a protector of its interests. Finally, Il Giornali
reminded its readers of the relative positions of Turkey and Italy in the international power
hierarchy dominated by the Great Powers.541
From the beginning, Ankara opposed Italian policy towards Abyssinia. Until the Italian
conquest of Abyssinia was complete, Turkey focused on strengthening existing regional pacts
and encouraging the formation of new ones against Italian expansionism. During the
Abyssinian crisis, the Turkish press carried reports and feature articles that emphasized
539
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Ankara, (8 March 1936).
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Ankara, (8 March 1936).
541
BCA 238.606.7 “Interior Ministry to Prime Ministry” (4 September 1935).
540
170
Turkey’s military and naval strength in the Eastern Mediterranean. For instance, an interesting
commentary in Tan argued that Turkey’s military and naval strength had to be taken into
account more seriously than that of any other power of lesser degree in the event of war or
quest for supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean.542 Again, according to the Turkish press,
neighbouring countries had begun to consider Turkey’s contribution to international peace in
the context of the Mediterranean conflict.543 In fact, Turkey promised Yugoslavia “unlimited
assistance” in the case of an Italian attack on Belgrade.544 Belgrade considered the Turkish
army as a force that could deter Bulgaria and stand fast against Italy. After a military
delegation from Turkey had visited Romania and Yugoslavia in November 1935, a tripartite
military conference was held in Belgrade between the three countries that resulted in the
signing of a military convention.545
One consequence of the Abyssinian Crisis was the realization of the need for a
strengthened Balkan Entente which subsequently became a fundamental policy objective of
the Turkish government. Moreover, Bulgarian aspirations in Thrace were not considered dead
by Ankara. On the other hand, Turkey had by no means given up hope of bringing Bulgaria
into the Balkan Entente. American diplomats linked Ankara’s optimism to President Atatürk’s
fondness for the country in which he had served as military attaché. But it was felt that
watchfulness was in order.546 Moreover, the Italian attack on Abyssinia had already added
fuel to the Balkan countries’ apprehensions regarding Italy. For instance, on 16 August 1935,
Titulescu received from Belgrade a draft military convention proposing cooperation between
542
Tan, (14 February 1936).
Tan., (5 November 1935).
544
Krastjo Mancev, “Le Conflit Italo-Ethiopien et l’Entente Balkanique”, Etudes Balkaniques
21, (1986): 50.
545
This convention ensured reciprocal military aid between Turkey, Romania and Yugoslavia
in the case of aggression against any party. Mancev, “Le Conflit Italo-Ethiopien…,” 53. For
Romania’s opinion on the military evolution of Turkey, see Dimitru Preda, “Romanian
Diplomatic Documents on the Political-Military Evolution of Turkey During Atatürk (19231938)” in XIX. International Colloquium of Military History (İstanbul: Acta, 1993), 163-186.
546
Preda, “Romanian Diplomatic Documents…”
543
171
Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey. A similar text was sent to Ankara though not to Athens. On
15 October 1935, Yugoslavia and Turkey joined Romania in its request that a committee be
established to study the issue of sanctions against the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.547
On 11 March 1936, the representatives of the Balkan Entente declared that they would
defend the application of all treaties including that of Locarno.548 Rebecca Haynes wrote that
Titulescu had sent a message of support to France in the name of the Balkan Entente
following the remilitarization of the Rhineland. Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece subsequently
contacted the German government distancing themselves from Titulescu’s message.549
The American Ambassador to Turkey, J. V. A. MacMurray, reported to Washington that
Shaw’s dispatch of March on the picture of Turkey’s international position was accurate but
there had been some changes since then. . First of all, the Italian threat had become more
concrete because of Italy’s military success in Abyssinia. A peace dictated by Italy and the
inability of the powers to prevent aggression had definitely impressed Ankara.550
MacMurray pointed out Turkish concern about the developing Italian influence on
Bulgaria. He made a comment on the remarks of Aras who stated to the Yugoslav press that
Bulgaria would take no steps towards rearming without notifying its neighbours. According to
MacMurray, this was more of a warning than a reflection of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’
real convictions. The Turkish authorities also believed that the Germans were supplying arms
and munitions for Bulgarian ports because they had inquired concerning the attitude Ankara
might take towards the passage through the Straits of vessels loaded with arms and
munitions.551
Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic Relations…, 198 and 201.
Romania’s Diplomatic Relations…, 202. Greek delegate had not received authority to sign
the statement.
549
Rebecca Haynes, Romanian Policy towards Germany, 1936-1940 (NY: St. Martin’s Press,
Inc., 2000): 6.
550
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul, (9 April 1936).
551
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul, (9 April 1936).
547
548
172
Yet Turkey had no desire to commit herself in the present Western European crisis,
according to the American diplomat. In fact, the Turkish government asked for the resignation
of Turkish Minister in Berne Cemal Hüsnü Taray who was accused of committing Turkey
without instruction to taking sides in a controversy among the great powers. At Geneva, Taray
had backed Titulescu who stated that the Balkan and Little Ententes should align with France
and Belgium in the present European crisis.552
Even after the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the Turkish Foreign Ministry still had in
mind to bring forward a general Mediterranean settlement to include all riparian states and
Britain on the basis of non-aggression and mutual guarantees, including settlement of the
Italian-Abyssinian conflict.553 Contrary to Ankara’s desires, the British Foreign Office’s
immediate objective was not to discuss the Mediterranean question in its broader aspects but to
further the British-Italian détente in the Mediterranean. In December 1935, the British Foreign
Office advised its embassy in Turkey to discourage the Turkish Foreign Ministry from
embarking on so ambitious and comprehensive a scheme.554
Turkey’s dilemma as a middle power continued vis-à-vis the great powers even though
Turkey hoped to gain more British support in the region. The greatest disappointment for
Turkey was the growing disregard by these powers of multilateral organizations and initiatives.
As a member of the League of Nations, Turkey endeavored to assist the League in its efforts,
including the use of sanctions for the maintenance of peace under all circumstances as was
argued by Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü.555 However, while the League imposed limited
sanctions on Rome, the British and French Foreign Ministers were considering new
552
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul, (9 April 1936).
PRO FO 371/ 19168 J 9177/1/1, f. 194
554
PRO FO 371/ 19168 J 9177/1/1, 195. Britain, in fact, confined itself to giving only military
assurances to Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia.
555
Ayın Tarihi 24 (October 1935): 79-80, and PRO FO 37119034, E 6600/1213/44, f. 83
553
173
concessions to Italy in Abyssinia. For instance, in December, Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval
agreed to cede most of Abyssinia to Italy.556
Turkish political leadership felt uneasy about the way in which the great powers
approached international security and questioned whether peace could be maintained in the
existing regime of collective security. These powers were concerned with finding bilateral
solutions to settle international issues, instead of counting on the authority of the League of
Nations. In contrast to this, Ankara frequently emphasized that the greatest benefit they
expected from the League was its pursuit of the principle of collective security. Concerning the
Abyssinian issue, İnönü said: “If the idea of the mutual guarantee of nations for the
maintenance of peace widens its scope so as to be applicable to all events, we are in favour of
labouring to assure such an evolution.”557
Thus Ankara demanded more efficient efforts on the part of the League of Nations
towards all nations. British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Percy Loraine, reported his informal
conversation with the President of the Republic of Turkey concerning Abyssinia. Atatürk said
that it had become necessary to consider seriously what the position would be supposing Italy
won a complete victory. Then he continued: “Italian exultation over such a success would be
all the more intense and arrogant because the success would have been won despite the League
of Nations”.558 Finally he asked the following question:
“If the action taken by the states who had pronounced Italy an aggressor and were
enforcing sanctions on her, had not proved efficacious to prevent Italy’s single-handed
conquest of Abyssinia, was it to be expected that the action of those states through the
League would be more energetic and more efficacious in preventing Mussolini’s next act
of spoliation?”559
Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy…, 161.
PRO FO 371/ 19034 E 6600/1213/44, f. 48
558
PRO FO 371/ 20093 E 2583/2583/44, f. 254
559
PRO FO 371/ 20093 E 2583/2583/44, 255-56
556
557
174
In this conversation, President Atatürk made several points: First, Ankara was against
“inactivity” towards Italian “colonialist” policy in Abyssinia since Turkey itself had been a
victim of colonialist policies in the very recent past.560 Secondly, the Turks could not disregard
the invasion of a member of the League of Nations which they had expected to be more active
and efficient. Thirdly, Mussolini’s action in Abyssinia might be the harbinger of future Italian
actions in other territories if these were not stopped.561 Finally, Atatürk’s conversation with the
British ambassador aimed to give London the message that Britain should be more outspoken
concerning Italian expansionism.
In March 1936, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras, in an interview in Paris-Midi, said that
Turkey’s place in the Mediterranean had become even more important in the past three months,
and this might create a basis for British-Italian rivalry.562 Aras discussed two related issues.
One was the sanctions implemented by the League against Italy. He argued that the sanctions
would have an effect only some time in the future. The other issue was the increasing
geopolitical significance of the Mediterranean region. Since the Turkish political leaders
believed that efficient measures against aggression had not yet been taken, they had made all
the efforts necessary to work for regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. But Ankara had
seen that the conflicting interests of the Mediterranean powers prevented such cooperation.
Aware of its limitations, Turkey was forced to prioritize its objectives in a situation of
increasing instability. Ankara’s disappointment at the failure of the League of Nations to
ensure international security led Ankara to demand a revision of the status of the Straits. In
fact, Ankara assumed that the four members of the League, Britain, France, Italy and Japan,
would not, in fact, guarantee the security of the Straits, contrary to their decision at the
560
ASMAE, Busta 19/1 Turchia 1936 (11 January 1936).
ASMAE, Busta 19/1 Turchia 1936, (3 September 1936). In fact, in 1936, Mussolini stated
that Italy had to be strong and armed in order to revise old treaties and impose its rules on the
world
562
Cited in Ayın Tarihi 27 (March 1936): 45.
561
175
Lausanne Conference. Thus, after the Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the German occupation
of the Rhine Demilitarized Zone, Turkey sought the revision of the status of the Straits status
and consequently called for a meeting.
In May 1936, after Turkey’s request for the revision of the Straits status, the American
Chargé d’Affaires in Bucharest, Frederick P. Hibbard, commented on Turkish-Romanian
relations. On the one hand, he mentioned that the Romanian press talked about a feeling of
gratification towards Turkey which had requested revision in a legal manner rather than
resorting to treaty violation as Austria and Germany had done. On the other hand, Hibbard
wrote that Romanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu was most indignant at Turkey’s
request for the revision. Interestingly enough, he argued that Turkey had not consulted with
its allies in the Balkan Entente prior to issuing the note to the League of Nations.563
According to the American diplomat, Titulescu also opposed Turkey’s request because
of its timing. He argued that if Turkey’s claims were met, Hungary and Bulgaria would be
encouraged to request revision of the military clauses of the Trianon and Neuilly Treaties. 564
Moreover, the Romanian leader believed that if the request of these countries was made in the
same manner as Turkey has made its request, Romania would find it difficult to refuse to
consider this.
Whatever their original reservations might have been, in the end the Balkan Entente
members preferred to present a common front in response to the Turkish demand as a
manifestation of regional solidarity in the Balkans. They issued a joint communiqué
supporting Turkey’s claims.565 But Turkey had to convince Britain, a mainly naval power, to
bring about a change in the status of the Straits. At this point, Britain consented to the Turkish
demand because of the rapidly deteriorating political situation in the Mediterranean. As a
563
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 4, Bucharest, (1 May 1936).
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 4, Bucharest, (1 May 1936).
565
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, A. IV-18-b, D. 74, F. 1-21
564
176
consequence of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, Turkey was seen to be a counterweight to
Italian action and ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean.566 Moreover, Turkish friendship
with Britain would prevent Soviet-Turkish collaboration in the region.567
Finally, in June and July 1936, Turkey, Britain and the other signatories of the Treaty of
Lausanne met at Montreux and decided to abolish the International Straits Commission.
Furthermore, the Montreux Conference put the Straits under Turkish control by terminating the
demilitarized status of the Straits. Italy was the only country which rejected the transfer of the
rights of the Straits Commission to Turkey; as such a change would prevent Italy from having
free passage through the Straits.568 As an excuse not to accept the Montreux Convention Rome
used the imposition of sanctions.
It is important here to point out that at Montreux, Turkish officials were still making
efforts to work for regional alliances. During the conference, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras
and Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu had conversations with Soviet Foreign Commissar
Litvinov on the possibility of forming a Black Sea pact, part and parcel of a wider
Mediterranean pact. Even though Turkey did not completely agree with Romania and the
Soviet Union concerning their rights in the Black Sea, Ankara fully supported the idea of a
Black Sea pact for the security of the Straits.569
After taking the Straits under Turkish control, regional cooperation became even more
significant for Turkey. Ankara continued to emphasize the importance attached to the
formation of a Mediterranean pact. Turkish officials knew that the security of the Straits was
closely related to the security of the Mediterranean which ought to be guaranteed by regional
cooperation. Although Turkey, to some extent, had guaranteed its own security by taking the
Straits under its control, it was quite aware that multilateral solutions were the only way to gain
566
PRO FO 371/ 20072, E 269/26/44, f. 146
The Soviet Union was the first country which replied to the Turkish demand.
568
Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932-1939, Vol. II, 501.
569
Spasov, “Les Projets d’un Pacte…,“ 15.
567
177
complete security. In other words, it was cognizant that the principle of pursuing a generalized
strengthening of multilateral decision is in the middle powers’ interests since it helps to reduce
the uneven control of great powers.
Moreover, systems where two or more great powers are involved in a mixture of
cooperation and conflict relationships offers the chance for middle powers to follow
multilateralism in foreign policy strategy.570 During the Montreux Conference and afterwards,
Ankara again took the initiative in efforts for a regional entente in the midst of mixed conflict
and cooperation between the great powers. In the atmosphere of 1936, when steps towards the
Axis powers were being taken, Turkey aimed at convincing at least France and Britain to work
for Mediterranean cooperation. During the Italian-German rapprochement in July, it was easier
to convince France which felt the need to balance the influence of the Axis powers in the
region.571 In September, the Turkish press reported a conversation between Turkish Foreign
Minister T. R. Aras and French Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos in which the latter emphasized
the significant place that Turkey occupied in the Eastern Mediterranean following the
establishment of the new regime in the Straits.572
Holbraad, Middle Powers…, 213.
In an October speech in Milan Cathedral, Mussolini declared that the July agreements
(1936) between Italy and Germany had resolved all the problems between the two countries.
Ayın Tarihi 36 (October 1936): 245-47. On 11 July the Fascist leader gave his approval to an
Austro-German agreement which made the Anschluss a foregone conclusion. Michaelis,
“Italy’s Mediterranean Srategy…,” 53.
572
Cumhuriyet, (22 September 1936).
570
571
178
10. LIMITS OF ACTIVISM: FROM BRIDGING TO BALANCING
Until the mid-1930s, Turkish naval policy developed mostly as a function of
institutional and domestic political considerations. Preoccupied with internal security and
regime consolidation, the Turkish political and military elite devised a strategy for territorial
defence that relied mostly on manpower. Turkey’s international isolation accentuated this
introverted orientation. As Turkey had no allies to count on, until 1930 military strategy was
shaped more or less in a diplomatic vacuum. However, after 1930, the international system
began to have more weight than institutional or domestic factors. The changing international
power configuration in Europe and the Mediterranean compelled Turkey to make major
strategic adjustments.573 The process had been underway since 1930, and Turkey’s admission
to the League of Nations in 1932 symbolized the end of its isolation or “outcast” status in the
international system.
Politically, Turkey was clearly inclined towards cooperating with status quo powers.
However, its economic dependence on Germany gradually increased. The adverse effects of
the 1929 world economic crisis brought about German domination of Turkish external trade.
The near monopoly status that Germany enjoyed in Turkey’s trade relations was formalized
under the Clearing Agreement signed in August 1933. This pattern was subsequently
repeated in Germany’s trade with other Balkan countries. The 1929 world economic crisis
also added economic impetus to regional cooperation efforts in the Balkans. Ankara and
Athens, in particular, promoted initiatives to this end. In February 1934, Turkey, Greece,
Romania and Yugoslavia signed the Balkan Entente to preserve the status quo in the
Peninsula, which was moving towards economic domination by a revisionist Germany. The
Brock Millman, “Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy: 1934-1942,” Middle Eastern
Studies 31/3 (July 1995): 485-489.
573
179
Entente was in essence directed against revisionism from within (Bulgaria) but not from
powers external to the region.574
In March 1934, Mussolini’s speech on future Italian expansion into Asia and Africa
had reinstated Italy to the status of “enemy number one” in Turkish threat assessments. The
Italian threat was perceived to be greater in the mid-1930s than in the early 1920s due to the
increased strength of the Italian navy.575 Turkey, on the other, had until 1934 adhered to the
“naval holiday” with Greece in the Aegean and the Soviets in the Black Sea. After fours
years without ordering any new units, Ankara decided to expand the Turkish Navy. The
priority was again placed on submarines. The decision to first acquire submarines clearly
points to the degree of continuity in Turkish strategic thinking that emphasized coastal
defence as the main mission for the navy. For the Turks, “the defence of the Straits… was not
a question of battleships, but rather of mines, guns and torpedoes.”576 The growing Italian
naval and military strength in the Dodecanese increased Turkish sensitivity regarding the
demilitarized status of the Straits. The new naval program would also include one or two
cruisers, two destroyers and a hospital ship.577 The inclusion of cruisers was a long-awaited
element of change in Turkish naval programs.
The Turkish economy was in no better shape than in the 1920s to finance armaments,
particularly after the 1929 world economic crisis. The new Turkish naval policy called for
four new submarines to be ordered immediately. As for financing the new effort, the
government devised new sources of revenue in the form of a “national defence tax” on
Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy…, 114-153.
Between 1922 and 1934, the Italian navy built 119 new units that totaled 244,500 tons,
including seven heavy cruisers, 12 light cruisers, 12 scouts, 28 destroyers, six torpedo boats,
15 ocean-going submarines and 39 medium submarines. Rimanelli, Italy between Europe and
the Mediterranean…, 543.
576
PRO FO 371/17966, E6915/3652/44 (15 November 1934).
577
SHM, Carton 1BB7/169 Compte Rendu De Rensignements (Turquie) No. 8 (8 July 1934).
574
575
180
tobacco and spirits.578 However, without foreign credits, naval expansion had little chance of
being realized. Britain was not interested in supporting Turkish naval expansion through
government subsidies to private shipyards. France was not considered a politically reliable
supplier due to disputes over the Ottoman debt and the Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay). Thus,
Turkey had to look elsewhere for naval units at affordable prices under favourable credit
terms. In spite of the declared urgency of adding new submarines to the fleet, the new
Turkish order was deferred. In April 1935, Foreign Minister Aras reiterated to the visiting
British naval attaché the Turkish government’s changing view on the need for, and the utility
of, a fleet:
“Turkey must increase her navy firstly to have a fleet in the proper sense of the word
and secondly for the protection of her merchant vessels. A fleet [is] on sea what the
infantry [are] on the land. It [is] the fleet and infantry which in the last resort decide
wars. Undoubtedly the roles of submarines and of aircraft [have] become of great
importance but on the sea a fleet [has] the last word.”579
Around the same time, Britain had its own problems with German naval power after
Hitler’s rise to power in 1933. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 removed the
Versailles restrictions on the German navy but limited its size to 35 percent of the British
fleet.580 At the time, London still viewed Italy as a power which could be useful in checking
Germany in Europe.581 The Italian attack on Abyssinia in October 1935 compelled Britain to
court new partners in the Mediterranean. When the League of Nations imposed sanctions on
Italy, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia agreed to implement them. In return, Britain furnished
578
ASMAE, Busta 13/6 Turchia 1934 (18 May 1934).
PRO FO371/19040, E3039/3039/44 (10 May 1935).
580
Clare M. Scammell, “The Royal Navy and the Strategic Origins of the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement of 1935,” Journal of Strategic Studies 20/2 (June 1997): 92-118
581
Michael Simpson, “Superhighway to the World Wide Web: The Mediterranean in British
Imperial Strategy,” in Hattendorf (ed.), 57
579
181
guarantees to these three countries against any Italian threat during the implementation of the
sanctions.
This turn of events reinforced the Turkish conviction of the need to rectify the defence
gap caused by the demilitarized status of the Straits. The remilitarization of the Straits
became a military imperative and, in the short term, Turkey’s foremost foreign policy
objective. On 5 December, 1935, Turkish political and military leaders discussed with a
German naval advisor the details of a new naval strategy and armaments program for the
defence of the Straits. Ankara was more concerned about the defence of the Dardanelles than
the Bosphorous. The emphasis on the former reflected the primacy of the Italian threat in
determining Turkish strategy.582
Another new parameter in Turkish naval strategy was Greece’s significance as an ally.
With the Balkan Pact of 1934, Turkey had made regional allies in the Peninsula. None was
seen as strategically more crucial than Greece.583 As a result, keeping the sea lines of
communication in the Northern Aegean open became an important objective in Turkish naval
strategy.584 In compliance with the Turkish-Greek Naval Protocol of 1930, Ankara notified
Athens of its intention to increase its submarine fleet to 10 units from four. Athens, in return,
notified Ankara of its plans to order two new destroyers.585
The two capitals then made a joint request to London for financial assistance to acquire
new units against the Italian threat. However, their joint plea for British credit was not
received enthusiastically in London on two accounts. The lack of funds was a restraining
factor. London was still reluctant to spend even on its own naval programs. The British were
also the champions of worldwide disarmament. Viewed through the double prism of
Koçak, Türk-Alman İlişkileri…, 188-189.
PRO FO 371 20860 E2918/188/44 (14 May 1937).
584
PRO FO 371 17966 E6915/3652/44 (11 November 1934)
585
SHM, Carton 1BB7/169 Compte Rendu De Rensignements (Turquie) No. 4, (18 April
1934) and No. 6 (4 May 1934).
582
583
182
economics and disarmament, it would be difficult to justify financing the armament efforts of
two foreign countries. In sum, British skepticism was expressed thus: “the prospect of a race
between Italy and its nervous little neighbours conducted on borrowed money is a
nightmare.”586
In 1936, Turkish diplomacy secured substantial revision of the status of the Turkish
Straits, not by force or fait accompli but by negotiation. The Montreaux Convention on the
Turkish Straits was signed on 20 July, 1936. The Convention terminated the demilitarized
status of the Straits. Therefore, Turkey successfully achieved its number one priority in
foreign policy and security. The gap that had been caused in its defences by the demilitarized
status of the Straits had been filled. Now, Turkish attention was turned to acquiring military
and naval instruments for defence. In this venture, Ankara again relied on the services of
German naval officers, led by Admiral von Wülfing. The German naval advisors were asked
to provide an opinion on the requirements for the defence of the Dardanelles. In the light of
new requirements, a new naval program was to be launched.587
Aircraft retained its priority as a weapon in the defensive and offensive staff plans
against Italy. An interesting indicator of the Turkish military’s pursuit of offensive
capabilities was the acquisition of 36 Martin 139WT bomber aircraft from the United States.
Reportedly, these aircraft were ordered as they offered the range and payload required to
launch an air raid on mainland Italy from Turkish territory.588 For the defence of the Turkish
mainland opposite the Dodecanese Islands, Turkey was to rely on its air force supported by
mobile heavy artillery.589 According to British Admiralty assessments, the Turkish navy was
586
PRO FO 371 17964 E7047/2462/44 (23 November 1934)
Özgüldür, Türk-Alman İlişkileri…, 89.
588
Kaymaklı, Havacılık Tarihinde…, 224
589
The primacy of airpower was also challenged by the naval officers on the basis of costeffectiveness. The argument was that navy would provide better security than the air force for
the same initial and operating costs See Mithat Işın, “Deniz, Hava ve Kara Silahlarının
587
183
also tasked with launching offensive raids from the Dardanelles or the Bosphorous with the
cruisers included in the new naval program. These cruisers had to match the Italian eight-inch
gun cruisers and the Soviet 7.1-inch gun cruisers in firepower and speed.590
Similarly, submarines, another weapon of choice for the Turkish General Staff, were
among the first units to be ordered under the new naval program. Not surprisingly, the
Turkish naval contract for four submarines in June 1936 went to German builders. Although
the initial bid had been submitted by the Dutch Shipyard of I.v.S., the contract was signed
with German shipbuilders as Germany finally rid itself of the Versailles restriction on
submarine building. Under the contract, the first two boats were to be built in Germany and
the last two in Turkey.591
Certainly, this latest Turkish order was a consequence of German influence on the
Turkish navy. However, several other factors worked in Germany’s favour in this order.
German submarines were cheaper, for instance, than French submarines.592 Also, Germany
dominated Turkey’s economic relations after the 1933 Clearing Agreement. In particular,
German demand for Turkish chrome increased in line with the requirements of its four-year
armaments program. In a sense, the order for submarines offered Turkey a way to liquidate
the surplus of 45 million TL accrued from its trade with Germany.593 In 1936, the Turkish
navy made an unexpected acquisition of another I.v.S.-built submarine. The boat had
originally been ordered for Spain which was not able to acquire her due to the Civil War. The
Teşekkülleri İktisadi Bakımından Mukayese ve Tetkiki,“ Deniz Mecmuası 47(338) (October
1935): 832-839.
590
PRO FO 371/20865, E3007/528/44 (2 June 1937).
591
Metel, Türk Denizaltıcılık…, 58-75.
592
SHM, Carton 1BB2/91, Bulletin de Rensignements, No. 491 (1-15 April 1936): D-18.
593
Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy…, 146-154. Johannes Glasneck, Türkiye’de Faşist Alman
Propogandası, A. Gelen (trans.) (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, n.d.p.): 65.
184
submarine was therefore offered to the Turkish navy and commissioned as Gür in December
1936.594
According to an American assessment of Turkey’s international position after taking the
Straits under its control, Turkey had been very much drawn into the European picture and its
policy of being on friendly terms with everybody and tied to nobody had received several
dents. The change was partly due to the European crisis, but some of it was the price Turkey
was paying for raising the questions of the Straits and the Sanjak. As a result, British
influence over Turkey was getting stronger. The report cited the visit of the Turkish fleet to
Malta as an indication of this development.595
The Americans clearly had a point in linking the Turkish naval visit to its changing
international position. After 1936, London displayed a more positive approach to Turkey as a
status quo country. The change in British policy towards Turkey can also be understood in
the context of a general change in the strategy of British foreign policy. After 1932, the
foreign office bureaucracy tried to steer politicians in the direction of “old diplomacy” whose
principal aim was to maintain a balance in continental Europe, in the Mediterranean and in the
Far East. After the War, as the constellation of enemies that could threaten the Empire
changed, so did the identity of potential allies and friends to protect the same. According to
McKercher,
“Like the ‘Victorians’ before them, the interwar ‘Edwardians’ did not see a balance
existing only in continental Europe. Rather, they saw several balances in those areas of
globe judged vital to British and Imperial security. Though they gave expression to these
multiple balances in terms of questions needing answers – the ‘Mediterranean question’,
the ‘Chinese question’, and so on – they approached the issue of national security as one
of meeting specific threats in particular parts of the world. Grand strategy thus entailed
pursuing foreign and defence policies that considered a series of interlocking questions
on a global scale.”596
Metel, Türk Denizaltıcılık…, 56-57.
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul, (10 March 1937).
596
McKercher, “Old Diplomacy and New…,” 84.
594
595
185
Therefore, by 1932, civilian and military bureaucracy in Britain began to put pressure on
the government to increase defence spending to meet emerging German and Japanese threats.
The Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC) set up under the Committee of Imperial
Defence (CID) came up with specific recommendations to bring British defences up to
strength by 1939, the year the DRC identified as the one when war was most probable. The
Sub-Committee recommendations were geared mainly towards making up for deficiencies
and delays in the existing programs as a result of anticipation of a certain degree of success in
international disarmament efforts. More importantly, the DRC’s work culminated in a new
strategy for British foreign policy which remained in effect until Neville Chamberlain’s
Premiership. This new strategy identified Germany as the “ultimate potential enemy” of
Britain. Its immediate objective was to buy time by making the best possible use of political
means to maintain a global equilibrium until British defences were brought up to strength.597
The new British mood was also reflected in Anglo-Turkish naval relations that
culminated in the first overseas visit to Malta in November 1936.598 Although London tried
to downplay the political significance of this unprecedented Turkish naval visit, Ankara’s
intention was give a clear political message by dispatching to Malta all frontline units of the
navy.599 Beyond its symbolic significance, the Malta visit pronounced the increasing
openness of the Turkish military and naval forces to Britain. Normally at best reserved
towards foreigners, the Turks were surprisingly accommodating to the British and allowed
them to board and examine, in particular, two Turbine class destroyers, Zafer and Tinaztepe,
McKercher, “Old Diplomacy and New…,” 110-112.
Fahri Çoker, Bahriyemizin Yakın Tarihinden Kesitler, (İstanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 1996):
132-157.
599
PRO FO 371 20029 E5702/1373/44 (9 September 1936).
597
598
186
built in Italy.600 The Italian-built destroyers of the visiting Turkish squadron were of great
interest to British naval intelligence since the Italian navy included destroyers of the same
class. This new policy of openness to the British stood in stark contrast to the earlier reserved
attitude of Turkish naval authorities towards similar demands. For instance, back in1933, the
Fleet Commander had denied the request of high-ranking Soviet military visitors to visit the
battlecruiser Yavuz and have a look inside one of her main turrets.601
After the first visit to foreign ports in 1936, Ankara seemed intent on continuing its
naval activism. For instance, in July 1937, the government decided to send Turkish naval
units to make port calls in Italy, Yugoslavia, Romania and the Soviet Union. The fleet would
be divided into two groups, one to cruise in the Mediterranean and the other in the Black Sea.
The planned visits would strain the naval budget as the Ministry of Finance had faced
difficulties in gathering the requisite funds for these two simultaneous tours.602 Very shortly,
in fact, the government reversed its decision and cancelled visits to Italian and Yugoslav ports
in the Mediterranean and the Romanian and the Soviet ports in the Black Sea.603
A quick succession of events had rendered such naval visits risky ventures in the
submarine infested waters of the Mediterranean. Pirate submarine activity in the
Mediterranean during the Spanish Civil War propelled Ankara more towards Britain and even
France. Spanish vessels had, at best, been rare sights in Turkish waters before the Civil War.
600
Interview with Captain Bargut, (13 April 2001). Captain Bargut served as the
communications officer on board Zafer during the Turkish fleet’s Malta visit in 1936. For
these destroyers see, Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II (New York: Crescent Books,
1998): 250-253; Cem Gürdeniz (ed.), Cumhuriyet Donanması- Fleet of the Republic: 19232000 (İstanbul: Seyir Hidrografi ve Oşinografi Daire Başkanlığı, 2000): 21.
601
Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu I…, 327
602
BCA 77.66.11 “Government Decree,” (19 July 1937),.
603
BCA 48.307.20 Başvekalet [Prime Ministy] to Milli Müdafaa Vekaleti [Ministry of
National Defence], (13 August 1937),.
187
They began to make their appearances in Turkish ports after 1936.604 Less than a year later,
in 1937 an unidentified submarine managed to sneak into the Straits and torpedo two Spanish
vessels. After the attacks, the Council of Ministers held an extraordinary meeting at
Dolmabahçe Palace on 24 August, 1937. Chief of Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak and
Fleet Commander Admiral Şükrü Okan also attended the meeting. The meeting culminated in
two decisions. First, the military/naval authorities were asked to establish whether the attack
had taken place within Turkish territorial waters. Secondly, diplomatic notes were to be
delivered to the League of Nations, to the foreign missions in Turkey and finally to the NonIntervention Committee describing the incident and advising the rules of engagement with
unidentified submarines in Turkish territorial.605
Two weeks later, the Government adopted a number of additional decisions and tougher
measures regarding unidentified submarine activities in and around Turkish territorial waters.
The Government instructed the General Staff and the Fleet Command to attack and destroy, as
a rule, any unauthorized submarines that might be detected in the Sea of Marmara if they
failed to comply with calls to surrender. The fleet was instructed to heighten its state of
alertness and readiness for a surprise attack. The Customs Ministry’s boats were to be placed
at the disposal of the General Staff for anti-submarine patrols. In addition to the above, the
General Staff seem to have suggested laying nets across the Straits. However, this suggestion
was not adopted by the Government on the grounds that it might be construed as declaration
of war, which the current situation did not warrant.606
Reports of unidentified submarine activity continued to pour in. Periscopes of
unidentified submarines were spotted several times in the Sea of Marmara in the summer of
604
Among the first to have noticed the Spanish vessels in the port of Istanbul were German
naval instructors of the Naval War Academy. Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının
Kuruluşu I…, 383.
605
BCA 78.77.14 “Government Decree No. 7344,” (24 August 1934)..
606
BCA 78.77.15 “Government Decree No. 7345,” (9 September 1937),.
188
1937. Shore-based observers reported submarine activity, once off Gallipoli and once off
Darıca respectively. A third encounter was reported by the commanding officer of protected
cruiser Hamidiye off the Prince’s Islands. The second and third sightings indicated
unidentified submarine activity within the Sea of Marmara and indicated poor performance of
Turkish submarine defences. Subsequently, Turkish navy submarine chasers and destroyers
of were put on patrol in the Marmara Sea to hunt for submarines. On one such patrol, a
submarine chaser claimed to have sighted a periscope and dropped depth charges in pursuit
off Gallipoli.607
It soon became embarrassingly evident to Ankara that the Turkish navy did not have the
necessary means to defend even Turkey’s own territorial waters against the submarine
menace.608 Meanwhile, the Turkish government agreed to cooperate with other
Mediterranean powers against pirate submarine activity. However, the extent of this
cooperation became a divisive issue in the government. During the Nyon Conference in
September1937, the Turkish leaders had sharply divided opinions on the scope and mode of
Turkish participation in the campaign against pirate submarine activity. President Atatürk
favoured a closer cooperation with Britain and France than İnönü was ready to accept. Chief
of Staff Field Marshal Çakmak endorsed İnönü’s position on this issue. Atatürk and İnönü
assessed the risks associated with such cooperation differently.609
President Atatürk gave serious and thorough consideration to responding positively to
the British request for a Turkish destroyer to patrol with the British fleet in the Eastern
Mediterranean. He even discussed the issue with the Fleet Commander in İzmit. For him,
naval cooperation with Britain and France would be a beneficial policy even though they
Büyüktuğrul, Cumhuriyet Donanmasının Kuruluşu I…, 393.
Brock Millman, The Ill-Made Alliance: Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1934-1940 (Montreal:
McGill-Queens University, 1998): 92-93.
See Hasan Rıza Soyak, Atatürk’ten Hatıralar, Vol. II (n.p.p.: Yapı Kredi Bankası
Yayınları, 1973): 657-682
607
608
189
might run the risk of losing one or two destroyers in the Mediterranean. Such cooperation
was likely to be rewarded by British and French support against Italy.610 Disagreement on
this matter cost İnönü his premiership. However, in the end the guarded approach İnönü and
Field Marshal Çakmak represented prevailed. In practice, Turkish contribution to the joint
naval activity in the Mediterranean remained modest and did not include commitments
beyond Turkish territorial waters.611 The Turkish port of Alaçatı (near İzmir) was designated
as a supply and relief port for British and French fleets. A Turkish naval officer, Lieutenant
Commander Safiyetin Dagada, who subsequently served as the head of the Commission, was
appointed to the International Commission at Gibraltar as Turkey’s official representative.612
The termination of the Nyon arrangement also marked the end of Turkish openness
towards the British. After a brief period of openness with the British, the Turkish military
reverted to their reserved attitude as soon as the crisis in the Mediterranean ceased to be
vital.613 Another explanation of the return to a reserved Turkish attitude may lie in London’s
unrelenting efforts to keep Italy on its side for the sake of continental European power balance
at the expense of Mediterranean security. It also reflected a choice on the issue of Turkey’s
multilateral solutions to regional problems. In May 1936, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras had
proposed that France present to the League of Nations its project for a Mediterranean pact of
mutual assistance for July 1936.614 Britain again avoided convening the League for a
discussion of the French project. In the meantime, the situation in the Mediterranean took a
very dramatic turn which resulted in the Nyon arrangement.
Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivleri, AIV-6, D-54, F102-63 (12 September 1937); Metel, Atatürk
ve Donanma…, 150-151; Büyüktuğrul, Büyük Atamız…, 161.
611
The naval policy advocated by President Atatürk during the Nyon Conference might be
taken as a sign of consistency in his thinking. A British diplomatic document quoted him to
as having said earlier: “Turkey would do her best to stay out of any future war, but if she did
have to go to it would be on the side which held the command of the sea.” PRO FO 371
16987 E6297/6297/44 (21 October 1933).
612
BCA 73.23.19 “Government Decree No. 6254,” (25 March 1937).
613
PRO FO 371/20861, E1578/315/44, Minute, (12 March 1937).
614
Spasov, “Le Projets d’un Pacte…,” 18.
610
190
Later the French government sent a memorandum to London proposing a Mediterranean
pact of mutual assistance which would include the Mediterranean as well as the Black Sea
countries.615 The French administration believed that such a pact would guarantee the security
of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. But the British administration did not agree with the
French. In October, British Foreign Office Under-Secretary R. Sergeant said to French Foreign
Ministry Chargé d’Affaires R. Cambon that the security of the three Balkan countries could be
disregarded if there was a possibility of settling British-Italian relations tête à tête.616
British behaviour in the Mediterranean reveals the main difference at this time between
middle power states and the great powers. While the former stressed the importance of
multilateral solutions to international problems, the latter preferred bilateral ones. For London,
it was more of a priority to be on good terms with Italy in the Mediterranean than to be
involved in regional cooperation as, in this way; it could prevent Italy from getting closer to
Germany. But Ankara aimed to preclude this kind of bilateral relation. It had not yet given up
hope of forming a Mediterranean pact. At the first stage, Turkey made all the necessary efforts
to persuade its neighbours and partners in the Balkan Entente. In October 1936, İnönü and Aras
had talks with Yugoslav Prime Minister Stojadinovic in order to persuade him to work for a
Mediterranean pact. In April 1937, the Turkish government repeated to Belgrade its desire to
see the formation of such a pact. Turkey had already been frustrated by the reluctance of its
neighbours.617
This frustration prompted did Ankara to seek accommodation with the great powers,
including Italy. After the Montreux Conference, Turkish diplomacy sought ways to secure
Spasov, “Le Projets d’un Pacte…,” 18. The proposition was made after the suspension of
guarantees given by Britain to Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia and the cancellation of
economic sanctions against Italy.
616
Spasov, “Le Projets d’un Pacte…,” 16. In January 1937, London signed a “Gentlemen’s
Agreement” with Italy. By this agreement, Britain accepted that the Mediterranean was of
vital interest to Italy. John F. Coverdale, Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975): 200.
617
In January and March 1937, Belgrade respectively signed pacts with Sofia and Rome.
615
191
Italian endorsement of the new regime of the Turkish Straits. Foreign diplomatic papers give
the impression that Ankara and Rome might have established a tacit link between the Straits
and the Abyssinian issues. The latter issue had eventually presented Turkey with a dilemma
regarding the fate of its diplomatic mission in Addis Ababa. Maintaining a Turkish diplomatic
mission there could add tension to the already strained Italian-Turkish relations. Withdrawing
the mission would mean lending legitimacy to the Italian annexation. Ankara was helped by
the “illness” of the Turkish Chargè d’Affaires in that country.
In September 1936, the news was leaked that Ankara would recall the head of its
diplomatic mission for reasons of health and ask the British to undertake the protection of
Turkish nationals and Turkish interests in Abyssinia. Reportedly, Tevfik Rüştü Aras knew that
the Italians would certainly be satisfied with this turn of events. At any rate, if genuine, the
Turkish Chargè D’Affaires’ poor health was a blessing in disguise as it allowed Turkey to
justify the closure of its diplomatic mission on non-political grounds. Moreover, Ankara’s
request to Britain to protect its nationals and interests in Abyssinia “removed the
embarrassment of asking the Italians for an exequatur to establish a consular mission.”618
In an American diplomatic dispatch of May 1937, reportedly Count Ciano commented
that, in a conversation Turkish Foreign Minister Aras undertook to support at Geneva Italy’s
claim to recognition of the annexation of Abyssinia, although Ciano was less clear as to what
Italy would or would not do with respect to the Montreux Convention. In fact, when the
Italian conquest had become clear, Turkey withdrew its diplomatic mission to Addis-Ababa.
In analyzing the Turkish diplomacy of the time towards Italy, MacMurray wrote that the
underlying distrust was barely concealed by a discreet and realistic diplomacy.619
The year 1937 was a decisive one in many respects. In that year, Italy, having abandoned
the League of Nations and signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, increased its solidarity with
618
619
Barros, Britain, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions…, 210
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL I, Istanbul, (19 May 1937).
192
Germany and Japan.620 As international divisions became more clear-cut, Ankara gradually
reoriented its foreign policy towards Britain, the principal status quo power. Anglo-Turkish
rapprochement came about due to Turkey’s strategic value for Britain, not only in the Eastern
Mediterranean but also in the Balkans. According to the Admiralty, Turkey could serve as a
bulwark against Italian action and ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean.
In the Balkans, keeping Turkey out of the German orbit was crucial in preventing “the
domino effect” which could result in German control of the Peninsula. The Admiralty
suggested that Britain should not allow German domination of Turkish foreign trade to turn
into political influence in Turkey.621 In 1937, the Turkish General Staff hired Royal Air Force
instructors to set up the AirForce War College. This was a clear challenge to the German
instructors’ domination in Turkish staff training in place since 1926.622
The impact of rapprochement was more salient in naval matters. In 1937, Ankara
decided to become a party to naval disarmament treaties, probably to enhance its status quo
credentials. Anglo-Turkish discussions to this end revealed the contours of the Turkish naval
expansion plans to the British. The discussions centered on the Turkish intention to build two
cruisers (8,000 or 10,000-ton) with eight-inch guns. By including such cruisers under its new
naval building program, Turkey risked involvement in “the cruiser controversy,” an issue that
Felix Gilbert, “Ciano and his Ambassadors,” in,The Diplomats 1919-1939, Gordon A.
Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), (Princeton: Princeton University, 1994): 529.
621
PRO FO 371/20072, E269/26/44 (13 January 1936).
622
ir Vice-Marshal Arthur S. Gould Lee, Special Duties: Reminiscences of a Royal Air Force
Staff Officer in the Balkans, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Sampson Low, [1946]): 810. See also Gary Leiser “The Turkish Air Force, 1939-1945: the Rise of a Minor Power,
Middle Eastern Studies 26/3 (July 1990): 383-395. It should be added that the Turkish
General Staff had approached the German Air Force for assistance before it turned to Britain.
However, Herman Göering did not respond favourably to the Turkish request, as Germany
could not afford to spare precious resources for purposes other than the quick revival of
German air power. Glasneck, Türkiye’de Faşist Alman…, 78.
620
193
undermined the entire naval disarmament process and became a major preoccupation for
Britain.623
The origins of “the cruiser controversy” can be traced as far back as February 1925
when the Admiralty came up with an outline disarmament proposal that called for revision of
the cruiser classification and limitations agreed upon at Washington. Indeed, it was Britain
who strongly advocated limits of 10,000 tons displacement and eight-inch gun caliber
dimensions for cruisers. The cruisers that were built to these limitations were called “the
Washington cruisers,” or “Washington standard type.” London argued subsequently that a
distinction had to be made between the Washington standard types and smaller, less powerful
cruisers armed with 6-inch-guns.624 In a similar frame of mind, British naval experts tried to
dissuade their Turkish counterparts from building Washington Standard type cruisers under
the new Turkish naval program on the grounds of the cost of building and maintenance.625
Ernest Andrade Jr., “The Cruiser Controversy in Naval Limitations Negotiations, 19221936,” Military Affairs 48/3 (July 1984): 113-120; Richard W. Fanning, Peace and
Disarmament: Naval Rivalry and Arms Control, 1922-1933 (Lexington: The University Press
of Kentucky, 1995): 155.
624
Dick Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s, (London:
Pinter Publishers, 1989): 104-105 and 127-128. In the post-Washington Treaty naval
negotiations, the British position revolved around the classification of cruisers. In British
naval understanding, “Washington standard types,” armed with eight-inch guns, constituted
an offensive class of cruisers while the six-inch gun cruisers were, for all intents and
purposes, of a defensive type. In support of this proposed distinction between offensive and
defensive types, British naval experts argued that an eight-inch gun provided an offensive
quality that was two-and-a-half times that of a six-inch-gun. Indeed, for the British, cruisers
lighter than 10,000 tons and armed with six-inch-guns were ideal weapons for trade defence
and the protection of imperial communications since they were cheaper to build and maintain
than the Washington standard types. Affordability was an important consideration as Britain
needed a large number of such cruisers for its imperial requirements. On the other hand, the
United States was contemplating an extensive building program involving eight-inch-gun
cruisers. For the British, such a building program presented the risk of rendering their sixinch-gun cruisers obsolete and resulting in a deterioration of British naval strength relative to
that of the United States. Richardson argues that “in reality, the whole British case had
devolved from the intention of the Sea Lords to control the size of cruisers in an attempt to
improve Britain’s maritime position.”
625
However, cost estimates showed that an 8,000-ton eight-inch-gun cruiser required an extra
445,000 pounds sterling to build and 29,000 pounds sterling more every year to maintain
than a 6,000 ton six-inch gun cruiser. Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament…, 172-173.
623
194
Other details of the new Turkish naval strategy and program also emerged from the
discussions. In the new naval strategy, coastal defence retained its priority. The navy was
tasked with (a) keeping coastwise communication from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean
open; (b) cooperating with other services in preventing enemy landings from the Aegean
islands; (c) making tip-and-run raids on enemy shipping. To perform these tasks, the Turkish
navy would need two 10,000-ton cruisers mounted with eight-inch or bigger guns compatible
with a speed of 35-knots. Speed was an essential requirement for the task of preventing
enemy landings. In addition, the fleet would consist of eight destroyers and 20
submarines.626
Early in 1938, British Ambassador Percy Lorraine was convinced that Turkey was
planning to seek British assistance in completing its naval and air armament programs.627
Subsequently, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras officially notified the British Embassy of its
requirements under the second ten-year naval program of the Republic in February 1938.
This program devised by the Turkish General Staff called for two ships (cruisers) of 10,000
tons, 12 destroyers of 1,200 tons and 30 submarines (15 coastal type and 15 medium type).
This fleet would be divided into two groups, each with one cruiser, four destroyers and 12
submarines. Four destroyers and six submarines would be kept in reserve or undergoing
maintenance. One group would be assigned to the Mediterranean and the other to the Black
Sea.
The cruisers were indispensable elements as recent war games at the War Academy
clearly demonstrated the need for them. The first cruiser was to be commissioned in 1942 and
the second one by 1945. The Yavuz would serve as a stopgap until the second cruiser was
626
PRO FO 371/20865, E1399/528/44 (4 March 1937).
PRO 371/21929 E1193/135/44 (16 February 1938). Ankara also sought to acquire new
units from Germany. Particularly due to the British reluctance, Turkey asked Germany to
build a 10,000-ton cruiser by 1942. However, Berlin turned down the Turkish request, as the
German shipbuilders were fully booked with the orders for the German Navy. Glasneck,
Türkiye’de Faşist Alman…, 73.
627
195
commissioned. The Turkish navy also expected to build a 23,000-ton ship between 1950 and
1960. Four destroyers and 10 submarines would be built urgently in Britain. Four more
destroyers would follow.628 Of course, Turkey would need credit on favourable terms to
launch its second ten-year naval program. In response to informal Turkish inquiries, London
hinted at its willingness to consider the Turkish naval building requirements, providing that
no urgent deliveries were asked for. Moreover, London would prefer Turkey to consider
8,000 ton cruisers with 6.1 inch guns in lieu of 10,000 ton cruisers.629
Within a month, Britain had agreed to provide a six million pound sterling credit for
Turkish armaments, including naval orders. The Admiralty viewed Turkish orders as of such
vital importance that it stated its willingness to accept even a reasonable delay in its own
armaments program.630 On the eve of the Second World War, Turkey was again able to find
affordably priced naval arms, this time from a politically satisfied great power in Europe.
CONCLUSION
Subsequent to its admission as a legitimate member to the League of Nations, between
1932 and 1937, Turkey, with its activist policies, exhibited typical middle power diplomatic
behaviour. Although typical middle power activism calls for an involvement in global issues
beyond their immediate concern, middle power status may come after a country first earns
regional prominence. On Turkey’s path to becoming a middle power, its regional initiatives in
628
PRO ADM 116/4198 M02082/38 (12 March 1938).
PRO ADM 116/4198 M02082/38 (12 March 1938).
630
PRO FO371/21918 E2274/67/44 (14 April 1938).
629
196
the Balkans played an important role.631 For Ankara, the Balkan Entente was meant to serve,
inter alia, as a step towards, or a building block for, a more comprehensive arrangement in the
form of a Mediterranean Pact. It was probably not a coincidence that Turkish Foreign
Minister Aras had talked for the first time about the Mediterranean project during the meeting
of the Balkan Entente in October 1934. To his way of thinking, this pact should include
France, Italy, the Balkan Entente and even the Soviet Union.
Turkish diplomatic leadership occasionally gave thought to, or at least voiced, policies
that would imply involvement in global issues. For such policies, Turkish diplomacy
enthusiastically hoped to rely on means of multilateral diplomacy, particularly within the
framework of the League of Nations. For instance, in 1934, Turkish Foreign Minister Aras
was so enthusiastic about Turkey’s election to the League Council that he said to an American
diplomat in Turkey that he would work for some sort of universal arrangement which the
United States could join, pointing out that the Kellogg Pact was not sufficiently strong to
accomplish its purpose.632
As the world was gradually drifting into yet another major conflict, Ankara was busy
contemplating ways to maintain international peace. In 1938, Turkish diplomats assumed that
Turkey could best contribute to peace in two ways: First, it should avoid any situation likely
to increase the tension between the opposing groups of major powers. Turkey was on its
guard against becoming involved in any ideological front or other alignment of powers. It was
not that the Turkish government had had no opportunities to identify its interests with those of
stronger countries – on the contrary, it had received offers and inducements from various
quarters- but the Turkish government was convinced that their aligning themselves with any
631
632
See Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy…
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 1, Ankara, (1 November 1934).
197
group of powers would tend inevitably to embroil them in the situation and create new
difficulties and dangers.633
Second of all, Turkey seized on any opportunity to exert a helpful influence in
reconciling any of the antagonisms existing in various parts of Europe. The Turkish Republic
had built up for itself a respect and prestige disproportionate to its rather meager material
resources. This was due to its scrupulous observance of obligations, its renunciation of
irredentism and its consistency in maintaining relations of good will and helpfulness with
other countries. Aras added that even though his country was one of the smaller powers, it
was actually in the position of being an influence for good.634
There is evidence to suggest that Turkish diplomats were aware that they were trying
something different in the 1930s. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that Turkish
statesmen or diplomats ever defined Turkey, at least openly, as being in an intermediate
category. Nevertheless, it was recognized as such, for instance, by the British diplomats who
identified Turkey as a “small great power.”635 Despite the Ottoman heritage, Turkish
diplomacy had no great power pretensions or an inflated view of their country. On the other
hand, they never shied away from asserting Turkey’s legal equality with others as a sovereign
state. Yet, they saw their interests as being more identifiable with those of the minor powers
in the international system. During a conversation with an American diplomat in 1934,
Turkish Foreign Minister Aras suggested that those who lost must learn how to adapt
themselves to the consequences of war- exactly as Turkey had done-because war was a
terrible experience.636
633
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 10, Ankara, (27 August 1938).
NARA RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 10, Ankara, (27 August 1938).
635
Dilek Barlas, “Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean: Opportunities
and Limits for Middle Power Activism in the 1930s,” Journal of Contemporary History 40/3,
(July 2005): 442.
636
NARA, RG 59 Microcopy T1245 ROLL 1, Ankara, (1 November 1934).
634
198
After 1937, there was not much room for middle power activism in Europe, the
Mediterranean, the Balkans or elsewhere. After Munich, the world began to resemble more
and more Mussolini’s Four-Pact ideal. It was a great –power- managed world order where
great powers compromised a minor power’s territorial integrity and existence without even
consulting the minor power in question. Hence, on the eve of the Second World War,
comparably placed states, Turkey’s natural partners, began to side with one or the other great
power. There were not so many of them in the Mediterranean where Turkey attempted to act
like a middle power by promoting multilateral arrangements for security. The Mediterranean
once again turned into a stage for great power rivalry, limiting the scope for initiatives by
others. In conclusion, the outbreak of war can be said to have prevented Turkey from
consolidating its status as a middle power. As such, it remained a middle power in the
making.
ANNEX 1:
Middle Powers of Europe for selected years according to the Yearbooks of International
Disarmament of the League of Nations.
Table 1 - 1927
199
Area
Population
Army
Aircraft
Navy (tons)
Hungary
92.928
8.364.653
35.103
n/a
n/a
Poland
388.279
29.249.000
290.000
n/a
2.812
Spain
511.985
22.444.000
113.434
600
117.100
Turkey
762.736
13.139.000
120.000
n/a
45.623
Yugoslavia
248.488
12.492.000
107.541
n/a
2.912
Area
Population
Army
Aircraft
Navy (tons)
Hungary
92.928
8.683.700
34.993
n/a
n/a
Poland
388.000
31.148.000
265.980
700
6.020
Spain
511.985
22.940.000
119.210
n/a
129.783
Turkey
762.736
13.648.000
140.000
n/a
44.466
Yugoslavia
249.000
13.931.000
112.610
568
13.570
Table 2 - 1932
Table 3 - 1936
Area
Population
Army
Aircraft
Navy (tons)
Hungary
92.928
8.949.000
35.026
n/a
n/a
Poland
388.000
33.823.000
266.005
700
6.091
Spain
511.985
24.849.000
117.092
208
136.341
200
Turkey
762.736
16.201.000
194.000
370
53.720
Yugoslavia
247.542
14.950.900
115.864
552
9.512
Area
Population
Army
Aircraft
Navy (tons)
Hungary
92.928
n/a
149.522
n/a
n/a
Poland
388.000
35.090.000
300.000
n/a
n/a
Spain
511.985
24.849.000
n/a
n/a
90.994
Turkey
762.736
16.158.000
194.000
370
63.948
Yugoslavia
247.542
15.630.000
134.128
484
16.057
Table 4 - 1939
201